Tag: ADA accommodations

Alcohol Suppliers Hit with ADA Website Accessibility Lawsuits

The increasing popularity of online shopping is placing e-commerce businesses—specifically those in the alcohol beverage industry—in legal crosshairs. In lockstep with a recent uptick in website accessibility cases, plaintiff firms are sending pre-suit demand letters to alcohol suppliers and, in some cases, even filing a state or federal court lawsuit. These lawsuits—which are typically filed in California or New York—involve claims that a supplier’s website is not accessible to individuals who are blind in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and related state laws. In these cases, plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees, damages (only under state law) and injunctive relief that would require the website to conform with the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) standards, which have been broadly adopted by courts and regulators.

To prevail on a website accessibility claim, plaintiffs must first show that a defendant is a private entity that owns, leases or operates a “place of public accommodation.” Courts, however, are split on what it means for a website to be considered a place of public accommodation under Title III of the ADA. While some jurisdictions require that there be a “physical nexus” between the website and a brick-and-mortar store, other jurisdictions have permitted these cases to go forward against a website-only company that does not own or operate any physical retail location.

In addition to establishing that the supplier’s website is a place of public accommodation, the plaintiff must satisfy certain jurisdictional requirements which will depend upon whether products can be purchased directly from the website as well as whether the supplier ships to the state in which the suit was filed. Leveraging these defenses (among others) will be critical when it comes to either convincing the plaintiff to withdraw the claim, filing a motion to dismiss or achieving an early resolution on favorable terms.

Due to the rise in these website accessibility lawsuits, we encourage industry members to take a proactive approach:

  1. Train personnel on accessibility requirements and WCAG standards.
  2. Test the website against WCAG standards (through independent consultants or user testing).
  3. Retain testing documentation to demonstrate that users with disabilities can fully use the website.
  4. Assess potential areas of non-conformance with WCAG standards.
  5. Work with internal/external technical teams to implement accessibility features into the website.
  6. Develop an accessibility policy that informs users about the company’s accessibility practices.
  7. Consider including a link to the website accessibility policy on every webpage, including a reporting option that is appropriately routed to address accessibility issues.
  8. Regularly audit the website to assess its level of accessibility (particularly after website updates).
  9. Engage legal counsel to minimize litigation risk associated with website accessibility issues, including whether the ADA is applicable to the company’s website in light of the current state of the law.

Article By Jeremy White and Alva C. Mather of McDermott Will & Emery

For more biotech, food, and drug news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 McDermott Will & Emery

Indiana Federal Court Gives Frostbitten ADA Plaintiff The Cold Shoulder

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana recently granted summary judgment on behalf of a logistics employer in a case alleging discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court found that because the plaintiff employee could not work in the freezer area of his employer’s warehouse, as was required for his job, he failed to establish that he was a “qualified individual” with a disability.

In Pryor v. Americold Logistics, LLC, the defendant employer operates a cold-storage warehouse that “provides temperature-controlled food warehousing and distribution services,” with “five cooler rooms, two freezer rooms, a loading dock, a designated battery-changing room, and a small office.” The plaintiff was a Lift Truck Operator (LTO) who filled orders by picking items from the various rooms of the warehouse and wrapping them on a skid for pickup by another employee. He had previously “suffered severe frostbite on his left hand after he spent three-quarters of a shift in the freezer with defective gloves,” and due to his prior frostbite “exposure to the freezer’s extreme cold caused pain and risked further injury.”

After treatment (and intervening stints of alternate duty), the plaintiff employee “reached maximum medical improvement” and was put on “a permanent restriction of exposure to the freezer for no more than thirty minutes per workday.” The plaintiff’s LTO role, however, required nearly constant exposure to subzero temperatures. When the plaintiff did not return from leave, he was terminated.

