Tag: Clean Water ACt

Federal Judge Limits the Reach of the WOTUS Rule

Introduction

During the Obama Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (collectively, “the Agencies”) adopted a rule amending the regulatory definition of “waters of the United States” (the “WOTUS Rule” or “Rule”).  As explained in a previous alert, the WOTUS Rule has far-reaching implications for project development and landowners across the energy, water, agricultural, construction, and transportation sectors, and it has been the subject of extensive litigation, as well as rulemaking by the Trump Administration.

On Wednesday, August 21, 2019, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia ruled in Georgia v. Wheeler that the WOTUS Rule impermissibly extended the Agencies’ authority beyond the scope of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The Court remanded the WOTUS Rule back to the Agencies and extended its preliminary injunction of the Rule.

Background

Since its enactment, the WOTUS Rule has been the subject of many legal challenges, and it was enjoined in numerous states. Additionally, under the Trump Administration, the Agencies proposed a new rule that would have delayed the effectiveness date of the WOTUS Rule for two years (the “Suspension Rule”). As previously discussed, the Suspension Rule was the subject of a nationwide injunction in South Caroline Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt.  A federal judge in the Western District of Washington then vacated the Suspension Rule in Puget Soundkeeper Alliance v. Wheeler.

After the vacatur of the Suspension Rule, the WOTUS Rule continued to provide fodder for litigation. To date, the WOTUS rule is enjoined in 27 states: Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wyoming, and Wisconsin.  The Rule remains effective in 22 other states and the District of Columbia.

The Opinion

In Georgia v. Wheeler, the Court—relying primarily on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Rapanos v. United States—held that the WOTUS Rule impermissibly extended the Agencies’ jurisdiction beyond their delegated authority under the CWA.

The Court also held that the Agencies’ definitions of interstate waters, tributaries, adjacent waters, and case-by-case waters violated the CWA, and that the Rule significantly interfered with lands and waters that were traditionally under state authority without clear congressional intent.

Additionally, the Court determined that the Rule failed to comply with the APA both procedurally and substantively. These topics are further discussed below.

Definition of Interstate Waters

The Court found that the definition of interstate waters, which considers all interstate waters to be a “water of the United States” irrespective of navigability, disregarded the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rapanos. In particular, the Court found that WOTUS reads the term “navigability” out of the CWA. As such, under the WOTUS Rule, a non-navigable interstate water with no significant nexus to a “water of the United States” would still be regulated. According to the Court, that result extends beyond the Agencies’ authority under the CWA.

Definition of Tributaries

The Court also concluded that the Rule’s definition of “tributaries” was over-inclusive because it used the presence of an ordinary high water mark (“OHWM”) and bed and banks as physical indicators of volume sufficient to create a regulated “tributary.”  The Court took particular issue with provisions in the WOTUS Rule discussing situations in which these physical indicators are “absent in the field,” but are nevertheless determined to be present by “other appropriate means,” such as “lake and stream gage data, elevation data, spillway height, historic water flow records, flood predictions, statistical evidence, the use of reference conditions, or through . . . remote sensing and desktop tools.”  The Court found this approach inconsistent with Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, noting that “the physical indicators that the Agencies assert provide evidence of sufficient volume and flow to adhere to Justice Kennedy’s significant-nexus test need not actually be physically present in a geographic area so long as computer programs can decipher that they exist and need not presently exist so long as those programs can conclude that they have existed at sometime in the past.”

The Court was also troubled by the application of the “tributaries” definition in the Arid West, citing evidence that the physical indicators of a tributary often appear around water bodies in the Arid West, even when they are wholly isolated from navigable waters. The Court found that the definition of tributaries could inadvertently regulate dry areas that may contain attributes of an OWHM and a bed and bank due to an extreme weather event—a result that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Rapanos sought to avoid. Accordingly, Court concluded that the “tributaries” definition extended too far.

Definition of Adjacent Waters

According to the Court, the definition of “adjacent waters” clearly conflicted with Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Rapanos by erroneously including waters adjacent to non-navigable tributaries. The Court recognized that, while adjacency is a permissible factor to consider when determining jurisdiction under the CWA, that factor must still be subject to Kennedy’s significant-nexus test.  The Court reasoned that the definition impermissibly extended jurisdiction over isolated and inconsequential waters.

Case-by-Case Waters

The Court presumed that the case-by-case category was the Agencies’ attempt to implement Justice Kennedy’s significant-nexus test. Because the Agencies relied on impermissible definitions of “interstate waters” and “tributaries” in formulating their criteria for the case-by-case category of waters, the criteria were also invalid to the extent they were the logical outgrowth of these definitions. Because the definitions of “interstate waters” and “tributaries” were already overbroad, the Agencies could not base case-by-case category waters of those definitions, as they too would impermissibly expand federal jurisdiction. Notably, the Court concluded that the Agencies’ reliance on erroneous definitions of “tributaries” and “interstate waters” was the only error in the WOTUS Rule’s case-by-case category under the CWA.

