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U.S. Sentencing Commission Weighing Recommendation to Increase Criminal Antitrust Penalties

In June, the United States Sentencing Commission, which is appointed by the President to make recommendations to Congress on the criminal penalties for the violation of federal law, issued a request for comments regarding whether the guidelines for calculating antitrust fines should be modified. Currently, corporate fines for cartel price fixing are calculated on a sliding scale, tied to the amount of the “overcharge” imposed by the violators, with the standard maximum fine under the Guidelines for a corporation capped at $100 million and, for an individual, capped at $1 million. The deadline for such comments was July 29, and the views expressed on the issue varied considerably.

Contending that the current Guidelines do not provide an adequate deterrent to antitrust violations, the American Antitrust Institute urged the Commission to recommend an increase in the fines for cartel behavior. The AAI stated that the presumption in the Guidelines that antitrust cartels, on average, “overcharge” consumers for goods by 10% is greatly understated, and thus should be corrected to reflect more accurate levels. Pointing to economic studies and cartel verdicts, the AAI suggests that the median cartel “overcharge” is actually in excess of 20%, and therefore the presumption should be modified in the Guidelines. If adopted, the AAI’s proposal would double the recommended fines under the Guidelines for antitrust violations.

Perhaps surprisingly, the DOJ responded to the Commission’s Notice by stating that it believes that the current fines are sufficient, and that no increase in antitrust fines is warranted at this time. The DOJ indicated that the 10% overcharge presumption provides a “predictable, uniform methodology” for the calculation of fines in most cases, and noted that the Guidelines already permit the DOJ to exceed the fine levels calculated using the 10% overcharge presumption in some circumstances. Specifically, the DOJ noted that the alternative sentencing provisions of 18 USC 3571 already permit it to sidestep the standard guidelines and seek double the gain or loss from the violation where appropriate. Notably, the DOJ utilized this provision in seeking a $1 billion fine from AU Optronics in a 2012 action, although the court declined the request, characterizing it as “excessive”. The court did, however, impose a $500 million fine, an amount well in excess of the cap under the standard antitrust fine guidelines.

Finally, D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Douglas Ginsburg and FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright offered a completely different view on the issue in comments that they submitted to the Sentencing Commission. Suggesting that fines imposed on corporations seem to have little deterrent effect, regardless of amount, they encouraged the Commission to instead recommend an increase in the individual criminal penalty provisions for antitrust violations. Notably, they encouraged the Commission not only to consider recommending an increase in the fines to which an individual might be subjected (currently capped at $1 million), but also to recommend an increase in the prescribed range of jail sentences for such conduct (which currently permit for imprisonment of up to 10 years).

The Commission will now weigh these comments and ultimately submit its recommendations to Congress by next May. If any changes are adopted by Congress, they would likely go into effect later next year. Stay tuned.

ARTICLE BY

James M. Burns

Dickinson Wright PLLC

United Kingdom: A Reminder About Careful Drafting of Confidentiality Clauses for Shareholders

The recent decision by the High Court of England and Wales (Chancery Division) in Richmond Pharmacology Limited (Company) v. Chester Overseas Limited, et al. underscores the need to carefully draft confidentiality clauses and to incorporate specific exceptions where these exceptions are reasonably foreseeable in the future. The case involved a shareholders agreement which contained a standard confidentiality clause requiring the parties to treat as strictly confidential all commercially sensitive information concerning the company subject to certain prescribed exceptions. One of the exceptions allowed disclosure to a professional advisor provided that the advisor agrees to be bound by a similar confidentiality obligation. Unsurprisingly, however, there was no specific exception allowing disclosures to a potential third-party buyer. Under the terms of the clause as drafted, the shareholder was required to obtain consent to make the disclosures.

Over time Chester Overseas Limited decided to sell its shares and engaged a corporate finance advisor (Advisor) to assist in facilitating the sale. After the initial discussions regarding a management buy-out fell through, the Advisor sought to generate interest from third parties. In doing so, the Advisor took care to obtain nondisclosure agreements from certain of these potential buyers prior to disclosing the sensitive information.

