Feuding Business Partners in Private Companies: Considering Arbitration to Resolve Partnership Disputes

It is common for private company co-owners to have disagreements while they operate their business, but they typically work through these disputes themselves.  In those rare instances where conflicts escalate and legal action is required, business partners have two options—filing a lawsuit or participating in an arbitration proceeding.  Arbitration is available, however, only if the parties agreed in advance to arbitrate their disputes.  Therefore, before business partners enter into a buy-sell contact or join other agreements with their co-owners, they will want to consider both the pros and the cons of arbitration.  This post offers input for private company owners and investors to help them decide whether litigation or arbitration provides them with the best forum in which to resolve future disputes with their business partners.

Arbitration is often touted as a faster and less expensive alternative to litigation with the additional benefit of resulting in a final award that is not subject to appeal.  These attributes may not be realized in arbitration, however, and there are other important factors involved, which also merit consideration.  At the outset, it is important to emphasize that arbitrations are created by contract, and parties can therefore custom design the arbitration to be conducted in a manner that meets their specific needs.  The critical factors to be considered are: (i) speed—how important is a quick resolution to the dispute, (ii) confidentiality—how desirable is privacy in resolving the claims, (iii) scope—how broad are the claims to be resolved, (iv) expense—how important is it to limit costs, and (v) finality—is securing a final result more desirable than preserving the right to appeal an adverse decision.

Speed—Prompt Resolution of Dispute

Arbitrations generally resolve claims more promptly than litigation, but that is not always the case as arbitration proceedings can drag on if the arbitration is not subject to any restriction on when the final hearing must take place.  One way to ensure that an arbitration will promptly resolve the dispute, however, is to require an end date in the arbitration agreement.  Specifically, the parties can state in their arbitration provision that the final arbitration hearing must take place within a set period of time, perhaps 60 or 90 days of the date the arbitration panel holds its first scheduling conference.  The arbitrators will then set a date for the final hearing that meets this contractual requirement.  Similarly, in the arbitration provision, the parties can also specify the length for the hearing (no more than 2-3 days), and they can also impose limits on the extent of discovery, including by restricting the number of depositions than can be taken.

If securing a prompt resolution of a dispute with a business partner is important, this result can be assured by requiring that all claims are arbitrated, particularly if the parties specify in the arbitration provision that the final hearing must take place on a fast track basis.

Confidentiality—Arbitration Conducted Privately

Litigation takes place in a public forum and, as a result, all pleadings the parties file, and with only rare exceptions, all testimony and other evidence presented at any hearings and at trial will be available to the public.  Therefore if a business partner wants to avoid having future partnership disputes subject to public scrutiny, arbitration provides this protection. But looking at this from another perspective, a minority investor may want to decline to arbitrate future claims against the majority owner if the owner is sensitive to adverse publicity.  The threat of claims being litigated in a public lawsuit may provide the investor with leverage in the negotiation and settlement of any future claims the investor has against the majority owner.

Scope of Dispute—How Much Discovery Required

Determining the scope of a future dispute with a business partner is difficult to do at the time that business partners enter into their contract when any future claims are unknown.  The downside arises in the arbitration context, because one of the parties may desire broad discovery of the type that is permitted in litigation, which may be necessary to defend against certain types of contentions, such as claims for fraud, personal injury and other types of business torts.  In an arbitration proceeding, discovery is typically more restricted, and it may further be limited by the arbitration provision, which caps the number of depositions and narrows the scope of document discovery.  Under these circumstances, the defending party (the respondent) may be hamstrung by these discovery limitations in defending against the claimant’s allegations in arbitration.

To avoid prejudice to the respondent from restrictions on discovery in arbitration, the parties may decide to agree that not all claims between them would be subject to arbitration.  For example, the parties could agree that all claims related in any way to the value and purchase of a departing partner’s interest in the business would be subject to arbitration, but that other claims of a personal nature (e.g., claims for discrimination, wrongful termination) would be litigated in court rather than arbitrated.  This splitting of claims in this manner may not be practical, but is something to be discussed by the parties when they enter into their agreement at the outset.

Expense of Dispute Resolution

As discussed above, business partners can limit the expense of resolving future claims between them by requiring a fast track arbitration hearing and also by limiting the scope and the extent of allowed discovery.  For example, if the parties require a final arbitration hearing to take place in 90 days after the initial scheduling conference, limit the hearing to two days and permit no more than three fact witness depositions per side.  They will have likely achieved a significant reduction of the cost of resolving their dispute.

The issue of cost requires additional analysis, however, because if the parties are not of equal bargaining power, the partner with more capital may not agree that arbitration is the best forum to resolve disputes with a less solvent partner.  The wealthier partner may believe that he or she would prevail over the less well-capitalized partner in a “war of attrition.” This factor may be so significant that it causes the wealthier partner to reject the arbitration of future disputes in favor of resolving of all future claims by or against the other partner through litigation.

Finality of Arbitration Awards

There is no right of an appeal in arbitration and the grounds for attacking an arbitration award in a court proceeding after the arbitration concludes are narrow and rarely successful.  This finality element may thus be an important factor in selecting arbitration as the forum for resolving partnership disputes with the goal of ending the dispute without having it linger on.

There is another concern here, however, that also bears considering.   The conventional wisdom among trial lawyers is that arbitrators are prone to “split the baby” by not providing a strict construction of the written contract or the controlling statute at issue.  Instead, the belief is that arbitrators are inclined to include something for both sides in the final award in an attempt to be as fair as possible, which results in mixed bag outcome.   That has not been my personal experience, but it is true that if the arbitration award is not fully consistent with the contract or a governing statute, there is no right to appeal the decision.  The bottom line is that, at the end of the arbitration, the parties will have to live with the result, and there is no available path to challenge an unfavorable/undesired outcome.

Conclusion

The takeaway is that arbitration is not a panacea.  It can be structured to take place faster and more cost-effectively than a lawsuit, and it will also be held in private and not be subject to public scrutiny.  But, business partners also need to consider other factors in arbitration, such as specific limits on discovery that may be problematic and the finality of the arbitrators’ decision, which may not be viewed as fully consistent with the partners’ contract or in strict accordance with the applicable law.   To the extent that business partners do opt for arbitration, they should craft the arbitration provision to make sure its terms closely align with their business goals.


© 2020 Winstead PC.

ARTICLE BY Ladd Hirsch at Winstead.
For more on business conflict resolution, see the National Law Review Corporate & Business Organizations law section.

