Tag: business

SCOTUS Freezes States’ Efforts to Resolve Water Conflict

What Happened?

On June 21, 2024, the Supreme Court narrowly held that three states could not enter a consent decree to settle their interstate water dispute without the support of the intervening federal government. The ruling halts the agreement between Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado to settle Texas’s claims and reconfigure water allocation under the Rio Grande Compact going forward. The decision frustrates multi-year efforts by the states to fairly apportion shrinking water supplies and continues uncertainty for water users dependent on flows from the Rio Grande. More generally, the decision highlights the federal government’s power in cases arising under interstate compacts where federal interests are “inextricably intertwined” with the outcome.

Background

In 2013, Texas sued New Mexico and Colorado, claiming that New Mexico’s increased groundwater pumping was diminishing flows from the Rio Grande, unfairly shorting water allocated to the Lonestar state. This claim arose under the Rio Grande Compact, a 1938 allocation agreement between the three states that depend on the Rio Grande’s waters. The Supreme Court allowed the federal government, although not a party to the Compact, to intervene in the dispute in 2014, based on the federal interests in delivering water to Mexico under a 1906 treaty, in operating a Bureau of Reclamation reservoir and irrigation project closely connected to Compact compliance, and in fulfilling potential federal obligations to Indian tribes. The Supreme Court held that the federal government’s interests were “inextricably intertwined” with the case.

Since that decision, the states sought a compromise, recognizing that the 1938 Compact failed to predict severe droughts and dwindling water supplies, new circumstances that require adaptation. Despite this negotiated solution, the federal government refused to sign the agreement. The federal government claimed that the settlement undermines the Compact’s plain language, which cannot be modified without congressional approval, and that the negotiated agreement would impose new obligations on the federal reservoir and irrigation project. Based on its intervenor status, the federal government asked the Supreme Court to reject the deal in the absence of its consent.

Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Jackson explained that the Court’s 2018 decision to allow federal claims in the case to proceed “leads inexorably” to the federal government’s approval being necessary before a valid resolution. Justice Gorsuch, writing for the dissent, cautioned that this deference to the intervenor risks federalizing interstate water disputes and limiting the necessary discretion for states to independently manage their waters. Despite previously authoring a unanimous 2018 decision that green-lighted the federal claims, his dissent pointed back to “a century’s worth” of precedent, holding that the Reclamation Act requires the federal government to comply with state control of water resources and not to assert incompatible federal interests. The majority reasoned, by contrast, that the federal government’s interest was particular to the Compact, where compliance depends on federal action.

Analysis

The Court’s acknowledgment of the federal interest in the three states aligning Rio Grande Compact compliance with contemporary water realities is expressly tailored to the unique federal role in this situation. The problem the Court focused on was the proposed resolution’s failure to include the federal government, given its intervenor status and its integral role in managing a reservoir and irrigation project essential to the Compact. This does not authorize federal interference in all interstate water compacts, as the dissent fears, but others may be “inextricably intertwined” with federal interests. Still, the pointed dissent may signal that a significant court minority stands ready to guard state control of water resources when the federal government overreaches. The decision’s immediate impact will perpetuate uncertainty for water users in all three states as the parties are forced back to trial or the negotiating table.

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Cracks Down on Employer Non-Disclosure Provisions

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) has now joined the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in taking a stand against broad non-disclosure provisions in employment agreements.

Last week, the CFTC announced a settlement with Trafigura Trading LLC, in which the company agreed to pay a $55 million penalty, in part because it required employees to sign agreements that impeded voluntary communications with the CFTC.

In its decision, the CFTC specifically found:

Between July 31, 2017 and 2020, Trafigura required its employees to sign employment agreements, and requested that former employees sign separation agreements, with broad non-disclosure provisions that prohibited the sharing of Trafigura’s confidential information with third parties. These nondisclosure provisions did not contain carve-out language expressly permitting communications with law enforcement or regulators like the Commission.

The CFTC concluded that such non-disclosure provisions violate Regulation 165.19(b), 17 C.F.R. § 165.19(b) (2023), implementing Section 23(h)-(j) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 26(h)–(j), even without any additional actions impeding communications.

As a result of this finding, among others involving misappropriation of material nonpublic information and manipulative conduct, the CFTC not only levied a significant fine on Trafigura, but imposed a host of conditions and undertakings with which Trafigura was required to comply. Relevant here, the CFTC required that Trafigura modify its non-disclosure provisions to include language making clear that “no term in any such Agreement should be understood to limit or prevent the filing of a complaint with; or voluntary, lawful communication with; or disclosure of information to any federal, state, or local governmental regulatory or law enforcement agency.”