In its decision, the High Court stated that while the shareholder was entitled to disclose the information to its Advisor pursuant to the professional advisor exception, it was not authorized to disclose the confidential information to third parties.

While the High Court’s decision regarding the confidentiality clause may not come as a surprise, it does reinforce the need to carefully consider a client’s position in future transactions governed under English law.

The High Court’s decision is available here.

ARTICLE BY

Neil Robson

Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

Sizing Up the Competition: Antitrust Enforcement and the Bazaarvoice Ruling

High-profile or highly profitable firms are no longer the sole targets of post-merger divestitures by antitrust enforcers. Today, firms that have little or no revenues, including some that operate in emergent industries with little or negative profits, also find themselves subject to merger inquiries, as demonstrated by the recent merger review of Bazaarvoice’s 2012 non-reportable $160 million acquisition of PowerReviews.

Bazaarvoice merger antitrust

These competing firms were both operating at a loss in the relatively small Ratings and Review (R&R) market. Yet, the nature of competition in the industry and the industry’s potential importance to adjacent industries – combined with statements by the acquirer’s executives prior to the transaction – attracted the scrutiny of antitrust enforcers. Ultimately, Bazaarvoice agreed to divest all of its PowerReviews assets, including employees and client base, to a small competitor, Viewpoints – which had initially entered R&R space by building a solution for Sears – for $30 million.

This article considers the economic arguments and evidence used by the court to reach its decision in United States v. Bazaarvoice.

Background

R&R platforms offer an online interface for customer reviews of different products, which can help to drive sales, increase product visibility, and offer valuable information on customers to brands and retailers, allowing brands to respond to customer concerns in real time. Leading platforms offer clients the following services: confirmation of the authenticity of customer reviews; moderation of reviews (e.g., removing offensive language); syndication that combines reviews from multiple retailers to increase the visibility of a product; data on retailers and social media analytics to support marketing; and search engine optimization to drive traffic. Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews offered clients all of these services, but Bazaarvoice generally provided more customizable features at higher price points to larger clients. Bazaarvoice offered human moderation of customer reviews, for example, while PowerReviews offered only automated monitoring.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) applied competitive analysis that ignored more traditional focuses on supracompetitive pricing, high margins, and immediate harm to consumers.

In 2012, Bazaarvoice had 800 employees and revenue of $106.1 million; in 2011, the privately held PowerReviews employed just 80 people and reportedly had revenue of $11.5 million. Although PowerReviews did not publicly report its profitability, according to Bazaarvoice executives, the smaller firm was operating at a loss. Similarly, Bazaarvoice itself reported consistently negative operating margins in 2011–2013 that were no higher than -23%.

At the time of the court ruling (January 2014), actual competition from other platforms in the R&R market was marginal, composed primarily of a handful of start-ups with inferior products or of larger firms that offered complementary products. Direct competitors like Pluck, Gigya, Practical Data, Rating-system.com, and European Reevoo were tiny, with few customers and weak services. More established firms that might have acted as potential competitors, such as Google, Facebook, Oracle, and Salesforce, were more interested in partnering with Bazaarvoice than in competing in the R&R market. Meanwhile, Amazon accounted for 28% of e-commerce revenue and maintained (and still does, as of August 2014) its own R&R platform, which was not available to competing retailers.

Competitive arguments and evidence

In its review of the transaction, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) applied competitive analysis that ignored more traditional focuses on supracompetitive pricing, high margins, and immediate harm to consumers. The analysis focused instead on the nature of competition in the R&R industry, including barriers to entry and the anticompetitive potential for long-run harm to consumers as detailed in the assessments of Bazaarvoice senior staff.

Low margins: The parties were losing money. Their profits were a far cry from the supracompetitive profits often associated with companies targeted by antitrust litigation. In previous antitrust cases against Microsoft, for example, the company’s margins on Windows and MS Office had played a significant role at trial. Similarly, the potential for enhanced market power and exceptional margins contributed to the DOJ decision to prevent Microsoft from acquiring Intuit in 1994–1995.

