Tag: California

‘ABC Test’ for Independent Contractors Set to Take Effect in California Jan. 1

As 2019 draws to a close, every business with a California presence should consider evaluating its workforce in the Golden State to ensure compliance with AB 5, which will be effective Jan. 1, 2020.

Through AB 5, the California legislature codified and expanded the reach of the so-called “ABC Test” for determining whether a worker should be classified as an independent contractor. This new law expands the reach of the California Supreme Court’s Dynamex decision which applied to coverage under the California Industrial Welfare Commission’s Wage Orders. AB 5 applies this new test to businesses under the California Labor Code and the California Unemployment Insurance Code.

Currently, California businesses are subject to a variety of tests of employee status, depending upon the law in question. Under most federal and California laws, the common law agency test applies. For workers’ compensation laws, the California Supreme Court adopted an “economic realities” test 30 years ago in S.G. Borello & Sons v. Department of Industrial Relations.

However, as of Jan. 1, 2020, the default standard for independent contractor treatment will be the ABC Test.

The ABC Test significantly narrows the scope of work for which businesses may classify workers as independent contractors, rather than employees, and expands the application of this new standard to nearly all employers doing business in California.

Businesses that do not adapt to the ABC Test may face an increased risk of claims from workers asserting that they were misclassified as independent contractors, on an individual and class or collective basis.

ABC Test Explained

Under the ABC Test, a worker is assumed to be an employee unless the business demonstrates:

A. That the worker is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in performing the work, both in the contract for performance and in fact

B. That the worker performs work that is outside of the usual course of the hiring entity’s business

C. That the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed for the hiring entity

It is Prong B of the test that will likely cause the most difficulty for companies that regularly engage independent contractors.

Prong B excludes from the assumption of employee status workers who perform duties outside the “usual course of the hiring entity’s business.” While AB 5 does not specifically define the phrase, many businesses use contractors to help them perform their regular business. California courts are expected to be tasked with interpreting the scope of this requirement.

Many industries lobbied hard to obtain exemptions from the ABC Test. The new statute excludes seven different categories of occupations or business, each with its own separate test for qualifying for the exclusion. These exclusions cover diverse occupations ranging from professionals such as architects and lawyers to non-professionals such as grant writers, tutors, truck drivers, and manicurists. Each category has a slightly different requirement to qualify for the exclusion from the ABC Test. However, qualifying for the exclusion from the ABC Test merely defaults the workers to a determination under the Borello test. Complicating matters further is that for all these occupations, a determination of employee status under federal law, such as under the National Labor Relations Act, likely remains under the common law agency test.

Application and Enforcement

While the California Labor Commissioner is officially tasked with enforcing many of the provisions of AB 5, claims of worker misclassification will more commonly be asserted in private civil actions either individually or on a class basis. In other words, companies will increasingly see independent contractors bring claims for wage and hour law lawsuits or class actions (i.e. overtime claims, meal and rest break claims, wage statement claims, etc.).

Employer Takeaways

Although several industry groups are expected to challenge the new law, businesses operating in California should review and update their practices relative to independent contractors before Jan. 1, 2020 – whether through potentially reclassifying independent contractors as employees or revising independent contractor agreements.

© 2019 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP\

More on independent contractor compliance via the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

California DMV Exposes 3,200 SSNs of Drivers

The California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) announced on November 5, 2019, that it allowed the Social Security numbers (SSNs) of 3,200 California drivers to be accessed by unauthorized individuals in other state and federal agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service, the Small Business Administration and the district attorneys’ offices in Santa Clara and San Diego counties.

According to a news report, the access included the full Social Security numbers of individuals who were being investigated for criminal activity or compliance with tax laws. Apparently, the access also allowed investigators to see which drivers didn’t have Social Security numbers, which has given immigration advocates concern.

The DMV stated that the incident was not a hack, but rather, an error, and the unauthorized access was terminated when it was discovered on August 2, 2019. Nonetheless, the DMV notified the 3,200 drivers of the incident and the exposure of their personal information. The DMV issued a statement that it has “taken additional steps to correct this error, protect this information and reaffirm our serious commitment to protect the privacy rights of all license holders.”

 

Copyright © 2019 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.
For more on data security, see the National Law Review Communications, Media & Internet law page.

AB 1291 Forces California Cannabis Companies To Sign “Labor Peace Agreements” With Unions, But Statute May be Unconstitutional

 

On October 12, 2019, Governor Newsom signed Assembly Bill 1291 (“AB 1291”) into law, which requires companies to sign a so-called “labor peace” agreement with a union or risk losing their cannabis license; thereby, strengthening already union-friendly statewide cannabis law. AB 1291 was supported and endorsed by various unions, including the United Food and Commercial Workers Western States Council, a 170,000-member branch representing thousands of cannabis workers. This bill, as well as other California statutes and local laws, signals a growing insistence by state and local regulators that employers doing business in California accept pro-union requirements. However, many of these new pro-union laws, including AB 1291, may be unconstitutional.

The main takeaways of AB 1291 are as follows:

  1. Effective January 1, 2020, California cannabis license applicants must sign so-called labor peace agreements with a union within 60 days of their 20th hire or risk losing their cannabis license.
  2. Employers and business associations seeking to challenge AB 1291, and other similar state or local union-related ordinances, are encouraged to speak with experienced labor counsel to discuss their options.
  3. Employers seeking to comply with AB 1291 and sign labor peace agreements should conduct due diligence on the labor unions they are considering entering into negotiations with. Not all unions are the same. Additionally, businesses should be thoughtful about what they agree to put into a labor peace agreement to satisfy the requirements under California’s cannabis laws. For example, these agreements are frequently mistakenly referred to as “neutrality agreement.” Neutrality agreements typically contain a commitment from the employer to remain “neutral” through a union organizing campaign. In contrast, AB 1291 does not use the term “neutral(ity)” and, thus, arguments can be made that strict “neutrality” is not required under the statute and may not need to be included in the labor peace agreement. Thus, employers should speak with experienced labor counsel before negotiating labor peace agreements with unions.