Director of the Whistleblower Office Brian Young commented, “This is the first CFTC action charging a company under regulations designed to prevent interference with whistleblower communications. This groundbreaking action demonstrates the CFTC’s commitment to protecting potential whistleblowers and puts the market on notice that the CFTC will not tolerate contractual arrangements that could impede communication by potential witnesses.”

We have long reported on the SEC’s targeting of employment agreements. With the CFTC following suit, employers should expect additional agencies to scrutinize language in employment agreements, separation agreements and other employment-related documents, such as employee handbooks and Codes of Conduct. To minimize such scrutiny and exposure employers should take action to modify non-disclosure and other provisions such as non-disparagement and confidentiality clauses that might have the purpose or effect of impeding agency communications. Such modifications must include carve-out language clarifying that nothing precludes current and former employees from communicating in any way with a government agency, such as the CFTC or the SEC. It is more important than ever for employers to work with counsel to conduct a comprehensive review of their policies, practices, and agreements for language that such agencies may find problematic.

©2024 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.
For more news on Employer Non-Disclosure Provisions, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

The SEC Continues Its War On Crime Victims

More than a decade ago, I expressed concern when the Securities and Exchange Commission charged Koss Corporation and one its CEO, Mr. Koss, with filing materially false financial statements after the corporation had discovered that it had been the victim of employee embezzlement. In the post, I decried the SEC’s decision to punish the victims of crime:

The SEC’s decision to prosecute this case is troubling. Surely, neither Koss Corporation nor Mr. Koss intended or wanted to be the victim of a criminal embezzlement. It is also hard to see how the shareholders’ benefited from the company incurring the legal costs associated with defending and settling the SEC investigation. While the SEC did force the return of bonus compensation, the injunctive relief ordering the company and Mr. Koss not to do this again strikes me as silly. Does it really make sense for the court to order a company not to be the victim of a theft?

I was therefore heartened by the recent statement by Commissioners Hester Peirce and Mark Uyeda on the SEC’s recent settlement of administrative proceeding against R.R. Donnelly & Sons, Co.:

Also concerning is the Commission’s decision to stretch the law to punish a company that was the victim of a cyberattack. While an enforcement action may be warranted in some circumstances, distorting a statutory provision to form the basis for such an action inappropriately amplifies a company’s harm from a cyberattack.

According to the SEC’s press release, R.R. Donnelly & Sons, Co. “cooperated throughout the investigation, including by reporting the cybersecurity incident to staff prior to filing a disclosure of the incident, by providing meaningful cooperation that helped expedite the staff’s investigation, and by voluntarily adopting new cybersecurity technology and controls”. Nonetheless, the SEC thought a just resolution required payment of a $2.125 million civil penalty for transfer to the U.S. Treasury. I remain unconvinced that the expropriation of millions of dollars from a crime victim to the U.S. Treasury protects, much less helps, the shareholders of R.R. Donnelly & Sons, Co.

© 2010-2024 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP
For more news on SEC Punishing Crime Victims, visit the NLR Securities SEC section.

Supreme Court Rules Against Taxpayers in IRC Section 965 Case

On June 20, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a 7-2 opinion in Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. __ (2024), ruling in favor of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

Moore concerned whether US Congress and the IRS could tax US shareholders of controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) on those corporations’ earnings even though the earnings were not distributed to the shareholders. The case specifically focused on the so-called “mandatory repatriation tax” under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 965, a one-time tax on certain undistributed income of a CFC that is payable not by the CFC but by its US shareholders. Some viewed the case as hinging upon whether Congress has the power to tax economic gains that have not been “realized.” (i.e., In the case of a house whose value has appreciated from $500,000 to $600,000, the increased value is “realized” only when the house is sold and the additional $100,000 reaches the taxpayer’s coffers.)

However, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson, rejected that position on the ground that the mandatory repatriation tax “does tax realized income,” albeit income realized by a CFC. On this basis, they reasoned that the question at issue was whether Congress has the power to attribute realized income of a CFC to (and tax) US shareholders on their respective shares of the undistributed income. This group of justices ultimately decided Congress does have the power.