The WOTUS Rule Substantially Interferes with Traditional State Power

The Court also found that the Rule substantially encroached on traditional state power. Recognizing that the CWA permits the federal government to regulate waters in order to protect the biological and physical integrity of the Nation’s waters, the Court also emphasized the Congressional policy in the CWA stating that states should retain primary responsibility over land and water resources. The Court found that the WOTUS Rule as written would result in the federal government regulating immense stretches of intrastate land not contemplated by that CWA.  To support this finding, the Court cited statements made by the Agencies under the Trump Administration in a recently-proposed rule to rescind the WOTUS Rule that the WOTUS Rule “may have altered the balance of authorities between the federal and State governments, contrary to the agencies’ [prior] statements,” and to statistics suggesting the WOTUS rule was estimated to increase the scope of federal jurisdiction over waters by at least two percent — an increase the Court characterized as “a substantial intrusion into lands and waters traditionally left to state authority.” According to the Court, this significant increase in jurisdiction improperly stripped states of their traditional authority to regulate these types of lands and waters.

The Rule failed to comply with APA and was arbitrary and capricious

The Court found that the rule violated the APA in two ways: (1) the final Rule was not the logical outgrowth of the Agencies’ previously-proposed version of the Rule; and, (2) there were parts of the Rule that were arbitrary and capricious. The Rule failed to be the logical outgrowth of the Agencies’ proposed rule for three reasons. First, while the proposed Rule did not include distance limitations when defining “neighboring waters,” the final Rule did. Second, the proposed Rule similarly did not include distance limitations for adjacent waters in the case-by-case categories, while the final Rule did. Lastly, the proposed Rule did not contain any explicit farming exemption, but the final Rule contained a farming exemption for adjacent waters. The Court agreed with Plaintiffs’ argument that, had they known that there was going to be a farming exemption for adjacent waters, they would have also commented that there should be a farming exemption for tributaries.

The Court also determined that portions of the Rule were arbitrary and capricious. The Court found that the Agencies’ inclusion of a farming exemption for adjacent waters but not tributaries was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to treat similar cases in a similar manner without justification. The Court also found that the Agencies’ decision to use FEMA 100-year floodplain maps to define adjacent and case-by-case waters was arbitrary because of the inaccuracies of outdated flood maps, and because the Agencies failed to sufficiently explain why the 100-year floodplain was the proper limit. Lastly, the Agencies’ use of a distance limitation for adjacent waters was arbitrary because the Agencies only gave broad, conclusory reasons why the limit was selected and failed to explain their decision.

Practical Implications

Georgia v. Wheeler represents yet another federal court to examine the merits of the WOTUS Rule and to find it exceeding the Agencies’ statutory authority under the CWA and violating provisions of the APA.  The Court did not vacate the rule, but simply remanded it back to the Agencies, and therefore the Rule remains effective where not enjoined. This case continues the patchwork implementation of the WOTUS Rule, which is now enjoined in 27 states, but is still effective in 22 other states and the District of Columbia.

This patchwork situation may not last long, as appeals will likely be filed challenging the Georgia v. Wheeler decision and other decisions enjoining or declining to enjoin the WOTUS Rule. Additionally, the Agencies under the Trump Administration are expected in the near future to publish a final version of their proposed new WOTUS Rule, which is also very likely to face legal challenges.

As a result on the ongoing litigation and rulemaking processes, the regulated community is unlikely to see true certainty on the question of the geographic scope of the CWA until Congress takes action to clarify its scope or the Supreme Court issues a new substantive decision addressing this issue.

© 2019 Van Ness Feldman LLP

After Shutdown, US EPA Announces New Hearing Date for the New WOTUS Rule

As a result of the recent lapse in appropriations, the US EPA and US Department of the Army (Army) delayed a planned January 23, 2019 hearing regarding the proposed new “Waters of the United States” (WOTUS) definition. Publication of the proposed rule and the start of the comment period on the rule were also postponed due to the shutdown. On February 6, 2019, EPA announced that the hearing will now be held on February 27 and 28, 2019.   The Office of the Federal Register has not yet published the proposed rule, which will start the clock on the 60-day comment period.

Because it determines the scope of the Clean Water Act, the definition of “waters of the United States” has been a hot-button issue since it was amended, and significantly broadened, by the Obama administration in mid-2015.  The 2015 rule was challenged by 31 states and numerous other stakeholders in multiple lawsuits. In October 2015, the Sixth Circuit issued a nationwide stay of the rule. The nationwide stay was lifted when the US Supreme Court determined on January 13, 2017, that review of the rule falls within the jurisdiction of the district courts.   Although the nationwide stay is no longer in effect, decisions by the US District Courts for the Districts of North Dakota, Southern District of Georgia, and Southern District of Texas, preliminarily enjoining the 2015 rule in 28 states remain in effect. Thus, the Obama-era rule is in effect in only 22 states, the District of Columbia, and US territories.

