China Archives - The National Law Forum

China’s Supreme People’s Court Issues First Anti-Anti-Suit Injunction in Huawei v. Netgear

Following Huawei obtaining two anti-anti-suit injunctions (AASI) against Netgear on December 11, 2024 at the Unified Patent Court’s Munich Local Division and the Munich I Regional Court, China’s Supreme People’s Court also awarded an AASI in favor of Huawei against Netgear in a decision dated December 22, 2024. This is believed to be the first AASI issued by a Chinese court.

China’s Supreme People’s Court granted Huawei’s request for an AASI against Netgear’s pursuit of an Anti-Suit/Enforcement Injunction in the U.S. reasoning:

First, Huawei’s application for injunction has factual and legal basis. Huawei Huawei is the patent owner of the two patents involved in the case. The two patents are Chinese invention patents granted by the China National Intellectual Property Administration in accordance with the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China. They are currently in a valid state and their intellectual property rights are relatively stable. Huawei filed patent infringement lawsuits in the Chinese courts against Netgear for alleged infringement of the two Chinese patents involved in the case. The Chinese court, namely the Jinan Intermediate People’s Court, accepted the lawsuits in the two cases, which complies with Article 29 of the Civil Procedure Law on the jurisdiction of infringement cases and is also in line with the internationally recognized territorial principle of intellectual property protection.

In the first instance judgment of the two cases, the Jinan Intermediate People’s Court has determined that the alleged infringing products offered for sale, sold, and imported by Netgear fall within the scope of protection of the two patents involved in the case, and that Huawei fulfilled its fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing obligations in the licensing negotiations with Netgear, while Netgear had obvious faults such as delaying negotiations, making unreasonable counter-offers, and not actively responding to Huawei’s negotiation offers during the licensing negotiations, and ordered Netgear to stop its infringement. Netgear, based on its interest relationship with Netgear Beijing, applied to the U.S. court for a so-called anti-suit injunction order against the judicial relief procedures, including the patent infringement lawsuits filed by Huawei in the Jinan Intermediate People’s Court, in an attempt to prevent Huawei from filing normal lawsuits in Chinese courts, which obviously lacks legitimate reasons.

Second, if behavioral preservation measures are not taken, the legitimate rights and interests of Huawei will suffer irreparable damage or the two cases will be difficult to proceed or the judgments will be difficult to enforce. For standard essential patents, based on the principle of good faith and the fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing obligations it promised in the standard setting process, the patent owner generally cannot request the alleged infringer to stop implementing its standard essential patents when the alleged infringer has no obvious fault as stipulated in Article 24, paragraph 2 of the “Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Laws in the Trial of Patent Infringement Disputes (II)” revised in 2020.. However, if the alleged infringer has obvious faults such as delaying negotiations and not actively responding to the patent owner’s negotiation offer in the negotiation of standard essential patents, the patent owner still has the right to request the alleged infringer to stop implementing its standard essential patents.

As mentioned above, based on the facts ascertained in the first-instance judgments of these two cases, it can be preliminarily determined that Netgear had obvious faults in the negotiation of the SEP license involved and was not a good-faith, honest patent implementer, while Huawei did not intentionally violate the fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing obligations. In this case, the legitimate rights and interests of Huawei as a good-faith licensor should be fully protected by law. If Netgear applies to the U.S. court for the so-called injunction (enforcement) order for the two cases, Huawei will at least face the pressure of considering terminating the litigation in the Chinese court, including giving up the future application for the enforcement of the Chinese court’s judgment, and its legitimate rights and interests will obviously suffer irreparable damage.

Third, if the behavior preservation measures are not taken, the damage caused to the Chinese company will obviously exceed the damage caused to Netgear by taking the behavior preservation measures. As mentioned above, if the behavior preservation measures are not taken, the Chinese company will suffer obvious damages, which include not only the damages to its substantive rights such as the long-term infringement of its patent by Netgear and the inability to obtain normal income in a timely manner, but also the improper obstruction of the Chinese company’s due process rights to promote the trial of these two cases and apply for judgment and enforcement in Chinese courts in accordance with Chinese law. Allowing the Chinese company to apply for and take behavior preservation measures is only to impose a procedural non-action obligation on the respondent and its affiliated companies within a certain period of time, and will not cause any additional losses to Netgear.

Fourth, the adoption of behavioral preservation measures in these two cases will not harm the public interest, and this court has not found any other factors that require special consideration.

The full text of the decision (with redacted party names) is available here (Chinese only) courtesy of Michael Ma at PRIP.

NSA Wants Industry to Disclose Details of Telecom Hacks in Light of Chinese Involvement

On November 20, 2024, the director of the National Security Agency, General Timothy Haugh, urged the private sector to take swift, collective action to share key details about breaches they have suffered at the hands of Chinese hackers who have infiltrated US telecommunications.

Gen. Haugh said he wants to provide a public “hunt guide” so cybersecurity professionals and companies can search out the hackers and eradicate them from telecommunications networks.

US authorities have confirmed Chinese hackers have infiltrated US telecommunications in what Senator Richard Blumenthal, a Connecticut Democrat, this week described as a “sprawling and catastrophic” infiltration. AT&T Inc., Verizon Communications Inc. and T-Mobile are among those targeted.

Through those intrusions, the hackers targeted communications of a “limited number” of people in politics and government, US officials have said. They include Vice President Kamala Harris’ staff, President-elect Donald Trump and Vice President-elect JD Vance, as well as staffers for Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, according to Missouri Republican Senator Josh Hawley.

Representatives of the Chinese government have denied the allegations.

“The ultimate goal would be to be able to lay bare exactly what happened in ways that allow us to better posture as a nation and for our allies to be better postured,” – Gen. Tim Haugh.

