Tag: copyright

Arguing Internet Availability to Establish Copyright Infringement Is Bananas

In an unpublished opinion, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision finding that a pro se Californian artist failed to establish that an Italian artist had reasonable opportunity to access the copyrighted work simply because it was available to view on the internet. Morford v. Cattelan, Case No. 23-12263 (11th Cir. Aug. 16, 2024) (Jordan, Pryor, Branch, JJ.) (per curiam).A plaintiff alleging copyright infringement may show factual copying by either direct or indirect evidence showing “that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that there are probative similarities between the allegedly infringing work and the copyrighted work.” To do so, however, the copyright owner must establish a nexus between the work and the defendant’s alleged infringement. Mere access to a work disseminated in places or settings where the defendant may have come across it is not sufficient.

Joe Morford’s Banana and Orange and Maurizio Cattelan’s Comedian both “involve the application of duct tape to a banana against a flat surface” (see images below from the court decision’s appendix). Cattelan’s Comedian went viral and sold for more than $100,000 at Miami’s Art Basel. Morford claimed that Comedian was a copy. The district court found that Morford failed to show that Cattelan had reasonable opportunity to access Banana and Orange and thus could not establish a copyright claim. Morford appealed.

Orange and Banana, Comedian

On appeal, Morford argued that because he could show striking similarity between Banana and Orange and Comedian, he was not required to proffer evidence of access to show copyright infringement. In the alternative, he argued that he could show substantial similarity and that Cattelan had reasonable opportunity to access Banana and Orange as it was widely disseminated and readily discoverable online.

The Eleventh Circuit explained that in circuits adopting a widespread dissemination standard, that standard requires showing that the work enjoyed “considerable success or publicity.” Morford showed that Banana and Orange was available on his public Facebook page for almost 10 years and featured on his YouTube channel and in a blog post, with views in more than 25 countries. But Banana and Orange’s availability on the internet, without more, was “too speculative to find a nexus” between Cattelan and Morford to satisfy the factual copying prong of a copyright infringement claim, according to the Court.

The Eleventh Circuit also found that Morford failed to meet the high burden of demonstrating that the original work and accused infringement were so strikingly similar as to establish copying. Such similarity exists if the similarity in appearance between the two works “is so great that [it] precludes the possibility of coincidence, independent creation or common source,” but identical expression does not necessarily constitute infringement. In this analysis, a court addresses the “uniqueness or complexity of the protected work as it bears on the likelihood of copying.” Morford argued that he established striking similarity based on the “same two incongruous items being chosen, grouped, and presented in the same manner within both works.” Although the two incongruous items in both works were similar (i.e., a banana and duct tape), the Court decided that there were sufficient differences between Banana and Orange and Comedian to preclude a finding of striking similarity. Banana and Orange had both a banana and an orange held by duct tape, while Comedian only contained a banana.

© 2024 McDermott Will & Emery
For more news on Copyright Infringement Litigation, visit the NLR Intellectual Property section.

Fourth Circuit Reverses $1 Billion Award for Vicarious Liability Claim for More than 10,000 Works

On January 12, 2021, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia awarded a group of music recording companies (the plaintiffs) a $1 billion verdict against Cox Communications (Cox). The Virginia court’s ruling found that Cox, an internet service provider (ISP), was contributorily and vicariously liable for copyright infringement committed by certain subscribers on its networks. The plaintiffs alleged that the ISP allowed the unauthorized downloading and distribution of more than 10,000 copyrighted works by Cox subscribers who had already received three or more notices of infringement. The district court in Virginia established that the “takedown” notices sent by the plaintiffs provided Cox with the requisite knowledge of its subscribers’ repeated infringement to substantiate their claim that Cox was contributorily liable, suggesting that Cox had sufficient specific knowledge of infringement to have done something about it.

The plaintiffs’ notice to Cox identified the IP address of the subscriber, as well as the time of infringement and the identification of the infringed work, which the plaintiffs argued was sufficiently specific knowledge for Cox to be able to identify the subscriber and to exercise its policy by suspending or terminating the infringing subscriber. This case proceeded to trial on two theories of secondary liability – vicarious and contributory copyright infringement. The plaintiffs argued that Cox failed to act on these known repeat infringers, and the jury found Cox liable for willful contributory infringement and vicarious infringement, ordering Cox to pay more than $99,000 for each of the infringed-upon works. Cox appealed the jury verdict.

On appeal, before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Cox raised several questions of law concerning the secondary liability for copyright infringement, as well as what constitutes a derivative work in the Internet Age.

Vicarious Infringement
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis first considered whether the district court erred in denying plaintiffs’ vicarious infringement claim. “A defendant may be held vicariously liable for a third party’s copyright infringement [if the defendant] (1) profits directly from the infringement and (2) has a right and ability to supervise the direct infringer.” See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 n.9 (2005) (internal citations omitted). The Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiffs failed to establish the first element as a matter of law and thus found that the plaintiffs failed to establish that Cox was vicariously liable.

In reaching this decision, the Fourth Circuit turned to the landmark decision in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963), a case on vicarious liability for infringing copyrighted music recordings. In Shapiro, a department store was sued for the selling of “bootleg” records by a concessionaire operating in its stores. The store had the right to supervise the concessionaire and employees, demonstrating its control over the infringement. There, the store received a certain percentage of every record sale, “whether ‘bootleg’ or legitimate,” giving it “a more definite financial interest” in the infringing sales.” Thus, the Shapiro court found that the financial gains were clearly spelled out from the bootleg sales and acts of infringement in Shapiro.

Next, the Fourth Circuit recognized that courts have found that a defendant may possess a financial interest in a third party’s infringement of copyrighted music, even absent a strict correlation between each act of infringement and an added penny of profits. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). In Fonovisa, the operator of a swap meet allowed vendors to sell infringing goods, and the operator collected “admission fees, concession stand sales, and parking fees” but no sales commission “from customers who want[ed] to buy the counterfeit recordings at bargain-basement prices.” The Fonovisa court found that the plaintiffs adequately showed a financial benefit from the swap meet owner and the sales of pirated recordings at the swap meet, which was a draw for customers. Thus, the infringing sales “enhance[d] the attractiveness of the venue of the potential customers, finding the swap meet operator had a financial interest in the infringement sufficient to state a claim for vicarious liability.”

The Fourth Circuit established that Shapiro and Fonovisa provided the steppingstones of the principles of copyright infringement to the internet and cyberspace and that Congress agreed that “receiving a one-time setup fee and flat periodic payment for service” from infringing and non-infringing users alike ordinarily “would not constitute a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.” Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F. 3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). The Court also reviewed other court precedents, including A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), to show that increased pirated music drew in users as a direct financial interest for vicarious liability., but also notes that courts have found no evidence of a direct financial benefit between subscribers of American Online (AOL) and the availability of infringing content.’’ Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1079.

Against this backdrop, the Fourth Circuit held that to prove Cox was vicariously liable, the plaintiffs had to demonstrate that Cox profited from its subscribers’ infringing download and distribution of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted songs, which – given the evidence at trial – it did not. While the district court found it was enough that Cox repeatedly declined to cancel an ISP subscriber’s monthly subscription fee, the Fourth Circuit found this evidence to be insufficient. Instead, the Fourth Circuit found that the continued monthly payment fees for internet service, even by repeat infringers, was not a financial benefit flowing directly from the copyright infringement. Cox established that subscribers paid a flat fee even if all of its subscribers stopped infringing. Recognizing that an internet provider would necessarily lose money if it canceled subscriptions only demonstrates that service providers have a direct financial interest in providing subscribers with access to the internet only. Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that vicarious liability demands proof that the defendant profits directly from the acts of infringement for which it is being held accountable.

To rebut this, the plaintiffs claimed that the jury could infer that subscribers paid monthly membership fees based on the high volume of infringing content. The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument and found that the evidence was insufficient to prove that customers were drawn to Cox’s internet service or that they continued the service because they were specifically drawn to the opportunity to infringe the plaintiffs’ copyrights. The plaintiffs further asserted that subscribers were willing to pay more for the opportunity to infringe based on Cox’s tiered structure for internet access – but the plaintiffs fell short in proving this claim because no reasonable inference could be drawn that Cox subscribers paid more for faster internet to infringe on the copyrighted works. Ultimately, the Court found that the plaintiffs could not establish a causal connection between subscribers’ copyright infringement and Cox’s revenue for monthly subscriptions. Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that Cox was not liable for its subscribers’ copyright infringement and reversed the district court’s ruling on this theory. The court vacated the $1 billion damages award and remanded the case for a new trial on damages, holding that the jury’s finding of vicarious liability could have influenced its assessment of statutory damages.

