Tag: Antitrust Law

FTC Launches New Office of Technology

On February 17, 2023, the Federal Trade Commission announced the launch of their new Office of Technology. The Office of Technology will assist the FTC by strengthening and supporting law enforcement investigations and actions, advising and engaging with staff and the Commission on policy and research initiatives, and engaging with the public and relevant experts to identify market trends, emerging technologies and best practices. The Office will have dedicated staff and resources and be headed by Chief Technology Officer Stephanie T. Nguyen.

Article By Hunton Andrews Kurth’s Privacy and Cybersecurity Practice Group

For more privacy and cybersecurity legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2023, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

USTR Seeks Comments on Section 301 Tariffs on Chinese Goods; Portal Opens Nov. 15

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced Oct. 17 that starting Nov. 15, it will begin soliciting comments on the effectiveness of Section 301 tariffs the Trump administration placed on Chinese goods. The notice and request for comments relate to USTR’s ongoing four-year statutory review of the Section 301 investigation of China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation.

In the Federal Registrar Notice, USTR said it is seeking “public comments on the effectiveness of the actions in achieving the objectives of the investigation, other actions that could be taken, and the effects of such actions on the United States economy, including consumers.”

The USTR is specifically interested in comments on the following:

  • The effectiveness of the actions in obtaining the elimination of China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation.
  • The effectiveness of the actions in counteracting China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation.
  • Other actions or modifications that would be more effective in obtaining the elimination of or in counteracting China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation.
  • The effects of the actions on the U.S. economy, including on U.S. consumers.
  • The effects of the actions on domestic manufacturing, including in terms of capital investments, domestic capacity and production levels, industry concentrations, and profits.
  • The effects of the actions on U.S. technology, including in terms of U.S. technological leadership and U.S. technological development.
  • The effects of the actions on U.S. workers, including with respect to employment and wages.
  • The effects of the actions on U.S. small businesses.
  • The effects of the actions on U.S. supply chain resilience.
  • The effects of the actions on the goals of U.S. critical supply chains.
  • Whether the actions have resulted in higher additional duties on inputs used for additional manufacturing in the United States than the additional duties on particular downstream product(s) or finished good(s) incorporating those inputs.

The continuing assessment of these additional duties has been criticized by some business groups and lawmakers who believe they have hurt both U.S. businesses and U.S. consumers but have not checked China’s behavior. They also have called for the reinstatement of previously issued exclusions and for a new, robust tariff exclusion process. Some labor and civil society groups, however, want the tariffs to remain in place. The fate of these tariffs is closely tied to the Biden administration’s ongoing review and the overall U.S.–China trade relationship. The controversial tariff program that covers upwards of $300 billion worth of imports from China has sparked lawsuits from more than 3,500 importers.

The comment period begins on Nov. 15 and extends until Jan. 17. USTR said it will post specific questions on its website Nov. 1 before the portal opens.

Article By Laura Siegel Rabinowitz, Donald S. Stein, and Madeline Orlando of Greenberg Traurig, LLP

For more trade regulation news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

In the Weeds? Humira “Patent Thicket” Isn’t an Antitrust Violation

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that welfare benefit plans that bought the drug Humira did not have valid antitrust claims against the patent owner. The Court found that amassing patents by itself is not enough to give rise to an antitrust claim, and that the welfare benefit plans would need to prove that the patents were invalid. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, et al. v. AbbVie Inc., et al., Case No. 20-2402 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 2022) (Easterbrook, Wood, Kirsch, JJ.)

AbbVie owns a patent covering Humira, which is a drug used to treat arthritic and inflammatory diseases. Humira is not covered by the Hatch-Waxman Act because it is a biologic drug, rather than a synthetic drug. Biologics are covered by the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), under which a competitor must ask the US Food and Drug Administration for permission to sell a “biosimilar” drug based on certain guidelines. From the first sale of the original drug, the competitor must wait 12 years to enter the market. If the original drug seller believes that a patent blocks competition and initiates litigation, the competitor is still free to sell its biosimilar drug. The competitor sells at risk of an adverse outcome in the litigation.