Barriers to entry: Bazaarvoice’s extensive syndication network, in particular, became a major component of the case. The DOJ argued that it would be extremely difficult for competitors to develop a comparable syndication network of retailers and brands, allowing Bazaarvoice to leverage anticompetitive economies of scale across many important clients. These advantages, combined with the difficulty of switching from one R&R platform to another – as demonstrated by the reluctance of PowerReviews customers to switch to the Bazaarvoice platform – would effectively block new entrants from the market. While the DOJ’s argument was much less convincing with respect to other barriers to entry, such as the company’s technology and reputation, clearly antitrust enforcers had seized on important elements of the relationship between Bazaarvoice’s value proposition and the growth of the R&R market.

Bad documents: These potential anticompetitive implications were explicitly referenced in Bazaarvoice’s own internal documents, which became instrumental in court. The firm’s current CEO remarked that there were “literally, no other competitors” beyond PowerReviews, and the former CEO wrote that after the proposed acquisition of PowerReviews, Bazaarvoice would have “[n]o meaningful direct competitor.” Bazaarvoice senior executives openly acknowledged that syndication networks created high barriers to entry in the R&R industry and clearly described that the elimination of Bazaarvoice’s “primary competitor” would provide “relief from price erosion.” The DOJ seized on these documents, arguing that the merger would increase prices and eliminate the “substantial price discounts” that retailers and manufacturers received as a result of competition between Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews.

Court’s opinion

In this case, the court noted these apparent competitive weaknesses and remained on the lookout for changes in the R&R market. In fact, in the 18 months from the time of the acquisition on June 12, 2012, until the case’s ultimate outcome on January 8, 2014, the only post-merger evidence that was considered dispositive by the court was
the absence of serious entry to the market. The court explicitly rejected the use of pricing data, suggesting that it could be manipulated. The same pricing data that regulators might have expected to rise above competitive levels – and that therefore could have created space for new entrants in the R&R market at lower price points – was viewed as suspect. The DOJ case was structured instead around the absence of a credible entry threat in the R&R space, despite Bazaarvoice’s annual margins of around -30%.

Discussion

The court’s focus on the entry threat and its dismissal of pricing policies is curious, because the two issues are highly related. In an industry characterized by prices so low that the market leader is highly unprofitable, new firms have no incentive to enter. To become profitable, Bazaarvoice would have had to double its prices, and yet no evidence presented in the case demonstrated that entry would be impossible at that much higher price level. Surprisingly, the court did not connect these two issues in a meaningful way.

For Bazaarvoice, the challenge was less about responding to customer concerns or even to actual prices than it was about addressing the incendiary internal paper trail left by the company’s senior executives. In fact, as the testifying expert for Bazaarvoice/PowerReviews, Dr. Ramsey Shehadeh, pointed out, customers expressed no reservations about the merger, and Bazaarvoice had not raised prices. Ultimately, the court discounted Bazaarvoice’s arguments related to the absence of actual anticompetitive effects, noting that the firms could moderate their behavior while under antitrust scrutiny and focused instead on the firm’s own internal documents, which had detailed a plan to block competitive pressure. Bazaarvoice found itself fighting its own internal assessment of the competitive effects of the proposed merger, in addition to the DOJ’s economic arguments. The internal documents and emails were far more difficult to explain away than the economic circumstances, resulting in a full divestiture.

ARTICLE BY

Rebecca Kirk Fair

Analysis Group, Inc.

ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund: How Broad Was That Bylaw?

On our July 1st posting, I noted a recent Form 8-K filing that discloses the adoption of a fee-shifting bylaw. In ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 2014 Del. LEXIS 209 (Del. May 8, 2014), the Delaware Supreme Court held that a fee-shifting provisions in a non-stock corporation’s bylaws can be valid and enforceable under Delaware law. In reaching this conclusion, the Court said: ”A bylaw that allocates risk among parties in intra-corporate litigation would also appear to satisfy the DGCL’s requirement that bylaws must ‘relat[e] to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.’” Note that the Court held that a fee-shifting bylaw “can be valid and enforceable”. Thus, the Court only addressed the question of facial validity – it expressly disclaimed any conclusions on either the adoption or use of the bylaw in question.

