Tag: Contracts

Recent Changes to the Law of Private Construction Contracts – Your Government is Here to Help You Again – Massachusetts

As part of the end-of-session rush at the Massachusetts General Court this summer, significant changes were made to Massachusetts law governing private construction contracts at the urging of general contractor and subcontractor industry groups. Members of the development and lending community were largely taken unaware as the bill moved forward, and unsuccessfully attempted in the later stages of the process to modify or defeat the legislation. Consequently, developers, lenders, contractors, sub-contractors, design professionals and attorneys need to be aware of substantial changes (and many unanswered questions) created by the new statute in the areas of withholding and release of retainage, defining substantial completion, and preparation of punchlists.

Key highlights of Chapter 276 of the Acts of 2014, to be codified at M.G.L. c. 149, sec. 29F:

  • Applicability: All contracts on projects on which the prime contract (a) is entered into after November 6, 2014, and (b) has a contract price of $3 million or more, except projects of 1 to 4 dwelling units.

  • Withholding of Retainage:  Caps retainage to be withheld from progress payments at 5% (long-standing practice has been to retain 10% of each progress payment, with reduced (or no) withholding of further retainage after the project achieves some level (typically 50%) of completion).

  • New Definition of “substantial completion”: “The stage in the progress of the project when the work… is sufficiently complete in accordance with the contract for construction so that the project owner may occupy or utilize the work for its intended use…”  Parties may divide a project into phases and apply the statutory scheme applicable to “substantial completion” separately to each designated project phase.

Process for determining substantial completion:

  • Within 14 days after achieving substantial completion, the prime contractor submits a notice of substantial completion to the owner (form provided in the statute) with contractor’s determination of the date of substantial completion.

  • Within 14 days after receiving this notice, the owner must accept or reject it and return it to the contractor.  If the owner does neither, the notice is deemed accepted and the date of substantial completion determined by the contractor is binding.

  • If the owner rejects the notice, it must notify the prime contractor within this 14-day period, including the “factual and contractual basis for the rejection”, which must be certified as made in good faith.  The dispute is then governed by the contractual dispute resolution provisions, which the contractor must commence within 7 days of its receipt of the owner’s rejection notice.

Punchlist:

  • Within 14 days after the date of substantial completion is established (either through the notice process described above or the applicable dispute resolution proceeding), the owner must submit to the prime contractor a list (certified as made in good faith) of (a) all defective or incomplete work and (b) all outstanding deliverables required under the prime contract.

  • Within 7 days after the prime contractor’s receipt of that list, it must submit a similar list (certified as made in good faith) of all defective or incomplete work and outstanding required deliverables to each sub from whom it is withholding retainage.

Release of Retainage:

  • Applications for release of retainage can be submitted starting 60 days after the date of substantial completion (unless the contract provides for earlier submission), and each application must be accompanied by a list (certified as made in good faith) identifying the defective or incomplete work and deliverables on that party’s punchlist which have been completed, repaired and delivered.

  • Contract must permit applications for release of retainage at least monthly.

  • Retainage (other than that withheld in accordance with the new statute) must be released within 30 days of submission of the application for release, with an additional 7 days added for each tier of subcontractor.

Withholding Release of Retainage:

  • Only the following amounts can be withheld from retainage in response to an application for its release:

    • For incomplete, incorrect or missing deliverables, either (a) the value of the deliverables as mutually agreed to by the contracting parties, or (b) if no value has been agreed to, the reasonable value of the deliverables (not to exceed 2.5% of the total adjusted contract price of the party seeking release of retainage);

    • 150% of the reasonable cost to complete or correct incomplete or defective work; and

    • Reasonable value of any claims, costs, expenses and, where permitted under the contract of the party seeking release of retainage, attorneys’ fees.

  • No retainage can be withheld unless the withholding party provides to the party seeking the retainage, before the date payment is due, a notice (certified as made in good faith) (i) identifying the defective or incomplete work and the incomplete, incorrect or missing deliverables, (ii) the “factual and contractual basis” for any claims, and (iii) the value attributable to each item of incomplete or defective work, deliverable, and claim.

