Vampires vs. Zombies – Trademark Registrations

The National Law Review’s featured guest bloggers this week are from our friends up north at Winthrop Weinstine. In keeping with all things Halloween and a bow to pop-culture,  Sharon Armstrong discusses trademark filings in relation to these spooky favorites:  

What is it with zombies these days? If recent memory serves correct, it wasn’t so long ago that a pop-culture junkie like me couldn’t mention the words “creature of the night” without some girl/tween/soccer mom swooning over the likes of one Edward Cullen, the romantic hero of Stephanie Meyer’s wildly popular Twilight series. You know who you are.

Then there was True Blood, The Vampire Diaries, and a slew of other vampire-related books, movies, parodies, and the like, including what may be one of the best fan-made mash-ups ever.

And then came the zombies. I received a copy of Pride and Prejudice and Zombies about a year ago as a gift – and suddenly it seems that zombies, like vampires, are everywhere too.

A recent review of the new television series “The Walking Dead” in the New York Times explains that “[z]ombie movies didn’t die off, but they were overshadowed by vampire mania that has dominated popular culture… Finally, perhaps as a backlash against all the girlish, gothic swooning over ‘Twilight,’ zombies are making a comeback.”

If recent filing activity at the Trademark Office is any indication, then what’s left of 2010 (and 2011) may be The Year of the Zombie. The stats are as follows:

Since September 6, 2006, the date upon which Twilight was first published, the following trademark applications have been filed with the Trademark Office:

  • 132 marks incorporating the term “zombie”
  • 118 marks incorporating the term “vampire”
  • 116 marks incorporating the term “demon”
  • 83 marks incorporating the term “troll”
  • 13 marks incorporating the term “ghoul”
  • 9 marks incorporating the term “corpse”

Of the first two categories, and since April 4, 2009, the date upon which “Pride and Prejudice and Zombies” was published, 84 applications for marks incorporating the term “vampire” have been filed and 69 applications for marks incorporating the term “zombie” have been filed.

Tellingly, the most recent applications incorporating the term “vampire” are for the mark VAMPIRES SUCK, for a variety of goods and services.

© 1994 – 2010 Winthrop & Weinstine, P. A.

About the Author:

Sharon D. Armstrong is an associate in the Intellectual Property practice group. Her practice is focused on the prosecution and enforcement of trademarks and copyrights, and Internet/domain name enforcement and acquisition. She assists clients in nearly all facets of trademark prosecution and enforcement, both foreign and domestic, administrative proceedings before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, and intellectual property transactions including due diligence, licensing, trademark acquisitions, settlement, consent and coexistence agreements, and other transfers of rights. Ms. Armstrong also provides assistance with intellectual property litigation and arbitration. Prior to joining Winthrop & Weinstine, Ms. Armstrong was an associate with Greenberg Traurig in Las Vegas, Nevada, a law clerk with the National Endowment for the Humanities, and an arts administrator at Los Angeles Opera. www.winthrop.com /612-604-6463

USPTO Extends and Expands Patent Application Peer Review Program

Under the category of “Who Knew” — National Law Review guest blogger James M. Singer of Pepper Hamilton LLP lets us know about  a US Patent Office Pilot Program which invites public participation in the patent application process.  

The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has announced an additional one-year pilot of its “Peer To Patent” pilot program, which invites public participation in the patent application process.  The new program launches on October 25, 2010 and will be available through September 30, 2011.

The Peer-to-Patent program is a collaboration between the USPTO, the New York Law School, and others in which participating patent applications receive public scrutiny through comments and prior art submissions on the Peer-to-Patent website.  The peer review period begins approximately one month after the patent application is published, and it lasts for three months.  After the peer review period, the project sends the prior art and comments to the USPTO, and the USPTO advances the application earlier in its queue for examination.  Both the USPTO and the applicant can consider the public comments and submitted prior art during the examination.

Applications that participate in the program can receive the benefit of quicker examination than they would have received if they had merely waited their ordinary turn at the USPTO.  This is especially useful for technologies such as software and telecommunication inventions where the typical wait time to first Office Action often is several years.  In addition, many commenters have suggested that the fact that a patent was peer reviewed patent could be useful in situations such as challenges to validity in litigation — in order words, the fact that a patent went through the program may make a jury less likely to find the patent invalid.

According to the USPTO, the Peer to Patent Program “opens the patent examination process to public participation in the belief that such participation accelerates the examination process and improves the quality of patents. Under the pilot program, inventors can opt to have their patent applications posted on the www.peertopatent.org website. . .. After the review period, the prior art is sent to the USPTO patent examiners for their consideration during examination.”

Changes in the new pilot include:

  • eligible technology classes have expanded to include software, telecommunications, and others;
  • peer review time is reduced to three months (from the previous four months);
  • up to 1,000 applications will be accepted into the program; and
  • peer reviewers may submit up to six items of prior art per application (down from the previous limit of 10).

The original Peer To Patent pilot ran from June 2007 until June 2009.  The original pilot included 189 patent applications, and it received over 600 items of prior art from peer reviewers.  To participate in the program, a pending application must not have published more than 30 days before filing a consent form, and it must fall into an eligible technology class.  Eligible classes include, among others:

  • 260 (certain subclasses) – chemistry of carbon compounds,
  • 380 – cryptography,
  • 424 (certain subclasses) – drug, bio-affecting and body-treating compositions,
  • 702, 703, 705-715, 717 and 718, which relate to certain types data processing and computers, and
  • 726 – information security.

The full list of technology classes eligible for the 2010 pilot is listed at www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/class_subclasses_for_2010pilot.jsp.  For more details about the Peer to Patent program, visit the Peer to Patent website at www.peertopatent.org.

Copyright © 2010 Pepper Hamilton LLP

Are You Ready For the Cloud?

Meredith L. Williams of Baker Donelson is the National Law Review’s Business of Law Featured blogger.  Meredith discusses the pros and cons of cloud computing for law office operations. 

Introduction

Is cloud computing a shift or is it the next natural step in strategic business development?  Is the cloud  the right answer for your law firm or company?  Is the cloud the right answer for all applications and infrastructure or is it just a piece of the puzzle?  These are a just few of the many questions law firms and companies are asking themselves as they consider a move to the cloud.  There are many reasons why cloud computing is a very seductive solution to the cost cutting environment we find ourselves dealing with today.  However, there are many issues, legal and organizational, that must be considered to determine the validity of the cloud for each environment.

The “cloud” means different things to different people.  For most of us, we have been using cloud computing technology for years without defining the term.  Example cloud environments are extranets, legal research websites, online file storage and much more.  By definition, the cloud is a metaphor  referring to internet based computing in which applications, data, software or network functions are stored on remote servers.  There are presently three types of cloud environments:

  1. Infrastructure as a service or hardware cloud which serves as a data center,
  2. Software as a service or the software cloud, and
  3. Desktop applications operated within a hardware cloud.

Although we have been using the cloud in the past, the difference at this time is the potential of using the cloud for core business applications.

Why the Cloud?

For strategic business leaders, the cloud offers a way to minimize cost, increase mobility, prepare for disaster recovery, offer device flexibility, collaborate on demand and reduce downtime. Let us take a look at the different sections of a law firm and see how the cloud can affect the overall business functions.

In the information management world collaboration is key.  The more a firm can offer needed collaboration tools with a client, the more the client becomes entrenched in that firm culture.  The cloud provides law firms with a unique opportunity to offer clients a collaborative environment in an on-demand system.  The client can truly be connected with the law firm from anywhere with any device in the world.

Fewer applications or errors and easier upgrades are phrases application and support specialists love to hear.  The cloud environment can make them a reality.  The cloud offers software functionality to users regardless of locality or device.  Therefore, fewer setups, downloads and support hours are spent dealing with application changes and upgrades.  This new environment aids a law firm in flexibility allowing the firm to change applications as rapidly as the needs of the users change.

The main concern of most in the applications world is support.  How do current structured IT staffs support an environment when the applications are not local?  What will be the skill set of an applications and desktop support staff individual with applications in the cloud? These are areas IT departments must address before making the move to the cloud.

The cloud offers business and cost savings in a very unique way.  The upfront costs of moving to the cloud are large.  However, over time the cost savings from increased efficiency and reduced hardware, software, support and downtime help to offset the upfront costs.  The biggest hurdle for cloud computing may not be cost but instead data security.  It is easy to argue that a law firm or company can protect its data when it lives in a server room on site with a locked door but how do IT departments protect their data when it sits thousands of miles away on servers not owned by the company?  Law firms will need to determine if this is a deal breaker or is this an area of contract negotiation with the cloud provider.

What are the contractual issues?

Now that we see the potential of cost savings, flexibility, mobility and more,  we will address the contractual issues and concerns each law firm will need to consider.  The first step in any contractual negotiation is due diligence of both parties.  Law firms must evaluate news, law suits, current events, financial stability, customer references, provider longevity and any other possible information that could affect the contractual obligation fulfillment.  Only then can the contract negations begin.

The largest areas of concern in the cloud are data security and privacy. A demonstration of these concerns is seen in the 2009 complaint filed with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) regarding cloud services of Google.  In the complaint, EPIC alleges Google did not adequately safeguard the confidential information obtained from clients.  This complaint raises serious questions for the vendor to address and draft into the contract.  Questions to ask include where the data is stored, what are the physical security measures to protect the data, is a shared resource used in storage, what is the security during transmission, what are the disaster recovery measures and what are security incident response times. In addition, questions around data migration and transition should be addressed.

