Lawsuits Against Creditors of NewPage

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The trustee for the litigation trust resulting from the NewPage Corporation bankruptcy has launched nearly 800 lawsuits against pre-bankruptcy creditors of NewPage Corporation seeking payment to the trust.

The lawsuits (also called adversary proceedings) have been filed in Delaware bankruptcy court by litigation trustee Pirinate Consulting Group LLC to recover allegedly preferential payments made in the months prior to the company’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing in September, 2011.

Much to the surprise of many who did business with the debtor prior to the bankruptcy filing, not only are they waiting for payment on amounts owed, but they will now face claims that they must give back monies previously received.

Defendants should know there are often defenses to these claims, including that the allegedly preferential payments were made in the ordinary course of business or that additional goods were shipped after those allegedly preferential payments were received. Upon receipt of a complaint, defendants should contact counsel knowledgeable about bankruptcy avoidance actions for assistance. Failure to respond to the adversary proceeding complaint in a timely manner, can result in a judgment and collection efforts by the litigation trustee.

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Second Circuit Rules Against Make-Whole Premium for Refinancing of Accelerated Debt

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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has upheld a bankruptcy court’s decision enforcing indenture language providing for the automatic acceleration, without make-whole premium, of secured American Airline, Inc. notes upon American Airline Inc.’s bankruptcy filing.  The Second Circuit’s September 12 opinion generally follows that of the lower court, discussed in our February 20, 2013 blogpost, and likewise holds that the subsequent refinancing of the accelerated notes did not convert the acceleration into a voluntary redemption on which a make-whole premium would have been due.

The Second Circuit’s opinion does not hold that make-whole premiums are unenforceable in bankruptcy, it merely applies express language in a particular indenture stating that the make-whole premium is inapplicable to an acceleration upon bankruptcy.  Accordingly, creditors that wish to preserve the possibility of obtaining a makewhole premium (or other type of prepayment premium) if their debt is repaid in bankruptcy should insist upon express indenture language to the effect that a make whole premium (or other premium) is due upon acceleration.  Whether or not a court would enforce such a premium is left unaddressed by the Second Circuit ‘s decision; however, the opinion aligns the Second Circuit with courts that have held that automatic acceleration upon bankruptcy clauses in debt instruments are enforceable, because the bankruptcy code’s proscription on the enforcement of so-called ipso facto clauses triggered by bankruptcy applies only to executory contracts, and debt instruments are not executory.

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Municipal Bankruptcies: An Overview and Recent History of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code

Katten Muchin

The City of Detroit filed for protection under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code on July 18, 2013,[1] becoming the largest municipality to ever file for bankruptcy. Detroit’s bankruptcy filing presents numerous complicated issues, which will be resolved over the course of the case.

This advisory provides an overview and history of chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, beginning with a discussion of the various substantive provisions that govern (i) chapter 9’s eligibility requirements, (ii) case administration issues that arise in chapter 9 cases and (iii) the requirements for confirming a chapter 9 plan of adjustment. Next, the advisory discusses significant chapter 9 cases since the Orange County bankruptcy case in 1994—the largest municipal bankruptcy at the time. Finally, since many municipal bonds are insured, the advisory provides an update on the major monoline insurance companies—most of which have been placed into rehabilitation proceedings due to their own financial challenges. At the end of this advisory is a chart that compares the key provisions of chapter 9 to counterparts of chapter 11.

I.            Chapter 9 Case Issues

a.       Eligibility Requirements (§ 109(c))

Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the requirements to be eligible to file as a chapter 9 debtor. Specifically, a debtor must establish that it (i) is a municipality, (ii) has specific authorization to file, (iii) is insolvent, (iv) wants to adjust its debts through a plan and (v) meets one of four creditor-negotiation requirements.[2]

i.      Authorization to File (§ 109(c)(2))

Section 109(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that in order to be a chapter 9 debtor a municipality must be “specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental officer or organization empowered by State law to authorize such entity to be a debtor under such chapter.”

The degree to which state laws permit chapter 9 filings varies from state to state.[3] Twelve states specifically authorize chapter 9 filings, while 12 others permit bankruptcy filings given a further action to be taken by a state, official or other entity.[4] In addition, three other states authorize a limited subset of municipalities to file for bankruptcy. The remaining 23 states do not authorize municipal bankruptcy filings.

ii.      Negotiation with Creditors (§ 109(c)(5)(A)-(D))

Section 109(c)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that chapter 9 eligibility requires some element of pre-petition negotiation with creditors, which can be satisfied by complying with one of four alternative provisions. The first alternative is that the chapter 9 debtor “obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of each class, that [the debtor] intends to impair under a plan in a case under [chapter 9].”[5]Significantly, in order to satisfy this requirement, the chapter 9 debtor must obtain the creditors’ consent to the actual plan as filed, and, thus, the debtor cannot simultaneously file an amended plan of adjustment and satisfy the first alternative.[6]

The second alternative is that the chapter 9 debtor “has negotiated in good faith with creditors and has failed to obtain the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of each class that [the debtor] intends to impair.”[7] In In re Sullivan County Regional Refuse Disposal District,[8] the bankruptcy court interpreted this provision to require that the debtor present to creditors a comprehensive, but not formal, workout plan that the debtor can implement in its chapter 9 case.[9] The negotiations must also “revolve around the negotiating of the terms of a plan that could be effectuated if resort is required to [c]hapter 9.”10Chapter 9 debtors do not have to show that they have fully levied taxes to the maximum allowed by law.[11] However, bankruptcy courts have found that municipal debtors have not acted in good faith where the debtors never exercised their assessment powers prior to initiating proceedings in bankruptcy court.[12]

The third alternative is that the chapter 9 debtor demonstrate that it “is unable to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation is impracticable.”[13] This alternative was inserted in the statute to deal with the problems created by major municipalities, whose bonds are numerous and are frequently in bearer form. Under such circumstances, negotiation is difficult at best, because of the difficulty in identifying the creditors with whom the municipality must negotiate.

The fourth alternative is that the debtor “reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a preference.”[14] As discussed below, pursuant to section 926(b) of the Bankruptcy Code it is important to note that payments on account of a bond or a note may not be avoided as a preference under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, a chapter 9 debtor cannot avoid entering into negotiations with its bondholders on the basis that the bondholders are attempting to obtain a preference.

b.      Chapter 9 Case Administration

i.      Automatic Stay of Enforcement of Claims Against the Debtor (§ 922)

Section 922(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for a stay of actions against entities other than the debtor itself. The additional stay is meant to supplement, and not replace, the automatic stay granted under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The additional stay prohibits a creditor from taking actions against an officer or inhabitant of the city. Accordingly, a creditor cannot bring a mandamusaction against an officer on account of the creditor’s claims against the debtor, nor can a creditor seek to collect its debt by commencing an action against an inhabitant of the debtor for collection of taxes that are owed to the municipality. Similarly, any attempt by a creditor to enforce a lien on taxes owed to the municipality is also stayed under section 922(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 922(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides an exception to the additional stay for pledged funds. Specifically, under section 922, if an indenture trustee or paying agent is in possession of pledged funds from special revenue bonds, the trustee or agent may apply the pledged funds to payments as they come due and/or distribute the funds to the bondholders. In addition, a chapter 9 debtor’s voluntary payment of such funds to an indenture trustee or paying agent on account of the special revenue bonds, and the application thereof, does not violate the stay and does not require court approval. In Jefferson County, however, the bankruptcy court allowed Jefferson County to withhold payment (at least on an interim basis) of special revenues pending determination of the scope of the county’s interest in the special revenues and the county’s actions in connection with its restructuring efforts.

ii.      Avoidance Powers

Section 901 of the Bankruptcy Code provides, among other things, that a chapter 9 debtor has most of the avoidance powers granted to a chapter 11 debtor, including the ability to avoid preferences and fraudulent transfers.[15] Further, section 926(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “[i]f the debtor refuses to pursue a cause of action under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549(a), or 550 of [the Bankruptcy Code], then on request of a creditor, the court may appoint a trustee to pursue such cause of action.” Notwithstanding a chapter 9 debtor’s ability to commence an avoidance action, section 926(b) provides that a transfer on account of a bond or a note may not be avoided as a preference under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code.

iii.      Bankruptcy Judge (§ 921(b))

Pursuant to section 921(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, “[t]he chief judge of the court of appeals for the circuit embracing the district in which the case is commenced shall designate the bankruptcy judge to conduct the case.” The provision is designed to remove politics from the case of a major municipality and to ensure that the case is presided over by a competent judge.[16] The provision also gives the chief judge the flexibility to appoint a retired judge or a judge who sits in a district other than the one where the case is pending, which allows the chief judge to manage the flow of judicial business in the various parts of the circuit.[17]

iv.      Collective Bargaining Agreements (§ 365)

Like a chapter 11 debtor, a chapter 9 debtor has the power to assume and reject contracts under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. In chapter 11, if a debtor wishes to reject a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor must comply with the requirements of section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, which affords various protections to the union that is the counterparty to the collective bargaining agreement. Section 1113, however, does not apply in a chapter 9 case. Instead, section 365, as informed by the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,[18] applies when determining whether a chapter 9 debtor may reject or modify a union contract. Bildisco, which was decided prior to the enactment of section 1113, held that under section 365, a debtor could unilaterally reject or modify a collective bargaining agreement without complying with applicable state law.