  • Multiple sequential applications for release of retainage are permitted as work is completed or corrected/deliverables are delivered/claims are resolved.

  • Unless the owner has declared the prime contractor in default under its contract, the owner cannot withhold retainage owed by the contractor to a subcontractor except for withholding based on a default by that sub.

  • Rejection of an application for release of retainage is subject to contractual dispute resolution procedures.  Contract provisions requiring a party to wait more than 30 days after rejection of an application for release of retainage before being permitted to commence dispute resolution procedures are void and unenforceable.

Additional Provisions:

  • All communications provided for in the new statute may be made electronically.

  • Section 29F(l) provides that any provision in a contract “which purports to waive, limit or subvert this section or redefine or expand the conditions for achievement of substantial completion for payment of retainage, shall be void and unenforceable.”

The new statute creates major areas of uncertainty for all parties on private construction projects, including:

  • How far an owner can go in adding requirements for deliverables, issuance of permanent C of Os, completion of commissioning, etc. as conditions to achieving “substantial completion”, in light of the new statutory definition of that term and the limitations imposed by Section 29F(l);

  • How an owner can mobilize its design professionals, its lender’s construction inspector, and its own construction team to respond to the prime contractor’s notice of substantial completion in the detailed manner required by the statute within the very short (but required) 14-day period;

  • How disputes over whether substantial completion has been achieved can be resolved through contractual dispute resolution procedures without jeopardizing project delivery deadlines;

  • What constitutes the “factual and contractual basis” required for various actions by the owner; and

  • How lenders will respond to the mandatory reduction in retainage to 5% (some are already saying that they will require an additional 5% in equity from the owner to make up the 10% retainage traditionally withheld by owners).

Although the consequences (intended or otherwise) of this new statute for the real estate lending, development and construction industries in Massachusetts remain to be seen over the coming months and years, they are likely to include:

  • Owners requiring retainage to be withheld on components of the contract price that previously may not have been subject to retainage (e.g., contractor’s fee, general conditions); exercising much greater control over a contractor’s use of contingency funds; requiring bonds from prime contractors and subs more regularly; and policing variations from the project schedule and/or the contract documents more strictly earlier in the project; and

  • Owners being much more selective in the choice of prime contractors and subs, tending towards repeat relationships, leading to greater consolidation within the industry and raising the barriers to entry by new companies.

There is already discussion underway about efforts to amend, limit or repeal this statute, so this will be something to watch for in 2015.

© 2014 SHERIN AND LODGEN LLP
ARTICLE BY

Peter Friedenberg
OF
Sherin and Lodgen LLP

Sender Beware: How Your Emails or Letters may be Ruled a Binding Contract

Heyl Royster Law firm

Often when we think of a contract, we think of the multi-page document that is plagued with legal jargon and minuscule print, followed by signature lines, and then sometimes followed by even more documents nicknamed “schedules” or “annexes” that in some way modify or supplement everything in the previous pages. But courts do not necessarily require contracts to take on this formal appearance in order to be enforceable.

In order to create a binding contract, courts require the following four elements: (1) an offer, (2) acceptance of that offer, (3) consideration (meaning payment or other benefit to one party or a detriment to another party), and (4) definite certain terms. If there is no formal, written contract, then courts will require a fifth element: demonstration of an intent by the parties to be bound by a contract. This fifth element is an objective standard, so it has nothing to do with what you actually intended, and everything to do with the language actually used by the parties and how a reasonable person (really, a judge) would interpret it. See Alyasmen Group, LLC v. MS Rialto Raintree Village IL, LLC, 2011 IL App (1st) 102875-U. As a result, courts in Illinois and other states have on more than one occasion found all of these required elements to be present in emails or letters sent by unsuspecting business people.