Contributory Infringement
The Fourth Circuit then examined the remaining issue of contributory infringement. Under this theory, “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another is liable for the infringement, too.” Cox argued that the district court erred by taking away the factual determination from the jury that notices of past infringement established Cox’s knowledge that subscribers were substantially certain to infringe in the future. Cox had contracted with a third party to provide copyright violation notices to users and asserted that it used these notices as their safe harbor under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to alert violators and to terminate access to users who were repeat infringers. Despite this, the Fourth Circuit ultimately agreed with the jury’s finding that Cox materially contributed to copyright infringement occurring on its network and that its conduct was culpable.

Therefore, a three-judge panel found that Cox was liable for willful copyright infringement but reversed the vicarious liability verdict and remanded a new trial on damages. The Fourth Circuit held that because Cox did not profit from its subscribers’ acts of infringement, a legal prerequisite for vicarious liability, Cox was not liable for damages under the vicarious liability theory.

The Impact
The Fourth Circuit’s decision recognizes a new dawn breaking in copyright law, one that requires a causal connection between profit and/or financial gain and a defendant’s acts of infringement to prove vicarious liability in a copyright infringement claim under the Copyright Act. The plaintiffs attempted to bridge the financial gap between acknowledging access to infringing content through a monthly internet subscription and high-volume infringing acts. However, the Fourth Circuit found that this leap in logic was a step too far and reversed the award for vicarious liability for lack of evidence to find this missing connection between Cox subscribers and infringing plaintiffs’ content.

While this may be one route the courts may consider to reduce music piracy damages, it remains to be seen whether other courts will take this approach to determining that profit is the key element supporting other vicarious liability claims in cyberspace.

© 2024 Wilson Elser
For more news on Copyright Litigation, visit the NLR Intellectual Property section.

To AI or Not to AI: U.S. Copyright Office Clarifies Options

The U.S. Copyright Office has weighed in with formal guidance on the copyrightability of works whose generation included the use of artificial intelligence (AI) tools. The good news for technology-oriented human creative types: using AI doesn’t automatically disqualify your work from copyright protection. The bad news for independent-minded AI’s: you still don’t qualify for copyright protection in the United States.

On March 16, 2023, the Copyright Office issued a statement of policy (“Policy”) to clarify its practices for examining and registering works that contain material generated by the use of AI and how copyright law’s human authorship requirements will be applied when AI was used. This Policy is not itself legally binding or a guarantee of a particular outcome, but many copyright applicants may breathe a sigh of relief that the Copyright Office has formally embraced AI-assisted human creativity.

The Policy is just the latest step in an ongoing debate over the copyrightability of machine-assisted products of human creativity. Nearly 150 years ago, the Supreme Court ruled at photographs are copyrightable. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Company v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). The case involved a photographer’s claim against a lithographer for 85,000 unauthorized copies of a photograph of Oscar Wilde. The photo, Sarony’s “Oscar Wilde No. 18,” is shown below:

Sarony’s “Oscar Wilde No. 18"

The argument against copyright protection was that a photograph is “a reproduction, on paper, of the exact features of some natural object or of some person” and is therefore not a product of human creativity. Id. at 56. The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that there was sufficient human creativity involved in making the photo, including posing the subject, evoking the desired expression, arranging the clothing and setting, and managing the lighting.

In the mid-1960’s, the Copyright Office rejected a musical composition, Push Button Bertha, that was created by a computer, reasoning that it lacked the “traditional elements of authorship” as they were not created by a human.

In 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Naruto, a crested macaque (represented by a group of friendly humans), lacked standing under the Copyright Act to hold a copyright in the “monkey selfie” case. See Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018). The “monkey selfie” is below:

Monkey Selfie

In February 2022, the Copyright Office rejected a registration (filed by interested humans) for a visual image titled “A Recent Entrance to Paradise,” generated by DABUS, the AI whose claimed fractal-based inventions are the subject of patent applications around the world. DABUS’ image is below:

“A Recent Entrance to Paradise”

Litigation over this rejected application remains pending.

And last month, the Copyright Office ruled that a graphic novel consisting of human-authored text and images generated using the AI tool Midjourney could, as a whole, be copyrighted, but that the images, standing alone, could not. See U.S. Copyright Office, Cancellation Decision re: Zarya of the Dawn (VAu001480196) at 2 (Feb. 21, 2023).

The Copyright Office’s issuing the Policy was necessitated by the rapid and remarkable improvements in generative AI tools over even the past several months. In December 2022, generative AI tool Dall-E generated the following images in response to nothing more than the prompt, “portrait of a musician with a hat in the style of Rembrandt”:

Four portraits generated by AI tool Dall-E from the prompt, "portrait of a musician with a hat in the style of Rembrandt."

If these were human-generated paintings, or even photographs, there is no doubt that they would be copyrightable. But given that all four images were generated in mere seconds, with a single, general prompt from a human user, do they meet the Copyright Office’s criteria for copyrightability? The answer, now, is a clear “no” under the Policy.

However, the Policy opens the door to registering AI-assisted human creativity. The toggle points will be:

“…whether the ‘work’ is basically one of human authorship, with the computer [or other device] merely being an assisting instrument, or whether the traditional elements of authorship in the work (literary, artistic, or musical expression or elements of selection, arrangement, etc.) were actually conceived and executed not by man but by a machine.” 

In the case of works containing AI-generated material, the Office will consider whether the AI contributions are the result of “mechanical reproduction” or instead of an author’s “own original mental conception, to which [the author] gave visible form.” 

The answer will depend on the circumstances, particularly how the AI tool operates and how it was used to create the final work. This will necessarily be a case-by-case inquiry.” 

See Policy (citations omitted).

Machine-produced authorship alone will continue not to be registerable in the United States, but human selection and arrangement of AI-produced content could lead to a different result according to the Policy. The Policy provides select examples to help guide registrants, who are encouraged to study them carefully. The Policy, combined with near future determinations by the Copyright Office, will be critical to watch in terms of increasing likelihood a registration application will be granted as the Copyright Office continues to assess the impacts of new technology on the creative process. AI tools should not all be viewed as the “same” or fungible. The type of AI and how it is used will be specifically considered by the Copyright Office.

In the short term, the Policy provides some practical guidance to applicants on how to describe the role of AI in a new copyright application, as well as how to amend a prior application in that regard if needed. While some may view the Policy as “new” ground for the Copyright Office, it is consistent with the Copyright Office’s long-standing efforts to protect the fruits of human creativity even if the backdrop (AI technologies) may be “new.”

As a closing note, it bears observing that copyright law in the United Kingdom does permit limited copyright protection for computer-generated works – and has done so since 1988. Even under the U.K. law, substantial questions remain; the author of a computer-generated work is considered to be “the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.” See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (1988) §§ 9(3), 12(7) and 178. In the case of images generated by a consumer’s interaction with a generative AI tool, would that be the consumer or the generative AI provider?

Article By Nadia G. Aram and Dr. Christian E. Mammen of Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2023 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.

IP Rights in Virtual Fashion: Lessons Learned in 2022 and Unanswered Questions

There was a lot of talk and much hype about the “metaverse” in 2022. While some were skeptical and stayed on the sidelines to watch, many companies began offering virtual counterparts to their real-world products for use by avatars in the metaverse, including virtual clothing and accessories. For example, Tommy Hilfiger live-streamed a virtual fashion show on Roblox as part of the New York Fashion Week, and Decentraland hosted a Metaverse Fashion Week. Many companies also introduced NFTs into fashion product lines, such as Alo’s NFT offering.

The emergence of virtual goods has generated novel questions about how to protect and enforce IP rights in virtual fashion, and how those strategies might differ from IRL (meaning “in real life”) fashion. Although many questions remain unanswered, this article sets out important considerations for how companies might use various IP laws to protect virtual fashion goods in the United States.

I. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN VIRTUAL FASHION AND IRL FASHION

Before diving into the IP discussion, it’s worth highlighting some distinctions between virtual fashion and IRL fashion outside the legal context, beyond the obvious fact that virtual fashion is worn by avatars. IRL clothing and accessories are worn primarily for protection against the elements, to conform to societal standards, to conform with a specific event’s dress requirements, to communicate via express messages on clothing or accessories, or to express oneself through the style or design of the clothing.

