discrimination Archives - The National Law Forum

Recent Scrutiny of English-Only Workplace Rules Comes into Focus During National Hispanic Heritage Month

National Hispanic Heritage Month is celebrated each year from September 15 to October 15 in recognition of the contributions of Hispanic and Latino people to the history, culture, and economy of the United States. During this time, several Latin American countries celebrate their independence days. Employers can also use this month as a reminder to remain compliant with anti-discrimination and anti-harassment laws.

Quick Hits

National Hispanic Heritage Month starts on September 15 and ends on October 15 each year in the United States.
Hispanic workers constitute approximately 19 percent of the U.S. labor force, or approximately 32 million people, and that proportion continues to rise. Foreign-born workers, of which Hispanics account for 47.6 percent, make up 18.6 percent of the U.S. civilian workforce.
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) reports that in 2023 just nineteen lawsuits alleging race or national origin discrimination cost employers $4.9 million.

Recent EEOC Cases

Employers usually have anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies to protect Hispanic/Latino employees and applicants from employment discrimination. However, protections from discrimination based on national origin—particularly, workplace policies prohibiting language discrimination—sometimes are overlooked by employers. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on national origin, and the EEOC considers an individual’s primary language “often an essential national origin characteristic.” (See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a).)

This means employers generally may not mandate that employees or applicants speak English. While employers may require English in certain employment situations, such as when speaking only English is needed to ensure safe and efficient communication for specific tasks, an English-only rule must be justified by business necessity and put in place for nondiscriminatory reasons. These situations will typically be specified, limited, and communicated to all employees in a language they understand. Recent cases show how this aspect of Title VII is being enforced.

On June 26, 2024, the EEOC announced a settlement with a housekeeping company that allegedly required its employees in California to speak only English at all times. As a result, the employer agreed to pay monetary damages to the complainant—a Spanish-speaking housekeeper who worked in a nursing home in Concord, California. Additionally, the employer agreed to provide training for its California employees and to revise its policies to clearly state that it would not restrict languages spoken by employees who didn’t perform patient care—and that employees had the right to speak their preferred languages in the workplace. The employer agreed to issue its policies in Spanish, English, and any other language spoken by 5 percent or more of the employer’s California workforce. The EEOC stressed that “[c]lient relations and customer preference do not justify discriminatory [English-only] policies.”

On March 29, 2023, the EEOC announced that a staffing firm based in Washington and Oregon had agreed to pay $276,000 to settle discrimination and retaliation claims. Allegedly, the employer had imposed a no-Spanish rule, which lacked adequate business justification, and then had fired five employees who opposed the rule and continued to speak Spanish in the workplace. The employer agreed to provide an anonymous complaint process for employees, update its policies to be in English and Spanish, perform its investigations promptly, and train its staff on the new anti-discrimination policies. The director of the EEOC’s Seattle field office warned employers that they “should think twice before imposing limitations on what languages are ‘allowed’ to be used at work.” She further warned that in the absence of “a legitimate business necessity, such policies [were] likely to discriminate against workers based on their national origin.”

A Growing Demographic

In 2023, there were 65.2 million Hispanic people in the United States, representing approximately 19.5 percent of the U.S. population. Hispanic workers make up 19 percent of the U.S. labor force, and those rates continue to grow, according to the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). By 2030, BLS projects Hispanic workers will constitute 21 percent of the U.S. labor force.

Looking Ahead

The EEOC is likely to scrutinize employers’ English-only rules and policies as potentially violative of Title VII, as national origin discrimination includes discrimination based on language, ancestry, place of origin, origin (ethnic) group, culture, and even accent. Employers may wish to review their hiring and onboarding policies and practices to ensure compliance with Title VII and avoid potential legal issues, as recent cases demonstrate the EEOC’s active enforcement of protections against national origin discrimination.

To mitigate the risk of costly litigation, employers may also want to consider implementing management training focused on ensuring managers understand that requiring English at all times may be considered discrimination on the basis of national origin.

In Rare Summer Opinion, Supreme Court Follows Sixth Circuit’s Lead

In Department of Education v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court issued a rare August opinion to maintain two preliminary injunctions that block the Department of Education’s new rule. That rule expands Title IX to prevent sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination. State coalitions brought challenges; district courts in Louisiana and Kentucky enjoined the rule during the litigation; the Fifth and Sixth Circuits denied the government’s requests to stay the injunctions, nor would the Supreme Court intercede for the government.

