Tag: courtroom

Update Alert on Mickelson v. PGA Tour, Inc.

On August 16, 2022, we prepared an alert discussing Mickelson v. PGA Tour, Inc. and the claims made by suspended PGA Tour players (“Player Plaintiffs”) against PGA Tour, Inc. (“Tour.”) Quite a bit has transpired in the past three weeks both in and out of the courtroom. This alert highlights new developments that stem from an amended complaint that was filed in the US District Court, Northern District of California on August 26, 2022 (the “Amended Complaint.”)

The Amended Complaint can be found here and the original alert can be found here.

The Amended Complaint removes several Player-Plaintiffs listed as plaintiffs in the original complaint. Originally, the Player Plaintiffs were comprised of the following eleven golfers: Abraham Ancer, Bryson DeChambeau, Taylor Gooch, Matt Jones, Jason Kokrak, Phil Mickelson, Carlos Ortiz, Pat Perez, Ian Poulter, Hudson Swafford, and Peter Uihlein. Per the Amended Complaint, four of the original Plaintiff Players have been removed as plaintiffs, namely: Abraham Ancer, Jason Kokrak, Carlos Ortiz, and Pat Perez.[1] As a result, only seven of the eleven original Player Plaintiffs remain as Player Plaintiffs.

Perhaps the most significant development in the case is that LIV Golf has been added as a Plaintiff in the Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint generally reiterates allegations made by the Player Plaintiffs (together with LIV Golf, collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) in the original complaint and incorporates LIV Golf’s alleged harm, mainly, that the Tour’s efforts made to prevent LIV Golf’s entry into the elite professional golf market forced LIV Golf to delay and restructure its 2022 launch plans and required LIV Golf “to pay excessively higher guaranteed payments to recruit a number of marquee players than would be required in a competitive market.”

Three more claims were added to the Amended Complaint, for a total of eight claims brought by the Plaintiffs. The first new claim alleges that Tour has violated Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act by monopolizing the market for promotion of elite professional golf events (which is in addition to the Section 2 claim in the original complaint that alleges that the Tour maintains a monopoly on elite event services.) In addition to the now three antitrust claims brought in the Amended Complaint, LIV Golf also brought separate tortious interference claims of contractual relationships and prospective business relationships. The antitrust claims and the tortious interference claims are based on the premise that the Tour’s exclusionary actions: (i) prevent competition for the promotion of golf entertainment among stakeholders, such as broadcasters, players (via the Media Rights Regulation), vendors, sponsors, advertisers, partners, and agencies, and (ii) interfere with LIV Golf’s ability to negotiate and enter into contracts with those stakeholders.

Key Observations

Although more than one-third of the original Player Plaintiffs have withdrawn from Mickelson v. PGA Tour, Inc., the addition of LIV Golf as a plaintiff elevates the lawsuit because it brings the very public rivalry between the Tour and LIV Golf to the courtroom. The circumstances surrounding the case are also rapidly evolving. Since the order denying Player Plaintiffs Talor Gooch, Hudson Swafford, and Matt Jones’s motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”) issued on August 9, 2022, six Tour members (most notably world number 2 Cameron Smith) have joined LIV Golf, which amounts to nearly half of the major winners since 2016 and 26 of the world’s top 100 golfers that have now signed with LIV Golf. In addition, the Tour announced various rule changes for the 2023 PGA Tour season, including increased purse winnings, bonus pools, and elevated events. It remains to be seen whether these circumstances will materially alter the arguments made throughout the TRO proceedings.

The tentative date to hear dispositive motions (such as summary judgment) has been scheduled for July 23, 2023, and the jury trial date is expected to begin on January 8, 2024.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Pat Perez was the only player who directly provided the reason for his withdrawal: “I didn’t really think it through… I did it to back our guys,” he reportedly said. He also said that he does not have “ill will” towards the Tour and emphasized his content of playing for LIV Golf.

Article By Richard L. Brand, Thomas R. Castiello, Brian D. Schneider, and Anjelica L. Fuccillo of ArentFox Schiff LLP

For more entertainment, art, and sports legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 ArentFox Schiff LLP

Are You Being Served? Court Authorizes Service of Process Via Airdrop

In what may be the first of its kind, a New York state court has authorized service via token airdrop in a case regarding allegedly stolen cryptocurrency assets. This form of alternative service is novel but could become a more routine practice in an industry where the identities of potential parties to litigation may be difficult to ascertain using blockchain data alone.