Virtual fashion can also serve each of those purposes for an avatar, and in some cases the person behind the avatar. But, because it is comprised of software code, the possibilities for virtual fashion utility are endless. For example, a particular piece of virtual clothing can also grant access to certain virtual spaces or events or give the avatar special powers within virtual worlds. If tied to an NFT (non-fungible token), virtual clothing can also provide benefits on and off virtual platforms, including exclusive access to sales promotions and IRL events.

Unlike IRL clothing, however, virtual fashion items currently face compatibility limitations, as the ability to use any virtual fashion item across all virtual platforms is unlikely.

To muddy the waters, as virtual and augmented reality technologies are becoming more popular, they can blur the lines between IRL and virtual fashion. For example, an IRL sweatshirt, when viewed through an appropriate lens, could feature virtual components.

II. IP PROTECTION FOR VIRTUAL FASHION

Because there are no IP laws specific to virtual fashion items, we must seek protection from laws that have traditionally applied to real-life clothing, namely, trademark, trade dress, copyright, and design patent. But the application of these laws can sometimes differ in the virtual context. Each is addressed below.

A. TRADEMARK

Trademark law protects source identifiers such as words, names, logos, and slogans. Obtaining trademark rights specifically in virtual goods, whether acquired through use in commerce or federal registration, is generally straightforward and similar to marks covering IRL fashion. This is evidenced by many marks that were registered in 2022 and specifically cover virtual goods.

That said, even if a company does not have trademark coverage specifically for its virtual goods, the owner of a trademark covering IRL fashion items should have strong arguments that such trademark rights extend to their virtual counterparts. To that point, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) has refused registration of marks covering virtual goods and services based on prior registrations for the identical marks covering the corresponding IRL goods and services. See, e.g., the refusals of Application No. 97112038 for the mark GUCCI and Application No. 97112054 for the mark PRADA, each of which were filed by parties unrelated to the famous brands.

However, for purposes of enforcement outside of the USPTO context, if a defendant’s goods are virtual, it would have a stronger argument that such goods are not commercial products, but rather expressive works protected by the First Amendment. If a court accepts such an argument, it must then weigh the plaintiff’s trademark rights against the defendant’s First Amendment right of free expression, meaning it would be more challenging for a brand owner to enforce its trademark rights.

In this regard, please see our earlier alert regarding the Hermès v. Rothschild case, in which the court deemed NFTs tied to images of bags called “MetaBirkins” subject to First Amendment protection. [1] In denying Rothschild’s motion to dismiss, the court acknowledged in a footnote that virtually wearable bags (i.e., as opposed to virtual fashion that is displayable but not wearable) might not be afforded First Amendment protection. But we suspect defendants will argue even virtually wearable items should be afforded First Amendment protection, especially given that video games have received such protection. [2]

On balance, companies should consider seeking federal trademark registration specifically for virtual goods and services, for a few reasons:

More direct coverage could help a company in an enforcement action against infringing virtual goods, even if the defendant successfully argues it should be entitled to First Amendment protection. For instance, if the plaintiff has direct coverage for virtual goods, it may be easier to prove the defendant’s use of the mark was “explicitly misleading” under the Rogers test. [3]

Certain platforms featuring virtual fashion items may only honor a takedown request if the complainant company has a federal registration covering goods that are the same or nearly identical to the allegedly infringing virtual goods.

The registration will provide a presumption of valid trademark rights nationwide, and it may serve as a deterrent to third parties wishing to use confusingly similar marks in virtual worlds.

B. TRADE DRESS

U.S. trademark law also protects certain source-identifying elements of a product’s aesthetic design, configuration/shape, and packaging, often referred to as “trade dress.” To obtain trade dress protection, such elements must be (1) non-functional and (2) distinctive (either inherently or acquired through use). There are a couple of interesting nuances with respect to acquiring trade dress protection in the virtual context.

First, although we have not yet seen any case law specifically addressing this, companies will likely have stronger arguments that virtual shape or design elements (as opposed to IRL elements) are non-functional. Specifically, the non-functionality requirement means the relevant elements must not be essential to the use or purpose or affect the cost or quality of the article. For real-life fashion items, this can be difficult to meet due to the inherently functional nature of many aspects of clothing or accessories. However, because virtual fashion items are essentially software code with endless possibilities, in many instances the fashion item will not require any particular design or shape to function.

Second, some virtual fashion items could receive more favorable treatment from a distinctiveness perspective. The distinctiveness requirement has historically been a difficult barrier for protecting IRL fashion. Specifically, case law prior to 2022 established that, while packaging can sometimes be inherently distinctive, product design and configuration/shape can never be, meaning companies must prove such elements have acquired distinctiveness. Proving acquired distinctiveness is burdensome because the company must have used the elements extensively, substantially exclusively, and continuously for a period of time. Often, by the time a company can acquire distinctiveness in the design, the design is no longer in style. Or, if a design is popular and copied by third parties, it can be difficult for the company to claim it used the design substantially exclusively.

If, however, a virtual fashion item provides the user with benefits that go beyond merely outfitting the avatar, such as by providing access to other products or services, one might argue that those items should be construed as packaging, or some new category of trade dress, for such other products or services, in which case the elements could possibly be deemed inherently distinctive with respect to those other products or services.

That said, if a company already has trade dress protection for IRL fashion goods, it should have good arguments that the protection extends to any virtual counterpart. On the flipside, given the difficulties companies typically face in seeking trade dress protection in IRL fashion, to the extent they can obtain trade dress protection in a virtual counterpart more easily, perhaps it can argue the rights in any virtual goods should also extend to the physical counterpart. Or, if a company introduces a physical design and virtual design simultaneously, it could possibly acquire distinctiveness in both sooner, as the simultaneous use would presumably create greater exposure to more customers and reinforce the source-identifying significance of the alleged elements.

With respect to enforcement, like traditional marks, defendants are more likely to raise a successful First Amendment defense for any virtual products allegedly infringing trade dress. The Hermès case is again an example of this, as Hermès alleged infringement of both its BIRKIN word mark and the trade dress rights in the design of its handbags, and the court held that the defendant’s MetaBirkin NFTs were entitled to the First Amendment protection.

Finally, although obtaining trade dress protection is typically more difficult than obtaining trademark protection for traditional marks such as words and logos, companies should also consider seeking registration for trade dress in virtual goods, particularly for important designs that are likely to carry over from season to season, for the same reasons discussed in the trademark section above.

C. COPYRIGHT

Copyright protects original works of authorship that contain at least a modicum of creativity, which is a relatively low bar. However, copyright does not protect useful articles. In effect, for IRL fashion items, copyright generally extends only to those designs that would be entitled to copyright protection if they were extracted or removed from the clothing or viewed on a different medium, and not to the shape of the fashion item itself.

Like trade dress protection, copyright protection should provide companies with greater protection for virtual fashion items than would be available for IRL items, particularly because the software behind the virtual fashion can theoretically create an infinite number of clothing shapes that are creative and not necessarily “useful.” Nonetheless, if a virtual clothing item is merely shaped like its IRL counterpart that lacks originality (e.g., a virtual t-shirt shaped like a basic real-life t-shirt), it may also fail to qualify for copyright protection based on a lack of creativity.

Unlike trade dress protection, however, copyright protection arises immediately upon creation of the work and its fixation in a tangible medium of expression, so it can be a useful tool for protecting virtual fashion without having to spend the time and resources required to seek registration as trade dress and establish acquired distinctiveness.

In addition, unlike IRL fashion, a separate copyright protects the underlying source code for virtual clothing items, which could provide owners with an additional, though likely limited, claim against unauthorized source code copycats.

A copyright registration will provide owners with the ability to sue for copyright infringement, but companies should balance:

  • the benefits of seeking potentially broader copyright protection in virtual fashion items (apart from the code) than it would for IRL items with the risks of conceding that virtual fashion items are works of art entitled to First Amendment protection, which would make trademark and trade dress enforcement more difficult; and
  • the benefits of obtaining any copyright registration for source code with the benefits of keeping the source code secret (although the Copyright Office permits some redactions, significant portions are required to be deposited into the public record).