In my review of the bylaw at issue in the case, it seems to me that it is so broadly worded that it arguably covers situations unrelated to the business of the corporation et cetera. Here is the bylaw as quoted in the Court’s opinion:

In the event that (i) any [current or prior member or Owner or anyone on their behalf (“Claiming Party”)] initiates or asserts any [claim or counterclaim (“Claim”)] or joins, offers substantial assistance to or has a direct financial interest in any Claim against the League or any member or Owner (including any Claim purportedly filed on behalf of the League or any member), and (ii) the Claiming Party (or the third party that received substantial assistance from the Claiming Party or in whose Claim the Claiming Party had a direct financial interest) does not obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy sought, then each Claiming Party shall be obligated jointly and severally to reimburse the League and any such member or Owners for all fees, costs and expenses of every kind and description (including, but not limited to, all reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation expenses) (collectively, “Litigation Costs”) that the parties may incur in connection with such Claim.

Now, let’s suppose that one member of the corporation is driving to pick up her child at school and collides with an automobile driven by another member who is on her way to a social occasion. If the first member sues the second member and fails to obtain a judgment on the merits, will that member be liable under the bylaw for attorneys’ fees and other costs? The bylaw seems to require only that a member assert a claim against another member and fail to obtain a judgment. The bylaw does not on its face require that the claim be brought by or against a member qua member.

Article By:

Keith Paul Bishop

Of:

Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

Retroactive Tax Planning Re: U.S. Shareholders of Foreign Corporations

Converting Subpart F Income into Qualified Dividends

U.S. shareholders of foreign corporations are generally not subject to tax on the earnings of such corporations until the earnings are repatriated to the shareholders in the form of a dividend. Moreover, when a foreign corporation is resident in a jurisdiction with which the United States has a comprehensive income tax treaty, the dividends distributed to its individual U.S. shareholders are eligible for reduced qualified dividend tax rates (currently taxed at a maximum federal income tax rate of 20 percent).

Where a foreign corporation is classified as a “controlled foreign corporation” (“CFC”) for an uninterrupted period of 30 days or more during any taxable year, however, its U.S. shareholders must include in income their pro rata share of the Subpart F income of the CFC for that taxable year, whether or not such earnings are distributed. A CFC is a foreign corporation, more than 50 percent of which is owned (by vote or value), directly or indirectly, by “U.S. shareholders.” A U.S. shareholder, for the purpose of the CFC rules, is a U.S. person who owns, directly, indirectly or constructively, at least ten percent of the combined voting power with respect to the foreign corporation.

In addition to the inability to defer taxation on its share of a CFC’s subpart F income, one of the pitfalls of a U.S. shareholder owning stock in a CFC is that subpart F income is treated as ordinary income to the U.S. shareholder (currently taxed at a maximum federal income tax rate of 39.6 percent), regardless of whether the CFC is resident in a jurisdiction that has an income tax treaty with the United States. Therefore, the U.S. shareholder would not be able to repatriate its profits at qualified dividend rates.

Among other things, subpart F income generally includes passive investment income (e.g., interest, dividends, rents and royalties) and net gain from the sale of property that gives rise to passive investment income. Gain on the sale of stock in a foreign corporation, for example, falls within this category. Consequently, when a CFC sells stock of a lower-tier corporation, the U.S. shareholders of the CFC will have to include their share of the gain from the sale as subpart F income, which will be taxed immediately at ordinary income rates.

Check-the-Box Elections

Pursuant to the “check-the-box” entity classification rules, a business entity that is not treated as a per se corporation is an “eligible entity” that may elect its classification for federal income tax purposes. An eligible entity with two or more members may elect to be classified as either a corporation or a partnership. An eligible entity with only one member may elect to be classified as either a corporation or a disregarded entity.

