Federal Agencies Have Placed a Heightened Priority on Whistleblowers and Speedy Cooperation

As new areas of the law emerge, driven in part by technology and the free flow of information, federal agencies are becoming more aggressive with a tried and true carrot-and-stick approach to law and regulatory enforcement.

In a recent PLI panel on government enforcement priorities in May 2024, Brent Wible, Chief Counselor, Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice (DOJ or Department); Daniel Gitner, Chief of the Criminal Division, US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (SDNY or the Office); and Antonia Apps, Director of the New York Regional Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) shared their thoughts, priorities and practices in 2024 enforcement and beyond.

All of the government lawyers stressed that the DOJ and enforcement agencies are open and are actively encouraging whistleblowers with new incentives and programs. To that end, Mr. Gitner from the SDNY stated very directly that corporations need to understand that there is a “need for speed” in corporate self-disclosures. Otherwise, whistleblowers will be closing the door to the benefits of corporate self-disclosures. Put differently, enforcement agencies do not want a corporation to complete lengthy internal investigations before reporting.

A uniform theme and stance taken by all is that whistleblowers are valuable, and bounties will be paid in cash or in deferred prosecution agreements or possibly both. Whistleblowers must be protected. Internal and external whistleblowers should be encouraged.
This article focuses on three whistleblower initiatives—(i) the SEC’s Whistleblower Program, (ii) the SDNY Whistleblower Pilot Program and (iii) DOJ’s Pilot Whistleblower Program for voluntary self-disclosure—and how those programs may impact a corporation’s response to whistleblowers, internal investigations, and disclosures.

SEC 21F WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM

Since its inception more than a decade ago, the SEC’s Whistleblower Program is widely viewed as successfully incentivizing whistleblower reports of violations of the securities laws. In its 2023 fiscal year, the SEC received more than 18,000 tips from whistleblowers and issued the most awards to whistleblowers ever in one year, totaling nearly US$600 million. That year, the Commission also issued its largest ever award of US$279 million to a single whistleblower.1

What is the SEC’s Whistleblower Program?

Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, requires the SEC to pay awards to whistleblowers who provide information to the SEC about violations of federal securities laws.2 Accordingly, the SEC has issued a series of rulemakings implementing Section 21F to create its whistleblower program. To qualify as a whistleblower, an individual must voluntarily provide the SEC with original information in writing about a possible violation of federal securities law that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.3 To qualify for an award, this information must lead to a successful enforcement action with monetary sanctions totaling more than US$1 million.4

“Original” information means that it cannot be found in publicly available sources and is not already known by the Commission, but is instead the product of the whistleblower’s independent knowledge or analysis.5 A submission is “voluntary” if the whistleblower provides it to the SEC before receiving a regulatory request or demand for information relating to the same subject matter. Therefore, a submission of information that is made in response to a request, inquiry, or demand by the SEC, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, a self-regulatory organization (such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority), or a separate federal or state governmental body does not qualify as a voluntary submission.6 Additionally, a submission that is required under a legal or contractual duty to the Commission is not considered voluntary and is thus ineligible for an award.7

The SEC’s whistleblower rules also include anti-retaliation protections intended to ensure that the incentives provided to whistleblowers for reporting are not outweighed by a fear of reprisal from their employer. Under Rule 21F-17, companies are prohibited from interfering with or impeding a whistleblower’s communications to the SEC about a possible violation of the securities laws, including through enforcement or threatened enforcement of a confidentiality agreement that may be read to prevent whistleblower communications with the SEC.8

The SEC is taking violations of Rule 21F-17 seriously and has increased enforcement activity in this area over the last two years. The Commission brought a number of actions, with significant civil penalties, focused on corporate agreements containing confidentiality language that, according to the SEC, does not provide an express exception for whistleblower communications. The enforcement actions extend to different types of companies, including publicly traded companies, privately held companies, broker-dealers and investment advisers, and to a variety of forms of agreements with employees and customers alike.9