Background

Since its adoption into law in 2018, the Medicinal and Adult Use of Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act (“MAUCRSA”) has required applicants for state cannabis licenses with 20 or more employees to “provide a statement that the applicant will enter into, or demonstrate that it has already entered into, and abide by the terms of a labor peace agreement.”1 (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 26015.5(a)(5)(A).) A labor peace agreement, as defined under California’s cannabis laws, must contain the following commitments, at a minimum:

  1. Employer shall not “disrupt” efforts by the union to “communicate with, and attempt to organize and represent” the employer’s employees;
  2. Employer shall give the union “access at reasonable times to areas in which the employees work, for the purpose of meeting with employees to discuss their right to representation, employment rights under state law, and terms and conditions of employment;” and
  3. Union and its members shall not engage in picketing, work stoppages, boycotts, and any other economic interference with the employer’s business.

(Cal. Lab. & Prof Code § 26001(x).)

Effective January 1, 2020, AB 1291 requires an applicant for a state license under MAUCRSA with 20 or more employees to provide a notarized statement that the applicant will enter into, or demonstrate that it has already entered into, and abide by the terms of a labor peace agreement. If the applicant has less than 20 employees and has not yet entered into a labor peace agreement, AB 1291 requires the applicant to provide a notarized statement as a part of its application indicating that the applicant will enter into and abide by the terms of a labor peace agreement within 60 days of employing its 20th employee. By expanding the scope of the crime of perjury, AB 1291 imposes a state-mandated local program and authorizes the Bureau of Cannabis Control, the Department of Food and Agriculture, and the State Department of Public Health to revoke or suspend a license for a violation of these requirements.

AB 1291 May Be Unconstitutional

AB 1291 poses substantial questions as to whether it is unconstitutional due to preemption by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) under two complementary preemptions doctrines: Garmon and Machinists. In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the states are constitutionally barred by the U.S. Constitution’s supremacy clause from regulating conduct that NLRA protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or prohibits. Garmon preemption exists to protect the National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB”) primary jurisdiction and to preclude a state’s interference with its interpretation and enforcement of the integrated regulatory scheme that is the NLRA. Indeed, Congress delegated exclusive authority to the NLRB because it sought to establish a single, uniform national labor policy that would be unaffected by the vagaries of state law or shaped by local attitudes or prejudices. (Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953).) In Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court similarly declared that the NLRA forbids states to regulate conduct that Congress intended “to be unregulated because left ‘to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.’” Together, Garmon and Machinists preempt state and local policies that would otherwise interfere with the “integrated scheme of regulation” and disrupt the balance of power between labor and management embodied in the NLRA.

It appears AB 1291’s purpose is to afford unions greater rights than provided under the NLRA and make it easier for unions to organize cannabis employers. AB 1291 arguably presents the type of state interference in labor-management relations that Garmon and Machinists preemption forbids. For example, in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (“Golden State I”), 475 U.S. 608, 616 (1986), the Supreme Court held that while the NLRA “requires an employer and a union to bargain in good faith, … it does not require them to reach agreement,” nor does it demand a particular outcome from labor negotiations.” The substance of labor negotiations, and the results therefrom, are among those areas Congress intentionally left to the free play of economic forces when it legislated in the field of labor law. (Id.) In that case, the Supreme Court found that Machinists preempted the City of Los Angeles’ (“City”) refusal to renew a taxi cab company’s license when it failed to reach an agreement with striking union members. By conditioning the renewal of the taxi cab franchise on the acceptance of the union’s demands, the City effectively imposed a timeline on the parties’ negotiations and undermined the taxi cab company’s ability to rely on its own economic power to resist the strike. (Id. at 615.) The Supreme Court held that the City could not pressure the taxi cab company into reaching a settlement and thereby “destroy[] the balance of power designed by Congress, and frustrate[] Congress’ decision to leave open the use of economic weapons.” (Id. at 619.)

The facts of Golden State I are instructive here. Like the taxi cab company in Golden State I, California cannabis businesses now face a Hobson’s “all or nothing” choice under AB 1291. If a cannabis business refuses to negotiate a labor peace agreement with a labor organization, it effectively loses the right to do business in California. But if the cannabis business negotiates a labor peace agreement, the union knows full well that it can hold out for significant concessions in exchange for its members giving up one of their most valuable economic weapons – the power to strike.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008) is also instructive. At issue in Brown was California’s Assembly Bill 1889 (“AB 1889”), prohibiting certain private employers from using state funds to “assist, promote, or deter union organizing.” (Id. at 63 [quoting Cal. Govt. Code §§ 16645.1–16645.7].) The Court held that AB 1889 was unconstitutional. As explained by the Court, the current text of Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA are amendments made to the NLRA in 1947 as part of the Labor Management Relations Act, also known as the Taft Harley Act, for the purpose of overturning earlier NLRB precedent. The NLRA was amended in in several key respects. First, it emphasized that employees “have the right to refrain from any or all” union activities. (29 U.S.C. § 157.) Second, it added Section 8(b), which prohibits unfair labor practices by unions. (29 U.S.C. § 158(b).) Third, it added Section 8(c), which protects speech by both unions and employers from regulation by the NLRB. (29 U.S.C. § 158(c).) Specifically, Section 8(c) provides:

The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.

With the amendments, Section 8(c) “manifested a “congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor and management.” (Id. at 6-7.) That Congress amended the NLRA, rather than leaving to the courts the task of correcting the NLRB’s decisions on a case-by-case basis, is “indicative of how important Congress deemed such ‘free debate.’” (Id. at 7.) In addition, Sections 8(a) and 8(b) “demonstrate that when Congress has sought to put limits on advocacy for or against union organization, it has expressly set forth the mechanisms for doing so.” (Brown, 554 U.S. at 67.) Moreover, “the amendment to §7 calls attention to the right of employees to refuse to join unions, which implies an underlying right to receive information opposing unionization.” (Id.) “[T]he addition of §8(c) expressly precludes regulation of speech about unionization so long as the communications do not contain a ‘threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” (Id. [internal quotation omitted].) Thus, based on these overriding principles, the Court concluded that “California’s policy judgment that partisan employer speech necessarily interfere[s] with an employee’s choice about whether to join or to be represented by a labor union” and struck down AB 1889. (Id. at 68 [internal quotation omitted].)

AB 1291 is arguably no different. By forcing unwilling cannabis businesses to negotiate and accept labor peace agreements, AB 1291 compels a result Congress deliberately left to the free play of economic forces. The NLRA does not allow state and local governments to interfere with employer rights to communicate with employees regarding unionization under Section 8(c). Nor does it allow state and local governments to “introduce some standard of properly balanced bargaining power . . . or to define what economic sanctions might be permitted negotiating parties in an ideal or balanced state of collective bargaining.” (Machinists, 427 U.S. at 149-50.) Yet, this is exactly what AB 1291 appears to do. Accordingly, AB 1291 may be unconstitutional.