Renewed Shutdowns/Restrictions Present Interesting Issues Regarding COVID-19 Business Interruption Claims

In recent weeks we have published multiple pieces on issues related to the calculation of damages under business interruption policies for losses associated with COVID-19 shutdowns/restrictions.  Unlike more conventional business interruption claims, such as losses associated with a hurricane, COVID-19 claims are likely to be more complicated regarding the end date for loss calculations, especially in instances where the policyholder was permitted to resume operations in a limited capacity, such as restaurants that initially were ordered closed but then were allowed to transition to a take-out/delivery model, outdoor seating only, or to operate at restricted capacities.

As many jurisdictions now face a resurgence in COVID-19 cases, another complicating issue is likely to arise.  In these jurisdictions that previously imposed restrictions on operations but lifted such restrictions, many policyholders have already submitted COVID-19-related business interruption claims to their insurance carriers.  Having thought that they had weathered the storm and were on the path to recovery, they now face the potential of new shutdowns/restrictions.

If renewed shutdowns/restrictions are imposed, a question is likely to arise as to whether these policyholders have one claim applicable to both sets of shutdowns/restrictions or two separate claims.  Does the policyholder need to provide additional notice related to the second set of shutdowns/restrictions?  Is it more beneficial for the policyholder to have one or multiple coverage triggering events (i.e., occurrences)?  What is the impact on available limits or deductibles/retentions?

These are just a few of the insurance issues potentially presented by the prospect of renewed shutdowns/restrictions.  Policyholders should review the terms of their policies carefully to understand their rights and their best path forward.


© 2020 Gilbert LLP

For more on business interruption, see the National Law Review Insurance, Reinsurance & Surety law section.

One-Two Punch: Businesses Must Fight the Virus and Possible Liability Claims

After several weeks in lockdown and thousands of business closures in an attempt to control the spread of the novel coronavirus, businesses are finally reopening their doors. Given the high transmission of COVID-19, businesses should consider their risks of legal liability to visitors on their property – customers, employees and others – in the event of COVID-19 exposure at their premises.  But the fear of civil liability remains a hindering problem. These claims will most commonly be pursued under the legal theory of negligence and plaintiffs may seeking financial compensation for their injuries and medical treatment related to COVID-19. Plaintiff’s lawyers in these cases will focus on the operations and procedures in place during the reopening. Some businesses are taking extraordinary measures to protect customers, while others are doing the bare minimum. Businesses need to know how to be in compliance with best safety practices to prevent and defend against claims related to an alleged failure to protect customers from COVID-19 exposures.

Immunity for Businesses for COVID-19 Exposure?

A large number of states, including Massachusetts, have enacted laws to shield health care workers, health care facilities and volunteer organizations treating COVID-19 patients from negligence claims subject to certain exceptions. However, the immunity does not extend to cover damages caused by gross negligence or recklessness. It is important to note that these states have not provided similar immunity to other businesses, nor have they limited liability in cases involving gross negligence for COVID-19 related claims. There have been discussions of additional legislation to protect businesses in these cases, but this has yet to happen.

Tort Claims and Premises Liability Law in Massachusetts

Personal injury claims typically stem from negligent acts, where a party had a duty of care, failed to reasonably care for that individual, and that failure to care caused the individual harm or injury. A ”duty of care” exists when its reasonably foreseeable that some act or omission would cause some type of knowable harm, and thus taking reasonable action to ensure safety. The breach of that duty is the act or omission that causes the harm. The breach of duty must cause some damages. Damages are monetary compensation for the victim’s injuries and losses if liability is found.

Premises liability law, a subset of personal injury law, similarly holds that property owners owe a duty of reasonable care to visitors on their premises in Massachusetts, so as to not create or allow unsafe or hazardous conditions to exist on their premises that could cause injury or harm to patrons and guests. If a hazardous condition exists that could reasonably cause harm, and the property owner fails to remove it or warn of it, this could ultimately result in liability.

The duty of care is stricter for business owners, as they invite persons onto their property to purchase goods or services. The level of care owed depends upon the type of visitor on the property. Massachusetts has two types of lawfully present visitors: 1) licensees- individuals presenting financial gain for the property owner like patrons, diners, shoppers; and 2) invitees- those who are not providing any financial gain to the property owner like guests and friends at a social gathering. The property owner owes its visitors a duty of care, that is to keep the property reasonably safe. In this context, the property owner is well aware of the risks associated with COVID-19, the nature of the disease and how it is transmitted. If it did not take reasonable steps to prevent the transmission of the virus to its licensees and invitees, and the claimant can prove the business’ failure to exercise reasonable care was a “substantial contributing factor” in causing the claimant’s injury, they may be entitled to damages, which can include among other things, medical expenses, economic damages, and even emotional distress.

Breach of Duty

There is an abundance of guidance available to businesses on the virus, transmission, preventative measures. Whether a business “breached” their duty of care will focus on what the business did to determine if taking action (or taking no action) was reasonable or not, given the state of knowledge on the virus. Thus, claimants would need to point to what steps the businesses took to protect its licensees and invitees, and whether there were additional procedures that could have been implemented to prevent the transmission, and whether those additional actions were reasonable in light of what was known about the virus. Intentional ignorance is not a defense – property owners have a duty to investigate known or potential hazards, including COVID-19.

Causation

Claimants in tort claims have the burden of proving causation. This usually means proving that the breach of duty was a “substantial contributing factor” in causing the claimant’s injury. In COVID-19 cases, the claimant will ultimately need to prove that the virus was contracted at that business as opposed to another source, which may be extremely difficult to do. Asymptomatic spread of COVID-19 is one of many challenges to proving the initial source of exposure. While some claimants will rely on contact tracing, that alone does not rule out alternative sources of COVID-19 exposure – any other place the person visited (markets, homes, their workplace), and exposure to family members and friends.

Notably, a large number of states are enacting legislation applicable to workers compensation claims related to COVID-19. This legislation establishes a rebuttable presumption that an employee who tests positive for COVID-19 contracted it in the course of employment, although some are limited to essential workers. A “rebuttable presumption” means that the burden of disproving causation is thrust upon the employer. While there are no similar rebuttable presumptions for personal injury and premise liability claimants at this time, it is an open question as to whether these presumptions can be used affirmatively in tort lawsuits, particularly in a situation where a worker brings COVID-19 into the home and sickens a family member or housemate.

