Tag: Brexit

How the UK Legal Market Adapted to COVID-19: Top Trends for Firms in 2021

Ongoing pressures such as the effects of the coronavirus pandemic are causing disruptions and the shifting of priorities in the UK legal market in 2021, according to findings from the State of the UK Legal Market 2021 report from the Thomson Reuters Institute.  The State of the UK Legal Market 2021 combines research on 250 senior corporate counsel, financial results from the UK operations of 34 US-based law firms and 156 stand-out private practice lawyers.

With law firms switching to fully remote working environments as well as other pressures such as courthouse closures and Brexit, there has been a shift in client priorities. As a result, UK law firms are re-evaluating how their clients’ legal needs can best be met amidst these pressures and disruptions.

How Has the COVID-19 Pandemic Affected UK Law Firm Client Partnerships?

Given the demands that 2020 put on UK corporate legal departments, there was an increased focus on the strength of their relationship with external law firms. The report showed that amidst the shift to remote working, clients are looking to create long-term partnerships with law firms that have a deep understanding of their business operations. The report found that 47 percent of corporate law departments said firms who commit to a long-term partnership create more value in the relationship. This focus on strong interpersonal skills comes as a result of investing non-billable time in clients, the report said.

“This wasn’t the year where clients looked out and said, ‘Hey are we going to bring three or four of our firms on a roster?’ This was the year that clients looked at all of the firms they are currently working with and said, ‘Actually, which two or three do we trust the most?’” said David Johnson, Account Director for Thomson Reuters Acritas in an interview with the National Law Review.  “We’ll start to see firms doing a bit more to make sure that they are that trusted advisor.”

While technology plays an important role both with those working within law firms and with clients, the importance of the more meaningful connection has taken center stage. According to the report, the greatest changes in what drove favorability in the UK market are customer service (17 percent) and a good working relationship (15 percent).

The report predicted that in 2021 and beyond, many firms will strive to create sustainable servicing models that focus on developing a more involved and strategic relationship with clients. Specifically, the report showed that law firms need to appraise which skills are valued most in the industry they serve and then determine how to develop those skills. The top skills that help the UK legal market stand out compared to global markets include being practical and pragmatic, being approachable and friendly and investing in developing good working relationships, according to the report.

“The big things that come through from the UK side from our research in particular is that it’s the ability to be practical and pragmatic in the way that you deliver the work,” Mr. Johnson said. “It’s having industry knowledge. How that feeds into the kind of pain points that their clients are facing is definitely going to be one that we are going to see more of.”

Brexit and Coronavirus Play a Role in UK Legal Market

Alongside higher demand for long-term firm partnerships, the report found that the demand for cross-border legal advice had increased since 2017 because of the uncertainty caused by Brexit. Specifically, 80 percent of UK corporates were looking for international legal support, and 47 percent of UK corporate legal spend was dedicated to international legal work.

“I think the interesting thing here is that we’ve gone through a global pandemic, and we’ve gone through an incredibly disruptive political and economic period. We’re still very much transitioning through that period,” Mr. Johnson said about Brexit. “There’s still a lot more unknowns than knowns in terms of how this is going to play out. I can’t imagine it’s going to drop off dramatically in the next couple of years. I think the challenge is about how firms can organize themselves around this international need to support clients.”

One pain point that developed as a result of remote work during the coronavirus pandemic was the deterioration of collaboration between cross-border teams.  Eighty-three percent of UK partners reported internal barriers to international relationships, including IT and knowledge sharing structures. The report notes firms that foster a culture of collaboration between cross-border teams will be able to better support their clients’ international needs.

This is especially important considering 38 percent of UK corporates are looking to increase their international legal spend moving forward.

Even though UK corporates are looking to increase spend, the report notes that 28 percent of UK-based buyers felt the main thing that could be done to improve their satisfaction with firms was for services to be more competitively priced. Firms that are willing to address pricing issues with clients foster more long-term relationships and bring more, the report noted. This can be achieved through exploring alternative fee arrangements.

However, with increased demand also comes increased competition, according to the report.

How Have UK Law Firms Adapted to Competition During COVID-19?

Alternative legal service providers (ALSPs), non law-firm providers of legal services such as accounting firms, provide competition and increase the pressure on UK law firms to adopt innovative, technology-driven legal service delivery models that can provide greater flexibility and value. As a result, UK law firms are adopting more flexible working arrangements and focusing on technology.

“I think one of the areas that’s going to be here to stay from personal conversations with managing partners in the market is how do you create an office environment that provides that kind of flexibility for those who want to come into the office and those who don’t?” Mr. Johnson said. “I think that discussion has got to be right top and center in terms of managing committees across the next six to 12 months.”

Law firm partners touted a shortened commute, improved efficiency and more productive use of technology as the top benefits of flexible working. According to the report, 86 percent of attorneys want flexible working arrangements to continue after the coronavirus pandemic ends, and would consider leaving their firm if such arrangements weren’t available.

Specifically, stand-out UK lawyers surveyed said they’d like to work remotely two days a week, see a 10 percent reduction in working hours (even with a reduction in pay) and the ability to have different start and finish times or spread hours across the day. However, 80 percent of stand-out lawyers cited remote working as a barrier to developing new business during the pandemic, further highlighting the importance of improving current client relationships.

That being said, law firms are looking to invest more in technology amidst the shift to remote work and increased competition from ALSPs, with 74 percent of senior UK partners believing that their firms should be investing more in technology. Eighty-four percent of corporates think their firms should explore more innovative ways to use technology.

“The ALSP market is not necessarily being adopted as strongly as we’re seeing from the US at the moment, but we’re starting to see more because of the pushback on price and the financial challenges that UK businesses and legal departments are being put under,” Mr. Johnson said. “I think that this is going to become more prominent and we’ll see higher levels of usage of these over the course of the next couple of years. And the last 18 months have accelerated that process.”