All the Justices agreed that aspects of the rule warranted interim relief, most centrally the “provision that newly defines sex discrimination” to include sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination. But because the district courts enjoined the entirety of the rule, the scope of relief proved divisive. A narrow majority agreed to leave the broad injunctions in place, while four Justices in dissent argued to sever the suspect aspects of the rule and allow the remainder of the rule to take effect. With emphasis on the “emergency posture,” the majority explained that the government had not carried its burden “on its severability argument.”

Justice Sotomayor’s dissent proposed limiting the injunctions to just the three challenged aspects of the rule. The dissent focused on the “traditional” limits on courts’ power to fashion “equitable remedies.” That Justice Gorsuch joined Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson should come as no surprise. Justice Gorsuch has harped on limiting equitable remedies to party-specific relief (e.g. Labrador v. Poe); cast doubt on severability doctrine (Barr v. AAPC (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part)); and, of course, authored the landmark Bostock v. Clayton County decision that interpreted Title VII to protect against sex discrimination in much the same way the Department wishes to interpret Title IX.

This decision is an unreliable forecast of the Court’s view of what Title IX sex discrimination encompasses. The Court unanimously agreed to table the debate over the Department’s new definition of sex discrimination while the lower courts proceed “with appropriate dispatch.” The case concerned the status of the rest of the rule as that litigation continues.

A truer tell on the merits is the Sixth Circuit panel’s order denying the government’s stay request. The panel found it “likely” “that the Rule’s definition of sex discrimination exceeds the Department’s authority.” Preliminarily at least, the court thought it unlikely that Title IX—last amended in 1972—addresses sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination. The Sixth Circuit has been reluctant “to export Title VII’s expansive meaning of sex discrimination to other settings”—and so it was here.

If “past is not always prologue,” still sometimes it is. The Sixth Circuit panel divided on the injunction’s scope just like the Supreme Court. Chief Judge Sutton and Judge Batchelder formed the majority, finding that the three “central provisions of the Rule . . . appear to touch every substantive provision.” Saddling school administrators with new regulatory requirements on the eve of the new schoolyear tipped the equities toward enjoining the full rule. Judge Mathis dissented because the injunction disturbed provisions of the rule “that Plaintiffs have not challenged.”

For now, the Department’s new rule yields to the old one. That rule, too, is being litigated in the Sixth Circuit because guidance documents say the Department will interpret Title IX the same way Bostock interpreted Title VII. See Tennessee v. Dep’t of Educ. and this coverage at the Notice & Comment blog. To close out with some Supreme Court trivia—this marks its first mid-summer opinion since Alabama Association of Realtors v. DHHS in 2021, where the Court ended the Biden Administration’s Covid-era moratorium on evictions. Before that may be the Court’s September 2012 decision Tennant v. Jefferson County Commission involving a challenge to West Virginia’s congressional districts.

Fourth Circuit Holds Firm Against Expansion of Religion-Based Defenses to Discrimination (US)

What happened in the interim that ended this beloved educator’s decorated teaching career? In 2014, shortly after North Carolina recognized same-sex marriage, Mr. Billard posted on his personal Facebook page that he and his partner of fourteen years were engaged to be married.

Lonnie Billard was a well-loved and decorated drama and English teacher at Charlotte Catholic High School (CCHS) in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. He was named Teacher of the Year in 2012 after serving the Catholic high school’s students for eleven years.

Two years later, CCHS told Mr. Billard he was not welcome back as a teacher.

CCHS has never denied why it fired Mr. Billard: his plans to marry violated the Mecklenburg Diocese’s policy against teachers engaging in conduct contrary to the moral teachings of the Catholic faith. Mr. Billard filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging sex discrimination in employment. The EEOC issued a notice of right to sue. Mr. Billard sued in federal court. He won and was awarded stipulated damages.

If that were the end of the story, although a frustrating one for Mr. Billard and his husband, the case would hardly be newsworthy. Why the case warrants attention is the defense that CCHS did not assert, and why.