Background on the Dispute

According to the Complaint in the case, the plaintiff LCX AG (“LCX”) is a Liechtenstein based virtual currency exchange. As alleged in the Complaint, on or about January 8, 2022, the unknown defendants (named in the Complaint as John Does 1-25) illegitimately gained access to LCX’s cryptocurrency wallet and transferred $7.94 million worth of digital assets out of LCX’s control. Cryptocurrency wallets are similar in many ways to bank accounts, in that they can be used to hold and transfer assets. In the same way a thief can transfer funds from a bank account if they gain access to that account, thieves can also transfer cryptocurrency assets if they gain access to the keys to the wallet holding digital assets.

Following the alleged theft, LCX and its third-party consulting firm determined that the suspected thieves used “Tornado Cash,” which is a “mixing” service designed to hide transactions on an otherwise publicly available blockchain ledger by using complicated transfers between unrelated wallets. While Tornado Cash and other mixing services have legal purposes such as preserving the anonymity of parties to legitimate transactions, they are also utilized by criminals to launder digital funds in an illicit manner.

Even the use of these mixing services, however, can often also be unwound. This is especially true in transactions of large amounts of cryptocurrency, similar to how transactions utilizing complex money laundering schemes in the international banking system can be unwound. According to the blockchain data platform Chainalysis, although Illicit crypto transactions reached an all-time high of $14 billion in 2021, these suspected nefarious transactions accounted for 0.15% of crypto volume last year, down from 0.62% in 2020.

While the Complaint alleges the suspected thieves used Tornado Cash, LCX believes its hired consultants were able to unwind those mixing services to identify a wallet which is alleged to still hold $1.274 million of the allegedly stolen assets.

Unlike bank accounts which have associated identifying information, there are often no registered addresses or other identifying information connected to digital wallets. This makes it difficult to provide the actual proof of service required to institute an action or obtain a judgement against an individual where the only known information is their digital wallet addresses. Service via token airdrop into those wallet addresses solves that issue.

Service Via Airdrop

Service of lawsuits is traditionally made on the defendant personally at a home or business address via special process servers. In cases where service on the individual is not possible for some reason, many states authorize alternative means of service if the plaintiff can show that the alternative means of service likely to provide actual notice of the litigation to the defendant. For example, courts have historically allowed notice via newspaper publication as an alternative means of service where the defendant cannot be serviced personally.

Here, the Court permitted service via “airdrop” in which a digital token is placed in a specific cryptocurrency wallet, similar to how a direct deposit can place funds in a traditional bank account. This particular token contained a hyperlink to the associated court filings in the case, and a mechanism which allowed the data of any individual who clicked on the hyperlink to be tracked. While this is a novel way to serve notice of a lawsuit, similar airdrops have been used to communicate with the owners of otherwise anonymous cryptocurrency wallet owners. Such was the case recently when actor Seth Green had his Bored Ape non-fungible token (“NFT”) stolen and the unknowing buyer of the stolen NFT was otherwise difficult to locate.

While this type of digital service is new, it could be implemented in many disputes in the future regarding digital assets. Similar to the authorization of service that was seen recently in the Facebook Biometric Information Privacy Act litigation (where notice was served on potential class members via email and directly on the Facebook platform), service via airdrop may be the most efficient way to inform potential lawsuit participants of the pending dispute and how they can protect their rights in that dispute.

This type of airdropped service is not without issues, though. First, transactions on the blockchain are largely publicly available, meaning any individual with the wallet address would also be able to see service of the lawsuit notice. Additionally, many users are hesitant to click on unknown links (such as the one in the airdropped LCX) due to legitimate cybersecurity concerns.

While service via airdropped token is unlikely to replace traditional methods of service, it may be a useful means of serving process on unknown persons where there is a digital wallet linked to the acts which the applicable lawsuit relates.

Article By Bryan M. Westhoff, Daniel L. McAvoy, and Jonathan E. Schmalfeld of Polsinelli PC

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

Ninth Circuit Reverses Class Certification Order Because Liability Issues, Not Merely Damages, Were Individualized

The Ninth Circuit recently addressed an issue that tends to arise frequently in class certification motion practice: how trial courts should apply the predominance requirement where appellate decisions have said that the need to calculate individualized damages generally is not sufficient on its own to defeat class certification, but some putative class members likely have no damages. On these types of issues, plaintiffs often try to characterize defendants’ arguments in opposition to class certification as raising mere “damages issues” that can be addressed individually at the end of a class case, and defendants often respond that the issues they raise go to liability, not merely damages, and in any event the damages trials would be too complicated and impractical. The Ninth Circuit recently clarified that if determining liability requires highly individualized inquiries, a class should not be certified, and any individualized damages trials would have to be feasible.