How the UK Legal Market May Change After COVID-19

One of the most important takeaways from the report is that clients’ desire for deeper institutional relationships and an increased level of business understanding with firms isn’t new, but that the COVID-19 pandemic amplified the need for an increased focus on these areas. Specifically, the report noted that for the first time, the UK legal industry may be facing the consequences of failing to adapt to those needs earlier.

However, UK firms can emerge from the pandemic in a better position through evaluating the relationship between the firm and its clients, focusing on cross-border collaboration and adopting technology to foster flexibility, efficiency and innovation.

Copyright ©2021 National Law Forum, LLC
For more articles on the UK legal industry, visit the NLR Law Office Management section.

UK Withdrawal Agreement Becomes Law

On January 23, the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill became an Act of Parliament and is now legally binding in the UK. The purpose of this legislation is to give binding force to the withdrawal agreement that was made between the UK and the EU on October 19, 2019.

The next step will be for the withdrawal agreement to be ratified by the European Parliament, which is scheduled for January 29. If this vote is passed, the UK will leave the EU on January 31, 2020. The UK will then enter an ‘implementation period,’ during which all EU laws will continue to apply in the UK, while the UK and the EU negotiate their future relationship. This implementation period is scheduled to end on December 31.

©2020 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

For more Brexit developments, see the Global Law section of the National Law Review.

Brexit: Turkeys Voting for Christmas?

Brexit delayed again – now it’s off to the races in a General Election

Despite having finally achieved a Parliamentary majority in favour of a way of delivering Brexit, in the Second Reading of the Withdrawal Agreement Bill on 22nd October, Prime Minister Boris Johnson decided – in the face of Parliament’s refusal to allow him to put the Bill through very rapidly so as to meet the 31st October Brexit deadline – to pursue a General Election instead of pushing the Bill through.

After some “after you, Claude” to-ing and fro-ing, the EU agreed to the request to extend the Article 50 deadline of 31st October which the Prime Minister had been forced by Parliament to send. The EU did so under condition that there should be no re-opening of withdrawal negotiations, no disruption to EU business by the UK (including the UK appointing a member of the new European Commission), and that the UK could leave earlier if the ratification process completed earlier.

A delicate game ensued in Parliament about the basis for a decision to hold the election, with opposition parties wanting to remove the Prime Minister’s discretion over the date of the election, and to make it impossible for him to try again to push the Withdrawal Agreement Bill. On 28th October Parliament rejected the Prime Minister’s attempt to secure an election on 12th December. Parliament then decided on 29th October that the election should be held on 12th December. The difference between the first 12th December and the second 12th December would take too long to explain, and would anyway test the sanity of all but the most extreme political geek.

And so the unhappy child of Theresa May’s disastrous 2017 election fades into the twilight…

The election Bill still needs to go through the House of Lords (unlikely to be problematic) and receive Royal Assent, and the House of Commons needs to tidy up some necessary business. So on current plans Parliament will dissolve on Wednesday 6th November for MPs to campaign for the General Election on Thursday 12th December. The British electorate, used to voting at national level every five years, had a General Election in 2015, the Brexit referendum in 2016, a further General Election in 2017, and now a third General Election in 2019 (the Scots also had an independence referendum in 2014).

Was the 2017-2019 Parliament a travesty of democratic accountability, or a powerful example of representative democracy grappling with issues which had split the nation in two through a binary exercise in direct democracy? Historians will judge. It was certainly a tough one for individual MPs, who regularly found themselves objects of extremely hostile, sometimes violent, social media messaging. Parliament certainly seemed to reflect accurately the division in the electorate, which the polls show has not shifted significantly throughout the period since the 52:48 result of the 2016 Brexit referendum.

“Prediction is very difficult, especially if it’s about the future” – Nils Bohr

So what’s going to happen in the 12th December election? It will be the first December election for almost a century, and the hardest to predict for many decades. Will Boris Johnson scoop the Leave vote across the country, or will Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party damage the Conservatives by arguing that Johnson’s Brexit deal is not really Brexit? Will the clarity of the Liberal Democrats’ Remain position help them and weaken Labour, or will Labour be able to sit on the fence on Brexit and focus the campaign on Tory austerity and public services?

The next six weeks will be exhilarating, confusing and passionate. They will decide the future course of the nation. Nothing more will happen on Brexit until after the election. Whether the election provides a clear way forward will depend on whether a party achieves a clear majority or the election produces another hung Parliament. Watch this space…

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Read more about Brexit on the Global Law page on the National Law Review.

FCA Publishes “Brexit Special” Market Watch

On October 7, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) published a “Brexit Special” of its monthly Market Watch newsletter, in which it summarized some recent developments and publications in connection with the regulated sector’s preparedness for the forthcoming departure of the UK from the EU on November 1.

In the newsletter, the FCA noted that Andrew Bailey, FCA CEO, gave a speech in September at Bloomberg London on the Brexit “state of play”. Mr. Bailey outlined recent developments and the outstanding issues, such as the desire for an equivalence agreement for the Share Trading Obligation (STO). (For more information, please see the June 14 edition of Corporate & Financial Weekly Digest).

The FCA explained that transaction reporting rules under the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR) will not be subject to the temporary transitional power. (For more information, please see the September 27 edition of Corporate & Financial Weekly Digest). Therefore, firms, trading venues and approved reporting mechanisms will need to take “reasonable steps to comply with the changes to their regulatory obligations”. Firms who cannot comply on the day that the UK leaves the EU will need to back-report missing, incomplete or inaccurate transaction reports as soon as possible thereafter.

The FCA provided an updated statement on the operation of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) transparency regime following Brexit. The FCA published a statement on this topic in March 2019 (please see the March 8 edition of Corporate & Financial Weekly Digest), and the main purpose of this update was to change dates to reflect the extension of the departure date from March to October 2019.