The ‘Ministerial Exception’

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, a judicially crafted concept known as the “ministerial exception” emerged among federal appellate courts: Religious institutions may discriminate in their treatment of certain employees, notwithstanding Title VII, provided that the employee plays a vital ministerial employment role or is involved in ecclesiastical matters. Indeed, ministerial exception is a misnomer because the exception is not limited to those employees holding titles of independent religious significance (e.g., priest, pastor, rabbi, imam), but also applies to employees holding important positions within churches and other religious institutions. The Supreme Court recognized the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012). Although the Court refused to answer directly the question of who is and is not a minister, it found on the facts of the case before it that a “called teacher” with the title of “Minister of Religion, Commissioned” fit the bill.

Hosanna-Tabor was binding law when Mr. Billard filed suit in 2017. CCHS’s obvious defense to Mr. Billard’s allegations of sex discrimination was that he, as a Catholic school teacher engaged to teach his students in accordance with diocesan mission, fell within the ministerial exception, but in an unusual turn of events, CCHS waived this argument. In fact, CCHS stipulated with Mr. Billard that it would not argue that his job duties qualified him for the ministerial exception. Why? CCHS claims that it waived the ministerial exception defense because it wanted to avoid the burden of discovery around the issue of whether Mr. Billard’s role was sufficiently ministerial. (More on that below.) Since CCHS waived the best defense available to it and unequivocally admitted why it fired Mr. Billard, it’s no wonder he prevailed.

The Appeal

On appeal, CCHS propounded four affirmative defenses it had advanced without success at the trial court level – none of which included the ministerial exception. First, CCHS asserted two First Amendment-based defenses: the “church autonomy” doctrine and freedom of association. The trial and appellate courts quickly disposed of both theories, concluding that CCHS’s “church autonomy” argument was another way of trying to dress up the ministerial exception and, as to freedom of association, the courts found “no precedent for privileging a right of expressive association over anti-discrimination laws.” CCHS also asserted a statutory defense under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), but the courts made quick work of this too, finding that the RFRA does not apply to suits between private parties.

But CCHS’s fourth and final argument, and by far its most controversial, was that the trial court should have exonerated it under Title VII’s religious exemption. This notion, which is different than the First Amendment-inspired ministerial exception and derives from the plain text of Title VII, exempts certain religious organizations from Title VII’s non-discrimination strictures “with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). For instance, a Baptist church may favor hiring a Baptist minister or liturgical worship leader over a Methodist or Lutheran candidate, regardless of their respective qualifications. But the religious exemption has only ever been applied as a defense to claims of religious discrimination. Seeking to overturn decades of precedent, CCHS argued in Billard for an unprecedented expansion of the exemption, one that would permit religious organizations to discriminate even on the basis of sex, race or national origin as long as religious belief motivated the employment decision. At oral argument before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, CCHS conceded that its proffered interpretation of the religious exemption would permit discrimination against not only the relatively small number of employees of religious institutions with a claim to ministerial status, but also the hundreds of thousands of groundskeepers, custodians, bus drivers, musicians and administrative personnel that work for such institutions but whose duties are non-ecclesiastical.

An interpretation like that for which CCHS called would seriously erode protections against discrimination. For instance, under CCHS’s interpretation of the religious exemption, if a religious employer asserted as a principle of its faith that women should not work outside the home, it should be permitted to discriminate on the basis of sex. Likewise, under CCHS’s reading of the exemption, a religious employer asserting a faith-based reason for preferring one race over another would be exempt from Title VII consequences. And, to close the loop, if a religious employer held as a religious tenet that being gay or marrying one’s gay partner was a moral lapse, then it should be permitted to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.

The Fourth Circuit balked at CCHS’s statutorily ungrounded argument for an expansion of the religious employer exemption. The text of Title VII is ambiguous and exempts religious organizations “with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion”; it does not protect discrimination against individuals because of religion. The appellate court was also unimpressed by CCHS’s attempt to force a determination on these grounds by earlier waiving the ministerial exception. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit set aside the parties’ waiver and found sua sponte (meaning on the Court’s own initiative), that CCHS was not liable for discrimination for terminating Mr. Billard because he was, notwithstanding his secular teaching subjects, “a messenger of CCHS’s faith.”

The Fourth Circuit explained that it was constrained to reach this outcome based on developing jurisprudence interpreting the ministerial exception. In the years since Mr. Billard filed suit, the Supreme Court expanded on Hosanna Tabor in Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, finding in 2020 that two secular subject teachers at religious schools were nonetheless ministers within the ministerial exception as they were entrusted with educating and forming students in the school’s faith. (Notably, CCHS was represented by The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty. The Becket Fund was also lead counsel in Our Lady of Guadalupe, a fact which raises a few questions about the plausibility of CCHS’s explanation for waiving the ministerial exception. The Becket Fund claims to be a “leader[ ] in the fight for religious liberty … at home and abroad,” and has fought against COVID-19 mandates, contraception care and LGBT and unmarried parent foster and adoption rights.)