Another issue to consider is legal compliance.  Highly regulated industries such as health care facilities falling under HIPAA must think twice about moving information to the cloud.  Vendors are expected to maintain the data at the same standard required of the company.  This can become a contractual deal breaker if the vendor will not agree to the higher standards.   The regulated industries affect law firms that maintain work product and client information for clients working in these regulated industries.  Law firms must now consider the standards guaranteed to their clients when moving to the cloud and verify the vendor will agree to that level of maintenance.

A point that is only just beginning to emerge in the cloud discussion is the level of control and ownership of the servers and data existing on the servers.  Questions to consider are data termination and vendor claims and rights to the data.  The control influences discovery, liability and litigation hold processes.  Negotiation can help prevent future claims of spoliation.

Performance, reliability and service features shape the day to day experience of users in the cloud.  Therefore, inquiring about disaster recovery set up, scalability of applications, process for upgrades and feature releases, suspension of services, offline capabilities, base subscription services and add-on services of applications can affect the contract obligations of the vendor, expectations of the client and most importantly cost of the contract.

Global performance and legal compliance of data across international borders are concerns for many large law firms.  Is the vendor only offering a cloud solution that is U.S. based?  This is a discussion point for the contract and can possibly be a deal breaker when adhering to EU standards of compliance.

All of the above contract negotiation points lead to the largest decision, cost.  What is included in the cost of the cloud services?  What is not included?  And the final and most important question to ask, whether the move to the cloud is a benefit if the law firm already owns the software licenses and hardware to maintain the status quo.

What will the courts be deciding?

The courts are well aware of the cloud computing movement.  In Oregon v. Bellar, 217 P. 3d 1094 (Or. App. 2009), the court took note that 69% of U.S. residents that are online utilize at least one cloud site. Due to the unique custodial issues involved with cloud computing, the cloud can present challenges to e-discovery and jurisdictional questions. Decisions concerning these issues are just starting to appear but with conflicting rulings.  The question of what the courts will decided has yet to be seen.

What will the future bring?

As we stated earlier, many of us have been using the cloud for years without calling it the cloud.  The difference surrounds the movement of core business functions such as email and document management to the cloud.  In the past, these features have been kept at a local level.  But as you see above, this is changing.  As more and more cloud providers make their way to the forefront, this movement will only increase.  The question is whether the cloud is the right solution for your law firm?

©2010 Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC. All Rights Reserved.

About the Author:

Meredith L. Williams is Baker Donelson’s Director of Knowledge Management.  Although trained as a lawyer, she is not actively engaged in the practice of law.  Instead, she oversees BakerNet, the Firm’s industry-leading intranet, and coordinates strategic growth on behalf of the Firm in knowledge management, competitive intelligence and technology.  Ms. Williams is widely recognized as a leading authority in knowledge management issues for the legal field, and is a frequent presenter and author on knowledge management and competitive intelligence. 901-577-2353 / www.BakerDonelson.com

 

 

Nondisclosure Agreements (NDAs): Not Just a “Standard Form.”

James M. Singer of Pepper Hamilton LLP is the featured guest blogger this week at the National Law Review.  James provides some great reminders about NDA’s Non-Disclosure Agreements. 

Many business transactions start with a nondisclosure agreement (NDA).  Often, one of the first deal points to be negotiated is whose “form” NDA will controls.  However, it’s common for both parties to overlook the fact that there is no “one-size-fits all” form NDA.

Before entering into an NDA, each party should examine the terms to ensure that the agreement makes sense for the party’s business.  Each party should ensure that the agreement adequately protects its own information, while not going so far as to subject the party to confidentiality procedures that can create issues down the road.

Issues to consider when entering into an NDA include:

  1. Nature of the disclosure: Are you more likely to be the discloser or the recipient of confidential information?  If your client will be a discloser, then a strong agreement may benefit the client. If you will only be the recipient, then you might seek a less stringent agreement.
  2. Duration of the confidentiality obligation: Some NDAs require information to be kept confidential forever. Others have a more limited term, such as 2 to 3 years.  A long term is valuable if the disclosure involves proprietary manufacturing processes, chemical compositions, or similar information.  However, if you are disclosing information that will become publicly known anyway — such as design details for a soon-to-be-sold product, or information that will be published in a patent application — then a term greater than 2 or 3 years may only benefit the other party.
  3. Consistency with corporate procedures: Each party should review the terms of the agreement to ensure that the agreement does impose obligations with which it cannot comply.  For example, if you need to disclose the information to contractors who aren’t employees, be sure that the agreement permits that.   I’ve also seen NDAs stating that all individuals who will have access to the information must sign a confidentiality agreement that specifically refers to  the NDA.  Will you require your employees to sign a new agreement that specifically refers to this agreement?  When faced with this type of obligation, consider whether or not you are prepared to comply.
  4. Purpose / Non-use clause: It’s standard for an NDA to prohibit the recipient from disclosing the information.  However, does it also restrict the recipient from internally using the information for its own benefit?  Does it clearly limit the purpose for which the recipient can use the information?  “Purpose” clauses are often filled in after all other terms are negotiated.  Parties should take care so that the purpose clause is as carefully drafted as any other clause.

These are just a few areas that parties should consider before signing a confidentiality agreement.  Rather than simply signing an ‘off the shelf” form, each party should carefully review the agreement with its attorneys to ensure that the document fits the business need.

Copyright © 2010 Pepper Hamilton LLP

About the Author:

James M. Singer is a partner in the Intellectual Property Practice Group of Pepper Hamilton LLP.  A registered patent attorney, Mr. Singer provides strategic counseling that helps businesses identify, acquire, license, protect and maximize the value of intangible assets.  Mr. Singer is the author and co-author of several publications, and he publishes IP Spotlight, a blog about topics relevant to the intersection of business and intellectual property law, at http://www.ipspotlight.com/. He also is a frequent public speaker on issues relating to technology and the law, and is recognized in Intellectual Asset Management (IAM) Licensing 250: The World’s Leading Patent and Technology Licensing Lawyers 2010. 412-454-5023 /www.pepperlaw.com

An Analysis of South Africa’s Mental Health Legislation

The National Law Review is pleased to congratulate Natalie LaToya McCrea of American University- Washington College of Law winner of the Fall 2010 Law Student Writing contest.  

If one were to measure a society’s health by its historical environment, then something can indeed be said of South Africa. This nation is known for its long abhorrent history with apartheid entrenched with a political and human rights struggle. In 1995, the world witnessed the evisceration of apartheid and the birth of a new democratic South Africa. In light of the struggle endured by a visible portion of the South African population, a question asked is, what about the forgotten and somewhat invisible individuals, those who suffer with mental illness. The purpose of this work is to discuss South Africa’s mental health legislation, namely Mental Health Care Act, No. 17 [MHCA 2002], and conduct a comparative study with the African Banjul Charter, the UN Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness [MI Principles], and the World Health Organization Principles.

Historical Mental Health Legislation

While South Africa has had numerous mental health statutes, our discussion will commence with the 1973 Act.

Mental Health Act 18 of 1973 [MHA 1973] grew out of a “public panic” that ensued after the assassination of then Prime Minister, Dr. Hendrik French Verwoerd by someone deemed to be mentally ill.[i] A Commission that inquired into his death concluded that many assassinations “are committed by mentally disordered persons.”[ii] The Commission’s conclusion spawned a proposed amendment, which eventually culminated into MHA 1973.[iii]

Scholars and psychiatrists have noted that MHA 1973 did not have an individual rights concern. Rather, its primary focus was on patient control and treatment, along with the “welfare and safety” of the society.[iv] The fact that this Act was propelled during the apartheid era cements the view that the human rights of the patients were not necessarily the priority. Specifically, MHA 1973 has been criticized because (i) it only required a reasonable degree of suspicion to be certified to a mental institution;[v] (ii) individuals could be denied their freedom and placed in a mental facility based on prejudices and vendettas.[vi] In fact, finding someone mentally incapable was sometimes utilized solely for political means in the apartheid era. Freedom fighters were often silenced by being placed in a mental facility; (iii) once deemed mentally ill and certified, patients went without the assistance of the law, and could spend a considerable amount of time in the mental institutions against their will[vii]; and (iv) patients did not have a significant right of appeal or representation.[viii]

According to the South Africa Federation for Mental Health, while MHA 1973 was in existence, it facilitated disproportionate mental health care based on race, with blacks receiving the least care. In effect, the MHA 1973 provisions did not promote personal autonomy, dignity or justice for individuals with mental illness.  Instead, it highlighted a paternalistic principle which allowed mentally ill patients to be alienated, stigmatized and disempowered. It became apparent that MHA 1973 needed to be reconsidered and changed.

South Africa’s Present Mental Health Legislation

South Africa entered into a state of transition after the presidential election of Nelson Mandela in 1994. The nation was moving from a repressive regime into a new democratic era. According to the World Health Organization [WHO], Mandela’s administration was particularly focused on ridding the nation of all apartheid polices, and instituting new ones that met the needs of groups previously disadvantaged.

The new South Africa adopted its Constitution with an accompanying Bill of Rights on May 8, 1996, which came into force on February 7, 1997. It became even more evident that MHA 1973 needed to be brought in step with the newly adopted principles of the South African Bill of Rights.[ix] Specifically, it needed to reflect the rights expounded in Chapter 2, §§§ 9, 10, and 12; recognizing respectively, issues of equality; the right to the respect and protection of human dignity; and the freedom and security of person.