The majority went out of its way to avoid expressing any opinion as to whether Congress can tax unrealized appreciation, with Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s concurrence and Justice Clarence Thomas’s dissent asserting that it cannot. Perhaps the Court was signaling a distaste for the Billionaire Minimum Income Tax proposed by US President Joe Biden, which would impose a minimum 20% tax on the total income of the wealthiest American households, including both realized and unrealized amounts, among other Democratic proposals.

Practice Point: We previously noted that certain taxpayers should consider filing protective refund claims contingent on the possibility that Moore would be decided in favor of the taxpayers. In light of the case’s outcome, however, those protective claims are now moot.

© 2024 McDermott Will & Emery
For more news on US Shareholders of Foreign Corporations Taxes, visit the NLR Tax section.

Junk Science or Relevant Evidence: Supreme Court Says Experts May Now Aid in Determining Criminal Intent

In criminal cases, oftentimes the most significant element in dispute is whether the defendant harbored the intent to “knowingly” or “willfully” violate the criminal law at issue. If the defendant denies that he knew what he was doing was illegal, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the required mens rea — or mental state — to violate the law. The government does this by presenting circumstantial evidence that it argues supports a reasonable inference that the defendant had the required mental state to violate the law. And defense lawyers test that evidence largely on cross examination and by presenting counterevidence.

The more complicated the law — think tax, securities, or federal election conduit contribution laws — the riskier it is that a person can be held criminally liable for what seemed like innocent or at least not illegal conduct. In these cases, experts may be called to testify about how a certain industry or regulatory regime is structured or how it operates, and the parties can argue to the jury whether the facts of the case circumstantially prove the reasonable inference that the defendant knowingly or willfully violated a criminal law related to that industry or regulatory regime. But Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) prohibits an expert from stating an opinion about whether a criminal defendant “did or did not have the mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.” FRE 704(b) was adopted in response to President Ronald Reagan’s shooter, John Hinkley, being found not guilty by reason of insanity after competing experts offered opinions on the ultimate issue of Hinkley’s sanity. So FRE 704(b) now requires that a jury alone must decide whether the defendant intended to commit a crime. And the answer to this question is often the difference between freedom or years in prison.

In Diaz v. United States, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2024 WL 3056012 (June 20, 2024), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that FRE 704(b) does not preclude expert testimony about the likelihood that the defendant intended to commit a crime based on the defendant’s membership in a particular group. Diaz was charged with “knowingly” transporting drugs across the U.S.-Mexican border. She argued the “blind mule” defense: she did not know there were drugs in the car, therefore she did not knowingly transport them. The government called as an expert a Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent to testify that “in most circumstances, the driver knows they are hired to take drugs from point A to point B.” The Agent said that drug-trafficking organizations would expose themselves to too much risk by using unknowing couriers. The Agent admitted on cross examination that he was not involved in Diaz’s case, and that drug-trafficking organizations sometimes use unknowing couriers. The jury found Diaz guilty and she was sentenced to 84 months in prison.

Diaz argued that the Agent’s expert testimony violated FRE 704(b)’s proscription of expert’s providing opinions about whether a defendant did or did not have the required state of mind to violate the law. The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion that the Agent’s expert testimony did not violate FRE 704(b) because the expert “did not express an opinion about whether Diaz herself knowingly transported [drugs].” Instead, he testified that “most” drug couriers know they are hired to drive drugs from point A to point B. “That opinion does not necessarily describe Diaz’s mental state. After all, Diaz may or may not be like most drug couriers.” The Court acknowledged that it would have violated Rule 704(b) if the Agent had testified that “all” drug couriers know they are transporting drugs, since Diaz would be included in that drug courier group thus making it an opinion about Diaz’s mental state.

The Court said that FRE 704(b) only proscribes expert opinions “in a criminal case that are about a particular person (‘the defendant’) and a particular ultimate issue (whether the defendant has ‘a mental state or condition’ that is ‘an element of the crime charged or of a defense.’).” Because the Agent “did not give an opinion ‘about whether’ Diaz herself ‘did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense,’ his testimony did not violate Rule 704(b).”

In her concurrence, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson inferred that “what’s good for the goose is good for the gander” when she wrote that criminal defendants were now free to offer expert testimony “‘on the likelihood’ that the defendant had a particular mental state, ‘based on the defendant’s membership in a particular group.’” For example, “Diaz could have offered expert testimony on the prevalence and characteristics of unknowing drug couriers.” Justice Jackson said that the Diaz opinion will now allow psychiatrists to testify as experts “to tell the jury that when people with schizophrenia as severe as a defendant’s commit acts of violence, it is generally because they do not appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct.” This would not create a “spectacle of dueling experts on the defendant’s mental state,” Justice Jackson wrote, but instead “could help jurors better understand a defendant’s condition and thereby call into question a mens rea that might otherwise be too easily assumed…given the biases, stereotypes, and uneven knowledge that many people have about mental health conditions.”

Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote a terse dissent that was joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. The dissent said the Agent’s probabilistic assessment that “most” couriers know they are transporting drugs violated FRE 704(b) because it was a statement “about whether the defendant” had a “mental state . . . that constitutes an element of the crime charged.” The word “about” is defined as “concerning, regarding, with regard to, with reference to; in the matter of.” And according to the dissent, expert testimony about what most drug couriers know was testimony about the likelihood of what Diaz knew. Justice Gorsuch warned of “warring experts” on the issue of a defendant’s intent, which he says will make the criminal justice system less reliable as lawyers may try and find probabilistic expert opinions on intent rather than doing the hard work of gathering circumstantial evidence and arguing about what that evidence reasonably infers about a defendant’s intent.

© 2024 Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone PLC

Supreme Court Upholds Refusal to Register Trademark Containing the Name of Living Individual – Donald Trump

In a recent unanimous decision in the case Vidal v. Elster (602 U.S. ___ (2024)), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the refusal to register a federal trademark for the phrase “Trump Too Small” based on the fact that the Lanham Act prohibits the registration of the name of a living individual without their consent. The plaintiff in this case, Mr. Elster, filed a federal trademark application in 2018 for the mark “TRUMP TOO SMALL” for use on clothing as shown below, without the prior consent of former President Trump, arguing that the phrase was intended to be a criticism of Donald Trump and his policies and that the refusal was a violation of Mr. Elster’s First Amendment right of free speech. Mr. Elster claimed he wanted to register the mark to convey a political message about the former president.

The Supreme Court reviewed the matter based on the initial refusal to register issued by the United States Patent & Trademark Office, which was then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, who overturned the refusal holding that barring registration of “Trump Too Small” under a provision of federal trademark law unconstitutionally restricted free speech. The Court’s ruling upholds the “living-individual rule” established under the Lanham Act which requires the consent of the living individual prior to registration. Specifically, “No trademark … shall be refused registration … on account of its nature unless it…[c]onsists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent….” 15 U.S.C. §1052(c). Proponents of the law, including the International Trademark Association, argue that this provision of trademark law is consistent with the concepts of the right of publicity and privacy, and assists in preventing the unauthorized use of individuals’ names in commercial contexts. In explaining the rationale for the decision, Justice Thomas wrote: “This Court has long recognized that a trademark protects the markholder’s reputation, and the connection is even stronger when the mark contains a person’s name,” and further stated, “This history and tradition is sufficient to conclude that the names clause — a content-based, but viewpoint-neutral, trademark restriction — is compatible with the First Amendment.”

It is worth noting the Court’s decision does not affect the ability of Mr. Elster to offer goods or services under any particular name or brand – in fact, Mr. Elster’s T-shirts bearing the phrase “Trump Too Small” are still available online for $24.99, even though his trademark application was refused. But the ruling does uphold the prohibition of seeking and obtaining federal trademark protection where the mark contains the name of a living individual without their consent. This ruling from the Supreme Court joins a string of other First Amendment challenges to provisions of the Lanham Act, the main statute governing trademarks. The high court in 2017 struck down a section of the law that barred registration of disparaging marks and did the same for a provision prohibiting immoral or scandalous marks in 2019.

The key takeaway from this narrowly tailored decision is that, prior to seeking federal trademark protection for a mark containing the name of a living individual, consent from that individual must be obtained. In the context of protecting a name or brand focused on a living individual, or in the continuation of such use post-merger or other transaction, it is important to ensure that the consent of the living individual is secured in some manner.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

Confused About the FCC’s New One-to-One Consent Rules– You’re Not Alone. Here Are Some FAQs Answered For YOU!

Heard a lot about what folks are concerned about in the industry. Still seems to be a lot of confusion about it. So let me help with some answers to critical questions.

None of this is legal advice. Absolutely critical you hire a lawyer–AND A GOOD ONE–to assist you here. But this should help orient.

What is the new FCC One-to-One Ruling?