The appellate court’s decision undoubtedly provides little comfort to Mr. Billard, who is now spending his retirement with his husband whom he married in May 2015. But even though the Fourth Circuit reversed judgment in his favor and instructed the trial court to enter judgment in CCHS’s favor on the grounds that the ministerial exception protected the school, it at least rejected CCHS’s request for unfettered license to discriminate on any basis so long as it articulated a faith-based motive for doing so. As CCHS proved victorious and therefore lacks grounds to appeal to the Supreme Court, for now, religious employers remain insulated from civil interference with decisions about the appointment and removal of persons in positions of theological significance—even high school drama teachers—but may not use purported religious beliefs to justify discrimination on other grounds.

Chamber of Commerce Challenges CFPB Anti-Bias Focus Concerning AI

The end of last month the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Bankers Association and other industry groups (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed suit in Texas federal court challenging the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (“CFPB”) update this year to the Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or Practices section of its examination manual to include discrimination. Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, et al., Case No. 6:22-cv-00381 (E.D. Tex.)

By way of background, the Consumer Financial Protection Act, which is Title X of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act (the “Act”), prohibits providers of consumer financial products or services or a service provider from engaging in any unfair, deceptive or abusive act or practice (“UDAAP”). The Act also provides the CFPB with rulemaking and enforcement authority to “prevent unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in connection with any transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the offering of a consumer financial product or service.” See, e.g., https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_unfair-deceptive-abusive-acts-practices-udaaps_procedures.pdf. In general, the Act provides that an act or practice is unfair when it causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers, which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers, and the injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.

The CFPB earlier this spring published revised examination guidelines on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices, or UDAAPs. Importantly, this set forth a new position from the CFPB, that discrimination in the provision of consumer financial products and services can itself be a UDAAP. This was a development that was surprising to many providers of financial products and services. The CFPB also released an updated exam manual that outlined its position regarding how discriminatory conduct may qualify as a UDAAP in consumer finance. Additionally, the CFPB in May 2022 additionally published a Consumer Financial Protection Circular to remind the public of creditors’ adverse action notice requirements under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”). In the view of the CFPB, creditors cannot use technologies (include algorithmic decision making) if it means they are unable to provide required explanations under the ECOA.

In July 2022, the Chamber and others called on the CFPB to rescind the update to the manual. This included, among other arguments raised in a white paper supporting their position, that in conflating the concepts of “unfairness” and “discrimination,” the CFPB ignores the Act’s text, structure, and legislative history which discusses “unfairness” and “discrimination” as two separate concepts and defines “unfairness” without mentioning discrimination

The Complaint filed this fall raises three claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) in relation to the updated manual as well as others. The Complaint contends that ultimately it is consumers that will suffer as a result of the CFPB’s new position, as “[t]hese amendments to the manual harm Plaintiffs’ members by imposing heavy compliance costs that are ultimately passed down to consumers in the form of higher prices and reduced access to products.”

The litigation process started by Plaintiffs in this case will be time consuming (a response to the Complaint is not expected from Defendants until December). In the meantime, entities in the financial sector should be cognizant of the CFPB’s new approach and ensure that their compliance practices appropriately mitigate risk, including in relation to algorithmic decision making and AI. As always, we will keep you up to date with the latest news on this litigation.

For more Consumer Finance Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review

L.A. Jury Delivers Mother of All Verdicts – $464 Million to Two Employees!

As we have previously reported, jury verdicts in employment cases have continued to skyrocket in recent months, and there is no sign they are leveling off. Late last week, a Los Angeles Superior Court jury awarded a total of over $464 million ($440 million of which was in punitive damages) in a two-plaintiff retaliation case. This verdict is more than double any previous amount ever awarded and clearly qualifies as the largest verdict of its kind since the Fall of the Roman Empire.

The plaintiffs alleged they were retaliated against for making complaints about sexual and racial harassment in the workplace, directed at them and other coworkers, leading to their being pushed out of the company.