We are unaware of any 2022 case law specifically addressing copyright in virtual fashion. However, the following cases are worth watching:

  • Andy Warhol Found. for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith[4]: In October 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments regarding whether Andy Warhol’s “Prince Series” silk screen prints and pencil drawings based on a photograph infringed the photographer’s copyright, or whether they were sufficiently “transformative” to constitute fair use. The outcome of this case could affect a copyright owner’s ability to enforce copyrights against unauthorized digital reproductions of its work, especially if the original work is fixed in a physical medium (e.g., enforcing copyright in a physical clothing item against a third party’s digital reproduction).
  • Thaler v. Perlmutter[5]: Filed in June 2022, the plaintiff is suing the U.S. Copyright Office for refusing registration of an AI-created image because there was no human author. The outcome of this case will necessarily implicate virtual fashion incorporating any AI-generated work.

D. DESIGN PATENT

Design patents protect the ornamental appearance or look of a unique product. Specifically, they protect any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture. Traditionally, this law was interpreted to require that the article of manufacture is a physical or tangible product. Thus, in the fashion industry for example, one can file a design patent application directed to a unique shoe, handbag, or jewelry design. Historically, an image or picture would not qualify for design patent protection.

However, the USPTO is currently assessing design patents with respect to new technologies such as projections, holograms, and virtual and augmented reality. In December 2020, the USPTO issued a request for public comment regarding a potential rule change to the “article of manufacture” requirement and whether U.S. law should be revised to protect digital designs. Public opinion was mixed, and in April 2022, the USPTO issued a summary of this requested information.

Although the USPTO has not yet formally revised the rules, it has issued guidelines over the years that provide examples of non-physical products that could be protected by a design patent, suggesting changes may ultimately be coming to U.S. design patent law. For example, in 1995, the USPTO released guidelines for design patent applications claiming computer-generated icons. In general, to be eligible for protection, the computer-generated icon must be embodied in a computer screen monitor, or other display monitor. The USPTO has also issued guidance allowing type font to be protectable by design patents. However, it is still unclear whether the USPTO will set forth design patent guidance specific to digital designs or virtual fashion.

Notwithstanding the possibility of obtaining a design patent specifically on such virtual goods, courts have been reluctant to find that a virtual product infringes the design patent for an IRL product. For example, in 2014, in P.S. Products, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc.,[6] P.S. Products accused Activision of infringing its design patent directed to a stun gun by depicting a virtual weapon in its video game that P.S. Products claimed resembled its patent-protected IRL product.

The court found there was no infringement because “no ordinary observer would be deceived into purchasing a video game believing it to be plaintiffs’ patented stun gun.” This case may have come out differently if the virtual gun was sold separately from the video game and could be used across various platforms rather than being one component of a particular video game. Although there are still software compatibility restrictions for virtual goods, portability of virtual goods is likely to grow as technology evolves and companies respond to consumer demands.

While we wait for further USPTO guidance that ultimately may have application to virtual fashion, parties seeking design patent protection may consider simultaneously filing one application to protect the work as a digital design on a display screen, like a patentable computer-generated icon, and a second, traditional design patent application to protect the design as a tangible product. That said, companies should consider other options for protecting any designs created by AI, as the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held in 2022 that AI cannot qualify as an inventor for purposes of obtaining a patent.[7]

III. Virtual Fashion in Practice

Contracts relating to virtual fashion are analogous to contracts for IRL fashion and should be structured accordingly. For instance, companies should ensure that contracts with IP contributors include an assignment of all IP rights, or at least a sufficiently broad license. In the virtual context, this includes rights to the software code itself. Likewise, downstream licensing should generally address ownership, licensee rights, and if applicable, confidentiality for any trade secrets in the source code. In addition, for both IP contributors and licensees, if AI software is used in any part of the creative process, companies should give thought to allocation of ownership.

In addition, some designers or marketing teams may prefer to encourage a brand’s customer base to copy its designs or create derivative works. Although this seems counterintuitive (especially to an IP lawyer), many players in the Web3 space encourage others to build off their own designs. For example, the Bored Ape Yacht Club (BAYC), known for issuing NFTs tied to images of apes, grants owners of its NFTs the rights to use the images of apes, including for commercial purposes.[8] For example, one purchaser of a Bored Apt NFT created a Bored Ape-themed restaurant.

In the virtual fashion context, if a marketing team wants customers to build off the brand’s virtual designs but wants to retain ownership of its own designs (and perhaps derivatives), it should implement standard licensing terms relating to ownership, customer licensee rights, and other provisions. However, it’s important to consider how the terms are presented and how customers indicate assent to maximize the prospects of enforceability.

From a business perspective, companies can also now use NFTs and smart contracts to receive automatic royalties in any downstream sales or licenses. And because NFTs use blockchain technology, which provides an immutable chain of title, third parties will be able to trace such designs to the original source. This means companies can encourage the sharing of designs and receive royalties in connection with the downstream licensing of designs tied to NFTs, and third parties can confirm that the designs are legitimate by reviewing the relevant blockchain ledger. Accordingly, although encouraging customers to use the brand’s designs may not be a model for every brand, there are some steps brands can take to protect the IP rights associated with them and reap financial benefits.

As virtual fashion items become more popular, companies are faced with uncertainties and novel questions regarding how to protect and enforce their IP rights. In 2022, some questions were answered, but many more remain open. Therefore, it is important to discuss strategies for protecting innovative virtual fashion with IP counsel.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Notably, on December 30, 2022, the Hermès court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment, with an opinion to follow by January 20. A jury trial is scheduled to begin on January 30, 2023. Hermès International, et al. v. Mason Rothschild, 1:22-cv-00384-JSR (S.D.N.Y.).

[2] See, e.g., AM Gen. LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 467, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

[3] If a defendant’s unauthorized use of a mark is protected by the First Amendment, many courts use the Rogers test to balance the plaintiff’s trademark rights with the defendant’s First Amendment right of expression. This test looks at whether the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark was artistically relevant and, if so, whether it was explicitly misleading. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).

[4] 11 F.4th 26 (2d Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 1412 (2022).

[5] Case No. 1:22-cv-01564 (D.D.C.).

[6] 140 F. Supp. 3d 795, 802 (E.D. Ark. 2014).

[7] Thaler v. Vidal, 43 F.4th 1207, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2022).

[8] We will save for another day a discussion of the recent lawsuit against BAYC and many celebrities for failing to disclose financial incentives when promoting the BAYC NFT collection, and instead focus here on IP protection. Adonis Real, et al., v. Yuga Labs, Inc., et al., 2:22-cv-08909 (C.D. Cal.). But companies should also ensure that influencers properly disclose any incentives and other material connections.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2023 Pierce Atwood LLP. All rights reserved.

“Levitating” Lawsuits: Understanding Dua Lipa’s Copyright Infringement Troubles

Even global stardom will not make copyright woes levitate away from British superstar Dua Lipa. The pop icon is making headlines following a week of back-to-back, bi-coastal lawsuits alleging copyright infringement with her hit “Levitating.” First, on Tuesday, March 1st, members of reggae band Artikal Sound System sued Dua Lipa for copyright infringement in a Los Angeles federal district court1. Then, on Friday, March 4th, songwriters L. Russell Brown and Sandy Linzer filed their own copyright infringement lawsuit against the pop star in a New York federal district court2. Both lawsuits were filed claiming violations of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.3

The Artikal Sound System lawsuit is short and alleges that Dua Lipa and the co-creators of “Levitating” copied Artikal Sound System’s 2017 song “Live Your Life.”4 The lawsuit does not provide any details in the allegation, other than explaining that “Live Your Life” was commercially released in 2017, was available during the time Dua Lipa and her co-creators wrote “Levitating,” and that because the two songs are substantially similar “Levitating” could not have been created independently.5 As a remedy, Artikal Sound System seeks actual damages, a portion of Dua Lipa’s profits stemming from the alleged infringement, the cost of the lawsuit, and any additional remedies the Court sees fit.6

Similarly, the Brown and Linzer lawsuit alleges that Dua Lipa and her “Levitating” co-creators copied their works “Wiggle and Giggle All Night” and “Don Diablo.”7 More specifically, the Brown and Linzer lawsuit alleges that “Levitating” is substantially similar to “Wiggle and Giggle All Night” and “Don Diablo.”8

Accordingly, the lawsuit claims that the defining melody in “Levitating,” the “signature melody,” is a direct duplicate of the opening melody in “Wiggle and Giggle All Night” and “Don Diablo,” and therefore appears in all three songs.9 As additional support, the lawsuit points to professionals and laypersons noticing a similarity between the three songs, and Dua Lipa previously admitting that she “purposely sought influences from past eras for the album Future Nostalgia.”10

As for a remedy, Brown and Linzer request full compensatory and/or statutory damages, punitive damages, an injunction on “Levitating,” a portion of Dua Lipa’s profits stemming from the alleged infringement, the cost of the lawsuit, and any additional remedies the Court sees fit.11

The copyright infringement legal framework

A general overview of the copyright infringement legal framework is helpful in assessing the potential outcomes of the “Levitating” lawsuits. Specifically, the legal framework from the 9th Circuit, where one of the “Levitating” lawsuits was filed, provides great guidance.