For example, a gaming company paid US$35 million to settle claims that it had violated the whistleblower protection rule by requiring former employees to execute separation agreements that obligated them to notify the company of any request for information received from the Commission, in addition to compliance failures regarding workplace complaints.10 In January 2024, the SEC settled the largest ever standalone Rule 21F-17 case, imposing US$18 million in civil penalties against a dually registered investment adviser and broker dealer for allegedly requiring clients to sign a confidential release agreement—without expressly allowing for direct communications to regulators regarding potential securities law violations—in order to receive certain credit or settlement payments.11 In another case involving US$10 million in civil penalties, the Commission charged a registered investment adviser with a standalone violation of Rule 21F-17 based on employment agreements that contained a confidentiality clause prohibiting external disclosure of confidential company information, without a carve-out for voluntary communications with the SEC concerning possible violations of the securities laws.12 As recently stated by the co-chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit, “Investors, whether retail or otherwise, must be free to report complaints to the SEC without any interference. Those drafting or using confidentiality agreements need to ensure that they do not include provisions that impede potential whistleblowers.”13

SDNY WHISTLEBLOWER PILOT PROGRAM

In February 2024, the SDNY launched a whistleblower pilot program. The purpose of the program is to encourage early and voluntary self-disclosure of criminal conduct by individual participants.14 The program is applicable to disclosures of conduct committed by public or private companies, exchanges, financial institutions, investment advisers, or investment funds involving fraud or corporate control failure or affecting market integrity, or criminal conduct involving state or local bribery or fraud relating to federal, state, or local funds.15 In exchange for a qualifying self-disclosure, the Office will enter into a non-prosecution agreement with the whistleblower.16

Given that a non-prosecution agreement is promised, the SDNY has identified factors to determine whether a whistleblower qualifies for a discretionary non prosecution agreement. The most salient include: whether and to what extent the misconduct is unknown to either SDNY or the DOJ; whether the information is disclosed voluntarily to SDNY and not in response to an inquiry or obligation to report misconduct; whether the whistleblower provides substantial assistance in the investigation and prosecution of culpable individuals, and in the investigation and prosecution of the disclosed conduct; whether the whistleblower truthfully and completely discloses all criminal conduct they participated in and are aware of; whether the whistleblower is a chief executive officer or chief financial officer of a public or private company, who is not eligible for the pilot program; and the adequacy of noncriminal sanctions, such as remedies imposed by civil regulators.

Mr. Gitner said the defense bar is coming around to a non-prosecution carrot for individuals involved in wrongdoing within the corporation. Mr. Gitner said that SDNY seeks early discussions, and the pilot program seems to be driving toward that goal.

DOJ PILOT PROGRAM ON VOLUNTARY SELF-DISCLOSURES FOR INDIVIDUALS

In March 2024, the DOJ announced an upcoming program to reward whistleblowers who report corporate crimes. The new program seeks to bolster existing whistleblower programs established by the SEC (discussed above), the Commodities Future Trading Commission (CFTC), the Internal Revenue Service, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.17 Accordingly, the program will offer rewards to whistleblowers who provide information on misconduct that is not under the jurisdiction of those agencies. In particular, the Department is interested in criminal abuses of the US financial system, foreign corruption cases outside of the SEC’s jurisdiction, and domestic corruption cases. In order to qualify, an individual must provide original, nonpublic, and truthful information that assists the Department in uncovering “significant corporate or financial misconduct” and is previously unknown to the agency.18 Like the SEC and CFTC, the Department does not plan to provide awards for information that is submitted under a preexisting duty or in response to an inquiry.19 Access to the program is only available where existing programs or qui tam actions do not exist. Additionally, the whistleblower in this program cannot be involved in the criminal activity itself. After compensation to victims, the whistleblower will receive a portion of the resulting forfeiture as a reward.20