Mitigating Liability

If businesses can show that safety protocols were followed, this evidence can be used to defend these types of claims. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has set guidelines that should be followed as best practices to avoid COVID-19 liability claims. There is an abundance of state and local guidance on social distancing, use of masks and other measures to prevent the spread of the virus. With the vast amount of information available to the public on the risks of the virus and preventative measures, claimants will argue that businesses have enough information to safely operate Crafty plaintiff’s lawyers will likely seek out and find guidance that specifically supports their clients case. Business owners are advised to do the same for their respective industries, whether it be restaurants, offices or youth sports leagues.

Defenses to Consider in Defending COVID 19 Liability Claims

Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations for in Massachusetts governing personal injury and premises liability cases places a time limit of three years within the date of the incident for filing the lawsuit. Lawsuits filed after the statute of limitations period may be dismissed as “time-barred.” Other states have similar statutes, although the specific timeframe may vary.

Modified Comparative Negligence Law

Some states, including Massachusetts, use a modified comparative negligence rule in personal injury cases, allowing plaintiffs to recover only if the defendant’s share of the blame was equal to or greater than their own. There are only a few exceptions allowing plaintiffs to recover if they were more than 51% at fault. Another important factor of this rule to consider is that if plaintiffs are found to be at fault, their damages are reduced by their allocated share of the blame. Did the visitor where a mask? Did they stay 6 feet apart from other individuals? Did they wash their hands and sanitize frequently? Were they placing their hands on their mouth and nose? These facts and circumstances are critical factors to consider when shifting the blame to the claimant.

Assumption of Risk Abolished in Massachusetts

Some jurisdictions allow a defendant in a personal injury action to raise an affirmative defense of assumption of risk, but that is abolished in Massachusetts as a defense in personal injury cases. In jurisdictions where this defense is allowed, instead of denying the allegations, defendants can assert that a plaintiff was aware of the risk when engaging in the activity or conduct, fully had knowledge of the consequences and willingly disregarded the risks or assumed the risks. Therefore, the defendant cannot be at fault for negligence and this serves as a complete bar to recovery.

Liability Waivers

Did a plaintiff sign a written liability waiver acknowledging and accepting risks? Enforceability of liability waivers as well as the exceptions to the enforceability of releases vary from state to state. While this only shows licensees and invitees were made aware of the risk, using such waivers in these COVID 19 claims is not a slam dunk defense.

Conclusion

We encourage businesses to consider these liability risks when resuming operations and to follow comprehensive procedures and CDC guidelines to mitigate the risks and protect licensees and invitees from the spread of the virus at these establishments. Our office can help businesses develop a plan specific to their business to mitigate the risks of liability from emerging claims related to COVID 19 and provide guidance and advocacy for defending such claims.


©2020 CMBG3 Law, LLC. All rights reserved.

ARTICLE BY Seta Accaoui at CMBG3 Law.
For more on business COVID-19 liability, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

Federal Courts Side With Strip Clubs in Opposing the SBA’s Ineligibility Rules for the Paycheck Protection Program, Possibly Signaling a Broader Trend

Recent rulings from federal courts enjoined the US Small Business Administration (SBA) from applying its April 2, 2020 Interim Final Rule (April 2 IFR) to limit the types of businesses that can participate in the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). Some of these rulings are expressly limited to the named plaintiffs that had been denied PPP loans and do not directly impact any other businesses that have or might apply for a PPP loan. Irrespective of any limitations in these cases, such decisions may signal a broader trend. In increasing numbers, federal courts are agreeing with arguments made by small businesses facing COVID-19-related challenges that the SBA’s PPP business eligibility limitations are inconsistent with Congress’ intention to help “any business concern” during this unprecedented time.

Financial services businesses that are deemed ineligible under the April 2 IFR need to pay close attention to cases that challenge the SBA’s incorporation of its existing list of “prohibited businesses” into eligibility requirements for a PPP loan. Even without court rulings, it also is possible (although not likely) that Congress or the SBA could suspend or revise the April 2 IFR to broaden PPP eligibility to include some or all of the currently designated “prohibited businesses.”

This advisory will explore:

  • the SBA’s April 2 IFR restricted eligibility in the PPP to certain financial services businesses that were ineligible for SBA-guaranteed loans under existing federal programs;

  • a recent Sixth Circuit ruling challenging the April 2 IFR as well as other federal court cases may signal a trend by federal courts to adhere to the text of the CARES Act; and

  • whether other federal courts will follow the Sixth Circuit’s view, or whether Congress or the SBA will suspend or revise the April 2 IFR to broaden PPP eligibility.

The April 2 IFR and Subsequent SBA Rules and Guidance

The PPP was one of several measures enacted by Congress under the CARES Act to provide small businesses with support to cover payroll and certain other expenses for an eight-week period due to the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. As noted in a prior Katten Financial Markets and Funds advisory, the SBA published the April 2 IFR on the evening before lenders could accept PPP applications, determining that various businesses, including some financial services business, were ineligible to apply for PPP loans under the CARES Act.1

The April 2 IFR limited the types of businesses eligible for the PPP by specifically incorporating an existing SBA regulation and guidance document that lists the types of businesses that are ineligible from applying for Section 7(a) SBA loans. In particular, the April 2 IFR provides, in part, that: “Businesses that are not eligible for PPP loans are identified in 13 CFR 120.110 and described further in SBA’s Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 50 10, Subpart B, Chapter 2.”2

Some of the ineligible financial services businesses listed in the SBA’s Standard Operating Procedure 50 10 (SOP) include, without limitation:

  • banks;
  • life insurance companies (but not independent agents);
  • finance companies;
  • investment companies;
  • certain passive businesses owned by developers and landlords, which do not actively use or occupy the assets acquired or improved with the loan proceeds, and/or which are primarily engaged in owning or purchasing real estate and leasing it for any purpose; and
  • speculative businesses that primarily “purchas[e] and hold[ ] an item until the market price increases” or “engag[e] in a risky business for the chance of an unusually large profit.”

With respect to last category in this list, the SBA provided further clarity regarding certain investment businesses and speculative businesses that were applying for PPP loans. In an April 24, 2020 Interim Final Rule (April 24 IFR), the SBA expressly clarified that hedge funds and private equity firms are investment and speculative businesses and, therefore, are ineligible to receive PPP loans.However, the April 24 IFR created an exception for portfolio companies of private equity firms, which were deemed eligible for PPP loans if the entities met the requirements for affiliated borrowers under the April 2 IFR.4

Recent Sixth Circuit Case

As noted above, the SBA’s SOP did not only deem financial services businesses ineligible to receive PPP loans. Other types of businesses, including without limitation, legal gambling businesses, lobbying firms, businesses promoting religion and businesses providing “prurient sexual material” also were deemed ineligible. Believing that these limitations were inconsistent with a plain reading of the text of the CARES Act, some of these businesses have challenged the SBA’s restrictions imposed pursuant to the April 2 IFR.

