Tag: Department of Justice

Top Competition Enforcers in the US, EU, and UK Release Joint Statement on AI Competition – AI: The Washington Report

On July 23, the top competition enforcers at the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ), the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), and the European Commission (EC) released a Joint Statement on Competition in Generative AI Foundation Models and AI products. The statement outlines risks in the AI ecosystem and shared principles for protecting and fostering competition.

While the statement does not lay out specific enforcement actions, the statement’s release suggests that the top competition enforcers in all three jurisdictions are focusing on AI’s effects on competition in general and competition within the AI ecosystem—and are likely to take concrete action in the near future.

A Shared Focus on AI

The competition enforcers did not just discover AI. In recent years, the top competition enforcers in the US, UK, and EU have all been examining both the effects AI may have on competition in various sectors as well as competition within the AI ecosystem. In September 2023, the CMA released a report on AI Foundation Models, which described the “significant impact” that AI technologies may have on competition and consumers, followed by an updated April 2024 report on AI. In June 2024, French competition authorities released a report on Generative AI, which focused on competition issues related to AI. At its January 2024 Tech Summit, the FTC examined the “real-world impacts of AI on consumers and competition.”

AI as a Technological Inflection Point

In the new joint statement, the top enforcers described the recent evolution of AI technologies, including foundational models and generative AI, as “a technological inflection point.” As “one of the most significant technological developments of the past couple decades,” AI has the potential to increase innovation and economic growth and benefit the lives of citizens around the world.

But with any technological inflection point, which may create “new means of competing” and catalyze innovation and growth, the enforcers must act “to ensure the public reaps the full benefits” of the AI evolution. The enforcers are concerned that several risks, described below, could undermine competition in the AI ecosystem. According to the enforcers, they are “committed to using our available powers to address any such risks before they become entrenched or irreversible harms.”

Risks to Competition in the AI Ecosystem

The top enforcers highlight three main risks to competition in the AI ecosystem.

  1. Concentrated control of key inputs – Because AI technologies rely on a few specific “critical ingredients,” including specialized chips and technical expertise, a number of firms may be “in a position to exploit existing or emerging bottlenecks across the AI stack and to have outside influence over the future development of these tools.” This concentration may stifle competition, disrupt innovation, or be exploited by certain firms.
  2. Entrenching or extending market power in AI-related markets – The recent advancements in AI technologies come “at a time when large incumbent digital firms already enjoy strong accumulated advantages.” The regulators are concerned that these firms, due to their power, may have “the ability to protect against AI-driven disruption, or harness it to their particular advantage,” potentially to extend or strengthen their positions.
  3. Arrangements involving key players could amplify risks – While arrangements between firms, including investments and partnerships, related to the development of AI may not necessarily harm competition, major firms may use these partnerships and investments to “undermine or coopt competitive threats and steer market outcomes” to their advantage.

Beyond these three main risks, the statement also acknowledges that other competition and consumer risks are also associated with AI. Algorithms may “allow competitors to share competitively sensitive information” and engage in price discrimination and fixing. Consumers may be harmed, too, by AI. As the CMA, DOJ, and the FTC have consumer protection authority, these authorities will “also be vigilant of any consumer protection threats that may derive from the use and application of AI.”

Sovereign Jurisdictions but Shared Concerns

While the enforcers share areas of concern, the joint statement recognizes that the EU, UK, and US’s “legal powers and jurisdictions contexts differ, and ultimately, our decisions will always remain sovereign and independent.” Nonetheless, the competition enforcers assert that “if the risks described [in the statement] materialize, they will likely do so in a way that does not respect international boundaries,” making it necessary for the different jurisdictions to “share an understanding of the issues” and be “committed to using our respective powers where appropriate.”

Three Unifying Principles

With the goal of acting together, the enforcers outline three shared principles that will “serve to enable competition and foster innovation.”

  1. Fair Dealing – Firms that engage in fair dealing will make the AI ecosystem as a whole better off. Exclusionary tactics often “discourage investments and innovation” and undermine competition.
  2. Interoperability – Interoperability, the ability of different systems to communicate and work together seamlessly, will increase competition and innovation around AI. The enforcers note that “any claims that interoperability requires sacrifice to privacy and security will be closely scrutinized.”
  3. Choice – Everyone in the AI ecosystem, from businesses to consumers, will benefit from having “choices among the diverse products and business models resulting from a competitive process.” Regulators may scrutinize three activities in particular: (1) company lock-in mechanisms that could limit choices for companies and individuals, (2) partnerships between incumbents and newcomers that could “sidestep merger enforcement” or provide “incumbents undue influence or control in ways that undermine competition,” and (3) for content creators, “choice among buyers,” which could be used to limit the “free flow of information in the marketplace of ideas.”

Conclusion: Potential Future Activity

While the statement does not address specific enforcement tools and actions the enforcers may take, the statement’s release suggests that the enforcers may all be gearing up to take action related to AI competition in the near future. Interested stakeholders, especially international ones, should closely track potential activity from these enforcers. We will continue to closely monitor and analyze activity by the DOJ and FTC on AI competition issues.

©1994-2024 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.
For more on AI Competition, visit the NLR Communications Media Internet section.

Federal Agencies Have Placed a Heightened Priority on Whistleblowers and Speedy Cooperation

As new areas of the law emerge, driven in part by technology and the free flow of information, federal agencies are becoming more aggressive with a tried and true carrot-and-stick approach to law and regulatory enforcement.

In a recent PLI panel on government enforcement priorities in May 2024, Brent Wible, Chief Counselor, Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice (DOJ or Department); Daniel Gitner, Chief of the Criminal Division, US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (SDNY or the Office); and Antonia Apps, Director of the New York Regional Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) shared their thoughts, priorities and practices in 2024 enforcement and beyond.

All of the government lawyers stressed that the DOJ and enforcement agencies are open and are actively encouraging whistleblowers with new incentives and programs. To that end, Mr. Gitner from the SDNY stated very directly that corporations need to understand that there is a “need for speed” in corporate self-disclosures. Otherwise, whistleblowers will be closing the door to the benefits of corporate self-disclosures. Put differently, enforcement agencies do not want a corporation to complete lengthy internal investigations before reporting.

A uniform theme and stance taken by all is that whistleblowers are valuable, and bounties will be paid in cash or in deferred prosecution agreements or possibly both. Whistleblowers must be protected. Internal and external whistleblowers should be encouraged.
This article focuses on three whistleblower initiatives—(i) the SEC’s Whistleblower Program, (ii) the SDNY Whistleblower Pilot Program and (iii) DOJ’s Pilot Whistleblower Program for voluntary self-disclosure—and how those programs may impact a corporation’s response to whistleblowers, internal investigations, and disclosures.