The FCC’s one-to-one ruling is a new federal regulation that alters the TCPA’s express written consent definition in a manner that requires consumers to select each “seller”–that is the ultimate good or service provider–the consumer chooses to receive calls from individually.

The ruling also limits the scope of consent to matters “logically and topically” related to the transaction that lead to consent.

Under the TCPA express written consent is required for any call that is made using regulated technology, which includes autodialers (ATDS), prerecorded or artificial voice calls, AI voice calls, and any form of outbound IVR or voicemail technology (including ringless) using prerecorded or artifical voice messages.

Why Does the FCC’s New One-to-One Ruling Matter?

Currently online webforms and comparison shopping websites are used to generate “leads” for direct to consumer marketers, insurance agents, real estate agents, and product sellers in numerous verticals.

Millions of leads a month are sold by tens of thousands of lead generation websites, leading to hundreds of millions of regulated marketing calls by businesses that rely on these websites to provide “leads”–consumers interested in hearing about their goods or services.

Prior to the new one-to-one ruling website operators were free to include partner pages that linked thousands of companies the consumer might be providing consent to receive calls from. And fine-print disclosures might allow a consumer to receive calls from business selling products unrelated to the consumer’s request. (For instance a website offering information about a home for sale might include fine print allowing the consumer’s data to be sold to a mortgage lender or insurance broker to receive calls.)

The new one-to-one rule stop these practices and requires website operators to specifically identify each good or service provider that might be contacting the consumer and requires the consumer to select each such provider on a one by one basis in order for consent to be valid.

Will the FCC’s One-to-One Ruling Impact Me?

If you are buying or selling leads, YES this ruling will effect you.

If you are a BPO or call center that relies on leads– YES this ruling will effect you.

If you are a CPaaS or communication platform–YES this ruling will effect you.

If you are a telecom carrier–YES this ruling will effect you.

If you are lead gen platform or service provider–YES this ruling will effect you.

If you generate first-party leads–Yes this ruling will effect you.

When Does the Rule Go Into Effect?

The ruling applies to all calls made in reliance on leads beginning January 27, 2025.

However, the ruling applies regardless of the date the lead was generated. So compliance efforts need to begin early so as to assure a pipeline of available leads to contact on that date.

In other words, all leads NOT in compliance with the FCC’s one-to-one rule CANNOT be called beginning January 27, 2025.

What Do I have to Do to Comply?

Three things:

i) Comply with the rather complex, but navigable new one-to-one rule paradigm. (The Troutman Amin Fifteen is a handy checklist to assist you);

ii) Assure the lead is being captured in a manner that is “logically and topically” related to the calls that will be placed; and

iii) Assure the caller has possession of the consent record before the call is made.

© 2024 Troutman Amin, LLP
For more news on FCC Consent Regulations, visit the NLR Communications, Media, & Internet section.

Understanding the Enhanced Regulation S-P Requirements

On May 16, 2024, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted amendments to Regulation S-P, the regulation that governs the treatment of nonpublic personal information about consumers by certain financial institutions. The amendments apply to broker-dealers, investment companies, and registered investment advisers (collectively, “covered institutions”) and are designed to modernize and enhance the protection of consumer financial information. Regulation S-P continues to require covered institutions to implement written polices and procedures to safeguard customer records and information (the “safeguards rule”), properly dispose of consumer information to protect against unauthorized use (the “disposal rule”), and implementation of a privacy policy notice containing an opt out option. Registered investment advisers with over $1.5 billion in assets under management will have until November 16, 2025 (18 months) to comply, those entities with less will have until May 16, 2026 (24 months) to comply.

Incident Response Program

Covered institutions will have to implement an Incident Response Program (the “Program”) to their written policies and procedures if they have not already done so. The Program must be designed to detect, respond to, and recover customer information from unauthorized third parties. The nature and scope of the incident must be documented with further steps taken to prevent additional unauthorized use. Covered institutions will also be responsible for adopting procedures regarding the oversight of third-party service providers that are receiving, maintaining, processing, or accessing their client’s data. The safeguard rule and disposal rule require that nonpublic personal information received from a third-party about their customers should be treated the same as if it were your own client.