On May 11, 2020, the US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan preliminarily enjoined the SBA from enforcing the April 2 IFR to preclude sexually oriented businesses from PPP loans under the CARES Act.5 Plaintiffs were primarily businesses that provided lawful “clothed, semi-nude, and/or nude performance entertainment,” which were considered ineligible businesses for the PPP under the April 2 IFR due to their “prurient” nature.6 The district court found that the CARES Act specifically broadened the class of businesses that are PPP eligible,7 determining that it was clear from the text of the statute that Congress provided “support to all Americans employed by all small businesses.”8 The district court, however, limited the injunction to the plaintiffs and intervenors in the case, noting that it was “not a ‘nationwide injunction’ and did not restrict any future action the SBA may take in connection with applications for PPP loans.”9 The SBA appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and requested a stay of the injunction.10

The Sixth Circuit ultimately denied the SBA’s stay, and agreed with the district court’s interpretation of the CARES Act’s eligibility requirements.11 Specifically, the Sixth Circuit held on May 15 that the CARES Act conferred eligibility to “any business concern,” which aligned with Congress’s intent to provide support to as many displaced American workers as possible. The SBA pointed out that the CARES Act explicitly listed “nonprofit organizations” as eligible for PPP loans, even though “they are ineligible for ordinary SBA loans.”12 The SBA argued that if Congress wanted to include previously ineligible businesses for PPP loans, like sexually oriented businesses, the CARES Act would have listed such entities.13 The Sixth Circuit stated that it was “necessary to specify non-profits because they are not businesses,” which further supported the district court’s expansive interpretation of the CARES Act.14

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion only requires the SBA to issue loans to the businesses that were a party to the underlying lawsuit. The ruling does not require the SBA to make PPP loans to any other businesses that are defined as ineligible in its April 2 IFR. However, as a practical matter, this opinion could be used to support a small business located in Ohio, Pennsylvania or Michigan (i.e., the states within the jurisdictional reach of the Sixth Circuit) in a federal court proceeding initiated prior to the submission of a PPP application requiring the SBA to defend its eligibility criteria in connection with such small business’s specific facts. (Note that an application should not be made without first obtaining a similar legal result as the small business applicant would not otherwise be able to make the certifications necessary to apply for a PPP loan.)

Cases in Other Circuits

In addition to the Sixth Circuit, several other federal courts have struck down the SBA’s imposition of its ineligibility criteria on PPP applicants engaged in sexually oriented businesses. For example, the US District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin on May 1 preliminarily enjoined the SBA from enforcing the April 2 IFR to preclude “erotic dance entertainment” companies from obtaining a PPP loan.15 The SBA argued that because Congress removed some conditions that would ordinarily apply to Section 7(a) SBA loans (such as the PPP eligibility for non-profits), “it must have intended for the SBA to enforce all other conditions.”16 Similar to the Sixth Circuit, the district court found the SBA’s interpretation “highly unlikely” given “Congress’s clear intent to extend PPP loans to all small businesses affected by the pandemic.”17 Additionally, the SBA failed to identify any purpose of either the CARES Act or Section 7(a) that is furthered by the SBA’s exclusion of sexually oriented businesses.18 The SBA appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and requested a stay of the injunction pending appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied the request for a stay on May 20, 2020, but has yet to rule on the merits of the appeal.19

Implications

As of May 21, 2020, roughly $100 billion PPP funds are still available.20 In its recent statutory amendments to the PPP, Congress decided not to address PPP eligibility issues.21 Notwithstanding Congress’s decision not to take action on these issues more recently, financial services businesses deemed ineligible under SBA regulations for PPP loans under the CARES Act should still pay close attention to these cases and whether federal court rulings influence Congress or the SBA to revisit the April 2 IFR.22


1 See US Small Business Administration, Interim Final Rule: Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 20811, (Apr. 15, 2020).

2 See Interim Final Rule at 8, citing 13 C.F.R. § 120.110 and Small Business Administration Standard Operating Procedure 50 10 Subpart B, Chapter 2.

3 See US Small Business Administration, Interim Final Rule: Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program – Requirements – Promissory Notes, Authorizations, Affiliation, and Eligibility, __ Fed. Reg.___, available.

4 According to the April 24 interim final rule, the affiliation requirements are waived if “the borrower receives financial assistance from an SBA-licensed Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) in any amount. This includes any type of financing listed in 13 CFR 107.50, such as loans, debt with equity features, equity, and guarantees. Affiliation is waived even if the borrower has investment from other non-SBIC investors.” Id.

5 DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC, et al. v. SBA, et al., No. 20-1437 (6th Cir. Apr. 15, 2020).

6 Id. at 2.

7 DV Diamond Club of Flint LLC v. SBA, No. 20-cv-10899 (E.D. Mich. May 11, 2020), at 2. The district court stated that 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(D) of the CARES Act specifically “broadened the class of businesses that are eligible to receive SBA financial assistance.” Id. at 9. This section provides, in relevant part, that “‘[d]uring the covered period, in addition to small business concerns, any business concern . . . shall be eligible to receive a covered [i.e., SBA-guaranteed] loan’ if the business employs less than 500 employees or if the business employs less than the size standard in number of employees for the industry,” which is established by the SBA. Id. See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 636(a)(36)(D)(i)(I)-(II).

8 DV Diamond Club, No. 20-cv-10899 (E.D. Mich. May 11, 2020), at 2.

9 Id. at 45.

10 DV Diamond Club, No. 20-1437 (6th Cir. Apr. 15, 2020), at 1.

11 Id. at 4. The Sixth Circuit interpreted the CARES Act under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Id. In Chevron, the Supreme Court stated that if a federal statute can be facially interpreted, “the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.

12 DV Diamond Club, No. 20-1437 (6th Cir. Apr. 15, 2020), at 5.

13 Id.

14 Id. US Circuit Judge Eugene E. Siler Jr. dissented, stating that the CARES Act was ambiguous and the district court’s injunction should be stayed to give time to decide on the merits. Id. at 6. He noted that the CARES Act requires “PPP loans to be administered ‘under the same terms, conditions and processes’” as the SBA’s section 7(a) loans, which would exclude sexually oriented businesses from PPP eligibility. Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(B).