SEC 21F WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM

Since its inception more than a decade ago, the SEC’s Whistleblower Program is widely viewed as successfully incentivizing whistleblower reports of violations of the securities laws. In its 2023 fiscal year, the SEC received more than 18,000 tips from whistleblowers and issued the most awards to whistleblowers ever in one year, totaling nearly US$600 million. That year, the Commission also issued its largest ever award of US$279 million to a single whistleblower.1

What is the SEC’s Whistleblower Program?

Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, requires the SEC to pay awards to whistleblowers who provide information to the SEC about violations of federal securities laws.2 Accordingly, the SEC has issued a series of rulemakings implementing Section 21F to create its whistleblower program. To qualify as a whistleblower, an individual must voluntarily provide the SEC with original information in writing about a possible violation of federal securities law that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.3 To qualify for an award, this information must lead to a successful enforcement action with monetary sanctions totaling more than US$1 million.4

“Original” information means that it cannot be found in publicly available sources and is not already known by the Commission, but is instead the product of the whistleblower’s independent knowledge or analysis.5 A submission is “voluntary” if the whistleblower provides it to the SEC before receiving a regulatory request or demand for information relating to the same subject matter. Therefore, a submission of information that is made in response to a request, inquiry, or demand by the SEC, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, a self-regulatory organization (such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority), or a separate federal or state governmental body does not qualify as a voluntary submission.6 Additionally, a submission that is required under a legal or contractual duty to the Commission is not considered voluntary and is thus ineligible for an award.7

The SEC’s whistleblower rules also include anti-retaliation protections intended to ensure that the incentives provided to whistleblowers for reporting are not outweighed by a fear of reprisal from their employer. Under Rule 21F-17, companies are prohibited from interfering with or impeding a whistleblower’s communications to the SEC about a possible violation of the securities laws, including through enforcement or threatened enforcement of a confidentiality agreement that may be read to prevent whistleblower communications with the SEC.8

The SEC is taking violations of Rule 21F-17 seriously and has increased enforcement activity in this area over the last two years. The Commission brought a number of actions, with significant civil penalties, focused on corporate agreements containing confidentiality language that, according to the SEC, does not provide an express exception for whistleblower communications. The enforcement actions extend to different types of companies, including publicly traded companies, privately held companies, broker-dealers and investment advisers, and to a variety of forms of agreements with employees and customers alike.9

For example, a gaming company paid US$35 million to settle claims that it had violated the whistleblower protection rule by requiring former employees to execute separation agreements that obligated them to notify the company of any request for information received from the Commission, in addition to compliance failures regarding workplace complaints.10 In January 2024, the SEC settled the largest ever standalone Rule 21F-17 case, imposing US$18 million in civil penalties against a dually registered investment adviser and broker dealer for allegedly requiring clients to sign a confidential release agreement—without expressly allowing for direct communications to regulators regarding potential securities law violations—in order to receive certain credit or settlement payments.11 In another case involving US$10 million in civil penalties, the Commission charged a registered investment adviser with a standalone violation of Rule 21F-17 based on employment agreements that contained a confidentiality clause prohibiting external disclosure of confidential company information, without a carve-out for voluntary communications with the SEC concerning possible violations of the securities laws.12 As recently stated by the co-chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit, “Investors, whether retail or otherwise, must be free to report complaints to the SEC without any interference. Those drafting or using confidentiality agreements need to ensure that they do not include provisions that impede potential whistleblowers.”13

SDNY WHISTLEBLOWER PILOT PROGRAM

In February 2024, the SDNY launched a whistleblower pilot program. The purpose of the program is to encourage early and voluntary self-disclosure of criminal conduct by individual participants.14 The program is applicable to disclosures of conduct committed by public or private companies, exchanges, financial institutions, investment advisers, or investment funds involving fraud or corporate control failure or affecting market integrity, or criminal conduct involving state or local bribery or fraud relating to federal, state, or local funds.15 In exchange for a qualifying self-disclosure, the Office will enter into a non-prosecution agreement with the whistleblower.16

Given that a non-prosecution agreement is promised, the SDNY has identified factors to determine whether a whistleblower qualifies for a discretionary non prosecution agreement. The most salient include: whether and to what extent the misconduct is unknown to either SDNY or the DOJ; whether the information is disclosed voluntarily to SDNY and not in response to an inquiry or obligation to report misconduct; whether the whistleblower provides substantial assistance in the investigation and prosecution of culpable individuals, and in the investigation and prosecution of the disclosed conduct; whether the whistleblower truthfully and completely discloses all criminal conduct they participated in and are aware of; whether the whistleblower is a chief executive officer or chief financial officer of a public or private company, who is not eligible for the pilot program; and the adequacy of noncriminal sanctions, such as remedies imposed by civil regulators.

Mr. Gitner said the defense bar is coming around to a non-prosecution carrot for individuals involved in wrongdoing within the corporation. Mr. Gitner said that SDNY seeks early discussions, and the pilot program seems to be driving toward that goal.

DOJ PILOT PROGRAM ON VOLUNTARY SELF-DISCLOSURES FOR INDIVIDUALS

In March 2024, the DOJ announced an upcoming program to reward whistleblowers who report corporate crimes. The new program seeks to bolster existing whistleblower programs established by the SEC (discussed above), the Commodities Future Trading Commission (CFTC), the Internal Revenue Service, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.17 Accordingly, the program will offer rewards to whistleblowers who provide information on misconduct that is not under the jurisdiction of those agencies. In particular, the Department is interested in criminal abuses of the US financial system, foreign corruption cases outside of the SEC’s jurisdiction, and domestic corruption cases. In order to qualify, an individual must provide original, nonpublic, and truthful information that assists the Department in uncovering “significant corporate or financial misconduct” and is previously unknown to the agency.18 Like the SEC and CFTC, the Department does not plan to provide awards for information that is submitted under a preexisting duty or in response to an inquiry.19 Access to the program is only available where existing programs or qui tam actions do not exist. Additionally, the whistleblower in this program cannot be involved in the criminal activity itself. After compensation to victims, the whistleblower will receive a portion of the resulting forfeiture as a reward.20