Customer Notification Requirement

The amendments require covered institutions to notify affected individuals whose sensitive customer information was, or is reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without authorization. The amendments require a covered institution to provide the notice as soon as practicable, but not later than 30 days, after becoming aware that unauthorized access to or use of customer information has occurred or is reasonably likely to have occurred. The notices must include details about the incident, the breached data, and how affected individuals can respond to the breach to protect themselves. A covered institution is not required to provide the notification if it determines that the sensitive customer information has not been, and is not reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that would result in substantial harm or inconvenience. To the extent a covered institution will have a notification obligation under both the final amendments and a similar state law, a covered institution may be able to provide one notice to satisfy notification obligations under both the final amendments and the state law, provided that the notice includes all information required under both the final amendments and the state law, which may reduce the number of notices an individual receives.

Recordkeeping

Covered institutions will have to make and maintain the following in their books and records:

  • Written policies and procedures required to be adopted and implemented pursuant to the Safeguards Rule, including the incident response program;
  • Written documentation of any detected unauthorized access to or use of customer information, as well as any response to and recovery from such unauthorized access to or use of customer information required by the incident response program;
  • Written documentation of any investigation and determination made regarding whether notification to customers is required, including the basis for any determination made and any written documentation from the United States Attorney General related to a delay in notice, as well as a copy of any notice transmitted following such determination;
  • Written policies and procedures required as part of service provider oversight;
  • Written documentation of any contract entered into pursuant to the service provider oversight requirements; and
  • Written policies and procedures required to be adopted and implemented for the Disposal Rule.

Registered investment advisers will be required to preserve these records for five years, the first two in an easily accessible place.

COPYRIGHT © 2024, STARK & STARK
For more news on SEC Amended Regulations, visit the NLR Securities & SEC section.

U.S. Supreme Court Raises Standard for Labor Board When Seeking 10(j) Injunctions

The U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision directing district courts to use the traditional four-part test when evaluating whether a preliminary injunction should issue at the request of the National Labor Relations Board pending litigation of a complaint under the National Labor Relations Act. No. 23-367 (June 13, 2024).

The decision settles the split among the federal circuit courts over the standard that should be applied when the Board files a motion for a “10(j)” injunction, named for the section of the Act that authorizes the Board to seek injunctive relief. Circuit courts were split on which test should apply: the traditional four-part test, a more lenient two-part test, or a hybrid of the two.

The Court’s decision raises the bar for the Board, requiring it to meet each prong of the four-part test for a court to grant an injunction. In particular, it will be more difficult for the Board to establish it is “likely to succeed on the merits,” as opposed to the more lenient standard espoused by the Board that “there is reasonable cause to believe that unfair labor practices have occurred.”

The Court vacated and remanded the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to reevaluate the merits of the injunction request under the four-part test.

10(j) Injunctions

Section 10(j) of the Act allows the Board to seek preliminary injunctions before federal district courts against both employers and unions to stop alleged unfair labor practices during the pendency of the Board’s administrative processing of an unfair labor practice charge. Section 10(j) authorizes a district court “to grant to the Board such temporary relief … as it deems just and proper.”

The requests are rare; the Board has sought only 20 such injunctions since 2023, according to the Board’s website. Nonetheless, the standard a court will use in evaluating the injunction request has been determinative of whether the relief was granted.

Prior Standards

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, as in this case, used a two-part test to assess whether the Board was entitled to an injunction. The two-part test examined whether “there is reasonable cause to believe that unfair labor practices have occurred,” and “whether injunctive relief is ‘just and proper.’” McKinney v. Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC, 875 F.3d 333 (2017). The Supreme Court noted in its latest decision that the Board could establish reasonable cause “by simply showing that its ‘legal theory [was] substantial and not frivolous.’”

Conversely, other courts, such as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh and Eighth Circuits applied the four-part test used for preliminary injunctions in traditional litigation settings set forth in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008). Under the Winter framework, a party seeking injunctive relief must “make a clear showing” that:

  1. He is likely to succeed on the merits;
  2. He is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief;
  3. The balance of equities tips in his favor; and
  4. An injunction is in the public interest.

New Standard for Labor Board

In holding that the four-part test applies to 10(j) injunction requests by the Board, the Court declined to allow Section 10(j) language “to supplant the traditional equitable principles governing injunctions.” Rather, courts should apply standard principles involved in granting injunctive relief, not 10(j)’s “discretion-inviting directive.”

The Court explained that the reasonable-cause standard in the two-part test “goes far beyond simply fine tuning the traditional criteria to the Section 10(j) context—it substantively lowers the bar for securing a preliminary injunction by requiring courts to yield to the Board’s preliminary view of the facts, law, and equities.” It noted there is a substantial difference between the “likely”-to-succeed-on-the-merits standard versus a finding that the charge was “substantial and not frivolous.” Under the “less exacting” standard, courts could evaluate injunction requests giving significant deference to the Board under even a “minimally plausible legal theory” without assessing conflicting facts or questions of law.