15 Camelot Banquet Rooms, Inc., et al. v. SBA, et al., No. 20-C-061 (E.D. Wis. May 1, 2020), at 27-28. A similar case, filed early May 2020, is currently pending in the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. See Admiral Theatre Inc. v. SBA et al., No. 1:20-cv-02807 (N.D. Ill May 8, 2020).

16 Camelot Banquet Rooms, No. 20-C-061 (E.D. Wis. May 1, 2010), at 15.

17 Id. at 16. In contrast to the Eastern District of Michigan, the Wisconsin federal court did not explicitly limit its injunction to the parties. In light of the potentially serious penalties for ineligible applicants, businesses that are ineligible for the PPP under the April 2 IFR should be cautious about applying for a PPP loan without exploring all options and consequences with counsel.

18 Id.

19Camelot Banquet Rooms, Inc., et al. v. SBA, et al., No. 20-1729 (7th Cir. May 20, 2020). In contrast to the Sixth and Seventh Circuit rulings, the US District Court for the District of Columbia denied an injunction to enjoin the SBA from making an eligibility determination for the PPP under the CARES Act. Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants v. SBA, No. 20-970 (D.D.C. April 21, 2020). Plaintiffs, a trade association of political consultants and lobbyists, argued that the denial of PPP loans under the SBA’s April 2 IFR due to the political nature of their businesses violated plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Id. at 1-2. The district court ruled that it was constitutionally valid for the SBA to decide “what industries to stimulate” with PPP loans. Id. at 11. The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on April 22, 2020. Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants, Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 22 (D.D.C. April 22, 2020).

20 Kate Rogers, More than half of small businesses are looking to have PPP funds forgiven, survey says, CNBC News (May 21, 2020), available at https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/21/more-than-half-of-small-businesses-are-looking-for-ppp-forgiveness.html.

21 On June 3, 2020, Congress passed the Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act (“PPP Flexibility Act”), which modified certain provisions of the PPP. H.R. 7010, 116th Cong. (2020), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7010/text?r=12&s=1. At a high level, the PPP Flexibility Act: 1) extends the PPP to December 31, 2020; 2) extends the covered period for purposes of loan forgiveness from 8 weeks to the earlier of 24 weeks or December 31, 2020; 3) extends the covered period for purposes of loan forgiveness from 8 weeks to the earlier of 24 weeks or December 31, 2020; 4) increases the current limit on non-payroll expenses from 25% to 40%; 5) extends the maturity date on the portion of a PPP loan that is not forgiven from 2 years to 5 years; and 6) defers payroll taxes for businesses that take PPP loans.

22 IFRs are subject to public comment under the Administrative Procedures Act. The particular comment period of the April 2 IFR expired on May 15, 2020.


©2020 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

For more on business’ PPP loan eligibility, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act of 2020 – Changes To The CARES Act

On Wednesday, June 3, 2020, the U.S. Senate passed the Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act of 2020 (“Act”) by voice vote.  The bill had passed the U.S. House on May 28 nearly unanimously.  It now heads to the President’s desk for signature.

Summary of Key Provisions

The Act provides important new flexibility to borrowers in the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) in a number of key respects:

Loan Maturity Date: The Act extends the maturity date of the PPP loans (i.e. any portion of a PPP loan that is not forgiven) from 2 years to 5 years.  This provision of the Act only affects borrowers whose PPP loans are disbursed after its enactment.  With respect to already existing PPP loans, the Act states specifically that nothing in the Act will “prohibit lenders and borrowers from mutually agreeing to modify the maturity terms of a covered loan.”

Deadline to Use the Loan Proceeds: The Act extends the “covered period” with respect to loan forgiveness from the original 8 week period after the loan is disbursed to the earlier of 24 weeks after the loan is disbursed or December 31, 2020.  Current borrowers who have received their loans prior to the enactment of the Act may nevertheless elect the shorter 8 week period.

Forgivable Uses of the Loan Proceeds: The Act raises the cap on the amount of forgivable loan proceeds that borrowers may use on non-payroll expenses from 25% to 40%.  The Act does not affect the PPP’s existing restrictions on borrowers’ use of the loan proceeds to eligible expenses: payroll and benefits; interest (but not principal) on mortgages or other existing debt; rent; and utilities.

Safe Harbor for Rehiring Workers: Loan forgiveness under the PPP remains subject to reduction in proportion to any reduction in a borrower’s full-time equivalent employees (“FTEs”) against prior staffing level benchmarks.  The Act extends the PPP’s existing safe harbor deadline to December 31, 2020: borrowers who furloughed or laid-off workers will not be subject to a loan forgiveness reduction due to reduced FTE count as long as they restore their FTEs by the deadline.

New Exemptions from Rehiring Workers: The Act also adds two exemptions to the PPP’s loan forgiveness reduction penalties.  Firstly, the forgiveness amount will not be reduced due to a reduced FTE count if the borrower can document that they attempted, but were unable, to rehire individuals who had been employees on February 15, 2020 (this codifies a PPP FAQ answer discussed on a previous post) and have been unable to hire “similarly qualified employees” before December 31, 2020.  Secondly, the forgiveness will not be reduced due to a reduced FTE count if the borrower, in good faith, can document an inability to return to the “same level of business activity” as prior to February 15, 2020 due to sanitation, social distancing, and worker or customer safety requirements.

Loan Deferral Period: The Act extends the loan deferral period to (a) whenever the amount of loan forgiveness is remitted to the lender or (b) 10 months after the applicable forgiveness covered period if a borrower does not apply for forgiveness during that 10 month period.  Under the unamended PPP, a borrower’s deferral period was to be between 6 and 12 months.

Payroll Tax Deferral: The Act lifts the ban on borrowers whose loans were partially or completely forgiven from deferring payment of payroll taxes.  The payroll tax deferral is now open to all PPP borrowers.

Summary

The Act provides much-needed flexibility to businesses who needed to spend PPP loan proceeds but could not open in order to do so.  As with the initial rollout of the PPP, it will be up to the Department of the Treasury and the Small Business Administration to provide regulations with respect to the Act.


© 2020 SHERIN AND LODGEN LLP

For more on the PPP, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

Get Closer With Your Contracts During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Contracts with customers, vendors, or other parties are a normal part of doing business.  Most businesses are party to numerous contracts and although it may seem that contracts are fairly standard documents, the reality is that each individual document is its own legally binding arrangement.  The parties to contracts often customize the arrangements to suit the particular business conditions or economics of the relationship.

