Federal Cannabis Reform – Is 2022 the Year?

Hope soared with the possibility of federal cannabis reform in 2021.  And for good reason –  the induction of a new, more liberal administration, rapid state-level legalization, broad support by Americans,[1] and growing bipartisan backing led many to believe that 2021 was going to be the year where federal decriminalization of cannabis would become a reality.  But, as 2021 continued on, optimism dwindled as any advancement in federal cannabis reform was hobbled by the inability of Congress to agree on the appropriate level of reform  and the proper mechanics for passage.  Specifically, tension rose amongst the elected Democrats on whether to support incremental reform (like access to banks or removal of cannabis from the list of Schedule 1 drugs) or comprehensive legalization with provisions to address social inequities stemming from the legacy of the War on Drugs.  And so 2021 came to an end, and the cannabis industry saw yet another year of failed meaningful change on the federal level.

Still, momentum for reform has not been lost.  If anything, last year saw more bills introduced into Congress (including two new federal legalization proposals) than ever before – clearly indicating its import to our nation’s leaders.  Justice Clarence Thomas from the Supreme Court even subtly advised Congress to address legalization, noting that the Federal Government’s current “half in, half out regime” on cannabis strained the principles of federalism.

And so, as we move forward in 2022 with hope, we review the bills before Congress and their progresses to assess which of these may have some traction for passage during this upcoming year.

Secure and Fair Enforcement (“SAFE”) Banking Act of 2021[2]

Considered modest reform, the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 mainly focused on granting cannabis-related businesses access to federally-backed financial institutions.  The bill was introduced early in 2021,[3] and passed in the U.S. House of Representatives on April 20, 2021 by a vote of 321 to 101.  At the time of the House’s passage, many believed the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 would easily move its way through the Senate, due – in part – to its demonstrated bipartisan appeal with 106 Republican votes in the House.  Congressman Ed Pearlman, one of its drafters, even remarked:

After years of bringing up this issue, I’m thrilled to see overwhelming support for this bipartisan, commonsense legislation in the U.S. House once again. I feel optimistic about the path forward for the SAFE Banking Act and, more broadly, reforms to our federal cannabis laws.[4]

However, after its passage in the House, the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 languished in the Senate’s Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.  Momentum for the bill slowed, with those opposing it campaigning for more comprehensive legalization.  In late September 2021, fervor for the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 arose again when the House passed, by voice vote, an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (“NDAA”) to add the SAFE Banking Act of 2021.  Many hoped that by couching the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 in the NDAA, it would make it easier to pass through the Senate.  On November 23, 2021, 4 Senators[5] penned a letter to the Senate’s Armed Services Committee urging them to retain the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 in the NDAA.  Despite these efforts, the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 was stripped from the NDAA on December 10, 2021 – stalling its progress once more.

The Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment & Expungement (“MORE”) Act

The MORE Act is the oldest comprehensive legislative proposal.  It was passed in the House in December 2020, during a lame-duck session, but never made any headway in the Senate.[6]  On May 28, 2021, Representative Jerrold Nadler reintroduced the MORE Act into the House and much of its substance provided the legislative stepping stones for the Cannabis Administrative and Opportunity Act (“CAO”).

The MORE Act aimed to end criminalization of cannabis by removing it from the list of controlled  substances, eliminate related past criminal penalties and convictions, and provide essential criminal justice reform, social justice and economic development for those affected by the War on Drugs.  The MORE Act also would tax cannabis products starting at 5% to 8% (increasing by 1% over 5 years) to help fund social reform projects, make Small Business Administration loans and services available to cannabis-related businesses, and prohibit denial of federal public benefits (like housing) and protections under immigration law on the basis of cannabis-related conduct or conviction.

After sitting in the House Judiciary Committee, the bill was finally approved in the Committee on September 30, 2021, with 2 Republican Representatives voting yes.  This act sent the measure to the House floor for another vote before it could make its way to the Senate.

The Cannabis Administrative and Opportunity Act

Embracing the MORE Act’s goals for comprehensive reform, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (along with Senators Cory Booker  and Ron Wyden) introduced the long awaited draft of the CAO into the Senate on July 14, 2021.  Considered a historic and ambitious bill, the CAO aimed to implement a full-scale federal scheme for cannabis reform that reaches beyond just decriminalization.  It hopes to provide restorative measures “to lift up people and communities who were unfairly targeted in the War on Drugs.”[7] Specifically, the CAO seeks to do the following:

  • Decriminalize cannabis by removing it from the Controlled Substances Act and automatically expunge any arrests and convictions for non-violent federal cannabis offenses;
  • Transfer primary agency jurisdiction over cannabis to the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (“TTB”), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“ATF”) so that cannabis can be federally regulated similar to alcohol and tobacco;
  • Establish a Center for Cannabis Products responsible for regulating the “cannabis aspect of all products containing cannabis,” and implementing requirements related to cannabis products (g., good manufacturing practice, product standards, product labeling, product distribution and recall, etc.) within the FDA;
  • Mandate federal research and studies regarding the impact of cannabis (including any benefits and/or impairments) on the human brain and health conditions and its impact on drivers under its influence;
  • Permit movement of cannabis products through channels of interstate commerce;
  • Establish Opportunity Trust Fund Programs funded by federal cannabis tax revenue to restore and reinvest in communities greatly impacted by the War on Drugs (including funds for job training, reentry services, legal aid, and youth recreation/mentoring programs) and to help level the playing field by granting entrepreneurs of color access to the cannabis industry through small business loans;
  • Prohibit denial of federal benefits or immigration protection due to a past cannabis-related offense; and
  • Impose federal excise tax on sale of cannabis products, starting at 10% and increasing up to 25% in a span of 5 years, with certain favorable tax credit for cannabis producers with less than $20 million sales.

Though the CAO has lofty goals, it does not force states to legalize cannabis, emphasizing the integrity of state-specific cannabis law.

As a draft bill, the CAO was subject to a review period in which its authors requested public comments by September 1, 2021.  At the expiration of this review period, the drafters of the bill received numerous comments from both supporters and those criticizing the CAO as overly ambitious and a big-government approach.  In particular, many critics take issue with the bill’s tax structure, calling the imposition of an ultimate 25% federal excise tax burdensome.  Indeed, the CAO – as it stands – implements the highest tax structure for cannabis products of all the bills proposed in 2021.  Many allege that the high federal tax in addition to any state-imposed tax could promote the illicit cannabis market rather than encourage business owners to engage legally.  Additionally, the high federal tax could force states to reduce their own tax requirements, negatively affecting their own ability to fund state-run social equity and education initiatives.

For now, the public comments have been taken under advisement as the cannabis industry waits to see what the drafters decide to incorporate.  Once formally filed, the CAO will be sent to a committee for continued discussions and revisions before it can be advanced to the Senate floor for a vote.

The States Reform Act

The States Reform Act (“SRA”) is the latest comprehensive reform bill led by Republican Representative Nancy Mace and introduced in the House in November 15, 2021.  Like the MORE Act and the CAO, the SRA also seeks to decriminalize cannabis and provides retroactive expungement for non-violent federal cannabis offense, except for any person involved in a drug cartel.  However, the SRA differentiates itself by limiting federal social equity reform programs.  Instead, the SRA vests the authority  to determine what level of cannabis reform, including outright prohibition, in the individual states.  States will also retain authority to regulate the use, distribution, sale and manufacturing of cannabis, with some general federal oversight by the FDA, TTB, ATF and the Department of Agriculture.  Specifically, the SRA aims to regulate cannabis like alcohol (and alcohol alone) – another substantial difference from the CAO.  The SRA permits each state to determine the appropriate age limit for purchase of cannabis products, but incentivizes states to implement a 21+ limit by eliminating funding for highways for any state with an age limit of under 21 years of age and prohibiting advertisements directed at any person under the age of 21.  The bill also seeks to provide veterans with access to medical cannabis without fear of discrimination or denial of Veteran Affairs benefits.  The SRA also generally requires that medical cannabis be permitted for treatment of arthritis, cancer and chronic pain.  Similar to the CAO, the SRA will also allow the interstate cannabis transportation.

Notably, the SRA provides the lowest tax structure for cannabis products in comparison to other reform proposals, with the proposed imposition of a single tax rate of 3% that cannot be increased for at least 10 years.  Revenues from the tax would be used to support SBA programs for cannabis businesses, law enforcement initiatives including reentry programs, and veteran mental health programs.

Given its recency, little is known about the bill’s reception in the House and any progress that has been made.  However, the SRA does carry potential bipartisan appeal, particularly because it is sponsored by 4 Republican Representatives.  Additionally, it is anticipated that the Congressional Republicans will appreciate the SRA’s straight forward tax structure capped at a low rate for at least 10 years and its stance on states’ sovereignty regarding cannabis reform.  The real issue for the SRA is its lack of restorative justice and social equity efforts, which may be its death knell in the current Democrat-controlled House.

Implications for 2022

There are now 4 bills (3 with comprehensive legislation) circulating Capitol Hill that could provide much needed cannabis reform in 2022.  Congress will likely continue debating, revising and attempting to compromise on the terms in the MORE Act, the CAO and the SRA.  Potentially, if the 3 comprehensive bills remain on the discussion table, they will compete with one another, potentially dividing the Legislators’ support.  Congress should thus focus on forging a compromise or middle ground on these reforms to increase bipartisan support and avoid competing and inconsistent bills floating around, resulting in another year of unwanted (and unnecessary) deadlock.  Indeed, the CAO could be an example of such needed compromise – especially if the drafters seriously heed the criticisms and comments provided during the bill’s review period and consider incorporating certain bipartisan elements of the SRA, like a more stream-lined and lower rate tax structure.  With that said, the status of these cannabis reform bills, particularly the CAO and the MORE Act, face potential change should this year’s mid-term elections change the makeup of who controls the Senate, House or both.

Regardless, until Congress can iron out the kinks on comprehensive cannabis reform, the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 remains a practical law to pass in the interim.  The SAFE Banking Act of 2021 is currently the least controversial of all the cannabis-reform bills, has substantial bipartisan appeal, and will provide immediate financial resources and relief to the largely cash-based cannabis industry.  Though a small reform, it is still a necessary one that is long overdue.  The SAFE Banking Act of 2021 (and its predecessors) has already made its way through the House 6 times, proving that federal lawmakers believe it will help cannabis businessmen.  It may not resolve the issue of prohibition on cannabis, but its passage will likely be a great victory for the cannabis industry, signal federal de-stigmatization of cannabis, promote public safety by discouraging participation in the illicit cannabis market, and help cannabis-related businesses comply with tax laws.

Footnotes

[1] https://news.gallup.com/poll/356939/support-legal-marijuana-holds-record…

[2] On February 4, 2022, the SAFE Banking Act passed again in the House – this time, as an included amendment to the America COMPLETES Act.

