Tag: coffee

The Hot Coffee Case Revisited: Has Proximate Cause Changed in the 25 Years Since Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants?

Two cases decided 25 years apart, but there were some facts in common: a hot drink, a consumer alleging that she was burned by the drink, and a lawsuit. These are the facts of the 1994 case Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants that resulted in an award of millions to the consumer, but also the facts from Shih v. Starbucks, a case decided last year. In Shih, however, the court found in favor of the product supplier. What’s different about these cases? The answer: how the courts interpreted proximate cause.

In 1994, Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants sparked a nationwide tort reform debate after a jury found McDonald’s liable for a consumer’s injuries after she spilled McDonald’s coffee on herself. At the time, many commentators predicted a wave of frivolous lawsuits and large judgments against businesses. But 25 years later, those predictions have not materialized. While consumers continue to sue, the doctrine of proximate cause limits the liability that businesses face from claims for injuries related to hot drinks.

Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants

In 1992, Stella Liebeck bought a cup of hot coffee from a McDonald’s drive-through in New Mexico. While parked, she placed the cup of coffee between her legs and attempted to peel the cap off. The coffee spilled and Ms. Liebeck sustained second- and third-degree burns.

Liebeck sued McDonald’s, alleging that the hot coffee was defectively manufactured, that it violated the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and that the defect caused her injuries. At trial, Liebeck’s attorneys offered evidence that McDonald’s asked franchisees to brew coffee at 180-190 degrees Fahrenheit. Additionally, the attorneys offered evidence that McDonald’s had received more than 700 reports of burns resulting from coffee spills out of billions of hot coffees sold during the time period.

The jury ruled in favor of Liebeck and awarded her compensatory damages of $200,000 and punitive damages of $2.7 million. But the jury determined that Liebeck was 20 percent at fault for her own injuries, and the court reduced the punitive award significantly, resulting in compensatory damages of $160,000 and punitive damages of $480,000.

Shih v. Starbucks

Shih v. Starbucks presents a similar set of facts, but with a different outcome. In June 2016, Tina Shih went to Starbucks with a friend, and each ordered a hot tea. Each tea was given to Shih in a double-cup – one full cup placed within an empty cup. Neither cup had a sleeve. Shih carried both teas to her table and sat down.

Shih claimed that because the cup of tea was filled to the top and was very hot, she did not want to lift it. Instead, she pulled the lid off the cup and moved her chair back to sip from the cup while it was on the table. Shih pushed her chair back to lean over the cup, lost her balance, and put her hand on the table to steady herself – causing the hot tea to spill in her lap. Shih sustained second-degree burns from the incident.

Shih sued Starbucks. She alleged that the double-cup without a sleeve was a manufacturing defect, which – combined with the cup being filled to the brim with hot tea – caused her injuries. Starbucks moved for summary judgment on Shih’s claims, arguing that Shih could not prove the alleged manufacturing defect proximately caused her injuries. The court agreed, granted Starbucks’s motion, and entered judgment in favor of Starbucks. In 2020, the appeals court affirmed.

Proximate Cause is Key the Difference

The differences between Liebeck and Shih are the litigants’ defect claims and their respective theories of proximate causation. The proximate cause inquiry examines the relationship between the defendant’s alleged conduct and the plaintiff’s injury: if the defendant’s conduct is too attenuated from the consumer’s injuries, the defendant cannot be held liable for those injuries. Proximate cause exists when the defect in question increased the risk of harm to the consumer, and the consumer sustained injuries resulting from the increased risk. Courts generally test proximate cause by looking at whether the harm was a foreseeable result of the defect – meaning the business could reasonably have predicted the harm.

Liebeck’s attorneys successfully argued that the coffee was defective because it was served too hot and that the excessively hot temperature put Liebeck at an increased risk of burns. Liebeck established proximate cause by showing that her burn injuries were a foreseeable result of the alleged defect – the coffee being served very hot.

Shih could not establish proximate cause because the court held that the alleged defect was too attenuated from her injuries. Shih’s attorneys argued that the lack of a cup sleeve and the fact that the hot tea was full made it defective. Specifically, Shih would not have removed the tea lid, leaned forward, moved her chair, lost her balance and grabbed the table – causing it to wobble and spill the tea on her – if Starbucks had given her a cup sleeve or not filled the cup to the brim.