In order to establish copyright infringement, one must prove two elements: owning a valid copyright and copying of “constituent elements of the work that are original.”12 Importantly, when there is no direct evidence of copying, but rather circumstantial evidence, plaintiffs must show that:

  1. the accused infringers had access to the copyrighted work, and

  2. the infringing work and the copyrighted work “are substantially similar.

Plaintiffs can easily show access to the copyrighted work, but “substantial similarity” is harder to show.

2-Part Test

Luckily, the 9th Circuit devised a 2-part test to prove “substantial similarity.”13 Under the test, there is sufficient copying, and therefore “substantial similarity,” if an infringing work meets an “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” prong.14 The intrinsic prong is met if there is “similarity of expression” between the works, as evaluated from the subjective standpoint of an “ordinary reasonable observer.”15 The extrinsic prong is objective and requires comparing the “constituent elements” of the copyrighted and infringing works to see if there is substantial similarity in terms of the “protected” elements in the copyrighted work.16

As such, if the commonality between the copyrighted and infringing works is not based on “protected” elements, then the extrinsic prong is not met, and there is no “substantial similarity” between the works for purposes of a copyright infringement action. It must be noted that the 9th Circuit recognizes that, in certain situations, there can be a “substantial similarity” even if the constituent elements are individually unprotected, but only if their “selection and arrangement” reflects originality.17

To understand “substantial similarity” one must define what is “protectable” under copyright law. Copyright protection extends only to works that contain original expression.18 In this context, the standard for originality is a minimal degree of creativity.19 According to the Copyright Act, protection does not extend to ideas or concepts used in original works of authorship.20 In the musical context, copyright does not protect “common or trite musical elements, or commonplace elements that are firmly rooted in the genre’s tradition” because “[t]hese building blocks belong in the public domain and cannot be exclusively appropriated by any particular author.”21

Katy Perry “Dark Horse” case and an ostinato

While the “Levitating” lawsuits are still young, a recent decision by the 9th Circuit in the infamous Katy Perry “Dark Horse” case is a good example of how courts conduct legal analyses in copyright infringement cases. The precedential ruling (Gray v. Hudson), released on March 10th, affirms a U.S. District Judge’s decision to vacate a jury verdict that awarded US$2.8 million in damages to a group of rappers who claimed Katy Perry’s “Dark Horse” copied their song “Joyful Noise.”22

The 9th Circuit’s opinion cogently applies copyright law to hold that the plaintiffs in the original lawsuit did not provide legally sufficient evidence that “Joyful Noise” and “Dark Horse” were “extrinsically similar” in terms of musical features protected by copyright law.23

Specifically, the Court reasoned that while “Dark Horse” used an ostinato (a repeating musical figure) similar to the one in “Joyful Noise,” the resemblance in the ostinatos stemmed from “commonplace, unoriginal musical principles” and made them uncopyrightable.24 Without the ostinatos, the plaintiffs could not point to any “individually copyrightable” elements from “Joyful Noise” that were “substantially similar” in “Dark Horse.”25

Additionally, the Court held that the “Joyful Noise” ostinato was not original enough to be a protectable combination of uncopyrightable elements.26 In turn, under the legal framework for copyright infringement the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden.27 The Court put it best by opining that:

“[a]llowing a copyright over [the] material would essentially amount to allowing an improper monopoly over two-note pitch sequences or even the minor scale itself, especially in light of the limited number of expressive choices available when it comes to an eight-note repeated musical figure.”28

“Levitating” lawsuits likely outcomes

Applying the copyright infringement framework to the “Levitating” lawsuits allows us to understand the likely outcomes. First, the Artikal Sound System lawsuit does not allege any direct evidence of copying. As such, Artikal Sound System must show that Dua Lipa had access to “Live Your Life” and that “Levitating” is “substantially similar” to their song under the 2-prong test. Access is easily proved, as “Live Your Life” was commercially available on multiple streaming services when Dua Lipa wrote “Levitating.”29

However, the Artikal Sound System lawsuit does not provide enough information to pass the 2-prong “substantial similarity” test. The lawsuit only alleges that “Levitating” is “substantially similar” to “Live Your Life,” but does not detail any similarities much less provide any evidence that there is similarity of expression between the works from the point of view of a reasonable observer, as required by the intrinsic component of the test.30

More importantly, the lawsuit does not even mention any protectable elements from “Live Your Life” copied in “Levitating” and would, therefore, fail the extrinsic prong of the “substantial similarity” test.31 In turn, as submitted, the Artikal Sound System lawsuit fails to make a prima facie case of copyright infringement by Dua Lipa’s “Levitating.”

The story may be different for the Brown and Linzer lawsuit. Like the first suit, the Brown and Linzer lawsuit does not provide direct evidence of copying and will therefore only succeed if it passes the circumstantial evidence requirements of 1) access and 2) “substantial similarity.” Unlike the first suit, however, the Brown and Linzer complaint includes comparisons of the notes in “Levitating” to the notes in “Wiggle and Giggle All Night” and “Don Diablo” as support for the allegation of “substantial similarity.”

The 2nd Circuit, where the lawsuit was filed, held that a court can determine as a matter of law that two works are not “substantially similar” if the similarity between the two works concerns non-copyrightable elements of the copyrighted work.32 In practice, this means that the 2nd Circuit can apply the 2-prong “substantial similarity” test. Brown and Linzer can easily prove access to “Wiggle and Giggle All Night” and “Don Diablo” since both songs are internationally popular.33

Brown and Linzer can also meet the intrinsic prong of the test because, as they point out, “laypersons” (ordinary reasonable observers) have noticed the commonality between their copyrighted works and “Levitating,” as supported by widespread postings on mediums like TikTok.34 The extrinsic prong of the test is more uncertain.

In their lawsuit, Brown and Linzer point to a “signature melody” that repeats in “bars 10 and 11 of all three songs… [and] with some slight variation, in bars 12 and 13.”35 The court may find that this “signature melody” is not protected by copyright if it reasons that a melody is a basic musical principle, much like the 9th Circuit did for ostinatos in the Katy Perry “Dark Horse” case.

At its core, it seems like Brown and Linzer will have to convince the court that a melody, which they define as “a linear succession of musical tones,” qualifies as copyrightable because it is an original creative expression. Conversely, Brown and Linzer can concede that a melody is not copyrightable, but that their original arrangement and use of the melody in their copyrighted songs is copyrightable. In the end, it will be up to whether or not a court finds that the “signature melody” is copyrightable. As such, the outcome of Brown and Linzer’s action for copyright infringement is uncertain.

Nonetheless, one thing is for sure, copied or not, “Levitating” will continue powering gym visits and nights out dancing.

Footnotes

  1. See Complaint, Cope v. Warner Records, Inc., Case 2:22-cv-01384 (C.D. Cal. 2022).

  2. See Complaint, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

  3. See Complaint at ¶ 7, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022); Complaint at ¶ 12, Cope v. Warner Records, Inc., Case 2:22-cv-01384 (C.D. Cal. 2022).

  4. See Complaint at ¶ 17, Cope v. Warner Records, Inc., Case 2:22-cv-01384 (C.D. Cal. 2022).

  5. See Complaint at ¶ 15-18, Cope v. Warner Records, Inc., Case 2:22-cv-01384 (C.D. Cal. 2022).

  6. See Complaint at ¶ 19-22, Cope v. Warner Records, Inc., Case 2:22-cv-01384 (C.D. Cal. 2022).

  7. See Complaint at ¶ 2, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

  8. See Complaint at ¶ 2, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

  9. See Complaint at ¶ 3, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

  10. See Complaint at ¶ 49, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

  11. See Complaint at 13-14, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

  12. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).

  13. Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994).

  14. Id.

  15. Id.

  16. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004).

  17. Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003).

  18. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.

  19. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.

  20. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Skidmore as Tr. for the Randy Craig Wolfe Tr. v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).