[3] The bill is the successor to the previously introduced SAFE Banking Act of 2019.  See https://www.cannabislawblog.com/2021/09/safe-banking-act-2021/

[4] https://perlmutter.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=5486

[5] Gary Peters, Angus King, Kevin Cramer, and Mark Kelly

[6] https://www.cannabislawblog.com/2020/12/house-representatives-passes-bil…

[7] https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CAOA%20Detailed%20Summary

 

Copyright © 2022, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Senator Manchin Announces That He Will Not Support the Build Back Better Act – Where Things Stand Now

Today, December 19, 2021, Senator Joe Manchin (D., W.Va.) said that he opposes the Build Back Better Act, which effectively prevents its passage.  While there are no immediate prospects for the Build Back Better Act to become law, future tax acts tend to draw upon earlier proposals.  With a view to future tax proposals, this blog summarizes the final draft that was released by the Senate Finance Committee on December 11, 2021 (the “Build Back Better Bill”), and compares it to the bill passed by the House of Representatives (the “House Bill”) and the prior bill that was released by the House Ways and Means Committee in September 2021 (the “Prior House Bill”), which the House Bill was based on.  In light of Senator Manchin’s announcement, this blog refers to the bills in the past tense.

Summary of Significant Changes to Current Law in the Build Back Better Bill

Individual taxation

  •  A 5% surtax would have been imposed on income in excess of $10 million ($5 million for a married individual filing a separate return) and a 3% additional surtax would have been imposed on income in excess of $25 million ($12.5 million for a married individual filing a separate return). The surtax would have also applied to non-grantor trusts but at significantly lower thresholds – the 5% surtax would apply to income in excess of $200,000 and the 3% surtax would apply to income in excess of $500,000.  The individual income tax rates would have otherwise remained the same as under current law.
  • The 3.8% net investment income tax would have been expanded to apply to the active trade or business income of taxpayers earning more than $400,000. As a result, active trade or business income allocated to a limited partner of a limited partnership or a shareholder of a subchapter S corporation would have been subject to the net investment income tax. Under current law, the tax applies only to certain portfolio and passive income.  Under current law, a limited partner of a limited partnership and a shareholder of a subchapter S corporation is otherwise not subject to self-employment taxes.  The Build Back Better Act would not have had otherwise imposed self-employment taxes on S corporation shareholders or limited partners.
  • The exemption of gains on the disposition of “qualified small business stock” would have been reduced from 100% to 50% for taxpayers earning more than $400,000/year, and all trusts and estates.
  • “Excess business losses” in excess of $250,000 ($500,000 in the case of a joint return) would have been carried forward as business losses (thus remaining still subject to the limitation) and would not have been converted to net operating losses, and the excess business loss provision would have been made permanent. It currently is scheduled to expire in 2026.
  • Losses recognized with respect to worthless partnership interests would have been treated as capital losses (rather than ordinary losses as is often the case under current law), and would have been taken when the event establishing worthlessness occurs (rather than at the end of the year under current law).
  • The wash sale rules would have been expanded to cover commodities, foreign currencies, and digital assets, like cryptocurrency, as well as dispositions by parties related to the taxpayer.
  • The constructive ownership rules would have been expanded to cover digital assets, like cryptocurrency.

Business taxation

  • A corporate minimum tax of 15% would have been imposed on “book income” of certain large corporations. But the corporate income tax rates would have remained unchanged at 21%.
  • 1% excise tax would have been imposed on the value of stock repurchased by a corporation.
  • The interest expense deduction of a domestic corporation that is part of an “international financial reporting group” and whose average annual net interest expense exceeds $12 million over a three-year period would have been disallowed to the extent its net interest expenses for financial reporting purposes exceeds 110% of its proportionate share (determined based on its share of either the group’s EBITDA or adjusted basis of assets) of the net interest expense for financial reporting purposes of the group. The disallowed interest deduction could be carried forward for subsequent years.
  • Losses recognized by a corporate shareholder in liquidation of its majority-owned corporate subsidiary would have been deferred until substantially all of property received in the liquidation is disposed of by the shareholder.
  • Corporations spinning off subsidiaries would have been limited in their ability to use debt of the subsidiary to receive tax-free cash.

International taxation

  • A foreign person who owns 10% or more of the total vote or value of the stock of a corporate issuer (as opposed to 10% or more of total vote under current law) would have been ineligible for the portfolio interest exemption.
  • The Build Back Better Bill would have substantially revise the various international tax rules enacted as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”), including “GILTI”, “FDII” and “BEAT” regimes.
  • Foreign tax credit limitation rules would have been applied on a country-by-country basis.
  • Section 871(m), which imposes U.S. withholding tax on U.S.-dividend equivalent payments on swaps and forward contracts, would have been expanded to require withholding on swaps and forwards with respect to, or by reference to, interests in publicly traded partnerships.[1]

Proposals Not Included in the Build Back Better Bill

The Build Back Better Bill would not have:

  • Increased individual and corporate income tax rates (other than the surtaxes);
  • Changed the tax treatment of carried interests;
  • Affected the “pass-through deduction” under section 199A;
  • Affected “like-kind” exchanges under section 1031;
  • Increased the cap on social security tax withholding;
  • Changed the $10,000 annual cap on state and local tax deductions;[2] or
  • Treated death as a realization event.

Discussion

Individual Tax Changes

Surtax on individuals

The Build Back Better Bill would have added new section 1A, which would have imposed a tax equal to 5% of a taxpayer’s “modified adjusted gross income” in excess of $10 million (or in excess of $5 million for a married individual filing a separate return).  Modified adjusted gross income would have been adjusted gross income reduced by any reduction allowed for investment interest expenses.  Modified adjusted gross income would not have been reduced by charitable deductions and credits would not have been allowed to offset this surtax.  An additional 3% tax would have been imposed on a taxpayer’s modified adjusted gross income over $25 million (or in excess of $12.5 mm for taxpayers filing as married filing separately).  The surtaxes would also have applied to non-grantor trusts at significantly lower thresholds – the 5% surtax would apply to modified adjusted gross income in excess of $200,000 and the 3% additional surtax would have applied to modified adjusted gross income in excess of $500,000.

As a result, the top marginal federal income tax rate on modified adjusted gross income in excess of $25 million would have been 45% for ordinary income and 31.8% for capital gains (including the net investment income tax).  Nevertheless, the Build Back Better Bill rate on capital gains would have remained meaningfully less than the 39.6% rate proposed by the Biden Administration.

The Build Back Better Bill did not include a change to the individual income tax rates, which was a major departure from the Prior House Bill.  The Prior House Bill included a similar surtax on individual taxpayers, but the threshold was lower at $5 million for taxpayers that file joint returns and the surtax rate was 3%.

The surtax would have been effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2021.

Application of net investment income tax to active business income; increased threshold

The Build Back Better Bill would have expanded the 3.8% net investment income tax to apply to net income derived in an active trade or business of the taxpayer, rather than only to certain portfolio income and passive income of the taxpayer under current law.

As a result, the 3.8% net investment income tax would have been imposed on limited partners who traditionally have not been subject to self-employment tax on their distributive share of income, and S corporation shareholders who have not been subject to self-employment tax on more than a reasonable salary. This proposed change was generally consistent with the Biden administration’s proposal to impose 3.8% Medicare tax (although the additional net investment income tax proposed in the Build Back Better Bill would not be used to fund Medicare).

The Build Back Better Bill also would have limited the 3.8% net investment income tax so that it applies only to taxpayers with taxable income greater than $400,000 (and $500,000 in the case of married individuals filing a joint return), rather than $250,000 under current law.

These changes were consistent with the proposals in the Prior House Bill and would have applied in taxable years beginning after 2021.

Limitation on “qualified small business stock” benefits

The Build Back Better Bill would have limited the exemption of eligible gain for disposition of “qualified small business stock” (“QSBS”) to 50% for taxpayers with adjusted gross income of $400,000 or more, as well as all trusts and estates, and would have subjected the gain to the alternative minimum tax.

Very generally, under current law, non-corporate taxpayers are entitled to exclude from tax up to 100% of gain from the disposition of QSBS that has been held for more than 5 years.[3]  In addition, gain from the sale of QSBS can potentially be deferred if proceeds are reinvested in other QSBS.

The same proposal was included in the House Bill and the Prior House Bill.  The Prior House Bill contained a proposal to increase corporate tax rates, which together with the proposed changes to the QSBS rules, would have further limited desirability of investing in QSBS. The Build Back Better Bill, the House Bill and the Prior House Bill only addressed the rules applicable to exclusion of gain from the sale of QSBS, and did not alter the rules allowing for deferral of gains for proceeds invested in other QSBS.   Although the benefits associated with ownership of QSBS would have remained significant, had the Build Back Better Bill passed, in light of the reduction in potential gain that would have been excluded, the Build Back Better Bill would have required a reevaluation of choice-of-entity decisions based on QSBS benefits.

The proposal would have been effective retroactively and apply to sales or exchanges of stock on or after September 13, 2021, which is the date that the Prior House Bill was released.

Excess business losses

Under current law, for taxable years that begin before January 1, 2027, non-corporate taxpayers may not deduct excess business loss (generally, net business deductions over business income) if the loss is in excess of $250,000 ($500,000 in the case of a joint return), indexed for inflation.  The excess loss becomes a net operating loss in subsequent years and is available to offset 80% of taxable income each year.  The Build Back Better Bill would have made this limitation permanent and would treat the losses carried forward to the next taxable year as deduction attributable to trades or businesses, which would have been subject to the excess business losses limitation under section 461(l).  As a result, no more than $250,000/$500,000 in losses could be used in any year, and excess business losses would never have become net operating losses.  Unlike deductions that are suspended under the passive activity rules and at-risk rules that become deductible upon a disposition of the interest in the relevant trade or business, the excess business losses continue to be limited after the sale of the relevant trade or business.

This proposal is consistent with the Prior House Bill and would have been retroactive and apply for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2020.

Worthless partnership interest and limitation on loss recognition in corporate liquidations

Under current law, if a partner’s interest in a partnership becomes worthless, in the taxable year of worthlessness the partner may take an ordinary loss if the partner receives no consideration and a capital loss in all other cases.  As a practical matter, this rule allows for an ordinary loss if the partner has no share of any liabilities of the partnership immediately prior to the claim of worthlessness, or a capital loss if the partner has a share of any partnership liability immediately prior to the claim of worthlessness (because relief of partnership liabilities is treated as consideration received in a sale).  Under current law, if a security (not including an obligation issued by a partnership) that is held as a capital asset becomes worthless, the loss is treated as occurring on the last day of the taxable year in which the security became worthless.