1 A labor peace (aka a labor harmony agreement) is essentially a contract between an employer and an organized labor union in which the employer agrees to help the union organize the employer’s workforce (i.e., unionize) by providing, for example, certain information or agreeing not to interfere with the union organizing efforts, in exchange for the union’s agreement not to strike or cause other disruption in the employer’s workforce during a union organizing campaign. Because these agreements open the door to union activity within the workplace, they should not be entered into casually. Rather, unionization may result in increased labor costs, contractual contributions to union pension plans, loss of flexibility, and adherence to union rules set forth in a legally binding contract. In addition, once a union is recognized or certified as the collective bargaining representative of employees, it is practically impossible to terminate that relationship. Indeed, only after a costly and divisive decertification election can a workforce return to the merit-based and flexible non-union environment.

Copyright © 2019, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

For more on union regulation, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

California’s New Statewide Rent Control – What You Need to Know

Summary:

As expected, California’s legislature passed AB 1482 this month, which imposes statewide rent control, restricting the ability of landlords to terminate certain tenancies without just cause, and further restricting the ability of landlords to increase rent on an annual basis. For those properties already subject to rent control, the new law is unlikely to change much if anything, but owners of other residential rental properties should be aware of the new restrictions.

Below is a summary of the key points of the new law.

When does it apply? 

AB 1482 applies to tenants that have occupied a dwelling unit for more than 12 consecutive months. If additional adult tenants are added during the lease term, it applies once the new tenant has occupied for 12 months, or one of the existing tenants has occupied the unit for 24 or more consecutive months.

What properties are exempt? 

AB 1482 applies to all residential properties in California, excluding the following:

  • Housing that has been issued a certificate of occupancy within the previous 15 years.
  • Transient and tourist hotel occupancy.
  • Housing accommodations in a nonprofit hospital, religious facility, extended care facility, licensed residential care facility for the elderly or an adult residential facility.
  • Dormitories owned and operated by colleges or schools.
  • Housing accommodations in which the tenant shares bathroom or kitchen facilities with the owner who maintains their principal residence at the residential real property.
  • Single-family owner-occupied residences, as long as the owner does not lease more than 2 units (including ADUs).
  • A duplex in which the owner occupied one of the units as the owner’s principal place of residence at the beginning of the tenancy, so long as the owner continues in occupancy.
  • Residential real property that is alienable separate from the title to any other dwelling unit, provided the owner is not a REIT, corporation or limited liability company in which at least one member is a corporation, and further subject to certain tenant notice requirements.

What are the limitations on increasing rent?

The bill restricts the owner of residential real property from increasing rent during any 12-month period by more than the lesser of (i) 5% plus a cost of living adjustment based on the California CPI, or (ii) 10%. The percentage increase in any 12-month period is based on the lowest applicable rate during the preceding 12-month period, but the value of any rent discounts, incentives or other concessions made by the landlord are not taken into account when determining the lowest rate in effect during such period.

When can a landlord terminate a lease? 

A landlord can terminate the lease for at-fault just cause for (i) defaults in the payment of rent, (ii) a material breach of the lease, (iii) nuisance uses, (iv) illegal or criminal activities, (v) committing waste, (vi) refusal by the tenant to sign a lease extension, (vii) refusal by the tenant to allow owner entry as required by law, (viii) assignment or subletting in violation of the lease, (ix) failure to vacate after signing a vacation agreement, or (x) failure to vacate upon termination of employment.

A landlord can also terminate for no-fault just cause if (i) the owner or certain family members intend to occupy the property (for leases entered into after July 1, 2020 other requirements must be satisfied), (ii) the property is withdrawn from the rental market, (iii) the owner is required by law to vacate the property (and if the tenant was the cause, the tenant will not be entitled to relocation assistance), or (iv) the owner intends to demolish or substantially remodel the property.

For any no-fault just cause termination, the landlord must provide the tenant with relocation assistance by either paying the tenant an amount equal to one month’s rent or waiving in writing the final month’s rent before the same is due. A landlord’s failure to strictly comply with the provisions relating to a no fault just cause termination renders the termination void.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

ARTICLE BY Herman Enayati and David V. Hall of Polsinelli PC.
For more on rental laws, see the National Law Review Real Estate law page.

California Tackles Big Pharma’s Anticompetitive ‘Pay for Delay’ Practices That Slow Down Lower-Cost Generic Drug Development

California Gov. Gavin Newsom has signed AB 824, known as the “Pay-for-Delay” bill, blocking pharmaceutical companies from paying generic drug makers to not develop and bring lower-cost medicines to market. The law makes these so-called “reverse payment” settlements of patent disputes – which the Federal Trade Commission says cost consumers $3.5 billion a year – “presumptively anticompetitive.”

The new law provides that an agreement resolving a patent infringement claim is anticompetitive if the generic drug or biosimilar drug makers receive anything of value from the brand name company that’s claiming infringement, and if the generic maker agrees to slow-walk or stop research, development, manufacture, marketing, or sales of a generic product for any period of time. Exceptions are made in cases in which an agreement promotes competition.

The state Attorney General is authorized to seek civil penalties within four years of any violations of the law. Other remedies would be available under California’s Cartwright Act, Unfair Practices Act, or unfair competition laws.

Sidestepping Competition

The FTC has prosecuted brand name and generic drug companies and has sued to stop these reverse payment agreements which allow drug companies to “sidestep competition.” Earlier this year, for example, the FTC announced a global settlement of three separate federal antitrust lawsuits involving subsidiaries of pharmaceutical manufacturer Teva Pharmaceuticals Industries Ltd.

There is no legitimate pro-competitive justification for pay-for-delay of generic drugs by brand name pharma companies. It's the consumer who pays the price. In one of the cases, Teva’s Cephalon company paid four generic drug manufacturers $200 million to back off on their plans to sell a generic version of Cephalon’s Provigil, a medication used to treat excessive sleepiness caused by sleep apnea, narcolepsy, or shift-work sleep disorder. Teva, which was able to delay the generic version for six years, agreed in its settlement to create a $25 million consumer fund and pay $69 million plus another $200,000 to cover the state’s legal fees. Teva was also barred from engaging in reverse-payment patent settlement agreements for 10 years.