Administration Action Could Unravel the De Minimis Exception for Goods From China

Many e-commerce retailers are closely monitoring increasing bipartisan criticism of the Section 321 de minimis program. This program, which provides an exemption for goods valued at $800 or less destined to a single person on a given day, allows these goods to enter the US duty and tax-free without formal entry.

While this expedited clearance process has been beneficial for many retailers, critics argue that it creates loopholes that can be exploited, particularly by foreign sellers, to bypass tariffs and import restrictions. Addressing US Congress’ inability to pass de minimis reform legislation, on September 13, the Biden-Harris Administration took decisive action to address these concerns. They announced a notice of proposed rulemaking aimed at reducing de minimis import volumes and strengthening trade enforcement through the following measures:

Limiting De Minimis Exemptions for Products Subject to Other Trade Remedies: Removal of the de minimis exemption for shipments that contain products subject to additional tariffs under Sections 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (e.g., from China).
Increased Disclosure Requirements for De Minimis Shipments: Additional information would be required for de minimis shipments, including the 10-digit tariff classification and identification of the person claiming the exemption.
Compliance Requirements for the CPSC: All importers of consumer products must file Certificates of Compliance (CoC) with the US Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC).

It is unclear when the proposed rule will be published.

The Administration also calls on Congress to implement legislation to further reform the de minimis program. Earlier this year, the House Ways and Means Committee introduced H.R. 7979 – End China’s De Minimis Abuse Act, which would similarly limit the use of this program for products subject to Sections 201, 301, and 232 and require a 10-digit Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States declaration. There have been several other de minimis reform bills proposed however, Congress has struggled to pass comprehensive legislation to reform the program. This announcement may be the push Congress needs to pass legislation during the lame duck session, but we will see…

Although these measures are primarily aimed at restricting Chinese e-commerce giants like Shein and Temu, these government actions could have long-term implications for direct-to-consumer sales. Any changes to the program will impact other US retailers that benefit from Section 321, small start-up companies, as well as consumers who might experience longer wait times and higher costs for their online orders due to these changes.

What’s the Problem?

Over the past decade, the rise of online shopping has led to a sevenfold increase in the number of shipments that enter the United States through the de minimis exemption. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has reported that nearly 4 million de minimis shipments enter the United States per day. This volume makes it impossible for the government to properly screen the shipments for import violations. The government is concerned because contraband, including drugs, counterfeit goods, goods violating the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), and undervalued shipments are allegedly entering the United States through this program. DHS reported that as of July 30, 89% of cargo seizures in fiscal year 2024 originated as de minimis shipments. We have previously reported on proposed legislation and government actions aimed at addressing the alleged misuse of this program to import contraband or improperly declare shipments, particularly those originating from China.

A Focus on China

Most of these shipments are sold on e-commerce platforms and originate in China. As a result, many of these shipments would normally be subject to additional duties under the Section 232, 301, or 201 programs. According to the Administration’s announcement, Section 301 tariffs apply to 40% of US imports, including 70% of textile and apparel goods from China. The Administration’s proposed rule would significantly limit the scope of goods eligible for the Section 321 de minimis program.

Enhancing Transparency in De Minimis Shipments

To assist in targeting problematic shipments and expediting the clearance of lawful shipments, the Administration will also solicit comments on a proposed rule that would require submission of more detailed information in order to use the de minimis exemption. Currently, these shipments can be entered through informal entries by providing the bill of lading or a manifest that outlines the shipment’s origin, the consignee, and details about the merchandise’s quantity, weight, and value. The additional data points required would include the tariff classification number and the identity of the individual claiming the exemption. The Administration asserts that these requirements will protect US business from unfair competition against imported goods that would otherwise be subject to duties and will facilitate US Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) ability to detect the illicit goods at the border.

Protecting Consumers From De Minimis Shipments

The Administration also announced that the CPSC plans to propose a final rule that would require importers of consumer products to electronically file CoC with CBP and CPSC upon entry, including de minimis shipments. This action is intended to prevent foreign companies from exploiting the de minimis exemption to circumvent consumer protection testing and certification requirements.

Focus on Textiles

The Administration has committed to prioritizing enforcement efforts to prevent importation of illicit shipments of textile and apparel imports through increased targeting of de minimis shipment, more customs audits and verification, as well as the expansion of the UFLPA Entity List.

The Administration’s focus on the textile and apparel industry follows DHS’s enforcement initiative to curb illicit trade to support American textile jobs. Since the DHS announcement in April, we have seen a notable increase in enforcement actions such as CBP requests for information, risk assessment questionnaires, and detentions under the UFLPA.

Potential Legislative Implications

The Administration has also advocated for further legislative action by Congress including:

Exclusion of import-sensitive products such as textiles from the de minimis exemption, the exclusion of shipments containing products covered by certain trade enforcement actions, and the passage of previously proposed de minimis reforms.
Legislation that would expedite the process of excluding products covered by Sections 301, 201, and 232 from the de minimis exemption.
Reforms in the previously introduced Detect and Defeat Counter-Fentanyl Proposal, which would require more data from shippers under the de minimis program and strengthen the CBP’s ability to detect and seize illicit drugs and raw materials.

What This Means for Retailers and How We Can Help

The Administration’s notice of proposed rulemaking suggests that changes to the de minimis program are on the horizon. For e-commerce retailers, these changes could mean a shift in how they manage their imports. Stricter eligibility criteria and enhanced enforcement may require more diligent documentation and compliance efforts. Retailers should stay informed about these proposed changes and prepare to adapt their operations accordingly.

USTR Finalizes New Section 301 Tariffs

The United States Trade Representative (USTR) published a Federal Register notice detailing its final modifications to the Section 301 tariffs on China-origin products. USTR has largely retained the proposed list of products subject to Section 301 tariffs announced in the May 2024 Federal Register notice (see our previous alert here) with a few modifications, including adjusting the rates and implementation dates for a number of tariff categories and expanding or limiting certain machinery and solar manufacturing equipment exclusions. USTR also proposes to impose new Section 301 tariff increases on certain tungsten products, polysilicon, and doped wafers.