One plaintiff brought complaints to management about the alleged sexual harassment of two female employees and claimed he was constructively discharged after being subjected to retaliatory complaints and investigations from other supervisors. The other plaintiff made anonymous complaints to the internal ethics hotline about the racial and sexual harassment of both himself and other coworkers.

After a two-month trial, the jury awarded one plaintiff $22.4 million in compensatory damages and $400 million in punitive damages and awarded the other plaintiff $2 million in compensatory damages and $40 million in punitive damages.

This latest verdict comes on the heels of a judge reducing another huge December 2021 verdict from a Los Angeles Superior Court jury (which we wrote about here) that awarded $5.4 million in compensatory damages and $150 million in punitive damages to a fired insurance company executive who alleged discrimination and retaliation. The judge ordered a reduction in the verdict to $18.95 million in punitive damages (or, in the alternative, a new damages trial) on the grounds that the prior verdict involved an impermissible double recovery ($75 million each from two Farmers Insurance entities) and a presumably unconstitutional ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages (a ratio exceeding 9 or 10-to-1 is presumed to be excessive and unconstitutional, and the ratio, in that case, was 28-to-1).

Only time will tell if this $464 million verdict stands. In the meantime, our advice to employers worried about these gargantuan verdicts remains the same: ARBITRATE!

Article By Anthony J Oncidi and Morgan J. Peterson of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more labor and employment news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

The X Box: EEOC Announces Addition of Nonbinary Gender Option to Discrimination Charge

In recognition of Transgender Day of Visibility, today, the EEOC announced that it would be providing members of the LGBTQI+ community the option to select a nonbinary “X” gender marker when completing the voluntary self-identification questions that are traditionally part of the intake process for filing a charge of discrimination.

Specifically, in an effort to promote greater equity and inclusion, the EEOC will add an option to mark “X” during two stages of the intake and charge filing process. This addition will be reflected in the EEOC’s voluntary demographic questions relating to gender in the online public portal, which individuals use to submit inquires regarding the filing of a charge of discrimination, as well as related forms that are used in lieu of the online public portal. The nonbinary “X” gender marker will also be included in the EEOC’s modified charge of discrimination form, which will also include “Mx” in the list of prefix options.

Additionally, the EEOC will incorporate the CDC and NCHS’s proposed definition of “X,” which provides as follows: (1) “unspecified,” which promotes privacy for individuals who prefer not to disclose their gender identity; and (2) “another gender identity,” which promotes clarity and inclusion for those who wish to signify that they do not identify as male or female.

The EEOC’s announcement came shortly after the White House released a detailed Fact Sheet highlighting the steps the federal government has taken to address equality and visibility for Transgender Americans.

Article By Aretta K. Bernard and Stephanie Olivera Mittica of Roetzel & Andress LPA

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Regulation by Definition: CFPB Broadens Definition of “Unfairness” to Rein in Discrimination

In a significant move, the CFPB announced on March 16 a revision to its supervisory operations to address discrimination outside of the traditional fair lending context, with future plans to scrutinize discriminatory conduct that violates the federal prohibition against “unfair” practices in such areas as advertising, pricing, and other areas to ensure that companies are appropriately testing for and eliminating illegal discrimination. Specifically, the CFPB updated its Exam Manual for Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or Practices (UDAAPs) noting that discrimination may meet the criteria for “unfairness” by causing substantial harm to consumers that they cannot reasonably avoid.

With this update, the CFPB intends to target discriminatory practices beyond its use of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) – a fair lending law which covers extensions of credit – and plans to also enforce the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), which prohibits UDAAPs in connection with any transaction for, or offer of, a consumer financial product or service. To that end, future examinations will focus on policies or practices that, for example, exclude individuals from products and services, such as “not allowing African-American consumers to open deposit accounts, or subjecting African-American consumers to different requirements to open deposit accounts” that may be an unfair practice where the ECOA may not apply to this particular situation.

The CFPB notes that, among other things, examinations will (i) focus on discrimination in all consumer finance markets; (ii) require supervised companies to include documentation of customer demographics and the impact of products and fees on different demographic groups; and (iii) look at how companies test and monitor their decision-making processes for unfair discrimination, as well as discrimination under ECOA.

In a statement accompanying this announcement, CFPB Director Chopra stated that “[w]hen a person is denied access to a bank account because of their religion or race, this is unambiguously unfair . . . [w]e will be expanding our anti-discrimination efforts to combat discriminatory practices across the board in consumer finance.”