Most businesses neither fuss over nor spend a lot of time on the contract provisions that allocate risk between the parties (outside of the major issues of payment and performance).  During extraordinary times, such as the current COVID-19 pandemic, business owners may not realize that the “roadmap” to their relationships with their business partners is usually in the often unread details of their business contracts.

Just as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides guidance to prepare individuals, families and their households for natural disasters or political unrest, a well-prepared business owner has created a plan of their own for how their business will respond to unforeseen situations.  Understanding how a business might be impacted by the contracts they are party to should be part of that planning.  Even now, as we continue to face uncertainty as to when businesses will fully reopen as the pandemic begins to recede, it is not too late to assess how this may impact your contractual relationships.

Here are ideas and important things to keep in mind while reviewing your contracts:

  • Take stock of your most important contracts. Where are they located?  Are they easily accessible?  When was the last time they were reviewed?  Are you readily familiar with the provisions in each?  Now is a perfect time to organize those contracts into a system that allows those in your organization to quickly refer to them as needed.
  • Pay special attention to contracts with customers or vendors which are or may be impacted the most heavily by the economic uncertainty surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • Several remedies are available to contracting parties to enable them to excuse performance or protect themselves in a situation such as an epidemic, civil unrest or natural disaster. The “force majeure” clause is a well-known provision included in many contracts that excuses performance during certain unforeseen and highly adverse situations.  Included in the definition of force majeure is often a laundry list of events where a party’s performance obligation is excused.  I am seeing more efforts by parties in recent draft contracts to specifically exclude pandemics such as COVID-19 from the scope of force majeure, just as contracts written after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack often specifically excluded terrorist events.  However, most force majeure clauses have a specific exclusion regarding payment obligations, which require the paying party to make payment to the other party regardless of the occurrence of a force majeure event.  It is important to review your contract to determine which contain force majeure clauses and under what particular circumstance a party is excused from performance.  If you are currently negotiating a contract, pay particular attention to the force majeure clause and how that may affect future unforeseen circumstances.
  • Rights of termination and damages for breach are often clearly spelled out in contracts. Be familiar with those triggering events and any provisions providing for damages, including liquidated damages.  Keep in mind that the normal business of the state court system has also been affected by this pandemic, so your ability to obtain relief or damages will be limited or delayed for the foreseeable future.  In light of that, alternative dispute resolution (such as mediation or arbitration), if permitted under the contract or as the parties otherwise agree, may be your best bet to get a prompt resolution.
  • Be careful about entering into any course of business that deviates from the written terms of the contract. This comes into play in two areas in particular.  First, if the parties agree to or engage in a course of practice that deviates from the written terms of the contract, it may be difficult for a party moving forward to enforce terms of the contract as written following that deviation.  The second scenario includes one of the parties waiving their right(s) in the contract (usually for a reason that makes good business sense in the current state of affairs).  Businesses will want to make sure that any departure from the written contract during the current pandemic, or otherwise, does not become the “new normal” and undercut important legal rights within their contract.
  • If the contract is silent on a particular aspect, the answer can often be found in statutory law. The Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) provides “standard” rules for purchases and sales, leases, and other transactions.

Keep in mind that there is no requirement that a contract that is not beneficial to either or all parties be rigidly adhered to if the parties are willing to amend the contract or enter into a new contract altogether.  The key to staying afloat or even thriving in business in general, but especially during extraordinary times such as these, is flexibility and willingness to adapt.  Remember that contracts which have been altered to account for an event such as the COVID-19 pandemic may not be as sound once the economy bounces back, so do some mental visioning about where your business needs to be when returning to “business as usual” so that your contracts put you where you want to be.

If you have any concerns with how your contracts are being interpreted or administered during the COVID-19 pandemic, an attorney can be an important resource to prevent loss and ensure the continuing health of your business.


© 2020 Davis|Kuelthau, s.c. All Rights Reserved

Legislation Enabling Policyholders to Obtain Insurance Coverage for Coronavirus Claims is Constitutional Part 1

On top of its human toll, the coronavirus pandemic has had massive economic effects.  Stay-at-home orders, which remain in place in much of the United States, have resulted in massive layoffs, spiraling claims for unemployment compensation, and unprecedented federal aid.

Many businesses affected by the pandemic have turned to their insurers seeking “business interruption” coverage.  As its name suggests, this coverage typically reimburses the policyholder for costs incurred when the business is unable to open.  Insurers have denied policyholders’ pandemic-related claims, contending that they only have to cover business interruption that results from a “physical injury” and that the damage that results from infestation with the coronavirus or a governmental shutdown order does not constitute “physical injury.”  Insurers have also cited the exclusions in many of their policies that purport to bar coverage for virus-related injuries.

Legislative Responses to the Crisis

One response to the insurance industry’s position has been introduction of legislation voiding virus exclusions and/or defining physical injury to include coronavirus.  New Jersey, Massachusetts, Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina are all considering such legislation.  The proposed bills generally provide that, notwithstanding any other law or policy language to the contrary, every insurance policy that insures against loss or damage to property which includes the loss of use and occupancy and business interruption shall be construed to include coverage for business interruption resulting from COVID-19.  The bills typically provide mechanisms for insurers to seek reimbursement from a state established and managed fund for losses paid related to COVID-19.

Insurance Industry Responses to the Proposed Legislation

Predictably, the insurance industry has objected to this legislation.  For example, in a recent interview, Evan Greenberg, CEO of Chubb, said in an interview on CNBC state governments can’t force insurance companies to cover incidents not included in the policy.  “You can’t just retroactively change a contract. That is plainly unconstitutional,” Greenberg told “Mad Money” host Jim Cramer.  See https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/16/chubb-ceo-making-insurers-cover-pandemic-losses-is-unconstitutional.html.

Law firms that defend insurers have similarly argued that “This proposed legislation …., is unfair and is likely unconstitutional, as it appears to run afoul of the Contracts Clause of the Constitution.”   That Clause prohibits States from “pass[ing] any . . .  Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”  U. S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 10.  The insurer lawyers contend that “the proposed legislation would substantially impair insurance policies, as [it] would operate to rewrite policies to cause them to cover a risk they do not currently cover.…”   While acknowledging that the Supreme Court has upheld state laws that impair contracts, so long as they are reasonably tailored to fulfill a legitimate interest, insurer counsel contend that such laws are still unconstitutional.  Counsel claim that the proposed laws do not fulfill a legitimate interest because they “arguably benefit[] only a narrow class of businesses; the public at-large is only an indirect beneficiary.”  Id.  And counsel assert that the proposed laws are not “appropriate and reasonable” because they “attempt[] to shift the responsibility of providing financial assistance to small businesses from the government to certain insurance companies. . . .” Id.