In one somewhat surprising case, business partners exchanged emails about how to close a joint real estate business venture and distribute earnings from completed real estate transactions. Less than one month after the partners reached an agreement by email as to how earnings would be distributed, the partners signed a written contract with terms different than what was agreed to in the emails. One of those business partners later sued to enforce the agreement set forth in the emails. Upon review of the case, the court determined that the business partners expressed the intent to be bound by the emails where one of them stated in his email, “this is final and agreed to,” and even offered to print out and sign a copy of the emails. Furthermore, the terms of the agreement were sufficiently definite and consideration existed such that the judge ruled the emails could constitute a binding contract aside from the actual signed, written contract. Bryant v. Way, C.A. No. 11C-01-164 RRC, 2011 WL 2163606 (Del. Sup. Ct. May 25, 2011).

Courts seem most eager to rule emails are binding contracts when the emails relate to the settlement of an ongoing dispute. An employer was able to enforce an agreement reached through email with an employee regarding settlement of that employees’ employment discrimination claim in Todd v. Kohl’s Department Store, No. 08-CV-3827, 2010 WL 3720265 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2010). Similarly, in Protherapy Associates, LLC v. AFS of Bastian, Inc., No. 6:10CV0017, 2010 WL 2696638 (W.D. Va. July 7, 2010), a judge ruled an email setting forth payment terms in settlement of a dispute between a provider of physical therapy services and nursing homes was enforceable against the nursing homes.

Emails are not the only correspondence exposed to potentially being ruled an enforceable contract. Letters of intent generally are used to express the intent of two parties to enter into a written agreement in the future, but these too could be construed as an enforceable contract. The Illinois Supreme Court found that one letter of intent between a general contractor and subcontractor was ambiguous as to whether the parties intended it to be a binding contract and as a result ruled that the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the letter of intent would in fact be binding. Quake Const., Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 141 Ill. 2d 281 (1990). Regardless of the outcome, the parties most certainly incurred legal fees and expenses for a court to rule on whether a letter was an enforceable contract.

So how can you prevent your emails and letters from becoming your next contractual obligation? If you are negotiating or making an offer to someone via email, include a disclaimer in your email that makes it clear the negotiations or offer are contingent on the parties signing a written contract. Don’t bury this disclaimer at the bottom of the email in fine print; intentionally include it in the body of the email so there is no denying your intent. If you are negotiating by a letter of intent or sending some other correspondence such as an offer of employment, use language to make it clear that the letter is not intended to create a binding contract. And as always, if there is any uncertainty, have an attorney do a quick review of before you sign or hit send – your legal fees will be far less for a precursory review than later if you are sued for breach of contract.

Article By:

Stacy Crabtree
Of:
Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C.

Chicken Restaurant Case Serves Up A Bucket of Sound Contract Principles for Commercial Leases

vonBriesen

 

In Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality LLC, 2013 WI 62, the Wisconsin Supreme Courthighlighted the importance of including precise language in commercial leases, especially if the lease includes an integration clause. The court confirmed that when dealing with a fully integrated lease, it is guided by the terms of the lease as written rather than by extrinsic evidence or unwritten understandings between the parties. While this may seem obvious, this case serves as a good reminder for those who negotiate commercial leases to always include all specific business and legal terms.

Tufail (“Landlord”) and Midwest Hospitality LLC (“Tenant”) entered into a lease for commercial property that was then being used by Landlord as a “New York Chicken” restaurant. Tenant leased this property with the intent of operating a “Church’s Chicken” restaurant. However, during build-out, Tenant discovered that a special use permit would be required to operate its fast food restaurant with a drive-through. While Tenant was able to obtain the permit it needed, the permit was conditioned upon the restaurant being closed by 9 p.m. (as opposed to the 4 a.m. close time allowed for the prior restaurant).

Tenant terminated the Lease and notified Landlord that it would stop paying rent due to the adverse effect the earlier closing time would have on its profitability. Tenant argued that the permit requirement was contrary to Landlord’s representation that Tenant would not be prevented from using the premises for the permitted uses set forth in the lease. The lease contained the following use clause: “[t]enant may use and occupy the Premises for any lawful purposes, including, but not limited to, the retail sales, consumption, and delivery of food and beverages which shall include, but not be limited to, Chicken products, Fish products, bread products, salads, sandwiches, dessert items, promotional items, and any other items sold by any Church’s Chicken store.”