In another instance, the FTC announced the settlement of its case against Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc., which paid Impax Laboratories $112 million not to go to market with a competing generic version of Endo’s Opana ER – a pain reliever in the opioid family.

Collusive Arrangements

Attorney General Xavier Becerra, AB 824’s sponsor, wrote that these kinds of pay-for-delay agreements are “collusive arrangements between brand-name drug companies and rival drug manufacturers” that allow the companies to charge monopolistic prices. “Pay-for-delay agreements hurt consumers twice – once by delaying the introduction of an equivalent generic drug that is almost always cheaper than the brand name and second by stifling additional competition because we know that when multiple manufacturers of generic drugs compete with each other, prices can be up to 90% less than what the brand name drug cost originally,” Becerra wrote.

Supporters of the bill included Health Access of California, the California Labor Federation, and the Small Business Majority. Another supporter, the California Public Interest Research Group, said brand-name drugs cost an average of 10 times and sometimes 33 times more than generics, adding that brand-name companies make billions in sales while generics are delayed.

All Those Opposed

The Association for Accessible Medicines (AAM) opposed the bill, saying it “penalizes procompetitive patent settlements that significantly expedite generic and biosimilar access.” Besides, the group argued, a federal framework already exists to review patent settlements, citing FTC v. Actavis, the 2013 decision in which the Supreme Court held that a brand drug manufacturer’s reverse payment to a generic competitor to settle patent litigation can violate the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court refused to call these agreements presumptively unlawful, instead saying the FTC had to prove its case as it would in any other “rule of reason” cases. The likelihood that a pay-to-delay settlement would have anticompetitive effects “depend[s] on its size, its scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any other convincing justification,” the Supreme Court ruled.

The pro-industry pro-tort reform Civil Justice Association of California called the bill “an enhanced, steroid infused codification” of the California Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in In re Cipro, which followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s FTC v. Actavis ruling.

Biopharmaceutical company Biocon opposed the bill for, it said, replacing the FTC with the State of California in the commission’s role as prosecutor of anticompetitive conduct.

The FTC’s Competition Bureau has been keeping track of the effectiveness of the Supreme Court’s FTC v. Actavis decision. In May 2019, FTC Chairman Joe Simons announced: “The data are clear: the Supreme Court’s Actavis decision has significantly reduced the kinds of reverse payment agreements that are most likely to impede generic entry and harm consumers.”

Commentary

There is simply no legitimate procompetitive justification for pay-for-delay settlements. There is simply no legitimate procompetitive justification for pay-for-delay settlements. They are explicit agreements between competitors to restrain competition and serve only to keep pharmaceutical prices unnecessarily high in this country. According to FTC data, pay-for-delay settlements cost consumers billions of dollars per year.

AB 824 simply aligns the law with the reality of this burden on the consumer, creating a presumption that such settlements are anticompetitive and requiring the settling parties to demonstrate why this is not the case. In fact, AB 824 essentially codifies the rule the FTC argued should govern pay-for-delay settlements in Actavis.

Critics of the law will challenge its legality, including its constitutionality under the dormant commerce clause. And while it may not withstand these legal challenges, AB 824 is an encouraging sign that lawmakers are beginning to understand the negative impact that pay-for-delay settlements have on competition in the pharmaceutical industry. We hope more states follow suit.

© MoginRubin LLP

ARTICLE BY Jennifer M. Oliver and Timothy Z. LaComb of MoginRubin. Edited by Tom Hagy for MoginRubin LLP. Photo of “worried man” by Nik Shuliahin via Upsplash.
For more on pharmaceutical regulation, see the National Law Review Biotech, Food & Drug law page.

CCPA Alert: California Attorney General Releases Draft Regulations

On October 10, 2019, the California Attorney General released the highly anticipated draft regulations for the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). The regulations focus heavily on three main areas: 1) notices to consumers, 2) consumer requests and 3) verification requirements. While the regulations focus heavily on these three topics, they also discuss special rules for minors, non-discrimination standards and other aspects of the CCPA. Despite high hopes, the regulations do not provide the clarity many companies desired. Instead, the regulations layer on new requirements while sprinkling in further ambiguities.

The most surprising new requirements proposed in the regulations include:

  • New disclosure requirements for businesses that collect personal information from more than 4,000,000 consumers
  • Businesses must acknowledge the receipt of consumer requests within 10 days
  • Businesses must honor “Do Not Sell” requests within 15 days and inform any third parties who received the personal information of the request within 90 days
  • Businesses must obtain consumer consent to use personal information for a use not disclosed at the time of collection

The following are additional highlights from each of the three main areas:

1. Notices to consumers

The regulations discuss four types of notices to consumers: notice at the time of collection, notice of the right to opt-out of the sale of personal information, notice of financial incentives and a privacy policy. All required notices must be:

  • Easy to read in plain, straightforward language
  • In a format that draws the consumer’s attention to the notice
  • Accessible to those with disabilities
  • Available in all languages in which the company regularly conducts business

The regulations make clear that it is necessary, but not sufficient, to update your privacy policy to be compliant with CCPA. You must also provide notice to consumers at the time of data collection, which must be visible and accessible before any personal information is collected. The regulations make clear that no personal information may be collected without proper notice. You may use your privacy policy as the notice at the time of collection, but you must link to a specific section of your privacy policy that provides the statutorily required notice.

The regulations specifically provide that for offline collection, businesses could provide a paper version of the notice or post prominent signage. Similar to General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a company may only use personal information for the purposes identified at the time of collection. Otherwise, the business must obtain explicit consent to use the personal information for a new purpose.

In addition to the privacy policy requirements in the statute itself, the regulations require more privacy policy disclosures. For example, the business must include instructions on how to verify a consumer request and how to exercise consumer rights through an agent. Further, the privacy policy must identify the following information for each category of personal information collected: the sources of the information, how the information is used and the categories of third parties to whom the information is disclosed. For businesses that collect personal information of 4,000,000 or more consumers, the regulations require additional disclosures related to the number of consumer requests and the average response times. Given the additional nuances of the disclosure requirements, we recommend working with counsel to develop your privacy policy.