The FCA’s MiFID transparency regime update also reflects a statement made on October 7 from the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). In addition to other updates, ESMA described how reference data submitted by UK trading venues and systematic internalisers will be phased out of EU calculations. ESMA will “freeze” the quarterly calculations until Q1 2020, during which time the EU will re-determine the relevant competent authority (RCA) for all financial instruments that remain available for trading in the EU, for which the FCA is currently the RCA.

Finally, the FCA announced that industry testing for the FCA Financial Instruments Transparency Systems (FITRS) would start on October 10 and noted that it continues to update the Brexit material available on its website.

The Market Watch newsletter is available here.

Andrew Bailey’s speech is available here.

The FCA’s updated statement is available here.

ESMA’s statement is available here.

©2019 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

Brexit: Can the Remainers Stop a No-Deal Brexit?

Brexit has driven fault lines through British politics as seen at no time since the 1680s. Fervent ‘leavers’ and fervent ‘remainers’ can be found in both of the main political parties, although most favour various compromise options in between.

This is reflected in the composition of the UK Parliament and has resulted in an impasse, with Parliament rejecting both the transitional ‘deal’ to leave the EU negotiated by former Prime Minister Theresa May at the end of 2018 and the prospect of leaving the EU without a deal – a ‘no deal’ Brexit. The election of Boris Johnson as the new UK prime minister and his appointment of a government leaning firmly towards leaving the EU, with or without a deal on October 31, 2019, throws up some distinctive legal challenges: If a new deal cannot be struck with the EU, is a no-deal Brexit inevitable, or can the remainer MPs stop it?

Concluding a new deal with the EU by October 31 is challenging, not least given the limited time available for negotiating it and having it approved by the European and UK Parliaments. This is compounded by the complexity of the issues the UK government seeks to renegotiate, particularly the Irish backstop, and the EU’s no-renegotiation stance – although it has indicated willingness to revisit the nature of the future relationship between the EU and UK.

The legal position on a no-deal Brexit is set out in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as amended in April 2019. This Act sets Brexit date at October 31, 2019. It also requires Parliament to approve any withdrawal agreement with the EU. What it does not require is that there should, in fact, be a withdrawal agreement. Consequently, the Act does not require parliamentary consent for a ‘no deal’ Brexit. Prime Minister Johnson does not, accordingly, need to secure any parliamentary majority for this. And since the Act will prevail over any parliamentary vote to reject a no-deal Brexit, he does not have to comply with any vote passed to the contrary.

The first legal route open to remainer MPs is to seek to amend the 2018 Act. The problem that they would have is timing. Parliament is in recess until September 3. There is usually a further recess from mid-September to the second week in October for the party conference season. Even if the second recess were to be abandoned, there is insufficient time for an amending bill to be passed before October 31 using normal parliamentary procedures. There is provision for emergency legislation to be passed very quickly, but this would require a consensus among all parties and the support of the government, both of which seem unlikely given the split between remainers and leavers within the main parties and the new government’s express intention to achieve Brexit by October 31.

The second legal route open to remainer MPs is to force a general election. Under the terms of the UK Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, Leader of the Opposition Jeremy Corbyn would need to propose a motion of no confidence in Prime Minister Johnson’s government. At present, the Conservatives have a majority of one in Parliament, but only with the support of the Democratic Unionist Party from Northern Ireland. However, a number of Conservative MPs have indicated that they would be prepared to bring their own government down on this issue. An unknown factor is whether leaver MPs in the Labour Party are prepared to abstain or even vote against such a motion.

A motion of no confidence under the 2011 Act requires only a simple majority of MPs voting in favour. However, there are still timing issues. The earliest that such a motion can be proposed is September 3. If passed, it would trigger a cooling-off period of 14 days for an alternative government to be formed. At the end of this period, if, as he would be entitled to do, Mr Johnson were to remain prime minister, UK electoral law would require him to announce the date for a general election within a further 25 days. However, there is no requirement for the election actually to be held within a particular time. Although the Queen must be consulted about the date, this is a formality. Prime Minister Johnson would, therefore, be within his constitutional rights to call an election only after the October 31 Brexit deadline has passed and the UK has left the EU.

Remain supporters have indicated that their strategy, if they are able to force an election, would be to rely on the legal status of the ‘standstill’ or status quo convention to prevent a no-deal Brexit on October 31. When an election is called, the government immediately becomes a caretaker administration. By parliamentary convention (‘convention’ in the sense of accepted practice), this administration should not embark on any major new projects and may not use the UK civil service for such a purpose. Cabinet Secretary Sir Mark Sedwill, the head of the civil service, is reported as having expressed the view that the ‘standstill’ in this situation would be that the UK remains in the EU. However, government spokespersons have said that this would involve the civil service effectively acting in contravention of the 2018 Withdrawal Act.

It seems likely, if this scenario develops, that the matter will be referred to the UK Supreme Court. The British constitution is not written down and relies on many traditions and convention, some of considerable antiquity. However, there is precedent in a December 2018 Supreme Court case, which decided that the legislative consent motions passed by the Scottish Parliament under the Scotland Act 1998 could not be used to affect the validity of the 2018 Withdrawal Act. It had been argued that the convention requiring the Scottish government to be consulted on any UK legislation that involved matters devolved to Scotland was absolute. The Supreme Court disagreed, on the basis that a convention could not take precedence over a statute. On this basis, any reference to the Supreme Court seeking to block the operation of the 2018 Act through convention would likely fail.

It is often said ‘a week is a very long time in politics’. Prime Minister Johnson may be able to secure some last-minute concessions from the EU negotiators enabling a withdrawal agreement to be approved by Parliament, but this looks challenging. Legal routes to block Brexit are also likely to meet several hurdles. Consequently, at this stage, Britain’s exit from the EU on October 31 looks the more likely outcome. Whether that means an abrupt departure from the EU, or whether a managed ‘no-deal’ Brexit could be achieved through negotiation and agreement on key matters, remains to be seen.