  21. Skidmore, 952 F.3d at 1069.

  22. Gray v. Hudson, No. 20-55401, slip op at 26 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2022).

  23. Id.

  24. Id. at 14-21.

  25. Id. at 17.

  26. Id. at 22.

  27. Id. at 26.

  28. Id. at 24.

  29. See Complaint at ¶ 16, Cope v. Warner Records, Inc., Case 2:22-cv-01384 (C.D. Cal. 2022).

  30. See Complaint at ¶ 18, Cope v. Warner Records, Inc., Case 2:22-cv-01384 (C.D. Cal. 2022).

  31. See Complaint at ¶ 18, Cope v. Warner Records, Inc., Case 2:22-cv-01384 (C.D. Cal. 2022).

  32. Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 63-65 (2d Cir. 2010).

  33. See Complaint at ¶ 35, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

  34. See Complaint at ¶ 4, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

  35. See Complaint at ¶ 38, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Article By Adrian Gonzalez Cerrillo and Sana Hakim of K&L Gates

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright 2022 K & L Gates

Ed Sheeran in “Shape of You” Court Battle

Singer Ed Sheeran is currently giving evidence in a three week High Court copyright trial over his 2017 chart-topping hit “Shape of You.”

Sheeran has been accused by two musicians, Sami Chokri and Ross O’Donoghue, that his hit song, “Shape of You” plagiarises “particular lines and phrases” of their 2015 composition, “Oh Why.” The two songs in question share a similar melody.

The dispute began back in May 2018 and saw Sheeran and his co-writers prevented from obtaining an estimated £20 million in royalties from performances or broadcasts of “Shape of You” after Chokri and O’Donaghue accused Sheeran and his co-writers of “appropriating” their music. Chokri claims that he sent the track to Sheeran in a bid to work with the star, but later heard the chorus on “Shape Of You” – which became the biggest selling single of 2017 in the UK.

Sheeran’s lawyers told the High Court at that time, that the musician and his co-writers had no recollection of having heard the song in question before the dispute began and asked the High Court to declare that he and his co-writers had not infringed Chokri and O’Donoghue’s copyright, with Sheeran also stating his reputation had been tarnished by the allegations.

In July 2018, Chokri and O’Donoghue issued a counterclaim for “copyright infringement, damages and an account of profits in relation to the alleged infringement”.

In a November 2020 ruling, the parties involved “anticipated that they would incur costs in the region of £3 million between them on the dispute”.

Andrew Sutcliffe QC, for Chokri and O’Donoghue, said the question at the heart of the case was “how does Ed Sheeran write his music?” and whether he “makes things up as he goes along during songwriting sessions or whether his songwriting process involves the collection and development of ideas over time which reference and interpolate other artists.”

Whilst the trial plays out in the High Court over the course of the next three weeks, it serves as a timely reminder that content created should be original and independent to avoid falling within the remit of copyright infringement. Otherwise, the risk of copyright infringement can be reduced by:

  • Obtaining relevant authorisations and approvals from a Collective Management Organisation, such as; PPL PRS (the UK’s music licensing company) or the Copyright Licensing Agency (for printed material);
  • Obtaining relevant permissions from a copyright owner/the copyright owner’s agent which may require the payment of licencing fees;
  • Entering into an assignment of intellectual property where copyright work has been produced as part of an underlying contractual agreement; and
  • Checking any relevant copyright/licencing terms to ascertain whether there is permission to reproduce certain content.

Article By Keisha Phippen of K&L Gates

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright 2022 K & L Gates

SCOTUS Shelves Request to Review 11th Circuit Dark Tower Decision, Ending Copyright Saga

The Supreme Court’s refusal to review the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in DuBay v. King marks an end to a 4-year copyright battle concerning the lead character of Stephen King’s acclaimed series, The Dark Tower.  The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirmed that the King’s anti-hero, Roland Deschain, is not substantially similar to William DuBay’s The Rook comic book character, Restin Dane. The decision illustrates the complexity of literary copyright infringement disputes, where a claim is brought based on a mix of original and stock character elements.

In 2017 William DuBay’s heir, Benjamin DuBay, sued novelist Stephen King, Marvel Entertainment, Sony Entertainment, and others for various counts of copyright infringement, alleging that King copied DuBay’s artistic expression based on purported similarity between lead characters of The Rook (Restin Dane) and The Dark Tower (Roland Deschain). The district court granted summary judgment to King, determining (1) that any similarities between the characters comprise unprotectable general ideas and scènes à faire elements; and (2) that the protectable original character elements in dispute are different, such that “no reasonable jury…could find the works substantially similar.” DuBay appealed.

The principal issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in assessing substantial similarity.  DuBay argued that the characters were substantially similar based on several shared characteristics, including: (1) similar names; (2) interaction with time-travel related towers; (3) having a bird as a companion; (4) having knightly characteristics; (5) wearing Western-style clothing; (6) surviving a fictionalized interpretation of The Alamo; (7) the use of knives; and (8) traveling back in time to save a young boy who becomes a gunslinger. DuBay also argued that the unique combination of these elements made Dane a distinctive character, and that Deschain is a copy of DuBay’s artistic expression in that character.

The Eleventh Circuit addressed DuBay’s contentions in two parts.

First, the court assessed whether each of the claimed character elements merit copyright protection. The court affirmed the district court’s holding that “character names do not merit copyright protection,” since mere words and short phrases cannot be protected under copyright law.  The court reiterated that only original elements of a copyrighted work can be afforded protection, and that certain claimed elements (i.e., “knightly heritage,” time travel to “different times and parallel worlds,” “western attire,” “fictionalized Alamo histories,” and “knife wielding”) are merely general ideas or scènes à faire that are “too general to merit copyright protection.”  The court then reviewed the remaining elements to determine whether the shared characteristics rendered the characters substantially similar.  Although both characters may be broadly similar in having bird companions, a relationship to towers and tower imagery, and past time travel experiences involving the rescue of a young boy, the court found that the depiction of these elements was different in each work.  For example, whereas Dane lives in and travels via tower shaped structures shaped like the namesake chess piece, Deschain embarks on an endless mission to find an elusive Gothic tower that connects parallel worlds and time periods.  Because the portrayals of each original element are distinguishable, the court determined that no reasonable jury could have concluded that the works were similar.

Second, the court examined whether the characters are substantially similar based on each character’s combination of the claimed elements (or the “look and feel” of the characters).  The Court recognized of the potential dangers of comparing works based on individual similarities alone because an original combination of unoriginal elements can potentially sustain a claim of copyright infringement.  However, the court found that any similarities of combined elements were “superficial” at best, and that the “look and feel” analysis actually hurt, rather than helped, DuBay’s case by highlighting differences in expression of shared original character elements.

Takeaway:

The Supreme Court’s refusal to hear Dubay reinforces the basic tenet of copyright law that general ideas or scènes à faire cannot be protected by copyright.  It also reminds litigants that although a combination of original and non-original elements can be protected under copyright law, broad similarities are usually insufficient to sustain a copyright infringement claim.

The case is DuBay v. King, 844 Fed. Appx. 257 (11thCir. 2019), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 490 (2021).

Article By Spencer K. Beall and Margaret A. Esquenet of Finnegan

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2021 Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP

You Streamed What? Copyright Infringement Pitfalls During COVID-19

In the sudden transition from in-person to online presentation of content precipitated by the COVID-19 stay-at-home orders, some educators and other presenters have run headlong into the digital world without a thought to the application of copyright law to their online presentations.  Scrambling to provide content, did some consider the sufficiency of their internet bandwidth and the security of their video-conferencing platform while overlooking copyright infringement issues?  Caution.  Those office webinars, college lectures, music lessons, and club meetings can be fraught with legal pitfalls.

Although we are slowly emerging from our bunkers and cautiously lifting our masks while maintaining social distance, some have predicted that online meetings and classes are here to stay—at least in some form.  Thus, these copyright infringement pitfalls merit consideration.  Granted, any attempt to treat this matter comprehensively in a 1500 word article is a fool’s errand.  And when it comes to these highly fact-specific matters, there’s no substitute for an attorney’s legal advice.  But some basic education on copyright law and some understanding of the distinctions between copyright as applied to education versus other areas might assist those unaccustomed to the online stage from stumbling into a battle over copyright infringement.

What is Protected by Copyright?