The notice, published on September 18, 2024, clarifies that tariff increases will take effect on September 27, 2024, and subsequently on January 1, 2025 and January 1, 2026 (Annex A). The final modifications to Section 301 tariffs will apply across the following strategic sectors:

Steel and aluminum products – increase from 0-7.5% to 25%
Electric vehicles (EVs) – increase from 25% to 100%
Batteries
- Lithium-ion EV batteries – increase from 7.5% to 25%
- Battery parts (non-lithium-ion batteries) – increase from 7.5% to 25%
- Certain critical minerals – increase from 0% to 25%
- Lithium-ion non-EV batteries – increase from 7.5% to 25% on January 1, 2026
- Natural graphite – increase from 0% to 25% on January 1, 2026
Permanent magnets – increase from 0% to 25% on January 1, 2026,
Solar cells (whether or not assembled into modules) – increase from 25% to 50%
Ship-to-shore cranes – increase from 0% to 25% (with certain exclusions)
Medical products
- Syringes and needles (excluding enteral syringes) – increase from 0% to 100%
- Enteral syringes – increase from 0% to 100% on January 1, 2026
- Surgical and non-surgical respirators and facemasks (other than disposable):
  - increase from 0-7.5% to 25%; increase from 25% to 50% on January 1, 2026
- Disposable textile facemasks
  - January 1, 2025, increase from 5% to 25%; increase from 25% to 50% on January 1, 2026
- Rubber medical or surgical gloves:
  - increase from 7.5% to 50% on January 1, 2025; increase from 50% to 100% on January 1, 2026
- Semiconductors – increase from 25% to 50% on January 1, 2025

USTR adopted 14 exclusions to temporarily exclude solar wafer and cell manufacturing equipment from Section 301 tariffs (Annex B), while rejecting five exclusions for solar module manufacturing equipment proposed in the May 2024 notice. The exclusions are retroactive and applicable to products entered for consumption or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption on or after January 1, 2024, and through May 31, 2025. USTR also granted a temporary exclusion for ship-to-shore gantry cranes imported under contracts executed before May 14, 2024, and delivered prior to May 14, 2026. To use this exclusion, the applicable importers must complete and file the certification (Annex D).

With respect to machinery exclusion, USTR added five additional subheadings to the proposed 312 subheadings to be eligible for consideration of temporary exclusions. USTR did not add subheadings outside of Chapters 84 and 85 or subheadings that include only parts, accessories, consumables, or general equipment that cannot physically change a good. USTR will likely issue additional guidance to seek exclusions of products under these eligible subheadings.

Importers should assess the (i) table of the tariff increases for the specified product groups (Annex A), (ii) temporary exclusions for solar manufacturing equipment (Annex B), (iii) the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) modifications to impose additional duties, to increase rates of additional duties, and to exclude certain solar manufacturing equipment from additional duties (Annex C), (iv) Importer Certification for ship-to-shore cranes entering under the exclusion (Annex D), and (v) HTSUS subheadings eligible for consideration of temporary exclusion under the machinery exclusion process (Annex E). The descriptions set forth in Annex A are informal summary descriptions, and importers should refer to the HTSUS modifications contained in Annex C for the purposes of assessing Section 301 duties and exclusions.

Importers should also carefully review the final list of products subject to the increased Section 301 tariff, with their supply chains, to identify products subject to increases in tariff rates as a result of the recent of USTR and consider appropriate mitigation strategies.

BIOSECURE Act: Anticipated Movement, Key Provisions, and Likely Impact

Last night, the House of Representatives passed the BIOSECURE Act (BIOSECURE or the Act) by a bipartisan vote of 306 to 81.

The BIOSECURE Act prohibits federal agencies from procuring or obtaining any biotechnology equipment or service produced or provided by a biotechnology company of concern. Subject to some exceptions, it also prohibits federal agencies from contracting with a company that uses equipment or services produced or provided by a biotechnology company of concern. Further, the Act prohibits recipients of a loan or grant from a federal agency from using federal funds to purchase equipment or services from a biotechnology company of concern.

The Senate version of BIOSECURE, sponsored by Sens. Gary Peters (D-MI) and Bill Hagerty (R-TN), was voted out of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental affairs with bipartisan support in March 2024. Given its passage in the House last night, the BIOSECURE Act is likely to be signed into law by the end of the year. The House version of BIOSECURE is likely to be the version that becomes law. President Biden is unlikely to veto the Act given its bipartisan support, his previous executive actions to support domestic biotechnology development, and his Administration’s approach towards competition with China.

The Act defines “biotechnology company of concern” as any entity that:

is subject to the jurisdiction, direction, control, or operates on behalf of the government of a foreign adversary (defined as China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia);
is involved in the manufacturing, distribution, provision, or procurement of a biotechnology equipment or service; and
poses a risk to U.S. national security based on:
- engaging in joint research with, being supported by, or being affiliated with a foreign adversary’s military, internal security forces, or intelligence agencies;
- providing multiomic data obtained via biotechnology equipment or services to the government of a foreign adversary; or
- obtaining human multiomic data via the biotechnology equipment or services without express and informed consent.

Somewhat unusually, the Act names specific Chinese companies as automatically qualifying as “biotechnology companies of concern”:

BGI (formerly known as the Beijing Genomics Institute);
MGI;
Complete Genomics;
WuXi AppTec; and
WuXi Biologics.

Both categories include any subsidiary, parent, affiliate, or successor entities of biotechnology companies of concern.

The Act also has very broad definitions of “biotechnology equipment or service.” The definition of equipment encompasses any machine, device, or subcomponent, including software that is “designed for use in the research, development, production, or analysis of biological materials.” The definition of services is similarly broad.

