DOJ Releases its 2016 False Claims Act Recovery Statistics

DOJ False Claims actOn Wednesday, the Department of Justice (DOJ) released its annual False Claims Act (FCA) recovery statistics, which revealed that Fiscal Year 2016 has been another lucrative year for FCA enforcement.  Based on these statistics, DOJ recovered more than $4.7 billion in civil FCA settlements this fiscal year — the third highest annual recovery since the Act was established.  Since 2009 alone, the government has recovered $31.3 billion in FCA settlements and judgments.  This is a truly staggering statistic.  It shows that the government’s reliance on the FCA to combat fraud will continue for the foreseeable future.

The healthcare and financial industries represent the largest portions of this year’s FCA recoveries.  In the healthcare industry alone, DOJ recovered a total of $2.5 billion based on federal enforcements.  DOJ also touted its instrumental role in assisting states recovering funds overpaid under state Medicaid programs.  From the financial industry, the government collected another $1.7 billion, largely as a result of enforcement actions arising from alleged false claims in connection with federally insured residential mortgages.

The number of new FCA matters through both qui tam and non-qui tam actions has increased since last year.  Interestingly, however, the statistics indicate that the share of settlements and judgments for relators declined—the percentage of the total recoveries from qui tam suits decreased from 80.7% in 2015 to 61% in 2016.  Most significantly, the percentage of recoveries for cases where the government declined to intervene decreased from 31% to 2.2% since last year.  Although the cause for this decline is uncertain, one could argue that this indicates that DOJ views the assistance of relators as less valuable in recent years.

Notwithstanding the specific observations related to the industries and types of actions resulting in recoveries this fiscal year, the statistics demonstrate that the FCA remains a powerful tool for the government’s fraud deterrence efforts.

Copyright © 2016, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

DOJ Issues New FCPA Guidance and Launches Self-Reporting Pilot Program

The US Department of Justice has announced the creation of a one-year pilot program intended to encourage companies to self-report bribery violations and provide extensive cooperation in exchange for reduced penalties, ranging from reductions in fines to declinations.

On April 5, the Fraud Section of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) issued its “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance” (Guidance) outlining the following “three steps in [its] enhanced FCPA enforcement strategy”:

  1. The intensification of its investigative and prosecutorial efforts by substantially increasing its FCPA law enforcement resources.

  2. The strengthening of its coordination with foreign law enforcement.

  3. Its implementation of an “FCPA enforcement pilot program” to encourage voluntary disclosure, cooperation, and remediation.[1]

While the first two steps have been championed in prior DOJ press releases and speeches, the third step—the creation of the FCPA enforcement pilot program—is an important development that has the potential to change the voluntarily disclosure calculus in connection with FCPA matters.

The Guidance applies “to organizations that voluntarily self-disclose or cooperate in FCPA matters during the pilot period, even if the pilot thereafter expires.”[2]

Intensification of DOJ’s Investigative and Prosecutorial Efforts

The Fraud Section plans to more than double the size of its FCPA Unit by “adding 10 more prosecutors to its ranks”[3]—a staffing goal that was previously announced by Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division Leslie Caldwell at an FCPA conference in November 2015.[4] The Guidance also cites the FBI’s establishment of “three new squads of special agents devoted to FCPA investigations and prosecutions,” a hiring initiative that was announced approximately a year ago.

Strengthening of DOJ’s Coordination with Foreign Law Enforcement

The second part of the Guidance builds on previous statements by senior DOJ leaders that they “are greatly aided by our foreign partners”[5] and “it is safe to say [in 2013] that we are cooperating with foreign law enforcement on foreign bribery cases more closely today than at any time in history.”[6]

FCPA Enforcement Pilot Program—Eligibility and Potential Benefits

The most important part of the Guidance is the Fraud Section’s announcement of a one-year “FCPA enforcement pilot program,” which provides for “mitigation credit” that takes into consideration three essential factors: (1) voluntary disclosure, (2) full cooperation, and (3) remediation. In cases in which the above three factors are met but a criminal resolution is nonetheless warranted, “mitigation credit” can include “up to a 50% reduction off the bottom end of the Sentencing Guidelines fine range, if a fine is sought” and the avoidance of a third-party compliance monitor.”[7] Moreover, the Guidance states that, in appropriate cases, where the above factors are fully satisfied, DOJ “will consider a declination of prosecution.”[8]