Interestingly, however, it appears the Department may be moving away from offering monetary awards to whistleblowers. In April 2024, the Department introduced a pilot program that tracks with the SDNY and offers mandatory non prosecution agreements to individuals who provide information on corporate misconduct.21 Under the program, an individual must voluntarily self-disclose original information to the Criminal Division about criminal misconduct that is not previously known to the Department. The information must be “truthful and complete,” meaning it must include all known information relating to the misconduct, including the individual’s own culpability. In particular, the Department seeks information on violations by financial institutions; violations related to market integrity committed by financial institutions, investment advisers, investment funds, or public or private companies; foreign corruption and bribery violations by public or private companies; violations relating to health care fraud or illegal health care kickbacks; fraud or deception against the United States in connection with federally funded contracting; and bribery or kickbacks to domestic public officials by public or private companies. The whistleblower also cannot be a chief executive officer, chief financial officer, or those equivalents of a public or private company; or an elected or appointed foreign government or domestic government official; nor can the whistleblower have a previous felony conviction or a conviction of any kind involving fraud or dishonesty. Irrespective of this program, the Department still has the discretion of offering a non-prosecutorial agreement to individuals who may not meet the above criteria in full, subject to Justice Manual and Criminal Division procedures.22

TAKEAWAYS

The takeaways here for corporate in-house legal departments are:

  • Federal agencies are incentivizing whistleblowers with cash and non-prosecution agreements. It is clear that wrongdoers and witnesses now more than ever have several whistleblower programs from which to choose. As a result, corporations must become more vigilant at detecting wrongdoing and effectively utilizing internal reporting systems. Careful consideration of an early self-disclosure to the appropriate agency may also be warranted. Internal investigations will take a heightened priority to aid the c-suite and board on disclosure decisions.
  • Not only is protecting whistleblowers a priority but encouraging whistleblowers through heightened compliance programs, updated hotlines or other internal reporting programs should be considered. You may also wish to consider offering financial incentives for timely reporting to the corporation’s internal reporting program. All of which will benefit the company in any government disclosure.
  • The enforcement risk for companies under the SEC’s whistleblower rules is real and potentially significant, including with respect to day-to-day business activities (such as entering into client or employee confidentiality agreements) that may not otherwise be recognized as creating regulatory exposure. Companies may wish to revisit their standard contracts and compliance materials to ensure that any confidentiality provisions align with Rule 21F-17.

We acknowledge the contributions to this publication from our summer associate Minu Nagashunmugam.

1 https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/enforcement-results-fy23.

2 https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 2.

3 https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 2.

4 https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 3.

5https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 5.

6 https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 5.

7 https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 5.

8 https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 28.

9 The SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower has stated that violations of Rule 21F-17 may be triggered by “internal policies, procedures, and guidance, such as codes of conduct, compliance manuals, training materials, and other such documents.” SEC, Whistleblower Protections (last updated July 1, 2024) https://www.sec.gov/enforcement-litigation/whistleblower-program/whistleblower-protections#anti-retaliation.

10 https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/sec-biggest-whistleblower-penalty-signals-broad-protection-focus?context=search&index=11

11 In re JP Morgan Sec. LLC, File No. 3-21829 (Jan. 16, 2024), https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2024/34-99344.pdf.

12 In re D.E. Shaw & Co., L.P., File No. 3-21775 (Sept. 29, 2023), https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2013/34-70396.pdf.

13 SEC Press Release (Jan. 16, 2024), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2024-7.

14 https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-05/sdny_wb_policy_effective_2-13-24.pdf

15 https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-05/sdny_wb_policy_effective_2-13-24.pdf

16 https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-05/sdny_wb_policy_effective_2-13-24.pdf

17 https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-assistant-attorney-general-nicole-m-argentieri-delivers-keynote-speech-american

18 https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-lisa-monaco-delivers-keynote-remarks-american-bar-associations

19 https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1347991/dl?inline

20https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-lisa-monaco-delivers-keynote-remarks-american-bar-associations

21https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1347991/dl?inline

22 https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1347991/dl?inline

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Copyright 2024 K & L Gates
For more on Whistleblowers, visit the NLR Criminal Law Business Crimes section

DOJ Confirms Moving Marijuana to Schedule III; Sidesteps Anticipated Impact on State Cannabis Markets

On May 16, 2024, the Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated the formal rulemaking process to move marijuana to Schedule III of the Controlled Substances Act. The DOJ’s notice of proposed rulemaking unfortunately sidesteps the hard questions about the impact of rescheduling on the existing state adult-use and medical cannabis markets.

Summary of Content

The 92-page notice of proposed rulemaking primarily summarizes and comments on last year’s recommendations by the Department of Health and Human Services to reschedule marijuana, as well as related legal concerns such as compliance with international treaty obligation. The DOJ emphasizes that if marijuana is transferred to Schedule III, “the manufacture, distribution, dispensing, and possession of marijuana would also remain subject to applicable criminal prohibitions under the CSA [Controlled Substances Act],” and that marijuana would remain subject to applicable provisions of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act.

With respect to the critical question of impact on the cannabis markets, however, the DOJ is silent and merely states that it is “seeking comment on the practical consequences of rescheduling marijuana.”

By way of explanation, the DOJ offers:

“DOJ recognizes this action may have unique economic impacts. As stated above, marijuana is subject to a number of State laws that have allowed a multibillion dollar industry to develop. DOJ acknowledges that there may be large impacts related to Federal taxes and research and development investment for the pharmaceutical industry, among other things. DOJ is specifically soliciting comments on the economic impact of this proposed rule. DOJ will revise this section at the final rules stage if warranted after consideration of any comments received.” (Emphasis added.)

Robust Public Comments Expected

For an industry that has been eagerly awaiting to hear how the DOJ will approach rules that address the interplay between existing state cannabis laws and the complex web of federal laws around Schedule III drugs, the DOJ’s notice is disappointing and may not bode well for a smooth rulemaking process. DOJ will accept public comments for 60 days once the notice of proposed rulemaking has been published in the Federal Register. We can expect robust commentary from cannabis businesses, state regulators, trade organizations and ancillary industries.

Regardless of the outcome of the final rulemaking, it seems apparent that clarity through congressional action is needed more than ever.

International Groups Call for DOJ Whistleblower Program to Incorporate Best Practices

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is in the midst of developing a whistleblower award program. According to Acting Assistant Attorney General Nicole M. Argentieri, “the whole point of the DAG’s 90-day ‘policy sprint’ is to gather information, consult with stakeholders, and design a thoughtful, well-informed program.”

Since the Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco announced the policy sprint on March 7, whistleblower advocates in the U.S., including Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, have consulted with the DOJ, outlining key elements of other successful whistleblower programs which should be incorporated in the DOJ program.