Putting it Into Practice: This announcement expands the CFPB’s examination footprint beyond discrimination in the fair lending context and makes it likely that examiners will assess a company’s anti-discrimination programs as applied to all aspects of all consumer financial products or services, regardless of whether that company extends any credit. By framing discrimination also as an UDAAP issue, the CFPB appears ready to address bias in connection with other kinds of financial products and services. In particular, the CFPB intends to closely examine advertising and marketing activities targeted to consumers based on machine learning models and any potential discriminatory outcomes.

Article By Moorari Shah and A.J. S. Dhaliwal of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more financial legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Protections for Employees Who Report Workplace Discrimination

While thousands of employees each year submit complaints of discrimination against their employers, many more experience workplace discrimination and do not submit a formal complaint or even report it internally. A 2016 study by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) noted that three out of four individuals who experienced harassment never spoke with a supervisor, manager, or union representative about the harassment. Other studies estimate that only one percent of people who experience workplace discrimination file a formal discrimination charge.

Types of Discrimination Charges Filed

Even with a high level of underreporting of harassment and discrimination in the workplace, the EEOC reported that workers filed 67,448 charges of workplace discrimination in fiscal year 2020.[1] The EEOC breaks down the data by the characteristics of the individual who filed the complaint. The breakdown reflects the various bases for protection under federal anti-discrimination laws, specifically disability, race, sex, age, national origin, color, religion, and genetic information. In the EEOC data from fiscal year 2020, retaliation claims made up 55.8% of all charges filed, which was the most common claim asserted. Retaliation claims are often coupled with claims of discrimination because they generally require complaints about, or opposition to, discrimination in the workplace. Because of this overlap in claims and the reality that workers may have multiple characteristics or identities that entitle them to protections, the total of the percentages of the types of claims asserted is greater than 100%.

Following retaliation claims, discrimination claims based on disability were the most common in fiscal year 2020, making up 36.1% of all workplace discrimination claims. Fiscal year 2020 may have seen an even greater increase in disability-related charges due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The EEOC continues to update its guidance periodically on the impact of COVID-19 on workplace discrimination laws related to disability. Discrimination based on race made up 32.7% of claims, and discrimination based on sex made up 31.7%.

The breakdown by category is consistent with charge filing patterns in past years. One study conducted by the Center for Employment Equity of the University of Massachusetts Amherst analyzed all discrimination charges filed with the EEOC (or a comparable state agency) from 2012 to 2016. It determined that discrimination charges based on disability and race were the most common and that disability-related claims had become more frequent than charges based on other protected categories. In an article published by staff at the Center for Employment Equity, they determined that 63% of employees who filed a complaint eventually lost their jobs.

Protections from Retaliation

The data from the EEOC and Center for Employment Equity underscores an unfortunate reality for employees who come forward to report discrimination—they face the possibility of retaliation by their employer, which, at its most extreme, results in a loss of their job. Fortunately, there are legal protections in place for employees who face retaliation for complaining about workplace discrimination.

Employees who engage in protected activity, either by participating in an investigation of workplace discrimination, complaining of workplace discrimination, or opposing discrimination in the workplace, are protected from retaliation. This means that an employer cannot take any “materially adverse action” against these employees. Such actions include anything that would deter a reasonable worker from coming forward to complain about discrimination in the workplace. This includes actions short of termination, like demotions or salary reductions. The law protects not only current employees and applicants, but also former employees and third parties who have a close relationship with the employee who experienced discrimination. Employees who face retaliation for reporting discrimination in the workplace may be entitled to monetary compensation for the harm caused by the retaliation, including back wages, reinstatement to their former position if they were terminated, compensation for emotional distress caused by the employer’s actions, and reimbursement of their attorneys’ fees and costs.

While no employee should face retaliation for reporting workplace discrimination or harassment, the data demonstrates that it is an unfortunate reality in workplaces. If you believe you have faced discrimination, harassment, or retaliation, you should contact an employment attorney to determine your options and how to proceed.

Importance of Seeking Legal Counsel

The Center for Employment Equity’s analysis highlighted another reality faced by employees who filed discrimination charges with the EEOC. Upon examining the outcome of each charge and excluding charges that were closed because of administrative reasons, it noted that monetary benefits and changes to workplace practices were relatively infrequent. In less than 20% of charges, employees received a monetary benefit. Less than 10% resulted in changes to employer practices. This data does not account for employees who made complaints of discrimination and were able to reach a resolution with their employer prior to filing a charge.