Two California bankruptcy courts have clarified the ramifications of Congress’s decision not to incorporate section 1113 in chapter 9 cases. InOrange County,[19] a coalition of county employee organizations brought an action against the debtor to enforce their various labor agreements.[20] In connection with their action, the coalition also sought an emergency injunction enjoining the debtor from permanently laying off county employees represented by the various organizations composing the coalition.[21] Although the Orange County court held that the standard articulated in Bildisco was applicable to the rejection of the labor agreements in chapter 9, the court also agreed with the coalition that the debtor should also be required to satisfy the standards of California law “if not as a legal matter, certainly from an equitable standpoint.”[22] Accordingly, the Orange County court concluded that even under Bildisco, municipalities may only modify their labor contracts as a matter of last resort.

In City of Vallejo,[23] the debtor moved to reject its collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) less than a month into the case. Agreeing with Orange County court, the Vallejo court held that section 1113 is inapplicable to a chapter 9 debtor’s motion to reject a CBA and that the correct standard is the one set forth in Bildisco.[24] The Vallejo court, however, was far less deferential to California state labor law than the Orange County court had been. The court emphasized that under section 903 of the Bankruptcy Code, states “act as gatekeepers to their municipalities’ access to relief under the Bankruptcy Code.”[25] Accordingly, the court reasoned that when a state authorizes its municipalities to file chapter 9 petitions, “it declares that benefits of chapter 9 are more important than state control over its municipalities” and, therefore, “must accept chapter 9 in its totality.”[26] Thus, if a state authorizes a municipality to file under chapter 9, the municipality “is entitled to fully utilize [section] 365 [of the Bankruptcy Code] to accept or reject its executory contracts.”[27] While the California law allowing Vallejo to file for bankruptcy purported to require that municipalities comply with state law while in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court held that that portion of the law was preempted by the Bankruptcy Code.[28] Ultimately, the bankruptcy court did not grant Vallejo’s motion.[29] Instead, the court encouraged the parties to reach a settlement, which they did approximately five months later.

Ultimately, bankruptcy courts have consistently held that section 1113 does not apply in a chapter 9 case. Instead, section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, as such section is applied in Bildisco, governs the rejection of CBAs in chapter 9. These courts, however, have issued inconsistent opinions as to whether the chapter 9 debtor must comply with state law when seeking to reject or modify a CBA.

v.      Official Committees (§ 901(a))

Section 901(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that section 1102 applies in a chapter 9 case. Accordingly, official committees can be formed in a chapter 9 case. As discussed below, however, a chapter 9 debtor is not technically obligated to pay for the fees and expenses of an official committee through the debtor’s plan of adjustment.

c.       Plan of Adjustment Requirements

i.      Confirmation Requirements (§ 943)

A chapter 9 plan of adjustment is simply the document that provides for the treatment of the various classes of creditors’ claims against the municipal debtor. Similar to a chapter 11 debtor, a chapter 9 debtor submits a disclosure statement that describes the plan and related matters, and the disclosure statement is sent with a ballot to each impaired creditor with an opportunity to vote on the plan. Similar to a chapter 11 plan of reorganization, in order to be confirmed, the plan of adjustment must be accepted by a majority of creditors and two thirds in amount of claims within each class of claims that is impaired under the plan.

In addition to the voting requirements, the Bankruptcy Code contains several other requirements that a plan of adjustment must meet to be confirmed by the bankruptcy court. The requirements include the following: (i) the chapter 9 debtor must not be prohibited by law from taking any action necessary to carry out the plan; (ii) all post-petition administrative expense claims must be paid in full; (iii) the chapter 9 debtor must have obtained all of the regulatory and electoral approvals necessary to consummate the plan; and (iv) the plan must be feasible. Importantly, the plan of adjustment must also be in the best interest of creditors. Since a chapter 9 debtor is ineligible to be a debtor in a chapter 7 liquidation, however, this test has been interpreted to mean that a plan of adjustment need only be “better than alternatives,” such as the dismissal of the chapter 9 case.

If an impaired class of creditors votes against a chapter 9 debtor’s plan of adjustment, the bankruptcy court can still confirm the plan through a “cram down” of the dissenting class (or classes) if the plan meets all of the other confirmation requirements set forth in section 943 of the Bankruptcy Code. In order to accomplish such a cram down, the debtor must show that at least one impaired class has accepted the plan and that the plan is fair and equitable and does not discriminate unfairly among creditors. In chapter 11, the fair and equitable requirement, often referred to as the “absolute priority rule,” requires that the debtor establish that no junior class of creditors is receiving any distribution under the plan of reorganization on account of its claims unless all senior classes of claims are paid in full. In chapter 9, however, a plan of adjustment is considered “fair and equitable” if the amount to be received by the dissenting class is “all they can reasonably expect to receive under the circumstances.”

If a plan of adjustment is not approved, the bankruptcy court may dismiss the chapter 9 case, thereby stripping the municipality of the protections of the Bankruptcy Code. A bankruptcy court may also dismiss a chapter 9 case for a variety of other reasons, such as the failure of a debtor to prosecute the case, unreasonable delay, the non-acceptance of a plan by creditors or a material default or termination of a plan.

ii.      Professional Fees (§ 943(b)(3))

Section 943(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that “all amounts to be paid by the debtor or by any person for services or expenses in the case or incident to the plan have been fully disclosed and are reasonable.” As such, a chapter 9 debtor must disclose any and all fees and expenses being paid to professionals. Section 943(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, however, does not require the municipality to pay the fees and expenses of committee professionals. “Absent the debtor’s consent, there is nothing in chapter 9 that automatically requires a debtor to pay the fees and costs of an official committee, professionals employed by the committee or professionals employed by members of an official committee.”[30]

II.            Noteworthy Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Cases

Municipal bonds are traditionally viewed as safe investments because defaults are rare. From 1970 to 2012, only 71 rated municipal bond defaults occurred, and only five of those were by general purpose municipalities (i.e., cities, villages, towns or counties).[31] In fact, 78 percent of all municipal bond defaults came from health care- and housing-related projects issued by special entities.[32]

Given this low default rate, it is hardly a surprise that municipal bankruptcies are also rare. Only 636 municipal bankruptcy cases have been filed since such cases were first authorized by Congress in 1937.[33] Moreover, only approximately 250 municipalities have filed under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code,[34] as compared to the approximately 1.2 million individuals who filed personal bankruptcy proceedings in 2012 alone.[35]Only 17.5 percent of chapter 9 filings between 1980 and 2007 were by general purpose municipalities.[36] Approximately 61.8 percent of chapter 9 cases involved utilities and special purpose districts.[37] The remaining 20.7 percent of chapter 9 cases mainly involved schools, public hospitals and transportation authorities.[38]

Historically, bondholders have fared well in chapter 9 cases, experiencing, at worst, some payment delays or relatively minor haircuts. Recently, however, the assumption that bondholders will be paid in full (or at least the vast majority of their claims) in a bankruptcy case has been called into question.[39] Below is a discussion of the major municipal bankruptcies from the past 20 years.

a.       Orange County, California (1994)

In 1994, Orange County, California, was the fifth-largest county in the United States with an operating budget in excess of $3.7 billion. Increasing demand for high-quality public services strained the county’s finances since the California Constitution restricted the ability of local governments, including Orange County, to raise tax revenue. The County Treasurer tried to solve Orange County’s financial problems by pooling the county’s money with funds from nearly 200 local public agencies through an entity known as the Orange County Investment Pool (OCIP) and investing those funds. In particular, the OCIP used the pooled funds to borrow more money (the OCIP borrowed $2 for every $1 on deposit) to invest in derivatives and high-yield, long-term bonds. As a result of adverse market conditions, the OCIP lost $1.64 billion by November 1994.[40]

In December 1994, Orange County and the OCIP both filed for chapter 9 after many Wall Street investment firms commenced legal actions to seize their collateral. The bankruptcy court dismissed the OCIP’s case after determining that such an entity did not qualify as a “municipality” under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, was ineligible to be a chapter 9 debtor. Although the dismissal allowed the creditors to continue their actions against the OCIP, the bankruptcy court enjoined such creditors from enforcing against the OCIP’s funds, thereby preventing severe financial stress being placed on Orange County (and the other local agencies that had invested in the fund).[41]

Orange County initially submitted a plan of adjustment that called for a sales tax increase of one half of one percent, which would require voter approval under California law. As such, the voters of Orange County would effectively be voting on the plan. After the voters rejected the tax increase, it became apparent that the debtor’s initial plan would not be confirmed. The bondholders, who risked having the debtor default on its principal payment obligation, agreed to rollover the county’s debt for another year in exchange for increased interest payments. The county then developed another plan under which (i) the county would divert tax funds from other county agencies and use those funds to pay bondholders; (ii) the local governments that lost money would agree to wait for full payment until the county won the lawsuits it filed against Wall Street firms alleging that such firms were culpable as a result of their actions surrounding the bankruptcy; and (iii) the county would issue $880 million in 30-year bonds that were insured by a municipal bond insurer to pay the debt on existing bonds, refinance other debt and pay for bankruptcy litigation and other expenses.[42]