On May 13, a coalition of anti-corruption organizations and law firms from over twenty countries sent a letter to the DOJ emphasizing that an effective DOJ whistleblower program could greatly aid international anti-corruption efforts.

“We, the undersigned organizations, believe that a U.S. Department of Justice whistleblower rewards program has the potential to be instrumental to each of our anti-corruption efforts,” write the organizations.

“However, without careful consideration for the unique risks of international whistleblowers and without the implementation of the best-practice protocols identified above, this program could be damaging for international whistleblowers, and their catalytic role in transnational anti-corruption efforts,” the letter continues.

In the letter, the organizations call on the DOJ to incorporate four proven best practices for whistleblower award programs. These best practices mirror those previously called for by Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto. Allison Herren Lee, former SEC Commissioner and currently Of Counsel at Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, outlined these four elements in a recent article for the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.

The four recommendations are:

1. Mandatory Awards of 10-30% of Proceeds Collected

2. Anonymous and Confidential Reporting Channels

3. Dedicated Whistleblower Office

4. Eligibility Requirements which Match the SEC Whistleblower Program

Geoff Schweller also contributed to this article.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2024. All Rights Reserved.
For more on the DOJ Whistleblower Program, visit the NLR Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

Justice Department has Opportunity to Revolutionize its Enforcement Efforts with Whistleblower Program

Over the past few decades, modern whistleblower award programs have radically altered the ability of numerous U.S. agencies to crack down on white-collar crime. This year, the Department of Justice (DOJ) may be joining their ranks, if it incorporates the key elements of successful whistleblower programs into the program it is developing.

On March 7, the Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco announced that the DOJ was launching a “90-day policy sprint” to develop “a DOJ-run whistleblower rewards program.” According to Monaco, the DOJ has taken note of the successes of the U.S.’s whistleblower award programs, such as those run by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS), noting that they “have proven indispensable.”

Monaco understood that the SEC and IRS programs have been so successful because they “encourage individuals to report misconduct” by “rewarding whistleblowers.” But how any award program is administered is the key to whether or not the program will work. There is a nearly 50-year history of what rules need to be implemented to transform these programs into highly effective law enforcement tools. The Justice Department needs to follow these well defined rules.

The key element of all successful whistleblower award programs is very simple: If a whistleblower meets all of the requirements set forth by the government for compensation the awards must be mandatory and based on a percentage of the sanctions collected thanks to the whistleblower. A qualified whistleblower cannot be left out in the cold. Denying qualified whistleblowers compensation will destroy the trust necessary for a whistleblower program to work.

It is not the possibility of money that incentives individuals to report misconduct but the promise of money. Blowing the whistle is an immense risk and individuals are only compelled to take such a risk when there is real guarantee of an award.

This dynamic has been laid clear in recent legislative history. There is a long track record of whistleblower laws and programs failing when awards are discretionary and then becoming immensely successful once awards are made mandatory.

For example, under the 1943 version of the False Claims Act awards to whistleblowers were fully discretionary. After decades of ineffectiveness, in 1986, Congress amended the law to set a mandate that qualified whistleblowers receive awards of 15-30% of the proceeds collected by the government in the action connected with their disclosure.

The 1986 Senate Report explained why Congress was amending the law:

“The new percentages . . . create a guarantee that relators [i.e., whistleblowers] will receive at least some portion of the award if the litigation proves successful. Hearing witnesses who themselves had exposed fraud in Government contracting, expressed concern that current law fails to offer any security, financial or otherwise, to persons considering publicly exposing fraud.

“If a potential plaintiff reads the present statute and understands that in a successful case the court may arbitrarily decide to award only a tiny fraction of the proceeds to the person who brought the action, the potential plaintiff may decide it is too risky to proceed in the face of a totally unpredictable recovery.”

In the nearly four decades since awards were made mandatory, the False Claims Act has established itself as America’s premier anti-fraud law. The government has recovered over $75 billions of taxpayer money from fraudsters, the vast majority from whistleblower initiated cases based directly on the 1986 amendments making awards mandatory.

Similar transformations occurred at both the IRS and SEC where ineffective discretionary award laws were replaced by laws which mandated that qualified whistleblowers receive a set percentage of the funds collected thanks to their whistleblowing. Since these reforms, the whistleblower programs have revolutionized these agencies’ enforcement efforts, leading directly to billions of dollars in sanctions and creating a massive deterrent effect on corporate wrongdoing.

Most recently, Congress reaffirmed the importance of mandatory whistleblower awards when it reformed the anti-money laundering whistleblower law. The original version of the law, which passed in January 2021, had no set minimum amount for awards, meaning that they were fully discretionary. After the AML Whistleblower Program struggled to take off, Congress listened to the feedback from whistleblower advocates and passed the AML Whistleblower Improvement Act to mandate that qualified money laundering whistleblowers are awarded.

Monaco states that the DOJ has long had the discretionary authority to pay whistleblower awards to individuals who report information leading to civil or criminal forfeitures and has “used this authority here and there — but never as part of a targeted program.”

The most important step in turning an underutilized and ineffective whistleblower award law into an “indispensable” whistleblower award program has been made clear over the past decades. Qualified whistleblowers must be guaranteed an award based on a percentage of the sanctions collected in connection with their disclosure.

By administering its whistleblower program in a way that mandates award payments, the DOJ would go a long way towards creating a whistleblower program which revolutionizes its ability to fight crime. The Justice Department has taken the most important first step – recognizing the importance of whistleblowers in reporting frauds. It now must follow through during its “90-day sprint,” making sure reforming the management of the Asset Forfeiture Fund works in practice. Whistleblowers who risk their jobs and careers need real, enforceable justice.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2024. All Rights Reserved.
For more news on DOJ Whistleblower Programs, visit the NLR Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

Department of Justice Ramps Up Investigations of Private Clubs that Received PPP Loans

As Varnum’s government investigations team has previously discussed, (link) the COVID-era Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) resulted in millions of businesses receiving emergency loans. The PPP’s hurried implementation, coupled with confusion among recipients over eligibility requirements, created an environment ripe for both fraud and the issuance of loans to ineligible recipients. Over the past few years, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has focused on fraud by among other things, opening civil investigations under the False Claims Act and bringing criminal charges against PPP loan recipients who misused loan proceeds on luxury items. But recently, the DOJ has shifted its focus to a new category of PPP recipients: social clubs that may have been technically ineligible for the loans they received.