Under the Build Back Better Bill, if a partnership interest becomes worthless, the resulting loss would have been treated as a capital loss (and not an ordinary loss).  Also, in the case of a partnership interest or a security that becomes worthless, the loss would have been recognized at the time of the identifiable event establishing worthlessness (and not at the end of the taxable year).  The proposal would also have expanded the scope of securities subject to worthless securities rules to included obligations (bond, debenture, note, or certificate, or other evidence of indebtedness, with interest coupons or in registered form) issued by partnerships.  These proposals were also included in the Prior House Bill and would apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2021.

The Build Back Better Bill would also have deferred the loss that is recognized by one corporate member of a controlled group[4] when a subsidiary merges into it in a taxable transaction under section 331 until substantially all of the property received in the liquidation is disposed to a third-party.  This proposal would effectively have eliminated taxpayers’ ability to enter into Granite Trust transactions to recognize capital losses by liquidating an insolvent subsidiary.[5]  A similar loss deferral rule would also have applied to dissolution of a corporation with worthless stock or issuance of debt in connection with which corporate stock becomes worthless.  This proposal would have applied to liquidations occurring on or after the date of enactment.

Expansion of wash sale and constructive sale rules

The Build Back Better Bill would have expanded the application of wash sale rules and constructive sale rules to cryptocurrencies and other digital assets.

The Build Back Better Bill would also have expanded the wash sale rules to include transactions made by related parties.  The wash sale rules disallow a loss from a sale or disposition of stock or securities if the taxpayer acquires or enters into a contract to acquire substantially similar stock or securities thirty days before or after the sale giving rise to the claimed loss.  The basis of the acquired assets in the wash sale is increased to include the disallowed loss.  Under the Build Back Better Bill, a wash sale would also have occurred when a “related party” to the taxpayer (other than a spouse) acquires the substantial similar stock or securities within the thirty-day period.[6]  More significantly, the disallowed loss in a wash sale triggered by a related party (other than a spouse) would have been permanently disallowed under the Build Back Better Bill. If the Build Back Better Bill had passed, it would have been challenging for certain taxpayers to comply with the related party provisions—and very difficult for the IRS to enforce it.  Under the provision, if a parent were to sell stock at a loss and, within 30 days, her child were to purchase the same stock, the parent’s loss would have been denied, even if neither parent nor child knew about each other’s trades.

The Build Back Better Bill would have exempted from the wash sale rules foreign currency and commodity trades that were directly related to the taxpayer’s business needs (other than the business of trading currency or commodities).  This exception would not have applied to digital assets.

Finally, the Build Back Better Bill would have provided that an appreciated short sale, short swap, short forward, or futures contract is constructively sold under section 1259 when the taxpayer enters into a contract to acquire the reference property (and not when the taxpayer actually acquires the reference property, as current law provides).

The changes were the same as those proposed in the Prior House Bill.  The proposal would have applied after 2021.

SALT deductions

The Build Back Better Bill has a “placeholder for compromise on deduction for state and local taxes”.  This is a key departure from the House Bill, which included an increase to the current annual $10,000 cap on SALT deductions to $80,000 until 2030, at which time the $10,000 annual limitation would apply again.

Business Tax Changes

Corporate alternative minimum tax

The Build Back Better Bill would impose a 15% minimum tax on “book income” of corporations with a 3-year average book income in excess of $1 billion.  A corporation’s book income would have been calculated based on the corporation’s audited financial statement (or if publicly traded, the financial statement shown on SEC Form 10-K), but adjusted to take into account certain U.S. income tax principles.[7]  Because this is a minimum tax, a corporation would have paid any excess amount of this minimum tax over its regular tax for the applicable tax year.  This minimum tax would also have applied to a foreign-parented U.S. corporation if the U.S. corporation has an average annual book income of $100 million or above.

The Prior House Bill did not include this corporate minimum tax based on book income, but the Biden administration’s tax reform proposals included a similar corporate minimum tax for large corporations.  The Build Back Better Bill does not otherwise provide for an increase in corporate income tax rates.

The corporate minimum tax would have been effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 2022.   

Limitation on business interest expense deductions

The Build Back Better Bill would have introduced an additional interest deduction limitation for a U.S. corporate member of an international group that has disproportionate interest expense as compared to the other members of the group.  New section 163(n) would generally have limited the interest deduction of a U.S. corporation that is part of an “international financial reporting group” and has net interest expense that exceeds $12 million (over a three-year period) if the ratio of its net interest expense to its EBITDA (or if an election is made, the aggregated bases of its assets)[8] exceeds by 110% of the similar ratio for the group.

Proposed section 163(n) was similar to what was included in the Prior House Bill, as well as a proposal that was included in the Senate and House bill for TCJA that was ultimately dropped in the conference agreement between the Senate and the House.  This limitation appears to target base erosion interest payments that may not be captured under the BEAT regime (which is further discussed in detail below).

The Build Back Better Bill would also have revised section 163(j) to treat partnerships as aggregates for purposes of applying the business interest expense limitation.  As a result, the section 163(j) limitation would have been applied at the partner level.  Under current law, the limitation, which very generally limits business interest expense deduction to 30% of EBITDA, is applied at the partnership level.   The interest deductions limited under section 163(j) or (n) (whichever imposes a lower limitation) would have continued to be allowed to be carried forward indefinitely (as opposed to 5 years under the Prior House Bill).

The proposals would have been effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 2022.

Limitation on using controlled corporation’s debt in a spin-off transaction

The Build Back Better Bill would have limited the ability of a U.S. “distributing corporation” to effectively receive cash tax-free from a spun-off “controlled corporation” subsidiary.  Under current law, a controlled corporation can issue debt securities to its parent distributing corporation that the distributing corporation can then use to redeem its own outstanding debt on a tax-free basis in connection with the spin-off of the controlled corporation.  The Build Back Better Bill would have required the parent distributing corporation to recognize gain in this transaction to the extent that the amount of controlled corporation debt it transfers to its creditors exceeds (x) the aggregate basis of any assets it transfers to its controlled corporation in connection with the spin-off less (y) the total amount of liabilities the controlled corporation assumes from it and (z) any payments that the controlled corporation makes to it. This effectively would have treated the debt securities issued by a controlled corporation as same as any other property distributed by the controlled corporation (which is commonly called as “boot”).

The proposal would have applied to reorganizations occurring on or after the date of enactment.

Excise tax on corporate stock buybacks

The Build Back Better Bill would have imposed a nondeductible 1% excise tax on publicly traded U.S. corporations engaging in stock buybacks. The tax was to be imposed on the value of the stock “repurchased” by the corporation during the tax year, reduced by value of stock issued by the corporation during the tax year (including those issued to the employees).  The term “repurchase” is defined as a redemption within the meaning of section 317(b), which is a transaction in which a corporation acquires its stock from a shareholder in exchange for property.  Repurchases that are (i) dividends for U.S. federal income tax purposes, (ii) part of tax-free reorganizations, (iii) made to contribute stock to an employee pension plan or ESOP, (iv) made by a dealer in securities in the ordinary course of business, or (v) made by a RIC or a REIT are not subject to the excise tax.  Also, repurchases that are less than $1 million in a year are excluded.

It was unclear how the value of repurchased stock was to be determined in calculating the excise tax amount.  The types of transactions that would have been covered under the proposed rule is also unclear.  The term “repurchase” was very broad and it could have had applied to different types of transactions, such as redemption of redeemable preferred stocks or redemption of stock in a company’s acquisition transaction.  The rule would also have had significant impact on de-SPAC transactions, which involve redemption rights for shareholders of the SPAC.  The Treasury would also have been provided with a broad authority to issue regulations to cover economically similar transactions.

The proposal would have applied to repurchases of stock after December 31, 2021.

International Tax Changes

Portfolio interest exemption

Under current law, a foreign person that owns 10% or more of the total voting power of a corporate issuer of debt is not eligible for the “portfolio interest” exemption, which provides for exemption from withholding on interest paid on certain debt.  Current law does not prohibit “de-control structures” under which the sponsor of a fund will typically invest a small percentage of the capital of a U.S. blocker in exchange for large percentage of its voting stock, thereby ensuring that no foreign investor will own 10% of the voting power of the U.S. blocker and permitting those foreign investors who own more than 10% of the value of the U.S. blocker to take the position that they may avoid U.S. withholding tax on interest received from the U.S. blocker.  The Build Back Better Bill would have revised this exception so that any person who owns 10% or more of the total vote or value of the stock of a corporate issuer would have been ineligible for the portfolio interest exemption.  This change would have prevented the de-control structures.

This proposal, which was also included in the Prior House Bill, would have applied to obligations issued after the date of enactment (i.e., all existing obligations would have been grandfathered).  However, if a grandfathered obligation was “significantly modified” for U.S. federal income tax purposes, it might have lost its grandfathered status.  Also, any subsequent draws on existing facilities that are made after the date of enactment would not have been grandfathered.

GILTI

The “global intangible low-taxed income” (“GILTI”) regime generally imposes a 10.5% minimum tax on 10-percent U.S. corporate shareholders of “controlled foreign corporations” (“CFCs”) based on the CFC’s “active” income in excess of a threshold equal to 10% of the CFC’s tax basis in certain depreciable tangible property (such basis, “qualified business asset investment”, or “QBAI”).  GILTI is not determined on a country-by-country basis, and, therefore, under current law a U.S. multinational corporation may be able to avoid the GILTI tax with respect to its subsidiaries operating in low-tax rate countries by “blending” income earned in the low tax-rate countries with income from high-tax rate countries.  Taxpayers are allowed 80% of the deemed paid foreign tax credit with respect to GILTI.

The Build Back Better Bill would have imposed GILTI on a country-by-country basis to prevent blending of income from a low tax-rate country with income from a high-tax rate country. This general approach would have been largely consistent with the prior proposals made by the Biden administration and the Senate Finance Committee.[9]

The Build Back Better Bill would have determined net CFC tested income and losses and QBAI on a country-by-country basis.  The Build Back Better Bill would have achieved this by using a “CFC taxable unit” – net CFC tested income and loss would have been determined separately for each country in which CFC taxable unit is a tax resident.  The Build Back Better Bill would have allowed a taxpayer to carryover country-specific net CFC tested loss to succeeding tax year to offset net CFC tested income of the same country.  In addition, taxpayers would no longer have been able to offset net CFC tested income from one jurisdiction with net CFC tested losses from another jurisdiction.  These proposed changes on determining net CFC tested income on a country-by-country basis were consistent with the Prior House Bill’s proposals.

The Build Back Better Bill would also have (i) reduced the exclusion amount from 10% to 5% of QBAI, (ii) increased the effective tax rate on GILTI for corporate taxpayers from 10.5% to 15%,[10] and (iii) helpfully reduced the “haircut” for deemed paid foreign tax credit for GILTI from 20% to 5% (i.e., 95% of GILTI amount would have been creditable as deemed paid credit).

The GILTI proposals would generally have been effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2022.