Orange County emerged from bankruptcy 18 months after it filed. From a fiscal perspective, the county’s bankruptcy was very successful in that it reduced the county’s debt to an affordable level. Indeed, Orange County was able to access the lending markets a mere two years after its bankruptcy. Seven years after the filing, Orange County had a AA bond rating.[43]

b.      Prichard, Alabama (1999 and 2009)

Prichard, Alabama, which experienced a population decline of approximately 50 percent over the past 50 years, filed for bankruptcy in 1999 after it was unable to pay approximately $3.9 million in delinquent bills. In addition to the unpaid bills, Prichard also admitted to not making payments to its employees’ pension funds and, even though the city had withheld taxes from employees’ paychecks, the city failed to submit such withholdings to the state and federal governments.[44]

During the bankruptcy case, Prichard was able to make some progress enhancing social, financial and technological growth, as well as economic development. Its 2001 budget predicted a four percent increase in revenue over its 2000 budget, and the city exited from bankruptcy in 2001.[45]

While in bankruptcy, the city successfully revised its budget so that it no longer operated at a deficit. However, Prichard was still unable to meet its pension obligations. In 2009, Prichard filed for bankruptcy for the second time in order to stay a pending suit brought by its pensioners after it failed to make pension payments for six months. In its chapter 9 petition, the city claimed that during the previous year it had operated a $600,000 deficit on its $10.7 million budget. Further, Prichard had failed to make a $16.5 million payment to its pension fund under its previous plan of adjustment.[46]

In August 2010, the bankruptcy court dismissed Prichard’s chapter 9 case because the court held that the city was ineligible to be a chapter 9 debtor. In particular, the bankruptcy court determined that the Alabama statute authorizing chapter 9 filings only enabled permitted municipalities with bonded debt to file. Since Prichard did not have bond debt, the bankruptcy court found that it was ineligible to file.[47] Prichard appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision to the district court, which in turn certified the eligibility question to the Alabama Supreme Court.[48] In April 2012, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that municipalities did not need bond debt in order to file. The district court therefore reversed the bankruptcy court’s decision and remanded the case.[49] The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision has been viewed as opening the door for Jefferson County’s bankruptcy case— which is discussed below in greater depth—because Jefferson County’s debt was in the form of warrants, not bonds.[50]

c.       City of Vallejo, California (2008)

The City of Vallejo, with 120,000 residents, filed for bankruptcy in May 2008. Unlike most general purpose municipalities that file for bankruptcy, Vallejo’s financial distress was not caused by excessive debt. Rather, the city’s financial problems resulted from a budget issue. Vallejo’s finances had a long-term structural imbalance resulting from a declining tax base, decreasing revenues from property and sales taxes, state funding cuts and satisfying its expensive labor contracts. The city’s tax revenues decreased by $20 million between 2007 and 2011 as a result of the recession and decreasing home values that caused property taxes to decrease. Vallejo’s largest debt resulted from the city’s pension liabilities and financial obligations under its various labor contracts. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, Vallejo attempted to negotiate with several of its labor unions, but the parties were unable to reach an agreement.[51]

Shortly after Vallejo filed for bankruptcy, the city filed a plan of adjustment that it thought was feasible at the time and sought to adjust its labor contracts. As discussed below, the labor unions objected to the plan on the ground that it impermissibly abrogated the unions’ collective bargaining agreements. The bankruptcy court held that the labor agreements could be rejected under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. At the court’s encouragement, the parties negotiated new labor agreements. However, Vallejo’s finances continued to deteriorate during the chapter 9 case, causing the original plan of adjustment to no longer be feasible.[52]

Three years and five months after Vallejo filed its bankruptcy petition, the bankruptcy court approved the city’s new plan of adjustment. As part of the confirmed plan, the city closed fire stations, reduced public services, cut staffing requirements, laid off city workers, required new city workers to contribute more to their pensions and all employees to contribute more for their health insurance and sought new revenue.[53]

It was noteworthy that during the bankruptcy proceedings, Vallejo continued to make all payments on its bond debt, which totaled approximately $62 million, on time and in full. Likewise, the city’s plan of adjustment did not adjust the city’s bond debt. Under the plan, general unsecured claims received between 5 and 20 percent of their claims over a period of two years.[54]

d.      Westfall, Pennsylvania (2009)

Westfall, Pennsylvania, a small town with a population of 2,400 and a $1.5 million operating budget in 2009, filed for bankruptcy in April 2009. The impetus for the bankruptcy filing was a $20 million civil rights judgment obtained by a property developer against the town. Westfall and the developer entered into negotiations to settle the developer’s claim, which proved unsuccessful.[55]

The bankruptcy court ultimately approved Westfall’s plan of adjustment, which reduced the developer’s claim to $6 million and provided that the claim would be paid over 20 years without interest. In order to pay for the settlement, the town raised the property tax rate by 48 percent (the property tax would gradually decrease each year over the 20-year period).[56]

It is likely that the developer ultimately agreed to the plan of adjustment because he was concerned that the bankruptcy court would approve a less favorable plan. Specifically, the developer was aware that one class of the town’s creditors would vote to confirm the plan, which would allow the debtor to cram down the plan over the developer’s objection.[57]

e.      Jefferson County, Alabama (2011)  

Jefferson County, the second-largest county in Alabama, filed for chapter 9 in November 2011, which at the time was the largest municipal bankruptcy case in US history, in order to resolve the indebtedness of the county’s sewer system (a special purpose vehicle). In 1994, Jefferson County began a sewer restoration and rehabilitation program. Although the project was originally estimated to cost $1 billion, the costs eventually ballooned to $3.2 billion. In order to service its debt, the county increased sewer rates by 400 percent. In addition, the county lowered the costs of its debt service by entering into swap agreements under which the county would swap long-term fixed higher interest rate debt into short-term variable rate debt. The 2008 financial crisis destabilized the market for such swap agreements, which caused the county’s debt service to increase. In 2008, Jefferson County defaulted on its debt obligations, which resulted in the acceleration of the debt.[58]

Over the next several years, Jefferson County considered a chapter 9 filing. The county opted, however, to enter into a forbearance agreement in 2009, which allowed the county to negotiate with its creditors. The parties’ negotiations revolved around (i) the creditors forgiving a portion of the sewer debt, (ii) the parties restructuring the remaining debt at fixed rates and (iii) the county limiting sewer rate increases to the rate of inflation.[59]

In June 2013, Jefferson County reached an agreement on a plan of adjustment, which still needs to be approved by the bankruptcy court, under which the county will pay its creditors $1.84 billion, or 60 percent of what they are owed. JPMorgan Chase & Co., seven hedge funds and a group of bond insurers, which together hold $2.4 billion, or approximately 78 percent, of the sewer debt, agreed to support the plan. Under the plan, JPMorgan, which holds $1.22 billion of debt, will forgive $842 million. Taken together with a previous settlement, the bank will have agreed to pay the county and waive sewer obligations totaling $1.57 billion. Under the plan, the county will increase sewer rates by 7.4 percent annually for four years. The plan provides that Jefferson County will exit bankruptcy by the end of the year.[60]

f.       Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (2011)

The city of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the state capital, guaranteed debt issued by a special purpose vehicle that was formed in order to finance the construction of an incinerator plant. The construction and operation of the plant went over budget, and the original forecasts of the revenues that would be generated from the plant proved to be overly optimistic. Consequently, the special purpose vehicle defaulted triggering the city’s guaranty of the bond debt. In 2010, Harrisburg owed $68 million in interest payments—an amount that was $3 million in excess of the city’s yearly operating budget.[61]

Harrisburg sought a forbearance agreement with its creditors, which would permit the parties to negotiate a settlement. During this time, the city also began considering a chapter 9 filing in the face of the city mayor’s resistance to such a filing. Notwithstanding the ongoing negotiations, in October 2011, the Harrisburg city council authorized the city to file for bankruptcy. The filing was met with disagreement from the mayor, the dissenting city council members and elected state officials.[62]

In November 2011, the bankruptcy court dismissed the chapter 11 petition, holding that the city was not properly authorized to file under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, was ineligible to be a chapter 9 debtor. Following the dismissal, Pennsylvania’s governor commenced an action in state court seeking to have a receiver appointed for the city pursuant to the state intervention procedures for municipalities in fiscal distress.[63]

g.      Stockton, California (2012)

The City of Stockton, a city of 296,000 residents, filed for bankruptcy in June 2012, which at the time was the largest city ever to file for bankruptcy. Stockton was hard hit by the 2008 financial crisis. The collapse of the real estate market resulted in significant declines to the city’s property and sales tax revenues. In addition, the city experienced budgetary stress as 75 percent of Stockton’s general fund was used for the public safety payroll and to service debt, and satisfying pension obligations accounted for nearly 13 percent of the city’s overall spending. These budgetary problems were exacerbated by Stockton’s inability to generate new tax revenue, which was limited by California law. Stockton could not raise property taxes, and if the city wanted to levy a sales tax, like Orange County, it would need two-thirds voter approval in a special election.