In an effort to eliminate or narrow the Obama-era rule and reestablish a consistent nationwide rule, on December 11, 2018, the US EPA and the Army signed a newly proposed rule revising the WOTUS definition. The proposed rule is part of the agencies’ two-step plan to remove and replace the 2015 rule, which the agencies believe exceeds US EPA’s statutory authority. The first step, a rule which suspended the application of the 2015 rule, was enjoined and vacated by two district courts. Despite this roadblock, the agencies moved forward with step two and submitted the new proposed definition rule to the Office of the Federal Register. However, due to the shutdown, it has not yet been published. The 60-day comment period for the rule will begin on the date of publication.

Under the proposed rule “waters of the United States” encompasses “traditional navigable waters, including the territorial seas; tributaries that contribute perennial or intermittent flow to such waters; certain ditches; certain lakes and ponds; impoundments of otherwise jurisdictional waters; and wetlands adjacent to other jurisdictional waters.” Importantly, the agencies propose to eliminate the case-by-case application of the significant nexus test, which under the 2015 rule extends the definition of WOTUS to water, including wetlands, that “significantly affects the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of a water.” The agencies propose instead “the establishment of clear categories of jurisdictional waters.”

The new WOTUS definition would also exclude from regulation some tributaries and waters adjacent to jurisdictional waters. The 2015 rule extends to adjacent waters that are bordering, contiguous or neighboring a jurisdictional water, which broadly encompasses any water within 100 feet of a jurisdictional water or water located within the 100-year floodplain of a jurisdictional water. By contrast, the proposed rule includes only adjacent wetlands that “abut or have a direct hydrological surface connection” to a water. Under the 2015 Obama-era rule, a tributary is a water that contributes flow to a jurisdictional water. The proposed rule eliminates ephemeral flows from being considered a tributary, requiring a water that contributes at least “perennial or intermittent flow.” Given these and other significant differences between the two rules, once published, the proposed rule is certain to draw intense debate over the proper reach of the Clean Water Act.

US EPA is not alone in experiencing delays, as the federal rulemaking process ground to a halt during the shutdown. The Office of the Federal Register (OFR) issued “Government Shutdown FAQs,” stating that in an appropriations lapse the OFR may publish documents from unfunded agencies “directly related to the performance of governmental functions necessary to address imminent threats to safety of human life or protection of property.”   And, in the case of a partial shutdown, where some agencies are funded, the OFR may publish documents from funded agencies “if delaying publication until the end of the appropriations lapse would prevent or significantly damage the execution of funded functions at the agency.”

 

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
This post was written by Weslynn P. Reed of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP.
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Water, Water, Everywhere: The Clean Water Act

If it isn’t already, water should be on your mind this year.  The excitement of Scituate storm surge and coastal flooding aside, the region – and the U.S. as a whole – is facing a slew of legal developments that may change how citizens, businesses, and governments operate under the federal Clean Water Act and similar state programs.  In particular, the scope of Clean Water Act jurisdiction is in play following a pair of Supreme Court decisions, as is the potential delegation of permitting authority to Massachusetts and New Hampshire, two of only four states in which the EPA administers permitting under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).

Clean Water Act Jurisdiction

Since well before Samuel Taylor Coleridge penned those famous lines in the Rime of the Ancient Mariner – “Water, water, every where, / Nor any drop to drink” – people have worried about access to clean water.  It makes sense, then, that the Clean Water Act is one of our oldest environmental laws, with its origins in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.  The Rivers and Harbors Act – the nation’s very first environmental law – imposed the first “dredge and fill” requirements, made it illegal to dam rivers without federal approval, and prohibited the discharge of “any refuse  matter  of  any  kind  or  description” into “any  navigable  water  of  the  United  States, or  into  any  tributary  of  any  navigable  water.”

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, with major amendments in 1961, 1966, 1970, 1972, 1977, and 1987, largely superseded the Rivers and Harbors Act and resulted in what we know today as the federal Clean Water Act (CWA).  And although today’s statute is very different from its 1899 precursor, one thing has remained constant: an intense and lasting fight over the scope and jurisdiction of federal regulation.  Federal CWA jurisdiction is premised on the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and prohibits (without a permit) “dredge and fill” activities and the discharge of pollutants into “navigable waters,” which the CWA defines as “the waters of the United States.”  But what, exactly, are “waters of the United States”?

The 1870 Supreme Court decision in The Daniel Ball held that waterways were subject to federal jurisdiction if they were “navigable in fact.”  But what has never been clear is the extent to which non-navigable waters, like certain tributaries to navigable waters or wetlands, constitute “waters of the United States” such that they are subject to federal regulation.