If a business provides financial incentives to a consumer for allowing the sale of their personal information, then the business must provide a notice of the financial incentive. The notice must include a description of the incentive, its material terms, instructions on how to opt-in to the incentive, how to withdraw from the incentive and an explanation of why the incentive is permitted by CCPA.

Finally, the regulations state that service providers that collect personal information on behalf of a business may not use that personal information for their own purposes. Instead, they are limited to performing only their obligations under the contract between the business and service provider. The contract between the parties must also include the provisions described in CCPA to ensure that the relationship is a service provider/business relationship, and not a sale of personal information between a business and third party.

2. Consumer requests

Businesses must provide at least two methods for consumers to submit requests (most commonly an online form and a toll-free number), and one of the methods must reflect the manner in which the business primarily interacts with the consumer. In addition, businesses that substantially interact with consumers offline must provide an offline method for consumers to exercise their right to opt-out, such as providing a paper form. The regulations specifically call out that in-person retailers may therefore need three methods: a paper form, an online form and a toll-free number.

The regulations do limit some consumer request rights by prohibiting the disclosure of Social Security numbers, driver’s license numbers, financial account numbers, medical-related identification numbers, passwords, and security questions and answers. Presumably, this is for two reasons: the individual should already know this information and most of these types of information are subject to exemptions from CCPA.

One of the most notable clarifications related to requests is that the 45-day timeline to respond to a consumer request includes any time required to verify the request. Additionally, the regulations introduce a new timeline requirement for consumer requests. Specifically, businesses must confirm receipt of a request within 10 days. Another new requirement is that businesses must respond to opt-out requests within 15 days and must inform all third parties to stop selling the consumer’s information within 90 days. Further, the regulations require that businesses maintain request records logs for 24 months.

3. Verification requirements

The most helpful guidance in the regulations relates to verification requests. The regulations provide that a more rigorous verification process should apply to more sensitive information. That is, businesses should not release sensitive information without being highly certain about the identity of the individual requesting the information. Businesses should, where possible, avoid collecting new personal information during the verification process and should instead rely on confirming information already in the business’ possession. Verification can be through a password-protected account provided that consumers re-authenticate themselves. For websites that provision accounts to users, requests must be made through that account. Matching two data points provided by the consumer with data points maintained by the business constitutes verification to a reasonable degree of certainty, and the matching of three data points constitutes a high degree of certainty.

The regulations also provide prescriptive steps of what to do in cases where an identity cannot be verified. For example, if a business cannot verify the identity of a person making a request for access, then the business may proceed as if the consumer requested disclosure of only the categories of personal information, as opposed to the content of such personal information. If a business cannot verify a request for deletion, then the business should treat the request as one to opt-out of the sale of personal information.

Next steps

These draft regulations add new wrinkles, and some clarity, to what is required for CCPA compliance. As we move closer to January 1, 2020 companies should continue to focus on preparing compliant disclosures and notices, finalizing their privacy policies and establishing procedures to handle consumer requests. Despite the need to press forward on compliance, the regulations are open to initial public comment until December 6, 2019, with a promise to finalize the regulations in the spring of 2020. We expect further clarity as these draft regulations go through the comment process and privacy professionals, attorneys, businesses and other stakeholders weigh in on their clarity and reasonableness.

Copyright © 2019 Godfrey & Kahn S.C.

For more on CCPA implementation, see the National Law Review Consumer Protection law page.

California’s “Housing Crisis Act of 2019” May Boost Housing Production or Just Boost Housing-Related Litigation

On October 9, 2019, Governor Newsom signed into law Senate Bill (SB) 330, or the “Housing Crisis Act of 2019” in an effort to combat California’s current housing shortage, which has resulted in the highest rents and lowest homeownership rates in the nation. In a nutshell, the Housing Crisis Act of 2019 seeks to boost homebuilding throughout the State for at least the next 5 years, particularly in urbanized zones, by expediting the approval process for housing development. To accomplish this, the Housing Crisis Act of 2019 removes some local discretionary land use controls currently in place and requires municipalities to approve all developments that comply with current zoning codes and general plans. If not extended, SB 330 will only be effective from January 1, 2020 through January 1, 2025.

Governor Newsom signed SB 330 over the objections of local governments to help meet his ambitious goal of 3.5 million new housing units by 2025. One study by UCLA found that localities have already approved zoning for 2.8 million new housing units – 80% of Governor Newsom’s goal. However, if zoning alone was enough to increase housing production, California’s rate of housing production would be increasing. Instead, in the first half of 2019, there was a 20% reduction in the issuance of residential building permits compared to the same time period in 2018. California believes the reduction was due, in part, to excessive hearings and local approval procedures, mid-application spikes in development impact fees, and mid-application changes to development regulations, all of which can render a residential development project infeasible.

Only time will tell if SB 330 will actually increase the rate of housing production or merely fill the courts with more housing-related litigation prior to SB 330’s sunset in 5 years. However, one thing is for sure – local governments must tread carefully before denying the next housing project.

Major Provisions:

The Housing Crisis Act of 2019 applies to all housing developments consistent with objective general plan, zoning and subdivision standards in affect at the time an application is deemed complete, and affects all cities and counties in California – including charter cities. A “housing development” is defined as a project that is (1) all residential; (2) a mixed use project with at least two-thirds of the square-footage residential; or (3) for transitional or supportive housing.

SB 330 also places extra restrictions on certain “affected” cities and counties with housing statistics below national averages. As defined by the legislation, today there are nearly 450 cities and unincorporated parts of counties that qualify as “affected.”

For all cities and counties, the Housing Crisis Act of 2019’s major impacts include:

  • Retroactive prevention of zoning codes or design standards alterations that reduce residential density or intensity of use from that which was in place on January 1, 2018;
  • Authorization of proposed housing developments to override the local zoning codes that are inconsistent with the general plan, if the project is consistent with the general plan or land-use element of a specific plan;
  • Prevention of non-scheduled impact fees increases after a project applicant has submitted all preliminary required information;
  • Limitation of the number of public hearings on a development to 5; and
  • Specification that applications must be reviewed for completeness within 30 days of submission, provision of a written notice to the applicant if the agency believes the project is inconsistent with objective local development plans, policies and standards within 30 days if a housing project is under 150 units (and 60 days if the housing project is over 150 units).