After reviewing the lease’s integration clause and finding it to be complete, the court rejected Tenant’s argument that the general reference to “Church’s Chicken” in the use clause required that a fast food restaurant with a drive-through be allowed because the understanding between the parties was that Church’s Chicken restaurants were in fact drive-through fast food restaurants. The court concluded that the lease did not include a false representation and also limited its review to the specific language used in the use and representation clauses of the lease due to its conclusion that the lease was fully integrated.

The court also concluded that the terms of the representation clause as written required simply that Tenant not be prevented from using the property for the purposes set forth in the use clause. The court stated that there was nothing that prevented Tenant from specifically addressing hours of operation, the requirement that a drive-through be allowed, or other specific requirements it considered to be vital to the successful operation of its restaurant in the lease. However, the court was bound to interpret only the contract to which the parties actually agreed, and these requirements were not included therein.

While this is a misrepresentation case on its face, the case ultimately turned on basic contract principles and is an important reminder of the effects of integration clauses. Not only can these “boilerplate” clauses intensify the scrutiny of the specific language chosen by the parties, but, as shown in this case, they can be used to support the theory that even the smallest of deal points should have been included in the agreement if they were important to the parties. This case demonstrates that it is extremely important to include precise, unambiguous language in leases and to double check that even the seemingly minor deal points are included in the lease if they are necessary to make the deal viable.

Article By:

Chris A. Jenny
William R. West
Megan L.W. Jerabek
Of:
von Briesen & Roper, S.C.

“Dual” Employment Contracts for US Executives Working in the UK

VedderPriceLogo

 

Background

February 2014

Individuals, whether of British or foreign nationality, who reside in the UK are, in principle, taxable on their worldwide employment income. Many US executives who are “seconded” by their US employer to work in the UK may therefore become UK tax resident.

Such US executives who have not been UK resident in the three previous tax years and are not UK domiciled need not pay UK tax on their overseas earnings if they do not bring the income to the UK. Other US executives resident in the UK over the longer term may incur liability for UK tax on their overseas income unless their employer structures their employment duties under separate employment contracts, one with the UK subsidiary for their UK duties and another with the US parent for their overseas duties. These have become known as “dual contracts”. If the non-UK domiciled executive keeps the income earned under the overseas contract outside the UK, no UK income tax should arise on that income. He or she will pay UK income tax on the income earned in the UK under his or her UK contract.

“All Change”

In December 2013 HM Government announced that it would be clamping down on the artificial use of dual contracts for longer-term UK residents and has now published draft legislation that makes offshore employment income in a dual-contract arrangement taxable in the UK in certain cases.

The New Rules

Under the new anti-avoidance rules, which come into force on 6 April 2014, the dual-contract overseas income of US executives resident in the UK will be taxed in the UK if:

  • the executive has a UK employment and one or more foreign employments,
  • the UK employer and the offshore employer either are the same entity or are in the same group,
  • the UK employment and the offshore employment are “related”, and
  • the foreign tax rate that applies to the remuneration from the offshore employment is less than 75 percent of the applicable rate of UK tax. The current top rate of UK income tax is 45 percent, and 75 percent of this rate is 33.75 percent.

The UK employment and the offshore employment will be “related” where, by way of non-exhaustive example:

  • one employment operates by reference to the other employment,
  • the duties performed in both employments are essentially the same (regardless of where those duties are performed),
  • the performance of duties under one contract is dependent on the performance of duties under the other,
  • the executive is a director of either employer, or is otherwise a senior employee or one of the highest earning employees of either employer, or
  • the duties under the dual contracts involve, wholly or partly, the provision of goods or services to the same customers or clients.

Action

US corporations should urgently review the use of dual contracts for their non-UK domiciled executives seconded to their UK subsidiaries before the 6 April 2014 start date. The proposed legislation is widely drafted and has the potential to catch even genuine dual-contract arrangements. If one of the dual contracts is with a group employer in a low-tax jurisdiction, that contract may be especially vulnerable. Dual contracts will not necessarily become extinct, but in the future, careful cross-border tax advice should be sought in their structuring.