Generally, the effective date of a check-the-box election cannot be more than 75 days prior to the date on which the election is filed. However, Rev. Proc. 2009-41 provides that if certain requirements are met, an eligible entity may file a late classification election within 3 years and 75 days of the requested effective date of the election. These requirements may be met if:

The entity failed to obtain its requested classification solely because the election was not timely filed
The entity has not yet filed a tax return for the first year in which the election was intended
The entity has reasonable cause for failure to make a timely election

The conversion from a corporation into a partnership or disregarded entity pursuant to a check-the-box election results in a deemed liquidation of the corporation on the day immediately preceding the effective date of the election. Distributions of property in liquidation of the corporation generally are treated as taxable events, as if the shareholders sold their stock back to the corporation in exchange for the corporation’s assets. As a result, the corporation shareholders would recognize gain on the liquidating distributions to the extent the fair market value of the corporation’s assets exceeds the basis of the shareholders’ shares. In addition, subject to limited exceptions, the corporation generally would recognize gain on the liquidating distribution of any appreciated property.

Converting Subpart F Income into Qualified Dividends

A CFC that elects to convert from a corporation into a partnership or disregarded entity generally would recognize Subpart F income on the deemed liquidation, to the extent it holds property that gives rise to passive investment income (such as stock in subsidiary corporations). The subpart F income inclusion rules only apply, however, when the foreign corporation has been a CFC for a period of 30 uninterrupted days in the given taxable year. Where the election is made effective as of January 2, the liquidation of the foreign corporation would be deemed to occur on January 1 of that year. Because the foreign corporation would be deemed to have been liquidated on January 1, it would not have been a CFC for 30 days during the year of liquidation. As a result, subpart F income would not be triggered on the deemed liquidation of the foreign corporation.

In addition, as a result of the check-the-box election, a U.S. shareholder of the foreign corporation would recognize gain on the deemed liquidation as if the shareholder sold its stock back to the corporation in exchange for the corporation’s assets. Section 1248(a) provides, however, that when a U.S. person sells or exchanges its shares in a foreign corporation that was a CFC during the 5-year period prior to disposition, the gain from the sale is recharacterized as a dividend to the extent of the allocable share of the earnings and profits of the foreign corporation. To the extent the foreign corporation is resident in a country with which the U.S. has an income tax treaty, its individual U.S. shareholders would be eligible for the reduced qualified dividend income tax rate on such dividend.

This may be illustrated by the following example:

A, a U.S. individual, is the sole shareholder of X, a foreign corporation resident in a country with which the United States has a comprehensive income tax treaty. X owns 40 percent of the shares of Y, another foreign corporation. In October 2013, X sells all of its shares of Y. X is a CFC and the net gain from the sale of the Y shares constitutes subpart F income. As a result, the gain would have to be included in A’s gross income as ordinary income. Instead, X files a retroactive check-the-box election pursuant to Rev. Proc. 2009-41 to be treated as a disregarded entity as of January 2, 2013. The election results in a deemed liquidation of X on January 1, 2013. Because X has not been a CFC for a period of 30 uninterrupted days in 2013, however, subpart F income is not triggered on the deemed liquidation of X. In addition, the gain recognized by A on the deemed liquidation of X is recharacterized as a dividend and subject to tax at the reduced rates applicable to qualified dividend income.

As a result, the combination of Section 1248(a) and the retroactive check-the-box rules allows individual U.S. shareholders of a CFC to convert gain that would be realized upon the sale of the CFC’s assets from subpart F income (taxed as ordinary income at rates up to 39.6 percent) to qualified dividend income (currently taxed at 20 percent). Following the deemed liquidation of the foreign corporation, because all of the assets would be deemed to have been distributed to the shareholders in complete liquidation of the corporation, and the shareholders would recognize gain on the receipt of the assets, the basis of the assets would be stepped up to fair market value, reducing or eliminating gain recognized upon the subsequent sale of the assets of the former CFC.