Additional controls on “affected”[1] cities include:

  • Prevention of municipalities from enacting moratoriums on residential and mixed use projects;
  • Prevention of municipalities from establishing caps on the number of people who can live in the municipality, the number of housing units allowed, or the number of housing units to be constructed; and
  • Prevention of any density reductions or changes to design standards that downzone or limit housing development.

In addition to the above-mentioned controls on a local government’s ability to restrict development, there are also special limitations on reductions to affordable housing in a community. As to cities and counties, a local agency may not disapprove, or condition approval in a manner that renders infeasible a housing project for very low, low-, or moderate-income households or emergency shelters without specific written findings based on a preponderance of evidence in the record. This only applies to projects with 20% of the total units set-aside for affordable housing at 60% area median income (AMI) or 100% of the total units set-aside for affordable housing at 100% AMI.

As for developers, the Housing Crisis Act of 2019 bans any demolition of affordable or rent-controlled units unless the developer replaces all such units, allows tenants to stay in their homes until 6 months before construction begins, provides relocation assistance to tenants, and offers tenants a first right of return at an affordable rent.

SB 330 also implements penalties for violation of Housing Accountability Act (Govt. Code § 65589.5) (HAA) rules. Specifically, a court may require an agency make appropriate findings of denial or pay a $10,000 per unit fine into affordable housing funds. In the case of a local agency’s bad faith and failure to comply with a court order within 60 days, fines can increase to $50,000 per unit and the court can overturn a project denial and approve the project itself. Bad faith includes decisions that are frivolous or entirely without merit.

[1] SB 330 sets out criteria for identifying “affected” cities based on incorporation, size, and the average rent and vacancy rate compared to the national average.

Copyright © 2019, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

ARTICLE BY Jeffrey W. Forrest and Kelsey Clayton, Law Clerk at Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP.
For more on housing development, see the National Law Review Real Estate law page.

The CCPA Is Approaching: What Businesses Need to Know about the Consumer Privacy Law

The most comprehensive data privacy law in the United States, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), will take effect on January 1, 2020. The CCPA is an expansive step in U.S. data privacy law, as it enumerates new consumer rights regarding collection and use of personal information, along with corresponding duties for businesses that trade in such information.

While the CCPA is a state law, its scope is sufficiently broad that it will apply to many businesses that may not currently consider themselves to be under the purview of California law. In addition, in the wake of the CCPA, at least a dozen other states have introduced their own comprehensive data privacy legislation, and there is heightened consideration and support for a federal law to address similar issues.

Below, we examine the contours of the CCPA to help you better understand the applicability and requirements of the new law. While portions of the CCPA remain subject to further clarification, the inevitable challenges of compliance, coupled with the growing appetite for stricter data privacy laws in the United States generally, mean that now is the time to ensure that your organization is prepared for the CCPA.

Does the CCPA apply to my business?

Many businesses may rightly wonder if a California law even applies to them, especially if they do not have operations in California. As indicated above, however, the CCPA is not necessarily limited in scope to businesses physically located in California. The law will have an impact throughout the United States and, indeed, worldwide.

The CCPA will have broad reach because it applies to each for-profit business that collects consumers’ personal information, does business in California, and satisfies at least one of three thresholds:

  • Has annual gross revenues in excess of $25 million; or
  • Alone or in combination, annually buys, receives for commercial purposes, sells, or shares for commercial purposes, the personal information of 50,000 or more California consumers; or
  • Derives 50 percent or more of its annual revenues from selling consumers’ personal information

While the CCPA is limited in its application to California consumers, due to the size of the California economy and its population numbers, the act will effectively apply to any data-driven business with operations in the United States.

What is considered “personal information” under the CCPA?

The CCPA’s definition of “personal information” is likely the most expansive interpretation of the term in U.S. privacy law. Per the text of the law, personal information is any “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”

The CCPA goes on to note that while traditional personal identifiers such as name, address, Social Security number, passport, and the like are certainly personal information, so are a number of other categories that may not immediately come to mind, including professional or employment-related information, geolocation data, biometric data, educational information, internet activity, and even inferences drawn from the sorts of data identified above.

As a practical matter, if your business collects any information that could reasonably be linked back to an individual consumer, then you are likely collecting personal information according to the CCPA.

When does a business “collect” personal information under the CCPA?

To “collect” or the “collection” of personal information under the CCPA is any act of “buying, renting, gathering, obtaining, receiving, or accessing any personal information pertaining to a consumer by any means.” Such collection can be active or passive, direct from the consumer or via the purchase of consumer data sets. If your business is collecting personal information directly from consumers, then at or before the point of collection the CCPA imposes a notice obligation on your business to inform consumers about the categories of information to be collected and the purposes for which such information will (or may) be used.

To reiterate, if your business collects any information that could reasonably be linked back to an individual, then you are likely collecting personal information according to the CCPA.

If a business collects personal information but never sells any of it, does the CCPA still apply?

Yes. While there are additional consumer rights related to the sale of personal information, the CCPA applies to businesses that collect personal information solely for internal purposes, or that otherwise do not disclose such information.

What new rights does the CCPA give to California consumers?

The CCPA gives California consumers four primary new rights: the right to receive information on privacy practices and access information, the right to demand deletion of their personal information, the right to prohibit the sale of their information, and the right not to be subject to price discrimination based on their invocation of any of the new rights specified above.

What new obligations does a business have regarding these new consumer rights?

Businesses that fall under the purview of the CCPA have a number of new obligations under the law:

  • A business must take certain steps to assist individual consumers with exercising their rights under the CCPA. This must be accomplished by providing a link on the business’s homepage titled “Do Not Sell My Personal Information” and a separate landing page for the same. In addition, a business must update its privacy policy (or policies), or a California-specific portion of the privacy policy, to include a separate link to the new “Do Not Sell My Personal Information” page.

A business also must provide at least two mechanisms for consumers to exercise their CCPA rights by offering, at a minimum, a dedicated web page for receiving and processing such requests (the CCPA is silent on whether this web page must be separate from or can be combined with the “Do Not Sell My Personal Information” page), and a toll-free 800 number to receive the same.