Interestingly, however, it appears the Department may be moving away from offering monetary awards to whistleblowers. In April 2024, the Department introduced a pilot program that tracks with the SDNY and offers mandatory non prosecution agreements to individuals who provide information on corporate misconduct.21 Under the program, an individual must voluntarily self-disclose original information to the Criminal Division about criminal misconduct that is not previously known to the Department. The information must be “truthful and complete,” meaning it must include all known information relating to the misconduct, including the individual’s own culpability. In particular, the Department seeks information on violations by financial institutions; violations related to market integrity committed by financial institutions, investment advisers, investment funds, or public or private companies; foreign corruption and bribery violations by public or private companies; violations relating to health care fraud or illegal health care kickbacks; fraud or deception against the United States in connection with federally funded contracting; and bribery or kickbacks to domestic public officials by public or private companies. The whistleblower also cannot be a chief executive officer, chief financial officer, or those equivalents of a public or private company; or an elected or appointed foreign government or domestic government official; nor can the whistleblower have a previous felony conviction or a conviction of any kind involving fraud or dishonesty. Irrespective of this program, the Department still has the discretion of offering a non-prosecutorial agreement to individuals who may not meet the above criteria in full, subject to Justice Manual and Criminal Division procedures.22

TAKEAWAYS

The takeaways here for corporate in-house legal departments are:

  • Federal agencies are incentivizing whistleblowers with cash and non-prosecution agreements. It is clear that wrongdoers and witnesses now more than ever have several whistleblower programs from which to choose. As a result, corporations must become more vigilant at detecting wrongdoing and effectively utilizing internal reporting systems. Careful consideration of an early self-disclosure to the appropriate agency may also be warranted. Internal investigations will take a heightened priority to aid the c-suite and board on disclosure decisions.
  • Not only is protecting whistleblowers a priority but encouraging whistleblowers through heightened compliance programs, updated hotlines or other internal reporting programs should be considered. You may also wish to consider offering financial incentives for timely reporting to the corporation’s internal reporting program. All of which will benefit the company in any government disclosure.
  • The enforcement risk for companies under the SEC’s whistleblower rules is real and potentially significant, including with respect to day-to-day business activities (such as entering into client or employee confidentiality agreements) that may not otherwise be recognized as creating regulatory exposure. Companies may wish to revisit their standard contracts and compliance materials to ensure that any confidentiality provisions align with Rule 21F-17.

We acknowledge the contributions to this publication from our summer associate Minu Nagashunmugam.

https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/enforcement-results-fy23.

https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 2.

https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 2.

https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 3.

5https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 5.

https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 5.

https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 5.

https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 28.

The SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower has stated that violations of Rule 21F-17 may be triggered by “internal policies, procedures, and guidance, such as codes of conduct, compliance manuals, training materials, and other such documents.” SEC, Whistleblower Protections (last updated July 1, 2024) https://www.sec.gov/enforcement-litigation/whistleblower-program/whistleblower-protections#anti-retaliation.

10 https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/sec-biggest-whistleblower-penalty-signals-broad-protection-focus?context=search&index=11

11 In re JP Morgan Sec. LLC, File No. 3-21829 (Jan. 16, 2024), https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2024/34-99344.pdf.

12 In re D.E. Shaw & Co., L.P., File No. 3-21775 (Sept. 29, 2023), https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2013/34-70396.pdf.

13 SEC Press Release (Jan. 16, 2024), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2024-7.

14 https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-05/sdny_wb_policy_effective_2-13-24.pdf

15 https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-05/sdny_wb_policy_effective_2-13-24.pdf

16 https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-05/sdny_wb_policy_effective_2-13-24.pdf

17 https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-assistant-attorney-general-nicole-m-argentieri-delivers-keynote-speech-american

18 https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-lisa-monaco-delivers-keynote-remarks-american-bar-associations

19 https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1347991/dl?inline

20https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-lisa-monaco-delivers-keynote-remarks-american-bar-associations

21https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1347991/dl?inline

22 https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1347991/dl?inline

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2023 Key Developments In The False Claims Act

2023 was another active year for the False Claims Act (FCA), marked by notable appellate decisions, emerging enforcement trends, and statutory amendments to state FCAs. We summarize the year’s most important developments for practitioners and government-facing businesses.