Why the Insurance Industry Is Wrong about the Contracts Clause

This analysis is simply mistaken.  The case law interpreting the Contracts Clause demonstrates that legislation designed to provide relief to policyholders is constitutional.

As discussed below, under the cases, courts have established a balancing test that weighs the extent to which the challenged legislation contravenes contractual expectations against the purpose of the legislation and the means used to achieve that purpose.  Under that test, the proposed legislation is constitutional.

Basic Principles

The range of state legislative actions that can affect contractual relationships is broad. For instance, a state statute may render a contract wholly illegal.  See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 819 (1879) (upholding state statute outlawing lottery against claim that it violated contract rights of lottery company).  Or a statute may directly change the term of a contract.  E.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 3 (1977) (state law abrogated covenant in contract with holders of state bonds); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 416 (1934) (state law modified foreclosure provisions in mortgages).  Even a law that has nothing to do with either the express terms of the contract or its subject matter can affect the parties’ allocation of risk, such as a law that changes the statute of limitations for contract actions.  See J. Ely, Jr., Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause?, 4 Charleston L. Rev. 371, 377 & n.48 (2010) (discussing Contracts Clause cases involving statutes of limitations).

Yet, as the Supreme Court has made clear, “it is not every modification of a contractual promise that impairs the obligation of contract under federal law.”  City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 506–07 (1965).  Even though the language of the Contracts Clause is  “facially absolute,” Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 (1983), “the prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts is not to be read literally,” Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 502.  Rather, “[t]he States must possess broad power to adopt general regulatory measures without being concerned the private contracts will be impaired, or even destroyed, as a result.”  United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. at 22.  In other words, the ban on impairment of contracts “must be accommodated to the inherent police power of the State ‘to safeguard the vital interests of its people.’’’  Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 410, quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 434.

Though not specifically referenced in the Constitution, the “police power” gives state legislatures broad leeway to pass laws to protect the public health, safety, and welfare.  The classic case is Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879).  There, a state statute outlawing lotteries was challenged by a company that had previously obtained a charter from the state to run a lottery.  Rejecting the challenge, the Court held that the state’s power to shield the public from the evils of gambling trumped the contract rights of the lottery company.  Id. at 819.  Over time, the definition of the police power expanded to include a wide variety of laws designed to protect the public.  See, e.g., Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934) (Great Depression “furnished a proper occasion for the exercise of the reserved power of the State to protect the vital interests of the community” by providing for mortgage relief for financially strapped homeowners); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905) (even if contract for sale of alcohol was permissible when made, state could later prohibit such sales without violating Contracts Clause).

As we’ll discuss in the next part of this post, since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has generally applied these principles to uphold state legislation against challenges brought under the Contracts Clause.  We’ll also discuss how these basic principles have been applied by lower courts in insurance coverage cases and why we think the proposed legislation passes muster under the Constitution.


© 2020 Gilbert LLP

For more business policies & the coronavirus, see the National Law Review Insurance, Reinsurance, and Surety law section.

Best Practices for Commercial Property Owners/ Operators: Phase One of Reopening the Economy

The Federal Coronavirus Task Force issued a three-stage plan last week to reopen the economy, where authorities in each state – not the federal government – will decide when it is safe to reopen shops, schools, restaurants, movie theaters, sporting arenas and other facilities that were closed to minimize community spread of the deadly virus. Once phase one is adopted in certain states, businesses that reopen will need to be prepared to take certain precautions to meet their common law duty to provide and maintain reasonably safe premises.

Phase One

The first stage of the plan will affect certain segments of society and businesses differently. For example, schools and organized youth activities that are currently closed, such as day care, should remain closed. The guidance also says that bars should remain closed. However, larger venues such as movie theaters, churches, ballparks and arenas may open and operate but under strict distancing protocols. If possible, employers should follow recommendations from the federal guidance to have workers return to their jobs in phases.

Also, under phase one vulnerable individuals such as older people and those with underlying health conditions should continue to shelter in place. Individuals who do go out should avoid socializing in groups of more than 10 people in places that don’t provide for appropriate physical distancing. Trade shows and receptions, for example, are the types of events that should be avoided. Unnecessary travel also should be avoided.

Assuming the infection rate continues to drop, then the second phase will see schools, day care centers and bars reopening; crowds of up to 50 permitted; and vacation travel resuming. The final stage would permit the elderly and immunologically compromised to participate in social settings. There is no timeline prescribed, however, for any of these phases.

Precautionary Basics

Once businesses are reopened during phase one, there are several common sense and intuitive safety practices that business owners/operators must absolutely ensure are in place to meet their common law duty to provide a reasonably safe environment for those present on their premises.

The guidelines issued by the CDC are the core protocols that form the baseline for minimal safety precautions: persistent hand washing, use of masks/gloves and strict social distancing.

Additional Measures

Given the highly infectious nature of the virus, the fact that it is capable of being transmitted by asymptomatic people who are nonetheless infected, and the apparent viability of transmission through recirculated air or via HVAC systems without negative pressure (per a recent report from China about transmission from one restaurant customer to several others via the air circulation system), there is nothing that reasonably can be adopted that will effectively and readily ensure that a business is completely free of someone who is infected and capable of spreading the virus.

As such, additional measures are advisable beyond the CDC protocols, such as robust cleaning/hygienic regimens/complimentary wipes and hand sanitizer for common areas, buttons and handles; and the necessary protections for employees who interact with the public (e.g., shielding and protective gear for checkout clerks at the supermarket or lobby desk/check-in personnel in hotels and office buildings). In addition, it would not be unreasonable or unduly intrusive to check the temperatures (via no-touch infrared devices) of those entering the premises. In the absence of available portable, instant and unobtrusive virus testing methods, temperature readings are the most practical and reasonable precautionary measure beyond the CDC baseline deterrents.

Conscientious and infallible implementation of maintenance, housekeeping and hygiene protocols for the commercial, hospitality, retail and restaurant industries also will be critical to mitigate potential liability claims for negligently failing to provide an environment reasonably safe from the spread of coronavirus.

Advisability of Warnings

Aside from conspicuously publicizing – via posted signage or announcements – the CDC guidelines relating to persistent hand washing, use of masks/gloves and strict social distancing, the need to warn of the potential for – or a history of – infections generally is not considered to be necessary or essential unless there is an imminent threat of a specific foreseeable harm.