The opportunity for improper loans to social clubs comes about because of a technical wrinkle in how Congress wrote the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021. In this Act, Congress made social clubs (i.e. golf clubs, tennis clubs, yacht clubs) organized under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(7) eligible for PPP loans. However, Congress incorporated an agency regulation that prohibited loans to “private clubs and businesses which limited the numbers of memberships for reasons other than capacity.” The result is that social clubs that limit their number of members for any reason besides capacity were technically ineligible for PPP loans.

In recent months, the DOJ has issued Civil Investigation Demands (CIDs) to clubs that it believes might not have been eligible for PPP loans. These CIDs are demands for documents and interrogatory answers and often relate to employment records, income statements, the membership admission process, prospective members’ applications, the club’s governance, and membership information. CIDs are expansive and the government can use the club’s answer in future civil or criminal proceedings.

Given the DOJ’s new focus, clubs should review their PPP paperwork now and consult with an attorney to determine whether their loan was properly issued. If the clubs find technical violations, proactively approaching the government through counsel may be beneficial. If a club receives a CID, it should immediately contact an attorney to begin preparing the appropriate response.

© 2024 Varnum LLP
by: Ronald G. DeWaard, Regan A. Gibson, Gary J. Mouw, Neil E. Youngdahl of Varnum LLP

For more news on Paycheck Protection Program Fraud Enforcement, visit the NLR Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

Will Hemp Save the World, Before the Government Kills It?

There is a great line in the wonderful film Charlie Wilson’s War, where Charlie Wilson (played remarkably by the inimitable Tom Hanks) describes the successful, if relatively covert, involvement of the United States government in the Soviet-Afghan War: “These things happened. They were glorious and they changed the world… and then we f***d up the endgame.”

With the next Farm Bill somewhere on the horizon, I believe we are approaching a similar moment for the future of hemp. I believe the future of hemp is glorious and that it can change the world. What will we do to the endgame?

This is an analysis about the current state of hemp and whether that industry will revolutionize the world before the government relegates it back to the ash heap of history. It just so happens to dovetail with my personal experience representing clients in connection with the hemp business.

In the Beginning…

Back in the “stone age” (circa 2017) when I decided I wanted to be a cannabis lawyer, I began with a focus on hemp. [As a brief aside, telling people in Alabama you practice cannabis law in 2017 must have been what Noah felt like when he was telling people it was about to start raining.]

The 2014 Farm Bill, which for the first time legalized “industrial hemp” as distinct from marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act and allowed state agricultural departments and universities to license the production of hemp, cracked the door for a nascent and limited hemp market, and it was a remarkable time to advise new hemp operators and investors about how to maximize this opportunity within the contours of the law.

At the same time, I was regularly receiving calls from existing clients, colleagues within the firm, and strangers about how their non-cannabis companies should conduct themselves when approached by hemp companies who wanted to do business with them. The latter category included banks, insurance companies, real estate companies, and myriad companies who had questions about how their employees’ use of hemp interplayed with the companies’ existing drug testing policies. Most of the time the companies were reluctant to have anything to do with hemp, but the conversations were interesting, and it was clear that most companies realized the landscape was changing. It was the Wild West, and I was having a ball.

Rocket Fuel

Enter the 2018 Farm Bill and the explosion of the hemp industry. The 2018 Farm Bill dropped the word “industrial” and defined “hemp” as:

the plant Cannabis sativa L. and any part of that plant, including the seeds thereof and all derivatives, extracts, cannabinoids, isomers, acids, salts, and salts of isomers, whether growing or not, with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol concentration of not more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight basis.

In addition to removing the limitations from the 2014 Farm Bill licensing, the 2018 Farm Bill also moved oversight authority from the Department of Justice and DEA to the USDA and FDA.

The 2018 Farm Bill was a tectonic shift, and we recognized the new regime’s potential almost immediately, predicting the following:

  • Increased “smart” money and research. Because hemp has been a Schedule I substance along with marijuana for decades, many sophisticated sources of funding have abstained from financing the industry. This placed hemp at a competitive disadvantage to other commodities and prevented hemp from reaching its full potential. Now that hemp can be manufactured and sold without substantial legal risks, look for the money to flow toward this underserved sector. Publicly traded companies, private equity firms, venture capitalists and other investment groups will all take significant stakes in both the manufacturing and selling of hemp and hemp-derived products. In addition to traditional commercial development efforts, much of this cash is likely to be spent to hire top researchers to develop proprietary strands of hemp to meet a range of product applications and to take steps to protect the resulting intellectual property.
  • Explosion of hemp and hemp-derived products. Fueled in large part by this injection of financing from sophisticated investors, there is likely to be an explosion in the ways that hemp is used. Hemp already has hundreds — if not thousands — of known uses, and that number should grow substantially once the industry is exposed to the market forces that come with smart money and increased research. The biggest winner may be the hemp-derived CBD business. Hemp-derived CBD is a compound believed to have significant therapeutic benefits without an appreciable psychoactive component. The Washington Post has reported that “dozens of studies have found evidence that [CBD] can treat epilepsy as well as a range of other illnesses, including anxiety, schizophrenia, heart disease, and cancer.” One industry analysis predicts that the hemp-CBD market alone could hit $22 billion by 2022. The health and wellness sector should see particular hemp-related activity and growth in the coming years.
  • Increased ancillary services provided to hemp-related businesses. Because hemp has been included within the definition of marijuana under federal law for decades, most banks, law firms and other service providers have avoided providing services to hemp businesses to avoid the risk of charges of money laundering or conspiring to violate state and federal drug laws. The absence of such service providers has fostered a great deal of uncertainty in an area where certainty and clarity have been sorely needed. With hemp’s new legal status, look for professional service providers to enter the market in 2019 and beyond. Of course, entities looking to provide services to hemp-related businesses should take adequate precautions to ensure those businesses are only producing federally legal hemp.
  • Consolidation and integration. An interesting phenomenon in “legal” marijuana states has been the rapid consolidation and integration of marijuana growers, processors and dispensaries. Some states have mandated vertical integration (e.g., the growers are the sellers) through regulation. And a number of large cannabis companies have acquired grow operations or multi-unit dispensaries rather than establish a cannabis presence in a state from scratch. The hemp industry is likely to follow a similar path, both through government regulation and because larger companies are likely to seek to obtain sufficient quantities of hemp through consolidation and vertical integration. Accordingly, attorneys and investors should anticipate significant merger and acquisition activity in the coming years.
  • Federal regulations and state regimes. The 2018 Farm Bill does not create an entirely unregulated playing field for hemp. Over the coming months, the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Food and Drug Administration will issue regulations implementing the 2018 Farm Bill. State governments will also unveil plans governing the testing, labeling and marketing of hemp-related products, as well as the licensing and monitoring of hemp-related businesses.