Developments in Caselaw

Supreme Court Holds That FCA Scienter Incorporates A Subjective Standard

The Supreme Court issued two consequential decisions on the False Claims Act this term. In the first, United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Co., 1 the Court held that objectively reasonable interpretations of ambiguous laws and regulations only provide a defense to the FCA’s scienter requirement if the defendant in fact interpreted the law or regulation that way during the relevant period. The Court held that the proper scienter inquiry is whether the defendant was “conscious of a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that their conduct was unlawful. 2 Previously, some courts (including the courts below in Schutte) had dismissed FCA claims based on an ambiguity in relevant statutory or regulatory provisions identified by a party’s attorneys, even if the party never actually believed that interpretation. Schutte precludes such a defense. That said, Schutte does require relators or the Government to allege facts to support an inference of actual knowledge of falsity, and some courts have granted motions to dismiss on that basis post-Schutte. 3

High Court Reaffirms Government’s Authority To Intervene And Dismiss Declined Actions, While Some Justices Raise Constitutional Questions

The Court also decided United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc., 4 which held that the Government may intervene in a declined action—i.e., where the Government declines to litigate the case at the outset under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B)—for the purpose of dismissing it over the relator’s objection. The case essentially preserves the status quo, as courts widely recognized the authority of the Government to dismiss declined qui tams before PolanskyPolansky places two minor restrictions on the Government’s ability to dismiss declined actions. First, the Government has to intervene. 5 Second, the Government needs to articulate some rationale for dismissal to meet the standard of Rule 41(a), which the Court remarked that it will be able to do in “all but the most exceptional cases.” 6 More notably, however, three of the nine Justices (Justice Thomas in dissent and Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett in concurrence) signaled that they would entertain a challenge to the constitutionality of the qui tam mechanism under Article II. 7 Though the one court that has considered such arguments on the merits post-Polansky rejected them, 8 it remains likely that additional, similar challenges will be made.

Split In Authority Deepens On Causation In Kickback Cases

In FCA cases where the relator alleges a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS), the payment of a kickback needs—at least in part—to have caused a submission of a false claim. That requirement flows from the statutory text of the AKS, which provides that claims “resulting from” AKS violations are “false or fraudulent claim[s]” for the purpose of the FCA. 9 But courts have not coalesced around a single standard for what it means for a false claim to “result from” a kickback. Before this year, the Third Circuit in United States ex rel. Greenfield v. Medco Health held that there needs to be “some link” between kickback and referral beyond temporal proximity. 10 On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit in United States ex rel. Cairns v. D.S. Medical, LLC, held that the kickback needs to be a but-for cause of the referral. 11 Earlier this year, the Sixth Circuit endorsed the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of causation. The court reasoned that but-for causation is the “ordinary meaning” of “resulting from” and no other statutory language in the AKS or FCA justifies departure from a but-for standard. 12 But not every court has adopted the Sixth Circuit’s straightforward analysis.

In the District of Massachusetts, for example, two decisions issued this summer came out on opposite sides of the split. In both cases, United States v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 13 and United States v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 14 the Government alleged that the pharmaceutical companies were improperly paying copayment subsidies to patients for their drugs. Yet Teva adopted Greenfield’s “some link” standard, while Regeneron adopted the “but-for” standard of the Sixth and Eighth Circuits. The Teva court also certified an interlocutory appeal to the First Circuit to resolve the issue prior to trial, which remains pending. 15 FCA defendants in cases arising out of the AKS thus continue to face substantial uncertainty as to the applicable standard outside the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits. That said, there is mounting skepticism of the Greenfield analysis, 16 and those defendants retain good arguments that the standard adopted by the Sixth and Eighth Circuits should apply.

Enforcement Trends

The also Government remained active in investigating and, in many cases, settling False Claims Act allegations. That enforcement activity included several large settlements, including a $377 million settlement with Booz Allen Hamilton arising out of its failure to comply with Federal Acquisition Regulation cost accounting standards. 17 Our review of this year’s activity revealed significant trends in both civil and criminal enforcement, which we briefly describe below.

Focus On Unsupported Coding In Medicare Advantage (Part C) Claims

Medicare recipients are increasingly turning to private insurers to manage the administration of their Medicare benefits: over half of Medicare enrollees now opt for managed care plans. 18 The Government announced several important enforcement actions focused on submissions to and the administration of Medicare Advantage plans.