South Africa’s new Mental Health Care Act (MHCA 2002) was passed in 2002 and promulgated on December 15, 2004.[x] It came in force in line with other positive international initiatives in mental health legislation, such as the London Mental Health Act 2007, The Scotland Mental Health (Care and Treatment) 2003, and the Jamaica Mental Health Act 1998.  In effect, MCHA 2002 seeks to: (1) shift the system from a past custodial approach to one encouraging community care; (2) make certain that appropriate care, treatment and rehabilitation are provided at all levels of the health service; and (3) highlight that individuals with mental disabilities should not be discriminated against, stigmatized or abused.[xi]

MCHA 2002’s Key Provisions

Mental illness is defined under the Act as a “positive diagnosis of a mental health related illness in terms of accepted diagnostic criteria” made by a mental health care practitioner authorized to make such diagnosis.[xii] The Act outlines the rights and duties to mental health patients, and highlights that their human dignity and privacy must be respected; that they should not be unfairly discriminated against because of their mental status; and that they should be protected from “exploitation, abuse and any degrading treatment” [xiii]

Involuntary Treatment:

Regulation No. 27117 of 2004 governs MCHA 2002.[xiv] This Regulation and § 33 of the Act, states that in order to commence a proceeding to have someone involuntarily committed, “an application must be made to the Head of a Health Establishment (HHE) by a spouse, next of kin, partner, associate, parent or guardian”, who must have seen the person within the past seven days.[xv] Once the application is received, the HHE must have the person examined by two mental health care practitioners who perform independent assessments of the patient, and must report their findings and recommendations.[xvi] If the assessments of the two practitioners are different, then the HHE must have the patient assessed by another practitioner.[xvii] The HHE can approve an application only if the two mental health care practitioners agree together that involuntary care is needed.[xviii]

MHCA 2002 is clear that only individuals suffering from mental illness are eligible for involuntary care.[xix] According to the Act, an involuntary mental health user “must be provided with care, treatment and rehabilitation at a health establishment if at the time of application, there is a reasonable belief that the mental health care user has a mental illness,” and is likely to cause serious harm to their person or others.[xx]

If the HHE recommends involuntary care, treatment and rehabilitation, the patient must be admitted to a health establishment within 48 hours.[xxi] The HHE must then arrange for the assessment of the patient’s physical and mental health status for 72 hours.[xxii] After the 72-hour assessment, based on the medical health care practitioner’s reports, the HHE must decide if the patient requires further involuntary care, treatment and rehabilitation services as an inpatient. If the HHE determines that the patient does not require further treatment, care or rehabilitation, the patient must be discharged immediately, unless the patient gives consent to further care. Invariably, depending upon the HHE’s determination, the patient can be discharged or have their status changed to a voluntary inpatient or outpatient. [xxiii]

Voluntary Treatment:

MHCA 2002 directs that an individual who voluntarily submits to a mental health facility for care and treatment, and who consents to such care, is “entitled” to care and treatment, or referral.[xxiv]

Procedural Protections and Precautions:

MHCA 2002 incorporates several procedures, and precautions to ensure that patient’s rights are fully protected. One notable precaution is that persons directed by the HHE to examine the prospective patient must be qualified mental health practitioners.[xxv]

Another important precaution and procedural protection is the establishment of the Mental Health Review Boards, which are to be constituted in every province.[xxvi]The primary aim of the Boards is to ensure that the rights of the prospective patients are not violated. The Boards must be comprised of one magistrate, one attorney, and a mental health practitioner.[xxvii] Where the HHE subjects an involuntary patient to the 72 hour assessment, and concludes that the patient should receive further involuntary care, treatment and rehabilitation, the HHE must submit a report within 7 days of the expiration of the 72-hour assessment requesting the Board to approve further involuntary care.[xxviii]

One striking element of the Act is that while the Board considers the HHE’s decision to continue involuntary treatment, all (the applicant, the mental health providers), except for the reluctant patient is afforded the opportunity to present their representations to the Board.[xxix] Additionally, it is interesting that after the Board makes its deliberations, there is no mention of them sending a notification of the results to the potential patient. The Act, however, notes that decision letters are sent to the HHEs and the applicant who requested that the patient be treated.[xxx] Once the Board decides to adhere to the HHE’s assessment that the involuntary patient should continue to be so treated, the Board must submit their decision for judicial review and send all documentations to the High Court for consideration of the matter. The Court has a month to consider.[xxxi]

The aforementioned concerns are somewhat ameliorated by the Act’s provision that mental health care users have a right to legal representation, and to appeal to the Board about the decisions of the HHE to continue involuntary treatment.[xxxii]One problem, however, is that the HHE’s decision in favor of involuntary care is not submitted to the patient, but to the applicant.  Since the reluctant patient was not notified of the HHE’s decision in the first place, it is rather difficult for the patient to submit an appeal.  If the Board finds for the reluctant patient, s/he must be released immediately. If the Board finds in favor of the HHE’s decision, the Board must submit their decision to the High Court for judicial review.[xxxiii]

Another important procedural protection applicable to both voluntary and involuntary mental patients is that their conditions must be periodically reviewed, and annual reports must be submitted to the Board for review.[xxxiv]

MHCA 2002 Compliance with Other Human Rights Principles

The African Banjul Charter on Human and People’s Rights was ratified by South Africa on June 9, 1996, and accordingly, its principles are binding on South Africa. The Charter calls for the protection of the dignity of mental health patients; their equality before the law; their right not to be deprived of their liberty and security; and the right to obtain good mental health. [Articles 5, 3, 6, 16, respectively]. Some of these proscriptions were called to the forefront before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in the landmark case, Purohit and Moore v. Gambia No. 241/2001 (2003). The Commission held that all states party to the Banjul Charter should guard and protect the rights of the mentally disabled to dignity and the enjoyment of life.[xxxv]

South Africa’s MHCA 2002 recognizes and subscribes to the importance of protecting individuals with mental illness.[xxxvi] The Act further recognizes that this protection is called for in the state Constitution.  There is a clear indication that South Africa wants to protect the rights and interests of the mentally ill.[xxxvii] The human dignity and respect principles evoked in Purohit are enforced and protected in §§8, 10 and 11 of the Act.

The Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care (MI Principles)[xxxviii]

As illustrated below, MHCA 2002 comports with many of the tenets of the United Nations’ MI Principles:

Chapter III of the Act is a reflection of MI Principle 1 enumerating some basic rights for the mentally ill, such as respect for human dignity and privacy;[xxxix] the consent to care factor;[xl] and rules against discrimination, exploitation and abuse.[xli] MI Principle 4 is reflected in Section 12 of the Act. Specifically, similar to the MI Principles, MHCA 2002 § 12 directs that a determination of an individual’s mental health status should not be based on their socio-political, cultural or economic background. The MI Principle of Notice of Rights (Principle 12) can be found in § 17 of the Act providing that mental health patients must be informed of their rights before any administration of care or treatment.  The Act follows MI Principle 16 on involuntary admission in that it considers the dangerousness factor before committing an individual involuntarily. The Act, like Principle 16, recognizes the importance of the concurrence of two mental health practitioners, and that involuntary preliminary treatment should be brief pending a review.[xlii] Additionally, both the Act and the MI Principles contain provisions for the creation of Review Boards [Principle 17; MHCA § 18]. They both also have provisions for periodical reviews of involuntary patients [Principle 17, MHCA § 30]; and the right of the patient to appeal [Principle 17, MHCA §29]. The MI Principle of monitoring is reflected in the Act in the form of judicial reviews in §§ 34, 35, 36 and 37.

The World Health Organization Principles

According to the WHO, South Africa’s MHCA 2002 “is consistent with international human rights standards…and appears to be a highly appropriate and important milestone in the development of the mental health system in South Africa.[xliii]

Many of the principles reflected in MHCA 2002 are in line with the WHO’s concept that the aim of a mental health legislation is to “protect, promote, and improve” the lives of the mentally ill.[xliv] Significantly, WHO’s concepts are reflected in a number of the Act’s principles, namely that mental health services should offer care, treatment and rehabilitation; and that recipients should be treated with the least possible restriction on their freedom.

Concerns with the New Mental Health Care Legislation

Despite the fact that MHCA 2002 represents a major milestone in South Africa’s history, the WHO has noted that it does not appear to be enough to bring forward major reforms greatly needed in South Africa’s mental health system.[xlv] In fact scholars have commented that the system is plagued with human resource constraints and infrastructure restraints, and thus implementation of the Act’s requirement in community and district hospitals is problematic.[xlvi] According to Moosa, South Africa has a limited amount of specialized psychiatric hospitals, and those that are available are ill equipped to properly abide by the 72-hour provision. Additionally, many South African psychiatric hospitals do not separate the patients by age groups; and there is a significant lack of beds.[xlvii] Other problematic areas that undermine the Acts successful implementation are lack of proper training, inadequate skills; and a lack of proper understanding of the Act.[xlviii]

Conclusion

South Africa’s new mental health care act is an important instrument implemented to advocate for the best interest of mental health care users. Although there are problems, one must remember that the nation had a horrid past, and remnants of the past system are still ingrained therein. The redeeming factor is that South Africa has made the step to correct the deficiency and has moved towards enabling its citizens to have access to obtaining optimal mental health care.

[i] Nicholas Haysom, Martin Strous, and Lloyd Vogleman, The Mad Mrs. Rochester Revisited: The involuntary confinement of the mentally ill in South Africa, 6 SAJHR 341, 343 (1990).