The Supreme Court Punts (Again)

The 2006 Supreme Court decision in Rapanos v. United States represented a key turning point in CWA jurisdiction, holding that certain remote wetlands are not subject to CWA jurisdiction.  But the decision was badly fractured, with no majority of justices agreeing on a single standard for determining what, exactly, constitute “waters of the United States” such that the CWA applies.  Minor chaos ensued, as regulators and courts applied varying interpretations of Rapanos in permitting decisions and enforcement actions.

In 2015, the Obama administration attempted to clarify the scope of CWA jurisdiction by promulgating a rule known as the “Waters of the United States” (or “WOTUS”) rule that attempted to define exactly which waters were regulated by the CWA.  That rule, which was based on Justice Anthony Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test in the Rapanos decision, was quickly challenged by 31 states, numerous industries, and landowner groups.  At bottom, challengers argued that the WOTUS rule represented significant federal overreach and extended CWA jurisdiction well beyond what the Commerce Clause allows. The numerous appeals were consolidated into a single Sixth Circuit case, National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense (NAM), and in late 2015 the Sixth Circuit stayed the WOTUS rule pending resolution of legal challenges.

But on January 22, 2018, the Supreme Court unanimously held that federal District Courts – not appellate courts – have jurisdiction over challenges to the WOTUS rule.  While the CWA generally requires challenges to CWA rules to be brought in district courts, there are seven situations where courts of appeal have jurisdiction.  In this case, the government argued that the challenge should be heard in the courts of appeal, under CWA Sections 1369(b)(1)(E)-(F) which allow appellate courts to hear cases related to the approval of certain effluent limits or permits, respectively.  Petitioners, on the other hand, maintained that the case should be heard in federal district court in the first instance.  In a procedural victory for the petitioners, the Supreme Court held that the WOTUS rule does not qualify for direct appellate review under CWA Sections 1369(b)(1)(E)-(F).  Following this decision, future challenges to the WOTUS rule will be brought in federal district courts, potentially with divergent outcomes around the country.  Appeals of those decisions will move to the courts of appeals, where there is yet again the possibility for inconsistency.  The upshot is a longer litigation timeline – and continued jurisdictional uncertainty – before the Supreme Court will have another chance to address the appropriate scope of CWA jurisdiction.

In the meantime, the Trump administration is working on a replacement rule for the WOTUS rule that is likely to apply the less expansive jurisdictional test described by Justice Antonin Scalia in Rapanos.  Under that interpretation, only tributaries that are “relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water,” and only wetlands with a continuous surface connection to a “water of the United States” are themselves “waters of the United States” subject to CWA jurisdiction.  And on February 6, 2018, EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers promulgated a rule delaying implementation of the WOTUS rule until February, 2020.  That action preserves the Rapanos status quo (such as it is) until EPA can craft a new rule.  Ultimately, it is likely that any WOTUS replacement rule will be challenged, and the Supreme Court will then have a chance to revisit its decision in Rapanos and redefine federal jurisdiction under the CWA, a process that could easily extend past 2020.

Defer much?

On February 26, 2018, the Supreme Court weighed in again on the Clean Water Act, this time by refusing to take up a challenge to a 2017 decision by the Second Circuit that upheld a 2008 EPA rule exempting water transfers from CWA permitting requirements.  Water transfers happen when water from one waterbody is diverted into another waterbody, such as diverting a stream into a nearby lake or reservoir. Drinking water systems have conducted water transfers for decades, and EPA has never required NPDES permitting for such transfers.  But in 2008, in response to pressure by environmental groups to require NPDES permits for water transfers, EPA adopted the Water Transfers Rule expressly exempting such transfers from NPDES permitting.

Environmentalists and states challenged the Water Transfers Rule, arguing that moving water from one waterbody to another requires a permit if the “donor” water contains pollutants that would have the effect of degrading the receiving water.  Both the Obama and Trump administrations defended the rule, arguing that it preserved long-standing practice and was justified by EPA’s ability to interpret CWA requirements.  Ultimately, the Second Circuit deferred to EPA and allowed the rule to stand.  In turn, the February 26 decision by the Supreme Court allows the Second Circuit decision to stand, thereby affirming the validity of the Water Transfers Rule.  The case was widely seen as a test for Justice Neil Gorsuch, who has expressed hostility to the deference doctrine and EPA regulations alike.  By declining to hear the case, the Court has deferred that test for another day.

Who’s in Charge?

Under a process known as “delegation,” states may assume permitting and other authority under the CWA.  To-date, 46 states have received such delegation from EPA, and all but Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Idaho, and New Mexico now administer their own NPDES permitting programs.  In the absence of delegation, EPA manages the Clean Water Act and NPDES program in those four states, which often overlap and may duplicate separate state law requirements.