This data showing the poor outcomes from filing discrimination charges demonstrates the importance of seeking legal counsel if you believe that you have faced discrimination in the workplace. An attorney can advise you on the merits of your claim as well as the appropriate deadlines for filing a charge and lawsuit, and can advocate for you before the employer, both before and after submitting a discrimination charge. For current employees, such advocacy may help to shield you from retaliation or to exit from your employment on more favorable terms. In addition to seeking legal counsel, you can begin to take other steps to assist your case by doing the following:

Document the mistreatment you experience.
Create a detailed timeline of instances of discrimination, which will assist an attorney who may assess your potential claims.
Retain employment-related documents, like employee manuals; employment offer letters and agreements; and information concerning commission, equity, and benefits plans.
Do not record conversations without the consent of the other party and without first seeking advice from legal counsel. Each state has different recording law statutes that require all parties or at least one party to consent to recording. It is important not to violate these laws, which can carry civil and sometimes criminal liability.

This list only identifies basic steps that you can take if you believe you have experienced discrimination or harassment in the workplace. If you have faced workplace discrimination, you should consult with an employment attorney for advice on your potential claims

[1] The number of charges filed has decreased steadily in recent years, with 72,675 charges of workplace discrimination filed with the EEOC in fiscal year 2019 and 76,418 filed in 2018. There may be multiple explanations for this decrease, though this year’s decline may be in part explained by the COVID-19 pandemic, which left many employees without work for much of 2020 and required others to work remotely.

This article was written by Alia Al-Khatib of Katz, Marshall & Banks, LLP.

For more articles regarding workplace discrimination, please visit our Labor and Employment News section.

COVID-19 Layoff or Pretext for Age Discrimination?

The recent, unprecedented changes to our country and its workforce due to the COVID-19 pandemic have upended the lives of millions. The economic fallout continues and in many instances, employers simply have no choice but to lay off large swaths of their employees due to the lack of business/revenue. And these employers have legitimate reasons for doing so and view this as a heart-wrenching but necessary step.

At the same time, a small subset of employers may decide that, even though mass layoffs are not necessary, they will still lay off certain, older employees. In this scenario, there is no legitimate business need driving the termination but an opportunity to let go of older employees who often have higher salaries. Or the employer is concerned that older employees may trigger additional costs in terms of insurance or paid time off because of their susceptibility to COVID-19. Similarly, the employer may hold stereotypical views that older employees are less likely to function well in a virtual/remote work setting that requires technological skills.

As such, the employer’s claim that it had to lay off the older employee due to the pandemic could be a pretext for age discrimination. The question is, how do courts make this call? The answer to this question centers on how an employee can prove that the employer’s purported reasons were just a mask for illegal behavior.

Signs That The Layoff May Be Age Discrimination

Each case will be reviewed based on its own facts and merits, so no “one size fits all” approach can apply when analyzing age discrimination and pretext claims. In the context of COVID-19 layoffs, there are some red flags that may suggest that the employer is targeting an employee(s) because of their age rather than a legitimate business need to reduce the workforce. These red flags include:

The company institutes a relatively small-scale layoff, which includes a number of more experienced, older, and higher paid employees
Younger, less experienced, and less expensive employees are retained and in some cases take over the work of the departed, older workers
Comments by decision-makers reference (or had referenced) the experience level, age, higher salaries, nearness to retirement, etc. of the older employees
The employer hires new, younger employees within a relatively short period of time after the older employees are let go

Many companies will be required to provide laid off employees with specific, written information about the employees it chose to lay off, including their job titles and ages. This is helpful information to assess whether age discrimination may have motivated the termination decision. But often it will be necessary to dig deeper into the employer’s data about the laid off employees to see if a correlation between the termination decision and their ages emerges.

Legal Standards For Age Discrimination And Pretext Claims

The key federal law that prohibits age discrimination in employment is aptly named the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). It prevents an employer from discharging or otherwise “[discriminating] against any individual… because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).

To win, a plaintiff “must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged employer decision.” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-178 (2009). Circumstantial evidence, as opposed to direct evidence of discrimination (which is less frequently available to plaintiffs), is analyzed under a three-part test created by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Note that the Supreme Court clarified that federal employees have a less onerous legal burden to prove in age discrimination claims as compared to private sector employees. Babb v. Wilkie, No. 18-882 (2020).