[ii] Id.

[iii] Id.

[iv] Burns, JK Implementation of the Mental Health Care Act (2002) at district hospitals in South Africa: Translating principles into practice, S Afr Med J 2008; 98 46-49.

[v] Id.

[vi] Id.

[vii] Id.

[viii] Id.

[ix] Bonthuys, Elsje, Involuntary Civil Commitment and the New Mental Health Bill,118 SALJ 667 (2001).

[x] Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 (S.Afr.),http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=68051

[xi] MYH Moosa and FY Jeenah, Involuntary treatment of psychiatric patients in South Africa, 11(2)Afr Journal of Psychiatry, 109, 110 (2008).

[xii] Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 Chapter 1, § xxi (S. Afr.).

[xiii] Id. atChapter 3, §§§ 8, 10 and 11.

[xiv] http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/notices/2004/27117.pdf

[xv] Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 §33 (1,2) (S. Afr).

[xvi] Id. at § 33(4,5).

[xvii] Id. at § 33(6).

[xviii] Id. at §33(7).

[xix] Id. at § 32.

[xx] Id.

[xxi] Id. at §33(9).

[xxii] Id. at § 34.

[xxiii] Id. at §34(3).

[xxiv] Id. at §§ 25, 26.

[xxv] Id. at §27(4), §33(4).

[xxvi] Id. at § 18.

[xxvii] Id. at § 20.

[xxviii] Id. at §34(3)(c).

[xxix] Id. at §34(7)(a).

[xxx] Id. at §34(7)(b).

[xxxi] Id. at §34(7)(c).

[xxxii] Id. at §§ 15, 35.

[xxxiii] Id. at §35(3)(4).

[xxxiv] Id. at §§30, 37.

[xxxv] Michael L. Perlin, Arlene S. Kanter, Mary P. Treuthart, Eva Szeli & Kris Gledhill, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS and COMPARATIVE MENTAL DISABILITY LAW840-841 (Michael L. Perlin eds., 2006).

[xxxvi] Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 Preamble (S. Afr).

[xxxvii] Id. at §4(c)(d).

[xxxviii] The Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care, G.A. Res. 46/119, U.N. Doc. A/Res/46/119 (Dec 17, 1991).

[xxxix] Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 §§8, 13 (S. Afr).

[xl] Id. at §9.

[xli] Id. at §§10, 11.

[xlii] Id. at §§26, 33.

[xliii] WHO, Mental Health Policy Development and Implementation in South Africa: A Situation Analysis, 10 [January 31, 2008].

[xliv] Id.

[xlv] Id.

[xlvi] MYH Moosa and FY Jeenah, Involuntary treatment of psychiatric patients in South Africa, 11(2)Afr Journal of Psychiatry, 109, 110 (2008).

[xlvii] Id.

[xlviii] Burns, JK Implementation of the Mental Health Care Act (2002) at district hospitals in South Africa: Translating principles into practice, S Afr Med J 2008; 98 46-49.

© 2010 Natalie McCrea

About the Author:

Natalie Latoya McCrea received her J.D. from Syracuse University College of Law in 2009. She also holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. She is currently pursuing a LLM with a specialty in international business from American University Washington College of Law.  www.wcl.american.edu / 347-886-6900

 

Avoiding Ambiguity in Patent License Agreements

National Law Review featured guest blogger James M. Singer of Pepper Hamilton LLP provides a great analysis of why companies need to take a very close look at the wording in their licensing agreements. 

Recent publications indicate that intangible assets account for between 70 percent and 80 percent of the overall value of United States companies.  For companies that are involved in intellectual property licensing, a significant portion of this value is derived from licensing revenues.  Thus, the agreements in which licenses are granted must be carefully drafted to ensure that agreement clearly explains the rights and obligations of each party.

Unfortunately, too often companies start a license discussion with a form document that does not anticipate issues that the parties may encounter during the licensing relationship.  In addition, a slight ambiguity in the agreement can create headaches for both parties down the road.

In early November I will have the opportunity to speak about patent licensing at a CLE seminar, and when preparing my comments I started thinking about situations that I’ve seen where just a few words in the agreement caused the parties to significantly disagree about the scope of the license, the payment obligations, or other key terms.

For example, when licensing a patent, the licensee also may expect to receive a license to general categories of “related know-how” or “related intellectual property.”  For some companies, it may be relatively easy to identify exactly what falls into these general categories.  However, other licensors — such as large companies, research institutions, and contract manufacturers — may have a wide variety of projects that could be considered “related” to the licensed IP.  These licensors should avoid general categories like “related IP”, or at least narrowly define “related IP” to that developed by specific individual, at a specific time, or under specific conditions.

Another example can be found in a 2009 Seventh Circuit court decision of Sunstar Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Company, which reviewed an agreement whereby Alberto-Culver granted Sunstar a senyoshiyoken in certain trademarks.  The parties differed as to whether the word senyoshiyoken — a Japanese word essentially meaning “exclusive use right” — allowed Sunstar to vary the trademark’s font. The court analyzed the agreement and the term’s Japanese meaning and concluded that the right granted was broad enough to permit the licensee to change the font.

In a 2009 Federal Circuit decision, Corebrace LLC v. Star Seismic LLC, the Court considered whether a license to “make” a patented invention inherently includes the right to have the invention made by a third party contract manufacturer.  The court analyzed its own precedent, along with California state law and concluded that a “have made” right is implicit in a right to “make, use and sell” an invention unless the agreement expressly says otherwise.

The licensing of intangible assets is big business.  Situations such as these show the importance of carefully drafting license agreements to avoid ambiguity.

Unless the agreement is clear, the parties can find themselves interpreting the agreement in vastly different ways, with a significant revenues riding on whose interpretation is correct.

Copyright © 2010 Pepper Hamilton LLP

About the Author:

James M. Singer is a partner in the Intellectual Property Practice Group of Pepper Hamilton LLP.  A registered patent attorney, Mr. Singer provides strategic counseling that helps businesses identify, acquire, license, protect and maximize the value of intangible assets.  Mr. Singer is the author and co-author of several publications, and he publishes IP Spotlight, a blog about topics relevant to the intersection of business and intellectual property law, at http://www.ipspotlight.com/. He also is a frequent public speaker on issues relating to technology and the law, and is recognized in Intellectual Asset Management (IAM) Licensing 250: The World’s Leading Patent and Technology Licensing Lawyers 2010. 412-454-5023 / www.pepperlaw.com

Inside Counsel Transformative Leadership Awards – Entry Deadline: October 29, 2010

Inside Counsel is inviting you to help them shine the spotlight on law firms and law departments that have achieved demonstrable results related to increasing opportunities for the empowerment of women in law by submitting a nomination for the 2011 Transformative Leadership Awards.  The Awards honor women general counsel and law firm partners who have demonstrated a commitment to advancing the empowerment of women in corporate law. 

If your firm or legal department has made momentous progress in elevating women to leadership positions, developed significant paths of advancement for women, or has a considerable number of women on key executive, compensation or equity partnership committees, then click here to nominate them for an award.

InsideCounsel magazine’s Editor-In-Chief, Cathleen Flahardy, in conjunction with Allstate Insurance Company’s SVP, General Counsel & Chief Legal Officer, Michele Coleman Mayes, will again co-chair the National Awards Committee to select the 2011 winners.

In 2011, seven total awards are will be presented: three awards for in-house counsel, three awards for law firms and one shared award for both law firm and in-house counsel.

 

An Overview of the Hedge Fund Industry and What’s Coming Next for Hedge Funds

The National Law Review‘s  winner of the Fall Student Legal Writing Contest is Karol C. Sierra-Yanez of Suffolk University Law School. Karol’s article provides some background on the hedge fund industry and where experts think regulation of this industry may be going.  Read on: 

This paper aims to provide the reader with a better understanding of what the term hedge fund means, their history and development, and how hedge funds differ from traditional investment vehicles, such as mutual funds. It will focus on the future of the hedge fund industry, specifically, the changes proposed in the Hedge Fund Transparency Act. While some critics and experts in the financial industry see this Act as a way to regulate an investment vehicle capable of affecting the economy, others see it as an invasion into the freedom of hedge fund advisers to develop creative strategies to hedge the risks of their investments and enhance returns.