FDII

The “foreign-derived intangible income” (“FDII”) regime encourages U.S. multinational groups to keep intellectual property in the U.S. by providing a lower 13.125% effective tax rate for certain foreign sales and provision of certain services provided to unrelated foreign parties in excess of 10% of the taxpayer’s QBAI.  The lower effective tax rate is achieved by 37.5% deduction allowed for FDII under section 250.

The Build Back Better Bill would have reduced the section 250 deduction for FDII from 37.5% to 24.8%, which would have had the effect of increasing the effective rate for FDII from 13.125% to 15.8%.[11]  The Build Back Better Bill further provided that if a section 250 deduction actually exceeded the taxable income of the taxpayer, the deduction would have increased the net operating loss amount for the taxable year and could be used in subsequent years to offset up to 80% of taxable income.

This proposal generally would have been effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2021.

BEAT/SHIELD

The “base erosion and anti-abuse tax” (“BEAT”) generally provides for an add-on minimum tax, currently at 10%, on certain deductible payments that are made by very large U.S. corporations (generally, with at least $500 mm of average annual gross receipts) whose “base erosion percentage” (generally, the ratio of deductions for certain payments made to related foreign parties overall allowable deductions) is 3% or higher (or 2% for groups that include banks and securities dealers).

The Build Back Better Bill would have expanded the BEAT regime.  The proposal would have increased the BEAT tax rate gradually from 10% up to 18% by the taxable year starting after December 31, 2024.  The proposal would also have substantially revised the formula for calculating “modified taxable income”, which generally appeared to have increased the income amount that would have been subject to the BEAT regime.  Finally, the Build Back Better Bill would have eliminated the 3%/2% de minimis exception.  These proposals were generally consistent with the BEAT proposals in the Prior House Bill, but with different tax rates.

The Build Back Better Bill did not include the Biden administration’s “Stopping Harmful Inversions and Ending Low-Tax Developments” (“SHIELD”), which had been proposed to replace the BEAT regime.

Changes to Subpart F regime

The Build Back Better Bill would have significantly changed the subpart F regime.  The Build Back Better Bill would have helpfully reinstated section 958(b)(4) retroactively.  Section 958(b)(4) had prevented “downward” attribution of ownership of foreign person to a related U.S. person for purposes of applying subpart F regime.  Section 958(b)(4) was repealed in the TCJA, which allowed stock owned by a foreign person to be attributed downward to a U.S. person for purposes of determining a foreign corporation’s CFC status.

To address the situation that had prompted the repeal of downward attribution, the Build Back Better Bill would have introduced a new section to apply the GILTI and subpart F regimes to a foreign corporation that would have been a CFC if the downward attribution rule had applied, but only if the U.S. shareholder held at least 50% of vote or value of the foreign corporation’s stock.  This regime would have been effective for taxable years beginning after the date of the enactment.

The Build Back Better Bill would also have allowed a U.S. shareholder of a foreign corporation to elect to treat the foreign corporation as a CFC, which may have permitted a taxpayer to exclude foreign-source dividends received from the foreign corporation under the Build Back Better Bill’s amended section 245A (which is discussed below).  The Build Back Better Bill also would have limited the scope of foreign base company sales and services income, which is includible as subpart F income, to sales and services provided to U.S. residents and pass-through entities and branches in the United States, which effectively would have subjected foreign base company sales and services income for non-U.S. sales and services to the GILTI regime.  The Build Back Better Bill also would have amended section 951(a) so that a United States shareholder that receives a dividend from a CFC would have been subject to tax on its pro-rata share of the CFC’s subpart F income (generally negating any deduction under section 245A with respect to the dividend), regardless of whether the shareholder held shares in the CFC on the last day of the taxable year.  Current law requires a United States shareholder to include Subpart F income only if it owned shares of the CFC on the last day of the taxable year.

Foreign tax credits

The Build Back Better Bill would have imposed the foreign tax credit limitation on a country-by-country basis.  Currently, foreign tax credits are calculated on an aggregate global basis and divided into baskets for active income, passive income, GILTI income, and foreign branch income.  The revised rules would have calculated foreign tax credit limitations based on a country-by-country “taxable unit”, which is consistent with the “CFC taxable unit” used under the Build Back Better Bill’s GILTI rules.  Together with the proposed amendments to the GILTI regime, this revision to the foreign tax credit limitation rules would have sought to prohibit taxpayers from using foreign tax credits from taxes paid in a high-tax jurisdiction against taxable income from a low-tax jurisdiction.

The Build Back Better Bill would have made a number of other changes to the foreign tax credit rules, including and repealing the carryback period (which, under current law, is 1 year, but retaining the current 10-year carryforward period for excess foreign tax credit limitation).

This proposal would have been generally effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2022.

Dividends from foreign corporations

The Build Back Better Bill would have amended section 245A so that the foreign portions of dividends received only from a CFC (rather than any specified 10-percent owned foreign corporation) would have qualified for the participation exemption (and not have been subject to U.S. federal income tax) under section 245A.[12]  Currently, section 245A allows foreign-source dividends from any specified 10-percent owned foreign corporation (a broader concept than CFC) to be exempt from U.S. tax under section 245A.  Although the provision appeared to narrow the scope of section 245A, as noted above, the Build Back Better Bill would have permitted a taxpayer and a foreign corporation to make an election to treat the foreign corporation as a CFC, in which case the benefits of section 245A would have been available to all dividends paid by the electing foreign corporation (even if U.S. shareholders own less than 10%).  This provision was consistent with the proposal in the Prior House Bill and would have been effective for distributions made after the date of the enactment.

Anti-inversion rules

The Senate Finance Committee’s Build Back Better Bill would have significantly expanded the anti-inversion rules.  Generally, under current law, a foreign acquirer of an inverted U.S. corporation – typically, an existing U.S. corporation that is acquired by a foreign acquirer and whose shareholders continue own the U.S. corporation indirectly through their ownership in the foreign acquirer – is treated as a U.S. corporation for U.S. federal income tax purposes, if the continuing ownership stake of the shareholders of the inverted U.S. corporation is 80% or more.   If the continuing ownership stake of the shareholders of the inverted U.S. corporation is between 60% and 80%, certain rules designed to prevent “earnings stripping” – or deductible payments by the U.S. corporation to its foreign parent – apply.

The Build Back Better Bill would have lowered the 80% threshold in treating a foreign acquirer of an inverted U.S. corporation as a U.S. corporation for U.S. federal income tax purposes to 65%.  The Build Back Better Bill would also have lowered the 60% threshold in applying the earnings stripping rules to 50%.  Finally, the Build Back Better Bill would have expanded the scope of the anti-inversion rules to cover acquisitions of substantially all of the assets constituting (i) a trade or business of a U.S. corporation or partnership, or (ii) a U.S. trade or business of a non-U.S. partnership.

This provision was not included in the House Bill, but it did reflect some elements of an anti-inversion rule proposal by the Biden administration, such as the lowering of the 80% threshold to treat a foreign acquirer as a U.S. corporation for U.S. federal income tax purposes and the expansion of the scope of the rules to cover certain asset acquisitions.  This proposal would have applied for taxable years ending after December 31, 2021.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

[2] The House Bill contained a provision that would raise the $10,000 cap to $80,000 for 2021 through 2030.

[3] The amount of gain eligible to be taken into account for these purposes by any taxpayer and any corporation is subject to a cap generally equal to the greater of (i) $10 million cumulative exclusions of gain with respect to that corporation and (ii) 10 times the taxpayer’s aggregate adjusted tax bases of QSBS of the corporation disposed of in that year.

[4] Generally, corporations connected through stock ownership of more than 50%.  Section 267(f).

[5] In a Granite Trust transaction, a corporate parent that owns a depreciated subsidiary reduces its ownership in the subsidiary to below 80% before liquidating the subsidiary so that the liquidation is taxable and any built-in loss of the parent in the subsidiary’s stock would have been recognized.

[6] A related party for this purpose includes (i) the taxpayer’s spouse, dependent, (ii) any corporation, partnership, trust or estate that is controlled by the taxpayer, and (iii) the taxpayer’s retirement account and certain other tax-advantaged investment accounts for which the taxpayer is the beneficiary or the fiduciary.

[7] For example, if a corporation owned foreign corporations that are “controlled foreign corporations” for U.S. federal income tax purposes, the corporation would have had to take into account its pro-rata share of such foreign corporation’s book income.  Also, prior year’s net operating losses (calculated for book purposes) could have been used to reduce the book income, but could have only offset 80% of the book income for the subsequent year.

[8] The election to use the aggregated bases of assets in lieu of EBITDA was added in the Senate Finance draft of the Bill.

[9] The Senate Finance Committee’s prior proposal (which included a draft legislation and a section-by-section explanation) provided for mandatory exclusion of high-taxed income.  This approach was different than the Build Back Better Bill, but the general approach of disallowing “blending” of income between high-tax jurisdiction and low-tax jurisdiction was the same.

[10] This would have been achieved by reducing the deduction provided to corporate taxpayers under section 250 from the current 50% level to 28.5%.  The Build Back Better Bill would have not changed the tax rate to be applied to a non-corporate taxpayer’s GILTI amount.  This was a lower rate than what was proposed in the Prior House Bill (37.5%), but the effective tax rate under the Prior House Bill was higher due to the increased income tax rates.

[11] The FDII deduction was higher under the Prior House Bill (at 21.875%), with an effective tax rate of 20.7% (taking into account the increased corporate rate).  The Senate Finance Committee’s prior proposal also stated that the FDII deduction would have been reduced, but did not commit to a specific percentage.

[12] The Build Back Better Bill would have also amended section 1059 so that if a corporation received a dividend from a CFC that was attributable to earnings and profits of the foreign corporation before it was a CFC or before it was owned by the corporation, the non-taxed portion of that dividend would have reduced the basis of the CFC’s stock, regardless of whether the corporation had held the CFC’s stock for 2 years or less.  Therefore, CFC’s dividends that are exempt from tax under section 245A could have been subject to the proposed expanded section 1059.

© 2021 Proskauer Rose LLP.

U.S. House and Senate Reach Agreement on Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act

On December 14, 2021, lawmakers in the House and Senate announced that they had reached an agreement on compromise language for a bill known as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act or “UFLPA.”  Different versions of this measure passed the House and the Senate earlier this year, but lawmakers and Congressional staff have been working to reconcile the parallel proposals. The compromise language paves the way for Congress to pass the bill and send it to President Biden’s desk as soon as this week.

The bill would establish a rebuttable presumption that all goods originating from China’s Xinjiang region violate existing US law prohibiting the importation of goods made with forced labor. The rebuttable presumption would go into effect 180 days after enactment.  The compromise bill would also require federal officials to solicit public comments and hold a public hearing to aid in developing a strategy for the enforcement of the import ban vis-à-vis goods alleged to have been made through forced labor in China.