Accordingly, the Board must satisfy the traditional standard that requires it to make a clear showing it is likely to succeed on the merits of the claim under a valid theory of liability.

The Court’s decision to standardize 10(j) injunction requests not only raises the Board’s burden of proof, but it creates more consistency across district courts at a time employers increasingly face injunction requests by an activist Board general counsel.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2024

The Double-Edged Impact of AI Compliance Algorithms on Whistleblowing

As the implementation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) compliance and fraud detection algorithms within corporations and financial institutions continues to grow, it is crucial to consider how this technology has a twofold effect.

It’s a classic double-edged technology: in the right hands it can help detect fraud and bolster compliance, but in the wrong it can snuff out would-be-whistleblowers and weaken accountability mechanisms. Employees should assume it is being used in a wide range of ways.

Algorithms are already pervasive in our legal and governmental systems: the Securities and Exchange Commission, a champion of whistleblowers, employs these very compliance algorithms to detect trading misconduct and determine whether a legal violation has taken place.

There are two major downsides to the implementation of compliance algorithms that experts foresee: institutions avoiding culpability and tracking whistleblowers. AI can uncover fraud but cannot guarantee the proper reporting of it. This same technology can be used against employees to monitor and detect signs of whistleblowing.

Strengths of AI Compliance Systems:

AI excels at analyzing vast amounts of data to identify fraudulent transactions and patterns that might escape human detection, allowing institutions to quickly and efficiently spot misconduct that would otherwise remain undetected.

AI compliance algorithms are promised to operate as follows:

  • Real-time Detection: AI can analyze vast amounts of data, including financial transactions, communication logs, and travel records, in real-time. This allows for immediate identification of anomalies that might indicate fraudulent activity.
  • Pattern Recognition: AI excels at finding hidden patterns, analyzing spending habits, communication patterns, and connections between seemingly unrelated entities to flag potential conflicts of interest, unusual transactions, or suspicious interactions.
  • Efficiency and Automation: AI can automate data collection and analysis, leading to quicker identification and investigation of potential fraud cases.

Yuktesh Kashyap, associate Vice President of data science at Sigmoid explains on TechTarget that AI allows financial institutions, for example, to “streamline compliance processes and improve productivity. Thanks to its ability to process massive data logs and deliver meaningful insights, AI can give financial institutions a competitive advantage with real-time updates for simpler compliance management… AI technologies greatly reduce workloads and dramatically cut costs for financial institutions by enabling compliance to be more efficient and effective. These institutions can then achieve more than just compliance with the law by actually creating value with increased profits.”

Due Diligence and Human Oversight

Stephen M. Kohn, founding partner of Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto LLP, argues that AI compliance algorithms will be an ineffective tool that allow institutions to escape liability. He worries that corporations and financial institutions will implement AI systems and evade enforcement action by calling it due diligence.

“Companies want to use AI software to show the government that they are complying reasonably. Corporations and financial institutions will tell the government that they use sophisticated algorithms, and it did not detect all that money laundering, so you should not sanction us because we did due diligence.” He insists that the U.S. Government should not allow these algorithms to be used as a regulatory benchmark.

Legal scholar Sonia Katyal writes in her piece “Democracy & Distrust in an Era of Artificial Intelligence” that “While automation lowers the cost of decision making, it also raises significant due process concerns, involving a lack of notice and the opportunity to challenge the decision.”

While AI can be used as a powerful tool for identifying fraud, there is still no method for it to contact authorities with its discoveries. Compliance personnel are still required to blow the whistle, given societies standard due process. These algorithms should be used in conjunction with human judgment to determine compliance or lack thereof. Due process is needed so that individuals can understand the reasoning behind algorithmic determinations.

The Double-Edged Sword

Darrell West, Senior Fellow at Brookings Institute’s Center for Technology Innovation and Douglas Dillon Chair in Governmental Studies warns about the dangerous ways these same algorithms can be used to find whistleblowers and silence them.

Nowadays most office jobs (whether remote or in person) conduct operations fully online. Employees are required to use company computers and networks to do their jobs. Data generated by each employee passes through these devices and networks. Meaning, your privacy rights are questionable.