The BIOSECURE Act also requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to publish a list of additional biotechnology companies of concern. The list is prepared by the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Secretaries of the Departments of Health and Human Services, Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security, and State, as well as the Director of National Intelligence and National Cyber Director. This list of companies must be published by OMB within one year of BIOSECURE’s enactment and reviewed annually by OMB in consultation with the other Departments.

Guidance and Regulatory Authorities

OMB is also tasked with developing guidance and has 120 days from enactment of the statute to do so for the named companies. For the list of biotechnology companies of concern, OMB’s guidance must be established within 180 days after the development of the list.

Beyond OMB, the Act requires the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council to revise the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to incorporate its prohibitions. The FAR regulations must be issued within one year of when OMB establishes its guidance.

For named companies the Act’s prohibitions are effective 60 days after the issuance of the FAR regulations. For companies placed on the biotechnology company of concern list, the effective date for the Act’s prohibitions is 80 days after the issuance of FAR regulations.

Impact on Existing Business Relationships

In response to stakeholder concerns about disrupting existing commercial relationships and triggering delays in drug development, the House version of the BIOSECURE Act provides a five-year unwinding period for contracts and agreements entered into before the Act’s effective dates. Contracts entered into after the Act’s effective dates do not qualify for the five year unwinding period.

Process for Designating Companies

BIOSECURE specifies the process for designating a biotechnology company of concern. Critically, the Act does not require OMB to notify a company prior to the Department of Defense making the designation. Rather, a company will receive notice that it is being designated and placed on the biotechnology company of concern list. Moreover, the criteria for listing will only be provided “to the extent consistent with national security and law enforcement interests.” Thus, companies may face a circumstance where they are not provided the evidence supporting their designation.

Once a company receives the notice, it will have 90 days to submit information and arguments opposing the listing. The Act does not require a hearing or any formal administrative process. If practicable, the notice may also include steps the company could take to avoid being listed, but it is not required.

Safe Harbor, Waivers and Exceptions

The Act only has one safe harbor for biotechnology equipment or services that were formerly but no longer provided or produced by a biotechnology company of concern. This safe harbor seems intended to allow a biotechnology company of concern to sell their ownership of a product or service to another company without prohibitions applying to the new owner.

Agency heads may waive the Act’s prohibitions on a case-by-case basis, but only with the approval of OMB acting “in coordination with the Secretary of Defense.” Waivers must be reported to Congress within 30 days of being granted. The waiver may last for up to a year with an additional “one time” extension of 180 days allowed if an agency head determines it is “in the national security interests of the United States.” The 180-day extension must be approved by OMB and the agency head must notify and submit a justification to Congress within 10 days of the waiver being granted.

The Act has only two exceptions. First, its prohibitions do not apply to intelligence activities. Second, the prohibitions do not apply to health care services provided to federal employees, members of the armed services, and government contractors who are stationed in a foreign country or on official foreign travel.

Impact and Considerations for Clients

1. Increased Risk of Partnerships with Chinese Companies and Researchers:

Pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies that receive federal funding or contract with federal agencies should be prepared to wind down business ties to biotechnology companies in China. Impacted companies need to begin evaluating the risk to their supply chains, manufacturing capacity, and R&D pipelines in the event a business partner is listed.

Universities in the United States and other research institutes that receive federal funding will also need to undertake a similar assessment of their research partners and collaborators based in China.

2. Loss of CDMO capacity:

Wuxi App Tec is a large, global provider of contract development and manufacturing (CDMO) services to the life sciences industry. According to the New York Times “[b]y one estimate Wuxi has been involved in developing one-fourth of the drugs used in the United States.” BIOSECURE would effectively ban Wuxi from conducting business in the United States, and if passed, risks causing delays, shortages, and cost increases as companies seek to transition to other CDMOs. It will likely take years for competitors to replace the lost CDMO capacity.

3. Fate of Wuxi U.S. Facilities:

Wuxi has a large presence in the United States. It operates 12 facilities and employs almost 2,000 people. Normally, Wuxi would be expected to sell its U.S.-based facilities. However, based on Tiktok’s experience, it is unclear if the Government of China will permit Wuxi to sell its facilities as opposed to dismantling and/or relocating facilities outside of the United States.

4. OMB’s Management of Biotechnology Companies of Concern List

OMB does not typically manage processes like the one envisioned by BIOSECURE. How OMB interprets the broad criteria for listing companies will be critical. Which Departments, beyond the Department of Defense, will have the greatest influence on OMB’s decision making and how open OMB is to evidence from companies seeking to avoid listing will also need to be watched closely. Until OMB starts preparing its guidance and the FAR regulations are proposed, it is hard to anticipate the rate at which new companies will be added to the list. How the process established by BIOSECURE will interact with or leverage existing entity lists will be another development to closely monitor.

5. Retaliation by China

BIOSECURE’s passage is likely to trigger a response from the Government of China. Responses could range from imposing its own export controls to using the country’s sweeping national security laws to harass United States businesses and their employees. Companies doing business in China, particularly those in the pharmaceutical or biotech industries need to be prepared.

15% Discount on Chinese Patent Annuities for Open Licensing

Per a slightly ambiguous notice from the Ministry of Finance and the National Development and Reform Commission released July 24, 2024 (财政部国家发展改革委关于调整优化专利收费政策的通知), annuity fees will be reduced by 15% for Chinese patents for participating in China’s open licensing system. As of the time of writing, there were over 2,000 open licenses published on China’s Intellectual Property Administration’s (CNIPA) online publication system.

15% Discount on Chinese Patent

Specifically, section 2 reads:

A 15% reduction in annual patent fees during the implementation period of patent open licensing. If other patent fee reduction policies are also applicable, the most favorable policy can be selected, but it cannot be enjoyed repeatedly.

However, it is unclear if this requires an actual license or simply having an offer to license published on CNIPA’s open license system.

In addition, there appears to be an additional annuity fee due for patents that receive patent term compensation (presumably for both patent term extensions for pharmaceutical patents and patent term adjustment for CNIPA delay in patent examination). It is unclear if this additional annuity is due for the entire patent term or just for the added patent term.

