Tag: all natural

A New Day for “Natural” Claims?

On May 2, the Second Circuit upheld summary judgment in favor of KIND in a nine year old lawsuit challenging “All Natural” claims. In Re KIND LLC, No. 22-2684-cv (2d Cir. May 2, 2024). Although only time will tell, this Circuit decision, in favor of the defense, may finally change plaintiffs’ appetite for “natural” cases.

Over the many years of litigation, the lawsuit consolidated several class action filings from New York, Florida, and California into a single, multi-district litigation with several, different lead plaintiffs. All plaintiffs alleged that “All Natural” claims for 39 KIND granola bars and other snacks were deceptive. Id. at 3. Plaintiff had alleged that the following ingredients rendered the KIND bars not natural: soy lecithin, soy protein isolate, citrus pectin, glucose syrup/”non-GMO” glucose, vegetable glycerine, palm kernel oil, canola oil, ascorbic acid, vitamin A acetate, d-alpha tocopheryl acetate/vitamin E, and annatto.

The Second Circuit found that, in such cases, the relevant state laws followed a “reasonable consumer standard” of deception. Id. at 10. Further, according to the Second Circuit, the “Ninth Circuit has helpfully explained” that the reasonable consumer standard requires “‘more than a mere possibility that the label might conceivably be misunderstood by some few consumers viewing it in an unreasonable manner.’” Id. (quoting McGinity v. Procter & Gamble Co., 69 F.4th 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2023)). Rather, there must be “‘a probability that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.’” Id. To defeat summary judgement, the plaintiffs would need to present admissible evidence showing how “All Natural” tends to mislead under this standard.

The Second Circuit agreed with the lower court that plaintiffs’ deposition testimony failed to provide such evidence where it failed to “establish an objective definition” representing reasonable consumer understanding of “All Natural.” Id. at 28. While one plaintiff believed the claim meant “not synthetic,” another thought it meant “made from whole grains, nuts, and fruit,” while yet another believed it meant “literally plucked from the ground.” Id. The court observed that plaintiffs “fail[ed] to explain how a trier of fact could apply these shifting definitions.” Id. The court next rejected as useful evidence a dictionary definition of “natural,” which stated, “existing or caused by nature; not made or caused by humankind.” Id. at 29. The court reasoned that the dictionary definition was “not useful when applied to a mass-produced snack bar wrapped in plastic” – something “clearly made by humans.” Id.

The court, finally, upheld the lower court’s decision to exclude two other pieces of evidence the plaintiffs offered. First, the Second Circuit agreed that a consumer survey was subject to exclusion where leading questions biased the results. Id. at 21-22. The Second Circuit also agreed that an expert report by a chemist lacked relevance where it assessed “typical” sourcing of ingredients, not necessarily how KIND’s ingredients were manufactured or sourced. Id. at 22-24.

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by: Food and Drug Law at Keller and Heckman of Keller and Heckman LLP

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New York Federal Court Rejects Preemption and Primary Jurisdiction Arguments in “All Natural” Case

GT Law

In our February 12, 2014 post, entitled “Consumer Class Actions Trending From Attacking ‘All Natural’ to ‘Raw,’” we addressed whether claims challenging consumer product advertising as “all natural” were preempted in the absence of specific guidance from the FDA and the mixed results the argument has produced.  In Ault v. J.M. Smucker Co. et al., 2014 WL 1998235 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2014), the Court denied a motion to dismiss based on preemption and primary jurisdiction where the plaintiff alleged that it was deceived into purchasing Smucker’s Crisco oil by “all natural” advertising where the product contained genetically modified organisms, or GMOs, because the FDA has not addressed the use of the term “all natural” in this context.

All Natural

Smuckers argued that FDA policies regarding the use of the term “natural” preempt state law false advertising claims based on this language, even if those policies are informal.  However, the Court found, “no federal specifications exist here.”  Id. at *3.  And “[e]ven if an informal FDA definition does exist, the term ‘natural’ ‘may be used in numerous contexts and may convey different meanings depending on that context[]” [citation,] [and] “that is one of the reasons the FDA has never adopted a formal definition.”  Id. (citing Pelayo v. Nestle USA, Inc.,<“> No. CV 13–5213, 2013 WL 5764644, at *5 (C.D.Cal. Oct. 25, 2013)).  In addition, “the FDA has declined to consider the specific issue here:  whether and under what circumstances food products containing ingredients produced using genetically engineered ingredients may or may not be labeled ‘natural.’”  Id. (citation and some internal quotation marks omitted).  “As a result,” the Court found, “any general, informal FDA guidance is not controlling.”  Id. (citing In re Frito–Lay N. Am., Inc. All Natural Litig., No. 12–md–2413,2013 WL 4647512, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013)).

The Court also rejected Smucker’s argument that the FDA’s decision not to impose a labeling requirement for foods with GMOs supports preemption, stating, “[i]n effect, Defendant interprets the FDA’s lack of action as approval for Defendant’s use of the phrase ‘All Natural’ to describe foods containing GMO [but] [i]n reality, the FDA has stayed silent because it ‘operates in a world of limited resources’ where it ‘must prioritize which issues to address.’”  Id. (citation omitted.)

In addition, the Court found Smucker’s primary jurisdiction argument unavailing:  “three federal district judges previously referred the question of whether foods containing GMOs may be labeled ‘natural’ to the FDA under the primary jurisdiction doctrine [and on] January 6, 2014, the FDA responded and explicitly declined to make such a determination.”  Id. at *4 (citing January 6, 2014 FDA Letter).  “The FDA’s refusal to consider the question demonstrates that ‘resort to the agency at this time would be unavailing,’ [citation] and therefore weighs against applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine.”  Id.

This case signals that, until the FDA acts, preemption and primary jurisdiction arguments against “all natural” advertising of products with GMOs may be more and more challenging.

Article By:

Jordan D. Grotzinger
Of:
Greenberg Traurig, LLP