  • Upon receipt of a verified consumer request to delete personal information, the business must delete that consumer’s personal information within 45 days.
  • Upon receipt of a verified consumer request for information about the collection of that consumer’s personal information, a business must provide the consumer with a report within 45 days that includes the following information from the preceding 12 months:
    • Categories of personal information that the business has collected about the consumer;
    • Specific pieces of personal information that the business possesses about the consumer;
    • Categories of sources from which the business received personal information about the consumer;
    • A corporate statement detailing the commercial reason (or reasons) that the business collected such personal information about the consumer; and
    • The categories of third parties with whom the business has shared the consumer’s personal information.
  • Upon receipt of a verified consumer request for information about the sale of that consumer’s personal information, a business must provide the consumer with a report within 45 days that includes the following information from the preceding 12 months:
    • Categories of personal information that the business has collected about the consumer;
    • Categories of personal information that the business has sold about the consumer;
    • Categories of third parties to whom the business has sold the consumer’s personal information; and
    • The categories of personal information about the consumer that the business disclosed to a third party (or parties) for a business purpose.
  • Finally, a business must further update its privacy policy (or policies), or the California-specific section of such policy(s), to:
    • Identify all new rights afforded consumers by the CCPA;
    • Identify the categories of personal information that the business has collected in the preceding 12 months;
    • Include a corporate statement detailing the commercial reason (or reasons) that the business collected such personal information about the consumer;
    • Identify the categories of personal information that the business has sold in the prior 12 months, or the fact that the business has not sold any such personal information in that time; and
    • Note the categories of third parties with whom a business has shared personal information in the preceding 12 months.

What about employee data gathered by employers for internal workplace purposes?

As currently drafted, nothing in the CCPA carves out an exception for employee data gathered by employers. A “consumer” is simply defined as a “natural person who is a California resident …,” so the law would presumably treat employees like anyone else. However, the California legislature recently passed Bill AB 25, which excludes from the CCPA information collected about a person by a business while the person is acting as a job applicant, employee, owner, officer, director, or contractor of the business, to the extent that information is collected and used exclusively in the employment context. Bill AB 25 also provides an exception for emergency contact information and other information pertaining to the administration of employee benefits. The bill awaits the governor’s signature – he has until October 13, 2019 to sign.

But not so fast – Bill AB 25 only creates a one-year reprieve for employers, rather than a permanent exception. The exceptions listed above will expire on January 1, 2021. By that time, the legislature may choose to extend the exceptions indefinitely, or businesses should be prepared to fully comply with the CCPA.

California employers would thus be wise to start considering the type of employee data they collect, and whether that information may eventually become subject to the CCPA’s requirements (either on January 1, 2021 or thereafter). Personal information is likely to be present in an employee’s job application, browsing history, and information related to payroll processing, to name a few areas. It also includes biometric data, such as fingerprints scanned for time-keeping purposes. Employers who collect employees’ biometric information, for example, would be well advised to review their biometric policies so that eventual compliance with the CCPA can be achieved gradually during this one-year grace period.

Notwithstanding this new legislation, there remains little clarity as to how the law will ultimately be applied in the employer-employee context, if and when the exceptions expire. Employers are encouraged to err on the side of caution and to reach out to experienced legal counsel for further guidance if they satisfy any one of the above thresholds.

What are the penalties for violation of the CCPA?

Violations of the CCPA are enforced by the California Attorney General’s office, which can issue civil monetary fines of up to $2,500 per violation, or $7,500 for each intentional violation. Currently, the California AG’s office must provide notice of any alleged violation and allow for a 30-day cure period before issuing any fine.

Are there any exceptions to the CCPA?

Yes, there are a number of exceptions. First, the CCPA only applies to California consumers and businesses that meet the threshold(s) identified above. If a business operates or conducts a transaction wholly outside of California then the CCPA does not apply.

There are also certain enumerated exceptions to account for federal law, such that the CCPA is pre-empted by HIPAA, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act as it applies to personal information sold to or purchased from a credit reporting agency, and information subject to the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act.

Would it be fair to say that the CCPA is not very clear, and maybe even a bit confusing?

Yes, it would. The CCPA was drafted, debated, and enacted into law very quickly in the face of some legislative and ballot-driven pressures. As a result, the bill as enacted is a bit confusing and even contains sections that appear to contradict its other parts. The drafters of the CCPA, however, recognized this and have included provisions for the California AG’s office to provide further guidance on its intent and meaning. Amendment efforts also remain underway. As such, it is likely that the CCPA will be an evolving law for at least the short term.

Regardless, the CCPA will impose real-world requirements effective January 1, 2020, and the new wave of consumer privacy legislation it has inspired at the state and federal level is likely to bring even more of the same. It is important to address these issues now, rather than when it is too late.

© 2019 Much Shelist, P.C.

For more on the CCPA legislation, see the National Law Review Consumer Protection law page.

Politics Trumps Economics? Trump’s Revocation of California’s Waiver Under the Clean Air Act

Today President Trump announced on Twitter that the U.S. was revoking California’s waiver under the Clean Air Act (CAA) which allowed it to impose stricter tailpipe emission standards than the federal ones. California’s Governor Newsom and Attorney General Becerra immediately announced that the state would file suit to challenge the revocation.

While the revocation has been characterized as an immediate rollback, the federal corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards[1] established under the previous administration, which are consistent with California’s, remain in place. Last year the Trump administration proposed to rollback those standards, freezing the efficiency and emission rules in 2021 and canceling further increases in stringency set through 2028. The final rule has not yet been issued. It is rumored that it will not be, as the administrative record supporting it has many problems and most acknowledge that it faces significant legal hurdles.

A little historical context is helpful. California began regulating tailpipe emissions in the 1960’s under then-Governor Reagan to combat air pollution. When the CAA was signed by President Nixon in 1970 it included a provision, Section 209, that allows California to establish stricter standards by obtaining a waiver of the normal federal preemption rules from U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Once granted, other states then can adopt California’s standards. Thirteen states and the District of Columbia have adopted California’s current standards.

For 30 years, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, Section 209 waivers to combat air pollution were routinely granted. In April 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), ruling that greenhouse gases (GHGs) are pollutants under the CAA. In December 2007, the Bush administration denied California’s request for a waiver to impose tailpipe emission standards aimed at reducing GHGs. California promptly sued in January 2008, joined by 11 other states. That case was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court when President Obama took office. In 2009, the parties settled the case before the Court issued its decision, and in 2010 the U.S. and California reached an agreement that aligned the state and federal standards. Those standards were subsequently expanded and a new waiver was granted in January 2013. It is that waiver that is now being revoked.