This rebuttable presumption will present significant challenges to businesses with supply chains that might touch the Xinjiang region.  Many businesses do not have full visibility into their supply chains and will need to act quickly to map their suppliers and respond to identified risks.  Importers must present detailed documentaton in order to release any shipments that they think were improperly detained, a costly and time-consuming endeavor.  Notably, the public comment and hearing processes will guide the government’s enforcement strategy, providing business stakeholders an opportunity to contribute to an enforcement process that could have implications for implementation of the import ban more broadly.

China’s Xinjiang region is a part of several critical supply chains, lead among them global cotton and apparel trade, as well as solar module production.  According to the Peterson Institute:

Xinjiang accounts for nearly 20 percent of global cotton production, with annual production greater than that of the entire United States. Its position in refined polysilicon—the material from which solar panels are built—is even more dominant, accounting for nearly half of global production. Virtually all silicon-based solar panels are likely to contain some Xinjiang-sourced silicon, according to Jenny Chase, head of solar analysis at Bloomberg New Energy Finance. If signed into law, the bill will send apparel producers and the US solar industry scrambling to find alternative sources of supply and prices are bound to increase.

Article By Ludmilla L. Kasulke and Rory Murphy of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more legal news and legislation updates, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Copyright 2021 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

H.R. 3684: Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act

On November 5, the U.S. House of Representatives approved a $1.2 trillion infrastructure spending bill that will make historic investments in core infrastructure priorities including roads and bridges, rail, transit, ports, airports, the electric grid, and broadband.

The legislation, titled the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (“IIJA”), will have major implications for states and municipalities of all sizes, as well as the entities involved in responding to governments’ needs for hard and cyber infrastructure.

Improvements to roadways, ports and mass transit are the focus of the legislation and the majority of the funding is targeted at these traditional hard infrastructure projects. U.S. Senator Rob Portman (R-OH) has championed the massive infrastructure bill and pushed for its passage.

This weekend, Senator Portman noted the massive impact the IIJA will have on Ohio, highlighting the bill’s bridge investment program which will award competitive grants to certain governmental entities to improve the condition of bridges. “This additional federal funding means we are one step closer to a solution for the Brent Spence Bridge,” Portman said.

The Brent Spence Bridge, which connects Cincinnati, Ohio with Covington, Kentucky has one of the busiest trucking routes in the nation. Questions about its safety and long shutdowns for repair have long concerned area residents as well as the business owners responsible for the more than $400 billion of freight which passes over the bridge every year.

While hard infrastructure priorities like bridge maintenance, port modernization, freight rail, and highway improvements account for a majority of the new spending appropriated by the bill (which totals $550 billion over five years), a sizable portion is dedicated to the expansion of broadband networks and the improvement of cybersecurity.

The new cybersecurity grant program and record-setting investments in broadband development could be game changing for state and local leaders wishing to modernize and protect their communities in these ways.

The U.S. Senate approved the IIJA in August 2020. Friday’s vote means the infrastructure bill will now move to the desk of President Joe Biden, who has indicated a bill signing ceremony will happen soon. Answers to questions about the billions of dollars in new infrastructure grants and programming are below.

Question: How will the money be distributed? 

Answer: The IIJA contains formulaic allocations of funds as well as earmarks and competitive grants. Some categories and sub-categories contain both non-competitive and competitive grants.

  • NON-COMPETITIVE FUNDING ALLOCATION PROCESSES
    • Formulas dictated by the bill are based on criteria like state population, or, potentially for specific items, users (ex: transit funds potentially determined by ridership)
    • Once the money is directed to the states, the local bureaucrats are able to make the important decisions about which projects deserve the funding.
    • States can also decide to allocate some of the funding to the county or city governments within their state
  • EARMARKS AND COMPETITIVE GRANT PROCESSES
    • Earmarks override state plans for how infrastructure funds should be spent. “Earmarks come out of the money that the state was going to get anyway.”
    • Localities must compete for Competitive Grants via an application process. The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Discretionary Grant Process is officially outlined on their website.
    • Generally, the award of competitive grants can be influenced by advocates who confer with decisionmakers in the Executive Branch about the merits of certain proposals.

Question: Which projects will qualify for funding?

Answer: The bill details specific funding streams for the specific projects included in its provisions. Categories of projects included in the $550 billion in new spending are below.

  • Roads, Bridges, & Major Projects: $110B — Funds new, dedicated grant program to replace and repair bridges and increases funding for the major project competitive grant programs. Preserves the 90/10 split of federal highway aid to states.
  • Passenger and Freight Rail: $66B — Provides targeted funding for the Amtrak National Network for new service and dedicated funding to address repair backlogs. Increases funding for freight rail and safety.
  • Safety and Research: $11B — Addresses highway, pedestrian, pipeline, and other safety areas (highway safety accounts for the bulk of this funding).
  • Public Transit: $39.2B — Funds nation’s transit system repair backlog, which includes buses, rail cars, transit stations, track, signals, and power systems. This allocation also includes money to create new bus routes and increase accessibility to public transit for those with physical mobility challenges.
  • Broadband: $65B — Funds grants to states for broadband deployment and other efforts to address access issues in rural areas and low-income communities. Expands eligible private activity bond projects to include broadband infrastructure.
  • Airports: $25B — Increases Airport Improvement grant amounts for runways, gates, & taxiways and authorizes a new Airport Terminal Improvement program.
  • Ports and Waterways: $17.4B — Provides funding for waterway and coastal infrastructure, inland waterway improvements, port infrastructure, and land ports of entry through the Army Corps, DOT, Coast Guard, the GSA, and DHS.
  • Water Infrastructure: $54B — Provides a $15 billion for lead service line replacement and $10 billion to address PFAS in water, in addition to other items.
  • Power and Grid: $65B — Funds grid reliability and resiliency projects and support for a Grid Development Authority; critical minerals and supply chains for clean energy technology; key technologies like carbon capture, hydrogen, direct air capture, and energy efficiency; and energy demonstration projects from the bipartisan Energy Act of 2020.
  • Resiliency: $46B — Funds cybersecurity projects to address critical infrastructure needs, flood mitigation, wildfire, drought, coastal resiliency, waste management, ecosystem restoration, and weatherization.
  • Low-Carbon and Zero-Emission School Buses & Ferries: $7.5B — Funds and authorizes the adoption of low-carbon and zero-emission school buses, including through hydrogen, propane, LNG, compressed natural gas, biofuel, and electric technologies. Provides support for a pilot program for low emission ferries and rural ferry systems.
  • Electric Vehicle Charging: $7.5B — Funds alternative fuel corridors and a national build out of electric vehicle charging infrastructure. The federal funding will have a particular focus on rural and/or disadvantaged communities.
  • Reconnecting Communities: $1B — Provides dedicated funding for planning, design, demolition, and reconstruction of street grids, parks, or other infrastructure (funding is especially targeted at infrastructure which is deteriorating due to age).
  • Addressing Legacy Pollution: $21B — Funds to clean up brownfield and superfund sites, reclaim abandoned mine lands, and plug orphan oil and gas wells, improving public health and creating good-paying jobs.

Article By Katherine M. Caprez of Roetzel & Andress LPA

For more legislative and legal news, read more from the National Law Review.

©2021 Roetzel & Andress

While Democrats Whittle Down Pro-Labor Provisions Of Social Spending Bill, Civil Penalties Remain

As we discussed here, members of the House Education and Labor Committee have been attempting to end-run the procedural hurdles that have prevented the Protect the Right to Organize Act (“PRO Act”) legislation from becoming law, through a process called “budget reconciliation.”  (For a refresher on the PRO Act, see our blog posts on the proposed legislation here and here.)

In September, the Committee released its proposed language for the federal budget incorporating several key provisions from the PRO Act that would have drastically amended federal labor law, such as establishing civil penalties for violations of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), personal liability for officers and directors, and newly-defined unfair labor practices that would effectively prohibit employers from utilizing some of the economic weapons traditionally thought to be lawful under the NLRA.  Through the budget reconciliation process, these provisions have a greater chance of becoming law where the bill only requires majority support in both the House and Senate and is not subject to a filibuster.

However, as the social spending bill faced challenges from both parties, the Administration presented a revised framework on October 28, 2021, entitled the “Build Back Better Act.”  The new bill  among other major edits, significantly pared down the proposed pro-labor provisions.

Even under the revised framework, there still exists for the first time ever civil penalties for those who commit unfair labor practices. If passed into law in its current form, the Build Back Better Act would:

  • Impose civil penalties of up to $50,000 per violation of the NLRA;
  • Double civil penalties up to $100,000 for NLRA violations that resulted in discharge or serious economic harm where the employer committed another similar violation within the past 5 years; and
  • Assess civil penalties against directors and officers where the facts indicate that personal liability is warranted.

Fortunately, some of the most significant PRO Act-inspired provisions of the prior reconciliation bill have been dropped from this spending bill; specifically, language that would have made it an unfair labor practice to:

  • Permanently replace strikers;
  • Discriminate against a worker who has unconditionally offered to return to work based on participation in a strike;
  • Lockout, suspend, or otherwise withhold employment from employees prior to a strike;
  • Misrepresent to a worker that they are excluded from the definition of “employee” under the Act, such as misclassifying independent contractor or supervisor;
  • Require or coerce employees to attend so-called “captive audience meetings” or other campaign activities;
  • Enter into, enforce, coerce, or retaliate against employees with respect to class or collective action waivers

The revised spending bill framework is now up for discussion and debate in both the House and the Senate. The bill needs majority support in both chambers in order to become law, and the amendments in the proposed language must withstand potential challenges in the Senate (called the Byrd Rule), which (as we discussed here) is intended to limit amendments that change the substantive policy of federal law, rather than limited to taxes or spending.  The significantly narrowed labor law amendments in the revised bill would seem to have a greater likelihood of withstanding a Byrd Rule challenge than the prior iteration.

As always, we will monitor this situation and report updates as they occur.

© 2021 Proskauer Rose LLP.

For more articles on labor law, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act of 2020 – Changes To The CARES Act

On Wednesday, June 3, 2020, the U.S. Senate passed the Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act of 2020 (“Act”) by voice vote.  The bill had passed the U.S. House on May 28 nearly unanimously.  It now heads to the President’s desk for signature.

Summary of Key Provisions

The Act provides important new flexibility to borrowers in the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) in a number of key respects:

Loan Maturity Date: The Act extends the maturity date of the PPP loans (i.e. any portion of a PPP loan that is not forgiven) from 2 years to 5 years.  This provision of the Act only affects borrowers whose PPP loans are disbursed after its enactment.  With respect to already existing PPP loans, the Act states specifically that nothing in the Act will “prohibit lenders and borrowers from mutually agreeing to modify the maturity terms of a covered loan.”

Deadline to Use the Loan Proceeds: The Act extends the “covered period” with respect to loan forgiveness from the original 8 week period after the loan is disbursed to the earlier of 24 weeks after the loan is disbursed or December 31, 2020.  Current borrowers who have received their loans prior to the enactment of the Act may nevertheless elect the shorter 8 week period.