At the time Stockton filed, the city stopped making debt service payments on its appropriation and pension obligation bonds. These bonds were, and still are, unsecured general fund obligations and have no specified tax revenues pledged for debt service. Stockton, however, has no general obligation bonds, which typically have better protections for bondholders.

Stockton has proposed to significantly reduce its bond debt while leaving its pension obligation owed to the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), the pension fund for public workers in California, unimpaired. While bondholders have suffered minor losses or delayed payments in previous chapter 9 cases, if Stockton’s case proceeds as planned, it would mark the first time that a municipality significantly impaired its obligations to bondholders.

Facing large losses, Assured Guaranty Corp., the monoline insurance company that insured Stockton’s bonds, and other capital market creditors objected to Stockton’s bankruptcy filing, arguing that Stockton had not negotiated with them in good faith. Specifically, the monoline argued that Stockton’s demands fell “short of the fairness requirements of chapter 9.” The bankruptcy court, however, overruled the objection, finding that the capital market creditors, not Stockton, had not negotiated in good faith prior to the bankruptcy filings when they “chose to take a we-have-nothing-to-talk-about position once the City indicated that it was not proposing to impair its obligations to CalPERS.”[64] Stockton’s bankruptcy case remains ongoing.

h.      San Bernardino, California (2012)

San Bernardino, a city of 210,000 residents, filed for bankruptcy in July 2012 because of a $48.5 million budget deficit that threatened the city’s ability to make payroll. Prior to filing, the city obtained $10 million in concessions from city employees and slashed its workforce by 20 percent over four years. Notwithstanding these efforts, San Bernardino’s fiscal problems that resulted from a variety of issues including accounting errors, deficit spending, lack of revenue growth and increases in pension and debt costs, remained unresolved. In addition, following the 2008 economic crisis, San Bernardino’s tax revenues declined by as much as $16 million annually, primarily because of drops in sales and property taxes. At the time of filing, 73 percent of the city’s general fund was being used to pay for public safety services.

In October 2012, CalPERS preliminarily objected to San Bernardino’s bankruptcy filing, arguing the city could not demonstrate that it was eligible to be a chapter 9 debtor. In particular, the pension fund argued that San Bernardino could not demonstrate that it (i) desired to effectuate a plan of adjustment, or (ii) negotiated with its creditors in good faith prior to the bankruptcy filing. The bankruptcy court ordered the parties to conduct discovery in respect of the eligibility issue. A hearing on the eligibility issue is scheduled for August 2013.

After filing for bankruptcy, San Bernardino, unlike Stockton, ceased making payments to CalPERS on account of the city’s pension obligations. San Bernardino submitted a pendency plan, which would defer $35 million of payments to CalPERS, which is necessary in light of the city’s budget deficit. San Bernardino has indicated that it intends to resume making payments. Such payments, however, will not include any payments on account of the $33 million owed to CalPERS in respect of the city’s unpaid post-petition obligations.

III.            Monoline Municipal Bond Insurers

In 2007, there were six AAA monolines that insured municipal bond debt. These companies, however, experienced various degrees of financial distress as a result of their structured finance obligations. Below is a brief summary of the current financial status of each company.

a.       Ambac Assurance Corporation (“Ambac”)

As of November 2007, Ambac had $556 billion of insured obligations outstanding. In 2008, Ambac’s financial condition began to be adversely affected by the effects of problems arising from mortgage lending practices in the United States because Ambac underwrote (i) direct financial guaranties of RMBS obligations and (ii) CDS on collateralized debt obligations backed primarily by RMBS. On March 24, 2010, at the request of the Wisconsin Office of the Commissioner of Insurance, Ambac formed a segregated account, which is a separate insurer from Ambac, and filed a petition for rehabilitation that limited the rehabilitation to only the segregated account, while leaving most policies in the general account with Ambac. Ambac’s municipal bond obligations remained in the general account and, therefore, were not affected by the rehabilitation proceeding.

b.      CIFG Guaranty (CIFG)

As of November 2007, CIFG had $85 billion of insured obligations outstanding. Like Ambac, CIFG experienced financial strains as a result of the company guaranteeing large amounts of RMBS. On January 22, 2009, the New York Insurance Department approved two transactions meant to keep CIFG out of a rehabilitation proceeding. The transactions involved a commutation of approximately $12 billion in troubled credit default swaps and reinsurance of $13 billion of municipal bonds. As part of the transaction, Assured Guaranty Corp. (AGC) acquired the investment grade portion of now-defunct CIFG’s municipal exposure through a reinsurance agreement. Most former CIFG bonds now carry the Aa3/AA+ ratings of AGC.

c.       Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (FGIC)

As of November 2007, FGIC had $315 billion of insured obligations outstanding. On June 28, 2012, the Court  signed a rehabilitation order appointing the Superintendent of Financial Services of the State of New York as rehabilitator of FGIC. On June 11, 2013, the New York state court entered an order approving FGIC’s plan of rehabilitation. Under the plan of rehabilitation, FGIC will make an initial payment of 17.5 percent on allowed claims, and make later payments totaling 40 percent of the allowed claims. While the court confirmed the plan of rehabilitation, the plan has not yet become effective and will not do so until mid-August 2013, at the earliest.

d.      Assured Guaranty Corp. (f/k/a Financial Security Assurance) (AGC)

As of November 2007, AGC had $414 billion of insured obligations outstanding. In 2009, AGC’s parent Assured Guaranty Ltd. acquired Financial Security Assurance and subsequently renamed it Assured Guaranty Municipal (AGM), thus combining under the same ownership the two most highly rated bond insurers at that time. Both monolines were rated AAA at the time of the acquisition, but were subsequently downgraded to AA in 2010. As a result of the real estate market deterioration, the RMBS portion of AGC’s consolidated exposure was hit with significant claims in recent years. However, on a percentage basis the exposure was not as large as that of other insurers such as MBIA and Ambac, and fewer claims have resulted. As such AGM and AGC have retained their high investment grade ratings. The addition of the insured book of CIFG has increased the percentage of exposure accounted for by municipal bonds.

e.       MBIA Insurance Corporation (MBIA)

As of November 2007, MBIA had $652 billion of insured obligations outstanding. Like many of the other monolines, MBIA’s credit rating was downgraded because of its RMBS exposure. Recently, however, the company’s bond rating was upgraded from B- to BBB. More importantly, MBIA’s municipal debt guaranty business unit, National Public Finance Guarantee Corp. (NPFGC), was upgraded from BBB to A. While MBIA retained Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP as restructuring counsel in April 2013,[65] such reports indicate that the firm’s retention was part of an effort to avoid a possible rehabilitation of MBIA’s structured finance unit, and not the municipal bond unit. There is no indication that a rehabilitation proceeding will be commenced against NPFGC.

f.       Syncora Guarantee Inc. (f/k/a XL Capital Assurance (XLCA))

As of November 2007, Syncora, then known as XLCA, had $143 billion of insured obligations outstanding. Unlike many of the other monoline insurers, Syncora has remained solvent. Syncora, however, is not underwriting any new policies.

Appendix A – Comparing Chapter 9 and Chapter 11


[1] The bankruptcy court docket for Detroit, including copies all documents filed in the case, is available without charge to the public athttp://www.kccllc.net/Detroit.

[2] See 1 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶109.04[1] (16th ed.).

[3] Mike Maciag, “How Rare Are Municipal Bankruptcies?” Governing, Jan. 24, 2013.

[4] Michigan is one of the states that conditionally authorizes chapter 9 filings. Specifically, MCL 141.1558 authorizes a local government for which an emergency manager has been appointed to become a chapter 9 debtor if the governor approves the emergency manager’s recommendation that the local government commence a chapter 9 case. The statute further provides that “[t]he governor may place contingencies on a local government in order to proceed under chapter 9.” Id.

[5] 6 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 900.02[2][e][i] (16th ed.).

[6] Id. (“In New Smyrna-DeLand Drainage District v. Thomas, in which the debtor filed an ‘amended plan,’ but relied on prior consents to the original plan, the court of appeals upheld the dismissal of the petition on the grounds that the plan was a new plan, and that the prior consents to one plan could not be counted toward the new plan.”).

[7] Id. ¶ 900.02[2][e][ii].

[8] 165 B.R. 60 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994).

[9] Id. at 78.

[10] Id. (citing In re Cottonwood Water & Sanitation Dist., 138 B.R. 973, 974, 979 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992).

[11] Id.In re Villages at Castle Rock Metropolitan Dist. No. 4, 145 B.R. 76, 84 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 900.03.

[12] Sullivan County, 165 B.R. at 78.

[13] 6 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 900.02[2][e][iii] (16th ed.).

[14] Id. ¶ 900.02[2][e][iv].

[15] Specifically, sections 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549(a), 549(c), 549(d), 550, 551, 552, 553, 555, 556, 557, 559, 560, 561, 562 of the Bankruptcy Code apply in a chapter 9 case.