New Hampshire is currently evaluating whether to seek CWA delegation from EPA, and has established a legislative commission to explore its options.  And as we have previously reported, Massachusetts has explored CWA delegation in the past, but those efforts largely fizzled out.  But both of these efforts may have new life: the EPA, under Administrator Pruitt, is very focused on “cooperative federalism” and with EPA seeking to slash its budgets, CWA delegation is likely on EPA’s radar as an action item over the next several years.  And, in late 2017, MassDEP Commissioner Martin Suuberg expressed strong support for CWA delegation, as has Governor Baker.  Whether delegation will become a reality for Massachusetts or New Hampshire is anyone’s guess, but regardless of the outcome 2018 is shaping up to be an interesting year for water law.

 

© 2018 Beveridge & Diamond PC
This post was written by Brook J. Detterman of Beveridge & Diamond PC.

Trump Executive Order Seeks to Limit Scope of Clean Water Act

clean water act, EPA, environmental protection agencyThe executive order asks agencies to repeal or revise an Obama-era rule defining the scope of the Clean Water Act and recommends adoption of a narrower standard articulated by the late Justice Scalia.

On February 28, US President Donald Trump issued an executive order asking the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the US Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) to repeal or revise a 2015 rule interpreting the term “waters of the United States,” which determines the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act. The order further recommends that the agencies consider crafting a new definition based on the “continuous surface connection” test adopted by a plurality of the US Supreme Court in Rapanos v. United States, which would result in a significant contraction in the Clean Water Act’s scope from the Obama EPA’s 2015 rule.[1] The 2015 rule was met with extensive criticism by some stakeholders and gave rise to a flurry of litigation. A new rule issued in response to President Trump’s executive order is likely to do the same—resulting in continued uncertainty as to the proper scope of the Clean Water Act and possibly requiring further review by the Supreme Court to resolve the question.

Background

The scope of jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act has long been controversial. It is also an important issue for stakeholders such as farmers, developers, and energy companies that own or use properties that may contain a “water of the United States.” The scope of the act affects the application of a number of regulatory programs, including the section 402 point source discharge permit program, the section 404 dredge and fill permit program, and the section 311 oil spill prevention program.

The Clean Water Act applies to “navigable waters,” which are defined in the statute as “waters of the United States, including territorial seas.” EPA and the Army Corps, the agencies charged with administrating the Clean Water Act, have sought multiple times to define “waters of the United States” through rulemakings and regulatory guidance, and those regulatory efforts have been subject to numerous legal challenges. The US Supreme Court has weighed in on the issue three times, most recently in Rapanos v. United States.[2] Rapanos resulted in a fractured decision in which no interpretation received support from a majority of the court—Justice Antonin Scalia and three other justices articulated a test based on a “continuous surface connection,” while Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurrence relied on whether there was a “significant nexus” to another water of the United States.[3] Because Justice Kennedy’s analysis provided the narrowest grounds for reversal, the “significant nexus” test has been understood by many as the controlling test post-Rapanos for what constitutes a water of the United States.

In May 2015, EPA and the Army Corps issued a new rule seeking to better define the Clean Water Act’s scope.[4] The agencies maintained that the final rule only clarified and limited the reach of the act, but many stakeholder groups concluded that the 2015 rule significantly expanded the existing interpretation of waters of the United States. Of particular concern to stakeholders were categorical inclusions of “tributaries” and waters “adjacent” to other waters of the United States, as well as the rule’s broad definition of what constitutes a “significant nexus.” Numerous lawsuits challenging the rule were filed, which are currently consolidated in the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

The Executive Order

On February 28, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order asking EPA and the Army Corps to review the 2015 rule and propose a new rule “rescinding or revising” it. The order also asks the agencies to consider defining waters of the United States “in a manner consistent with the opinion of Justice Antonin Scalia in Rapanos v. United States.” The order further directs the US attorney general to take appropriate measures regarding the ongoing litigation over the 2015 rule.

EPA and the Army Corps released a prepublication Federal Register notice the same day noting their intention to “review and rescind or revise” the 2015 rule pursuant to President Trump’s executive order. The agencies also acknowledged that they would consider adopting Justice Scalia’s test from Rapanos.

Implications

It likely will take years for the exact contours of the new regulation to be fleshed out by EPA and the Army Corps and for any ensuing litigation to be resolved. The process likely will start with the withdrawal of the Obama-era rule and the issuance of a new rule, including an explanation as to how the new rule fulfills the legislative intent of the Clean Water Act. The new rule will be subject to a public comment period.

If the agencies’ new rule is indeed based on Justice Scalia’s “continuous surface connection” test from Rapanos, it likely would entail a significant contraction in the scope of the Clean Water Act from existing practices and the Obama EPA’s 2015 rule. For example, a wetland next to a navigable river presumably would be covered by the act only if surface water from the wetland flowed into that river on a year-round basis, regardless of any subsurface flows. Under the 2015 rule, the same wetland could be covered under the act as a water “adjacent” to another water of the United States in the absence of a continuous surface connection. Many tributaries and ephemeral waters also likely no longer would be subject to regulation under the Clean Water Act if the “continuous surface connection” test is adopted. Such changes likely would be hailed by stakeholders that would have been prohibited from engaging in certain activities or obtaining permits under the 2015 rule, but criticized by environmental groups seeking to broadly protect aquatic resources.