©2019 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.
This article was written by Gillian Sproul at Greenberg Traurig, LLP.
For more Brexit developments, please see the Global Law page on the National Law Review.

Brexit – Here We Go Again

The new Prime Minister of the UK, Boris Johnson, has taken up office following his decisive (66% : 34%) victory in the contest among Conservative Party members who were presented with a choice between him and the Foreign Secretary, Jeremy Hunt. He promised during the campaign to take the UK out of the EU by 31 October (when the extension to the Article 50 Brexit process expires) “do or die”. In his first speech as PM, he again underlined his determination that the UK should leave the EU by 31 October. He said that his intention was that this should be with a new deal – “no deal” was a remote possibility which would only happen if the EU refused to negotiate. But it was right to intensify preparations for “no deal”, which could be lubricated by retaining the £39 billion financial settlement previously agreed with the EU.

So the starting gun for the next phase of Brexit has fired.

What Does the Campaign Tell Us About the Approach to Brexit?

The Conservative leadership election campaign happened in two parts. The first, among MPs, whittled the long list of candidates down to two. Perhaps conscious of the broad spread of opinion among Conservative MPs, both final candidates took a nuanced line during that phase, stressing their desire to leave the EU with a (revised) deal. In the second phase, which involved selection between the two by the broader membership of the Conservative Party (roughly 160,000 people), the tone hardened notably. Polling suggests that a majority of the Conservative Party membership puts delivering Brexit ahead of the economy, the survival of the union of the UK and even the survival of the Conservative Party itself (polling after Theresa May’s European Parliament elections suggests that two thirds of party members voted for another party in those elections, with nearly 60% voting for Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party). Only averting the prospect of a Jeremy Corbyn-led Labour Government is apparently a higher priority for Conservative Party members. Responding to this sentiment, the position of both candidates became harder through the second phase of the campaign. While both favoured leaving with a deal, both were clear that the threat of a “no deal” exit must be real in order to stimulate further negotiations with the EU. Both, therefore, also favoured ramping up “no deal” preparations. In the end, the main difference between the two candidates was that Jeremy Hunt could countenance a “short” further delay to Brexit if that was necessary to secure a deal from the EU, whereas Boris Johnson promised that the UK would leave the EU on 31 October “come what may, do or die”. Significantly, in one of the last public hustings during the campaign, Boris Johnson also ruled out making changes to the Irish border backstop in the Withdrawal Agreement. His approach to how to deliver Brexit could be summarised as: deliver on citizens’ rights straight away, have a “standstill” on trade (not clear how this differs from the transitional period in the Withdrawal Agreement – it would certainly involve zero tariffs on both sides, but unclear whether it would involve regulatory alignment (see trade negotiations section below), still less continued jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice), resolve the Irish border through a comprehensive trade agreement and create “constructive ambiguity” about whether/when the UK would accept the €39 billion exit settlement in the Withdrawal Agreement – presumably making it contingent on the trade agreement. Boris Johnson called for optimism and determination to secure this outcome.

What Do the Key Ministerial Appointments Tell Us About Brexit?

In appointing his Cabinet, Boris Johnson has made far-reaching changes which shift the profile of government decisively towards pro-Brexit. All ministers were required to subscribe to keeping the possibility of “no deal” Brexit open. The principal portfolios concerning Brexit are all held by people who are either comfortable with, or even favour, a “no deal” Brexit. This looks like – and is no doubt intended to be seen in Brussels as – a government fully committed to a “no deal” Brexit, if necessary. Perhaps the most interesting appointment was, however, not of a minister at all, but of Dominic Cummings, campaign director for Vote Leave in the 2016 referendum, as a senior adviser. Taken together, this looks like a team both strongly committed to delivering Brexit and ready for a public campaign (election or referendum), if necessary.

What Happens Next?

The new Prime Minister effectively has more than five weeks’ respite from Parliamentary scrutiny, as Parliament starts its summer recess and returns on 3 September. This gives him time to consolidate his team, articulate his strategy (including boosting preparations for a “no deal” Brexit), and explore the possibilities for further negotiation with the EU. But even within his own party, on both pro-Leave and pro-Remain sides, he is, in effect, on probation.

The Parliamentary arithmetic has not changed significantly from that faced by Theresa May, but by carrying out such a substantial eviction of Mrs May’s ministers, Boris Johnson is likely to have increased the number of opponents to his Brexit policies on the Conservative back benches. They now also have an important figurehead in former Chancellor Philip Hammond. The Prime Minister has no majority without the support of the 10 Northern Ireland Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) MPs. And, within the Conservative Party, the hard Brexit supporting European Research Group (ERG) is now balanced by an anti “no deal” faction bolstered by ministers who resigned because they could not support his approach to Brexit or were sacked by him. Technically, the government’s majority, including the 10 DUP MPs, is down to two (three including one MP under criminal investigation). A by-election on 1 August is likely to reduce that by one. If the PM tries to push through a deal based on the existing Withdrawal Agreement (with changes to the accompanying Political Declaration about the future relationship, to which the EU has said it is open), he risks losing the DUP and some ERG from his majority. If his policy becomes “no deal”, he risks losing the more pro-European faction. In either case, he lacks a majority to deliver the result. The two big questions are whether Parliament (which has a substantial anti “no deal” majority) can find a way to erect a legal barrier to a “no deal” Brexit and, if not, how many Conservative MPs would really vote against their own party in a confidence vote to force either a change of direction or a fresh election – several have already indicated that they would do so if necessary. All of which points to the same Parliamentary deadlock Theresa May faced returning in September. So, unless the PM can come up with a renegotiated deal which the DUP and ERG would accept, the only way out of the deadlock would be to go back to the people. Mr Johnson’s strong opposition to a further referendum would make that a politically difficult choice. Current polling suggests that an election before Brexit is delivered would be a high risk strategy for the Conservatives.