[16] 6 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 921.03 (16th ed.) (citing S. Rep. No. 94–458, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975)).

[17] Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94–686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975)).

[18] 465 U.S. 513 (1984). The three-part test articulated in Bildisco requires a debtor to establish that (a) the labor agreement burdens the estate; (b) after careful scrutiny, the equities balance in favor of contract rejection; and (c) “reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification have been made, and are not likely to produce a prompt and satisfactory solution.”Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 526.

[19] In re County of Orange, 179 B.R. 177 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).

[20] Id. at 179.

[21] Id.

[22] Id. at 184.

[23] 403 B.R. 72 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009).

[24] Id. at 78.

[25] Id. at 76.

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Id. at 76–77.

[29] Id. at 78.

[30] 6 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 901.04[13][c] (16th ed.).

[31] National Governors’ Association et al., Facts You Should Know: State and Local Bankruptcy, Municipal Bonds, State and Local Pensions 2 (2013).

[32] National Governors’ Association et al., Facts You Should Know: State and Local Bankruptcy, Municipal Bonds, State and Local Pensions 2 (2011).

[33] Michael De Angelis & Xiaowei Tian, “United States: Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy—Utilization, Avoidance, and Impact” 323 (2011).

[34] Id. at 321.

[35] See American Bankruptcy Institute, Quarterly Non-business Filings by Chapter (1994–2012).

[36] Id. at 321–22.

[37] Id. at 322.

[38] Id.

[39] See Steven Church, “Stockton Threatens to Be First City to Stiff Bondholders,” Bloomberg, June 30, 2012.

[40] See De Angelis & Tian, supra note 33, at 324.

[41] See id. at 325.

[42] See id. at 325–26.

[43] See id. at 326.

[44] See id. at 331.

[45] See id.

[46] See id.

[47] See id.

[48] See Katherine Sayre, “Alabama Supreme Court Ruling Allows Prichard Bankruptcy to Move Forward,” April 20, 2012.

[49] See id.

[50] See id.

[51] See De Angelis & Tian, supra note 33, at 326–27.

[52] See id. at 327.

[53] See id. at 327–28.

[54] See id.

[55] See id. at 330.

[56] See id.

[57] See id. at 330–31.

[58] See id. at 328.

[59] See id. at 328–29.

[60] See Steven Church, Margaret Newkirk and Kathleen Edwards, “Jefferson County, Creditors Reach Deal to End Bankruptcy,” Bloomberg, June 5, 2013.

[61] See De Angelis & Tian, supra note 33, at 329.

[62] See id. at 329–30.

[63] See id. at 330.

[64] In re City of Stockton, Slip-Op Case No. 12-32118-C-9 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. June 12, 2013).

[65] See, e.g., Shayndi Raice, “MBIA Hires Law Firm,” The Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2013, at B2.

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The Libor Scandal: What’s Next? Re: London Interbank Offered Rate

GT Law

The London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) is calculated daily by the British Banking Association (BBA) and published by Thomson Reuters. The rates are calculated by surveying the interbank borrowing costs of a panel of banks and averaging them to create an index of 15 separate Libor rates for different maturities (ranging from overnight to one year) and currencies. The Libor rate is used to calculate interest rates in an estimated $350 trillion worth of transactions worldwide.

The Libor Scandal

The surveyed banks are not required to provide actual borrowing costs. Rather, they are asked only for estimates of how much peer financial institutions would charge them to borrow on a given day. Because they are not required to substantiate their estimates, banks have been accused of Libor “fixing,” or manipulating the Libor rate by submitting estimates that are exaggeratedly higher or lower than their true borrowing costs. This scandal has resulted in the firing and even arrest of bank employees.

Libor’s reputation came under fire in June 2012 when Barclays PLC agreed to pay over $450 million to settle allegations that some traders fixed their reported rates to increase profits and make the bank appear healthier than it was during the financial crisis. In the wake of this settlement, investigative agencies around the world began to look deeper into Libor rate fixing, leading to a $750 million settlement by the Royal Bank of Scotland and a record-setting $1.5 billion settlement by UBS AG. To date, there have been over $2.5 billion in settlements, with many more investigations ongoing. One investment bank estimates that, in total, legal settlements could amount to as much as $35 billion by the time investigations conclude.

Replacing the Libor

In the wake of the Libor scandal, international and domestic agencies have advocated for its replacement. The BBA, the group responsible for setting Libor since the 1980s, voted to relinquish that authority, and a committee of the UK’s Financial Reporting Council is currently vetting bids from other independent agencies interested in administering the new rate.

The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Task Force on Benchmark Rates, led by the head of the UK Financial Services Authority Martin Wheatley and the US Futures Trading Commission Chairman Gary Gensler, released a report last month saying that the new system should be based on data from actual trades in order to restore creditability. Wheatley and Gensler agree on the need to create a transaction-based rate, but disagree on how to transition from Libor to the new system.

Wheatley proposes that: the estimate-based Libor system be kept in place while a new transaction based rate is introduced to run alongside it under a “dual-track” system (so as to avoid disrupting existing transactions), and that the decision as to if and when to abandon Libor be left to market participants as opposed to regulators.

Gensler proposes a wholesale replacement of Libor as soon as possible and cautions that its continued use undermines market integrity and threatens financial stability.

IOSCO is also pushing for a code of conduct that would hold banks to a higher standard of honesty in reporting and setting index rates, while other agencies, including the Financial Stability Board and the European Union, are working on the development of other potential solutions including stricter regulations and greater penalties for rate-fixing conduct.

The future of Libor is unclear, but it is certain that whomever is chosen to replace the BBA will be under immense pressure and scrutiny from the international financial community.

Recommendations

To stay prepared, parties to financial transactions should view existing and future contracts with an eye towards potential benchmark changes. Parties should perform contractual due diligence to establish the range of Libor definitions and benchmarks to which they are exposed. In addition, parties should review the fallback provisions dealing with change or discontinuance of Libor and other benchmark rates to understand the potential impact of such changes.

Going forward, parties should include fallback provisions in their contracts to allocate risk and set up alternatives to mitigate the uncertainty that could arise in the event of any changes to the Libor system or other relevant benchmarks.

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The Stockton Saga Continues: Untouchable Pensions on the Chopping Block?

Sheppard Mullin 2012

Judge Christopher M. Klein’s decision to accept the City of Stockton’s petition for bankruptcy on April 1, 2013 set the stage for a battle over whether public workers’ pensions can be reduced through municipal reorganization.

Stockton’s public revenues tumbled dramatically when the recession hit, leaving Stockton unable to meet its day-to-day obligations. Stockton slashed its police and fire departments, eliminated many city services, cut public employee benefits and suspended payments on municipal bonds it had used to finance various projects and close projected budget gaps. Stockton continues to pay its obligations to California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”) for its public workers’ pensions. Pension obligations are particularly high because during the years prior to the recession, city workers could “spike” their pensions—by augmenting their final year of compensation with unlimited accrued vacation and sick leave—in order to receive pension payments that grossly exceeded their annual salaries.

When Judge Klein accepted Stockton’s petition April 1, 2013, he reasoned that Stockton could not perform its basic functions “without the ability to have the muscle of the contract impairing power of federal bankruptcy law.” Judge Klein noted that his decision to “grant an order for relief … is merely the opening round in a much more complicated analysis.” The question looming is whether the contract-impairing power of federal bankruptcy law is strong enough to adjust state pension obligations.

Stockton will have the opportunity to present a plan of adjustment, which must be approved through the confirmation process. No plan of adjustment can be confirmed over rejection by a particular class of creditors unless the plan (1) does not discriminate unfairly, and (2) is fair and equitable with respect to each class of claims that is impaired under or has not accepted a plan. Judge Klein said that if Stockton “makes inappropriate compromises, the day of reckoning will be the day of plan confirmation.”

Stockton’s plan of adjustment will likely propose periods of debt service relief and interest-only payments for some municipal bonds, followed by amortization. Stockton intends to actually impair other municipal bonds, potentially paying only cents on the dollar. However, Stockton does not intend to reduce its pension obligations to CalPERS under the plan. Provisions of the California Constitution and state statutes prohibit the reduction of public workers’ pensions, even in bankruptcy proceedings. These California state law provisions were thought to make public pensions virtually untouchable. Yet, the plan may not be confirmable if it impairs Stockton’s obligations to bondholders but not its obligations to CalPERS. Bondholders and insurers will surely vote against and object to the plan, claiming it unfairly discriminates against them, and Judge Klein will have to decide whether the treatment constitutes unfair discrimination. The unfair discrimination claim may have merit, because an overarching goal of federal bankruptcy law is to equitably allocate losses among competing creditors. Federal bankruptcy law often trumps state laws, but there is no precedent for how federal bankruptcy law applies to California’s pension provisions.

For now, cash-strapped municipalities around the country—and their creditors—are watching to see just how Stockton will restructure its obligations.

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Where Do Your Interests Lie Under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code?

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Determining a foreign debtor’s “center of main interests” and its effect on creditors’ rights

When doing business with a foreign company, it is important to identify the company’s “center of main interests” (“COMI”) as creditors may find themselves bound by the laws of the COMI locale. If a company initiates insolvency proceedings outside the U.S., it must petition a U.S. court under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code for recognition of the foreign proceeding. If the foreign proceeding is found to be a “foreign main proceeding” (i.e., a proceeding pending where the debtor has its COMI), Chapter 15 provides certain automatic, nondiscretionary relief, including an automatic stay of all proceedings against the debtor in the U.S. Therefore, when faced with a foreign insolvency proceeding, U.S. creditors’ rights will often be determined in the jurisdiction where the debtor’s COMI is located. However, despite its significance, COMI is left undefined by the statute, which prompted the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 7608 (2nd Cir. April 16, 2013) to determine the relevant factors for locating a COMI and the appropriate time frame to consider those factors.

In Morning Mist, Miguel Lomeli and Morning Mist Holdings Limited (collectively, “Morning Mist”) filed a derivative action in New York state court against Fairfield Sentry Limited (the “Debtor”). The Debtor was one of Bernie Madoff’s largest “feeder funds,” having invested over $7 billion in the scheme. Shortly after the commencement of the derivative action, the Debtor initiated liquidation proceedings in the British Virgin Islands (the “BVI”). Then, in accordance with Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor petitioned the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York for recognition of the BVI liquidation proceeding. The bankruptcy court granted the Chapter 15 petition, recognizing the BVI liquidation as a “foreign main proceeding” and imposing an automatic stay on all proceedings against the Debtor in the U.S., including the derivative action. The district court upheld the bankruptcy court’s decision, and Morning Mist appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that the lower courts improperly found the BVIs to be the Debtor’s COMI.

To determine the Debtor’s COMI, the Second Circuit examined which factors should be considered and over what time period. Tackling the temporal element first, the Court concluded that the Chapter 15 petition filing date is the relevant review period, subject to an inquiry into whether the process has been manipulated. To offset a debtor’s ability to manipulate its COMI, a court may also review the period between the initiation of the foreign liquidation proceeding and the filing of the Chapter 15 petition. The Court squarely rejected Morning Mist’s suggestion that courts must consider a debtor’s entire operational history.

As for the appropriate factors to consider in locating a COMI, the Second Circuit held that any relevant activities, including liquidation activities and administrative functions, may be considered in a COMI analysis. Elaborating, the Court held that Chapter 15 creates a rebuttable presumption that the country where the debtor has its registered office will be its COMI, but recognized that courts have focused on a variety of other factors as well, including the location of the debtor’s headquarters, the location of those who actually manage the debtor, the location of the debtor’s primary assets, the location of the majority of the debtor’s creditors or the majority of the creditors who would be affected by the case, and/or the jurisdiction whose law would apply to most disputes. However, the Second Circuit emphasized that consideration of these factors is neither required nor dispositive.

Finally, Morning Mist argued that Chapter 15’s public policy exception (“Nothing in this chapter prevents the court from refusing to take an action governed by this chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States.”) applied because the BVI proceedings were confidential and therefore “cloaked in secrecy.” The Second Circuit quickly dismissed this argument explaining that the public policy exception should be read restrictively and invoked only under exceptional circumstances concerning matters of fundamental importance for the enacting State. Recognizing that court pleadings can be sealed in U.S. cases, including bankruptcy cases, the Second Circuit found that the confidentiality of the BVI bankruptcy proceedings did not offend U.S. public policy.

The Morning Mist case adds some clarity to a significant issue in cross border insolvencies by highlighting the importance of understanding the internal operations and structure of foreign companies—factors that could affect the ability of U.S. creditors to seek redress in U.S. courts.

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Club Membership Deposits in Bankruptcy

The National Law Review recently featured an article by the Hotels, Resorts & Clubs Group of Greenberg Traurig, LLP regarding Club Memberships and Bankruptcy:

GT Law

As noted in our “Club Membership Deposits — From Gold to Paper” posted on August 4, 2011,  many membership deposit clubs have resorted to bankruptcy to restructure their membership deposit debt liability.  Below are descriptions of how the membership deposits have been restructured in four bankruptcies.

Dominion Club. Members will receive in full satisfaction of their membership deposit claims, distributions pro rata from an escrow account to be funded in part from future new membership sales proceeds and certain contributions from a club owner affiliate. Each member had the option to receive in lieu of distributions from the escrow account an upfront payment equal to 11% of the member’s membership deposit.

Amelia Island. The purchaser of the multiple golf course club and resort entered into a lease/purchase agreement with a club member entity with respect to one golf course and clubhouse.  Members received in satisfaction of their membership deposit claims membership rights in the member owned club.  Under the new Membership Plan, a golf member who converted to equity membership by paying $2,000 was to receive a refund of 30% of the membership deposit after resignation from available funds, increasing to 80% over a seven year period.  Golf members who did not convert to equity membership were to receive a refund of 30% of their membership deposit after resignation from available funds.

Palmas del Mar. A government affiliated entity that acquired the club established a fund to pay, first, administrative claims and a tax claim, and then, if any amount remained, members would receive a pro rata share of the balance based on the present value of their membership deposit liability. It was expected that club members would be paid a very small percentage of their membership deposits.

PGA West.  Membership deposits payable after resignation and reissuance will be paid at 50% of the total membership deposit; starting two years after the date of the reorganization plan, the refund percentage will increase by 5% each year.  Members retain their right to 100% of their membership deposits at the end of 30 years and after death subject to annual caps on the total amount of payments under such provisions.

The individual circumstances for each club impacted the final provision governing the membership deposit restructure.

Membership deposits must be restructured so that members as a class of creditors vote in favor of the reorganization plan or the bankruptcy court determines that the reorganization plan does not unfairly discriminate and is fair and equitable.  The club governing documents and the economics of the restructure must be carefully reviewed.

©2012 Greenberg Traurig, LLP

Second Circuit Finds Anderson News Pleading Is Plausible . . . Enough

The National Law Review recently featured an article, Second Circuit Finds Anderson News Pleading Is Plausible . . . Enough, written by Scott MartinSimon HarmsMary K. MarksScott MartinIrving Scher, and Stephen C. Tupper of Greenberg Traurig, LLP:

GT Law

Admonishing that motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be decided based on whethera plaintiff’s complaint is plausible rather than how plausible it is, which was the district’s view in granting a dismissal motion, the Second Circuit, in Anderson News, L.L.C. v. American Media, Inc.,[1] declared improper the district court’s denial of leave to file a proposed amended complaint and vacated the dismissal.

Prior to its bankruptcy, Anderson News was the second largest wholesaler of magazines to newsstands and bookstores in the United States. Anderson alleged in a lawsuit against its major publisher suppliers that in response to a magazine distribution surcharge that Anderson another wholesaler (Source) had announced, the publishers conspired with Anderson’s competitors and distribution service companies to refuse to deal with the two wholesalers in order to drive them out of business Anderson claimed that the group boycott resulted in its loss of access to 80 percent of the magazines it distributed.

The District Court Decision

Judge Paul A. Crotty of the Southern District of New York dismissed Anderson’s original complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), denied reconsideration, and refused leave to file a proposed amended complaint, finding the alleged conspiracy to be facially implausible under the Twombly-Iqbalstandard,[2] and the original pleading’s defects incurable.[3] Among other things, Judge Crotty commented that eliminating Anderson and Source would have left 90 percent of the wholesale market share in the hands of two competitors. Because publishers and distributors have an economic self-interest in having more, not fewer, wholesalers (since that yields greater competition, which is good for suppliers), Judge Crotty concluded that the conspiracy’s alleged goal was implausible. By contrast, he believed that parallel, but unilateral, conduct was “completely plausible” under the circumstances. Specifically, the defendants initially had different reactions to the surcharge; there was no direct evidence of conspiracy alleged in the original complaint; and the defendants’ decisions to not pay the surcharge and instead stop shipping to Anderson were “in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market.”[4]

The district court concluded that Anderson’s allegations presented only “an economically implausible antitrust conspiracy” that was “based on sparse parallel conduct allegations” and lacked “a context suggesting a preceding agreement.”[5]The district court further stated that while it was compelled to take “all factual allegations as true on a motion to dismiss, . . . factual inferences are not entitled to the same benefit.”[6]

The Court of Appeals Decision

The Second Circuit reversed. While acknowledging that Twombly required “some factual context suggesting [that the parties] reached an agreement, not facts that would be merely consistent with an agreement,”[7] the appellate court declared that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to show “that its allegations suggesting an agreement are more likely than not true or that they rule out the possibility of independent action, as would be required at later litigation stages such as a defense motion for summary judgment or a trial.”[8] The Second Circuit emphasized that “a given set of actions may well be subject to diverging interpretations, each of which is plausible,” but the choice between such interpretations was for the fact-finder, not for the court to make on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.”[9] Unlike the Twombly complaint, however, Anderson’s proposed amended complaint did not rely solely on allegations of parallel conduct that was explicable as natural, unilateral reactions, but did, in fact, allege actual agreement — identifying dates, executives, and statements that could plausibly be interpreted as such. Ruling that these amendments would have stated a claim, the Second Circuit stressed that “[t]he plausibility standard is lower than a probability standard, and there may therefore be more than one plausible interpretation of a defendant’s words, gestures, or conduct.”[10] In such circumstances, taking all facts as true and making all reasonable inferences, “on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion it is not the province of the court to dismiss the complaint on the basis of the court’s choice among plausible alternatives.”[11]

Should We Discern A Trend?