Given the stakes and the contentious atmosphere regarding the scope of the Clean Water Act, any new rule is likely to be challenged in court. One issue that may be raised by challengers is whether a rule based on Justice Scalia’s “continuous surface connection” test is consistent with the requirements of the Clean Water Act as interpreted by Supreme Court decisions, including Rapanos. Opponents of the rule could contend that a “continuous surface connection” standard is inconsistent with the Rapanos court’s view of the limits of the Clean Water Act because five justices rejected Scalia’s test as too restrictive, and most lower courts have treated Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test as the operative standard. Proponents of a new rule could counter that such a construction is nonetheless a permissible interpretation of the Clean Water Act (as evidenced by the plurality’s opinion in Rapanos) that is entitled to judicial deference.[5]  

Environmental groups or others opposed to a new rule could also challenge the merits of the rule under the Administrative Procedure Act. Such a challenge could rely in part on the new rule’s departure from the 2015 rule, in which the Obama administration cited extensive scientific findings in support of its interpretation. While agencies can change their position, they must provide a “more detailed justification” if they rely on factual findings contradicting previous ones,[6] potentially heightening the agencies’ burden to provide support for a new rule.

In the interim, jurisdictional determinations under the Clean Water Act are likely to remain in a state of limbo. The 2015 rule has been stayed by the Sixth Circuit, technically leaving the rules and guidance pre-dating 2015 as the operative regulatory regime until the time that the stay is lifted or a new rule is promulgated. In light of the new administration’s expressed intent to limit the scope of the Clean Water Act, EPA and the Army Corps will be unlikely to assert jurisdiction over waters on the borderline of Clean Water Act jurisdiction until this legal limbo is resolved. The currently pending legal challenges also may be held in abeyance or remanded until the promulgation of a new rule, particularly given the executive order’s instruction to the US attorney general to take appropriate actions in pending litigation.

Ultimately, it likely will be years before the scope of the Clean Water Act is sorted out. And it may require a fourth trip to the Supreme Court for the justices to yet again wrestle with what are “waters of the United States.”

Additional Information

Additional information on the controversy that has surrounded efforts to define “waters of the United States” and the regulatory programs affected by the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act can be found in the Clean Water Handbook, Fourth Edition, authored by Duke McCall and available from Bernan Press.

ARTICLE BY Duke K. McCall III, Ella Foley Gannon & Douglas A. Hastings of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
Copyright © 2017 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

[1] 547 U.S. 715 (2006).

[2] Id.

[3] See id. at 717-18.  

[4] 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054. 

[5] See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

[6] See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).  

U.S. Supreme Court Allows Pre-Permit Challenges to Approved Jurisdictional Determinations

waters of the united statesIn a major new legal development for the Clean Water Act’s Section 404 wetlands permitting program, landowners can now challenge the federal government’s claim that areas targeted for fill are “waters of the United States” without first having to seek a permit to fill those waters, according to the Supreme Court’s decision issued on May 31st in United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc., No. 15-290 (U.S. May 31, 2016) (Hawkes). Until now, landowners could not immediately contest in court a determination by the Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) or the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency that jurisdictional wetlands, ephemeral drainages, vernal pools or any other types of “waters” existed on property targeted for fill. Instead, landowners had to first complete the Section 404 permitting process – a process that can take months or even years – before challenging the underlying jurisdictional determination, or proceed to fill the site without a permit and risk possible civil penalties of up to $37,500 per day, or even criminal prosecution. Under Hawkes, a landowner can now seek judicial review of the Corps’ formal assertion of jurisdiction without waiting for the conclusion of the Section 404 permitting process.

Unanimous Decision a Sharp Rebuke to the Corps and EPA

The Court’s opinion in Hawkes was unanimous (8-0), although some of the justices differed in their reasoning in support of the outcome. Nonetheless, at a time when the Court has been sharply divided on other issues, the unanimity of result in this case is a sharp rebuke to both the Corps and EPA.

At issue were plans by three mining companies to engage in the mining of peat, which is an organic material that forms in waterlogged ground. The companies applied for a Section 404 permit, and were told by the Corps that it would be very expensive and take years to complete the permitting process. The Corps issued an approved jurisdiction determination (“JD”) stating that the property contained jurisdictional “waters” by virtue of a “significant nexus” to a river, located some 120 miles away. The companies administratively appealed the JD within the Corps to no avail, and then sought judicial review in the federal district court. Following established legal precedent, the district court dismissed the case on the grounds that a JD does not constitute a “final agency action,” which is a prerequisite for judicial review under the federal Administrative Procedures Act. The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a JD was “final agency action,” and today the Supreme Court affirmed the 8th Circuit’s ruling.