In Bowerman v. Field Asset Services, Inc., Nos. 18-16303, 18-17275, — F.4th –, 2022 WL 2433971 (9th Cir. July 5, 2022), the plaintiffs contracted with the defendant to perform preservation services on properties being foreclosed on. They claimed that they should have been classified as employees rather than independent contractors under California law, and therefore should have been paid overtime and reimbursed for business expenses. The district court certified a class, decided certain issues on partial summary judgment in favor of the class, and left for a later damages trial whether a class member worked overtime (and to what extent) and whether the class member was entitled to reimbursement for business expenses (and the amount thereof).

The Ninth Circuit reversed the class certification order. It explained that “We need not decide whether common evidence can prove that [defendant] has a uniform policy of misclassifying its vendors” because “[defendant’s] liability to any class member for failing to pay them overtime wages or to reimburse their business expenses would require highly individualized inquiries on whether that particular class member ever worked overtime or ever incurred any ‘necessary’ business expenses.” (Emphasis in original.) The plaintiffs had “mischaracterize[d] an issue of individualized liability as an issue of individualized damages.” (Emphasis in original.) The Ninth Circuit explained that if the question involves the existence of damages, that is a liability issue, not a damages issue.

The Ninth Circuit also concluded that, under its interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013), the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that damages were “capable of measurement on a classwide basis” because they could not “show that the whole class suffered damages traceable to their alleged misclassification as independent contractors,” even if the amounts of those damages would need to be proven individually. In addition, determining damages would require “excessive difficulty” because there was little documentary evidence, and “using the individual testimony of self-interested class members to calculate the overtime hours they worked and the business expenses they incurred isn’t easy.” In a bellwether trial conducted by the district court, eight trial days had been required to determine damages for a sample of only eleven class members.

This decision helpfully clarifies the perennial debate between what constitutes a “damages” issue versus a “liability” issue. As I’ve often written on this blog, it can be helpful to think about the class certification analysis by analyzing how the named plaintiffs’ or putative class members’ claims would be tried in an ordinary individual case, and what evidence the defendant would be entitled to introduce. Here, the bellwether trial helped the Ninth Circuit determine that this case could not be litigated on a class basis.

Article By Wystan M. Ackerman of Robinson & Cole LLP

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.

Cameras Coming to an Illinois Courtroom Near You: What Are the Rules and What Impact Might They Have

Heyl Royster Law firm

Probably everyone saw portions of the O.J. Simpson and George Zimmerman trials, because each was a high profile case broadcasted on live television. Now, cameras are coming to Illinois courtrooms.

In January 2012, the Illinois Supreme Court approved the use of“extended media coverage” in the courtrooms of judicial circuits that applied for such coverage and received approval. “Extended media coverage” essentially means the use of still cameras, video cameras, and audio recording. Over time, 40 Illinois counties have applied for and received approval to allow extended media coverage in their courtrooms.

Attorneys and clients must familiarize themselves with the applicable rules for extended media coverage, and must consider and prepare for the practical implications if cameras will be present at trial. While such media coverage will likely be limited to criminal cases in most instances, it will inevitably occur in high profile civil cases, including some medical malpractice cases. And, if extended media coverage proves to benefit one side or the other over time, attorneys representing those parties will undoubtedly push for more and more coverage.

Who or What is Considered “Media”?

Historically, the media may have been thought of as newspapers and television stations. Today, however, the term media may include biased blogs, social media, or other similar internet media that does not follow basic standards of journalism. Luckily, Illinois rules operate with a more historical definition of media, thus limiting who may request to cover the trial and hopefully ensuring a certain amount of fairness in reporting. In order to be credentialed under the rules, a media member or organization must be regularly engaged in news gathering and reporting, cover judicial proceedings on a consistent basis, and must regularly follow basic journalistic standards for ethics, accuracy and objectivity.

Request for Extended Media Coverage

Extended media coverage is not allowed as of right. Instead, a credentialed media member must make a written request and have that request granted by the court before extended media coverage is allowed. The request for media coverage must be made at least 14 days before the trial or hearing the media member wishes to cover. Further, the written request must be provided to all attorneys. The 14 day requirement allows the defense time to consider the request and make appropriate objections prior to the trial or hearing.

