When Board Conflict Crosses the Line…

Elected officials are, naturally, sometimes at the center of conflict and division within their board.  Conflict is to be expected.  However, what happens when board members take action to freeze out a minority board member from information that he or she needs to do his or her respective job?  The use of information-control tactics against minority members on a board, impeding their ability to receive that information necessary to perform his or her duties is problematic – and it may be unconstitutional.\

Elected officials have duty to be informed. Palm v.Centre Tp., 415 A.2d 990, 992 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980):

It is the duty of a school board member, a commissioner, a councilman, or a supervisor to be informed. Supervisors are not restricted to information furnished at a public meeting. A supervisor has the right to study, investigate, discuss and argue problems and issues prior to the public meeting at which he may vote. Nor is a supervisor restricted to communicating with the people he represents. He is not a judge. He can talk with interested parties as does any legislator.

This responsibility extends beyond the contours of the public meeting and what is discussed at those meetings.

Elected officials have protections under the First Amendment. The Third Circuit has historically recognized that a public official’s right to free speech under the First Amendment will be violated when the retaliatory conduct of her peers interferes with her ability to adequately perform her elected duties. See Werkheiser v. Pocono Tp., 780 F.3d. 172, 182 (3d Cir. 2015); Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397, 404 (3d Cir. 2006).

To avoid entering the territory of this kind of interference, everyone can play a role in ensuring the government functions adequately and that Board members’ rights, duties, and privileges are protected.  Board division, when gone too far, can cross constitutional lines.  To avoid walking that line, there are things that everyone can do to make for a well-functioning Board or meeting:

  • Managers can stay neutral and ensure that every board member is kept up to date on significant municipal operations and projects.
  • Solicitors can host a meeting with the board to educate the board on laws pertaining to their position, such as a municipal code and the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act.
  • Board members can foster respect for fellow board members and learn how to communicate so that each board member can participate in healthy debate on contentious issues.  Enacting policies related to meeting decorum can be helpful, but they need to be enforced evenhandedly.

For more tips for handling divisiveness among a board, see the December 2021 article on “Tips for Handling Board Conflicts” in the Pa Township News.

©2022 Strassburger McKenna Gutnick & Gefsky
          

Apple Inc. v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and Dynamic Advances, LLC, Decision Denying Institution

DrinkerBiddle

Takeaway: A voluntary dismissal of a litigation without prejudice will not nullify service of a complaint for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) if that litigation is immediately continued in a consolidated case.

In its Decision, the Board denied institution of the Inter Partes Review as time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) because it was not filed within the statutory period of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).  The date of service of two different complaints was an issue of primary focus by the Board.

In a first patent litigation, Patent Owner (Dynamic Advances) filed a complaint on October 19, 2012. Dynamic Advances, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 1:12-cv-01579-DNH-CFH (N.D.N.Y.)(Dynamic I).  The complaint for the first litigation was served on Petitioner (Apple) on October 23, 2012.  In a second patent litigation, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and Dynamic Advances jointly filed a complaint on June 3, 2013. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst. & Dynamic Advances, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 1:13-cv-00633-DNH-DEP (N.D.N.Y.)(Dynamic II).  The complaint for the second litigation was served on Petitioner (Apple) on June 6, 2013.

The Petition in the instant proceeding was filed on January 3, 2014.  Thus, the service date of October 23, 2012 for the first litigation (Dynamic I) was more than 12 months prior to the filing of the Petition, whereas the service date of June 6, 2013 for the second litigation (Dynamic II) was less than 12 months prior to the filing date of the Petition.  The Board found that service of the first complaint on October 23, 2012, rather than service of the second complaint on June 6, 2013, controlled for purposes of determining whether the requested inter partes review was time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).  Because the service date of October 23, 2012 for the first litigation (Dynamic I) was more than 12 months prior to the filing of the Petition, the Board found that the Petition was not filed within the statutory period of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).

The Board’s rationale in reaching this conclusion related to the fact that on July 22, 2013, the court ordered consolidation of Dynamic I and Dynamic II under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42.  In doing so, the court ordered that pursuant to a joint stipulation of the parties, Dynamic I was “dismissed without prejudice and the parties would proceed to litigate their claims and defenses in [Dynamic II].”

Petitioner argued that under the decision in Macauto U.S.A. v. BOS GmbH & KG, IPR2012-0004 (“holding that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice nullified service of the complaint for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)”), service of the first complaint on October 23, 2012 was not effective.  According to Petitioner, as in Macauto, the facts of the present case have the effect of leaving the parties as if the first action had never been brought.

The Board disagreed, finding that “Dynamic I cannot be treated as if that case had never been filed under the rationale of Macauto.”  Instead, the Board found that it was “persuaded that the circumstances in the instant case weigh in favor of close scrutiny of the effect of the dismissal of Dynamic I, because that cause of action, although dismissed, was continued immediately in Dynamic II.”

This proceeding was the third time that Petitioner had petitioned for inter partes review against the ‘798 patent.  In IPR2014-00077, institution was denied.  IPR2014-00320 was filed concurrently with the petition for this proceeding.

Apple Inc. v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and Dynamic Advances, LLC,IPR2014-00319
Paper 12: Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
Dated: June 12, 2014
Patent 7,177,798 B2
Before: Josiah C. Cocks, Bryan F. Moore, and Miriam L. Quinn
Written by: Moore
Related proceedings: IPR2014-00077; IPR2014-00320; Dynamic Advances, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 1:12-cv-01579-DNH-CFH (N.D.N.Y.); Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst. & Dynamic Advances, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 1:13-cv-00633-DNH-DEP (N.D.N.Y.)

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