Article by:

Of:

Vedder Price

Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) New Rules Target Veterans and Individuals with Disabilities

DrinkerBiddle

Familiar with this?  It’s time to update your affirmative action plans.  For the women and minorities plan, you gather your applicant data, prepare spreadsheets and update your written materials to reflect new goals and changes in your recruiting sources.  For the veterans and individuals with disabilities plan, you update a bit and you’re done.  Starting early next year, however, the rules will change making updates more onerous for employers.  On August 27, 2013, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs announced final rules for federal contractors regarding hiring and employment of disabled individuals and protected veterans and imposing new data retention and affirmative action obligations on contractors.  The rules are expected to be published in the Federal Register shortly and will become effective 180 days later.

The key changes include:

  • Benchmarks.  Contractors must establish benchmarks, using one of two methods approved by the OFCCP, to measure progress in hiring veterans.  Likewise, contractors must strive to hire individuals with disabilities to comprise at least seven percent of employees in each job group.  The OFCCP says these are meant to be aspirational, and are not designed to be quotas.
  • Data Analysis and Retention.  Contractors must document and update annually several quantitative comparisons for the number of veterans who apply for jobs and the number of veterans that they hire.  Likewise, for individuals with disabilities, contractors are required to conduct analyses of disabled applicants and those hired.  Such data must be retained for three years.
  • Invitation to Self-Identify.  Contractors must invite applicants to self-identify as protected veterans and as an individual with a disability at both the pre-offer and post-offer phases of the application process, using language to be provided by the OFCCP.  This particular requirement worries employers who know that the less demographic information they have about applicants, the better – especially when the application is denied.  Contractors must also invite their employees to self-identify as individuals with a disability every five years, using language to be provided by the OFCCP.

Additional information, including with respect new requirements such as incorporating the equal opportunity clause into contracts, job listings, and records access, can be found here (http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/vevraa.htm) and here (http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/section503.htm).

Contractors with an Affirmative Action Plan already in place on the effective date of the regulations will have additional time, until they create their next plans, to bring their plan into compliance.  However, whether they have a current Affirmative Action Plan or not, federal contractors should begin looking at these new rules now and take steps to ensure they are in compliance.

Article By:

 of

A Federal District Court in Florida Finds Hospital System Properly Terminated a Professional Services Contract for a Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Breach

Dickinson Wright Logo

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida found on June 20, 2013 that defendant Community Health Systems, Inc., and its affiliated hospital, Salem Hospital (collectively, “CHS”) properly terminated a Professional Services Agreement it had with Managed Care Solutions, Inc. (“MCS”) for breach of contract after determining that Nichole Scott, one of MCS’s employees, misappropriated Protected Health Information (“PHI”) from the hospital. Ms. Scott misappropriated PHI from the hospital’s patients including patients’ checks, credit card numbers and social security numbers.

The Business Associate Agreement (“BAA”) between CHS and MCS provided, among other things, that in the event MCS breached its obligations under the BAA, CHS could terminate both the BAA and the Professional Services Agreement. After CHS terminated the Professional Services Agreement with MCS as a result of Ms. Scott’s misappropriation of its patients’ PHI, MCS sued CHS for breach of contract. The Florida District Court granted CHS’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the lawsuit.

The lesson from this case is that healthcare entities should have clear cross-default provisions in their Professional Services Agreements with their business associates and in their Business Associate Agreements that allow them to terminate the Professional Services Agreement or take other appropriate remedial action in the event of a breach by the business associate of its obligations under the Professional Services Agreement and/or under the Business Associate Agreement.

Article By:

 of

Does My Email Communication Constitute a Binding Agreement?

GT Law

In an era where the prevalence of email exchanges in the business arena is almost commonplace, clients and attorneys should be aware that a form of identification which could constitute their signature in an email, attesting to the substance of a negotiated settlement, may be considered a binding and enforceable stipulation of settlement under CPLR 2104.  Last month, a unanimous panel of the Appellate Division, Second Department, held, in Forcelli v. Gelco Corporation, 27584/08, that an agent for a vehicle insurer who sent an email message to plaintiff’s counsel, with her name entered at the bottom of the email, summing up the settlement terms in an automobile accident case, constituted “a writing subscribed by [client] or his attorney” as required under the statute.