The original Humira patent expired in 2016, but AbbVie obtained 132 additional patents related to the drug. After the 12-year BPCIA requirement passed, none of AbbVie’s competitors chose to launch a biosimilar. Instead, competitors settled with AbbVie on terms to enter the US market in 2023. In exchange, AbbVie agreed that enforcement of all 132 of its patents would end in 2023 even if they were not set to expire.

Welfare benefit plans that pay for Humira on behalf of covered beneficiaries accused AbbVie of violating Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The payors argued that AbbVie’s settlements with potential competitors established a conspiracy that restrained competition in violation of Section 1, and that AbbVie’s “patent thicket” allowed AbbVie to reap unlawful monopoly profits from Humira after expiration of the original patent in violation of Section 2. The district court dismissed the complaint. The payors appealed.

The issue on appeal with respect to Section 2 was whether the payors had to prove that all of AbbVie’s Humira-related patents were invalid. Under the Walker Process antitrust doctrine, a party may be liable for an antitrust violation if it knowingly asserts a fraudulently procured patent in an attempt to monopolize a market. The payors did not argue that all 132 of AbbVie’s patents were fraudulent. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that because the patent laws do not set a cap on the number of patents a person (or company) can hold, the payors would need to prove that each of AbbVie’s 132 Humira-related patents were invalid to succeed in showing a violation under Section 2. Not only did the payors fail to prove that all 132 patents were invalid, but they did not even offer to do so. The Court thus agreed with the district court that AbbVie did not amass a patent thicket to maintain monopoly profits from Humira.

The issue on appeal with respect to Section 1 was whether AbbVie’s settlements with potential biosimilar competitors were anticompetitive. The Seventh Circuit found that the payors could have a Section 1 claim if they were injured by the terms of AbbVie’s settlements with its competitors (for example, by showing that AbbVie overpaid a competitor to defer entry). The terms of AbbVie’s settlements allowed the competitors immediate entry to the European market, and AbbVie agreed to US market entry before its last Humira-related patents expired. The Court found that those terms, as well as the payors’ failure to show that AbbVie overpaid the competitors to delay their entry, rendered the settlements lawful.

The Seventh Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal.

Article By Alexandra Lewis of McDermott Will & Emery

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 McDermott Will & Emery

Full Ninth Circuit Removes Unwarranted Hurdles to Class Certification in Big Tuna Antitrust Case

Court delivers a necessary course correction in the law of class certification.

There was reason for optimism in August 2021, when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted rehearing en banc of a 2-1 decision that would have made it more difficult for antitrust claimants to secure class certification. The three-judge panel in Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 993 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2021) had determined that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) required a district court to find that no more than a de minimis number of class members are uninjured before a class may be certified. Having announced this de minimis rule in its opinion, the court then took the unusual step of inviting the parties to argue whether the full court should rehear the issue en banc.

As we wrote last year when en banc rehearing was granted, with its de minimis rule, “the panel really jumped the median strip.” We argued that the rule conflated the question of whether issues common to the class predominate over issues unique to individual class members with the question of how the class is defined and that the Ninth Circuit’s new and unrealistic de minimis requirement erected an unnecessary procedural hurdle to class certification. Other commentators and amici argued that requiring proof that all but a de minimis number of class members are injured requires a determination on the merits, impermissible at the class certification stage.

In welcome news for claimants and attorneys who bring antitrust class actions, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc decided against the de minimis rule, for all of the foregoing reasons, in Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, No. 19-56514, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 9455 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 2022).

In a thorough review of the requirements for class certification under Rule 23, the Ninth Circuit held that the movant’s burden is to prove the prerequisites of Rule 23 by a preponderance of the evidence, bringing the Ninth Circuit in line with the law in the First, Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits. As for the predominance requirement of a Rule 23(b)(3) class, the court cited In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 2008) as amended (Jan. 16, 2009), to hold that, when assessing whether a plaintiff has proven that a common question related to a central issue in the claim predominates, a district court is limited to resolving whether the evidence establishes that a common question is capable of class-wide resolution, not whether the evidence in fact establishes that plaintiffs would win at trial.”

In rejecting the de minimis rule, the court began with the notion that class-wide proof is not required for all issues. Thus, the need for individualized assessment of a class member’s damages does not preclude a court from certifying a class. It contradicts this notion to require proof of injury of not more than a de minimis number of class members.

The presence of uninjured class members, the court held, does not defeat predominance. Predominance is defeated only where the class members cannot rely on the same body of common evidence to establish the common issue.