Important Takeaways and Observations from Hawkes

  • The underlying merits of the challenge in Hawkes – whether the peat bog was jurisdictional under the Clean Water Act by virtue of its alleged “significant nexus” to a river 120 miles away – was not reached by the Supreme Court. Instead, under the posture of the case, the “waters” of the U.S.” determination will be returned to the District Court with instructions to hear the challenge to the JD, assuming the companies still wish to pursue their case.

  • The right to pre-permit judicial review of a JD applies only to “approved” jurisdictional determinations. These are the formal JD’s verified by the Corps (or the EPA in certain circumstances), which typically are based on extensive fact-finding by qualified experts following written guidance established by the Corps and EPA. These are distinguished from “Preliminary Jurisdictional Determinations” (“PJD’s”), which are also officially recognized as a basis for the issuance of a Section 404 permit, but which are not definitive declarations of jurisdiction by the Corps. Instead, PJD’s essentially operate as determinations by the Corps on the scope of jurisdictional waters that the landowner has agreed not to contest. The intent is to avoid a time-consuming, expensive and exacting jurisdictional determination and to instead move more quickly into the permitting process. It was the approved JD – not the PJD – that was the subject of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Hawkes case.

  • In order to challenge an approved JD, it still will be necessary for permit applicants to exhaust their administrative appeals within the Corps pursuant to the applicable Corps’ regulations (33 CFR Part 331) before they can file suit in federal court.

Implications of Hawkes

The Court’s decision in Hawkes is significant. Until now, the Corps and EPA held many of the cards in any proposed project that threatened to disturb or fill alleged “waters of the United States.” The landowner faced a Hobson’s choice of filling the potential “waters” and risking a civil or criminal enforcement action, or delaying project plans for months or even years while navigating the Section 404 permitting process. Now, in situations involving marginal claims of jurisdiction, the landowner has one more card to play – the opportunity to seek court review of an approved JD without waiting for the Section 404 permitting process to be completed.

Article By James T. Burroughs of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

© 2010-2016 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

EPA and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Approve New Definition of "Waters of the United States"

The U.S. EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers announced today that they have jointly approved a new definition of the key term “waters of the United States,” a term that defines the limits of federal jurisdiction over surface waters under the Clean Water Act and several other federal laws. The rule containing the new definition will become effective 60 days after its publication in the Federal Register, which typically occurs within a week or so of the agencies’ public announcement of a new rule.

The agencies announced the new rule after several years of wrestling with this regulatory definition, which establishes the scope of federal wetlands permitting authority, federal discharge limitations, and other important programs. EPA and the Corps assert in the preamble to the rule that this new definition is “narrower” than the existing regulatory definition, and that “fewer waters will be defined as ‘waters of the United States'” than under existing regulations. In the debate leading up to today’s announcement, however, a variety of affected parties – landowners, developers, farmers, manufacturers and others – have argued that the agencies’ effort to redefine “waters of the United States” will lead to a broadening of federal jurisdiction.

Several features of the new rule are of particular importance to interested parties in California and other western arid states:

  • All “tributaries” are jurisdictional (i.e., subject to federal regulation) “by rule” if they have an ordinary high water mark and a “bed and bank” and if those features can be shown to be hydrologically linked to navigable waters or interstate waters. The “by rule” designation means that it will no longer be necessary for the agencies to establish that a tributary has a significant link to a navigable water, regardless of how attenuated that connection might be. There are no threshold requirements for volume of water nor for frequency of flow. By way of example, it appears that a “tributary” that is miles removed from the closest river, lake or ocean, with only a trickle of flow that occurs once every 10 years or more, will nevertheless be deemed jurisdictional as long as there is physical evidence of a “bed and bank” and an ordinary high water mark.

  • Certain “adjacent wetlands” are now also jurisdictional “by rule” if, for example, they are located in a 100-year floodplain and are within 1,500 feet of a “traditional navigable water” (e.g., a river, lake, or ocean) or of a tributary.

  • Case-by-case determinations of whether an aquatic feature has a “significant nexus” to a navigable water – thereby rendering it jurisdictional – will continue to be made for a variety of different waterbody types, including “western vernal pools in California” and any surface water feature within the 100-year floodplain or within 4,000 feet of a navigable water or covered tributary that is not already defined as jurisdictional by the “by rule” standard. The term “significant nexus” is given some definition in the final rule by reference to a familiar list of functional ecosystem values served by wetlands and other water bodies.