The Forcelli case was brought by Mr. Forcelli and his wife for injuries Mr. Forcelli allegedly suffered in connection with a three-car accident on the Saw Mill River Parkway.  One of the cars was driven by the defendant Mitchell Maller who was driving a car owned by defendant Gelco Corporation.  In January 2011, Gelco and Maller (the “Gelco Defendants”) moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all claims.  In March 2011, the Gelco Defendants met with plaintiffs and their counsel for mediation.  Ms. Brenda Greene, a claims adjuster with the insurer of the Gelco Defendants’ vehicle, was also present and she informed Plaintiffs that she had authority to settle the case on behalf of her insured.  Although the mediation did not result in an immediate settlement, the parties continued their discussions and on May 3, 2011, Ms. Greene orally offered to settle the case for $230,000.  Plaintiffs’ counsel orally accepted the offer on behalf of the Plaintiffs.  Ms. Greene then sent an email message to Plaintiffs’ counsel memorializing the terms of the settlement.  On May 4, 2011, Plaintiffs signed a release in exchange for receiving the $230,000.  A few days later, on May 10, 2011, the Supreme Court issued an order granting the Gelco Defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing all claims against them.  After the Court’s decision, the Gelco Defendants took the position that there was no settlement finalized under CPLR 2104.  Plaintiffs moved to enforce the settlement agreement as set forth in Ms. Greene’s email message.

Writing for the unanimous panel, Judge Sandra Sgroi stated that “given the now widespread use of email as a form of written communication in both personal and business affairs, it would be unreasonable to conclude that email messages are incapable of conforming to the criteria of CPLR 2104 simply because they cannot be physically signed in a traditional fashion.”  Specifically, Judge Sgroi noted that the agent ended the email with the expression “Thanks Brenda Greene,” which “indicates that the author purposefully added her name to this particular email message rather than a situation where the sender’s email software has been programmed to automatically generate the name of the email sender….”  Judge Sgroi noted that Ms. Greene’s email message set forth the material terms of the settlement agreement and contained an expression of mutual assent.  Importantly, the settlement was not conditioned on any further occurrence and the record clearly demonstrated that Ms. Greene had apparent authority to settle the case on behalf of the insured.

Judge Sgroi cited to both First and Third Department decisions where those Courts came to the same conclusion.  In Williamson v. Delsener, 59 A.D.3d 291 (2009), the Appellate Division, First Department held that “emails exchanged between counsel, which contained their printed names at the end, constitute signed writings (CPLR 2104) within the meaning of the statute of frauds and entitle plaintiff to judgment.”  The First Department noted that the email communications evidenced that Delsener was aware of and consented to the settlement and there was no indication in the record that counsel was without authority to enter into the settlement.

Likewise, in Newmark & Co. Real Estate Inc. v. 2615 East 17 Street Realty LLC, 80 A.D.3d 476 (2011), which involved payment of a commission under a brokerage agreement, the First Department found that although the defendant did not sign the brokerage agreement sent by the plaintiff, there were several email communications, supported by other documentary evidence, which contained the terms of the brokerage agreement.  The Court stated that “an email sent by a party, under which the sending party’s name is typed, can constitute a writing for the purposes of the statute of frauds.”  The email agreement set forth all relevant terms of the agreement and thus “constituted a meeting of the minds.”

The Appellate Division, Third Department, held in Brighton Investment, LTD. v. Ronen Har-ZVI, 88 A.D.3d 1220 (2011) that “an exchange of emails may constitute an enforceable contract, even if a party subsequently fails to sign implementing documents, when the communications are sufficiently clear and concrete to establish such an intent.”  (internal citations omitted.)