Specifically, section 1 reads, in part:

A patent owner who files a request for patent term compensation shall pay a patent term compensation request fee.

If a request for patent term compensation is found to meet the conditions for term compensation upon review, an annual patent compensation fee shall be paid…

CNIPA earlier this month also released additional information about open licensing system including royalty rates.

The full text of the Notice if available here (Chinese only).

China’s Supreme People’s Court Releases Two Recent Patent-Related Typical Anti-Monopoly Cases

On June 24, 2024, China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) released five recent typical anti-monopoly cases, two of which relate to patents. The SPC stated that the cases were released so that Courts can “correctly apply the revised Anti-Monopoly Law and accurately understand the new judicial interpretation of anti-monopoly civil litigation issued today, fairly and efficiently hear monopoly cases, ensure the correct implementation of the Anti-Monopoly Law, and maintain fair competition in the market.”

Explanations from the SPC regarding the two cases follows:

Case No.:【案号】（2020）最高法知民终1140号

[Basic facts of the case] Yang XX Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd. and its subsidiaries (collectively referred to as Yang) are the manufacturers of the anti-allergic drug desloratadine citrate tablets with the trade name “Beixue.” Hefei Yi XX Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. owns the relevant patents for desloratadine citrate. The company and its subsidiaries and affiliated companies (collectively referred to as Yi) are the only suppliers of the desloratadine citrate API required for the production of “Beixue”. In addition to producing desloratadine citrate API, Yi also produces desloratadine citrate hard capsules. Yi and Yang are both the supply and demand parties of the desloratadine citrate API involved in the case, and are also competitors in desloratadine citrate preparations. Yang believed that Yi used its dominant position in the market of desloratadine citrate API to restrict Yang to only purchase the API involved in the case from it, significantly raised the price of the API involved in the case, and threatened to stop supplying the API involved in the case to force Yang to accept other commercial arrangements unrelated to the API transaction involved, causing huge losses to Yang and therefore constituting an abuse of market dominance. Yang requested that Yi stop abusing its market dominance and compensate Yang for losses and reasonable expenses of 100 million RMB. The court of first instance found that Yi had abused its market dominance by restricting transactions, setting unfair high prices, and attaching unreasonable transaction conditions, and ordered it to immediately stop the above-mentioned behaviors and compensate Yang more than 68 million RMB. Both parties were dissatisfied and appealed to the Supreme People’s Court.

The Supreme People’s Court held in the second instance that Yi has a dominant market position in the desloratadine citrate API market in China, but its dominant market position has been weakened to a certain extent due to the strong indirect competition constraints from the downstream second-generation antihistamine preparation market. Based on the existing evidence, it is difficult to determine that it has abused its dominant market position. First, desloratadine citrate falls within the scope of protection of Yi’s patent rights. The time and scope of Yi’s restriction that Yang can only purchase the patented API involved in the case from it do not exceed the scope of the legitimate exercise of patent rights, and the resulting market blocking effect does not exceed the statutory exclusive scope of patent rights, so it does not constitute a restricted transaction behavior that abuses the dominant market position. Second, considering the internal rate of return after the price increase and the matching degree of price and economic value, it is more likely that the initial price of the patented API involved in the case is a promotional price, and the subsequent large price increase is likely to be a reasonable adjustment from the promotional price to the normal price. The fact that the price increase is significantly higher than the cost increase is not enough to determine that there is an unfair high-price behavior that abuses the dominant market position. Third, the existing evidence is insufficient to prove that Yi has explicitly or implicitly bundled the sales of the patented API involved in the case with unrelated products, so it is difficult to determine that there is an act of attaching unreasonable transaction conditions. Therefore, the judgment was revoked and the first-instance judgment was changed to dismiss Yang’s lawsuit request.

[Typical Significance] This case is the first monopoly civil lawsuit in China involving raw material pharmaceuticals. The judgment clarified the consideration of indirect competition constraints from the downstream market when judging the market dominance of intermediate input operators, the relationship between the market blocking effect of limited trading behavior and the statutory exclusive scope of patent rights, and the basic ideas and specific methods for judging unfair high prices. It has positive significance for promoting the accurate application of the Anti-Monopoly Law and effectively maintaining fair competition in the pharmaceutical market.

【案号】（2021）最高法知民终1482号

[Basic facts of the case] Ningbo XX Magnetics Co., Ltd. is an enterprise engaged in the production of sintered NdFeB materials in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province. A Japanese metal company has more than 600 sintered NdFeB patents in the field of rare earth materials worldwide. After licensing eight companies in China to implement its patented technology, it decided not to add new licensees. From March 2014 to March 2015, Ningbo XX Magnetics Co., Ltd. repeatedly requested a license from the Japanese metal company but was rejected. Therefore, it filed a lawsuit in December 2014, requesting that the Japanese metal company stop the abuse of market dominance such as refusal to trade and compensate Ningbo XX Magnetics Co., Ltd. for economic losses of 7 million RMB. The court of first instance determined that the Japanese metal company had a dominant position in the patent licensing market for essential patents for sintered NdFeB and that its refusal to trade had no legitimate reason. Therefore, it ordered the Japanese metal company to stop abusing its market dominance by refusing to trade and compensate Ningbo XX Magnetics Co., Ltd. for economic losses of 4.9 million RMB. The Japanese metal company was dissatisfied with the decision and filed an appeal.