I’m proud to say that we were pretty much on the money with these projections, and countless studies and data confirm that hemp can be a viable product with countless form factors that help shape the global economy.

That is when I realized that I might be able to make a career as a cannabis lawyer.

The Good with the Bad

Of course, the development of the hemp industry has not been without controversy – in fact it may be the controversy that has spurred much of the development.

I would be lying to you if I told you that every hemp or hemp-derived product was designed with the best of intentions or contained appropriate mechanisms to ensure consumer safety. There are certainly hemp-derived products on the market that have not been subjected to sufficient product development and testing, and that are being marketed in ways that rightfully should concern policymakers and the public. Novel, psychoactive cannabinoids that fall within the bounds of the terms, if perhaps not the spirit, of the Farm Bill fill the shelves of stores around the country with little to no mechanisms for enforcement. That should change, and Americans should have confidence that the products made available to them are safe and effective.

In response to this proliferation, a number of states have enacted rules and regulations restricting the production and sale of certain hemp-derived cannabinoids. A number of those rules – for example, age and purity restrictions for psychoactive cannabinoids – seem well-intentioned, and we expect to see more of those unless and until the federal government takes further action.

On occasion, however, it appears that the motivations of policymakers may be less pure. It is no secret amongst those in the cannabis industry that marijuana licensees in states that have legalized marijuana are no fans of the unregulated hemp-derived psychoactive industry. After all, marijuana companies are subject to astronomical taxes and endure regulatory costs that make turning a profit far more difficult than if they were able to offer a product that offered a somewhat similar “high” without the institutional overhead and headwinds. Florida may be the clearest and most recent example. With adult-use marijuana widely expected to become law in Florida soon, the state legislature recently passed a law largely prohibiting delta-8 and delta-10.

On the other hand, it would be wrong, even lazy, to suggest that the development of hemp-based products has been without substantial benefits to society as a whole. Entrepreneurs are developing hemp-based substitutes for any number of the most common products used around the globe, meaning that the addressable market for hemp is everyone on earth and beyond.

A younger version of me once wrote, in comparing the addressable market for marijuana to that of hemp:

Hemp, on the other hand, has the potential to dwarf marijuana in the global market. Unlike its sister plant, hemp has the capacity to replace products we use every day without us even realizing it. For example, hemp can provide a substitute for concrete, plastic, fuel, automotive parts, clothes, etc. These are products nearly all consumers need but they neither realize nor care what the products are made of, as long as they work. In that way, while the market for marijuana is limited to consumers looking to purchase marijuana, the market for hemp includes anyone who purchases products that can be manufactured by hemp. In part for these reasons, experts predict four to five times growth in the industrial hemp market in the next five years.

I stand by those words. I am convinced that hemp can change the world.

But I am equally convinced that local, state, and federal governments can, without the appropriate consideration for hemp’s benefits, relegate the plant back to its prohibition era status and deny the world its many benefits. The policy choices made by state governments, and perhaps most importantly by the federal government during the next Farm Bill, could fundamentally alter the future of hemp. Will it be a soon-forgotten shooting star that dazzled the world for a decade and then burned out, or will we look back at the past decade as the renaissance of one of civilization’s oldest and most versatile plants?

Conclusion

I’ll end where I began because Philip Seymour Hoffman’s work is revered by the Budding Trends community (and anyone with taste), and because the film’s ominous conclusion is a message for anyone who wants to see the hemp industry thrive in the years ahead.

As Hanks’ character celebrates the Afghan defeat of the Soviets, the hardened CIA analyst played by Hoffman offers this parable:

On his sixteenth birthday the boy gets a horse as a present. All of the people in the village say, “Oh, how wonderful!”

The Zen master says, “We’ll see.”

One day, the boy is riding and gets thrown off the horse and hurts his leg. He’s no longer able to walk, so all of the villagers say, “How terrible!”

The Zen master says, “We’ll see.”

Some time passes and the village goes to war. All of the other young men get sent off to fight, but this boy can’t fight because his leg is messed up. All of the villagers say, “How wonderful!”

The Zen master says, “We’ll see.”

The message behind this story is pretty clear. We’re prone to jump to conclusions about whether something is “good” or “bad.” We are especially quick to label something as “bad.” The reality is that things can be either good or bad, both good and bad, or neither. When it comes to whether Congress and the states will recognize hemp’s great potential, I guess we’ll see.

© 2024 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
For more on Hemp, visit the NLR Biotech, Food, Drug section.

The Race to Report: DOJ Announces Pilot Whistleblower Program

In recent years, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has rolled out a significant and increasing number of carrots and sticks aimed at deterring and punishing white collar crime. Speaking at the American Bar Association White Collar Conference in San Francisco on March 7, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco announced the latest: a pilot program to provide financial incentives for whistleblowers.

While the program is not yet fully developed, the premise is simple: if an individual helps DOJ discover significant corporate or financial misconduct, she could qualify to receive a portion of the resulting forfeiture, consistent with the following predicates:

  • The information must be truthful and not already known to the government.
  • The whistleblower must not have been involved in the criminal activity itself.
  • Payments are available only in cases where there is not an existing financial disclosure incentive.
  • Payments will be made only after all victims have been properly compensated.

Money Motivates 

Harkening back to the “Wanted” posters of the Old West, Monaco observed that law enforcement has long offered rewards to incentivize tipsters. Since the passage of Dodd Frank almost 15 years ago, the SEC and CFTC have relied on whistleblower programs that have been incredibly successful. In 2023, the SEC received more than 18,000 whistleblower tips (almost 50 percent more than the previous record set in FY2022), and awarded nearly $600 million — the highest annual total by dollar value in the program’s history. Over the course of 2022 and 2023, the CFTC received more than 3,000 whistleblower tips and paid nearly $350 million in awards — including a record-breaking $200 million award to a single whistleblower. Programs at IRS and FinCEN have been similarly fruitful, as are qui tam actions for fraud against the government. But, Monaco acknowledged, those programs are by their very nature limited. Accordingly, DOJ’s program will fill in the gaps and address the full range of corporate and financial misconduct that the Department prosecutes. And though only time will tell, it seems likely that this program will generate a similarly large number of tips.

The Attorney General already has authority to pay awards for “information or assistance leading to civil or criminal forfeitures,” but it has never used that power in any systematic way. Now, DOJ plans to leverage that authority to offer financial incentives to those who (1) disclose truthful and new information regarding misconduct (2) in which they were not involved (3) where there is no existing financial disclosure incentive and (4) after all victims have been compensated. The Department has begun a 90-day policy sprint to develop and implement the program, with a formal start date later this year. Acting Assistant Attorney General Nicole Argentieri explained that, because the statutory authority is tied to the department’s forfeiture program, the Department’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section will play a leading role in designing the program’s nuts and bolts, in close coordination with US Attorneys, the FBI and other DOJ offices.

Monaco spoke directly to potential whistleblowers, saying that while the Department will accept information about violations of any federal law, it is especially interested in information regarding

  • Criminal abuses of the US financial system;
  • Foreign corruption cases outside the jurisdiction of the SEC, including FCPA violations by non-issuers and violations of the recently enacted Foreign Extortion Prevention Act; and
  • Domestic corruption cases, especially involving illegal corporate payments to government officials.

Like the SEC and CFTC whistleblower programs, DOJ’s program will allow whistleblower awards only in cases involving penalties above a certain monetary threshold, but that threshold has yet to be determined.

Prior to Monaco’s announcement, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York launched its own pilot “whistleblower” program, which became effective February 13, 2024. Both the Department-wide pilot and the SDNY policy require that the government have been previously unaware of the misconduct, but they are different in a critical way: the Department-wide policy under development will explicitly apply only to reports by individuals who did not participate in the misconduct, while SDNY’s program offers incentives to “individual participants in certain non-violent offenses.” Thus, it appears that SDNY’s program is actually more akin to a VSD program, while DOJ’s Department-wide pilot program will target a new audience of potential whistleblowers.

Companies with an international footprint should also pay attention to non-US prosecutors. The new Director of the UK Serious Fraud Office recently announced that he would like to set up a similar program, no doubt noticing the effectiveness of current US programs.

Corporate Considerations

Though directed at whistleblowers, the pilot program is equally about incentivizing companies to voluntarily self-disclose misconduct in a timely manner. Absent aggravating factors, a qualifying VSD will result in a much more favorable resolution, including possibly avoiding a guilty plea and receiving a reduced financial penalty. But because the benefits under both programs only go to those who provide DOJ with new information, every day that a company sits on knowledge about misconduct is another day that a whistleblower might beat them to reporting that misconduct, and reaping the reward for doing so.

“When everyone needs to be first in the door, no one wants to be second,” Monaco said. “With these announcements, our message to whistleblowers is clear: the Department of Justice wants to hear from you. And to those considering a voluntary self-disclosure, our message is equally clear: knock on our door before we knock on yours.”

By providing a cash reward for whistleblowing to DOJ, this program may present challenges for companies’ efforts to operate and maintain and effective compliance program. Such rewards may encourage employees to report misconduct to DOJ instead of via internal channels, such as a compliance hotline, which can lead to compliance issues going undiagnosed or untreated — such as in circumstances where the DOJ is the only entity to receive the report but does not take any further action. Companies must therefore ensure that internal compliance and whistleblower systems are clear, easy to use, and effective — actually addressing the employee’s concerns and, to the extent possible, following up with the whistleblower to make sure they understand the company’s response.

If an employee does elect to provide information to DOJ, companies must ensure that they do not take any action that could be construed as interfering with the disclosure. Companies already face potential regulatory sanctions for restricting employees from reporting misconduct to the SEC. Though it is too early to know, it seems likely that DOJ will adopt a similar position, and a company’s interference with a whistleblower’s communications potentially could be deemed obstruction of justice.

© 2024 Bracewell LLP
For more on Whistleblowers, visit the NLR Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

DHS and DOJ Announce Joint Guidance on Electronic Form I-9 Processing

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ) recently issued a fact sheet to guide employers on electronically completing, modifying, or retaining Form I-9. The joint guidance applies to employers using private sector commercial or proprietary I-9 software programs to complete Form I-9 or participate in E-Verify.

Requirements for Employers Using Electronic Form I-9 Software Programs

DHS permits completing Form I-9 electronically provided that the I-9 software complies with I-9 and E-Verify requirements. The DHS/DOJ fact sheet confirms that employers, rather than the software vendor, are responsible for ensuring compliance with these requirements. It provides the following key requirements and states that an I-9 software must:

  • Provide employees with access to the current acceptable version of Form I-9, I-9 instructions, and list of acceptable documents.
  • Allow employees to leave optional fields blank and accommodate employees with only one name.
  • Meet integrity, accuracy, security, and reliability requirements designed to prevent and detect unauthorized or accidental creation, alteration, or deletion of stored I-9s.
  • Comply with standards for electronic I-9 signatures.
  • Comply with general requirements applicable to I-9 documentation, retention, and audit trail requirements.
  • Ensure the electronic generation or storage of Form I-9 is inspected and monitored periodically.
  • Ensure the I-9 forms and all information fields on electronically retained I-9s are fully and readily accessible in the event of a government audit.

Specifically related to modifying and retaining Forms I-9 electronically, the fact sheet states that I-9 software must provide employees, employers, and preparers/ translators the option to make and record corrections to a previously completed I-9 form. Further, the software must uniquely identify each person who accesses, corrects, or changes an I-9 form. Modifications to stored I-9 forms must be properly annotated to include the date of access, the identity of the person making the change, and the nature of the change. Commercial or proprietary I-9 software may lack the functionality to comply with these guidelines regarding providing an audit trail and permitting corrections to completed I-9 records, so these are specific considerations employers should be aware of when assessing potential I-9 software for compliance.

Requirements for Employers Using Electronic Form I-9 Software Programs to Create E-Verify Cases

The DHS/DOJ fact sheet notes that employers who participate in E-Verify and access E-Verify through a software must:

  • Confirm that the software’s functionality allows employers to follow the requirements detailed in the E-Verify Memorandum of Understanding and DHS’s E-Verify guidance.
  • Refrain from creating new E-Verify cases due to corrections made to the previously completed I-9 if the employee received a prior “employment authorized” result. Depending on functionality, commercial or proprietary I-9 software may require completing a new I-9 instead of allowing a correction to the previously completed form.
  • Be able to delay creating E-Verify cases as instructed by E-Verify rules. For example, E-Verify instructs employers to postpone creating E-Verify cases for employees who have not yet received their Social Security numbers and for employees who show certain acceptable receipts for the Form I-9. The software’s functionality should permit employers to delay creating the E-Verify case in these scenarios.

Training for Employer Personnel Administering I-9 Software on Behalf of the Employer

The DHS/DOJ fact sheet also reminds employers to properly train personnel completing electronic Forms I-9 on the employer’s behalf. Key points include the following:

  • Employer personnel should be familiar with the employer’s procedures to complete Form I-9 or create an E-Verify case outside of the Form I-9 software program if, for example, the person completing the I-9 cannot use the I-9 software program or there is a software outage.
  • Employers should not pre-populate fields on electronic I-9 forms with employee information. An I-9 software may be part of the employer’s other HR-related systems and the system may initiate the I-9 verification process through impermissibility pre-populating the employee’s information on the electronic I-9.
  • The employer must not use auto-correct, use predictive text, or post-date an I-9 when completing an I-9 with an I-9 software.
  • The employer should not complete the I-9 on an employee’s behalf and must not change or update the employee’s citizenship or immigration status attestation. For corrections to Section 1, the process is the same as when completing a paper I-9 and changes or corrections to Section 1 must be made by the employee. The I-9 software must have the functionality to allow the employee to make corrections to a previously completed I-9 form.
  • The employer must not remove or add fields to Form I-9. An I-9 software that adds additional questions seeking information that is not requested by the I-9 form may violate this guidance.
  • Employers must permit preparers or translators to assist an employee in completing an electronic I-9.
  • Employers must permit employees to present any valid and acceptable documentation to establish identity and employment authorization, including acceptable receipts, and should not suggest specific documents for this purpose. Thus, an I-9 software should not notify the employer to, for example, request documentation to reverify an employee’s identity document or reverify a permanent resident card.
  • The fact sheet reminds employers to not impose unnecessary obstacles that make it more challenging for employees to start work or get paid, such as by requiring a Social Security number to onboard or by not paying an employee who can complete the Form I-9 but is still waiting for a Social Security number.

Given the significant penalties for non-compliance, employers should exercise thorough due diligence when evaluating I-9 software, considering compliance with DHS regulations alongside factors like cost, functionality, and interoperability with its other systems. Although government guidance has been minimal, the fact sheet provides some insight into the government’s stance on regulatory requirements for electronic I-9s and may be helpful to employers when selecting an I-9 software.

©2024 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.
For more news on Electronic Form I-9 Processing, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Form I-9 Software: Avoiding Unlawful Discrimination When Selecting and Using I-9 and E-Verify Software Systems

A recent employer fact sheet from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provides guidance for avoiding unlawful discrimination and other violations when using private software products to complete Forms I-9 and E-Verify cases.

Quick Hits

  • Employers are responsible for selecting and using software products that avoid unlawful discrimination and comply with Form I-9 and E-Verify requirements.
  • Employers must not use software products that violate Form I-9 and E-Verify requirements or involve system limitations that unlawfully discriminate among workers.
  • DOJ and DHS advise employers to train staff on Form I-9 and E-Verify requirements, and to provide access to published government guidance on Form I-9 and E-Verify requirements.

Employer Compliance With Form I-9 Software Products

The fact sheet reminds employers to use the current Form I-9 and properly complete the Form I-9 for each new hire after November 6, 1986, with any acceptable employee documents. Form I-9 systems must comply with requirements for electronic signatures and document storage including the ability to provide Form I-9 summary files containing all information fields on electronically stored Forms I-9. The fact sheet confirms required software capabilities and employer practices to properly complete the Form I-9 and avoid unlawful discrimination.

Employers must ensure that any software:

  • allows employees to leave form fields blank, if they’re not required fields (such as Social Security numbers, if not required on E-Verify cases);
  • allows workers with only one name to record “Unknown” in the first name field and to enter their names in the last name field on the Form I-9;
  • uniquely identifies “each person accessing, correcting, or changing a Form I-9”;
  • permits Form I-9 corrections in Section 1 and does not complete Section 1 corrections for workers, unless completing preparer/translator certifications in Supplement A;
  • retains all employee information and documents presented for form completion; and
  • permits Form I-9 corrections in Section 2 and allows completion of Supplement B reverifications with any acceptable employee documents.

Employer Compliance With E-Verify Software Products

The fact sheet reminds employers to comply with E-Verify program requirements when using software interfaces for E-Verify case completion. The fact sheet confirms required software capabilities and employer practices for completing E-Verify cases. Employers must still:

  • provide employees with current versions of Further Action Notices and Referral Date Confirmation letters in resolving Tentative Nonconfirmations (mismatches) in the E-Verify system;
  • provide English and non-English Further Action Notices and Referral Date Confirmation letters to employees with limited English proficiency;
  • display E-Verify notices confirming employer use of E-Verify;
  • “promptly notify employees in private” of E-Verify mismatches and provide Further Action Notices. If an employee who has been notified of a mismatch takes action to resolve the mismatch, provide the Referral Date Confirmation letter with case-specific information;
  • delay E-Verify case creation, when required. For example, when workers are awaiting Social Security numbers or have presented acceptable receipts for Form I-9 completion, employers must be able to delay E-Verify case creation; and
  • allow employees to resolve E-Verify mismatches prior to taking any adverse action, including suspensions or withholding pay.

Prohibited Employer Activity When Using Form I-9 Software

The fact sheet notes that an employer that uses private software products for Form I-9 or E-Verify compliance is prohibited from:

  • completing the Form I-9 on an employee’s behalf unless the employer is helping an employee complete Section 1 as a preparer or translator;
  • prepopulating employee information from other sources, providing auto-correct on employee inputs, or using predictive language for form completion;
  • requiring more or less information from employees for Form I-9 completion or preventing workers from using preparers/translators for form completion;
  • improperly correcting the Form I-9, improperly creating E-Verify cases, or failing to report corrections in the Form I-9 audit trail;
  • requesting more or different documentation than needed for Form I-9 completion, or failing to complete reverification in Supplement B of the Form I-9; and
  • imposing “unnecessary obstacles” in starting work or receiving pay, “such as by requiring a Social Security number to onboard or by not paying an employee who can complete the Form I-9 and is waiting for a Social Security number.” (Emphasis in the original.)

Staff Training and Technical Support

The fact sheet warns employers against using software products that do not provide technical support to workers, and it notes that employers are required to provide training to staff on Form I-9 and E-Verify compliance. Resources for staff members using software products for Form I-9 and E-Verify case completion include I-9 Central, the Handbook for Employers M-274, the M-775, E-Verify User Manual, and DOJ publications.

© 2024, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more on Form I-9, visit the NLR Immigration section.