Forgivable Uses of the Loan Proceeds: The Act raises the cap on the amount of forgivable loan proceeds that borrowers may use on non-payroll expenses from 25% to 40%.  The Act does not affect the PPP’s existing restrictions on borrowers’ use of the loan proceeds to eligible expenses: payroll and benefits; interest (but not principal) on mortgages or other existing debt; rent; and utilities.

Safe Harbor for Rehiring Workers: Loan forgiveness under the PPP remains subject to reduction in proportion to any reduction in a borrower’s full-time equivalent employees (“FTEs”) against prior staffing level benchmarks.  The Act extends the PPP’s existing safe harbor deadline to December 31, 2020: borrowers who furloughed or laid-off workers will not be subject to a loan forgiveness reduction due to reduced FTE count as long as they restore their FTEs by the deadline.

New Exemptions from Rehiring Workers: The Act also adds two exemptions to the PPP’s loan forgiveness reduction penalties.  Firstly, the forgiveness amount will not be reduced due to a reduced FTE count if the borrower can document that they attempted, but were unable, to rehire individuals who had been employees on February 15, 2020 (this codifies a PPP FAQ answer discussed on a previous post) and have been unable to hire “similarly qualified employees” before December 31, 2020.  Secondly, the forgiveness will not be reduced due to a reduced FTE count if the borrower, in good faith, can document an inability to return to the “same level of business activity” as prior to February 15, 2020 due to sanitation, social distancing, and worker or customer safety requirements.

Loan Deferral Period: The Act extends the loan deferral period to (a) whenever the amount of loan forgiveness is remitted to the lender or (b) 10 months after the applicable forgiveness covered period if a borrower does not apply for forgiveness during that 10 month period.  Under the unamended PPP, a borrower’s deferral period was to be between 6 and 12 months.

Payroll Tax Deferral: The Act lifts the ban on borrowers whose loans were partially or completely forgiven from deferring payment of payroll taxes.  The payroll tax deferral is now open to all PPP borrowers.

Summary

The Act provides much-needed flexibility to businesses who needed to spend PPP loan proceeds but could not open in order to do so.  As with the initial rollout of the PPP, it will be up to the Department of the Treasury and the Small Business Administration to provide regulations with respect to the Act.


© 2020 SHERIN AND LODGEN LLP

For more on the PPP, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

Congress Tackles PFAS on Multiple Fronts

With the enactment of the PFAS Act of 2019 and related provisions in December, opposing forces in Congress came together to force regulatory action on several different aspects of per- and poly-fluorinated substances (PFAS). Issues on which agreement was not reached are now before the Senate in House-passed legislation. While the PFAS debate continues in Congress, federal agencies are now tasked with multiple obligations related to PFAS. Companies that handle PFAS will have added PFAS reporting obligations under both the Toxics Release Inventory and the Toxic Substances Control Act.

The PFAS Act of 2019 is title LXXIII of the massive National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (NDAA), Public Law 116-92 (Dec. 20, 2019). This alert summarizes its six subtitles, as well as other PFAS provisions in the NDAA related to the Department of Defense (DOD). It then provides a preview of future legislative developments.

PFAS Act of 2019 Provisions

Subtitle A – Drinking Water Monitoring

EPA must include certain PFAS and classes of PFAS in the fifth Unregulated Contaminants Monitoring Rule (UCMR 5), expected later this year. EPA’s PFAS Action Plan (Feb. 2019) had called for EPA to take this action, but Subtitle A requires it to do so. EPA had included six PFAS in UCMR 3.

The PFAS to be included are all PFAS and classes of PFAS for which EPA has a validated test method for drinking water and that are not subject to a national primary drinking water standard under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). EPA has a validated test method for 18 PFAS, which it adopted in 2009 and expanded in 2018, EPA Method 537.1. The PFAS Action Plan had predicted additional test methods in 2019, but this did not occur.

The SDWA limits the number of unregulated contaminants that may be included in each UCMR to 30, but the NDAA excludes the listed PFAS from that limit.

Subtitle A also provides grant eligibility through the Drinking Water State Revolving Funds to address PFAS.

Subtitle B – Toxics Release Inventory

EPA’s PFAS Action Plan had set as a long-term action exploring data availability for listing some PFAS as toxic chemicals for purposes of the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) under section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA). EPA had begun that lengthy process with an advance notice of proposed rulemaking, published on December 4, 2019.

The NDAA disrupted this process later that month. By its terms, Subtitle B automatically added multiple PFAS to the TRI list as of January 1, 2020, and others will be automatically added as certain milestones are reached. EPA posted a list of 160 PFAS that were added as of January 1, 2020. The reporting threshold for all of the chemicals is set at 100 pounds unless revised by EPA within the next 5 years. Reporting on these 160 PFAS will be due by July 1, 2021.

Future automatic additions to the TRI list (as of January 1 of the following year) are mandated whenever:

  • EPA finalizes a toxicity value for a PFAS. (EPA has a provisional peer-reviewed toxicity value for PFBS, adopted in 2014.) Toxicity values are used in risk assessments under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).
  • EPA finalizes a significant new use rule (SNUR) under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) for a PFAS or class of PFAS.
  • EPA adds a PFAS or class of PFAS to an existing SNUR.
  • EPA designates a PFAS or class of PFAS as active on the TSCA Inventory.

In addition, over the next two years, EPA must determine whether certain listed PFAS meet any of the listing criteria in section 313. If so, EPA must add them to the TRI list within two years of making that determination.

These additions to the TRI list are subject to the provision that, if any PFAS chemical identity is claimed confidential, the PFAS is not added to the list until EPA reviews a substantiation of that claim. If EPA upholds the claim, that PFAS must be added to the list in a manner that does not disclose its identity (such as through a generic name).

Subtitle C – USGS Performance Standard and Sampling

Subtitle C directs the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to coordinate with EPA to develop an appropriate testing methodology for PFAS that is “as sensitive as is feasible and practicable,” with the ability to detect as many “highly fluorinated compounds” as possible. Highly fluorinated compounds are defined to mean PFAS with at least one fully fluorinated carbon atom. USGS must also develop quality assurance and quality control measures to ensure accurate sampling and testing, as well as a training program.

In addition, USGS must carry out nationwide sampling for PFAS. The nationwide sampling program must start with drinking water near locations with known or suspected sources of PFAS. Later stages of sampling will be based on an evaluation by USGS in consultation with the states and EPA to determine where sampling should occur, with an emphasis on direct human exposure through drinking water. The results of the sampling must be sent to EPA and, upon request, the states. In addition, USGS must prepare a report and submit it to certain committees and members of Congress.

EPA’s PFAS Action Plan called for EPA to collaborate with USGS, the Army Corps of Engineers, and universities to lead the science of PFAS.

Subtitle D – Emerging Contaminants

Subtitle D encourages research into “emerging contaminants,” defined broadly to include any physical, chemical, biological, or radiological substance or matter in water for which there is no national primary drinking water standard and that may have an adverse impact on the health of individuals. It mandates several actions to improve the level of technical understanding as well as support for states.

First, EPA, in collaboration with states and other stakeholders, must establish a strategic plan for improving existing federal efforts to identify, monitor, and assist in the development of treatment systems for emerging contaminants and to assist states in responding to human health risks posed by such contaminants.

Second, Subtitle D requires the establishment of a Working Group within 180 days of enactment to coordinate federal activities identifying and analyzing public health effects of emerging contaminants in drinking water. The Working Group will be comprised of representatives from several federal entities, including EPA, the National Institutes of Health, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, USGS, and others in the discretion of EPA.

Third, it requires the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy to establish the National Emerging Contaminant Research Initiative within 180 days of enactment. The goal will be improving the identification, analysis, monitoring, and treatment methods for emerging contaminants, including identifying priority emerging contaminants for research emphasis. Within one year after establishing the research initiative, involved agencies must issue solicitations for grant proposals for research projects consistent with that strategy.

Finally, Subtitle D requires EPA to study the actions it can take to increase technical assistance and support to states with respect to drinking water in emerging contaminants and issue a report to Congress within 18 months. Based on the findings in that report, EPA must develop a program to provide technical assistance to states within three years of enactment. When evaluating applications submitted by states seeking assistance, EPA must give priority to states with affected areas, primarily in financially distressed communities. Emergency assistance may be provided without application. EPA must also establish and maintain a database of available resources developed to assist states with testing for emerging contaminants and make it available to states and stakeholder groups with a scientific or material interest, such as drinking water utilities. The database must be searchable and available through the EPA website.

Subtitle E – TSCA Provisions

Subtitle E requires EPA to take two actions regarding TSCA – finalize amendments to two SNURs for certain PFAS substances by June 22, 2020, and issue a final rule by January 1, 2023, requiring manufacturers of PFAS to report detailed information about their PFAS.

The two PFAS SNURs and the effect of Subtitle E on EPA’s timetable for finalizing them are discussed in another Beveridge & Diamond alert, available here.

Subtitle E also amends TSCA § 8(a) so as to direct EPA to issue a final rule that would require each person who has manufactured a PFAS in any year since 2011 to submit a report that includes, for each year since 2011, detailed information on that PFAS. EPA must issue the rule by January 1, 2023.

The information that a PFAS manufacturer must provide includes, for each such PFAS:

  • Its common or trade name, chemical identity, and molecular structure.
  • Its categories or proposed categories of use.
  • The total amount manufactured or processed, reasonable estimates of the total amount to be manufactured or processed, the amount manufactured or processed for each of its categories of use, and reasonable estimates of the amount to be manufactured or processed for each of its categories of use or proposed categories of use.
  • A description of the byproducts resulting from its manufacture, processing, use, or disposal.
  • All existing information concerning its environmental and health effects.
  • The number of individuals exposed to it, and reasonable estimates of the number who will be exposed to it in their places of employment and the duration of such exposure.
  • The manner or method of its disposal.

Subtitle F – Guidance on Disposal; Research

EPA must publish interim guidance on the destruction and disposal of PFAS within one year of enactment. The guidance must address aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF), soil and biosolids, textiles (other than consumer goods) treated with PFAS, spent water treatment equipment, landfill leachate containing PFAS, and waste streams from facilities manufacturing or using PFAS. EPA must publish revisions at least every three years.

EPA’s Office of Research and Development must examine the effects of PFAS on human health and the environment and make that information public It must also develop a process for prioritizing PFAS and classes of PFAS for additional research. A total of $15 million per year for each of the next five years is authorized for appropriation for this research.

