BIPA Claims Against United Airlines Must be Arbitrated Due to Collective Bargaining Agreement

Last month a federal district court dismissed a putative class action lawsuit against United Airlines challenging its use of fingerprint scanning timeclocks. The lawsuit brought by United employee David Johnson alleged that the company’s collection and use of employees’ fingerprints violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) because the company failed to get the requisite consent from its employees for fingerprint collection and use.

In dismissing the lawsuit, the court found it lacked federal jurisdiction to resolve the dispute on two grounds. In the first instance, the court observed that the federal Railway Labor Act (RLA) creates a mandatory and exclusive arbitration process for resolving labor disputes that require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The CBA between United and its employees gave United the “sole and exclusive right to manage, operate, and maintain the efficiency” of the workplace. Therefore, any resolution of Plaintiff’s challenge under BIPA of United’s collection and use of fingerprints as part of its timekeeping technology necessarily requires interpretation of the scope of the CBA. And, thus, “[b]ecause there is no way for the Plaintiff to pursue a BIPA claim without interpreting the existing CBA,” the court concluded that its resolution of Plaintiff’s BIPA claim was preempted by the RLA’s mandatory arbitration requirement, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to decide the claim.

In the second instance, echoing two other recent federal BIPA cases, the court concluded that violation of BIPA’s notice and consent requirement alone is not adequate injury to establish standing to sue in federal court under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. The court found that a lack of consent, while a technical violation of the statute, does not itself alone increase the risk of disclosure that could result in injury or harm to the individual. Absent any actual compromise of the biometric information, or an increased risk of such compromise, there was no injury-in-fact, and thus no federal jurisdiction. While the court’s ruling in this regard continues the trend of other federal courts, it’s worth noting that standing to sue in Illinois state court is unaffected by these decisions. Whether a plaintiff or class action may succeed in state court based upon a mere technical violation of BIPA’s requirements—without more—remains an open question the Illinois Supreme Court is expected to answer in its next session.

Putting it Into Practice: Companies negotiating collective bargaining agreements should be aware that the right language may allow for resolution of many labor disputes, including disputes arising under BIPA, through mandatory arbitration rather than through the courts. When collecting and using biometric information, companies should continue to pay attention to BIPA’s requirements regarding consent, notice, and disclosure because although federal courts have dismissed suits predicated only on mere technical violations of the statute, other avenues of recourse may still be available to plaintiffs in state court and via arbitration.

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Unpaid Employer Contributions as Plan Assets: Expansion Of Liability Under ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act)

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The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”), requires trustees of multiemployer pension and benefit funds to collect contributions required to be made by contributing employers under their collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) with the labor union sponsoring the plans. This is not always an easy task—often, an employer is an incorporated entity with limited assets or financial resources to satisfy its contractual obligations. In some instances, an employer will resort to filing for bankruptcy to obtain a discharge of its debts to the pension or benefit funds.

In a distinct trend, federal courts have found that, depending on the text of the underlying plan documents, unpaid employer contributions due under a CBA may be viewed as plan assets, such that the representatives of an employer who exercise fiduciary control over those plan assets can be held individually liable for the unpaid amounts (together with interest and penalties) under ERISA. These cases will no doubt help plan trustees and administrators collect monies owed to the plan. They also should serve as cautionary warnings to contributing employers to ensure that they fully understand the obligations that they are undertaking when they agree to contribute to ERISA funds pursuant to CBAs.

Background

In the typical scenario, an employer will agree under one or more of its CBAs to make specified contributions to fund the pension and health and welfare benefits promised to plan participants under the trust fund’s plan of benefits. If an employer fails to timely remit those payments in violation of the CBA and the plan’s rules, the trustees of the fund have a legal duty to attempt to recover the unpaid contributions unless, after fully examining the facts and circumstances, the trustees conclude that the likelihood of recovery is outweighed by its costs. What happens if the trustees expend the fund’s resources to seek to collect the unpaid obligations and obtain a judgment against the employer, only to find the company’s coffers empty? Or what if the company files for bankruptcy?

Unlike employee contributions, which under U.S. Department of Labor regulations are explicitly deemed to be plan assets, employer contributions are typically found to be contractual obligations that do not become plan assets until such amounts are paid by the employer to the trust fund. Hence, while an employer’s failure to remit an employee contribution relegates the employer to the status of an ERISA plan fiduciary because it is has authority and control over plan assets, employer contributions have generally been held not to constitute plan assets. As a result, an employer who fails to make its contributions due under the CBA may have committed a contractual violation but has not breached an ERISA fiduciary duty.

The Potential for Individual Fiduciary Liability

Recently, courts have regularly carved out an exception to the general rule that unpaid contributions are not plan assets by finding that employer contributions are plan assets where the CBA explicitly defines them as such. In such cases, these courts will then proceed to consider the next question of whether the officers, directors or other representatives of such employer exercised a level of control over corporate assets sufficient to make them an ERISA plan fiduciary and thus individually liable for the contributions—effectively stripping them of the protections of the corporate form. Furthermore, if elevated to the status of a fiduciary breach, the debt may not be dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, the plan could proceed to collect the unpaid contributions against the principals of the debtor personally.

For over a decade, some federal district courts in the Second Circuit have applied a two-part test in delinquent employer contribution cases to find that: (i) such contributions are plan assets when so specified by the CBA; and (ii) the principals of the employer are an ERISA plan fiduciary. More recently, the Second Circuit concluded that delinquent contributions were not plan assets where there were no provisions in the relevant plan documents that stated that unpaid contributions are assets of the plan. See In re Halpin, 566 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2009). The Court expressly stated, however, that “the trustees were free to contractually provide for some other result.” It further noted that merely finding that delinquent contributions constitute plan assets does not end the inquiry. A court must also determine whether an individual defendant has exercised sufficient fiduciary conduct over the unpaid contributions to be found to be a plan fiduciary under ERISA.