As one influential commentator put it, the strategy may be to try for a new deal and see if the EU blinks. If they do not, go for “no deal” and see if Parliament blinks. If it does not, hold an election or referendum – an election is probably higher risk, but can be done more quickly and does not involve going back on strongly expressed views of the Brexiteers, including Mr Johnson.

What About the Europeans?

The debate about Brexit over the Conservative Party leadership campaign has been an entirely Brit-on-Brit affair, with reference to the EU position, but no engagement with it. European leaders’ reactions to Boris Johnson becoming Prime Minister have been polite, but also uncompromising, showing no willingness to re-open the Withdrawal Agreement. Michel Barnier looked forward to working with the Johnson Government to facilitate the ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement – signalling that negotiation is possible about the accompanying Political Declaration on the future relationship, and possibly other complementary accords, but not the Withdrawal Agreement itself. If the EU sticks to this position – and the EU team follows the UK Parliamentary arithmetic closely, so they know how much resistance there will be to “no deal” – the prospects for finding an agreed way forward look slim.

So “No Deal”, Then?

In April, we assessed the possibility of a “no deal” Brexit as very low. It has clearly now increased and, with a Cabinet committed to “no deal” if there is not a new deal, there are a number of ways in which it could come about. But Parliament’s majority against “no deal” remains, and there remain a number of obstacles to “no deal” in Parliament and in the economic analysis of the impact of “no deal” Brexit if the UK and EU are not able to agree on tariff-free trade using GATT XXIV. While some form of political process – such as an election – looks more likely than moving straight to “no deal” if the EU talks fail to yield a result, companies should certainly now put in place “no deal” contingency arrangements.

Free Trade Agreements

There are three interlinked free trade agreements (FTAs) in play: EU-US, EU-UK and UK-US. During the leadership campaign Boris Johnson spoke about making very rapid progress on the UK-US FTA (at one stage suggesting having a limited agreement in place by 31 October), but also about finding the long-term solution to the Irish border issue in the UK-EU FTA. In practice, it is likely that the UK-EU FTA has to come before the UK-US FTA, not least because the more the UK aligns to US regulatory standards through a UK-US FTA, the harder the solution to the Irish border issue will be – nowhere more so than in agriculture. The UK-EU FTA also has a unique character, in that the two parties start from a position of zero tariffs and complete regulatory alignment and the negotiation will, therefore, be about how far and in what respects to diverge. Both the EU-US and UK-US FTAs will have to address some highly charged political issues (agriculture, public procurement (in particular healthcare) and climate change); it could be argued that the UK would secure a better result on these issues by allowing the EU to find a politically workable way forward with the US first.

In an illustration of the complex interaction in the trade policy approach, the UK government has not been able to roll-over the EU-Canada FTA (CETA) into a bilateral UK-Canada FTA. This is because the Canadian government has analysed the impact for Canadian businesses of the UK moving to the interim “no deal” tariff policy published by the UK earlier this year – 87% of imported goods would be tariff-free to prevent harm to consumers – and concluded that the impact would be small. UK exporters to Canada would, however, face full Canadian WTO tariffs, rendering trade in some sectors unviable.

However the order of negotiations takes place, the three FTAs are effectively interlinked, and it will be important to ensure, for example, that something desirable in the UK-US FTA is not rendered more difficult to achieve by something agreed within the UK-EU FTA.

 

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
For more Brexit developments, see the National Law Review Global page.

Brexit: Bracing for IP Changes

The United Kingdom is due to leave the European Union on March 29, 2019 (Brexit day). If the UK does leave the EU under the currently proposed terms, then the UK would enter a so-called transition period ending on December 31, 2020 and the current status quo would effectively be maintained during this period. However, the UK Parliament recently refused to ratify the current terms of withdrawal and there remains a risk that there will be a “no-deal” Brexit that would not include any transition period. From an intellectual property perspective, these uncertainties and tentative changes should be taken into consideration in the upcoming weeks when developing international filing strategies.

Trademarks

A no-deal Brexit has substantial implications for the continued protection and enforcement of EU trademarks in the UK. However, the position as it stands under the current agreement will be as follows:

  • EU trademark registrations currently on the register will have a duplicate UK registration automatically added to the UK register (no new filing required);
  • Current EU applications will have the same procedure once registered, even if the registration date is post-Brexit; and
  • For trademark applications post-Brexit, two filings will have to be made to cover the former 28 countries of the EU (one UK direct application and one EU application).

Under these prospective events moving forward, it is not anticipated that the EU Intellectual Property Office will decrease their costs for an EU application (because the territories covered decrease from 28 to 27). Accordingly, it may prove cost effective to file any anticipated EU applications before the March 29, 2019 deadline to avoid the need to file two applications.

Patents

There will be no change to the application processes for UK and European patents. Patents covering the UK are granted by two organizations: the UK Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO) and the European Patent Office (EPO). Applications for patents can be filed directly with the UKIPO or EPO, or can be made pursuant to an international patent application filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty. Neither of these organizations are EU institutions and they will continue to function after Brexit.

Domain Names (.eu)

To register an .eu domain name, a person or entity must reside in or be established within the European Union. As a result, effective from March 30, 2019 (in the event of a no-deal Brexit) to January 1, 2021 (in the event the withdrawal agreement is ratified), entities that are established only in the UK – and natural persons who reside in the UK – will no longer be eligible to register .eu domain names, or to renew .eu domain names registered if they are .eu registrants, before Brexit day.

EURid, the registry manager of .eu domain names, has published a notice on its website which states that a no-deal Brexit will have the following consequences:

  1. UK registrants of .eu domain names will have until May 30, 2019 to update their contact details to an EU address or to transfer their domain names to an EU resident. During this period, their domain names will remain active but cannot be transferred to a UK registrant and will not be automatically renewed (but instead moved to “withdrawn” status).
  2. As of May 30, 2019 all registrants that do not demonstrate their eligibility will be deemed ineligible and their domain names will be withdrawn (that is, they can no longer support any active services such as websites or email), but they will remain in the .eu registry database and may be reactivated if the eligibility criteria are satisfied. On March 30, 2020 all the affected domain names will be revoked and will become available for general registration (which gives rise to a risk of cybersquatting).
© 2019 Varnum LLP
This post was written by Charles F. Gray and Erin Klug of © 2019 Varnum LLP.
Read more about Brexit on our National Law Review Global Page.

Brexit: Limiting the Damage

It is one of the ironies of history that the EU as it is today, starting with the single market, was largely made in Britain, the achievement, above all, of former prime minister Margaret Thatcher and her right-hand man in Brussels, the then Commissioner (Lord) Arthur Cockfield. The single market has long been viewed by observers in countries with less of a free market tradition as a typically British liberal invention. And yet it is this market, as well as the EU itself, that another Conservative government is now seeking to leave.

Britain has also left its stamp on key EU initiatives from regional policy to development assistance and fisheries. The EU’s interest in a common foreign and security policy originally stemmed from Britain. The EU’s comparatively transparent and accountable administrative rules date from the reforms introduced by former British Labour Party leader Neil Kinnock when he was Vice-President of the European Commission from 1999 to 2004. Thus, representatives of Britain’s two major parties have helped to make the EU what it is today.

If British prime ministers had explained to public opinion earlier the extent of their country’s influence on the EU, something that other Europeans never doubted, the referendum of 23 June 2016 might never have occurred.

A “Smooth and Sensible” Brexit

Be that as it may, Europeans on both sides of the English Channel are now grappling with the consequences of that vote. If reason and economic interest prevail, a “smooth and sensible” Brexit, as evoked by the British prime minister in Florence in September, might yet emerge.

This would involve a broad agreement, in 2017, on the principal aspects of the divorce settlement. This concerns mainly Britain’s financial commitments to the EU, the residence, professional and health rights of citizens living on both sides of the Channel after Brexit, and the need to maintain the Common Travel Area between Britain and Ireland and to avoid a hard border across the island of Ireland after Brexit. While Brussels, London and Dublin have affirmed their intention of achieving these goals, there are many practical and political issues to resolve.

If sufficient confidence and trust between EU and UK negotiators is established, it should also be possible to agree to the general terms of a future political and economic agreement between London and Brussels by the end of the year and to broach the question of transitional arrangements to smooth the way for government and business. The British government wishes to ensure that business need adjust to Brexit only once, hence the need for a smooth transition to a well-defined future relationship.

If good progress is made next year, the separation agreement and transitional arrangements could be drawn up by October 2018, allowing enough time for approval by EU and British institutions ahead of Britain’s exit from the EU at midnight between 29 and 30 October 2019. Little, except Britain’s lost vote in EU institutions, would then change for the next two to three years, as the UK continued to make payments to the EU budget, respect judgements of the European Court of Justice and accept the free movement of labour.

The breathing space would be used to negotiate, sign and ratify a two-part long-term agreement. The first part would cover trade and economic issues; it could take effect provisionally relatively quickly after agreement had been reached. The second part, though, would be a wide-ranging political agreement, involving security and even aspects of defence. Both sides have an interest in cooperation on armaments production and unconventional forms of conflict, as well as police and judicial affairs. This would involve the member states’ legal responsibilities and require ratification by all twenty-eight countries concerned. It might not come into effect before the mid-late 2020s.

This relatively benign sequence of events assumes that the British government is unified behind its negotiator, David Davies, and that the political situation in Britain and the EU remains generally stable. It also assumes that the EU can move beyond its rigid two-stage sequencing of the negotiations.

However, there may well be political upsets, involving a leadership competition in the Conservative Party and, perhaps, an early general election. The opposition Labour Party may come to power bringing a change in priorities but also differences of opinion in its own ranks. The British economy will be damaged by Brexit, according to leading economists, and public opinion is likely to react when this is widely felt.[1]Until now, the main impact has been a decline in sterling and rising inflation, raising the prospect of higher interest rates.

The “Cliff Edge” Scenario

Such uncertainties, as well as the divergent political agendas of London and Brussels, may make the smooth and sensible Brexit impossible to achieve during the limited time available. This opens the way to a second scenario, widely described in Britain as the cliff edge. Under this hypothesis, the December 2017 goal for achieving a breakthrough in the separation talks is missed. This further postpones discussion of transitional arrangements and a future long-term agreement.

Negotiations continue fitfully during 2018 but the two sides are too far apart to reach agreement by October 2018, which the EU chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, has designated as the effective deadline. If October passes without an overall agreement, it will probably be too late to secure the agreement of the European Parliament before 29 March 2019, when the two-year negotiating period initiated by the British government’s notification of withdrawal expires. Nonetheless, negotiations might well go down to the wire.

Unless all twenty-eight countries “stop the clock” at midnight, an old Brussels ruse, the UK would then leave the EU without an agreement. Business leaders have warned of the chaos this will bring. There will be an unmanageable fivefold increase in work at British, Irish and mainland European ports checking consignments, the suspension of air travel between the UK and the EU, pending the conclusion of a new air transport agreement, and other major disruptions.

Health, safety, veterinary and phytosanitary inspections, as well as the assessment of customs duties, would lead to long queues of lorries at ports on both sides of the channel. Neither side can build the necessary infrastructure and linked IT systems or recruit sufficient qualified staff in time to cope with dramatically increased requirements after a hard Brexit. Supply chains would be disrupted and many foreign-owned companies, which had not already relocated to remaining EU countries, would seek to do so rapidly.

The political and economic damage of going over the cliff edge would last for years and embitter the UK’s relations with the EU and third countries. Many would question the value of Britain’s WTO commitments in the absence of appropriate trading arrangements between Britain and the EU.

This then is a sketch of the cliff edge. Those who admire Britain for its pragmatism, fairness and common sense find it hard to believe that such a scenario might become reality. Surely, they say, Britain and the EU are involved in preliminary skirmishing of the type that precedes any negotiation. They are sure to come to their senses as the decisive deadlines approach. Nothing is less than certain.

A Tale of “Downside” Risks

The outcome may well diverge from either the optimistic or the pessimistic scenarios delineated above. However, the risks are mainly “downside” as the economists put it. British negotiators have not yet grasped the fundamentally asymmetric nature of negotiations between twenty-seven countries backed by European institutions on the one side and a single country seeking to leave the club on the other. It would be better for government, business and the public, if this reality were more widely recognized, leading to realistic negotiating targets. Indeed, Brexit is not really a negotiation at all in the usual sense. It is rather an effort by the leaving country to secure some exceptions from the club’s rules at the time of its departure. This is much akin to the efforts of a candidate (joining) country to achieve some, temporary, transitional exceptions to the EU’s rules.

The Brexit talks are essentially an exercise in damage limitation, mainly through transitional arrangements. When the divorce and transitional arrangements have been agreed, Britain and the EU can concentrate on negotiating a long-term partnership which will be in their mutual interest.

This post was written by Michael Leigh of Covington & Burling LLP., © 2017
For more Global legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

Brexit Poses Issues For Airports, Airlines

The United Kingdom’s split from the European Union could leave the nation and United States without a trade agreement to manage the aviation industry. The aviation industry currently operates between the two nations under the Open Skies agreement signed by the U.S. and the EU in 2007. However, the U.K. will no longer be covered under the agreement once it leaves the bloc and, while it is still an EU member, cannot negotiate a new agreement either.

Open Skies agreements are bilateral air service agreements (ASAs) the U.S. government negotiates with other countries to provide rights for airlines to offer international passenger and cargo services. Agreements cover a number of significant matters including rights to fly over and land in territories, regulatory requirements, competition, commercial opportunities, customs and duties, and landing charges.

The situation is creating uncertainty and legal challenges in one of the most important components of international trade. Forty percent of the EU’s air traffic to the U.S. departs from U.K. airports and nearly 48,000 flights left the U.S. bound for the U.K. in 2016 alone. Commercial arrangements in the aviation industry including for airlines, air freight companies, airports and all related businesses depend on the Open Skies agreements as a basis for their contractual arrangements. Some U.S. airlines are already seeking to renegotiate deals with U.K. airports to ensure that break clauses and other mechanisms are inserted to deal with any uncertainty following Brexit, which under Article 50 has a deadline of March 30, 2019. Post-Brexit flight bookings may also need some form of provision to deal with contractual rights to hedge against major changes in the event that the Open Skies agreement is terminated for the U.K.

Michael O’Leary, CEO of Ryanair, Europe’s largest airline, told reporters on Aug. 2 that without some understanding of what a future agreement will look like airlines won’t be able to plan their 2019 flight schedules.

“There is going to be a serious disruption unless the British government can negotiate an agreement by around this time next year,” Ryanair said.

In late July, Airlines for America, the nation’s largest aviation trade group, issued a formal statement calling for the airline industry to be dealt with immediately and separately from Brexit negotiations. On Aug. 1, Reuters reported that British Transport Secretary Chris Grayling met with White House and airline officials to assure them that an agreement would be in place when the U.K. exits the EU. The Federal Aviation Administration’s chief Michael Huerta has also recently explained the seriousness of the U.K.’s situation with regards to aviation safety. Along with the other EU member states, the U.K. is currently part of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is responsible for all aspects of civil aviation safety in the EU. Speaking at the UK’s Aviation Club, Huerta pointed out that the U.K. currently benefits from the being part of EASA and that when it leaves the EU it will need to be replaced or there would be the very real possibility of an “interruption of service.”

Faced with uncertainty of legal rights and concerns about ongoing aviation safety regulation, it is important that U.S. airlines as well as U.S. logistics and freight companies monitor the situation and plan for potential disruption. Some comfort can be taken from British Government assurances that open skies agreements and regulations will be in place when the U.K. exits the EU, however, individual commercial agreements should be reviewed to minimize risk of disruption. For instance, U.S. airlines have agreements with U.K. airports for a range of services including landing rights and leases for office outlets. All these agreements may need to be reviewed sooner rather than later so that both parties have contingencies in place to avoid any disruption as much as possible.

This post was written by G. Thomas Lee and David B. Hamilton of Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC.
Get more Brexit Analysis at the National Law Review.

Brexit – Squaring Circle and involving European Court of Justice

Clash of Philosophies

There is a potentially irreconcilable clash of constitutional philosophies between the UK and the EU which results in certain “no go” areas on the EU side for the forthcoming Brexit negotiations.

Perspective of the EU27

EU UK FlagsThe EU27’s approach is driven by the perception that the European Union is not merely representative of a negotiable bundle of international trade treaties but is a supranational entity based on and subject to a constitution created by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). From the perspective of the EU and the EU27 , the constitution of the EU goes well beyond international treaties.  The Treaties establish a Union which is based on principles similar to those in Federal States.

Any of the member states of the EU (including the UK) accordingly is, from the perspective of the EU, not only a counterparty to an international treaty but an integral part of an autonomous Union. The driving principle of the European Union – which was correctly identified and repeated by Leave campaigners – is the supremacy of the EU’s legal order over the legal order of its member states, including the supremacy of the EU’s legal order over the constitutions of the member states.

One of the most important principles of the EU is laid down in Article 3 (2) TEU.  This provides that the EU is an area within which its citizens are free and can freely move. This is a general principle which is not restricted to trade but applies in all areas of life. In addition to such general principle Article 3 (3) TEU states that, inter alia, one of the consequences of this area of freedom and free movement is the internal market.

That is the context of the European Union placing the future rights of EU citizens in the UK at the forefront of any of the forthcoming Brexit negotiations.