While the law in this area is plainly evolving, clients and attorneys should be careful when setting forth terms of a settlement or conducting any sort of negotiations via email.  One simple suggestion that may reduce the risk that emails with typed signatures (or even a signature block) at the bottom may unintentionally create a binding agreement is to include in the email a form of disclaimer that the email is for negotiation purposes only and does not constitute or give rise to a binding legal agreement.  We certainly have not heard the last word on this subject.  It will be up to the Court of Appeals to render a decision that will hopefully give some degree of finality to the issue of whether name identification on an email constitutes the type of signature required for a binding settlement under CPLR 2104.

Article By:

 of

Complete Your Non-Compete Agreement: Helpful Drafting Tips

McBrayer NEW logo 1-10-13

Perhaps you consider your non-compete agreement just one form in a stack of many? When it is time to use it there is not much to the process: you retrieve it from the HR office, briefly discuss it with the employee, and he willingly signs it. But such a practice is a perilous one because non-compete agreements are not meant to be “one-size-fits-all.” Rather, they should be thoughtfully tweaked to each specific employee and situation. By relying on boilerplate language and fill-in-the-blank forms, you are risking the chance that a court will find your agreement unenforceable.

Unfortunately, there are no bright-line rules that employers can abide by to ensure the legality of agreements, but there are some factors that you should consider when drafting these agreements that should assist employers in enforcing their agreements when the time comes to do so, including:

1) The nature of the industry

The higher the competition in the industry, the more likely a non-compete will be upheld. If the industry is such where an individual may gain sensitive or secretive data, strategies, or business models, then a strict non-compete makes much more sense. On the other hand, if succeeding in the industry primarily results from people relying on their own strengths (good service, knowledge, etc.), then there is less of a reason to restrict them from competing against their former employer because they will not be relying on what was gained at their previous employment. Compare the industry of a Silicon Valley technology start-up versus that of a general family physician; a non-compete agreement makes much more sense in the former rather than the latter. Lesson – explain clearly the reason why the agreement is necessary. 

2) The relevant characteristics of the employer

Is the business local or global? Are there a handful of employees or thousands? Does the employer dominate the industry or is competition fierce? As a general rule, the larger the employer’s geographical reach, the larger the geographical restriction can be. Yet, the geographic reach of the employer is just one of many considerations and must be viewed in light of the entire non-compete. For example, a court may uphold a one-year restriction of competing nationally, if the business is global. On the other hand, if the business is unique to one state (say, breeding racing thoroughbreds) then a five-year, state-wide restriction could be held unenforceable. Take time to understand your business and catalogue its characteristics. Lesson –limit the geographic and durational scope of the restriction as much as is reasonable – and explain the reasons for each.

There are some additional tips worth sharing; check back on Wednesday and I’ll discuss what else you can do to improve your non-compete agreements.

Employment as Consideration in Employee Non-Competes: Less than Two Years is Not Enough

MUCHblue

The Illinois Appellate court very recently clarified a budding dispute among practitioners regarding what type of consideration is necessary to enforce a non-compete or non-solicitation agreement. In Fifield v. Premier Dealer Services, Inc., in which our firm represented the employee and his new employer, the First District Illinois Appellate Court set forth this bright line rule — if the only consideration for a restrictive covenant is employment, then an employee has to work at least two years after signing the agreement before the non-compete or non-solicitation agreement can be enforced. This is true even if the restriction meets all other requirements (e.g., legitimate interest, reasonable scope).

This rule applies whether or not the agreement is signed at the beginning of employment or during, whether the employee quits or is fired. It simply doesn’t matter. Unless the employee has worked two years, the company will not be able to enforce that agreement unless some other adequate consideration is given for the restrictive covenant.

What does this mean to you? It means that if you hire a new employee and require her to sign a non-compete and that employee leaves a year after being hired, you will not be able to enforce that non-compete agreement no matter what. Indeed, based on the Fifield case, if the employee works one year and eleven months and then leaves, the agreement would still not be enforceable.

The same rule would apply if you ask an employee to sign a non-compete during his or her employment. After that agreement is signed, the employee has to work an additional two years for the agreement to be enforceable, provided that the only consideration for the agreement is employment.