Article By:

Jeffrey L. Rubinger

Nadia E. Kruler

Joshua Kaplan

Of:

Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP

Why October 1, 2014 Is An Important Date For Management Persons Of Nevada Entities

Two years ago, the Nevada Supreme Court in an en band decision held that a state district court may exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident officers and directors of a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in Spain. Consipio Holding, BV v. Carlberg, 282 P.3d 751 (Nev. 2012). The Supreme Court reasoned

When officers or directors directly harm a Nevada corporation, they are harming a Nevada citizen. By purposefully directing harm towards a Nevada citizen, officers and directors establish contacts with Nevada and “affirmatively direct [] conduct” toward Nevada.

At the time, Nevada, unlike Delaware, had no implied consent statute. Thus, the Nevada Supreme Court’s holding was based on Nevada’s long-arm statute, NRS 14.065(1).

In the ensuing session, the Nevada legislature decided to address the issue as well by enacting an implied consent statute:

Every nonresident of this State who, on or after October 1, 2013, accepts election or appointment, including reelection or reappointment, as a management person of an entity, or who, on or after October 1, 2014, serves in such capacity, and every resident of this State who accepts election or appointment or serves in such capacity and thereafter removes residence from this State shall be deemed, by the acceptance or by the service, to have consented to the appointment of the registered agent of the entity as an agent upon whom service of process may be made in all civil actions or proceedings brought in this State by, on behalf of or against the entity in which the management person is a necessary or proper party, or in any action or proceeding against the management person for a violation of a duty in such capacity, whether or not the person continues to serve as the management person at the time the action or proceeding is commenced. The acceptance or the service by the management person shall be deemed to be signification of the consent of the management person that any process so served has the same legal force and validity as if served upon the management person within this State.

NRS 75.160(1). Under the statute, an “entity” means a corporation, whether or not for profit; limited-liability company; limited partnership; or a business trust. NRS 78.160(10)(b). A “management person” means a director, officer, manager, managing member, general partner or trustee of an entity. NRS 75.160(10)(c).

Apparently, the Nevada legislature did not consult with Professor Eric Chiappinelli who last year published an article arguing that Delaware’s implied consent statute was unconstitutional. The Myth of Director Consent: After Shaffer, Beyond Nicastro, 37 Del. J. Corp. L. 783 (2013).

Why does the statute refer to October 1? Pursuant to NRS 218D.330(1), each law and joint resolution passed by the Legislature becomes effective on October 1 following its passage, unless the law or joint resolution specifically prescribes a different effective date.

Article By:

Keith Paul Bishop

Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

Tips for Success in the Current Mergers and Acquisitions Environment

If you have been waiting for a recovery in the Merger & Acquisition environment in the defense and government services industries, we have bad news: you will most likely have to wait until well into 2014. By almost all accounts, the M&A market has yet to snap out of the doldrums.

Back in 2008 and 2009, we could blame the problem on a dearth of available financing; however, today there is plenty of cash on corporate balance sheets. Lenders are more than willing to finance good deals. So, what gives? The reasons are diverse, including concerns over declining federal budgets, uncertain government programs, questions about the sustainability of global growth, and the increasing cost of business resulting from the vast array and complexity of government regulations, to name just a few.

With M&A volume meandering sideways, the fact that valuations are stagnant should also come as no surprise. Middle market M&A multiples continue to remain in the 4X to 6X EBITDA range, and sometimes higher in the case of acquisitions by strategic buyers.

While this all might sound depressing, it should not be. For companies with an interest in growing through M&A, conditions could not be much better. Between cash balances and available credit, there is plenty of financing available to fund good deals. Next, the Federal Reserve and other central banks have indicated a commitment to maintain low interest rate environments. Additionally, Baby Boomer retirements and generational transitions in family-owned businesses should continue to result in buying opportunities. Finally, the absence of frothy valuations typically present at this stage of a recovery have not yet materialized, increasing the likelihood of M&A success (when measured in terms of return on investment). This last point is particularly important, because M&A failure rates tend to increase dramatically as asset prices increase. Additionally, many larger companies are opting to divest non-core business units.