While litigation is inherently uncertain, it appears that California has a good case for challenging the revocation. Not only is the revocation unprecedented, there is no provision in the CAA providing for it. Section 209 only establishes the criteria for granting a waiver; it’s silent as to revocation. In 2013, the U.S. determined that the criteria for the waiver had been met, and both the states and the industry have acted in reliance on that determination for more than 6 years. The U.S. has also asserted that the federal Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) preempts California’s standards. However, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court ruled that EPCA does not displace EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs, and courts subsequently have extended that rationale to hold that EPCA does not preempt states’ regulation of GHGs under the waiver.

Just as it was in the late aughts, the automobile industry has been put in an extremely difficult position by this dispute. California has the 5th largest economy in the world, and when one adds in the 13 other states that have adopted its standards – states like New York and Pennsylvania – that equates to a large segment of the auto market. Having to produce vehicles to meet two different sets of emission standards would be extremely costly. The industry desperately needs regulatory certainty. Reflecting this, in June, 17 automakers sent a letter to President Trump calling for one national standard that included California, and in July, four automakers reached an agreement of sorts with California on emission standards.

Instead of the regulatory certainty that is needed for the economy to operate efficiently, it appears that this dispute will move into a phase of protracted litigation and years of regulatory uncertainty. The dispute may be good politics for those that want to motivate their base on each side, both Republicans in Washington D.C. and Democrats in Sacramento, but it is pretty clearly bad economics.

[1]   CAFE is, essentially, the average fuel efficiency of an automaker’s fleet of vehicles.

Copyright © 2019, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

For more on the Clean Air Act, see the National Law Review Environmental, Energy & Resources law page.

Continued Efforts to Bolster Wireless Infrastructure as California Officials Brace for Wildfire Season

California has been plagued by devastating wildfires over the past two summers, with the 2018 Camp Fire the deadliest and most destructive on record. Now that summer has officially started in 2019, officials are bracing for a possible string of new fires, with Governor Gavin Newsom telling officials to “prepare for the worst” in a recent meeting with emergency managers. In a discussion of what to expect for future California wildfire seasons, Chris Field, the Perry L. McCarty Director of the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment, stated:

The combination of climate change, increasing development in the wildland-urban interface, and fuel accumulation from decades of fire suppression dramatically increases the risk of fires that are large and catastrophic. Former California Governor Jerry Brown described the situation as a “new abnormal.” We need to recognize that, in California, we face the real risk that every fire season will be among the most destructive, or even the most destructive, on record.

Federal, state, and local officials, utilities, and residents, among many others, are now grappling with how to best prepare for this “new abnormal.” Efforts range from the U.S. Forest Service and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection’s fast-tracked forest management projects to Governor Newsom’s June 2019 proposal to create a $21 billion fund to compensate future wildfire victims. One big piece of the puzzle is strengthening wireless infrastructure to ensure that residents are connected to loved ones and vital services in the event of a disaster, particularly as the number of households without landlines continues to grow.

Senate Bill 670

As discussed in this blog previously, cellular service has a number of vulnerabilities that can cause it to falter during an emergency. During wildfires, one of the key risks for wireless infrastructure is physical damage and burning of underground and pole-mounted fiber lines. Gaps in cellular service can prevent residents from being able to reach 911 or receive crucial emergency notifications. This disruption of service is particularly dangerous in the face of a rapidly moving wildfire. Legislation aiming to address part of the problem is currently winding its waythrough the California legislature: Senate Bill 670, authored by State Senator Mike McGuire (D-Healdsburg).

The proposed legislation would require telecommunications companies to report outages impacting customers’ ability to access 911 or receive emergency notifications to the California Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) within 60 minutes of discovering the outage. Cal OES would then forward this information to local first responders so that they can identify any residents cut off from service. In 2018, certain Butte County residents received no official warning of the coming Camp Fire due to damaged cellular towers, with Sonoma County residents facing similar problems in 2017. The gap in communications was compounded by ineffectual use of wireless alert systems at the local level. Senator McGuire also authored Senate Bill 833, establishing statewide emergency alert protocols and regulations, which former Governor Jerry Brown signed in September 2018.

Concerns Regarding Power Supplies for Wireless Infrastructure

In May 2019, the Public Advocates Office (formerly the Office of Ratepayer Advocates), an independent organization within the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) that advocates on behalf of utility ratepayers, filed a legal motion urging the agency to act immediately to ensure that communication systems work during emergencies. As stated in a press release accompanying the motion:

[T]he Public Advocates Office seeks to better protect Californians during emergency situations by asserting that communication providers need to (1) ensure that calls and data be transmitted, without delay, during times of emergencies, (2) install backup generators or battery power at wireless facilities in high fire threat areas to reduce outages, (3) develop plans for alternative methods needed to support 9-1-1 call centers; (4) and take steps to improve their emergency alert and warning systems.

The Wireless Infrastructure Association has responded, pointing to regulatory hurdles inhibiting the expansion of cell sites to accommodate additional power sources and network redundancy. It has asked the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to collaborate with local governments to prioritize and streamline the approval process.

FCC’s Examination of Disaster Response and Recovery

Meanwhile, the FCC, on June 13, 2019, held the first meeting for the recently re-chartered Broadband Deployment Advisory Committee (BDAC), which will examine, in part, ways to boost wireless infrastructure during disasters and other emergencies. The committee will study how to accelerate the deployment of high-speed broadband access, focused on the following three areas:

  • Disaster Response and Recovery Working Group. Measures to improve resiliency of broadband infrastructure before a disaster occurs, and strategies that can be used during and after the response to a disaster to minimize broadband network downtime.
  • Increasing Broadband Investment in Low-Income Communities Working Group. New ways to encourage the deployment of high-speed broadband infrastructure and services to low-income communities.
  • Broadband Infrastructure Deployment Job Skills and Training Opportunities Working Group. Ways to make more widely available and improve job skills training and development opportunities for the broadband infrastructure deployment workforce.

Working in tandem with the BDAC, the FCC, in November 2018, launched a re-examination of the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative Framework, a voluntary commitment by mobile carriers focused on restoring communications during disasters and other emergencies, originally approved in 2016. The move was a response to major disruptions in wireless service following Hurricane Michael in the Florida Panhandle, but it is intended as a broader examination of wireless services in the event of a disaster.

 

© 2010-2019 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP
For more on mobile & wireless infrastructure, please see the Communications, Media & Internet page on the National Law Review.