The McDonnell Douglas framework for an ADEA claim for layoff due to age discrimination is as follows:

STEP 1/prima facie case (burden on plaintiff)

They belong to a protected class (older than 40 years old)
They were qualified for the job and performing in accordance with the expectations of their employer
Employer terminated their employment
The employer replaced plaintiff with an individual who was comparably qualified to the plaintiff, but substantially younger, or that they were laid off under circumstances that give rise to an inference of age discrimination

STEP 2 (burden on defendant)

Employer must produce evidence that its actions were the result of legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons

STEP 3 (burden on plaintiff)

Employee must prove that the non-discriminatory reason(s) offered by the employer in Step 2 were not true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination based on age.

The Supreme Court held that “it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer’s explanation.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 146-7 (2000). Also, Reeves allows the trier of fact to consider the evidence used to establish a prima facie case of discrimination (first prong of McDonnell Douglas) when they are deciding the final prong of McDonnell Douglas framework. How the employer treats similarly situated (but younger) employees plays a key role in age discrimination cases.

How Can Older Employees Protect Their Rights?

For employees in the private sector, a charge of age discrimination must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the discriminatory act (that is the notice of the layoff). The 180 calendar day filing deadline is extended to 300 calendar days if a state or local agency enforces a state or local law that prohibits employment discrimination on the same basis.

For age discrimination, however, the filing deadline is only extended to 300 days if there is a state law prohibiting age discrimination in employment and a state agency or authority enforcing that law. The deadline is not extended if only a local law prohibits age discrimination.

Note: federal employees have a different charge filing process. Visit www.eeoc.gov for more information.

ARTICLE BY Eric Bachman of Zuckerman Law.

For more on discrimination in hiring and firing, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law section.

Sticks and Stones May Break Bones, But Words May Constitute Unlawful Discrimination

In recent months, there have been several news stories about the legal implications of inappropriate and/or offensive language in our society, generating discussion about whether such language is, or should be, unlawful in certain circumstances. This past fall, the Massachusetts Legislature held a committee hearing on a widely-publicized bill which sought to penalize the use of “bitch,” by imposing a fine of up to $200 for any person who “uses the word ‘bitch’ directed at another person to accost, annoy, degrade or demean” another person.

While this proposed legislation, fraught with Constitutional issues involving the exercise of free speech, was largely decried and gained no traction, it does highlight an important question: In what circumstances may offensive and demeaning comments constitute unlawful discrimination? In fact, in January, Chief Justice John Roberts, during oral arguments in Babbe v. Wilkie, asked the hypothetical question whether the phrase “OK Boomer” would qualify as age discrimination.

The answer to Chief Justice Robert’s question is not a bright-line “yes” or “no.” Context matters. For example, in connection with a hostile work environment claim, one of the central legal issues is whether the conduct in question was severe or pervasive. As a general rule, a single, isolated comment will not be actionable as creating a hostile work environment, but in some instances, it may. See Augis Corp. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 408-409 (2009) (noting that a supervisor who calls a black subordinate a f***ing n***** “has engaged in conduct so powerfully offensive that the MCAD can properly base liability on a single instance”).

Courts do not impose a numerosity test. Rather, the legal analysis is focused on whether the discriminatory comments “intimidated, humiliated, and stigmatized” the employee in such a way as to pose a “formidable barrier to the full participation of an individual in the workplace.” See Thomas O’Connor Constructors, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 560–61(2008); Chery v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 98 F. Supp. 3d 179, 193 (D. Mass. 2015) (noting that, in the context of a hostile work environment based upon race, “[i]t is beyond question that the use of the [“N” word] is highly offensive and demeaning, evoking a history of racial violence, brutality, and subordination”).

Similarly, in the context of a disparate treatment claim (e.g., allegations that employee was terminated based on unlawful age bias), evidence that the decision-maker referred to the employee as a “Boomer” should not be evaluated in a legal vacuum. Rather, this evidence may be presented to the jury as just one piece of a “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence” from which a fact-finder could properly determine that the termination decision was driven by discriminatory animus based upon age. See Burns v. Johnson, 829 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2016).

So, while sticks and stones may break bones, words also do harm and depending upon the circumstances, may result in legal claims and liability.

ARTICLE BY Brian J. MacDonough of Sherin and Lodgen LLP.

For more on Free Speech, see the National Law Review Constitutional Law section.

Tag: discrimination

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