While the Court’s statements were extraneous to the holding of the case, some district courts within the Second Circuit have seized upon this language and have cited In re Halpin for the proposition that employer contributions can be plan assets where the plan documents so provide. See, e.g.Trustees of Sheet Metalworkers Int’l Assoc. v. Hopwood, 09-cv-5088, 2012 WL 4462048 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012); Sullivan v. Marble Unique Corp., 10-cv-3582, 2011 WL 5401987, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011).

Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, in ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011 (11th Cir. 2003), held that delinquent contributions can constitute plan assets when explicitly provided for in the plan documents and corporate officers are plan fiduciaries with respect to those assets. The Court demanded a high level of clarity in the plan documents, however, regarding the delinquent contribution’s status as plan assets. It explained that when a corporation is delinquent in its contributions, the fund “has a sufficient priority on the corporation’s available resources that individuals controlling corporate resources are controlling fund assets. This in effect places heavy responsibilities on employers, but only to the extent that . . . an employer freely accepts those responsibilities in collective bargaining.”

In addition, district courts in the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have found that employer contributions constitute plan assets when the plan documents so provide. See, e.g.Trustees of Construction Industry and Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. Archie, No. 2:12-cv-00225 (D. Nev. Mar. 3, 2014) (holding that unpaid contributions were plan assets based upon the CBA’s language and finding that the company principals’ acts and responsibilities demonstrated sufficient control and authority over the company’s operations and financials to qualify as ERISA fiduciaries); Galgay v. Gangloff, 677 F. Supp. 295, 301 (M.D. Penn. 1987) (refusing to dismiss fiduciary breach claims for alleged failure to pay delinquent contributions based upon the “clear and undisputed language [of the agreement] stating that title to all monies ‘due and owing’ the plaintiff fund is ‘vested’ in the fund,” rendering “any delinquent employer contributions vested assets of the plaintiff fund.”; Connors v. Paybra Mining Co., 807 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (S.D.W.V. 1992) (finding company officers personally liable for delinquent contributions that were plan assets based upon CBA’s language since they breached their fiduciary duty by exercising authority over those assets by favoring other creditors over the fund); see also Secretary of Labor v. Doyle, 675 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that district court erred in failing to determine whether payments collected from various employers were plan assets subject to ERISA).

District courts in the Sixth Circuit have even signaled support for finding that contributions are plan assets as soon as they become due, “regardless of the language of the benefit plan.” See, e.g.Plumbers Local 98 Defined Benefit Funds v. M&P Master Plumbers of Michigan, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 873, 879 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (holding company principal personally liable for delinquent contributions since “the CBA and trust agreements . . . treat these unpaid contributions as inalienable plan assets” and signaling support for holding delinquent contributions plan assets “regardless of the language of the benefit plan.”).

In a related context, a federal bankruptcy court recently refused to discharge a debtor’s debt for delinquent contributions based upon the Bankruptcy Code’s “defalcation in the performance of fiduciary duty” exception. See In re Fahey, 494 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013). Although the court initially found that the debtor lacked the necessary discretion for fiduciary status under ERISA because the “option to breach a contract does not constitute discretion in the performance of one’s duty,” the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit reversed. The Panel ruled that “even if an ERISA fiduciary does not per se satisfy the § 523(a)(4) requirement for ‘fiduciary capacity,’ an analysis of [the Debtor’s] control and authority over the plan in functional terms nonetheless yields the conclusion that he acted as a fiduciary of a technical trust imposed by common law.” On remand, the bankruptcy court found that the debtor prioritized payments that were personally beneficial over his obligations to the ERISA funds and, consequently, committed defalcation as contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code.

View from Proskauer

Although the general rule that employer contributions do not constitute plan assets until actually received by the trust fund continues, recent decisions indicate an increased willingness by courts to carve out an exception to this rule. Funds looking to protect their ability to collect contributions should explicitly define in the plan documents and agreements with employers that plan assets also include all unpaid contributions in the hands of the employer. Employers should be fully cognizant of these provisions; otherwise its officers, directors and other representatives who choose to pay other creditors rather than the trust fund might be held personally liable for the unpaid amounts and interest and penalties, and possibly be unable to escape this liability through bankruptcy.

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Federal Court Prohibits Union From Striking To Prevent Sale Of Business To Non-Union Employer

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Last week a New York federal district court granted a preliminary injunction against the Teamsters union after it threatened to go on strike against Will Poultry, Inc. if the company proceeded to sell its business to a non-union purchaser who had no plans of assuming the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA).The parties’ CBA did not have a “successor clause” or any other language obligating a purchaser to assume or otherwise recognize the Teamsters union upon a sale. When the Teamsters demanded that Will Poultry modify the CBA to include a “successor clause” in advance of the sale or face a strike, the company filed for an injunction in federal court.

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While the CBA did not contain an express “no strike clause,” it did have a grievance/arbitration provision, and the court held that constituted an “implied” no strike clause. Accordingly, the court issued an order prohibiting the union from striking in violation of the implied no strike clause, which almost certainly would have killed the pending sale.

While the New York federal court correctly found an implied no strike clause in this case, this case should serve as a reminder that you should always review your CBA in advance of successor contract negotiations to make sure any language issues (like the lack of a no strike clause) can be addressed.

The Teamsters have filed for an appeal of the decision, but a copy of the district court’s order can be found here.

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David J. Pryzbylski

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Barnes & Thornburg LLP