On September 30, DOJ announced a $172 million settlement with Cigna due to an alleged scheme to submit unsupported Medicare coding to increase reimbursement rates. According to the press release, Cigna operated a “chart review” team that reviewed providers’ submitted materials and identified additional applicable diagnosis coding to include on requests for payment. The Government alleges that some of the coding Cigna added was not substantiated by the chart review. 19

Similarly, in October, the Government declined to prosecute insurer HealthSun for submitting diagnosis coding to CMS that increased applicable reimbursement rate of treatment without an actual underlying diagnosis by the treating physician. The declination was based on HealthSun’s voluntary self-disclosure of the conduct through the Criminal Division’s recently updated Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy. 20 DOJ did, however, indict the company’s former Director of Medicare Risk Adjustment Analytics for conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud and several counts of wire fraud and major fraud against the Government in the Southern District of Florida. 21

In May, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania announced a settlement against a Philadelphia primary care practice based on the submission of allegedly unsupported Medicare diagnosis coding in Part C submissions. The press release asserts that the practice coded numerous claims with morbid obesity diagnoses when the patients lacked the required body-mass index for the diagnosis and diagnosed chronic obstructive pulmonary disease without appropriate substantiation. 22

Both managed care organizations and providers that submit claims to Medicare Advantage should review their claim coding practices to ensure that their claims accurately reflect the medical diagnoses of the treating physician, as well as the treatment provided.

DOJ Follows Through On Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative

In 2021, DOJ announced the launch of its Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative, 23 which was aimed at policing government contractors’ failures to adequately protect government information by meeting prescribed cybersecurity requirements. This year, the enforcement of that policy led the Government to alleged FCA violations based on implied or explicit certifications of compliance with cybersecurity regulations:

In September, the Government declined to intervene in a qui tam action against Pennsylvania State University alleging that Penn State falsely certified compliance with Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 252.204-7012, which specifies controls required to safeguard defense-related information, during the length of its contract with the Defense Department. 24 However, the parties subsequently sought a 180 day stay of proceedings due to an ongoing government investigation, which was granted. 25 The application for the stay hinted that the Government may yet intervene in the action and file a superseding complaint. 26

DOJ also announced in September a $4 million settlement with Verizon Business Network Services LLC arising out of Verizon’s provision of internet services to federal agencies that was required to meet specific security standards. The Government’s press release, which specifically noted Verizon’s cooperation with the investigation, alleged that Verizon failed to implement “three required cybersecurity controls” in its provision of internet service, which were not individually specified. 27

Entities doing business with the Government should ensure that they are aware of all applicable cybersecurity laws and regulations governing that relationship and that they are meeting all such requirements.

Continued Crackdown On Telemedicine Fraud Schemes

Following OIG-HHS’s July 2022 Special Fraud Alert 28 regarding the recruitment of practitioners to prescribe treatment based on little to no patient interaction over telemedicine, DOJ announced several significant settlements involving that exact conduct. In many circumstances, the Government pursued criminal charges rather than civil FCA penalties alone.

In September, the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts announced a guilty plea to a conspiracy to commit health care fraud charge. The Government alleged that the defendant partnered with telemarketing companies to pay Medicare beneficiaries “on a per-order basis to generate orders for [durable medical equipment] and genetic testing,” and then found doctors willing to sign “prepopulated orders” based on telemedicine appointments that the doctors did not actually attend. 29

In June, as part of a “strategically coordinated” national enforcement action, DOJ announced action against several officers of a south Florida telemedicine company for an alleged $2 billion fraud involving the prescription of orthotic braces and other items to targeted Medicare recipients through cursory telemarketing appointments that were presented as in-person examinations. 30

Although enforcement in the telemedicine space to date has largely focused on obviously fraudulent conduct, practitioners should be aware that the Government may view overly short telemedicine appointments as insufficient to support diagnoses leading to claims for payment from the Government.

State False Claims Acts

Both Connecticut and New York made notable alterations to the scope of conduct covered by their state FCAs. Companies doing business with state governments should be aware that 32 states have their own FCAs, not all of which mirror the federal FCA.

Connecticut Expands FCA To Mirror Scope Of Federal Statute

Prior to this year, Connecticut’s False Claims Act covered only payments sought or received from a “stateadministered health or human services program” In June, however, Connecticut enacted a substantial revision to its state FCA, which seeks to mirror the scope and extent of the Federal FCA. 31 Those doing business with the state of Connecticut should conduct an FCA-focused compliance review of that business to avoid potential liability arising out of state law, and should also understand federal FCA jurisprudence, which is likely to have a significant influence on the new law’s interpretation.