A copyright is a collection of rights that protect original works of authorship.  These works can include literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works.  A copyright does not protect facts, ideas, systems or methods of operation, although it may protect the way these things are expressed.  In general, a copyright exists from the moment the work is created and fixed in tangible form.  Registering does not create the copyright; but registering the copyright allows the owner to bring a lawsuit to enforce it and bears on the recovery that a copyright owner can obtain in the lawsuit.  Similarly, under the current law, neither the “©” symbol nor any other marking on an original work of authorship creates the copyright; but the copyright symbol or other marking can put the public on notice that the copyright owner claims his copyright.

What is in the Public Domain?

Works in the “public domain” can be copied.  These fall generally into three categories.

  • Works deliberately dedicated to the public without copyright protection.
  • Works for which the copyright has expired.
  • Works for which the copyright was not renewed.

The changes in the copyright legislation over the course of the past 40 years have made the rules about copyright expiration and renewal somewhat complex.  As of 2020, however, works published before January 1, 1925, entered the public domain.

What About Fair Use?

Most educators and presenters have some familiarity with the “fair use doctrine,” a defense to what is indisputably copying of an original work.  While some librarians have signed the “Public Statement:  Fair Use & Emergency Remote Teaching & Research” in which they boldly state that “making materials available and accessible to students in this time of crisis will almost always be a fair use”, as yet no legislature or court has carved out a “COVID-19” addendum or even a “public health emergency” addendum to the fair use doctrine.  Nevertheless, the fair use doctrine can provide a defense to presenters who exercise a modicum of discretion.

In considering an infringer’s reliance on the fair use doctrine as a defense to copyright infringement, courts consider the use made of the work in light of four factors:

1)   the purpose and character of the use, including whether the use is commercial or is for nonprofit educational purposes;

2)   the nature of the copyrighted work;

3)   the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

4)   the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

Consideration of these factors is highly subjective and fact-sensitive.  The first factor, besides asking whether the use is commercial or educational, looks at the purpose of the use.  Educational as opposed to commercial uses are favored.  But contrary to popular belief, educational use alone will not suffice as a defense to copyright infringement.  Generally, whether the use is commercial or educational, there must be something “transformative” about the use.  In other words, is there something new created?  Does the new work offer a new expression, meaning or message?  Is it serving as raw material for a new expression or insight?  In the education context, is the instructor adding something new such as commentary?  Is he tying the work into his own lesson or is he just using the work to replace his lesson?

While the first factor is often considered the “heart” of the fair use analysis, the other factors matter too.  Consider the second factor.  Is the original work creative or just an arrangement of facts?  Fair use has a broader scope where the original work is factual or informational.  Is it published or unpublished?  Greater latitude is afforded the alleged infringer claiming fair use where the work is published.

But even if the work is published, the third factor considers the portion used—in a quantitative as well as a qualitative sense.  Is the portion used a paragraph or several chapters?  The fair use defense will more likely shield copying a small portion of a work than a large section.  Despite efforts by advocates, courts have refused to specifically quantify how much is too much.  Furthermore, if a copier carves out the most memorable portion of the work, the “heart” of the work, no matter how small, fair use will offer no sanctuary—except in parody.  Where the new work is a parody of the original, the court has recognized that it is the heart of the work at which the parody takes aim.

Finally, how does the copied work impact the potential market for the original? If the copied work undermines the current or potential market for the original work, then this will undermine the use of the fair use doctrine as a defense.

In the education context, Congress has carved out some specific ways in which instructors can circumvent infringement.  House Report No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) includes the Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational Institutions (p.6).  Single copying of a chapter from a book or an article from a periodical, a chart or cartoon for use in teaching or preparing to teach, for example is considered fair use under the guidelines.  Multiple copying for the use of pupils in a class is similarly fair use where the copying meets tests of brevity and spontaneity (as defined in the guidelines), meets the cumulative effect test (as defined in the guidelines), and each copy includes a notice of copyright.  But copying cannot be used to replace anthologies or to replace books intended to be “consumable.”  Specific guidelines apply to music.  While there may be instances in which copying does not fall within the protection of the guidelines but nevertheless is permitted under the fair use criteria, compliance with the guidelines offers a safe harbor for educators.

Outside of this safe harbor, presenters employing copied works must navigate the more uncertain waters of fair use and consider other ways to avoid infringement.  But be forewarned that mere acknowledgement of the source material, while perhaps one factor to be considered in a fair use determination, will not absolve a copier for infringement.  Likewise, a disclaimer—effectively a “No Infringement Intended” notice—won’t work.

How Does the TEACH Act Apply in the Online Classroom?

Addressing more specifically the online environment for education, the Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, better known as the TEACH Act, addresses digital teaching materials used in both the classroom and in distance learning settings in 17 USC § 110(2).  This exempts from infringement certain performances and displays of works in an online classroom transmission under certain conditions.

What can be transmitted?

  • Performance of a nondramatic literary or musical work.
  • Performance of reasonable and limited portions of any other work.
  • Display of a work in an amount comparable to what would typically be displayed in the course of a live classroom session.

Under what conditions?

  • The transmission is under the actual supervision of an instructor.
  • The transmission is part of the instructional activities of the institution.
  • The work is related to the teaching content of the transmission.
  • The transmission is made solely for and is limited to the students officially enrolled in the course (as much as is technologically feasible).

What is not authorized?

  • Use of pirated copies.
  • Use of works normally marketed primarily for performance or display as part of online instructional activities.
  • Conversion of print versions of works to digital formats unless there is no digital version available, and even then, conversion is limited to the portions authorized by the size restrictions in the Act.

In order for an instructor to rely on the provisions of the Act, the institution must comply with certain requirements regarding policies and education of faculty and students and application of technological measures to reasonably prevent retention of the works by recipients of the transmission or further dissemination.  Posting class lectures that include copyrighted works on YouTube won’t qualify.

What about showing films?  In the face-to-face environment of a brick and mortar classroom, showing an entire film, video or TV program for educational purposes is allowed (17 U.S.C. § 110(1)), but not when the classroom goes virtual.  Showing portions of a film in an online classroom, may be considered fair use depending on how much of the film is shown and for what purpose.  If fair use does not apply and if the film is not in the public domain, however, students should view the film through a licensed streaming film provider.

What About Licenses and Releases?

Obtaining an author’s permission to use his work obviates the need to engage in the fair use or other analyses described above.  Whether the permission takes the form of a license (permission to use the work) or a release (promise not to sue for unauthorized use), however, many licenses and releases are limited to in-person presentation or distribution and do not extend to online presentation or distribution.  Presenters must carefully consider the scope of permission granted by a license or permission.

In the COVID-19 world, some publishers are offering educators temporary expanded permissions.  The key words here are “educators” and “temporary.”  These permissions do not extend to non-educators, and they are provisional.  Once the days of stay-at-home orders end, educators cannot assume that they can use the same works in the same way online.  In addition, the use of these expanded permissions comes with strings attached.  There are certain requirements that the publishers impose on the user.

Some creators offer their work through Creative Commons licenses.  These give creators standardized ways to grant the public permission to use their work.  Again, however, a user of a work offered under a Creative Commons license should carefully consider the scope of the permission granted.  Not all Creative Commons licenses allow the same types of use.

Obtaining permission to use works may seem daunting, but there are various organizations available online that streamline the process.  The Copyright Alliance offers a list of resources to assist those seeking licenses for works such as literary publications, music, photographs, software and motion pictures.

Conclusion

When it comes to copyright and online meetings, many well-meaning and well-educated people don’t know what they don’t know—until they do.  Unfortunately, that epiphany sometimes comes in the form of a takedown notice or a demand letter.  Thus, presenters would be well advised to evaluate their use of another’s work before posting, streaming, sharing or tweeting.

Copyright 2020 Summa PLLC All Rights Reserved

Hirst Spot Print Turned into Spots by MSCHF, Courtroom Artists Face New Challenge, Banksy Pays Homage to Hospital Workers

Still No LOVE in Robert Indiana’s Estate Battle

In the ongoing suit over the rights to Robert Indiana’s artworks, defendant Michael McKenzie, the founder of American Image Art, filed new counterclaims against the Morgan Art Foundation alleging that Morgan orchestrated “one of the most massive art frauds in history.” McKenzie argues that intellectual property rights were abandoned by Indiana decades ago and that the artist’s famous LOVE artwork is in the public domain. McKenzie further alleges that Morgan “fraudulently affixed” copyright to more than 1,000 sculptures worth more than $100 million and an additional million items valued at least $50 million in retail sales – Indiana did not affix a copyright symbol to his work when it was first published. McKenzie also seeks to invalidate two federal trademarks that Morgan registered for the design and reproduction of LOVE. Notably, several other counterclaims made by McKenzie and Indiana’s estate were dismissed in 2019. Morgan maintains that it has the rights to all images and sculptures that Indiana produced between 1960 and 2004, as well as the exclusive right to fabricate and sell certain sculptures, including LOVE, pursuant to agreements dating back to 1999. Morgan’s direct claim against McKenzie is over the sale of works it alleges were falsely attributed to Indiana.