In another recent Twombly-Iqbal decision, Liu v. AMERCO,[12] the First Circuit was similarly permissive in applying the plausibility test, this time with respect to the required element of damages in a claim under the Massachusetts unfair trade practices statute (“Chapter 93A”). The plaintiff in Liu had brought a class action against the U-Haul truck rental companies premised upon a recent Federal Trade Commission investigation and consent order concerning an alleged invitation to collude by U-Haul to its major competitors (which as an attempt to conspire would not be actionable under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, but could be challenged under Section 5 of the FTC Act and,could potentially provide a basis for a claim, under Massachusetts’ Chapter 93A).

Although the plaintiff claimed to have undertaken two U-Haul rentals in or to Massachusetts, she did not plead specific facts concerning those transactions, such as what she paid or what competitors’ rates were at the time. The district court dismissed her complaint, explaining that basic facts about her individual transactions where necessary to judge whether she had overpaid, and whether such overpayment was caused by U-Haul’s unconsummated conspiracy attempt. The First Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Michael Boudin, disagreed, finding sufficient the plaintiff’s reliance, inter alia, upon the FTC complaint’s allegations (including references to specific documents) that U-Haul had raisedits own prices as an essential element of its effort to collude. Although the appellate court noted that “U-Haul’s brief raises fair questions about the power of the analysis,”[13] it held, not unlike the Second Circuit in Anderson News, that “[t]he place to test factual assertions for deficiencies and against conflicting evidence is at summary judgment or trial.”[14] Again, although the First Circuit appeared skeptical of the claim, it required that the complaint set forth “only enough facts to make the claim plausible, and at this stage reasonable inferences are taken in favor of the pleader.”[15]

Author’s note: Several years ago, while participating on a panel not long after the Supreme Court decided Twombly, I was greeted with skepticism (to put it politely) when arguing that it would not be an extraordinary extension of the then-new pleading standard to require that a complaint alleging an agreement in restraint of trade set forth facts that, if true and allowing for all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, stated a claim that was more plausibly consistent with conspiracy than with competition. After all, that would be a logical application of the summary judgment standard of Matsushita[16] — a decision that likewise is framed around notions of plausibility and economically rational behavior — in the pleading context: i.e., if the record were to develop consistent with plaintiff’s pleading, would it “tend to exclude the possibility” of independent, non-collusive action?[17] It would also respond to concerns expressed by the Supreme Court that even under the old Conley v. Gibson[18] “plaintiff can prove no set of facts” pleading standard in itsAssociated General Contractors[19] decision, a district court served an important gatekeeping role at the pleading stage in antitrust cases due to the significant expense of discovery.[20] From the perspective of this (principally defense) antitrust litigator, Judge Crotty’s approach in Anderson Newswas not unwelcome. For the time being, though, at least in the Second Circuit, it is not the law.


[1] ___ F.3d ___ (2d Cir. April 3, 2012). The decision is available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 1085948.

[2] See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

[3] Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

[4] Id. at 397-99.

[5] Id. at 402.

[6] Id. (emphasis added).

[7] Anderson, 2012 WL 1085948, at *18 (internal quotations omitted).

[8] Id.

[9] Id. at *18-19 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

[10] Id. at *24.

[11] Id.

[12] F.3d ___ (1st Cir. May 4, 2012) (Boudin, J.). The decision is available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 1560170.

[13] Id. at *6.

[14] Id.

[15] Id. (citing SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 441 (1st Cir. 2010)).

[16] Matsushita Elec .Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).

[17] See id. at 588 (internal quotations omitted).

[18] 355 U.S. 41 (1957).

[19] Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).

[20] See id. at 528 n.17 (“a district court must retain the power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to proceed”).

©2012 Greenberg Traurig, LLP

Secured Lender Successfully Invokes Seldom Used Tool to Protect Collateral in Bankruptcy

Recently The National Law Review published an article about Protecting Collateral in Bankruptcy by Mark A. BerkoffRobert RadasevichNicholas M. MillerWilliam Choslovsky and Kevin G. Schneider of Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP:

The commercial real estate market continues to struggle.  Beyond poor market conditions, financing difficulties and other well known issues of late, many mortgage holders, realizing that their properties are worth significantly less than their mortgage balance, are walking away from the properties or otherwise looking for a way to reduce their mortgage obligation to the property’s current depressed market value, including through a chapter 11 bankruptcy process.  Ultimately, the question in that situation becomes:  who will take the loss on their balance sheet—the lender or the borrower?  Often, the loss falls on the lender.

On January 19, 2012, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion, authored by Judge Richard A. Posner, representing a significant victory for undersecured lenders holding distressed real estate collateral.  In that case, In re River East Plaza, LLC, No. 11-3263, — F.3d —-, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1048 (7th Cir. Jan. 19, 2012), the subject property was the River East Art Center located near Navy Pier in downtown Chicago.  Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP (“NGE”) was lead counsel to the property owner’s senior secured lender, LNV Corp., an affiliate of Beal Bank.

The facts are straightforward:  When the building’s owner and mortgagor, River East Plaza, LLC (“River East” or the “Debtor”), defaulted on its mortgage, LNV successfully pursued difficult foreclosure proceedings in state court and obtained a foreclosure sale order in February 2011, nearly two years after River East defaulted on its mortgage.  Then, just 11 hours before the scheduled foreclosure sale, River East filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, automatically halting the foreclosure sale.

Because this was a single asset real estate (“SARE”)[1] case, River East was subject to special Bankruptcy Code rules designed to put pressure on SARE debtors to move their cases quickly.

Once a Debtor files for bankruptcy, an estate is created and the Debtor is protected by an automatic stay that prohibits creditors of the Debtor from taking certain actions to collect debts, enforce remedies or complete litigation without obtaining relief from the automatic stay from the Bankruptcy Judge.  Among other things, in a SARE case, a Debtor has only 90 days to start making monthly mortgage payments to its lender or to file a plan of reorganization “that has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time”.  If one of these conditions isn’t satisfied, then the Bankruptcy Judge must modify the automatic stay and may allow the lender to pursue its state court remedies (i.e. complete its foreclosure).  11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3).

In this case, however, the Debtor did not make any mortgage payments to the lender within 90 days after the bankruptcy filing.  Therefore, the sole issue was whether this Debtor had timely filed a plan of reorganization that had a “reasonable possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time.”  Id.  The Debtor filed a plan that, in effect, proposed to cash out the lender at a very distressed price, well below LNV’s $38.3 million claim.  While it was undisputed that the value of the real estate had fallen precipitously in the current real estate recession and that the property was “underwater,” the Debtor valued the property at what LNV viewed as an artificially low $15 million (and also valued LNV’s claim, after accounting for taxes and mechanics liens, at $13.5 million).  Because LNV was unwilling to accept a lowball cash out, it objected to the Debtor’s plan andalso made the strategic decision to make what is called a “section 1111(b) election” – a provision that has been in the Bankruptcy Code for over 30 years, but is seldom invoked.

The statute is awkwardly worded, confusing and hard to interpret, which may explain why it is seldom invoked, but the key takeaway is that section 1111(b):

  1. Allows a secured creditor to “elect” to have its entire claim treated as secured (even if the lender is undersecured (i.e. claim is worth $38.3 million and debtor (borrower) believes the lender’s secured interest in the collateral is worth only $13.5 million));
  2. Allows the secured lender to retain its lien on the property until that secured claim is paid in full;
  3. Is appropriate when the secured creditor believes the property is undervalued and will appreciate, and when the lender believes the reorganized debtor may later default under its confirmed plan; BUT
  4. The secured creditor, in making the election, must agree to waive its undersecured deficiency claim (in this case approximately $25 million).

As the Seventh Circuit stated:

. . . an under-secured creditor who decides, as LNV has decided, to participate in his debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding has a secured claim for the value of the collateral at the time of bankruptcy and an unsecured claim for the balance.  11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1)(A).  But generally he can exchange his two claims for a single secured claim equal to the face amount of the unpaid balance of the mortgage.  §§ 1111(b)(1)(B), (2).  LNV made this choice, so instead of having a secured claim for $13.5 million and an unsecured claim for $24.8 million it has a secured claim for $38.3 million and no unsecured claim . . .

The swap is attractive to a mortgagee who believes both that the property that secures his mortgage is undervalued and that the reorganized firm is likely to default again . . .

River East Plaza, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1048, at *7-8.

The Debtor responded to LNV’s § 1111(b) election by filing an amended plan that offered LNV the option of receiving (1) a cash out of the secured portion of its claim at the distressed price of approximately $13.5 million, plus a dividend of 4% on LNV’s $25 million deficiency claim (meaning an additional $1 million); or(2) approximately $13.5 million in 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds paying approximately 3% interest (which, “through the magic of compound interest”, would pay LNV a total of $38.3 million in 30 years).