Unless there is a specific condition leading to a cluster of infections within a particular property (unlikely given the ubiquity of the disease and community spread, but the reporting would be to the CDC or local health authorities in such an instance), or an isolated circumstance that can be identified to be the source of likely infections to others who proximately were exposed, there is no need or obligation under existing law or regulatory guidelines to report generally that someone who tested positive for the virus may have been on a particular property.

Moreover, unless the business is an employer who administers a self-funded health plan (who are thus charged with the duty to maintain “protected health information”), businesses that are not health providers are not subject to HIPAA; as such, concerns about HIPAA violations are misplaced to the extent that the identity of someone who is infected is somehow disclosed or otherwise required to be disseminated by a business not otherwise charged with the duty to maintain “protected health information.”

A Coordinated Approach

While the CDC’s guidelines are important, they are not exclusive. Businesses planning to reopen also should consider regulations and guidelines from a number of other sources, including OSHA and state and local departments of public health.


© 2020 Wilson Elser

For more on reopening the economy, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

A Glut of “Opportunistic” Margin Calls: Are Creditors Moving Too Quickly to Seize Assets?

What can companies expect from their funding sources as COVID-19 does damage to the economy? In at least some instances, perhaps, opportunistic attempts by lenders to illegally take control of business assets. A real estate investment trust (REIT) in New York alleges in a new lawsuit that it has already fallen victim to that type of misconduct.

AG Mortgage Investment Trust Inc. (AG) filed suit against the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) on March 25 for allegedly taking advantage of the pandemic to unlawfully seize the trust’s assets and sell them at below-market prices. AG says RBC is just one of many banks that are now trying to trigger margin calls on entities like AG. It alleges that RBC is doing so by applying “opportunistic and unfounded” markdowns on mortgage-based assets. A margin call then occurs, according to AG, with RBC contending that the value of a margin account — an investment account with assets bought with borrowed money — has fallen, requiring the borrower either to make up the difference with more collateral or have the asset seized. RBC, the suit further alleges, is being unreasonable in its valuations. Having seized assets based on what AG calls an “entirely subjective and self-serving calculation” of true market value, RBC then auctioned off $11 million worth of AG’s commercial mortgage-backed securities.

Two days before filing the suit, AG had warned in a statement that it might not be able to satisfy the glut of margin calls it now faces from lending banks like RBC, as coronavirus crisis fears and fallout cripple the mortgage-based asset market. In its complaint, AG asserts that rampant, unwarranted margin calls have brought the nation’s mortgage-based REITs “to the brink of collapse.” AG notes, however, that unlike RBC, most banks have thus far agreed to hold back on taking action against those trusts’ assets — for the time being, at least.
“Recognizing the aberrant state of the markets, most banks have stopped short of taking precipitous steps that could push the mREIT industry into the abyss. This action is brought to stop one outlier bank—Royal Bank of Canada—that has not stopped short but is instead hitting the accelerator to unlawfully seize and unload a large portfolio of Plaintiffs’ assets at fire-sale prices into the seized markets which will have a cascading effect in the market for mortgage-based assets, and potentially the entire U.S. economy. These consequences are likely to undermine the emergent efforts currently being undertaken by federal and state agencies to provide breathing room and help stabilize the economy.”

Hours after filing its suit, AG sought a temporary restraining order to halt the auction. The auction had already begun that day by the time the judge had a chance to review AG’s request. RBC must soon respond to AG’s complaint, and, as the case progresses, will have to defend itself against AG’s claims for damages. If AG’s perception of a glut of unjustified margin calls is shared by other business entities, we should expect many similar suits to follow.


© 2020 Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP

For more COVID-19 related business news, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

COVID-19: Paycheck Protection Program: Is this the solution you have been waiting for?

The $2.2 trillion coronavirus stimulus bill enacted by Congress on March 27 provides immediate cash assistance to small businesses that keep their employees or recall employees they have furloughed or laid off due to financial hardships related to COVID-19.  The money is available through a Small Business Administration (SBA) loan program that allows businesses to keep the loan proceeds as a grant for eligible expenses, including payroll, for the period between February 15 and June 30, 2020.

This program, called the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), is a powerful tool for businesses with fewer than 500 employees to get immediate assistance with meeting operating expenses, with the prospect of not having to repay some or all of the loan.  It’s also available for nonprofits.

Here are the highlights of the program:

Maximum Loan Amount

  • The PPP raises the maximum amount for an SBA loan by 2.5x the average total monthly payroll cost, or up to $10 million.  The interest rate may not exceed 4%.

Qualified Costs

  • Payroll costs

  • Continuation of health care benefits

  • Employee compensation (for those making less than $100,000)

  • Mortgage interest obligations

  • Rent on any lease in force prior to February 15, 2020

  • Utilities

  • Interest on debt incurred before the covered period

Businesses Eligible to Obtain These Loans

  • Businesses with fewer than 500 employees.

  • Small businesses as defined by the Small Business Administration (SBA) Size Standards at 13 C.F.R. 121.201.

  • 501(c)(3) nonprofits, 501(c)(19) veteran’s organization, and Tribal business concern described in section 31(b)(2)(C) of the Small Business Act with not more than 500 employees.

  • Hotels, motels, restaurants, and franchises with fewer than 500 employees at each physical location without regard to affiliation under 13 C.F.R. 121.103.

  • Businesses that receive financial assistance from Small Business Investment Act Companies licensed under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 without regard to affiliation under 13 C.F.R. 121.10.

  • Sole proprietors and independent contractors.

Loan Forgiveness

All or a portion of the loan may be forgivable, and debt service payments may be deferred for up to one year.  The amount forgiven will be reduced proportionally by any reduction in employees retained compared to the prior year and reduced by the reduction in pay of any employee beyond 25% of their prior year compensation. To encourage employers to rehire any employees who have already been laid off due to the COVID-19 crisis, borrowers that rehire workers previously laid off will not be penalized for having a reduced payroll at the beginning of the period.

Application Process

Current lenders through the Small Business Administration 7(a) are authorized to make determinations on borrower eligibility and creditworthiness without going through the SBA.  These lenders can be found here. For eligibility purposes, lenders will not be determining eligibility based on repayment ability, but rather whether the business was operational on February 15, 2020, and had employees for whom it paid salaries and payroll taxes, or a paid independent contractor.

Timeline

The SBA is required to issue implementing regulations within 15 days, and the U.S. Department of Treasury will be approving new lenders.


©2020 Pierce Atwood LLP. All rights reserved.