New York Expands FCA To Cover Allow Tax-Related FCA Claims Against Non-Filers

New York is among the few states whose state FCAs cover tax-related claims. Prior to this year, though, the state and its municipalities could only assert tax-related claims against those who actually filed and whose filings contained false statements of fact. In May, New York amended its FCA to allow a cause of action against those who knowingly fail to file a New York tax return and pay New York taxes. 32 Companies doing business in New York should be aware that not filing required taxes in New York may potentially subject them to, among other things, the treble damages for which the FCA provides.

1 143 S. Ct. 1391 (2023).
Schutte, 143 S. Ct. at 1400-01.
See, e.g., United States ex rel. McSherry v. SLSCO, L.P., No. 18-CV-5981, 2023 WL 6050202,
at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2023).
4 143 S. Ct. 1720 (2023).
5 Id. at 1730.
6 Id. at 1734.
7 Id. at 1737 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); id. at 1741-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
8 See United States ex rel. Wallace v. Exactech, Inc., No. 7:18-cv-01010, 2023 WL 8027309, at
*4-6 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 20, 2023).
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g).
10 United States ex rel. Greenfield v. Medco Health Sol’ns, 880 F.3d 89, 98-100 (3d Cir. 2018).
11 United States ex rel. Cairns v. D.S. Med., LLC, 42 F. 4th 828, 834-36 (8th Cir. 2022).
12 United States ex rel. Martin v. Hathaway, 63 F. 4th 1043, 1052-53 (6th Cir. 2023).
13 Civ. A. No. 20-11548, 2023 WL 4565105 (D. Mass. July 14, 2023).
14 Civ. A. No. 20-11217, 2023 WL 7016900 (D. Mass. Oct. 25, 2023)
15 See United States v. Teva Pharma USA, Inc., No. 23-1958 (1st Cir. 2023).
16 See, e.g., Regeneron, 2023 WL 7016900, at *11 (remarking that the Greenfield analysis is
“fraught with problems” and “disconnected from long-standing common-law principles of
causation”).
17 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/booz-allen-agrees-pay-37745-million-settle-false-claims-act-
allegations.
18 https://www.kff.org/policy-watch/half-of-all-eligible-medicare-beneficiaries-are-now-enrolled-
in-private-medicare-advantage-plans/.
19 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/cigna-group-pay-172-million-resolve-false-claims-act-
allegations.
20 See https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-kenneth-polite-jr-delivers-
remarks-georgetown-university-law.
21 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-executive-medicare-advantage-organization-charged-
multimillion-dollar-medicare-fraud.
22 https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/primary-care-physicians-pay-15-million-resolve-false-
claims-act-liability-submitting.
23 See https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/deputy-attorney-general-lisa-o-monaco-announces-new-
civil-cyber-fraud-initiative.
24 See United States ex rel. Decker v. Penn. State Univ., Civ. A. No. 22-3895 (E.D. Pa. 2023).
25 Id. at ECF Nos. 24, 37.
26 Id. at ECF No. 24.

27 See https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/cooperating-federal-contractor-resolves-liability-alleged-
false-claims-caused-failure-fully.
28 https://oig.hhs.gov/documents/root/1045/sfa-telefraud.pdf.
29 https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/owner-telemedicine-companies-pleads-guilty-44-million-
medicare-fraud-scheme.
30 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/national-enforcement-action-results-78-individuals-charged-
25b-health-care-fraud.
31 See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 4-274–4-289.
32 See N.Y. State Fin. Law § 189(4)(a).

U.S. Department of Justice’s Criminal Division Implements Procedure to Immediately Review Civil Division Qui Tam Cases

vonBriesen

Recently, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) said that the Criminal Division implemented a new procedure related to qui tam cases. Under the new procedure, the Criminal Division will immediately review qui tam cases it receives from the DOJ’s Civil Division to determine whether to open a criminal investigation into the case. If the Criminal Division opens an investigation, it will work with the Civil Division and U.S. Attorney’s Offices to coordinate parallel investigations.

The announcement can be found here.

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