Since the EU is bound to such constitutional order, any agreement with the UK pursuant to Article 50 TEU needs, from the perspective of the EU, to comply with such constitutional principles. “Constitutionality” is a major issue for the continental European member states since governments and politicians on the continent are used to be bound by constitutions which cannot be overridden by domestic governments or parliaments by simple act of parliament or government. Constitutions can only be amended or overridden if a qualified majority in Parliament and, in some member states, a referendum so approves. In some member states, such as Germany, there are even some constitutional principles which cannotbe changed by Parliament at all.

Perspective of the UK

The UK approach is driven by its perspective that the EU is simply the creation of a bundle of international treaties which establish a common market in which various different principles of free trade and free movement apply, and the contents of which can be freely negotiated between the various parties to such international treaties. Accordingly the UK takes the point of view that the agreements to be entered into pursuant to Article 50 TEU upon Brexit can be freely negotiated and that such negotiations are not subject to or restricted by overriding constitutional principles which are binding on the EU during such exit negotiations.

How to reconcile the differing points of view and how to involve the European Court of Justice

The two above described perspectives of the UK and the EU would appear to be legally irreconcilable, but there is a potential avenue out of such dead-lock by making use of:

(a) the fact that Article 50 (3) TEU does not conclusively state that the UK ceases to be a member state of the EU two years after the Article 50 Notice has been given, but in principle refers to the date on which the relevant withdrawal agreement becomes effective, which effective date can either fall on a date occurring after the two years or on a date occurring prior to the two years.

Accordingly, a simple withdrawal agreement could provide that Brexit becomes effective only once certain specified additional agreements have been finalized and entered into.

(b) the Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council and/or any member state (including the UK) being entitled to request from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) pursuant to Article 218 (11) TFEU legal opinions on any draft agreement – like the agreements between the UK and the EU on their future relationships – to be entered into with a third country (which the UK would be once the withdrawal agreement becomes effective) in order to avoid and/or mitigate concerns relating to the constitutionality of the future relationship agreement with the UK.

It is likely that the EU27 will at some stage call upon the European Court of Justice to opine on the constitutionality of the future relationship agreement(s) with the UK because of the fundamental nature of the agreement(s).

Samples of constitutionally important legal opinions rendered by the European Court of Justice in relation to Agreements which the EU had entered into in the past under Article 218 (11) TFEU (and its predecessors) include, for example:

– ECJ opinions 1/91 and 1/92 on the European Economic Area Agreement and the system of judicial review thereunder,

– ECJ opinion 1/94 relating to the EU agreeing to accede to WTO, GATS and TRIPs

– ECJ opinion 2/13 relating to the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights

– ECJ opinion 2/15 relating to the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore.

In relation to the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore the ECJ held on 16 May 2017 that such Free Trade Agreement is, because of its far reaching comprehensive content, a so-called “mixed-agreement” and therefore requires the consent of all 28 Member States of the European Union. Depending on the contents of the future relationship agreement between the UK and the EU, such agreement will also need to be ratified by the Parliaments of the EU27 Member States.

Agreements to be negotiated between the UK and the EU

The minimum number of agreements to be negotiated in the context of the UK leaving the EU pursuant to Article 50 is two:

(i) the withdrawal agreement on the details of the withdrawal “taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union” and

(ii) an agreement on the details of the future relationship between the EU and the UK.

Even though the minimum number of agreements to be entered into is two, it is likely that there will be more than two agreements since there are areas which need to be dealt with instantaneously (like aviation between the UK and EU27 and a potential accession of the UK to the ECAA Agreement in order to enable the flow of air traffic between the UK and the EU to continue as normal) irrespective of whether other areas may be dealt with at a later stage.

Whereas the withdrawal agreement can be adopted by the EU pursuant to a qualified majority decision pursuant to Article 50 TEU, any agreement on the details of the future relationship will require the “normal” majority contemplated in the TEU and TFEU for the relevant matters concerned, because Article 50 does not apply to such agreements on the details of the future relationship.

From the EU27 perspective, the principal items of the withdrawal agreement are those set out in the Brexit Negotiation Guidelines adopted by the European Council on 29 April 2017, the European Parliament on 5 April 2017 and the Non-Paper of the European Commission of 20 April 2017 and the Commission Recommendation for a Council Decision of 3 May 2017.

Withdrawal Agreement and the date at which it comes into force

The EU and the UK could agree that the withdrawal agreement is ratified in accordance with Article 50 TEU before the lapse of the two-year period but provides that it comes into force only after the agreement on principles for the future relationship has been (i) agreed on working level; (ii) submitted to and reviewed by the European Court of Justice pursuant to Article 218 (11) TFEU, and (iii) been ratified by the UK and the EU – or after the ratification process has been declared by the UK to be defunct.

That would mean that the UK would not cease to be a member state of the EU until there is an agreement on the principles for the future relationship without having to achieve this within the tight two years period.

The UK would also continue to enjoy all rights as a member state under existing international trade and other agreements entered into by the EU with countries around the world, like free trade agreements, air transportation agreements etc. until the ECJ has determined that the principles agreed between the UK and the EU in the agreement on principles for the future relationship are compliant with TEU and TFEU. Once this has been determined, the details of the future relationship could be negotiated in detail between the UK and the EU.

If the UK ceased to be a Member State on 30 March 2019 and “only” some transitory period or implementation period thereafter was agreed on during which certain specified EU rules continue to apply, this would not prevent the UK from losing its rights under existing International Agreements which had been entered into by the EU.

There is clarity in the approach of the EU27. The approach that the UK will take should become clearer after the General Election on 8 June, and later in the year as the UK government begins to identify its Brexit strategy in more detail, and identifies the trade offs it is prepared to make.  The historical and current political climate, as well as the sheer complexity of Brexit, is such that the UK cannot necessarily be expected the trade offs which history will regard as the “right” ones.

By Jens Rinze and Jeremy Cape of Squire Patton Boggs.