I. WHAT IS A HEDGE FUND?

To begin with, there is no universally accepted definition of hedge funds. The various definitions refer to hedge funds as private investment vehicles that are subject to less regulation in comparison with more traditional forms of investment, such as mutual funds.[1] Hedge funds are not defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in fact, there is no regulatory or statutory definition of hedge funds.[2]

While the first hedge fund was started in 1949 when Alfred W. Jones developed a system to protect investments against market risk[3] that incorporated various techniques including the use of leverage[4] and short selling[5], other financially creative hedge fund managers also came along and developed new hedging strategies such as the use of futures and options, strategies that did not exist when Jones developed his fund.[6] With the use of these new strategies, hedge funds started to generate favorable returns again and increasingly grew in popularity, to the point that by 2002, there were an estimated 6,500 hedge funds operating in the United States, managing approximately $600 billion in capital.[7]

II. HOW DO HEDGE FUNDS DIFFER FROM TRADITIONAL INVESTMENTS?

To begin, a major characteristic difference between hedge funds and mutual funds is that mutual funds and their managers are required to register with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), whereas hedge funds are unregistered investment vehicles. [8] Mutual funds must register as investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and their managers must register under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940[9]; these funds are considered to be “public” investment funds, meaning they are open to the general public and any investor possessing the required capital may invest, regardless of their net worth or level of sophistication. [10] Hedge funds, on the other hand, are considered “private” investment funds, and are not registered with any government body, and are only open to qualified or accredited investors, including high-net-worth investors, institutions, endowments, family offices and pension programs.[11]

From a sales and marketing standpoint, mutual funds can be purchased in any number of ways, with common examples including directly through a fund management company (e.g. Fidelity), through a mutual fund ‘supermarket’ (e.g. Charles Schwab) or through a broker or financial planner (e.g. Ameriprise Financial).[12] Advertisements for mutual funds can often be found in a variety of published sources, including magazines, newspapers, and on the internet.[13]Hedge funds, meanwhile, are much different in terms of sales and marketing; to be free from certain restrictions, “hedge funds limit access to investors who regulators deem rich and savvy enough to handle the risk.”[14] This is closely related to the fact that hedge funds are referred to as “private placement” vehicles, which refers to the offer and sale of a security not involving a public offering and therefore not subject to filing a registration statement with the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933.[15]

From the standpoint of fees and expenses, mutual funds have what is called an “expense ratio”, which is the percentage of fees paid by investors to the company to cover the costs of managing and operating the fund, as well as marketing and distribution costs. [16] The expense ratio is the total fee that the investor will pay, besides any transaction costs that are incurred at the time of purchase or sale of the shares.[17] The average equity mutual fund charges an expense ratio somewhere between 1.3% and 1.5%. [18] Hedge funds, meanwhile, in addition to a management fee (similar to the expense ratio of mutual funds), also charge a percentage of profits earned by the fund. [19]The popular fee arrangement in the hedge fund industry, commonly referred to as “2 & 20”, is to charge 2% of assets under management (the management fee) as well as 20% of profits over a stated benchmark (the performance or incentive fee). [20]

Any person who possesses the required capital is generally allowed to invest in the mutual fund of their choice, and most funds have a minimum investment of $1000, making them a relatively accessible investment for most people.[21] In addition, mutual funds stand ready to redeem an investor’s shares at any point in time, a concept called liquidity, making it relatively easy for an investor to get their money back when they would like.[22] Minimum investments for hedge funds are quite steep, and vary from fund to fund, ranging from $100,000 to $1,000,000 or more. [23] Liquidity, or the ability of an asset to be converted into cash quickly,[24]is quite different between hedge funds and mutual funds. With mutual funds, a net asset value (or “NAV”) is computed every single business day, and investors can redeem their shares at the NAV on a daily basis. [25] Based on a review of several articles, with hedge funds, like mutual funds, the liquidity depends on the frequency with which they issue and redeem shares, but just much less frequently. Most hedge funds have monthly liquidity with a 35-day notice period, but some are much less liquid, depending on the type of assets invested in and the strategies employed by the fund.[26] Hedge funds are also subject to a “lock-up period”[27], which is the time period that an investor must hold their assets within a fund before they can be removed. In other words, mutual fund shares have a readily ascertainable market and a fair price, while hedge fund investors have a contract with the manager that essentially allows the manager to dictate the frequency and manner of redemption.[28]

Traditional mutual funds are generally segmented into a few basic categories, such as stock (growth, value, blend), bond (municipal, corporate, government), and money market (cash, t-bills),[29] according to the types of investments they will make as outlined in their prospectus. They do not deviate from their prescribed investment approach, and are generally limited to the types of investments they can make.  Hedge funds, however, generally employ sophisticated trading methods, including short selling (when the investor sells borrowed securities), options (financial contracts between two parties), and leverage (the use of borrowed capital to purchase additional assets with the objective of increasing returns). [30]

According to a Morningstar Methodology Paper published in 2007 titled “The Morningstar Category Classifications for Hedge Funds”, hedge fund managers typically focus on specific areas of the market and/or specific trading strategies. Morningstar states, as an example, “that some hedge funds buy stocks based on broad economic trends, while others search for arbitrage profits by pairing long and short positions in related securities.”[31]

III. PRESENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

As discussed briefly in the section outlining the key differences between hedge funds and more traditional investment vehicles, regulatory differences, most of which stem from the fact that participation in hedge funds is mainly the “preserve of sophisticated investors who possess the required knowledge to assess the risks associated with investing in this asset class”[32] are of the utmost importance. Under this sophistication premise, it is maintained that wealthy investors can better fend for themselves[33] and are thus more suited for hedge fund investments, whereas the everyday, less sophisticated investor may not be.

Two of the primary statutory exclusions for hedge funds from the definition of “Investment Company” come from the Investment Company Act of 1940: §3(c)(1) and §3(c)(7).[34] The §3(c)(1) exemption is satisfied when the issuer sells their securities to no more than 100 persons and does not make or will not plan to make a public offering of those securities;[35] the §3(c)(7) exemption, meanwhile, is satisfied when the securities are being sold only to “qualified purchasers” and also like §3(c)(1) the issuer does not make or does not plan to make a public offering of those securities. As one may note, §3(c)(7) makes no reference to the number of investors in a fund in the manner that §3(c)(1) does, and this is where the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 comes into play. Under §12(g) of the Exchange Act, it states that an issuer must “register, disclose information and submit periodic reporting” if the issuer has $10 million or more in assets under management and 500 or more investors.[36] Due to this fact, it comes as no surprise that many hedge funds elect to issue securities to less than 500 investors in order to avoid triggering this requirement.[37] Similarly, those fund managers that operate as Commodity Pool Operators (“CPO”) are able to rely on regulations contained in the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) that “provide an exemption from registration to CPOs that engage in limited commodity futures activities and sell interests solely to certain qualified individuals and that sell interests to highly sophisticated pool participants.[38]

Finally, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (not to be confused with the Investment Company Act of 1940), which regulates the activities of investment advisers, also contains one registration exemption that hedge funds commonly rely upon. The registration exemption is called the “private adviser exemption” and is found under §203(b) of the Advisers Act and states that the exemption is satisfied if the adviser “1) has fewer than fifteen clients during the preceding twelve months; 2) [nor] holds himself out to the public as an investment adviser nor acts as an investment adviser to any investment company.”[39] This exemption at first may seem rather difficult to achieve, as it would seem that most hedge funds would have 15 or more investors, but there is a catch. Under the law, hedge fund advisers are able to meet this exemption by satisfying a safe harbor whereby they treat each legal entity (e.g. a single fund, limited partnership, etc) as a single client and are able to invoke the small adviser exemption.[40] As such, many hedge fund advisers avoid registering with the SEC by relying on this de minimis exemption and have fewer than 15 “clients” during the preceding 12 months and do not hold themselves out to the public as investment advisers.[41] This specific exemption will be touched upon further in the paper as it has been the focal point of recent regulation changes affecting the hedge fund industry.

IV. PAST PROPOSED HEDGE FUND REGULATIONS

While hedge funds themselves have been around for decades, they did not grow to such prominence until much more recently. For example, during the post-technology bear market era around 2000 through late 2002 the popularity of hedge funds grew very quickly, and by 2006 there were approximately 8,000 hedge funds globally with assets under management in excess of $1 trillion compared to 1990 when there were only 600 hedge funds with under $40 billion in combined assets under management.[42]

This tremendous outgrowth, which directly results in a significant amount of power and influence within the capital markets, is one of the factors often cited by the SEC as rationale for regulatory action against the hedge fund industry. Other factors include the fact that government agencies generally lack meaningful and reliable data and information about the hedge fund industry as well as the increased “retailization” of hedge funds.[43] An example of such “retailization” would be the fact that U.S. hedge fund of funds that do not meet the aforementioned exemptions and are registered with the SEC do not need to require that all investors be accredited and may accept investments for as little as $25,000.[44] Pension plans, university endowments, and charitable organizations have been investing money in hedge funds, sometimes exposing unsophisticated investors to risky investment strategies.[45] This has led to concerns that unsophisticated investors have invested in vehicles they do not understand.[46]Besides, some hedge funds have been using television commercials to advertise their investment services to unsophisticated investors.[47]

In response to these factors, a 2003 SEC Staff Report investigated the hedge fund industry and concluded that the SEC should require hedge fund advisers to register under the Advisers Act.[48] The SEC had concluded that a number of existing hedge funds were using the private adviser exemption in contradiction of its intended purpose and that a change of the interpretation of the term “client” was justified.[49] Accordingly, in 2004, the SEC, by a vote of 3-2, adopted regulation 203(b)(3)-2, which was an amendment to §203(b)(2) of the Advisers Act, which would require many hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC for the first time.[50] This amendment is referred to as the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule, and defined each investor within a private hedge fund as a “client” for the purpose of determining whether the adviser satisfied the previously discussed private adviser exemption.[51] This Rule applied a “look-through” to hedge funds (in contrast to the previously mentioned safe harbor rule which counted each fund or legal entity as a “client”), whereby each individual investor would be counted as one client, thereby many hedge fund advisers were no longer able to satisfy the private adviser exemption under the Advisors Act and were legally required to register with the SEC.[52] Not surprisingly, the SEC, in support of the passing of this amendment, argued that the registration of hedge fund advisers is necessary “to protect investors in hedge funds and to enhance the Commission’s ability to protect our nation’s securities markets.”[53]

It seemed, however, that from the very beginning there were those who felt the passing of the “Hedge Fund Rule” would do little to no good in actually improving the hedge fund industry. One of the articles used for this research states that “the implementation of this mandatory disclosure will probably have little or no impact in practice” and even continues by saying that “the implementation of this rule might ultimately be counterproductive to the SEC’s goal of the abolishment of the “retailization” of hedge funds.[54]