The Supreme People’s Court held in the second instance that the evidence in this case was insufficient to prove that the sintered NdFeB patent of a Japanese metal company was irreplaceable, nor was it sufficient to prove that there was an independent licensing market for patents necessary for the production of sintered NdFeB. Therefore, it was difficult to determine that the relevant market in this case was the patent licensing market for patents necessary for the production of sintered NdFeB owned by the Japanese metal company. In this case, based on the demand substitution of sintered NdFeB material production technology, the relevant market in this case should be defined as the global sintered NdFeB material production technology market, including patented technologies and non-patented technologies with close substitution. Given that sintered NdFeB material production technology is used to produce sintered NdFeB materials, and the market share of sintered NdFeB materials (products) and other conditions can more accurately and conveniently reflect the market conditions of sintered NdFeB production technology, the market power of the technology owner in the relevant market involved in the case can be evaluated through the market share of the sintered NdFeB material market. Taking into account the evidence in the case, the Japanese metal company does not have a dominant position in the global sintered NdFeB material production technology market. Therefore, the court ruled to revoke the first-instance judgment and dismiss the lawsuit filed by the Ningbo magnetic company.

[Typical Significance] This case is a typical case in which intellectual property rights and antitrust are intertwined, and has received widespread attention. The second-instance judgment properly handled the relationship between the exercise of patent rights and antitrust, and through scientific and reasonable definition of the relevant market, revised the judgment in accordance with the law to determine that the foreign right holder’s refusal to license the patent involved did not constitute monopoly behavior. The judgment in this case demonstrates the judicial concept of Chinese courts to equally protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese and foreign parties and the trial ideas of antitrust cases involving intellectual property abuse in accordance with the law, and actively responded to the concerns of the industry at home and abroad.

The original text including three additional cases is available here (Chinese only).

Conviction Under China’s Version of the Economic Espionage Act for Theft of Trade Secrets

On April 26, 2024, the Shanghai Pudong Court released the “Typical cases of intellectual property judicial services provided by the Shanghai Pudong New Area People’s Court to ensure high-quality development of new productivity” (上海市浦东新区人民法院知识产权司法服务保障新质生产力高质量发展典型案例), which included a criminal case involving a newer provision of the Chinese Criminal Law that is somewhat analogous to the U.S. Economic Espionage Act. This is believed to be the first case in Shanghai under this provision and may be related to last year’s police raids on Bain and/or Capvision although the Court did not release information identifying the entities involved.

As explained by the Shanghai Pudong Court:

Case 12

Determination of the elements of the crime of illegally providing trade secrets to foreign countries – the first case of spying and illegally providing trade secrets to foreign countries in Shanghai

Judgment Summary

Article 219-1 of the Criminal Law states that “the crime of spying on and illegally providing commercial secrets for foreign countries” should be determined based on the following elements: first, the object of the perpetrator’s infringement is a commercial secret protected by China’s criminal law; second, the perpetrator objectively carried out the act of spying on and illegally providing commercial secrets; third, the commercial secrets were spied on and provided to foreign institutions, organizations, and personnel, and the perpetrator knew it. Among them, foreign institutions and organizations include not only institutions and organizations established in other countries or regions abroad, but also their branch (representative) institutions and branch organizations established in China, as well as institutions and organizations in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. If the perpetrator is not clearly informed that the commercial secrets are spied on and provided to foreign countries, but subjectively should know and takes a laissez-faire attitude, it constitutes knowing.

Basic facts

From August 2017 to 2020, the defendant Zheng worked as a thin film equipment engineer in a storage company. He signed the “Employment Contract” and “Secrecy Commitment Letter on Resignation” and promised to keep the company’s trade secrets confidential. In August 2021, the defendant Zheng accepted the invitation of an information company and became the company’s industry expert consultant. From October 2021 to the time of the incident, the defendant Zheng violated the confidentiality agreement with the storage company where he originally worked, used the information he had mastered and spied on the employees of the storage company, and accepted the arrangement of the information company many times in the name of an expert of the storage company to provide paid consulting services to companies with similar or competitive businesses to the storage company. Among them, Zheng accepted a telephone interview with the consulting company (whose shareholders are foreign companies) in February 2022. Knowing that the actual consulting party was an overseas organization, he still illegally provided the trade secrets of the storage company that he had spied on and learned to overseas organizations and personnel through the information company, and illegally made a profit of 2,062.40 RMB. On September 17, 2022, the defendant Zheng was detained and summoned by the Shanghai National Security Bureau. After being brought to justice, he truthfully confessed the main facts of the crime and, with the help of his family, surrendered the illegal gains of 2,062.40 RMB.

Judgement

After trial, the Pudong Court held that the commercial information of the relevant products accused by the public prosecution agency was the result of a storage company’s creative labor and embodied the wisdom of many R&D personnel. The above-mentioned trade secrets have an important impact on the company’s competitiveness and future development in the international and domestic industries. The company has never publicly released it, and the defendant Zheng also confirmed that the above-mentioned information belongs to the company’s undisclosed information. Therefore, this information is not generally known and not easily accessible to relevant personnel in the field. The storage company has taken reasonable confidentiality measures for the commercial information involved by formulating the “Confidential Information Protection Policy Text” and signing the “Employment Contract” and “Resignation Confidentiality Commitment Letter” with the defendant Zheng. Therefore, the commercial information involved is the company’s trade secrets. After the defendant Zheng resigned, he violated the agreement on keeping trade secrets with the storage company and the company’s confidentiality system. Knowing that the consulting party was an overseas organization, he still provided the trade secrets involved in the case that he illegally discovered from his former colleagues, together with the trade secrets he possessed, to the consulting party. His behavior has constituted the crime of overseas espionage and illegal provision of trade secrets. Based on this, the court sentenced the defendant Zheng to two years and six months in prison and a fine of RMB 10,000 for the crime of spying and illegally providing trade secrets abroad; the illegal gains were confiscated.

After the first-instance judgment, the defendant Zheng did not appeal and the public prosecution agency did not file a protest, and the judgment is now effective.