The court held that the alleged defect did not increase the risk of Shih being burned or otherwise injured by the hot tea; therefore, the defect was not the proximate cause of her injuries. The lack of a sleeve and the fullness of the tea did not increase Shih’s risk of losing her balance “while attempting to execute [this] kind of unorthodox drinking maneuver,” and spilling the tea on herself. The court’s use of “unorthodox” illustrates that, in the court’s view, Shih’s injuries were not a foreseeable result of the alleged defect. The court noted that while it is foreseeable that consumers could lose their balance and spill their drinks, losing one’s balance is not “within the scope of the risk” created by Starbucks’ decision to use a double cup and to fill the cup to the brim. Thus, Shih could not prove Starbucks’ actions proximately caused her injuries.

Twenty-five years after Liebeck sparked a national conversation about hot coffee and corporate liability, Shih demonstrates that courts continue to follow public policy limitations like proximate cause to protect businesses from unforeseeable consumer injuries.

© 2021 Schiff Hardin LLP

Article by Emilie McGuire and Jeffrey Skinner with Schiff Hardin LLP.

For more articles on class action lawsuits, visit the NLR Litigation section.

Sometimes You Feel Like a Nut

In a spit decision, the First Circuit reversed a dismissal of a putative class action in a Massachusetts consumer protection case. Dumond v. Reily Foods Co., No. 18-2055 (1st Cir. Aug. 8, 2019)

The defendant New England Coffee Company sells a “Hazelnut Crème” coffee. The plaintiff sued because the coffee contains no nut – it’s all coffee, no nut, only nut flavored. The district court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend on the basis that the complaint wasn’t sufficiently specific. After rejecting that ground for dismissal and also rejecting a preemption argument, the majority noted that the defendants argued as an alternative ground to support the dismissal that the factual allegations complaint failed to state a plausible claim, and that’s the part of the decision that interests us.

Whether the label was deceptive, Judge Kayatta, writing for himself and Judge Torruella, opined was a question of fact. While the label said it was “100% Arabica coffee” and listed no hazelnut as an ingredient, Judge Kayatta said that perhaps a reasonable factfinder could conclude the name of the product was sufficient, without having to read the “fine print,” “much like one might easily buy a hazelnut cake without studying the ingredients list to confirm that the cake actually contains some hazelnut.”

Responding to the dissent, Judge Kayatta wrote:  “Our dissenting colleague [Judge Lynch] envisions a more erudite reader of labels, tipped off by the accent grave on the word “crème,” and armed perhaps with several dictionaries, a bit like a federal judge reading a statute. We are less confident that ‘common parlance’ would exhibit such linguistic precision. Indeed, we confess that one of us thought “crème” was a fancy word for cream, with Hazelnut Crème being akin, for example, to hazelnut butter, a product often found in another aisle of the supermarket.”

Judge Kayatta further wrote: “None of this is to say that our dissenting colleague’s reading is by any means unreasonable. To the contrary, we ourselves would likely land upon that reading were we in the grocery aisle with some time to peruse the package.”

In her dissent, Judge Lynch said that she disagreed with the majority that this presented a “close” question – in her view “a reasonable consumer plainly could not view the phrase ‘Hazelnut Crème’ as announcing the presence of actual hazelnut in a bag of coffee which also proclaims it is ‘100% Arabica Coffee.’”  Aside from noting that the package ingredient only said it included 100% Arabica coffee and never said it contained an actual nut, Judge Lynch explained how the word “Crème” means, both in the dictionary and in common parlance, a cream or cream sauce as used in cookery or a sweet liqueur, with the latter usually “used with the flavor specified” (citing Webster’s) – in short, “hazelnut Crème” clearly indicates a flavoring, not an ingredient. The majority’s hazelnut cake analogy was inapt because cakes are “made up of many ingredients.” .

My thoughts on this opinion are, first, it sounds like a lively chambers discussion, and second, I wonder about the degree to which each of the members of the panel does his or her own grocery shopping, and, if so, whether he or she reads labels, and whether this, consciously or not, influenced their thinking.

Since according to the majority opinion, either Judge Kayatta or Judge Torruella thought “Hazelnut Crème” meant hazelnut butter (really? in coffee? And despite the fact no dairy product was listed on the label?), did the majority reason that it follows that a reasonable consumer could be confused, because obviously the members of the majority are reasonable consumers? As noted above, the majority stated that “we” would “likely” realize there was no actual hazelnut in the coffee “were we in the grocery aisle with some time to peruse the package.” Are they saying that’s not the reasonable consumer standard –someone with time to peruse a package? It’s unreasonable to have them look at the ingredients? Or is the majority saying “likely” isn’t good enough to avoid a jury question?

©2019 Pierce Atwood LLP. All rights reserved.