Despite the favorable environment, it is important to remember that M&A is fraught with risk. To maximize your probability of success, keep the following points in mind:

Make sure you have an M&A strategy. Clearly defining business objectives you intend to accomplish through M&A can help identify a broad pool of targets, sift through those targets to identify the best fit, and minimize merger premiums.
Start small. Successful acquirers tend to grow through a large number of small acquisitions, rather than “betting the farm” on a single transaction.
Set a walk-away price. The best acquirers set a maximum price early on and stick to it.
No stone unturned. Make sure you and your advisors do as much due diligence as possible before an acquisition, so you can make an informed investment decision and arrive at a proper valuation. In addition to thoroughly understanding the business and the financial aspects of the transaction (the target’s assets, revenue streams, liabilities, cost analyses and projections), also make sure you have a firm grasp on the risks involved in the transaction, and mitigate them to the best of your ability.
Do not fall in love with the deal. Negotiating a deal is exciting, but walking away is not. Call it what you want—pride, hubris, delirium—but the sheer desire to close the deal often leads incredibly brilliant people to do incredibly stupid things. Hit the pause button from time to time and ask the advice of those you trust.

Article By:

Michelle DiCintio

Of:

Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C.

Risky Business: Target Discloses Data Breach and New Risk Factors in 8-K Filing… Kind Of

After Target Corporation’s (NYSE: TGT) net earnings dropped 46% in its fourth quarter compared to the same period last year, Target finally answered the 441 million dollar question – To 8-K, or not to 8-K? Target filed its much anticipated Current Report on Form 8-K on February 26th, just over two months after it discovered its massive data breach.

In its 9-page filing, Target included two introductory sentences relating to disclosure of the breach under Item 8.01 – Other Events:

During the fourth quarter of 2013, we experienced a data breach in which certain payment card and other guest information was stolen through unauthorized access to our network. Throughout the Risk Factors in this report, this incident is referred to as the ‘2013 data breach’.

Target then buried three new risk factors that directly discussed the breach apparently at random within a total of 18 new risk factors that covered a variety of topics ranging from natural disasters to income taxes. Appearing in multiple risk factors throughout the 8-K were the following:

The data breach we experienced in 2013 has resulted in government inquiries and private litigation, and if our efforts to protect the security of personal information about our guests and team members are unsuccessful, future issues may result in additional costly government enforcement actions and private litigation and our sales and reputation could suffer.

A significant disruption in our computer systems and our inability to adequately maintain and update those systems could adversely affect our operations and our ability to maintain guest confidence.

We experienced a significant data security breach in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2013 and are not yet able to determine the full extent of its impact and the impact of government investigations and private litigation on our results of operations, which could be material.

An interesting and atypically relevant part of Target’s 8-K is the “Date of earliest event reported” on its 8-K cover page. Although Target disclosed its fourth quarter 2013 breach under Item 8.01, Target still listed February 26, 2014 as the date of the earliest event reported, which is the date of the 8-K filing and corresponding press release disclosing Target’s financial results. One can only imagine that this usually benign date on Target’s 8-K was deliberated over for hours by expensive securities lawyers, and that using the February earnings release date instead of the December breach date was nothing short of deliberate. Likely one more subtle way to shift the market’s focus away from the two-month old data breach and instead bury the disclosure within a standard results of operations 8-K filing and 15 non-breach related risk factors.

To Target’s credit, its fourth quarter and fiscal year ended on February 1, 2014, and Target’s fourth quarter included the entirety of the period during and after the breach through February 1. Keeping that in mind, Target may not have had a full picture of how the breach affected its earnings in the fourth quarter until it prepared its fourth quarter and year-end financial statements this month. Maybe the relevant “Date of earliest event” was the date on which Target was able to fully appreciate the effects of the breach, which occurred on the day that it finalized and released its earnings on February 26. But maybe not.

Whatever the case may be, Target’s long awaited 8-K filing is likely only a short teaser of the disclosure that should be included in Target’s upcoming Form 10-K filing.

Article by:

Adam M. Veness

Of:

Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.