Voluntary Self-Disclosure

A company must voluntarily disclose an FCPA violation to the Fraud Section in order to be eligible for the full mitigation credit. As a preliminary matter, the disclosure must be truly voluntary—a disclosure that the “company is required to make, by law, agreement, or contract” would not constitute voluntary self-disclosure for purposes of this pilot.[9] Second, the disclosure must occur “prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation” and be “within a reasonably prompt time after becoming aware of the offense,” with the burden on the discloser to demonstrate timeliness.[10] Finally, the disclosure must include “all relevant facts known to [the company], including all relevant facts about the individuals involved in any FCPA violation.”[11]

DOJ’s voluntary disclosure requirement follows a recent announcement by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that companies subject to FCPA enforcement actions are required to self-report their potential misconduct to be eligible for deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements. Full Cooperation

The Guidance sets forth nearly a dozen requirements for companies seeking cooperation credit under the pilot program.[12] Those requirements can be distilled into the following four categories:

  • Disclosure of Relevant Facts: Companies are expected to disclose “all facts relevant to the wrongdoing at issue” on a timely basis, including “all facts related to involvement in the criminal activity by the corporation’s officers, employees, or agents” and “all facts relevant to potential criminal conduct by all third-part[ies].” Disclosure is expected to be “proactive” rather than “reactive,” and facts relevant to the investigation should be voluntarily provided “even when [companies are] not specifically asked to do so.” In addition, disclosures are expected to include “all relevant facts gathered during a company’s independent investigation.”

  • Preservation and Disclosure of Documents: All relevant documents—as well as “information related to their provenance”—are expected to be collected, preserved, and disclosed. This expectation extends to “overseas documents” and important details about those records such as their location and the individuals who discovered them. In some cases, prosecutors may insist that companies provide translations of foreign-language documents. Finally, it is expected that companies will assist with the “third-party production of documents . . . from foreign jurisdictions.”

  • Making Individuals Available for Interviews: Upon request, companies are expected to “mak[e] available for [DOJ] interviews those company officers and employees who possess relevant information,” including—where appropriate and possible—individuals located overseas, as well as those who no longer work for the company.

  • Conducting Transparent and Coordinated Internal Investigations: Companies are expected to provide timely updates about their internal investigations and, where requested, ensure that such investigations do not conflict with those being conducted by the government.

The Guidance notes that “cooperation comes in many forms,” and that the Fraud Section “does not expect a small company to conduct as expansive an investigation in as short a period of time as a Fortune 100 company.”[13]

Remediation

The final requirement is that of “timely and appropriate remediation,” and the following items generally will be required in order for companies to receive remediation credit:

  • Implementation of an Effective Compliance Program: While the criteria depend on the size and resources of the organization, the following factors are normally considered:

    • Whether the company has established a “culture of compliance”

    • Whether the company has sufficient compliance resources

    • The quality and experience of the compliance personnel

    • The independence of the compliance function

    • Whether the company’s compliance program has performed an effective risk assessment and tailored the compliance program based on that assessment

    • How a company’s compliance personnel are compensated and promoted

    • Auditing of the program to assure its effectiveness

    • The reporting structure of compliance personnel within the company

  • Discipline of Culpable Employees: It is expected not only that companies discipline culpable employees, but that they have systems that provide for the possibility of disciplining others with oversight of the responsible individuals.

  • Acceptance of Responsibility and Implementation of Reforms: Companies are expected to recognize the seriousness of the misconduct, accept responsibility for it, and implement reforms to identify and reduce the risk of similar violations.[14]

Credit

Where the above conditions are met but a criminal resolution is warranted, the Fraud Section’s FCPA Unit (1) may accord up to a 50% reduction off the “bottom end” of the Sentencing Guidelines fine range, if a fine is sought; and (2) generally should not require appointment of a monitor if a company has, at the time of resolution, implemented an effective compliance program.

Furthermore, where the same conditions are met, the Fraud Section’s FCPA Unit will consider a declination of prosecution. In doing so, prosecutors must balance the importance of encouraging disclosure against the seriousness of the offense. In assessing the seriousness of the offense, prosecutors are to consider the involvement by executive management in the FCPA misconduct, the size of the ill-gotten gains in relation to the overall revenue of the company, a history of noncompliance by the company, and any prior resolutions by the company with DOJ within the past five years.

Finally, if the company cooperates and remediates, but has not voluntarily disclosed, the Fraud Section’s FCPA Unit may provide partial mitigation credit, but will agree to no more than a 25% reduction off the bottom of the Sentencing Guidelines fine range.[15]

Implications

This Guidance comes after what has been a growing perception that voluntary disclosures have slowed significantly due to a lack of transparency, consistency, and clarity as to what the benefits are, if any, to self-disclosing. Whether the pilot program succeeds in encouraging self-disclosures will likely depend on the perception of companies and defense counsel of the fairness and openness of the application of the criteria in the Guidance.


[1] US Dep’t of Justice, Memorandum from Andrew Weissmann titled “The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance” (Apr. 5, 2016) (Guidance)

[2] Guidance at 3.

[3] Id. at 1.

[4] Stephen Dockery, “US Justice Dept. Boosting Foreign Corruption Staff,” Wall Street Journal (Nov. 17, 2015)

[5] US Dep’t of Justice, “Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell Speaks at American Conference Institute’s 31st International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (Nov. 19, 2014)

[6] See id.; see also US Dep’t of Justice, “Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman Delivers Keynote Address at the Global Anti-Corruption Congress” (June 17, 2013)

[7] Guidance at 8.

[8] Id. at 9.

[9] Id. at 4.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id. at 5-6.

[13] Id. at 6.

[14] Id. at 7-8.

[15] Id. at 8-9.

Self-Reporting: A Wise Strategy or Chasing Unicorns?

As we noted in an earlier post, Department of Justice (DOJ) representatives have been emphasizing this spring the financial benefits of cooperation. They did so again last week at the Practicing Law Institute’s Enforcement 2015: Perspectives from Government Agencies, during which enforcement officials from the DOJ, SEC, CFTC, FINRA and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) all pushed back last week against complaints that the benefits of self-reporting are illusory and the costs far too high.

Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement Andrew Ceresney claimed that significant benefits of self-reporting are evidenced by three FCPA settlements earlier this year: a disgorgement-only settlement with Goodyear, a deferred prosecution agreement with PBSJ Corporation and a settlement with FLIR Systems, Inc. which entailed only a “minimal penalty” of $1 million. William Stellmach, Principal Deputy Chief of the Fraud Section at the U.S. Department of Justice, noted that the Alstom S.A. settlement in which Alstom paid a $772,290,000 criminal penalty to settle an FCPA prosecution “gives you 772 million reasons to self-disclose.” Among the factors cited for such a high fine was the company’s failure to self-report.

Stellmach claimed that – despite the perception of many practitioners that regulators almost always require some form of “public shaming” for even those companies that self-report – decisions not to prosecute are “not unicorns.” The difficulty, he explained, is that such decisions not to prosecute cannot be publicized without risking the adverse publicity companies want to avoid. As a result, he noted, there has been some discussion internally at DOJ about how it might anonymize such resolutions so that they could be publicized in order to provide the defense bar and their clients with evidence as to the benefits of self-reporting. The CFPB did exactly that, according to Deputy Enforcement Director Jeffrey Ehrlich, in a recent action filed against two financial institutions for alleged RESPA violations. A third institution (referred to in the complaint only as “Unnamed Financial Institution”) that engaged in the same conduct escaped being either named or fined by discovering the violation, reporting it and terminating the individual at issue.

The calculus regarding whether to self-report is also changing, according to the SEC’s Ceresney, as a result of the increase in whistleblowers. If a company’s management decides not to reach out to regulators, someone else may very well do it for them in today’s environment of substantial whistleblower awards.

For companies which have made the decision to self-report, the next decision is to which regulator should they report. The Director of the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement Aitan Goelman suggested that, if the company and/or the conduct is within the jurisdiction of multiple regulators, the company should advise all the relevant regulators, as opposed to relying on one regulator to pass the information along to the others.

The regulators also made clear that self-reporting is not, by itself, enough to get significant credit; sincere efforts and cooperation in uncovering the full scope of the problem is required. Ceresney and Stellmach, however, rejected criticism that regulator demands as to the scope of such investigations result in undue costs, sometimes in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Rather than micromanaging the companies’ investigation, the SEC and DOJ only expect a risk based investigation. For example, if an employee was paying bribes in one country, the investigation might cover only the countries in which the employee worked. Absent evidence of a more widespread problem, there would be no need to “boil the ocean” with an investigation that covered all operations around the globe.

Stellmach and others cautioned, however, that in order to receive the most significant credit for cooperation, a company must be willing to identify culpable employees and assist in the gathering of evidence in order to prosecute those individuals. As FINRA’s Executive Vice President of Enforcement J. Bradley Bennett noted, this is the area in which it is most difficult for FINRA to get cooperation. Too often, he indicated, the individuals identified by the company are dead, retired, now employed by a competitor or outside FINRA’s jurisdiction.

© 2015 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP  Authored by:  Anne N. DePrez

The DOJ Increases Scrutiny of Whistleblower False Claims Act Suits

McBrayer NEW logo 1-10-13The Criminal Division of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) recently announced that it will review all complaints filed under the qui tam provisions of the federal False Claims Act (“FCA”) to determine if a parallel criminal investigation is appropriate. This announcement came during a September 17, 2014 speech by the recently-confirmed Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the DOJ, Leslie Caldwell, at the Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund Conference in Washington D.C. This DOJ announcement signals a departure from prior policy, which allowed, but did not require, the Criminal Division to investigate Civil Division claims. In the past, the decision to open a criminal investigation was left to the discretion of each U.S. Attorney’s Office.

FraudNow, the Civil Division of the DOJ will share all new qui tam complaints with the Criminal Division as soon as they are filed. This change in procedure will likely be detrimental for defendants in future qui tam cases. With the Criminal Division more involved in False Claims cases, settlements with the government may become more difficult due to the need for approval from both the Civil and Criminal Divisions. Defendants may also face increased pressure to accept settlement offers from the government to avoid high-risk criminal penalties.

In 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder and Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius announced the creation of an interagency task force, the Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team (“HEAT”), to increase coordination and optimize criminal and civil enforcement.  This coordination yielded momentous results: the Department recovered $12.1 billion dollars under the False Claims Act from January 2009 through the end of the 2013 fiscal year.  Most of these recoveries relate to fraud against Medicare and Medicaid Programs. In fiscal year 2013 alone, the DOJ recovered $2.6 billion dollars for health care fraud violations and brought health care fraud-related prosecutions against 345 individuals.

Thus, providers seeking reimbursement from federal programs should be aware that non-compliance risks have never been greater. Providers or entities faced with a civil qui tam suit should immediately evaluate their exposure to possible criminal charges. Because an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, companies should closely review their compliance programs and pay special attention to the protocols in place to prevent and detect potential false claims or billing violations.

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U.S. Department of Justice’s Criminal Division Implements Procedure to Immediately Review Civil Division Qui Tam Cases

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Recently, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) said that the Criminal Division implemented a new procedure related to qui tam cases. Under the new procedure, the Criminal Division will immediately review qui tam cases it receives from the DOJ’s Civil Division to determine whether to open a criminal investigation into the case. If the Criminal Division opens an investigation, it will work with the Civil Division and U.S. Attorney’s Offices to coordinate parallel investigations.

The announcement can be found here.

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Manufacturer of Spinal Devices and Indiana Spinal Surgeon to Pay U.S. Government $2.6 Million for Violating the False Claims Act

tz logo 2On August 29, 2014, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that Omni Surgical L.P. (dba Spine 360), and Dr. Jamie Gottlieb, an Indiana Spinal Surgeon, agreed to pay the U.S. Government $2.6 million to settle allegations that Spine 360 and Dr. Gottlieb knowingly violated the False Claims Act when Dr. Gottlieb accepted kickbacks from Spine 360 for using their medical devices.  In addition, Spine 360 falsified financial documents in order to cover up illegal incentives paid to Dr. Gottlieb in an attempt to avoid suspicion.

The Anti-Kickback Statute, a provision of the False Claims Act, is designed to protect patients and federal health care programs from fraud and abuse by prohibiting the use of money or anything of value that is intended to induce, reward, or influence health care decisions. Therefore, anyone who knowingly and willfully accepts or offers payment or compensation of any kind and in any manner with the intention of influencing medical decisions is in violation of the False Claims Act.  In this case, between 2007 and 2009, Spine 360, located in Austin, Texas, allegedly offered Dr. Gottlieb monetary kickbacks for using their medical devices on his patients.  In doing so, it allegedly influenced Dr. Gottlieb’s medical decisions and possibly compromised the quality care and best interest of his patients.

Medical violations of this kind are not new.  However, the U.S. Government continues to hold those in violation of the False Claims Act accountable for their actions.  For example, in July 2014, the government settled a lawsuit filed against two Infirmary Health System Inc. (IHS) affiliated clinics and Diagnostic Physicians Group P.C. (DPG) for violating the False Claims Act by paying or receiving financial inducements in connection with claims to the Medicare program. In this case, whistleblower, Dr. Christian Heesch, a physician formerly employed by Diagnostic Physicians Group, is entitled to $4.41 million for reporting fraud against government-funded programs.  Furthermore, last month, the government settled allegations that Carondelet Health Network (CHN) and its affiliate hospitals, Carondelet St. Mary’s and Carondelet St. Joseph’s in Tucson, Arizona, knowingly violated the False Claims Act by overcharging the U.S. Government when it submitted false bills to Medicare and other Federal Health Care programs, and whistleblower, Jacqueline Bloink, formerly employed by the CHN, is entitled to a share of the settlement payment for reporting fraud against the government, which amounts to $6 million.

 
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The Department of Justice Continues to Bring the "Heat" in Pursuing Health Care Fraud

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The False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 – 3733) (the FCA) penalizes individuals and companies (often government contractors) who defraud the government by either submitting a false request for payment or avoiding payment of an obligation to the government. In May 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of Health and Human Services jointly announced the formation of the Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team, or the “HEAT” initiative, to specifically target fraud in the health care industry, and using the FCA as a primary tool.

 

According to the DOJ’s own estimates, the HEAT initiative has been successful. Indeed, the DOJ claims that in only five years, it has recovered more than $13.4 billion based on its pursuit of FCA and other claims against alleged perpetrators in the health care industry.

 

It is no shock based on those numbers that the DOJ remains as determined as ever to bring the “HEAT” against the health care industry. For example, on Feb. 25, 2014, the DOJ announced a $15.5 million settlement under the FCAagainst a chain of diagnostic testing facilities in New Jersey and New York. The DOJ alleged that the facilities falsely billed federal and state health care programs for tests that were not performed or not medically necessary and by paying kickbacks to physicians. Three whistleblowers received over $2.5 million in connection with the settlement.

 

On Feb. 10, 2014, the DOJ announced the settlement of FCA allegations against an addiction clinic, clinical lab, and two doctors in Kentucky for $15.75 million, approximately $12 million of which represent funds to be refunded to the federal government. The settlement arose out of allegations that the targets defrauded Medicare and Kentucky Medicaid by seeking reimbursement for unnecessary tests or tests that were more expensive than those performed.

 

These and other settlements demonstrate the DOJ’s ongoing commitment to aggressively pursuing allegations of fraud in the healthcare industry.

Article by:

Kathleen L. Matsoukas

Of:

Barnes & Thornburg LLP

 

Judge Rules in Favor of DOJ Finding Bazaarvoice / PowerReviews Merger Anticompetitive (Department of Justice)

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On January 8, 2014, Judge Orrick of the Northern District of California ruled that Bazaarvoice’s acquisition of competitor PowerReviews violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act.  The ruling was in favor of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).  The public version of the opinion was made available on January 10.  In its self-described “necessarily lengthy opinion,” which spans 141 pages, the court ultimately found that the facts overwhelmingly showed the acquisition will have anticompetitive effects and that Bazaarvoice did not overcome the government’s prima facie case.  The case included 40 witnesses at trial, more than 100 depositions and 980 exhibits.  Dr. Carl Shapiro testified as DOJ’s economist and Dr. Ramsey Shehadeh testified on behalf of Bazaarvoice/PowerReviews.  The court noted that the case presented some difficult issues, including that there were no generally accepted “market share statistics covering the sales of R&R solutions or social commerce solutions and no perfect way to measure market shares.”  And while neither side presented flawless analyses, the court found Dr. Shapiro’s approaches more persuasive than those of Dr. Shehadeh.

Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews each offered sophisticated “R&R platforms.”  R&R platforms provide a user interface and review form for the collection and display of user-generated content (i.e., user reviews) on the product page of a commercial website where the product can be purchased.  Often these are in the form of star ratings and open-ended reviews in a text box.  R&R platforms increase sales for the retailer and have a variety of different features.  The court noted that many on-ine retailers view an R&R platform as “necessary.”  Before the merger, Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews offered similar products and features and targeted similar customers.

The court found that the relevant product market was the narrow “R&R platforms,” rather than the broader “social commerce tools” or “eCommerce platforms.”  The court went through many popular social media platforms such as Facebook, Google+, Twitter, Instagram, and Pinterest, explaining why each was not a substitute for these R&R platforms.  In this relevant market, the court found that PowerReviews was Bazaarvoice’s only real competitor, and thus the merger “would eliminate Bazaarvoice’s only meaningful commercial competitor.”

At the end of the opinion, the court commented on the role of antitrust “in rapidly changing high-tech markets.”  It noted that there is a debate as to whether antitrust is properly suited to assess competitive effects in these markets.  The court declined to take sides and stated that its “mission is to assess the alleged antitrust violations presented, irrespective of the dynamism of the market at issue.”

The case now moves to the remedy phase.  In its complaint, the DOJ requested that the court order Bazaarvoice to divest assets originally possessed by either Bazaarvoice and/or PowerReviews to create a viable, competing business.   However, as Judge Orrick noted, 18 months after the merger, it may not be so simple to divest assets.  The judge scheduled a conference for January 22 with the parties to discuss a possible remedy.

There are several lessons to be gathered from this case.  First, the Bazaarvoice litigation is further evidence that the antitrust agencies are not shy about litigating mergers they feel are anticompetitive.  The DOJ invested significant resources and time – including three full weeks at trial in California – into litigating the case, beginning with its investigation that it launched two days after the firms closed their transaction on June 12, 2012.  It has established a significant record of bringing, and winning, merger cases.

Second, this is a significant event, having a federal district court evaluate a consummated merger transaction.  While the agencies have challenged many non-reportable transactions, almost all have been resolved by consent order, or litigated through the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) in-house administrative hearing process (where, not surprisingly, the FTC essentially always wins).  Accordingly, parties to a non-reportable transaction that raises significant antitrust risks should expect the agencies to investigate and, if warranted, litigate.

Third, the Court heavily discounted Bazaarvoice’s arguments regarding lack of any actual anticompetitive effect, because the companies knew the DOJ was reviewing the deal and could moderate their behavior.  The court discounted Bazaarvoice’s arguments that none of the 104 customers who were deposed complained that the merger has hurt them.  The court stated “it would be a mistake to rely on customer testimony about effects of the merger for several reasons.”  Among the reasons the court included was “Bazaarvoice’s business conduct after the merger was likely tempered by the government’s immediate investigation; the customers were not privy to most of the evidence presented to the Court, including that of the economic experts; many of the customers had paid little or no attention to the merger; and each had an idiosyncratic understanding of R&R based on the priorities of their company and their different levels of knowledge, sophistication, and experience.”  Thus, while raising prices after a transaction provides strong evidence to support the government’s case, the lack of a price increase does not necessarily support the merging parties’ defense.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the case shows the need to be circumspect in preparing ordinary course documents.  Aside from the fact that in reportable transactions, the DOJ and FTC are entitled to “4(c)” and “4(d)” documents about the transaction, once a second request is issued or discovery begins, documents created in the ordinary course of business are discoverable.  This includes Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analyses, board meeting minutes, business and strategic plans, market and market share analyses, and competitive assessments.  In this case, the court found the ordinary course documents, and particularly those made by the companies’ executives, some of the most persuasive evidence.  The court quoted extensively from the documents and cited numerous documents from Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews that showed that the parties viewed each other as their primary competitor, that there were no other strong competitors in this market, that the two companies operated in essentially a duopoly, and that the intent of the merger was to eliminate a primary competitor.  Despite the parties’ efforts to explain away these documents, the court was not persuaded.  Thus, it is important that companies carefully consider what to include in documents and e-mails, and assume that any non-privileged material may be discovered.

The agencies’ aggressive pursuit of perceived anticompetitive, non-reportable transactions places a premium on parties’ evaluating the antitrust risk.

The public version of the court’s opinion can be found here:http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f302900/302948.pdf

Article by:

Carrie G. Amezcua

Of:

McDermott Will & Emery