Unfortunately for the SEC, their efforts aimed at hedge fund regulation were short-lived, as in 2004 hedge fund manager Philip Goldstein, his firm Opportunity Partners LLC, and their general partner Kimball & Winthrop filed suit against the SEC, arguing that the “Commission lacked any power to regulate the hedge fund advisor industry and that only Congress may change the Advisers Act.[55] In doing so, Goldstein et al challenged the enforcement of the recently passed Hedge Fund Rule, arguing that Congress “unambiguously intended the term “client” to mean the fund, and not the investors in the fund.[56] The challenge also claimed that the SEC “drastically exceeded the term’s “probability of meaning” and the SEC’s adoption of the rule was arbitrary and capricious.[57] A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit heard arguments in the case of Goldstein v. SEC, and in 2006 they vacated and remanded the Hedge Fund Rule and held that the SEC’s interpretation of the word “client” was “outside the founds of reasonableness”, “arbitrary” and “inconsistent with Congressional intent.”[58] Adding insult to injury, the court even went as far as to say that “the Hedge Fund Rule came close to violating the plain language of the Advisers Act.”[59]

V. RECENTLY PROPOSED HEDGE FUND REGULATIONS

Despite a lack of early success, the U.S Government did not give up on the subject of hedge fund industry regulation. Looking back at the many concerns related to the hedge fund industry and the financial industry overall, the use of the term “systemic risk” has become rather commonplace when describing the perceived risk inherent in hedge funds. In a paper entitled “Unnecessary Reform: The Fallacies With and Alternatives to SEC Regulation of Hedge Funds”, author Evan M. Gilbert defines systemic risk as “the potential for a modest economic shock to induce substantial volatility in asset prices, significant reductions in corporate liquidity, potential bankruptcies and efficiency losses.”[60] Many including regulators are concerned that the sudden and powerful downfall of large and influential investment funds and/or firms could have drastic and far-reaching effects throughout the entire financial system.

As such, and particularly in the wake of the financial crisis that occurred between 2007 and 2008, regulators sprung into action in 2009 and quickly introduced new measures aimed at the hedge fund industry. The first came on January 29, 2009, when two United States politicians, Senators Chuck Grassley of Iowa and Carl Levin of Michigan, introduced the “Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 2009.” This act would amend the Investment Company Act of 1940 and aim to regulate hedge funds in two specific ways: first, it would require any funds with assets equal to or greater than $50 million to register with the SEC and second it would impose more stringent anti-money laundering obligations.[61] The Act would encompass all §3(c)(1) and §3(c)(7) exempted funds, not just “hedge funds” per se; as such, all privately-held investment funds ranging from hedge funds to venture capital and private equity funds would be affected.[62]

As mentioned, all “large” funds with $50 million or more in assets would be required to register with the SEC; in addition, they would be required to maintain books and records with the SEC, and also comply with any requests for information or examination by the SEC.[63] Finally, periodic electronic reporting (minimum once per year) to the SEC would also be required of all funds.

Besides the Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 2009, other regulatory developments were underway in 2009. In a paper published in March, 2010 entitled “New Developments in Securities Litigation”, author Elizabeth P. Gray, a partner at Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, states that “financial regulation of advisers to hedge funds and other private funds is expected to increase substantially during 2010.”[64] She goes on to add that “financial reform bills that would require the registration of advisers to hedge funds as investment advisers with the SEC under the Advisers Act appear to have significant momentum behind them.”[65] Of particular interest is a bill that was sponsored by Congressman Paul Kanjorski of Pennsylvania and approved by the U.S. House of Representatives in December, 2009 which would, if enacted, effectively eliminate the private adviser exemption from registration under §203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act.[66] This particular bill is clearly reminiscent of the previously discussed, and unsuccessful, Hedge Fund Rule of 2004 in that it seeks to amend the meaning of “client” under the Advisers Act and forcibly require advisers with 15 or more clients to require with the SEC. In doing so, these changes in regulation would have many effects similar to those proposed within the Hedge Fund Transparency Act as well as those presently in place for funds abiding by §3(c)(1) and §3(c)(7) of the Advisers Act. Such regulatory requirements would include, among other things, extensive record-keeping requirements, disclosure requirements, rules of conduct, subjectivity to examination processes, and standing ready to provide information to the SEC about the adviser themselves and the funds they manage.[67]

VI. THE FUTURE OF HEDGE FUND REGULATION

While it is difficult to say with any real certainty at this time exactly what the future holds for the hedge fund industry, no less trying to predict what future regulations may or may not be enacted, it can certainly be said that many experts and academics alike favor some degree of regulation or another. Long before the term ‘systemic risk’ became everyday vernacular from Wall Street to Main Street, progressive minds felt new regulation would be done. If and when it was done, most would likely agree that future regulation “must reduce the likelihood and potential costs of the failure of systemically important hedge funds whilst at the same time preserving the wider market benefits of hedge funds’ ongoing activities.”[68] It is important that any regulation that is enacted in the years ahead should somehow provide additional transparency, awareness, protection and overall risk management while at the same time allowing hedge fund companies and managers to invest and operate with the degree of anonymity which they deserve and to contribute to overall market efficiency. While some feel that new hedge fund regulations would “create a stable regulatory environment, bring parts of the industry in from the cold, and help lift the veil of secrecy that currently surrounds hedge funds,” others still maintain their rightful concerns.[69]Take for example former US Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan. With his traditionally “laissez-faire” approach to financial markets, he for one might be more inclined to believe that “hedge funds should not be regulated at all because of the efficiency they provide to the financial system.”[70]In a paper he published recently for The Brookings Institute entitled “The Crisis”, Greenspan continues down the “less is more” path, adding that “regulation by its nature imposes restraints on competitive markets. The elusive point of balance between growth and stability has always been a point of contention, especially when it comes to financial regulation.[71] Others, while cognizant of the systemic implications associated with the failure of one or more large hedge funds, agree, too, that the benefits hedge funds provide to the financial system are substantial and that “the trading behavior of hedge funds can improve market efficiency, price discovery and consumer choice.[72] Going even further, and somewhat contrary to what others may say or feel, some believe that “hedge funds may help in alleviating financial crisis.[73]

Others, meanwhile, are taking a much more middle-of-the-road approach, with beliefs that hedge fund regulations can and will help both sides. David Langguth, of EACM Advisors, LLC, a leading investment advisory firm and subsidiary of BNY Mellon Corporation, was quoted in a hedge fund roundtable as saying that “while regulatory initiatives such as increased transparency or registration may affect hedge funds, we do not anticipate measures that will significantly limit most managers’ ability to implement their strategies. Clearly, well designed measures intended to limit potential market abuses generally will be positive for market participants, including hedge funds.”[74]

Looking back again at the failed 2004 Hedge Fund Rule, some feel that “it would be an understatement to say that the Goldstein ruling was a setback for the SEC,”[75] and I cannot say that I disagree. Author Joshua Hess, in a paper entitled “How Arbitrary Really Was the SEC’s Hedge Fund Rule?” argues that the Goldstein decision resulted in a regulatory black hole to which the SEC found itself inadequately able to regulate a financial industry whose continuing growth will have a substantial impact on U.S. financial markets.[76] And, following the series of recent events that have roiled global financial markets, including the outright collapse of Lehman Brothers, the rescue of Merrill Lynch, countless lending institution bankruptcies, and bailout after bailout by central government banks, it feels to many that something, anything, needs to be done. Furthermore, Evan Gilbert, in his paper entitled “Unnecessary Reform: The Fallacies With and Alternatives to SEC Regulation of Hedge Funds” writes that “there appears to be a strong emotional component behind the calls for subjecting hedge funds to SEC registration and disclosure requirements…this fear-based response is understandable, especially in light of the growing number of established institutions either on the brink of collapse, or in some cases actually failing.[77]Once again, something, anything, needs to be done.

Two main ideas that I have come across in my research that stand out as possible solutions include: First, to establish legal limits and/or regulations related to the amount of credit that can be extended to hedge funds by financial institutions. Previously mentioned author Gilbert in his “Unnecessary Reform” paper states, “one of the more straight-forward solutions would be to limit the amount of credit public financial institutions are permitted to extend to hedge funds. Perhaps the most significant concern expressed by those critical of the hedge fund industry is systemic risk…one of the principal causes of systemic failure is failure amongst credit institutions, or more specifically, banks…if banks are limited in the credit they are permitted to extend to hedge funds, any failure of such funds would be less likely to instigate a liquidity crisis.”[78] As previously discussed in the earlier stages of this paper, financial leverage is something specifically available to hedge funds, and a variety of the well-known hedge fund collapses have been attributed to excess amounts of leverage. Therefore, some believe that limiting the amount of credit extended to hedge funds, which is then used to achieve leverage, could help stem systemic risk.

The second recommendation I have come across that I also agree with would be to impose more strict requirements for so-called “accredited investors”. Author David Schneider in his papered titled “If at First You Don’t Succeed: Why the SEC Should Try and Try Again to Regulate Hedge Fund Advisors” argues that the SEC could discourage hedge funds from allowing investors to invest in the hedge fund by changing the definition of an accredited investor.[79] By definition under the Securities Act, an accredited investor is any individual with a net worth that exceeds $1 million or any person with an income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years. Amazingly, however, Schneider points out an almost unbelievable fact, which is that this net worth/income benchmark has not changed since 1982, and that due to the presence of inflation (rising prices, incomes, etc) and increasing net worth, more and more investors have been satisfying the accredited investor benchmark.[80] It seems to me that it would be worthwhile to adjust the “accredited investor” threshold every year based on inflation rates, so that as incomes and net worth levels continue to rise, more and more individuals do not suddenly qualify as potential hedge fund investors. The income and net worth thresholds should be increased each and every year, so that it remains equally difficult with each passing year for individuals to become qualified as hedge fund investors.

Apart from the aforementioned recommendations, there is one additional point that continues to stand out as something that the government, at least it would appear, should tend to be more concerned with. As I have come to recognize through my research, hedge funds were originally an activity generally for the ultra rich – those with upper-tier income levels, high net worth, and money to spare, and lose. It was the last condition – the fact that they could essentially bare to lose some part of their net worth – that made them suitable hedge fund investors. But yet, over time, so-called institutional investors, such as pension plans, endowments, foundations, schools, hospitals, and so on, have all started to gradually wade further and further into the hedge fund waters. Institutional investors have pensioners and retirees to take care of, and if hedge fund investments go too far and returns go too astray, then those depending on the long-term benefits their retirement assets will provide are the ones who will lose. As such, I believe it is the government’s responsibility and duty to make sure that pension plans and other institutional investors, both public and private, have a strong handle on their investment choices and that they are fully informed as to the possible risks that hedge funds can present.

VII.  CONCLUSION

Hedge funds have enjoyed almost complete anonymity for a number of years, and it has become very evident over the past few years that while hedge funds are not to blame for the various problems our financial system has been dealing with, they certainly do play a very large part. Having more information about them, their actions, their clients, their assets, and so forth, will only help to add a much needed layer of transparency within our fragile financial system. There is also a need to let the financial system be a free flowing system, one that is not encumbered by over-bearing rules and regulations.

 


[1]Houman B. Shadab, The Challenge of Hedge Fund Regulation, Regulation, Vol. 30, No.1, Spring 2007, at 36, 41.

[2] Mark J. P. Anson, CAIA Level I: An Introduction to Core Topics in Alternative Investments 119 (John Wiley & Sons 2009).

[3]Id. at 2. See also James E. McWhinney, A Brief History of the Hedge Fund,http://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/05/HedgeFundHist.asp.

[4]Financial leverage is essentially the borrowing of capital in order to invest additional assets in a company, hoping that the company’s return is higher than the loan’s interest rate, thus generating excess return on equity. Gabelli, supra, at 2. See also, The Layman’s Finance crisis Glossary,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/7620678.stm(last updated Sept. 19, 2008).

[5]After reading about short selling and put in rather simple words, short selling is the act of borrowing assets (such as securities) from a third party after which point they are sold in the hope that the value of the assets will go down before repurchasing them again after which point they are then returned to the third party, thus making a profit on the price difference. Securities and Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-235.htm(last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (Statements of the SEC regarding short selling and issuer stock repurchases. The SEC was explaining the implication of short selling in the light of the current financial crisis and actions taken to control operation).

[6]Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, Sep. 2003,http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.

[7]Id. at 11.

[8]Slutz, supra, at 179.

[9]Craig T. Callahan, Hedge Funds vs. Mutual Funds (2009), http://www.iconadvisers.com/WebContent/Public/PDFDocuments/Hedge_vs_Mutual_Funds.pdf.

[10]Id. at 2.

[11]EurekaHedge.com, http://www.eurekahedge.com/database/faq.asp(last visited Apr. 5, 2010).

[12]WSJ.com, http://guides.wsj.com/personal-finance/investing/how-to-buy-a-mutual-fund/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).

[13]Id.

[14]Alistair Barr, How to Buy…Hedge Funds, Sept.11, 2007,http://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-to-buy-hedge-funds.

[15]Mark J. Astarita, Introduction to Private Placements,http://www.seclaw.com/docs/pplace.htm(last visited Apr. 6, 2010).

[16]Lee McGowan, What is a Mutual Fund Expense Ratio?,http://mutualfunds.about.com/od/mutualfundglossary/g/expense_ratio.htm(last visited Apr. 6, 2010).

[17]Id.

[18]Investopedia.com,http://www.investopedia.com/university/mutualfunds/mutualfunds2.asp(last visited Apr. 6, 2010).

[19]Mark Hulbert, 2+ 20, and Other Hedge Fund Math, Mar. 4, 2007,http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/business/yourmoney/04stra.html?_r=1.

[20]Id.

[21]Sec.State.MA.Us, http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctprs/prsamf/amfidx.htm(last visited Apr. 6, 2010).

[22]Sec.gov, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm(last visited Apr. 6, 2010).

[23]Ben McClure, Taking a Look Behind Hedge Funds,http://www.investopedia.com/articles/02/111302.asp(last visited Apr. 19, 2010).

[24]Investorwords.com, http://www.investorwords.com/2837/liquidity.html(last visited Apr. 19, 2010).

[25]Callahan, supra, at 2.

[26]Maintlandgroup.com, http://www.maitlandgroup.com/default.aspx?pid=53(last visited Apr. 19, 2010).

[27]Lock-up period is basically the time period that you must hold your assets (“lock-up” your money) within a fund before they can be removed. What is a Lock-Up Period?, http://www.eurekahedge.com/database/faq.asp#16(last visited Apr. 19, 2010).

[28]Callahan, supra, at 2.

[29]Richard Loth, Mutual Fund Categories,http://www.investopedia.com/university/quality-mutual-fund/chp3-invest-obj/mf-categories.asp(last visited Apr. 19, 2010).

[30]Slutz, supra, at 194.

[31]Morningstar.com,http://corporate.morningstar.com/US/documents/MethodologyDocuments/MethodologyPapers/MorningstarHedgeFundCategories_Methodology.pdf(last visited Apr. 19, 2010).

[32]Vikrant Singh Negi, Legal Framework for Hedge Fund Regulation,http://www.hedgefund-index.com/Legal%20Framework%20for%20Hedge%20Fund%20Regulation.pdf(last visited Apr. 19, 2010).

[33]Tamar Frankel, Private Investment Funds: Hedge Funds’ Regulation by Size, 39 Rutgers L.J., 657, 661 (2008).

[34]Negi, supra, at 3.

[35]David Schneider, If at First You Don’t Succeed: Why the SEC Should Try and Try Again to Regulate Hedge Fund Advisers, 9 J. Bus. & Sec. L. 261, 276 (2009).

[36]Id. at 273-274.

[37]Id.

[38]Negi, supra, at 5.

[39]Schneider, supra, at 277-278.

[40]Thierry Olivier Desmet, Understanding Hedge Fund Adviser Regulation, 4 Hastings Bus. L.J. 1, 15 (2008).

[41]Id.

[42]Id. at 8.

[43]Justin Asbury Dillmore, Leap Before You Look: The SEC’s Approach to Hedge Fund Regulation, 32 Ohio N.U. L.Rev. 169, 177 (2006).

[44]Desmet, supra, at 9.

[45]Id.

[46]Id.

[47]Id. at 10.

[48]Schneider, supra, at 280.

[49]Id.

[50]Janie Casello Bouges, Why the SEC’s First Attempt at Hedge Fund  Adviser Registration Failed, J. of Alternative Investments, Vol. 9, No.3, 89 (2006).

[51]Schneider, supra, at 280.

[52]Id. at 281.

[53]Franklin R. Edwards, New Proposals to Regulate Hedge Funds: SEC Rule 203(b)(3)-2, http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/fedwards/papers/New%20Prop%20to%20Reg%20Hedge%20Funds%2001.pdf(last visited Apr. 27, 2010).

[54]Dillmore, supra, at 182.

[55]Desmet, supra, at 22.

[56]Schneider, supra, at 281.

[57]Id.

[58]Desmet, supra, at 22.

[59]Id.

[60]Evan M. Gilbert, Unnecessary Reform: The fallacies with and Alternatives to SEC Regulation of Hedge Funds, 2 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship & L. 319, 328 (2009).

[61]Proposed Hedge Fund and Private Equity Fund Regulation,http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/1633.pdf(last visited Apr. 27, 2010).

[62]Id.

[63]Anita K. Krug, The Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 2009,http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Hedge_Fund_Transparency_Act_Comments_A.Krug.pdf(last visited Apr. 27, 2010).

[64]Elizabeth P. Gray, Heightened Government Prosecution and Anticipated Regulation of Private Hedge Funds, 2010 WL 894714 (aspatore).

[65]Id. at 2.

[66]Id.

[67]Id.

[68]Ashley Taylor, et al., Highwaymen or Heroes: Should Hedge Funds be Regulated? A Survey, http://www.ashleytaylor.org/hf_jfs2005.pdf(last visited May 13, 2010).

[69] The Future of Hedge Fund Regulation: Q & A with Ezra Zask and Gaurav Jetley of Analysis Group,http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/News_and_Events/News/AnalysisGroup_Release_Zask_Jetley_HedgeFunds_2009-07-16.pdf((last visited May 13, 2010).

[70]Taylor, supra, at 7.

[71] Alan Greenspan, The Crisis,http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2010_spring_bpea_papers/spring2010_greenspan.pdf(last visited May 13, 2010).

[72]Taylor, supra, at 2.

[73] Id.at 3.

[74]Hedge Fund Roundtable,https://privatewealth.mellon.com/en_US/public_content/Resources/documents/CIONewsHedgeFundArticle.pdf(last visited May 13, 2010).