DOD-Related PFAS Provisions of the NDAA

The National Defense Authorization Act includes several PFAS provisions in Title III, related to DOD operations and maintenance at military bases. AFFF containing PFAS, used for putting out fires, is the subject of several provisions. These include prohibiting the uncontrolled release of AFFF containing PFAS, with limited exceptions for emergency response as well as incineration requirements for the disposal of AFFF that must meet the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The use of PFAS AFFF must be phased out by October 1, 2024, and the use of PFAS in packaging for meals ready-to-eat (MREs) must end by October 1, 2021. There are also provisions for information sharing with municipal drinking water utilities located adjacent to military installations.

Additional PFAS Legislation

During the conference to reconcile the House and Senate versions of the NDAA, the House managers pushed for additional PFAS provisions, but the two sides did not reach agreement on those provisions. On January 10, 2020, the House passed a revised H.R. 535, the PFAS Action Act of 2019, with the votes of 24 Republicans, and sent it to the Senate for its consideration. Senate passage is probably unlikely, particularly in light of the rejection by Senate conferees on the NDAA of some of these provisions.

As revised, H.R. 535 would require a number of regulatory actions on PFAS, including:

  • A requirement that EPA designate PFOA, PFOS, and their salts as hazardous substances under CERCLA § 102(a) within one year of enactment, and determine within five years of enactment whether to designate additional PFAS as hazardous substances.
  • An amendment to TSCA § 4 directing EPA to adopt a rule requiring comprehensive toxicity testing on all PFAS, with a proposed test rule due six months after enactment and a final rule due two years after enactment.
  • An amendment to TSCA § 5 eliminating exemptions for PFAS (such as those for R&D, impurities, and the low-volume exemption).
  • An amendment to TSCA § 5 providing that, for five years after enactment, all PFAS that are the subject of premanufacture notices or significant new use notices are deemed to present an unreasonable risk. EPA would be required to issue orders to prohibit all manufacture, processing, and distribution of those PFAS.
  • An amendment to SDWA § 1412(b) directing EPA to promulgate a national primary drinking water regulation for PFAS (including at last PFOA and PFOS) within two years of enactment. It would also require EPA to publish a health advisory for a PFAS not subject to a national primary drinking water regulation within one year of a finalized PFAS toxicity value or effective quality control and testing procedure for a PFAS, whichever is later.
  • A provision that EPA may not impose a financial penalty for violation of a PFAS national primary drinking water regulation until five years after its adoption.
  • An amendment to the SDWA requiring EPA to establish a program to award grants to affected community water systems.
  • A requirement that EPA adopt a final rule adding PFOA, PFOS, and their salts to the list of hazardous air pollutants under the Clean Air Act § 112(b) within six months of enactment, and to determine within five years of enactment whether to issue final rules adding other PFAS to that list.
  • An amendment of RCRA § 3004 to prohibit unsafe incineration of PFAS.
  • A requirement that EPA revise the Safer Choice Standard of the Safer Choice Program within one year of enactment to identify requirements for certain consumer products to meet to be labeled with a Safer Choice label, including a requirement that they not contain any PFAS.
  • A requirement that EPA issue guidance on minimizing the use of AFFF and related equipment containing PFAS within one year of enactment.
  • A requirement that EPA investigate methods and means to prevent contamination of surface waters by GenX.
  • A prohibition of introducing PFAS pollutants to a treatment works under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) without first notifying the treatment works of the identity and quantity of each PFAS; whether the PFAS is susceptible to treatment by the treatment works; and whether the PFAS would interfere with the treatment works.
  • A requirement that EPA establish a website containing information on the testing of household well water within one year of enactment.
  • A requirement that EPA develop a risk-communication strategy to inform the public about potential hazards of PFAS.
  • A requirement that EPA publish a plan under FWPCA § 304(m) by September 30, 2021, that contains the results of a review of the introduction into treatment works or discharge of PFAS from categories of point sources (other than publicly owned treatment works). Based on that results of that review, EPA would be required to initiate as soon as practicable the process for adding certain PFAS to the list of toxic pollutants under FWPCA § 307(a), and within two years of publication of the plan to publish human health water quality criteria for other PFAS. EPA would also be required to adopt human health water quality criteria for PFOA, PFOS, and their salts within two years of enactment for each priority industry category, and to adopt a final rule within four years of enactment establishing effluent limitations and pretreatment standards for those PFAS for each priority industry category.

The White House announced on January 7, 2020, that it strongly opposes H.R. 535 and that President Trump’s senior advisors may recommend the bill be vetoed if passed by both Houses.


© 2020 Beveridge & Diamond PC

For more on PFAS regulation, see the Environmental, Energy & Resource section of the National Law Review.

House Vote on Cannabis Industry-Related SAFE Banking Act Scheduled for September 2019

As early as September 23, 2019, the United States House of Representatives is expected to vote on the widely anticipated Secure and Fair Enforcement (SAFE) Banking Act. First introduced in both chambers of Congress in 2017, re-introduced in the House in March of 2019, and amended this past June, the SAFE Banking Act has garnered bipartisan support as a necessary solution to the dilemma created by conflicting federal and state cannabis law regimes, particularly as it relates to financial service providers.

According to a press release issued by the House Committee on Financial Services on March 26, 2019, committee chairwoman, Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA), remarked, the SAFE Banking Act “addresses an urgent public safety concern for legitimate businesses that currently have no recourse but to operate with just cash.” The Act joins the ranks of congressional efforts such as the Rohrabacher-Farr amendment to omnibus spending bills, Section 728 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2019, the pending Blumenauer amendment, and proposed Strengthening the Tenth Amendment Through Entrusting States (STATES) Act—all of which seek to reconcile the federal government’s failure to enact comprehensive marijuana and, until recently, hemp policy despite widespread support on the state and local level. Status in the Senate is uncertain, as the chair of the Banking Committee has indicated an intent to poll those in Idaho, a state that has failed to legalize any form of cannabis, regarding the issue.

Today’s cannabis industry encompasses the growth, processing, distribution, and other ancillary services related to both hemp and marijuana. While hemp and marijuana are both derived from the plant Cannabis sativa L, they are legally distinguished on both a federal and state level by their THC content. As a result, marijuana remains a controlled substance under federal law, while hemp, boasting lower THC levels, is classified as an agricultural product within the purview of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). This federal distinction, however, has not prevented more than 40 states from legalizing marijuana for medical and/or recreational adult use. Unfortunately, the businesses that choose to take advantage of such progressive state marijuana laws must do so without the support of traditional financial institutions that businesses, particularly minority and women-owned, rely on to fund and protect their financial growth.

According to §4(a) of the bill’s text, the SAFE Banking Act will shield depository institutions that serve cannabis-related businesses from federal penalties in states and Indian country where “cultivation, production, manufacture, sale, transportation, display, dispensing, distribution, or purchase” of cannabis is legal. In particular, the Act will prohibit regulators from terminating or limiting deposit or share insurance of financial instruments because an institution’s client participates directly or indirectly in the cannabis industry. Regulators will also be prohibited from penalizing institutions for authorizing, processing, clearing, settling, billing, transferring, reconciling, or collecting payments for a legitimate cannabis-related business for payments made by any means, including a credit, debit, or other payment card, an account, check, or electronic funds transfer. Perhaps, most importantly, the Act will also require the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) to develop uniform guidance and examination procedures for depository institutions serving cannabis-related businesses.

For financial institutions and insurance providers operating in states where cannabis is legal, this creates an immense opportunity and incentive to assist industry participants as they strive to protect and invest their monetary assets without putting the institutions they rely on at risk of federal prosecution. However, because protections under the SAFE Banking Act only apply when legitimate cannabis-related businesses are involved, monitoring clients’ compliance with relevant state laws will be particularly important. In the absence of clear federal marijuana policy and official hemp regulations under the 2018 Farm Bill, in addition to constantly evolving state laws and regulations, this may prove especially challenging. As such, in anticipation of the Act’s passage, financial institutions should enlist the support of experienced legal counsel to ensure the necessary processes for monitoring clients’ compliance are in place. In addition, those seeking to benefit under the Act should still pay close attention to due diligence requirements promulgated by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), although many concerns should be alleviated by the Act’s prohibition on civil or criminal prosecution solely based on the provision of financial services or investing income derived from such services.

NOTE: Cannabis as defined under the Act only references marijuana. However, in practice, the bill’s passage should alleviate apprehension surrounding hemp, as many financial institutions and their affiliates have refrained from offering services to hemp businesses under the current financial legal framework, even in the wake of the 2018 Farm Bill and pending USDA regulations.

Read the bill’s text here.


© 2019 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.

This article was written by Jennifer K. MasonMichael G. Dailey and Ambur C. Smith of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP.
For more marijuana & cannabis legislation, see the National Law Review Biotech, Food & Drug law page.

Save the Internet Act of 2019 Introduced

On 6 March 2019, Democrats in the House and Senate introduced the “Save the Internet Act of 2019.” The three-page bill (1) repeals the FCC’s Restoring Internet Freedom Order released in early 2018, as adopted by the Republican-led FCC under Chairman Ajit Pai; (2) prohibits the FCC from reissuing the RIF Order or adopting rules substantively similar to those adopted in the RIF Order; and (3) restores the Open Internet Order released in 2015, as adopted by the Democratic-led FCC under Chairman Tom Wheeler.

Major Impacts:

  • Broadband Internet Access Service (BIAS) is reclassified as a “telecommunications service,” potentially subject to all provisions in Title II of the Communications Act.

  • The three bright line rules of the Open Internet Order are restored: (1) no blocking of access to lawful content, (2) no throttling of Internet speeds, exclusive of reasonable network management practices, and (3) no paid prioritization.

  • Reinstates FCC oversight of Internet exchange traffic (transit and peering), the General Conduct Rule that authorizes the FCC to address anti-competitive practices of broadband providers, and the FCC’s primary enforcement authority over the Open Internet Order’s rules and policies.

  • Per the Open Internet Order, BIAS and all highspeed Internet access services remain subject to the FCC’s exclusive jurisdiction and the revenues derived from these services remain exempt from USF contribution obligations.

  • The prescriptive service disclosure and marketing rules of the Open Internet Order, subject to the small service provider exemption, would apply in lieu of the Transparency Rule adopted in the RIF Order.

FCC Chairman Pai promptly issued a statement strongly defending the merits and benefits of the RIF Order.

KH Assessment

  • From a political perspective, Save the Internet Act of 2019 garners support from many individuals and major edge providers committed to net neutrality principles but faces challenges in the Republican-controlled Senate.

  • In comments filed in the proceeding culminating in the RIF Order, the major wireline and wireless broadband providers supported a legislative solution that codified the no blocking and no throttling principles but not the no-paid prioritization prohibition or classifying BIAS as a telecommunications service.

It is highly unlikely that the legislation will be enacted as introduced. Though still unlikely, there is a better chance that a legislative compromise may be reached.

 

© 2019 Keller and Heckman LLP.

Comey’s Testimony Underscores Need for Strong Whistleblower Protections

For me, the most telling moment of former FBI Director Jim Comey’s June 8th testimony occurred early in the hearing, when Mr. Comey choked up as he recalled the White House’s publicly stating that the President had fired him because the “FBI was in disarray.”

This emotional display seemed out of character for Mr. Comey. While U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, he successfully prosecuted organized crime. As Deputy Attorney General during the George W. Bush Administration, Mr. Comey refused to sign an extension of the warrantless domestic spying program and defied the White House Counsel and Chief of Staff. Mr. Comey can fairly be described as a “tough guy.” So how did he go from leading the most powerful law-enforcement agency worldwide to being labeled a “leaking liar”?

To an experienced whistleblower advocate, Mr. Comey’s predicament is not surprising. Mr. Comey’s experience, unfortunately, is like those of many whistleblowers I have represented over more than a decade. President Trump promised to bring a business approach to government—and his retaliation against Mr. Comey is straight out of the corporate defense playbook. Corporations typically take the following steps of escalating retaliation to silence whistleblowers:

Intimidate and Silence the Whistleblower

In his June 8th testimony, Mr. Comey described in detail how the President had asked him to drop the investigation of Michael Flynn and had conditioned Mr. Comey’s job on “loyalty” to him. Senator Rubio expressed skepticism about Mr. Comey’s feeling intimidated by the President and blamed Mr. Comey for not pushing back. But that type of Monday-morning quarterbacking ignored the power dynamics of the conversation. Mr. Comey wanted to keep his job and was understandably reluctant to accuse the President of obstructing an investigation.

Whistleblowers often confront this intimidation tactic in the workplace. A supervisor or senior company official tells the whistleblower to “let it go,” “mind your own business,” or learn to be a “team player.” And in some cases, the whistleblower is told to shut up if he or she wants to remain employed. Threats of retaliation, whether express or implicit, are powerful tools to silence a whistleblower. When a company officer or senior manager orders a subordinate to do something unlawful or to cover up unlawful conduct, holding firm to one’s ethical values is not an easy avenue to follow. As Mr. Comey learned, refusing to carry out an unlawful order may be career suicide, at least in the short term.

Retaliate Swiftly and Severely Against the Whistleblower

Initially, the bizarre method of firing Mr. Comey seemed surprising for a President who perfected the art of firing on his reality show, The Apprentice. Mr. Comey was not given an opportunity to resign; he was not even notified that he had been fired. But now that we know about the President’s real motive for firing Mr. Comey, it’s clear that his tack was deliberate.

Mr. Comey learned of his firing while addressing FBI agents at a Los Angeles field office when the announcement flashed across a television screen. The White House had announced Mr. Comey’s firing without notifying Mr. Comey himself. President Trump sent a loud and clear message to Mr. Comey and to every senior government official about the consequence of disloyalty.

In the corporate workplace, whistleblower-employees are similarly humiliated as a warning to their colleagues. A whistleblower may be escorted out of the office with security guards while other employees are present, pulled out of a meeting and fired on the spot in front of colleagues, or simply fired via text message. When a corporation fires a whistleblower in this humiliating fashion, it ensures that all other employees know the consequence of whistleblowing.

Badmouth the Whistleblower and Their Work History

Firing Mr. Comey in a humiliating and offensive manner served only as phase one. President Trump then defamed Mr. Comey and asserted that he fired him because of chaos within the FBI, as well as the alleged loss of confidence in Mr. Comey among FBI agents.

These statements stand in stark contrast to the President’s repeated, public praise of Mr. Comey before Mr. Comey refused to comply with the President’s “hope” that Mr. Comey drop the investigation of Flynn. Indeed, if President Trump believed that Mr. Comey’s leadership caused chaos within the FBI, then why did the President invite Mr. Comey to continue to serve as FBI Director?

This patent distortion of Mr. Comey’s performance record is an all-too-common experience of whistleblowers. Prior to blowing the whistle, they receive strong performance evaluations and bonuses; they are valued members of the team. But once they blow the whistle and refuse to drop their concerns, they are suddenly deemed incompetent and unqualified for their position. And when a company realizes that it lacks any existing basis to fire the whistleblower, it creates one by subjecting the whistleblower to heightened scrutiny and setting the whistleblower up to fail. For example, a company might place the whistleblower on a performance-improvement plan that contains impossible objectives, and then fire the whistleblower for not meeting those unattainable goals.

This tactic may backfire and enable a whistleblower to ultimately prevail at trial, but the damage to the whistleblower’s reputation is permanent. Prospective employers are reluctant to hire someone who previously fired for poor performance and are especially reluctant to hire a whistleblower. Many whistleblowers never find comparable employment and must accept lower-level positions, earning a fraction of what they did before their wrongful termination.

Attack the Whistleblower’s Credibility

Apparently, President Trump has no evidence to rebut Mr. Comey’s vivid account of the President’s alleged attempts to obstruct justice. So President Trump called him a “liar.”

Desperate to defend themselves at all costs, corporations frequently employ this tactic—labeling the whistleblower a disgruntled former employee who will say anything to win his or her case. So far, this is not working well for President Trump, whose accusation merely serves to shine a spotlight on his own questionable credibility.

Attacking a whistleblower’s credibility is an effective and pernicious tactic in many whistleblower cases. Once expelled from a company, a whistleblower is marginalized and alienated from former coworkers. The key witnesses continue to work at the company and, fearing retaliation, are reluctant to corroborate the whistleblower’s testimony. Though whistleblowers may still prevail (for example, by using documentary evidence), the attack on a whistleblower’s credibility is odious because the company fired the whistleblower precisely for having integrity.

Create a Post-Hoc Justification for Firing the Whistleblower

Prior to firing Mr. Comey, President Trump papered the file with a post-hoc justification for the firing. After the President decided to fire Mr. Comey, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein was tasked with drafting a memorandum to the Attorney General outlining concerns about Mr. Comey’s performance. Most of those concerns focus on Mr. Comey’s statements about the investigation of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email server. Surely President Trump knew of those public statements when he repeatedly asked Mr. Comey to remain as FBI Director (as long as he could pledge “loyalty” and drop the Flynn investigation).

In this case, the White House’s initial reliance on the Rosenstein memo as the basis for the decision to fire Mr. Comey backfired because President Trump told NBC anchor Lester Holt that he had decided to fire Mr. Comey regardless of the memo. In many whistleblower-retaliation cases, however, these types of pretextual memos may be persuasive. Some judges even rely on such memos, which mask the real reason for a firing or other adverse action, to grant the company summary judgment and deny the whistleblower a jury trial.

On the other hand, creating a post-hoc justification for a retaliatory adverse action sometimes misfires by providing strong evidence of pretext and spurring a jury to award punitive damages. For instance, a former in-house counsel at Bio-Rad Laboratories recently secured more than $11 million in damages at trial in a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower-retaliation case. The jury awarded $5 million in punitive damages because Bio-Rad had backdated a negative performance evaluation of the whistleblower that the company drafted after it fired him.

Focus on the Whistleblower’s Alleged Misconduct

To distract attention from what may be obstruction of justice, President Trump and his attorney have focused on Mr. Comey’s leak to the press and have alleged that the leak was unlawful. This accusation seems frivolous because Mr. Comey did not leak classified information, grand jury material, or other sensitive information. Instead, he revealed that President Trump had conditioned his continued service as FBI Director on his agreeing to drop the investigation of Flynn. As a private citizen, Mr. Comey has a constitutional right to blow the whistle to the media about this matter of public concern. Mr. Comey did not reveal to the media information from FBI investigative files or classified information. Yet President Trump and his allies compare Mr. Comey to leakers who illegally disclosed classified information. This is an appalling accusation against the former head of a law-enforcement agency.

But this is another standard corporate defense tactic in whistleblower cases. To divert attention from the wrongdoing that the whistleblower exposed, the company uses its substantial resources to dig up dirt on the whistleblower. The company or its outside counsel examines the whistleblower’s timesheets and expense reports with a fine-tooth comb to find any discrepancy, reviews every email to find some inappropriate communication, and places all of the whistleblower’s work under a microscope to find any shortcoming.

Sue the Whistleblower and Initiate a Retaliatory Investigation

Firing Comey, concocting a pretextual basis for the firing, and branding him a leaking liar apparently was not sufficient retaliation.  So shortly after his testimony, President Trump’s personal attorney announced his intention to sue Mr. Comey and/or file a complaint with the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General (OIG).  I am skeptical that a civil action against Mr. Comey or an OIG complaint poses any real legal threat to Mr. Comey.  To the contrary, such a complaint would likely pose a greater risk for President Trump, including potential counterclaims and the risk of being deposed or questioned under oath by the OIG.

The misuse of legal process against corporate whistleblowers, however, is an especially powerful form of retaliation in that it can dissuade a whistleblower from pursuing their claims.  When I defend against this form of abuse of process, I am always struck at the seemingly endless resources that the company will spend to prosecute claims lacking any merit or value.  Fortunately, these claims can go awry by spawning additional retaliation claims under the whistleblower protection laws.  And a jury can punish the employer for subjecting the whistleblower to abuse of process.

Why Whistleblowers Deserve Strong Legal Protection

In light of Mr. Comey’s distinguished record, he will likely bounce back and rebuild his career. But most corporate whistleblowers never fully recover. Too often they find their careers and reputations destroyed. Even when whistleblowers obtain monetary relief at trial, they are usually blacklisted from comparable positions, especially if they work in a small industry.

Mr. Comey’s experience as a whistleblower is a stark reminder of what can happen to any employee who is pressured by a powerful superior to engage in unlawful conduct or to cover up wrongdoing. When intimidation tactics succeed, the public suffers. The company could be covering up threats to public health or safety, environmental contamination, financial fraud, defective products, or any other conceivable harmful wrongdoing.

Courageous whistleblowers who put their jobs on the line deserve strong protection. As Congress embarks on a mission to gut “job killing” agencies, let us hope it will spare the very limited resources that are spent enforcing whistleblower-protection laws. Without such a large backlog of whistleblower cases, OSHA could have, for example, addressed the complaints of Wells Fargo whistleblowers years ago, potentially curbing or halting the bank’s defrauding of its customers. And Congress should consider filling the gaps in existing whistleblower laws. If Mr. Comey “lacked the presence of mind” to explicitly reject the President’s improper demand for him to drop the Flynn investigation, then surely most employees would also be reluctant to refuse an order to commit an unethical or unlawful act.

After Mr. Comey’s testimony, Speaker Ryan pointed out that “[t]he President’s new at this. He’s new to government.” Mr. Comey’s testimony should be a lesson for the President about how to treat whistleblowers. To make America great again, the President should abandon the Rambo litigation tactics that apparently served him well in New York real-estate disputes, and instead view whistleblowers as allies, not as enemies. As Tom Devine of the Government Accountability Project and I argue in an article in the Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability ReviewDraining the Swamp Requires Robust Whistleblower Protections and Incentives.

This post was written by Jason Zuckerman of Zuckerman Law.