The presence of a large number of uninjured class members, however, could require a district court to consider whether the class definition is “fatally overbroad.” The remedy in that case, the court said, is to “redefine the overbroad class to include only those members who can rely on the same body of common evidence to establish the common issue.” “[T]he problem of a potentially ‘over-inclusive’ class,” the court said, “can and often should be solved by refining the class definition rather than by flatly denying class certification on that basis” (citation and internal quotation omitted).

With that, the Ninth Circuit reversed the three-judge panel and affirmed the certification of the classes by U.S. District Judge Janis L. Sammartino of California’s Southern District*, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the methodology employed—statistical regression analysis and other expert evidence—”was capable of showing that a price-fixing conspiracy caused class-wide antitrust impact.”  [*Judge Sammartino subsequently recused herself and the case was reassigned to Chief Judge Dana Sabraw.]

The 9-2 decision was written by Circuit Judge Sandra S. Ikuta. In a dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Kenneth K. Lee said as much as a third of the class members were unharmed. This is a “victory to plaintiffs” who will now be able to settle the action without having to prove their case trial, he said.

The suit was brought by direct purchasers of tuna products, indirect purchasers of bulk-sized tuna products, and individual end purchasers against the owners of Bumble Bee Foods LLC (currently in Chapter 11), StarKist Co., and Chicken of the Sea—which sell more than 80 percent of the packaged tuna in the United States. The industry has also been investigated by the Department of Justice in recent years, resulting in criminal guilty pleas by industry executives for participating in a price-fixing conspiracy.

Nothing in Rule 23 suggests that the presence of more than a de minimis number of uninjured class members affects whether questions affecting only individual class members predominate.

The now vacated de minimis rule conflates impact with damages and the predominance inquiry with potential overbreadth in the class definition. The Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision is a model of clear thinking and a welcome course correction in the law of class certification.

Article By Dan Mogin and Jonathan Rubin of MoginRubin

For more antitrust legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© MoginRubin LLP

FTC Imposes Record-Setting $10M Fine Against Multistate Auto Dealer, Settling Charges of Racial Discrimination and Unauthorized Charges

On March 31, the FTC and Illinois State Attorney General announced a settlement of charges against a large, multistate auto dealer that allegedly discriminated against black consumers and included illegal junk fees for unwanted “add-ons” in customers’ bills.

Citing violations under the FTC Act, TILA, ECOA, and comparable Illinois laws, the complaint alleged that eight of the dealerships and two general managers of Illinois dealerships tacked on illegal fees for unwanted products to customers’ bills, often at the end of hours-long negotiations. These add-ons were allegedly buried in the consumers’ purchase contracts, which were sometimes upwards of 60-pages long, and sometimes added despite consumers specifically declining the products.

In addition, employees of the auto dealership also allegedly discriminated against black consumers during the process of financing vehicle purchases.  On average, black customers at the dealerships were charged $190 more in interest and paid $99 more for similar add-ons than comparable non-Latino white customers.

The multistate dealer will have to pay $10 million to settle the lawsuit per the stipulated order, the largest monetary judgment ever required in an FTC auto lending case.

Putting it into Practice:  From FTC Chair Lina Khan and Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter, the FTC appears poised to allege violations of the FTC Act’s prohibition on unfair acts or practices in light of discrimination found to be based on disparate treatment or having a disparate impact.  Their statement discusses how discriminatory practices can be evaluated under the FTC’s three-part unfairness test and concludes that such conduct fits squarely into the kind of conduct that can be addressed by the FTC’s unfairness prong.  This joint statement echoes similar announcements by CFPB Director Chopra about the use of unfairness to combat discrimination more broadly (we discussed Director Chopra’s statement and updates to the CFPB’s exam procedures in a recent Consumer Finance and FinTech blog post here).

The size of the financial judgment in this case underscores the seriousness with which the FTC takes discriminatory practices in consumer credit transactions entered into by entities over which they have authority, which includes auto dealerships.  As the FTC becomes increasingly focused on enforcement of key laws to protect consumers against discriminatory conduct, companies should use these latest agency pronouncements as a reason to be on high alert for potential discriminatory outcomes in their business activities, even if unintentional.