[75]Joshua Hess, How Arbitrary really was the SEC’s “Hedge Fund Rule”? The Future of Hedge Fund Regulation in Light of Goldstein, Amaranth Advisors, and Beyond, 110 W. Va. L. Rev. 913, 940 (2008).

[76] Id.

[77] Gilbert, supra, at  343.

[78]Id. at 345.

[79] Schneider, supra, at 308.

[80]Id.

© 2010 Karol C. Sierra-Yanez

Deadline for the National Law Review's Law Student Writing Contest Extended Until Friday Nov. 12th

The National Law Review has extend the date to Friday November 12th  for the final 2010 Law Student Writing Contest.

Please note that although students are encouraged to submit articles addressing Labor & Employment Law, the featured topic for the November issue, they may also submit entries covering current issues related to other areas of the law.

The winning articles will be published online starting in Mid November 2010. The top article(s) chosen will be featured on the NLR home page. Up to 5 runner-up articles will also be posted in the NLR searchable database.

By inviting your law students to enter, you are offering them a chance to build their resumes and a professional online presence that will help them to stand out to legal industry recruiters in an increasingly competitive job market.

The NLR consolidates practice-oriented legal analysis from a variety of sources for no-cost, easy access by lawyers, law students, business executives, insurance professionals, accountants, human resource managers, and other professionals who wish to better understand specific legal issues relevant to their work.

 

Why Students Should Submit Articles

 

  • Students have the opportunity to publicly display their legal knowledge and skills.
  • The student’s photo, biography, and contact information will be posted with each article, allowing for professional recognition and exposure.
  • Winning articles are published alongside those written by respected attorneys from Am Law 200 and other prominent firms as well as from other respected professional associations.
  • Now more than ever, business development skills are expected from law firm associates earlier in their careers. NLR wants to give law students valuable experience generating consumer-friendly legal content of the sort which is included for publication in law firm client newsletters, law firm blogs, bar association journals and trade association publications.
  • Student postings will remain in the NLR online database for up to two years, easily accessed by potential employers.
  • For an example of  a contest winning student written article from Northwestern University, please click here.
  • For more Information and contest rules, please click here.

Poor Help: Audit Says Legal Aid Boss Charged Taxpayers for Club, Car

From the featured guest bloggers from the Center for Public Integrity. John Solomon and Laurel Adams share some insight on how federal tax dollars meant for legal aid for the poor took a detour down in the Bayou State. 

The head of a Louisiana legal aid group funded by the federal government routinely dined at a private club and drove a leased vehicle for personal use at taxpayers’ expense, according to an audit that exposes significant fringe benefits inside a profession dedicated to helping the poor.

The Legal Services Corp. (LSC) inspector general, the chief watchdog for federal funds given to local legal aid groups nationwide, challenged $318,768 in expenditures by the Capital Area Legal Services Corp.in Baton Rouge, La., that were charged to taxpayers.

The group provides legal aid to poor residents in a dozen Louisiana parishes and received $1.5 million from Legal Services Corp. in 2009.

Many of the questioned expenditures involved the legal aid group’s executive director, James A. Wayne, Sr., who routinely submitted meals for reimbursement as “business expenses” even when he dined alone and on weekends.

The watchdog report, released earlier this month, concluded Wayne charged his legal aid group $33,150 for meals he claimed were business-related from Jan. 1, 2005 to May 31, 2009.

“The Executive Director frequently dined (breakfast, lunch, and dinner) at a private business club and restaurants in Baton Rouge,” Inspector General Jeffrey Schanz said in his report. “Many of the meals were lunches and dinners where the Executive Director dined alone, and some meals took place on weekends.”

Wayne acknowledged that he routinely dined at the Camelot Club, an exclusive dining club in Baton Rouge where an annual membership runs close to $2,000, but he disputed the audit report’s portrayal of the spending as inappropriate.

Utility giant Entergy Corp., a donor to Wayne’s nonprofit legal aid group, paid for his Camelot Club membership and meals, he said. That meant Wayne only charged taxpayers for the meal of his guests. The arrangement, he said, may have left the auditors with a false impression he was dining alone.

“I’m a very visible nonprofit director, so my meal is paid for,” Wayne told the Center in a telephone interview. “The other person wasn’t.”

The Camelot Club, located atop a downtown office building, describes itself as one of Baton Rouge’s “most prestigious clubs” with panoramic views of the Mississippi River, the state capitol building, and Louisiana State University. The club overlooks a city where about 24 percent of residents live in poverty, according to U.S. Census Bureau data.

When asked by the Center about the private club membership, New Orleans-based Entergy said it has temporarily suspended funding for the Baton Rouge group.

“We provided funding to the organization for low-income advocacy issues. We are aware of a pending investigation against the organization and have suspended any funding until it is resolved,” Entergy said in a statement to the Center. “We have no knowledge or control over how the donations were spent by the organization once they were received.

Wayne said he did not believe the inspector general’s criticisms were warranted. “None of it has any merit. We’ve been through this before,” he said.

EXPENSES LACKED DOCUMENTATION

The audit concluded that $11,462 of Wayne’s meal reimbursements paid by federal tax dollars lacked proper documentation to show they were justified by business purposes.

In fact, the inspector general concluded that Wayne sometimes charged his legal aid group and taxpayers for personal meals under a loose reimbursement system that often sought to justify expenses after the fact. In some cases, Wayne added the names of guests or the business purpose of a meal to receipts more than a month later.

“Personal expenses are being inappropriately charged to the grantee and decisions on allowability of the charges are being made after the fact rather than on contemporaneous supporting documentation,” the inspector general concluded.

The Capital Area Legal Services Corp. is promising to revise its internal financial controls in response to the watchdog report, but disputes the assertion that there was anything wrong with Wayne’s meal reimbursements.

“CALSC maintains that it has provided evidence that the expenditures reviewed by the OIG meet the criteria set out in” federal regulations, the legal aid group said in a written response that was attached to the watchdog’s report.

A lawyer for the group, Vicki Crochet, told the Center in an e-mail that while certain expenses were questioned, CALSC “looks forward to the opportunity to show that it has properly accounted” for all Legal Services Corp. funding received. The expenses challenged by the inspector general are being submitted to the Legal Services Corp. for a final decision.

A Legal Services Corp spokesman told the Center that if it confirmed that funds were misspent, the federal agency could ask for the money to be repaid or could attach conditions to any future federal funding for Capital Area Legal Services Corp. “We take the inspector general’s reports very seriously and the Office of Compliance and Enforcement will give this a lot of attention,” Legal Services Corp spokesman Steve Barr said.

The inspector general also suggested the legal group’s problems might also extend to the Internal Revenue Service and state tax authorities.

“CALSC appears to have also improperly recorded transactions dealing with fringe benefits …, membership dues, lease payments, subscriptions, and client trust fund interest [and] may be liable for additional payments to the Internal Revenue Service and may be subject to sanctions from the State of Louisiana,” the inspector general warned.

LEASED CAMRY, BUILDING RENT QUESTIONED

Among those transactions, the watchdog questioned why Wayne charged taxpayers more than $78,555 over more than four years for a leased vehicle that he used both for business and personal transportation, and warned it might have violated tax laws.

Wayne said the leased vehicle was a Toyota Camry, and that he got a new model each year. “They change the cars out every year,” he said.

The inspector general challenged the need for a taxpayer-funded car.

“The Executive Director used the vehicle for both business and personal use without prior approval from LSC and without adequate documentation identifying when the vehicle was used for business and when the vehicle was used for personal reasons. Also, the Executive Director did not maintain and provide CALSC any records to document the use of the vehicle as required by the Internal Revenue Service,” the watchdog report concluded.

“Lacking adequate records, CALSC did not report to IRS as required the value of all use of the vehicle by the Executive Director as wages.”

Wayne said the car was leased for his business travel but that he began taking it home after the vehicle was vandalized in the legal aid group’s parking lot. The IRS recently gave him permission, Wayne said, to start reimbursing his nonprofit group $100 a month for personal use of the car.

Other practices at Capital Area Legal Services Corp. were questioned, including travel reimbursements for Wayne, LSC-funded payments of $144,646 to a fundraising consultant, and rent charged to the Legal Services Corp. even though the Baton Rouge group owned the building where its offices were located.

The rent payments appeared to charge taxpayers to help cover the group’s building mortgage, the inspector general said. “It is not reasonable and necessary for a single entity to pay itself rent in order to occupy a building that it already owns,” it concluded.

Wayne told the Center that the Legal Services Corp. approved the purchase of the building and was aware of the billing situation. He also asserts that the going rate for the rent was $900 per month, and Capital Area Legal Services Corp. only charged $750 per month, the same amount as its previous rent.

The Louisiana audit is the latest example of trouble inside the Legal Services Corp., the federally chartered corporation funded by Congress to provide legal assistance to the poor so they can access the civil courts. LSC provides tax dollars to local groups to do the work.

Members of Congress, including Republican Sen. Charles Grassley of Iowa and GOP Rep. Darrell Issa of California, and Democratic Sen. Barbara Mikulski of Maryland, are questioning whether LSC is doing enough to monitor the way groups spend the federal money to ensure it really helps the poor.

The Center reported in July that LSC has been struck by a rash of fraud cases in which tax dollars aimed at the poor were diverted to personal uses, including a Baltimore legal aid group executive accused of stealing more than $1 million, spending much of it, investigators said, on prostitutes and gambling.

Reprinted by Permission © 2010, The Center for Public Integrity®. All Rights Reserved.