Objection to Extended Media Coverage

Objections to extended media coverage may be raised by the parties to the lawsuit and may also be raised by witnesses. In either case, a written objection is required, but the timing of the objection can differ for parties and witnesses. If a party, i.e. plaintiff or defendant, wishes to object, his written objection must be filed at least 3 days before the beginning of the trial or hearing. Witnesses must be advised by the attorney presenting their testimony of the right to object, and the witness must file his objection before the beginning of the trial or hearing. The rule also allows the judge to exercise discretion to consider objections that do not comport with the timing requirements.

Once an objection to extended media coverage has been made, the judge may rule on the basis of the written objection alone, or he may choose to hear evidence. At his discretion, the judge may choose to hear evidence from a party, witness, or media coordinator before ruling.

It would be inadvisable to object to media coverage in a trial where no member of the media has made a written request for coverage. Such a pre-emptive motion would be likely to draw media interest where none previously existed.

Technical Requirements and Sharing Equipment

Technical requirements for the cameras and other equipment are provided in the rules. The overall theme of these rules is to ensure that any equipment is not obstructive or disruptive during the trial or hearing. The equipment cannot produce distracting lights or noises during operation. Further, no flashbulbs or other lighting may be used to aid the cameras.

The rules limit the amount of equipment allowed in the courtroom, again with the overall goal of limiting obstructions and distractions. A maximum of two still cameras and two television cameras are allowed, but the judge may choose to limit that to only one still camera and one television camera. Only one audio recording system is permitted. Obviously, if multiple media outlets wish to cover the trial or hearing, they may be required to share the video and audio stream under the rules.

What May be Filmed or Photographed

Most trials and other hearings may be recorded, with exceptions limited mostly to the area of family law. Importantly though, several portions of the trial cannot be recorded. Jury selection cannot be recorded at all, and the media is forbidden from filming or photographing individual jurors or the jury as a whole. This is an important protection provided in the rule, because if a juror is assured that he cannot be recorded, the juror should feel less inclined to consider public opinion in deciding the case. Further, the media may not record interactions between the lawyer and client, between opposing lawyers, or between the judge and the lawyers, i.e. sidebars. And, no materials, papers or exhibits can be recorded unless they are admitted to evidence or shown to the jury. These limitations are obviously important to protect the confidential attorney-client relationship, among other things. Finally, no filming is allowed during recesses or in the public areas or hallways, which provides some known off-camera time.

Live Blogging

A judge also has discretion to allow live blogging during a trial or other proceeding, which does not include visual or audio recording. The most typical example of live blogging would be tweeting, but includes any transmittal in text form of testimony, proceedings, and summaries from the courtroom. Again, only credentialed news media are allowed to engage in live blogging.

The rule allowing for live blogging simply says that it may be allowed upon request. It does not provide a time-period within which the request must be made, and does not provide for objections. However, the decision to allow live blogging is left to the “absolute discretion” of the judge, and therefore, it seems reasonable that a judge would also be vested with the authority to allow objections and consider whatever he deems necessary. In any event, an objection can always be stated on the record, whether or not the judge chooses to consider it.

Required Jury Admonishment and Jury Instruction

Jurors cannot be photographed or filmed, with the apparent goal of minimizing any influence or consideration of public opinion. Carrying this theme further, the rules require the trial judge to read an admonishment to the jury at the beginning of the trial and an instruction to the jury at the conclusion of trial regarding the media coverage. Of course, the admonishment and instruction advise the jury that they should not be influenced by or draw inferences based upon the presence of the media. Also, importantly, the admonishment advises the jury they cannot be photographed or filmed as a group or individually, and it advises the jurors to inform the court if the cameras are distracting or cause an inability to concentrate.

Practical Considerations and Potential Effects

At the outset, the lawyer and client should consider whether they do or do not want cameras in the courtroom. In most cases, the defense would prefer cameras not be present so that the trial is focused exclusively on liability and damages, not extraneous issues. If a request for extended media coverage is made, the lawyer and client should ask themselves why the request is being made, and whether a written objection should be filed. If an objection will be filed, however, it should be based upon specific facts or concerns in that case. The Illinois Supreme Court and local judicial circuit have already determined, from a policy standpoint, that cameras should be allowed if the rules are complied with. Therefore, objections based upon general concerns that cameras may be disruptive or may have a negative impact on the jury are likely to fail.

Conclusion

While most defendants and their lawyers are opposed to cameras in the courtroom, it appears that they are here to stay for the foreseeable future. Given the national trend toward cameras in the courtroom and instantaneous media, it’s hard to imagine that these rules will ever be reversed. Therefore, attorneys and clients will need to carefully consider how to operate within the rules in a way that most favors the presentation of their case.

ARTICLE BY

Matthew Thompson
OF
Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C.