Typical significance

This case is the first case accepted by the Shanghai court for the newly added crime of “stealing, spying, buying, and illegally providing trade secrets for foreign countries” since the implementation of the Criminal Law Amendment (XI). It involves former employees of key enterprises in China’s high-tech field, who, in the name of expert consultation, leaked important trade secrets they spied on and learned to foreign organizations through consulting companies and made profits, causing serious harm to the development and economic interests of the enterprises. The judgment in this case strictly grasps the constituent elements of the crime, severely cracks down on commercial espionage crimes of foreign organizations against key high-tech enterprises in China, protects the independent intellectual property rights of Chinese enterprises in accordance with the law, helps to enhance international competitiveness, and safeguards China’s national security and national interests.

The original text (with 14 other typical case summaries) is available here (Chinese only).

U.S. House of Representatives Passes Bill to Ban TikTok Unless Divested from ByteDance

Yesterday, with broad bipartisan support, the U.S. House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly (352-65) to support the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, designed to begin the process of banning TikTok’s use in the United States. This is music to my ears. See a previous blog post on this subject.

The Act would penalize app stores and web hosting services that host TikTok while it is owned by Chinese-based ByteDance. However, if the app is divested from ByteDance, the Act will allow use of TikTok in the U.S.

National security experts have warned legislators and the public about downloading and using TikTok as a national security threat. This threat manifests because the owner of ByteDance is required by Chinese law to share users’ data with the Chinese Communist government. When downloading the app, TikTok obtains access to users’ microphones, cameras, and location services, which is essentially spyware on over 170 million Americans’ every move, (dance or not).

Lawmakers are concerned about the detailed sharing of Americans’ data with one of its top adversaries and the ability of TikTok’s algorithms to influence and launch disinformation campaigns against the American people. The Act will make its way through the Senate, and if passed, President Biden has indicated that he will sign it. This is a big win for privacy and national security.

For more news on Social Media Legislation, visit the NLR Communications, Media & Internet section.

Top Risks for Businesses in 2024

Just weeks into 2024, it is already clear that uncertainty will be the watchword. Will the economic soft landing of 2023 persist into 2024? Will labor unrest, strong in 2023, settle down as inflation cools? Will inflation remain tamed? Will the U.S. elections bring continuity or a new administration with very different views on the role of the U.S. in the world and in regulating business?

Uncertainty is also fueling a complex risk environment that will require monitoring global developments more so than in the past. As outlined below, geopolitical risks are present, multiple, interconnected and high impact. International relations have traditionally fallen outside the mandate of most C-Suites, but how the U.S. government responds to geopolitical challenges will impact business operations. Beyond additional disruptions to global trade, businesses in 2024 will face risks associated with expanding protectionist economic policies, climate change impacts, and AI-driven disruptors.

Geopolitical Tensions Disrupting Global Trade

The guardrails are coming off the international system that enshrines the ideals of preserving peace and security through diplomatic engagement, respecting international borders (not changing them through military might) and ensuring the free flow of global trade. In 2022, the world was shocked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but it has taken time for the full impact to reverberate through the international system. While political analysts write on a “spillover of conflict,” the more insidious impact is that more leaders of countries and non-state groups are acting outside the guardrails because they are no longer deterred from using military force to achieve political goals, making 2024 ripe for new military conflicts disrupting global trade beyond the ongoing war in Europe.

In October 2023, Hamas launched a war from Gaza against Israel. Thus far, fighting has spread to the West Bank, between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah in the north, and to the Red Sea, with Iranian-backed Houthis attacking shipping through the strategic Bab al Mandab strait. Container ships and oil tankers, to avoid the risks, are re-routing to the Cape of Good Hope, adding two weeks of extra sailing time, with the associated costs. Insurance premiums for cargo ships sailing in the eastern Mediterranean have skyrocketed, with some no longer servicing Israeli ports. Companies and retailers with tight delivery schedules are switching to airfreight, which is expected to drive up airfreight rates.

Iran, emboldened by its blossoming relationship with Russia as one of Moscow’s new arms suppliers, is activating its proxy armies in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to attack Western targets. In a two-day period in January 2024, the Iran Revolutionary Guards directly launched strikes in Syria, Iraq and Pakistan. Nuclear-armed Pakistan retaliated with a cross border strike in Iran. While there are many nuances to these incidents, it is evident that deterrence against cross-border military conflict is eroding in a region with deep, festering grievances among neighbors. Iran is in an escalatory mode and could resume harassing shipping in the Persian Gulf and the strategic Strait of Hormuz, where about a fifth of the volume of the world’s total oil consumption passes through on a daily basis.

In East Asia, North Korea is also emboldened by the changing geopolitical environment. Pyongyang, too, has become a major supplier of weaponry to Moscow for use in Ukraine. While Russia (and China) in the past have constructively contained North Korean predilection for aggression against its neighbors, Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un may believe the time is ripe to change the status quo. Ominously, in a Jan. 15 speech before the Supreme People’s Assembly (North Korea’s parliament), Kim rejected the policy of reunification with South Korea and proposed incorporating the country into North Korea “in the event of war.” While North Korean leaders frequently revert to brinksmanship and aggressive language, Kim’s speech reflects confidence of a nuclear power, aligned with Russia against a shared adversary – South Korea, which is firmly aligned with the G7 consensus on Russia. A war in the Korean peninsula would be felt around the world because East Asia is central to global shipping and manufacturing, disrupting supply chains, as well as the regional economy.

China is also waiting for the right moment to “unite” Taiwan with the mainland. Beijing has seen the impact of Western sanctions on Russia over Ukraine and has been deterred from aiding the Russian war effort. In many ways, China has benefited from these sanctions and the reorientation of global trade. Also, Russia, with its far weaker economy, has proven surprisingly resilient to sanctions, another lesson for China. Meanwhile, the Taiwanese people voted in January and returned for a third time the ruling party that strongly rejects Chinese territorial claims. Tensions are high, with the Chinese military once again harassing Taiwanese defenses. For Beijing, the “right moment” could fall this year should conflict break out on the Korean peninsula, which would tie the U.S. down because of the Mutual Defense Treaty.