Article By Moorari Shah, A.J. S. Dhaliwal, and Katie Daw of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more antitrust legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Federal Court Rules That Patent Infringement Can Violate Antitrust Laws

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Patent infringement can be considered anticompetitive conduct under federal antitrust law, according to a recent ruling issued by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

This ruling arose out of a dispute between Retractable Technologies, Inc. (Retractable) and Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD),1 in which Retractable alleges, among other claims, that BD’s infringement of Retractable’s patents foreclosed competition and maintained BD’s monopoly power in the hypodermic syringe market, thereby violating Section 2 of the Sherman Act.2

Retractable manufactures patented safety syringes and IV catheters, which protect against needlestick injuries by automatically retracting the needle after injection.  According to Retractable’s complaint, BD is the leading U.S. manufacturer of hypodermic syringes and holds a very large share of the relevant market.  Retractable claims that BD took steps to protect its dominant position after Retractable’s entry into the market, including by introducing an inferior line of safety syringes that infringe on Retractable’s patents.  Retractable contends that these actions, together with other exclusionary conduct including unlawful bundling and loyalty discounts, impeded the adoption of new and novel safety syringes, including those of smaller rivals such as Retractable, substantially lessening competition and maintaining BD’s dominance.  Retractable also alleges false advertising and other unfair competition claims.

To prove a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant (1) possesses monopoly power, and (2) acquired, enhanced, or maintained that power by exclusionary or anticompetitive conduct.3 In one of several motions to dismiss, BD asked the court to find that, as a matter of law, patent infringement can never be considered “exclusionary or anticompetitive conduct,” and therefore cannot be the basis of a Section 2 monopolization claim.  BD argued that no court has ever found patent infringement to be an “anticompetitive” act under Section 2 and that Retractable’s claim makes no economic sense, because patent infringement actually increases competition by making more products available to consumers.

On September 9, 2013, U.S. District Court Judge Leonard Davis adopted the recommendations of U.S. Magistrate Judge Roy S. Payne’s August 5 Report and Recommendation and issued an order denying BD’s motion.  Judge Davis agreed with Judge Payne that the only binding precedent offered by BD in support of its arguments held that patent infringement is not an injury recognized under the Sherman Act,4 but this has nothing to do with patent infringement as anticompetitive conduct.  Both judges noted the U.S. Supreme Court’s statement in U.S. v. American Tobacco Co. that the Sherman Act covers “every conceivable act which could possibly come within the spirit or purpose of the prohibitions of the law, without regard to the garb in which such acts were clothed.”5 Judge Payne further explained in his Report that while patent infringement often increases competition and benefits the end consumer despite harming a specific competitor, in this case Retractable alleges that the effect of BD’s patent infringement was to decrease competition by keeping BD’s inferior products on the market and preventing the sale of other, better quality safety syringes.

The complex interactions between intellectual property rights and the antitrust laws have received significant attention recently in various contexts, such as pay-for-delay settlements in pharmaceutical patent cases and abusive enforcement of standard essential patents.  The decision in this case adds an arrow to the quiver of companies with patented technology that are trying to compete in a market with a large and established player.  Companies with high market shares should take note that this ruling may expose them to additional antitrust risks, and should carefully consider whether any of their business practices would support a Section 2 monopolization claim against them.

1 Retractable Technologies, Inc., et al. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., Case No. 2:08-CV-00016 (E.D. Tex.).

2 15 U.S.C. § 2.

3 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).

4 A plaintiff must prove antitrust injury in order to recover damages.

5 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911).

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U.S. Medical Oncology Practice Sentenced for Use and Medicare Billing of Cancer Drugs Intended for Foreign Markets

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In a June 28, 2013 news release by the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of California, in San Diego, it was reported that a La Jolla, California medical oncology practice pleaded guilty and was sentenced to pay a $500,000 fine, forfeit $1.2 million in gross proceeds received from the Medicare program, and make restitution to Medicare in the amount of $1.7 million for purchasing unapproved foreign cancer drugs and billing the Medicare program as if the drugs were legitimate. Although the drugs contained the same active ingredients as drugs sold in the U.S. under the brand names Abraxane®, Alimta®, Aloxi®, Boniva®, Eloxatin®, Gemzar®, Neulasta®, Rituxan®, Taxotere®, Venofer® and Zometa®), the drugs purchased by the corporation were meant for markets outside the United States, and were not drugs approved by the FDA for use in the United States. Medicare provides reimbursement only for drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for use in the United States. To conceal the scheme, the oncology practice fraudulently used and billed the Medicare program using reimbursement codes for FDA approved cancer drugs.