Because of this, whistleblowing will get much harder – organizations can employ the technology they initially implemented to catch fraud to instead catch whistleblowers. They can monitor employees via the capabilities built into our everyday tech: cameras, emails, keystroke detectors, online activity logs, what is downloaded, and more. West urges people to operate under the assumption that employers are monitoring their online activity.

These techniques have been implemented in the workplace for years, but AI automates tracking mechanisms. AI gives organizations more systematic tools to detect internal problems.

West explains, “All organizations are sensitive to a disgruntled employee who might take information outside the organization, especially if somebody’s dealing with confidential information, budget information or other types of financial information. It is just easy for organizations to monitor that because they can mine emails. They can analyze text messages; they can see who you are calling. Companies could have keystroke detectors and see what you are typing. Since many of us are doing our jobs in Microsoft Teams meetings and other video conferencing, there is a camera that records and transcribes information.”

If a company is defining a whistleblower as a problem, they can monitor this very information and look for keywords that would indicate somebody is engaging in whistleblowing.

With AI, companies can monitor specific employees they might find problematic (such as a whistleblower) and all the information they produce, including the keywords that might indicate fraud. Creators of these algorithms promise that soon their products will be able to detect all sorts of patterns and feelings, such as emotion and sentiment.

AI cannot determine whether somebody is a whistleblower, but it can flag unusual patterns and refer those patterns to compliance analysts. AI then becomes a tool to monitor what is going on within the organization, making it difficult for whistleblowers to go unnoticed. The risk of being caught by internal compliance software will be much greater.

“The only way people could report under these technological systems would be to go offline, using their personal devices or burner phones. But it is difficult to operate whistleblowing this way and makes it difficult to transmit confidential information. A whistleblower must, at some point, download information. Since you will be doing that on a company network, and that is easily detected these days.”

But the question of what becomes of the whistleblower is based on whether the compliance officers operate in support of the company or the public interest – they will have an extraordinary amount of information about the company and the whistleblower.

Risks for whistleblowers have gone up as AI has evolved because it is harder for them to collect and report information on fraud and compliance without being discovered by the organization.

West describes how organizations do not have a choice whether or not to use AI anymore: “All of the major companies are building it into their products. Google, Microsoft, Apple, and so on. A company does not even have to decide to use it: it is already being used. It’s a question of whether they avail themselves of the results of what’s already in their programs.”

“There probably are many companies that are not set up to use all the information that is at their disposal because it does take a little bit of expertise to understand data analytics. But this is just a short-term barrier, like organizations are going to solve that problem quickly.”

West recommends that organizations should just be a lot more transparent about their use of these tools. They should inform their employees what kind of information they are using, how they are monitoring employees, and what kind of software they use. Are they using detection? Software of any sort? Are they monitoring keystrokes?

Employees should want to know how long information is being stored. Organizations might legitimately use this technology for fraud detection, which might be a good argument to collect information, but it does not mean they should keep that information for five years. Once they have used the information and determined whether employees are committing fraud, there is no reason to keep it. Companies are largely not transparent about length of storage and what is done with this data and once it is used.

West believes that currently, most companies are not actually informing employees of how their information is being kept and how the new digital tools are being utilized.

The Importance of Whistleblower Programs:

The ability of AI algorithms to track whistleblowers poses a real risk to regulatory compliance given the massive importance of whistleblower programs in the United States’ enforcement of corporate crime.

The whistleblower programs at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) respond to individuals who voluntarily report original information about fraud or misconduct.

If a tip leads to a successful enforcement action, the whistleblowers are entitled to 10-30% of the recovered funds. These programs have created clear anti-retaliation protections and strong financial incentives for reporting securities and commodities fraud.

Established in 2010 under the Dodd-Frank Act, these programs have been integral to enforcement. The SEC reports that whistleblower tips have led to over $6 billion in sanctions while the CFTC states that almost a third of its investigations stem from whistleblower disclosures.

Whistleblower programs, with robust protections for those who speak out, remain essential for exposing fraud and holding organizations accountable. This ensures that detected fraud is not only identified, but also reported and addressed, protecting taxpayer money, and promoting ethical business practices.

If AI algorithms are used to track down whistleblowers, their implementation would hinder these programs. Companies will undoubtedly retaliate against employees they suspect of blowing the whistle, creating a massive chilling effect where potential whistleblowers would not act out of fear of detection.

Already being employed in our institutions, experts believe these AI-driven compliance systems must have independent oversight for transparency’s sake. The software must also be designed to adhere to due process standards.

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