And that is the loophole that the court has left employers: providing some other consideration besides employment. For example, if a company gives a real (not an illusory or nominal) signing bonus, the employer would have a fairly good argument that it has provided adequate consideration to enforce the agreement. Perhaps a promotion would work as well, although that is more problematic since a promotion is still basically employment. After promoting its employee, nothing prevents the company from then firing the employee, if employment is at will. If, on the other hand, the employee was hired for a particular amount of time (at least two years) during which he or she could not be fired without cause, that could itself be sufficient consideration since it would arguably constitute two years of employment even if the employee quit early.

Another, albeit untested possibility would be to draft the restrictive covenant in such a way that the post-employment restriction would be equal to the length of time that the employee actually works. So if the employee leaves after one year, then she or he is restricted for one year. To be enforceable, the restriction would likely have to have some maximum period of time. Probably two to three years at the most.

As you can see, this new ruling has significant implications. At the very least, every company should carefully review its non-compete and non-solicitation agreements to see if they are supported by adequate consideration. If they don’t, then you should discuss with your attorneys how best to rectify the situation. You certainly do not want your former employees going to competitors singing, “I can’t get no consideration.”

Article By:

 of

Non-Compete Agreements Aren’t for Everyone: The Necessity of Proving a “Legitimate Business Interest”

Womble Carlyle

It is a longstanding tenet of North Carolina law:  A company must have a legitimate business interest to justify using non-competes in its employment agreements.

Employers often focus on specific language describing the scope of their non-competes – should it be six months, one year or two years?  Should it be citywide, statewide, or is a larger territory reasonable?  And although the scope of a non-compete is critical, two recent North Carolina court decisions emphasize that you can’t use a non-compete in just any situation.  There must be a legitimate business interest which merits its use.

What qualifies as a legitimate business interest?

In Pinehurst Surgical Clinic, P.A. v. DiMichele, the NC Court of Appeals enforced an employment agreement prohibiting the defendant physician from practicing medicine in competition with the plaintiff surgical clinic for two years within a 35-mile radius of its Pinehurst facility.

In reversing the trial court’s finding of no irreparable harm, and remanding the case with instructions to grant the PI, the Court focused on several key findings which demonstrated the employer had strong, legitimate and protectable business interests to justify the use of non-competes:

  • In its more than 60 years of existence, the clinic had invested many resources “cultivating relationships with patients, employees, and various entities in the region in which it does business.”
  • The clinic annually spent significant sums “to develop and maintain a loyal patient base and goodwill in the community.”
  • The clinic provided the physician with “extensive confidential information regarding all aspects of plaintiff’s medical practice and business affairs.”
  • The clinic also provided the physician with an extensive patient base and the support necessary to maintain a successful medical practice, reputation and goodwill in the community.

In contrast – and reaching a different result – in Phelps Staffing, LLC v. C.T. Phelps, Inc., the Court of Appeals found that a staffing company failed to establish a legitimate business interest supporting its use of non-competes.   A number of factors undermined the staffing company’s case:

  • The employees at issue were “general laborers”;
  • The employees did not have access to trade secrets or proprietary information; and
  • The staffing company admitted that the primary purpose of the non-compete was to prevent competition from other temporary staffing companies.

The Court had little trouble affirming the trial court’s finding that the non-compete was “merely an attempt to stifle lawful competition between businesses and that it unfairly hinders the ability of plaintiff’s former employees to earn a living.”

These North Carolina cases are in sync with the national trend.  For example, in Gastroenterology Consultants of the North Shore v. Mick S. Meiselman, an Illinois appellate court invalidated a physician’s non-compete because the former employer failed to show a legitimate protectable interest.  The evidence showed that the doctor had been practicing in the relevant territory for about 10 years before his employment with the practice, the practice did not introduce the doctor to his patients or his physician-referral sources, the practice did not advertise, promote or market the doctor’s practice, and the doctor maintained his own office and telephone number.  The practice merely provided some administrative support for the doctor.  As a result, the practice lacked a legitimate interest to justify the non-compete.

Article By:

 of