In so doing, the Debtor proposed to retain the property, to strip LNV’s lien from the property and, instead, give LNV a lien on the long-term Treasury Bonds so that the Debtor could obtain construction financing, develop the property, realize the benefit of any appreciation or improvement in the real estate market and, presumably, sell the property for a very tidy profit in a few years.  LNV, meanwhile, would be effectively cashed out for $13.5 million on its $38.3 million claim.

Needless to say, LNV vehemently opposed this tactic and immediately filed a motion to terminate the automatic stay on the grounds that the Debtor’s amended plan “was not likely to be confirmed in a reasonable time” because the Debtor was proposing to retain the property while stripping LNV’s lien in violation of section 1111(b) and other plan-related provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  LNV argued that its § 1111(b) election ensured it the right to retainitslien on the real estate and benefit from any appreciation in the real estate market until its claim was paid in full.

The Debtor argued that it was able to do this because, among other things, giving LNV the lien on Treasury Bonds was giving LNV the “indubitable equivalent[2] of its lien on the real estate, which the Bankruptcy Code allows under certain circumstances when a plan proponent (normally the debtor) attempts to cram a plan down the throat of an objecting secured creditor.[3]  LNV countered that even ifthe Debtor could use the “indubitable equivalent” standard of cram down, a lien on stagnant 30-year Treasury Bonds was not the indubitable equivalent of a lien on real estate that can and does fluctuate wildly in value.

Bankruptcy Judge Wedoff agreed with LNV and lifted the automatic stay to allow the foreclosure to proceed, and he also dismissed the bankruptcy case.  River East successfully requested a direct appeal to the Seventh Circuit, which ultimately affirmed Bankruptcy Judge Wedoff’s decisions.

In a key ruling for secured creditors, the Seventh Circuit determined that the Debtor had delayed the secured creditor long enough and that Judge Wedoff appropriately lifted the stay and dismissed the bankruptcy case.  The Seventh Circuit also determined that the proposed replacement lien on 30-year Treasury Bonds was not the indubitable equivalent of LNV’s lien on the property because the risk profiles of the two forms of collateral were not equivalent.

Judge Posner observed that:

River East argues that the reason LNV chose to convert the entire $38.3 million debt that it was owed to a secured claim is that it wanted to thwart the bankruptcy proceeding.  No doubt.  LNV wanted to foreclose its mortgage and doubtless expected to be the high bidder at the foreclosure sale and thus become the building’s owner and so the sole beneficiary of any appreciation if and when the real estate market recovered.  But there is nothing wrong with a secured creditor’s wanting the automatic stay lifted so that it can maximize the recovery of the money owed it.

* * *

Banning substitution of collateral indeed makes good sense when as in the present case the creditor is undersecured . . .

River East, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1048, at *12.

The Court also explained that:

And so it comes as no surprise that the lien on the Treasury bonds proposed by River East would not be equivalent to LNV’s retaining its lien on the building.  Suppose the building turns out to be worth $40 million five years from now, yet River East, having borrowed heavily in the interim to finance improvements that bring the building’s value up to that level, defaults.  With its lien intact and the bankruptcy court unlikely in this second round of bankruptcy to stay foreclosure, LNV would be able to foreclose, and so would be paid in full.  In contrast, if its lien were transferred to the substituted collateral, it would have to wait another 25 years to recover the $38.3 million owed it.

Id. at *14.

Judge Posner summed up the case as follows:

River East’s aim may have been to cash out LNV’s lien in a period of economic depression and reap the future appreciation in the building’s value when the economy rebounds.  Such a cashout is not the indubitable equivalent of a lien on the real estate, and to require it would be inconsistent with section 1111(b) of the Code, which allows the secured creditor to defeat such a tactic by writing up his secured claim to the full amount of the debt, at the price of giving up his unsecured claim to the difference between the current value of the debt and of the security.

Id. at *17 (emphasis added).

So, at least in this jurisdiction, secured lenders holding distressed real estate as collateral when a borrower files a SARE chapter 11 case now have another arrow in their quiver that can be used and must be considered.  Depending on the facts of your particular case, the §1111(b) election may just be “checkmate” to a debtor that is (i) frustrating a secured lender’s remedies on a defaulted mortgage, (ii) stringing out the lender in foreclosure court and then filing a bankruptcy petition on the eve of foreclosure to attempt to retain their property, and (iii) attempting to cash out the secured lender at a historically low price or give it inferior collateral in an effort to cram down a bankruptcy plan that hurts the lender.  Such “tactics” will no longer be tolerated in the Seventh Circuit.


[1]           The Bankruptcy Code defines SARE as a nonresidential property, or a residential property containing five or more apartments or other residential units, “on which no substantial business is being conducted by a Debtor other than the business of operating the real property and activities incidental thereto.”  11 U.S.C. §101(51B).

[2]           The Bankruptcy Code does not define indubitable equivalence.

[3]           A complete discussion of the parameters of “cram down,” which is technically complicated under the Bankruptcy Code, is beyond the scope of this article.

© 2012 Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP.

Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code Won’t Cap the Flow of Avoidance Action Liability

Recently The National Law Review published an article by Renée M. Dailey and Mark E. Dendinger of Bracewell & Giuliani LLP regarding Bankruptcy Codes:

Tronox Incorporated and certain affiliates (the “Debtors”) emerged from Chapter 11 in February 2011 armed with a new capital structure and operational game plan, but that’s yesterday’s news. The flavor of the month is last Friday’s decision by Justice Allan L. Gropper (located here) in a still pending adversary proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) filed by the Debtors against Anadarko Petroleum Corporation and certain affiliates (“Anadarko”) seeking to recover an alleged fraudulent transfer. The Court dismissed Anadarko’s summary judgment motion, holding that while section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a floor for creditor recoveries, it does not impose a cap on creditor recoveries following the determination of avoidance action liability.

In the adversary complaint, the Debtors alleged that in a prepetition transaction their predecessor corporation separated profitable oil and gas exploration and production assets from multi-billion dollar environmental and tort liabilities, in order to permit Anadarko to acquire the cleansed assets all while leaving behind significant environmental liabilities. The Debtors’ extensive environmental liabilities finally caught up with them and in January 2009 the Debtors filed for Chapter 11 protection. The Debtor’s plan of reorganization incorporated a settlement agreement by and amongst the Debtors, the environmental and tort plaintiffs and general unsecured creditors that handed general unsecured creditors the keys to the car (i.e., 100% of the Debtors’ equity) and left the environmental and tort creditors looking for alternate transportation – proceeds from the pending adversary proceeding – as the main source of their recovery. With the adversary proceeding trial starting in May, Anadarko and the Debtors filed competing motions for partial summary judgment on the limited issue of damages. The issue at hand was the interpretation of section 550(a), specifically the clause “for the benefit of the estate” and whether it places a damage cap on prospective fraudulent transfer liability.

By way of background, section 550 prescribes the damages owed by a transferee once a fraudulent transfer is avoided by a bankruptcy court. Specifically, subsection (a) permits the debtor in possession to recover either the value of the property or the property itself “for the benefit of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 550(a). In its motion for partial summary judgment, Anadarko argued that this language capped its liability, if any, in the fraudulent conveyance litigation to the total claims of the environmental and tort plaintiffs that would benefit from any fraudulent transfer litigation judgment. Specifically, Anadarko argued that the Debtors were inappropriately seeking to recover approximately $15.5 billion, despite the fact that the total amount of the environmental and tort claims at the time of prepetition transfer of assets was no more than $2 billion. The Debtors, on the other hand, asserted that the plain language of section 550(a) and relevant case law imposed no such ceiling on the Debtors’ potential recovery in the litigation.

The Court found no support for a damage cap in the plain words of section 550, and instead noted that the concept of the bankruptcy estate was broad and not limited to the interests or quantum of claims of creditors. The Court further focused on judicial interpretation of the “benefit of the estate” language and what other courts had determined constituted a “benefit” to the estate in order to permit the litigation to go forward. The Court determined that a “benefit” could either be direct (e.g., increased distribution to creditors) or indirect (e.g., increased chance of a successful Chapter 11 reorganization) and that the prospect of a recovery in the adversary proceeding had already benefited the Debtors’ estate by paving the way for a confirmable plan and raising the recovery for general unsecured creditors. Having established some benefit to the estate that could be (and here had been) obtained by bringing the avoidance action, the Court found no case law support for reading a cap on recovery into the same language. Indeed, the Court noted the significance that section 550 does not provide that a transfer can be avoided only “to the extent of the benefit to the estate.”

Anadarko further argued that because the Debtors relied on Oklahoma fraudulent transfer law – as incorporated by section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code – as the basis for a liability determination, the limitation under Oklahoma’s law that a creditor may not recover more than the amount of its claim should apply. The Court rejected this argument noting that such limitation was only relevant where an individual creditor was seeking to recover in a non-bankruptcy scenario and noted that the language of section 550 preempted relevant state law in this regard.

The Court noted that whether other relevant law would mitigate any ultimate finding of liability would require a full trial to drill down on the merits. All that is clear now is that section 550 does not cap the flow of damages from the liability well . . .

© 2012 Bracewell & Giuliani LLP