The uncertainty here is not that there are global tensions, but how the U.S. will respond as they develop and how U.S. businesses can navigate external shocks. Will the U.S. be drawn into a new war in the Middle East? Can the U.S. manage multiple conflicts, already deeply involved in supporting Ukraine? Is the U.S. economy resilient enough to withstand trade disruptions? How can businesses strengthen their own resiliency?

Economic Protectionism Increasing Costs and Risks

Geopolitical tensions, the global pandemic and the unequal benefits of globalization are impacting economic policies of the U.S. and the political discourse around the merits of unrestrained free trade. Protectionist economic policies are creeping in, under the nomenclature of “secure supply chains,” “friend-shoring” and “home-shoring.” The U.S. has imposed tariffs on countries (even allies) accused of unfair trade practices and has foreclosed access to certain technologies by unfriendly countries, namely China.

While the response to some of these trade restrictions are new trade agreements with “friends” to regulate access under preferred terms, in essence creating multiple “friends” trade blocs for specific sectors, other responses are retaliatory, including counter tariffs and export restrictions or outright bans. In 2024, the U.S. economy will see the impact of these trade fragmentation policies in acute ways, with upside risks of new business opportunities and downside risks of supply chain disruptions, critical resource competition, increased input costs, compliance risks and increased reputational risks.

Trade with China, which remains significant and important to the stability of the U.S. economy, will pose new risks in 2024. While Washington and Beijing have agreed to some political and security guardrails to manage the relationship, economic competition is unrestrained and stability in the bilateral relations is not guaranteed. The December 2023 bipartisan report by the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, with its 150 recommendations on fundamentally resetting economic and technological competition with China, if even partially adopted, risks reigniting the trade war.

2024 is a presidential election year for the U.S. A change of control of the executive branch could result in many economic and regulatory policy reversals. The definition of “friend” could shift or narrow. Restrictions on trade with China could accelerate.

Impacts of Climate Change and Sustainability Policies

2023 was the hottest year on record, and El Niño conditions are expected to further boost the warming trend. Many regions experienced record-breaking wildfire activity in 2023, including Canada where 18 million hectares of land burned. Extreme storms caused life-threatening flooding in Europe, Asia and the Americas. 2024 is expected to bring even more climate hazards. The impacts will be physical and financial, including growing insurance losses and adverse impacts on operations and value chain. Analysts expect that in 2024, the economic and financial costs of adverse health impacts from climate change will increase, with risks related to the spread of infectious disease, insufficient access to clean water, and physical harm to the elderly and vulnerable. The direct economic effect will be on health systems, but also loss of productivity due to extreme weather incidents and effects of epidemics.

Energy transition to low-carbon emissions is underway in the U.S., but it is uneven and still uncertain. The financial market is investing in an impressive number of startups and large-scale projects revolving around cleantech. Still, there is hesitancy on the opportunity and risks of sustainability. Thus far, progress towards sustainability goals has been private sector-led and government-enabled. There is a risk that government incentive programs encouraging the transition to low-carbon energy could be reversed or curtailed under a new administration.

In 2024, some companies will face more climate disclosure compliance requirements. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is expected to release its final rule on climate change disclosures. The final action has been delayed several times because of pushback by public companies on some of the requirements, including Scope 3 greenhouse gas emission disclosures (those linked to supply chains and end users). California has not waited for the SEC’s final rule: In October 2023, Gov. Gavin Newsom signed into law legislation that will require large companies to disclose greenhouse gas emissions. The California climate laws go into effect in 2026, but companies will need to start much earlier to build the capabilities to plan, track and report their carbon footprint. For U.S. companies doing business in the European Union, they will need to comply with the EU Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, with the rules coming into force mid-2024.

Disruptive Technology

In 2023, generative AI was the talk of the town; in 2024, it will be the walk. Companies are popping up with new tools for every imaginable sector, to increase efficiency, task automation, customization, personalization and cost reduction. Business leaders are scrambling to integrate AI to gain a competitive edge, while navigating the everyday risks related to privacy, liability and security. While there are concerns that AI will displace humans, there is a growing consensus that while some jobs will disappear, people will focus on higher value work. That said, new rounds of labor disruptions linked to workforce transition are likely in 2024.

2024 will also bring AI-generated misinformation and disinformation. Bad actors will spread “synthetic” content, such as sophisticated voice cloning, doctored images and counterfeit websites, seeking to manipulate people, damage companies and economies, and foment dissent.

In 2024, around 2 billion people in more than 50 countries will vote in elections at risk of manipulation by misinformation and disinformation, which could destabilize the real and perceived legitimacy of newly elected governments, risking political unrest, violence, terrorism and erosion of democratic processes. Large democracies will hold elections in 2024, including the U.S., the EU, Mexico, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and South Africa. Synthetic content can be very difficult to detect, while easy to produce with AI tools.

This is not a theoretical threat; synthetic content is already being disseminated in the U.S., targeting New Hampshire voters with robocalls that share fake recorded messages from President Biden encouraging people not to vote in the primary election. The U.S. is already polarized with citizens distrustful of the government and media, a ready vulnerability. Businesses are not immune. Notably, CEOs have stood apart, with higher ratings for trustworthiness and risk being called upon to vouch for “truth” (and becoming collateral damage in the fray).

AI-powered malware will make 2023 cyber risks look like child’s play. Attackers can use AI algorithms to find and exploit software vulnerabilities, making attacks precise and effective. AI can help hackers quickly identify security measures and evade them. AI-created phishing attacks will be more sophisticated and difficult to detect because the algorithms can assess larger amounts of piecemeal information and craft messages that mimic communication styles.

The role of states backing cyber armies to spread disinformation or steal information is growing and is part and parcel of the erosion of the existing international order. States face little deterrence from digital cross-border attacks because there are yet to be established mechanisms to impose real costs.

Tag: China

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