In pleading guilty, the practice admitted that from 2007 to 2011 it had purchased $3.4 million of foreign cancer drugs, knowing they had not been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for use in the United States. The practice admitted that it was aware that the drugs were intended for markets other than the United States and were not the drugs approved by the FDA for use in the United States because: (a) the packaging and shipping documents indicated that drugs were shipped to the office from outside the United States; (b) many of the invoices identified the origin of the drugs and intended markets for the drugs as countries other than the United States; (c) the labels did not bear the “Rx Only” language required by the FDA; (d) the labels did not bear the National Drug Code (NDC) numbers found on the versions of the drugs intended for the U.S. market; (e) many of the labels had information in foreign languages; (f) the drugs were purchased at a substantial discount; (g) the packing slips indicated that the drugs came from the United Kingdom; and (h) in October, 2008 the practice had received a notice from the FDA that a shipment of drugs had been detained because the drugs were unapproved.

In a related False Claims Act lawsuit filed by the United States, the physician and his medical practice corporation paid in excess of $2.2 million to settle allegations that they submitted false claims to the Medicare program. The corporation was allowed to apply that sum toward the amount owed in the criminal restitution to Medicare. The physician pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of introducing unapproved drugs into interstate commerce, admitting that on July 8, 2010, he purchased the prescription drug MabThera (intended for market in Turkey and shipped from a source in Canada) and administered it to patients. Rituxan®, a product with the same active ingredient, is approved by the Food and Drug Administration for use in the United States.

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Resale Price Maintenance in China: Enforcement Authorities Imposing Large Fines for Anti-Monopoly Law Violations

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Recently Shanghai High People’s Court reached a decision in the first lawsuit involving resale price maintenance (RPM) since China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) came into effect five years ago.  Shortly thereafter, a key enforcement agency announced RPM-related fines against six milk powder companies, five of which are non-Chinese.  Both cases clearly show that RPM can be a violation of the AML, and that RPM is currently under much greater scrutiny by enforcement authorities.  It would be prudent for all foreign corporations active in China’s consumer markets to take heed of these changes in China and conduct an immediate review of any potential RPM violations.

On 1 August 2013 the Shanghai High People’s Court reached a decision in the first anti-monopoly lawsuit involving resale price maintenance (RPM) since China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) came into effect in August 2008.  In addition to this judicial decision, on 7 August 2013 one of the key agencies in charge of enforcing the AML, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), announced RPM-related fines of USD 109 million against six milk powder companies, five of which are non-Chinese.  Both the High People’s Court and the NDRC have been striving to clarify how they will treat RPM, and specifically have focused on the issue of whether RPM should be treated as a per se violation or should be evaluated according to a “rule of reason” analysis.

Judicial Decisions in Civil Lawsuits

According to the recent decision by the Shanghai High People’s Court, in order to hold that an RPM provision is a monopoly agreement, the court must find that the RPM provision has restricted or eliminated competition.  Furthermore, the burden of proof will be on the plaintiff to show a restriction or elimination of competition arising out of the RPM.  The High People’s Court explicitly stated that this burden is the opposite from the burden of proof for horizontal monopolies, such as a cartel, in which case the burden of proof falls on the defendant to show that the agreement does not have any effect of eliminating or restricting competition.  This burden for horizontal monopolies has been further examined and confirmed by the “Judicial Interpretation of Anti-Monopoly Disputes” that was issued by China’s Supreme People’s Court on 1 June 2012.

Administrative Decisions in Enforcement Actions—Liquor and Infant Milk Formula

There have been several key RPM enforcement actions in 2013.  In February, the NDRC imposed a fine of USD 80 million on the famous Chinese liquor brands Maotai and Wuliangye for requiring distributors to resell the products above a certain price, which is common in some sectors in China.  On 2 July, according to the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the NDRC, six milk powder companies came under investigation for RPM violations of the AML.  According to the NDRC’s statements on the case, “from the evidence obtained, the milk powder companies under investigation instituted price controls over distributors and retailers, which excluded and limited market competition and therefore are alleged to have violated the Anti-Monopoly Law”.  The NDRC later announced record fines in that case of USD 109 million, which were the equivalent of between 3 per cent and 6 per cent of the companies’ revenue in 2012.

According to media reports, in the Maotai and Wuliangye cases, the NDRC provided clear indications about some of the factors that it will consider when determining whether the RPM has “eliminated or restricted competition”.   Specifically, when assessing the relevant market and market power of the two companies, the NDRC analysed the market structure and the role played by the two companies in the liquor industry, as well as the degree to which the products are substitutable with similar products and the loyalty of consumers towards the two liquors.  Based on this analysis, the NDRC concluded that the RPM provisions in the agreements with distributors of the two liquor giants eliminated and restricted competition, and thus were vertical “monopoly agreements”.

According to recent media reports, the NDRC has indicated it will “severely crack down” on and sanction vertical monopoly agreements such as RPM if they are maintained by business operators dominant in the market.  If business operators are not dominant, the NDRC reportedly indicated that it would still investigate all vertical monopoly conduct and determine if there has been any elimination or restriction of competition.

Conclusions

These civil lawsuits and administrative cases clearly show that RPM can be a violation of the AML and that RPM is currently under much greater scrutiny by enforcement authorities.  If RPM is an issue in civil lawsuits, a plaintiff will have to prove that RPM eliminates or restricts competition.  However, there are some indications that this burden of proof may be easily met.  In administrative cases, the NDRC will have to be satisfied that it has sufficient proof to show there is an elimination or restriction of competition.  However, it is unclear what level of evidence would be required to show such a restriction and it may not be a very high level, especially if the accused business operator is dominant in the market.

RPM has been a common feature of distribution agreements and other contracts in many sectors in China.  However, the recent cases clearly show there is a serious compliance risk if RPM continues to be part of a corporation’s normal practices.  This is particularly true for business operators that have a dominant market position or a group of business operators that are regarded as jointly dominant under the AML (in China, in certain circumstances, dominance is presumed with a market share as low as 10 per cent).  Unless the RPM conduct clearly falls within an exception in Article 15 of the AML, a company using RPM may face serious fines and confiscation of illegal gains.  It would be prudent for all foreign corporations active in China’s consumer markets to take heed of these changes to the enforcement priorities of the competition/antitrust authorities in China and conduct an immediate review of any potential RPM violations.

Alex An and Jared Nelson also contributed to this article.

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Federal Judge Finds that Apple Conspired to Raise E-book Prices

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On July 10, 2013, Judge Denise Cote of the Southern District of New York issued a 160-page opinion holding that Apple conspired with five book publishers to raise e-book prices and eliminate retail price competition in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and several relevant state statutes.  United States v. Apple Inc., case number 12-civ-2826 (DLC).  The five publishers – Hatchett, HarperCollins, Macmillan, Penguin and Simon & Schuester – had all previously settled with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).

The opinion stated that as Apple prepared to launch its iPad to the public and sought to concurrently enter the e-book market with its iBookstore, it met with the publishers and agreed to provide them with an “agency model” for e-book pricing that allowed the publishers to set the prices of the e-books themselves, subject to certain price caps.  Apple’s agreements with the publishers also included Most Favored Nation provisions which ensured that Apple could match its competitors’ prices and also provided an incentive for the publishers to lobby Amazon and other retailers to change their wholesale business models to agency models.  According to the court’s opinion, these agency model agreements caused e-book prices to increase, sometimes 50% or more for a specific title.

A separate trial for potential damages will be scheduled later.  Apple said it will appeal the ruling.

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Supreme Court Narrows ‘State Action’ Immunity From Antitrust Laws

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The U.S. Supreme Court has referred to the federal antitrust laws as “a charter of freedom [having] a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.” The antitrust laws are generally broadly worded, and they have been subject to various interpretations and reinterpretations over the past century. Certain types of anti-competitive activity, such as horizontal price fixing, have been deemed so obviously harmful to the marketplace as to be declared per se illegal. Others are judged by the so-called “rule of reason” analysis, in which courts weigh the effect on a defined market of the alleged anti-competitive activity.

Click the View Media link to read the full article.