The plaintiff alleged that his employer “discriminated against him by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for his disability and by terminating his employment.” The employer argued that the plaintiff was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA because “he could not perform the essential duties of an LTO with or without a reasonable accommodation.” The district court held that the plaintiff had not “presented sufficient evidence that he was able to perform the essential functions of his job with a reasonable accommodation,” and thus granted summary judgement in favor of the employer.

The court explained the employer’s judgment as to which job functions are essential is entitled to consideration. And with regard to the essential functions of the LTO role, the court found that the LTO role required “substantial exposure to freezer temperatures” each workday. The court explained that, because the plaintiff admittedly could not work in the freezer for more than thirty minutes per day, “he could not perform the essential functions of his LTO order selector position without reasonable accommodation.” He was thus a “‘qualified individual’ under the ADA only if he could perform the essential functions with reasonable accommodation.”

As for the question of what a reasonable accommodation might entail, the plaintiff argued that he could have been reassigned to a non-freezer position, a temporary “cooler-only” position, or a position in the loading dock or office. However, the court stated, “it is the plaintiff’s burden to show that a vacant position exists for which he was qualified.” The court explained that the ADA does not require an employer to “create a new position or transfer another employee to create a vacancy,” or to “transfer a disabled employee to a temporary position on a permanent basis.”

Ultimately, with regard “cooler-only” positions, the court held that the plaintiff failed to identify any vacancies, and noted that pursuant to a union contract, those positions had to be filled according to seniority. With regard to the vacant loading dock or office positions, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he was qualified. Thus, the court held that the plaintiff failed “to create a genuine issue of material fact whether reassignment was a reasonable accommodation,” and summary judgement in favor of the employer was appropriate.

The key takeaways from the Pryor decision for employers facing ADA claims are that employees must still be able to perform the essential functions of their job, and that courts should consider the employer’s determination of which job functions are essential. Moreover, the Pryor decision reaffirms that the ADA does not require employers to create positions or vacancies as part of the interactive process.

© 2019 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
For more ADA cases, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

ADA Website Litigation Likely to Increase

There has been considerable confusion amongst business owners as to the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as it relates to websites. The ADA requires, among other things, that places of “public accommodation” remove barriers to access for people with disabilities. This law has long been understood to apply to brick-and-mortar establishments, such as restaurants, retail stores, and hotels, but recent court decisions have held that the ADA applies to the websites and mobile applications of businesses offering goods and services online.

The Department of Justice (DOJ), which is responsible for establishing regulations pursuant to the ADA, has thus far failed to issue any guidance, regulations, or technical standards for online platforms, resulting in uncertainty for many business owners. Many have looked to the case of Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC   for potential guidance. Robles was filed by a blind man who claimed that he could not access the Domino’s website and mobile app with his screen-reading software. The District Court dismissed the case on the basis that, although the ADA applied to the website and app, the DOJ’s failure to provide guidance as to the ADA’s application to websites violated Domino’s due process rights. The Ninth Circuit reversed this ruling, and on October 7, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition by Domino’s Pizza asking the Court to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision.

The Supreme Court’s refusal to review the Ninth Circuit decision maintains the uncertainty in what will no doubt be an expanding field of litigation. Business owners should expect to see an increase in ADA website litigation, and should take steps to ensure that their websites and mobile apps are accessible to disabled users.

 

© 2010-2019 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

ARTICLE BY Rachel M. Sanders of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP.
More website regulation on the National Law Review Internet, Communications & Media law page.

EEOC Releases New Guidance on Rights of HIV-Positive Employees Applicable to Health Care Providers and Employers

In December 2015, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) released new guidance for job applicants and employees with HIV infection that is particularly applicable to employers in the health care industry.  This guidance is applicable not only to applicants and current employees with HIV infection, but also to physicians and other health care providers who treat individuals with HIV infection to the extent their assistance is requested in obtaining workplace accommodations.

The first publication, “Living with HIV Infection: Your Legal Rights in the Workplace Under the ADA,” discusses rights provided under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  Although the guidance is directed to applicants and employees with HIV infection, there are key takeaways for employers.  First, the EEOC emphasizes the workplace privacy rights of those with HIV infection, but reminds individuals that in certain situations an employer may ask medical questions about their condition.  Second, HIV infection should be treated as a disability and HIV-positive individuals are protected against discrimination and harassment at work because of the condition.  Finally, those with HIV infection may have a legal right to reasonable accommodations at work, which may include altered break and work schedules, changes in supervisory methods (e.g., written instructions from a supervisor), accommodations for visual impairments, ergonomic office furniture, unpaid time off (e.g., for treatment), and reassignment to a vacant position.

The second publication, “Helping Patients with HIV Infection Who Need Accommodations at Work,” informs physicians about their HIV-positive patients’ rights to reasonable accommodations at work.  While the guidance effectively coaches health care providers to advocate for their patients’ rights to accommodation, the EEOC reminds providers that that their legal and ethical obligations are not altered by the ADA.  Thus, providers should only disclose the medical information if requested by the patient and an appropriate release is signed.  Further, providers are reminded not to overstate the need for a particular accommodation in case an alternative accommodation is necessary.

Health care entities should be aware that, in its press release regarding the guidance, the EEOC continues to take the position that HIV-positive employees, even in health care settings, should not be excluded from jobs unless they pose a “direct threat” to safety, a strict standard under the ADA.  The EEOC—following CDC guidance—has said that “HIV-positive health care workers who follow standard precautions and who, except in specified circumstances do not perform specially defined exposure-prone invasive procedures, do not pose a safety risks in their employment based on HIV infection.”  For example, says the EEOC, an HIV-positive phlebotomist who draws blood does not pose a direct threat to patient safety based on her HIV-positive status if she follows standard precautions.

The EEOC guidance makes clear that HIV infection is a disability under the ADA.  Employers should be aware that applicants and employees have a right to privacy and, in most situations,  need not reveal the exact diagnosis of their medical illness. Employers should not unnecessarily inquire about the exact illness diagnosis if it is not needed for the purposes of determining reasonable accommodations.  Most importantly, health care employers should not use stereotypes or misinformation in evaluating patient safety implications for those employees with HIV infection.  Even in safety sensitive positions, an HIV-positive health care employee generally poses no safety risk when using standard precautions.  Health care employers should make sure that their front-line supervisors are also aware of the rights of their subordinates who may have HIV infection.

Article By Nathaniel M. Glasser & Jonathan K. Hoerner of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.
©2016 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Federal Court Stops Serial Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Plaintiff’s Latest Effort: Payne v. Chapel Hill North Properties

Poyner Spruill

The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina recently dismissed an Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) case filed by Denise Payne, a Florida resident, and National Alliance for Accessibility, Inc. (“NAA”), a nonprofit Florida corporation (Payne is the founder of and a member of NAA).   Payne and NAA sued Chapel Hill North Properties, LLC (“CHNP”) alleging the company’s shopping center in Chapel Hill, NC did not comply with ADA requirements for accessibility to disabled individuals.  Poyner Spruill attorneys Nick Ellis and Kevin Ceglowski filed a Motion to Dismiss the case and a supporting brief for CHNP arguing that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because Payne lacked standing to proceed.

Payne was seeking injunctive relief, requesting CHNP to remedy the alleged ADA violations.  In order to seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must have constitutional standing to proceed with the lawsuit, which depends on showing a likelihood of future harm from the alleged violations.  Payne alleged she encountered architectural barriers when she visited the shopping center on June 10, 2010, April 1, 2012  and on September 27, 2012.  Payne alleged only vague future plans to visit the shopping center, saying she “intends to visit North Carolina again in June of 2013” and “intends to visit Defendant’s property once again.”  Payne’s Complaint alleged she intends to continue to meet with existing NAA members in Asheville, Wilmington, and Fayetteville, none of which are near CHNP’s property.  After CHMP filed its Motion to Dismiss, Payne filed an affidavit, hoping to avoid dismissal of her case, and in which she stated she specifically intended to return to the shopping center in June 2013.  In her Complaint, she alleged she stopped at the shopping center on her visits to North Carolina because it “has an attractive selection of goods and services” and “is convenient based on her travel patterns.”

CHNP argued the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently show that Payne would return to the property and, therefore, that they were unable to demonstrate she was likely to suffer any harm in the future.  Specifically, CHNP argued Payne lives over 700 miles from the property, lacks a reliable record of past patronage, and her alleged intent to return to the property in the future is not credible.  In order to evaluate this argument, the court used what is known as the proximity test – a set of factors for determining standing that takes into account (1) the plaintiff’s proximity to the defendant’s business; (2) the plaintiff’s past patronage of the business; (3) definiteness of plans to return to the business; and (4) the frequency of the plaintiff’s nearby travels.

The court first examined the proximity factor because as the court said, “the further away a plaintiff ordinarily finds herself from a business, the less likely she is to suffer future harm.”  In this case, Payne lives over 700 miles from the shopping center, which the court decided weighed against finding she was likely to return and suffer harm.  More importantly, the court reviewed Payne’s filings in other ADA cases in North Carolina courts and determined her representations to the courts were not consistent from case to case.  Specifically as it related to this case, the court pointed out that Payne’s allegation that she passes through Chapel Hill on the way to see her attorney when traveling to North Carolina contradicted a sworn statement made in another case that her “first stop is always Greensboro.”  The court said, “the fact that Payne has submitted such clearly conflicting statements clearly calculated to avoid dismissal in these cases is very troubling and casts significant doubt on her claims.”

The court also examined Payne’s past patronage of the shopping center.  Although the court noted Payne had made only three past visits and did not explain why she chose this particular shopping center instead of many others on her route, it allowed this factor to weigh in her favor, if only slightly.

The court next examined Payne’s intent to return to the shopping center.  The court found this factor weighed against Payne and NAA because the shopping center is located on a 100-mile stretch of highway between the airport at which Payne arrives and her lawyer’s office, which is her alleged destination when she comes to North Carolina.  Moreover, several of the cities Payne alleged she intended to visit in the future (Fayetteville and Wilmington) are in the opposite direction from the shopping center. In sum, the court determined Payne did not express any definite reason she would return to the shopping center other than to test its compliance with the ADA.

Finally, the court assessed Payne’s frequency of travel to areas near the shopping center.  The court said Payne’s sporadic trips to North Carolina provided weak evidence she would suffer actual or imminent harm.  Beyond that, Payne’s frequent lawsuits worked against her efforts to maintain standing in this case.  The court noted it was implausible that in her one or two visits a year to North Carolina, Payne could return to each of the 80 plus properties she has sued in the state for alleged noncompliance with the ADA.  The court found this final factor weighed against finding that Payne had standing to proceed with her lawsuit.  After considering all the factors together, the court determined Payne was unlikely to suffer future harm at the shopping center and rules that she did not have standing to proceed and the lawsuit should be dismissed.

CHNP also argued that Plaintiff NAA lacked standing to proceed with the lawsuit because, as an association, its standing depended on an allegation that one or more of its members was suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the allegations in the Complaint.  Because Payne was the only member of NAA identified in the Complaint and the court decided she was not suffering immediate or threatened injury, the lawsuit was also dismissed as it related to allegations made by NAA.

The court’s opinion is a victory for CHNP, but also an example of how serial plaintiffs in ADA cases have credibility issues because the volume of lawsuits they file can create inconsistent “facts” they allege to be true.  The result in this case was also a strong rebuke against Payne’s dishonesty to the courts in an effort to maintain standing in her multitude of lawsuits against North Carolina companies.  (Payne has filed over 80 cases in NC.)  Businesses that find themselves facing ADA suits from out-of-state plaintiffs may find the arguments and result in this case helpful in defending those claims.

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Federal Courts Clarify Reasonable-Accommodation Standards

The National Law Review recently published an article, Federal Courts Clarify Reasonable-Accommodation Standards, written by Alan M. Koral and Andrea Lewis with Vedder Price:

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The extent of an employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate an employee with a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is not always clear. Indeed, when the requested accommodation involves a leave of absence or the transfer to a different position, employers are often unsure what the law requires of them. A series of recent decisions from the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, however, have addressed the limitations and obligations facing employers presented with such requests for accommodation.

Leaves of Absence as a Reasonable Accommodation

Few questions vex employers more than what length of time is reasonable when a disabled employee requests a leave of absence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma), in Robert v. Board of County Commissioners of Brown County, 691 F. 3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2012), has shed some light on this issue that should help employers in deciding how to respond to employee leave requests under the ADA. The plaintiff, Ms. Robert, worked for Brown County supervising felony offenders. The essential functions of her job required that she perform many duties outside of her office such as performing drug screenings, ensuring compliance with court orders, testifying in court, and other “considerable fieldwork” including site visits under potentially dangerous circumstances. Robert was diagnosed with sacroiliac joint dysfunction, and because of severe pain in her back and hips eventually she could work only from home. Thus, she was unable to visit offenders, supervise drug and alcohol screenings or testify in court.

Following a surgery to treat her joint dysfunction, Robert exhausted her FMLA and sick and vacation leaves, but she still could not return to work. Neither she nor her doctor informed her employer as to when she could resume her job duties. Since she could not perform her job duties, the County terminated Robert’s employment. Among other claims, Robert alleged that her termination constituted discrimination under the ADA. The court disagreed. The court accepted that site visits and other out-of-office work were essential functions of Robert’s employment, but it stated that she would still be qualified to perform her job if she could have performed those duties with reasonable accommodation. The only possible reasonable accommodation in this case, however, would have been a leave of absence.

The court noted that there are two limits on the bounds of reasonableness for a leave of absence: (1) the employee must provide the employer an estimated date for when she can resume her essential duties, and (2) the leave request must assure the employer that the employee can perform the essential functions of her position in the “near future.” Though the court did not define “near future,” it cited to a case stating that a six-month leave request was too long to constitute reasonable accommodation. Here, Robert never provided any estimate as to when she could resume her fieldwork. Therefore, the only accommodation that would have allowed Robert to perform the essential functions of her position was an improper indefinite reprieve from her fieldwork functions. Thus, since Robert was not qualified to perform her duties, her discrimination claim failed.

Transfers to a Different Position as a Reasonable Accommodation

On September 7, 2012, the Seventh Circuit in EEOC v. United Airlines overruled two of its prior decisions (EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling (2000) and Mays v. Principi (2002) that together stood for the principle that employers could hire the most qualified applicant for a position, even if that meant passing over a disabled employee seeking the position because his disability precluded him from performing the essential functions of his current position. Going forward, employers in the Seventh Circuit will now be required to offer that vacant position to the disabled employee, unless it can show that doing so creates an undue hardship that renders mandatory reassignment unreasonable.

The dispute in United Airlines centered around a set of “reasonable accommodation” guidelines that the company used when evaluating transfer requests involving disabled employees. United’s guidelines provided that the transfer process was a competitive one, and that employees requesting a transfer as an accommodation would not automatically be placed into qualifying vacant positions. Instead, the disabled employee would receive preferential treatment, which included a “guaranteed” interview for the position and priority over similarly qualified applicants. Under these guidelines, however, a non-disabled applicant would receive the job if he or she was more qualified than a disabled employee seeking the accommodation.

In abandoning the standard it had followed since 2000, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the “ADA does indeed mandate that an employer appoint employees with disabilities to vacant positions for which they are qualified, provided that such accommodations would be ordinarily reasonable and would not present an undue hardship to that employer.” While the existence of a seniority rule mandated by a collective bargaining agreement will likely satisfy the undue-hardship requirement, not all such provisions are created equal, and their language should be parsed before rejecting a transfer request out of hand in such a setting. In the future, employers in the Seventh (and Tenth or Washington, DC) Circuits may no longer rely on a “best applicant” policy when making decisions about transferring disabled employees to vacant positions.

The Employee’s Role in Requesting a Reasonable Accommodation

In yet another noteworthy decision, the Seventh Circuit held that a university was not liable for failing to accommodate a professor’s mental disorder, where the university reasonably tried to fulfill a request for office reassignment but the employee did not cooperate. In Hoppe v. Lewis University, 692 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2012), Elizabeth Hoppe requested that her office be relocated to accommodate her adjustment disorder. Both the initial letter that Hoppe presented from her doctor and a follow-up letter failed to specify a suitable campus location for Hoppe or the particular stressors that necessitated Hoppe’s relocation. Nevertheless, the university offered Hoppe four different office options, one of which she accepted but never used; she refused the remaining offices because they were in the same building as individuals whom she alleged heightened her anxiety, but her physician never specified a change of buildings or any location information at all. The court emphasized:

An employer can take no solace in its failure to engage in this process in good faith if what results is an unreasonable or inappropriate accommodation offer. And an employee who fails to uphold her end of the bargain – for example, by not “clarifying the extent of her medical restrictions” – cannot impose liability on the employer for its failure to provide a reasonable accommodation.[1]

In finding in favor of the university, the Seventh Circuit noted that the university offered Hoppe several options to change offices, despite having no specific details from her doctor about what steps were necessary to reasonably accommodate her disability. Further, the university had asked Hoppe’s doctor for specific information several times, to no avail. Therefore, the university did its part to participate in good faith in the ADA-required interactive process, and there was no evidence it did not offer Hoppe a reasonable accommodation.

Lessons for Employers

First, these cases emphasize that an employer need not shoulder the entire burden when trying to reasonably accommodate an employee with a disability; the employee has responsibilities as well. As noted in Hoppe, an employer need not offer an employee the precise accommodation he or she requests, if the employee does not clarify the extent of his or her medical restrictions. The employer must participate in good faith in an interactive process under the ADA to find a reasonable accommodation, but the employer’s obligation runs only so far. If an employee’s physician does not specify the employee’s restrictions or what type of accommodation is necessary, following up with the physician and working with the employee to find alternative options should protect an employer from liability if the employee later argues that the offered accommodations were unreasonable.

Second, an employer is not required to provide an open-ended leave of absence if an employee requests such an absence as an accommodation. Under Robert’sanalysis, an indefinite absence, especially when there is no assurance that the employee will be able to perform the essential functions of his or her position, is unreasonable as a matter of law. Under these circumstances, once an employee has exhausted other types of leave, if she cannot provide an estimate of when she can resume the essential duties of her position, a court is likely to uphold an employer’s decision to terminate her. The employee does not need to return to work at full capacity, but the employee must be able to perform the duties of her position with reasonable accommodation under the ADA.

Third, employers in the Seventh Circuit must now reassign qualified disabled employees who can no longer perform their original jobs to vacant positions, unless the employer can establish the existence of special circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship. While the seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement should satisfy this requirement, it remains to be seen what other special circumstances will suffice going forward. Employers should vigorously explore the possibility of reassignment with disabled employees and be sure that any positions discussed with and/or offered to the employee are documented.

Finally, these cases further emphasize the importance of detailed job descriptions. With or without accommodation, an employee must be able to perform the essential functions of his or her job. If the employer can pinpoint the essential functions of a job, both the employer and the employee will have an easier time engaging in the required interactive process for establishing reasonable accommodations. Further, in the event an employee cannot perform the essential functions of a job, an employer is further protected in a lawsuit if it has articulated the essential functions of a position ahead of time.If you have any questions about this article or the ADA in general, please contact Alan Koral at +1 (212) 407 7750, Andrea Lewis at +1 (312) 609 7739, or any other Vedder Price attorney with whom you have worked.

[1]   Id. at 840 (citations omitted)

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