As SCOTUS Moves Oral Arguments Online, Courtroom Artists Forced to Use Their Ears – and Imaginations – for Illustrations of Oral Arguments

The U.S. Supreme Court’s justices and their staffs are not the only people in the courtroom having to adapt. Court-appointed artists still capture the oral arguments, but must now rely on their ears and imaginations rather than their eyes to create the illustrations. The inability to be inside the courtroom during the arguments not only makes it difficult to paint a picture but also leaves lawyers in the dark as to the justices’ reactions to their arguments.

The Most Expensive Game of (Dis)Connect the Dots: A $30,000 Hirst Print Sold Off Spot by Spot

Damien Hirst created a spot print titled L-Isoleucine T-Butyl Ester. Now, MSCHF, a Brooklyn-based art collective, cut out each of the print’s 88 spots as part of the project called Severed Spots, created in protest against the practice of fractionizing the ownership of artworks. MSCHF sold off each of the spots for $480, generating a profit of about $12,000 over the $30,000 purchase price; in yet another example of an artwork’s value apparently growing as a result of its destruction (think Banksy’s Love Is in the Bin), they stand to gain even more as bidders line up to purchase leftover white paper. Our readers will remember MSCHF for auctioning off The Persistence of Chaos, a computer with the world’s most malicious viruses last year, among other news-making stunts/artworks. MSCHF also sold Jesus Shoes, custom Nike Air Max 97s with holy water from the River Jordan in the soles. Damien Hirst’s studio has not yet responded to this latest stunt by the collective.

Founder of Napster Involved in Suit Over Ownership of an Old Master Painting

Auction house Christie’s recent court filings to enforce an arbitration award reveal that art collector Sean Parker, founder of Napster and first president of Facebook, was embroiled in a dispute over a sale of Peter Paul Rubens’s A Satyr Holding a Basket of Grapes and Quinces with a Nymph (1620). In 2018, Parker acquired the artwork at a Christie’s auction for his foundation, after which the consignor of the artwork inexplicably sought to cancel the sale, despite making more than $1 million in profit. The consignor claimed that she tried to withdraw the painting before the auction took place. When the parties were unable to amicably resolve the dispute, it was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator ruled that Christie’s complied with its contractual obligations and that Parker lawfully acquired the painting. The case highlights the legal and financial responsibilities of the parties involved in consigning an artwork to an auction house.

Former Paddle8 CEO Sued for Alleged Misappropriation of Funds

A group of creditors brought suit in the Southern District of New York, accusing former Paddle8 CEO Valentine Uhovski of engaging in acts of gross mismanagement and disloyalty, including alleged misappropriation of funds from the auctions to pay the company’s operating expenses. Uhovski has denied the allegations. Paddle8 filed for bankruptcy in March, following a separate suit by a nonprofit cinema group that alleged misappropriation of funds from a charity auction.

Mail Art Experiencing Revitalization

In recent months, Mail Art – a 1950s art movement centered around sending small-scale artworks via the postal service – has regained popularity. Artists have been reaching out via social media for submissions, and to date, hundreds of individuals have answered the call. The original idea was to create a form of artistic production that bypasses the traditional channels of art dissemination. The reborn interest in Mail Art is “creating a sense of connectivity” while allowing for people stuck in their homes to take a break from their screens.

EUROPE

INTERPOL Recovers 19,000+ Artifacts in a Massive Operation Spanning 103 Countries

More than 300 INTERPOL investigations coordinated between 103 countries resulted in recovery of more than 19,000 artifacts. Recalling the work of the Monuments Men – unlikely World War II heroes who saved many of Europe’s art treasures – the investigations were focused on criminal networks that deal in artworks looted from war-torn countries as well as artifacts stolen from archeological excavations and museums. The success of the mission highlights the need for global cooperation in fighting the trafficking of cultural goods.

MoMA Voices Concerns Over Norway’s Handling of Picasso Murals

The Norwegian government is in the process of demolishing a government building in Oslo that features Pablo Picasso’s murals sandblasted onto the concrete walls. While plans have been made to relocate the artworks, many are concerned that once moved, the murals will crack. The MoMA letter, published in the Norwegian press, expresses grave concerns over the preservation of the murals and emphasizes their significance to the art community. In addition, the petition to preserve the building holding the murals has garnered more than 47,000 signatures.

Van Eyck Exhibition Organizers Argue Coronavirus Triggers Cancellation Policy

Organizers of the largest exhibition ever dedicated to the Flemish Old Master Jan Van Eyck will distribute refunds to 144,000 ticket holders who were unable to attend due to early closure following the coronavirus outbreak. The organizers are seeking coverage from their cancellation insurer for the refunds of more than €3.5 million.

Counterfeit Artwork Seized at Heathrow Airport Part of a Larger Problem

The British Museum’s inspection revealed that hundreds of what looked to be Middle Eastern artifacts intercepted last July by an officer at Heathrow Airport were fakes. While the items were discovered to be counterfeit, they had the potential to be sold for thousands of dollars to unsuspecting buyers.

Croatia Rushes to Save Valuable Pieces of Art

While the world deals with the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, Croatia experienced a 5.4 magnitude earthquake in its capital, Zagreb. The earthquake damaged some 26,000 buildings, palaces, university buildings and hospitals. The Museum of Decorative Arts, which planned on celebrating its 140th anniversary, suffered a roof collapse during the earthquake. While the building has been classified as unsafe for use, the Museum has been expeditiously removing many fragile objects, even while the aftershocks continued. Many other pre–20th century buildings also sustained damage.

Banksy Pays Homage to Hospital Workers

As a tribute to the National Health Service and health care workers during this pandemic, renowned street artist Banksy created an artwork titled Game Changer (2020), which he donated to England’s Southampton General Hospital. The piece came with a note to the health care workers that read: “Thanks for all you’re doing. I hope this brightens the place up a bit, even if it’s only black and white.” Just days after the artwork was installed, an opportunistic thief wearing a hazmat suit and armed with a drill was caught attempting to steal it.

ASIA

Archaeologists Uncover Further Evidence of Vital Role of Women in Ancient Mongolian Society

Archaeologists discovered 1,500-year-old skeletons of women warriors in northern Mongolia, near China – recalling the story of Hua Mulan, originally described in the Ballad (Ode) of Mulan composed in the fifth or sixth century CE, and appearing as the main character in the 1998 animated Disney film. A study of the skeletons revealed the two women to be skilled in archery and horseback riding. The skeletons were found in a cemetery at the Airagiin Gozgor archeological site. Disney has been planning to release a live-action adaptation of Mulan, currently scheduled for July 24, social distancing guidelines permitting.

 

© 2020 Wilson Elser

New Platform to Facilitate Development of COVID-19 Technologies

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has launched a new platform that could expedite the development of COVID-19 related technologies. As explained in the USPTO’s press release, the Patents 4 Partnerships web-based marketplace is designed to “facilitate the voluntary licensing and commercialization of innovations in a variety of key technologies” related to “the prevention, treatment, and diagnosis of COVID-19.”

The Patents 4 Partnerships IP marketplace platform currently lists 175 granted U.S. patents and pending U.S. patent applications, covering such diverse technologies as “Methods of Treating Coronavirus Infection,” “Air-Sampling Device and Method of Use,” “Rapid and Highly Fieldable Viral Diagnostic,” and “Dexterous Humanoid Robotic Wrist.” According to the press release, the initially listed items were “drawn from a variety of public sources, including the USPTO, the Federal Laboratory Consortium for Technology Transfer (FLC Business), the AUTM Innovation Marketplace (AIM), universities, and a number of federal agencies.”

Stakeholders wanting to add their U.S. patents or applications to the Patents 4 Partnerships platform can complete this simple form. As noted on the form, the technology should be “reasonably related to the prevention, treatment, diagnosis, protection from or alleviation of symptoms of coronaviruses in general.”

© 2020 Foley & Lardner LLP

For more in COVID-19 tech-development, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.