The final rule does call out a narrow class of “waters” that are determined not to be jurisdictional as “waters of the United States,” including, but not limited to,

  • certain types of ditches;

  • artificially irrigated areas that would revert to dry land should the irrigation cease;

  • erosional features, including gullies, rills, non-wetland swales;

  • groundwater, including groundwater drained through subsurface drainage systems;

  • stormwater control features

  • swimming pools, ornamental waters created in dry land, “puddles.”

Added to this list is a statement in the preamble to the final rule that it does not “regulate shallow subsurface connections nor any type of groundwater.”

Importantly, this rule applies only to new jurisdictional determinations that are required after the rule’s “effective date.” The agencies will not reopen existing approved jurisdictional determinations unless the usual conditions apply for a revision of the determination.

Implementation of this rule will be far more complicated and detail-driven than what can possibly be captured here in this very brief synopsis. It is hard to calculate its impact on the regulated community, especially in places like California where the Corps and EPA have traditionally taken a very aggressive approach to their claims of jurisdiction. At the very least, this rule will bolster those claims by giving the agencies a formal regulation to rely upon. Litigation challenging this rule has been threatened for months, and certain Members of Congress have vowed to do what they can to take legislative action.

ARTICLE BY James T. Burroughs & David D. Cooke of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

© 2010-2015 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

EPA and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Approve New Definition of “Waters of the United States”

The U.S. EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers announced today that they have jointly approved a new definition of the key term “waters of the United States,” a term that defines the limits of federal jurisdiction over surface waters under the Clean Water Act and several other federal laws. The rule containing the new definition will become effective 60 days after its publication in the Federal Register, which typically occurs within a week or so of the agencies’ public announcement of a new rule.

The agencies announced the new rule after several years of wrestling with this regulatory definition, which establishes the scope of federal wetlands permitting authority, federal discharge limitations, and other important programs. EPA and the Corps assert in the preamble to the rule that this new definition is “narrower” than the existing regulatory definition, and that “fewer waters will be defined as ‘waters of the United States'” than under existing regulations. In the debate leading up to today’s announcement, however, a variety of affected parties – landowners, developers, farmers, manufacturers and others – have argued that the agencies’ effort to redefine “waters of the United States” will lead to a broadening of federal jurisdiction.

Several features of the new rule are of particular importance to interested parties in California and other western arid states:

  • All “tributaries” are jurisdictional (i.e., subject to federal regulation) “by rule” if they have an ordinary high water mark and a “bed and bank” and if those features can be shown to be hydrologically linked to navigable waters or interstate waters. The “by rule” designation means that it will no longer be necessary for the agencies to establish that a tributary has a significant link to a navigable water, regardless of how attenuated that connection might be. There are no threshold requirements for volume of water nor for frequency of flow. By way of example, it appears that a “tributary” that is miles removed from the closest river, lake or ocean, with only a trickle of flow that occurs once every 10 years or more, will nevertheless be deemed jurisdictional as long as there is physical evidence of a “bed and bank” and an ordinary high water mark.

  • Certain “adjacent wetlands” are now also jurisdictional “by rule” if, for example, they are located in a 100-year floodplain and are within 1,500 feet of a “traditional navigable water” (e.g., a river, lake, or ocean) or of a tributary.

  • Case-by-case determinations of whether an aquatic feature has a “significant nexus” to a navigable water – thereby rendering it jurisdictional – will continue to be made for a variety of different waterbody types, including “western vernal pools in California” and any surface water feature within the 100-year floodplain or within 4,000 feet of a navigable water or covered tributary that is not already defined as jurisdictional by the “by rule” standard. The term “significant nexus” is given some definition in the final rule by reference to a familiar list of functional ecosystem values served by wetlands and other water bodies.

The final rule does call out a narrow class of “waters” that are determined not to be jurisdictional as “waters of the United States,” including, but not limited to,

  • certain types of ditches;

  • artificially irrigated areas that would revert to dry land should the irrigation cease;

  • erosional features, including gullies, rills, non-wetland swales;

  • groundwater, including groundwater drained through subsurface drainage systems;

  • stormwater control features

  • swimming pools, ornamental waters created in dry land, “puddles.”

Added to this list is a statement in the preamble to the final rule that it does not “regulate shallow subsurface connections nor any type of groundwater.”

Importantly, this rule applies only to new jurisdictional determinations that are required after the rule’s “effective date.” The agencies will not reopen existing approved jurisdictional determinations unless the usual conditions apply for a revision of the determination.

Implementation of this rule will be far more complicated and detail-driven than what can possibly be captured here in this very brief synopsis. It is hard to calculate its impact on the regulated community, especially in places like California where the Corps and EPA have traditionally taken a very aggressive approach to their claims of jurisdiction. At the very least, this rule will bolster those claims by giving the agencies a formal regulation to rely upon. Litigation challenging this rule has been threatened for months, and certain Members of Congress have vowed to do what they can to take legislative action.

ARTICLE BY James T. Burroughs & David D. Cooke of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

© 2010-2015 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP