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The National Law Forum - Page 536 of 753 - Legal Updates. Legislative Analysis. Litigation News.

Best of the Worst in Insurance Fraud

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The second most costly white collar crime in America behind tax evasion, insurance fraud costs an estimated $80 billion annually. Questionable claims rose 26.7% across the United States between 2010 and 2012, according to Mercury Insurance Company, whose Special Investigation Unit (SIU) of 50 investigators nationwide examines questionable claims. The team completed 1,476 investigations in California alone, exposing more than $24 million in attempted fraud, the company said.

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“It’s amazing the things people will do to try and cheat the system, but they don’t know we’ve seen it all,” said Dan Bales, national director of special investigations for Mercury, which established one of the country’s first SIU’s in 1978. “Our SIU goal is to stay several steps ahead of these criminals and continue to uncover fraud, which can contribute to as much as 30% of customers’ premiums.”

Below are Mercury’s Top 3 “Best of the Worst Claims,” in 2013, highlighting some of the methods used to try and beat the system.

Claim #3: Bicycle Down

The claimant alleged he was struck as his bicycle passed behind a Mercury-insured vehicle that was backing up in a parking lot. He called the police, filed a report claiming injury and property damage, and was then transported by ambulance to a medical center to treat his alleged injuries.

The real story was quite different, however, as this criminal didn’t know the entire incident was caught on video. The video clearly showed the claimant intentionally slapping the back of the insured vehicle with his hand and then guiding his bicycle to the ground to make it look like he’d been struck by the car.

The claimant retained an attorney to pursue an injury claim, which was denied by Mercury following the police report that included the security camera video taken at the scene. The claimant was ultimately arrested, convicted and sentenced to three months in jail with three years’ probation, and also had to pay a fine, restitution and his medical bills.

Claim #2: Wrong Way Driver

The insured stopped at an intersection in front of a repair van. Suddenly, the two vehicles collided in what appeared to be a rear-end collision, which necessitated police being called to gather statements.

The insured driver and passenger claimed the van driver had rear-ended the insured’s vehicle and both were allegedly injured. However, the van driver’s adamant contention that he hadn’t caused the accident led the investigating officer to seek surveillance video, which he found at a nearby gas station. Sure enough, the footage revealed that instead of proceeding through the intersection as expected, the insured driver threw her vehicle into reverse, slamming into the front of the van.

The insured driver and her passenger were subsequently charged with insurance fraud and conspiracy, and the driver was also charged with assault with a deadly weapon … her car. And yes, the claim was denied.

Claim #1: A Not-So-Merry Christmas

Looking to make some quick Christmas cash, the insured and two cohorts staged an accident and filed medical payment claims through Mercury, which were identified as questionable and assigned to the SIU for investigation.

A detailed claims history was compiled for the three individuals, who were then interviewed by SIU investigators. What the investigators found was that each claimant’s story was different, so they began to look deeper. That’s when they uncovered some very compelling evidence that suggested this accident was staged.

The SIU team discovered the insured’s prior claim history showed a loss at the same location with the same facts provided. A confession quickly followed about his latest claim, as well as a description of all the fraud he’d committed on each of his previous claims. All three claimants were convicted and given probation, community service and ordered to pay more than $26,000 in restitution to Mercury Insurance.

Suspicious activity can be reported to the National Insurance Crime Bureau.

The One SEO Rule You Need to Know About Alt Tags for Images

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Wikipedia says alt attributes (alt tags) are used in HTML documents/Web pages “to specify alternative text (alt text) that is to be rendered when the element to which it is applied cannot be rendered.”

Alt Tags Images

To optimize your website’s content for search, remember one simple rule for image alt tags: An image’s alt attributes should describe the visual. Including keywords in alt tags is a good practice as long as it’s not spammy. Alt attributes used to have a larger SEO impact in Google searches before the company changed its Google Image search design. Traffic has decreased considerably from image search since then.

 

 

 

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Michigan Minimum Wage Increases Enacted

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Michigan Governor Rick Snyder has signed the Workforce Opportunity Wage Act, mandating gradual increases in the state’s minimum wage to $9.25 an hour by January 1, 2018. The Act ties increases to the rate of inflation beginning 2019.

The first of four raises mandated by Senate Bill 934 (Public Act 138), to $8.15 an hour, occurs September 1, 2014. Michigan’s minimum wage since 2008 has been $7.40 an hour for workers who do not receive a tip and $2.65 an hour for workers earning tips, such as waiters.

Also beginning September 1, 2014, tipped employees would have a minimum rate that is 38 percent of the minimum for non-tipped workers, or about $3.51 an hour.

The state’s hourly minimum for non-tipped workers will increase as follows:

  • Beginning September 1, 2014, to $8.15.
  • Beginning January 1, 2016, to $8.50.
  • Beginning January 1, 2017, to $8.90.
  • Beginning January 1, 2018, to $9.25.

Starting in 2019, minimum wage increases will be tied to the rate of inflation, but any increase will be capped at 3.5 percent a year. The rate will adjust annually based on a five-year rolling average of inflation for the Midwest. Annual increases would take effect on April 1 of each year. No increase would occur if the state’s unemployment rate for the preceding year was 8.5 percent or higher.

Several other states, including Delaware and Minnesota, also have adopted increases this year, and the minimum wage for workers on new federal contracts has been raised to $10.10 per hour.

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Proposed Health Information Technology Strategy Aims to Promote Innovation

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On April 7, 2014, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), in consultation with theOffice of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released a draft report addressing a proposed strategy and recommendations on an “appropriate, risk-based regulatory framework pertaining to health information technology.”

This report, entitled “FDASIA Health IT Report: Proposed Strategy and Recommendations for a Risk-Based Framework”, was mandated by Section 618 of the Food and Drug Administration and Innovation Act, and establishes a proposed blueprint for the regulation of health IT.  The FDA, ONC and FCC (the Agencies) noted that risk and controls on such risk should focus on health IT functionality, and proposed a flexible system for categorizing health IT and evaluating the risks and need for regulation for each category.

The Agencies set out four key priority areas: (1) promote the use of quality management principles, (2) identify, develop, and adopt standards and best practices, (3) leverage conformity assessment tools, and (4) create an environment of learning and continual improvement.

The Agencies are seeking public comment on the specific principles, standards, practices, and tools that would be appropriate as part of this regulatory framework.  In addition, the Agencies propose establishing a new Health IT Safety Center that would allow reporting of health IT-related safety events that could then be disseminated to the health IT community.

The Agencies also divided health IT into three broad functionality-based groups: (1) administrative, (2) health management, and (3) medical device. The Agencies noted that health IT with administrative functionality, such as admissions, billing and claims processing, scheduling, and population health management pose limited or no risk to the patient, and as a result no additional oversight is proposed.

Health IT with health management functionality, such as health information and data exchange, data capture and encounter documentation, provider order entry, clinical decision support, and medication management, would be subject the regulatory framework proposed in the report.  In addition, the FDA stated that a product with health management functionality that meets the statutory definition of a medical device would not be subject to additional oversight by the FDA.

The report had a spotlight on clinical decision support (CDS), which provides health care providers and patients with knowledge and person-specific information, intelligently filtered or presented at appropriate times, to enhance health and health care.  The report concluded that, for the most part, CDS does not replace clinicians’ judgment, but rather assists clinicians in making timely, informed, higher quality decisions.  These functionalities are categorized as health management IT, and the report believes most CDS falls into this category.

However, certain CDS software – those that are medical devices and present higher risks – warrant the FDA’s continued focus and oversight.  Medical device CDS includes computer aided detection/diagnostic software, remote display or notification of real-time alarms from bedside monitors, radiation treatment planning, robotic surgical planning and control, and electrocardiography analytical software.

The FDA intends to focus its oversight on health IT with medical device functionality, such as described above with respect to medical device CDS.  The Agencies believe that this type of functionality poses the greatest risk to patient safety, and therefore would be the subject of FDA oversight.  The report recommends that the FDA provide greater clarity related to medical device regulation involving health IT, including: (1) the distinction between wellness and disease-related claims, (2) medical device accessories, (3) medical device CDS software, (4) medical device software modules, and (5) mobile medical apps.

The comment period remains open through July 7, 2014, and therefore the report’s recommendations may change based on comments received by the Agencies. In the meantime, companies in the clinical software and mobile medical apps industry should follow the final guidance recently published by the FDA with respect to regulation of their products.

In the meantime, health information technology companies should follow the final guidance recently published by the FDA with respect to regulation of their products.

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Landlords, Make Sure Your Eviction is URLTA-Compliant – Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act

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As tempting as it may be to immediately attempt to throw an unruly and non-abiding tenant out of the house or apartment, doing so can have serious legal consequences. Kentucky has codified the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act in KRS 383.500 – 383.715 (“URLTA”). Pursuant to KRS 383.500, in order for the URLTA to be applicable in a given locale, that particular city, county, or urban county government must adopt the URLTA in its entirety. In areas where the URLTA has been adopted, tenants are often afforded greater protection at the landlord’s expense.

It is imperative that if your property is in an URLTA jurisdiction, you follow the specific, detailed requirements to effectuate a legal, proper eviction. Adequate notice must be provided and contain precise elements, such as the tenant’s name and property address, the nature of the breach and the time period within which said breach must be remedied. Depending on the type of breach, URLTA also requires that the tenant be given a certain period of time to remedy the breach (i.e., 7 days for nonpayment of rent; 14 days for material noncompliance with the lease agreement). It is only after the URLTA notice requirements have been satisfied and the period for remedying the breach elapsed that a landlord may initiate eviction proceedings by filing a petition with the court.

In Kentucky, the eviction procedure is known as a “forcible detainer” action under the law and is outlined in KRS Chapter 383. The biggest misconception in forcible detainer actions is that the end result will be the landlord receiving the money owed to him for past due rent and/or damages. However, this is not the purpose of a forcible detainer action. The purpose is solely to determine who has the right to possession of property. If a forcible detainer judgment is entered against the tenant, the tenant has seven (7) days to vacate the premises. If the tenant does not vacate within the allotted seven (7) day period, the landlord may seek a writ of possession and have the tenant’s property removed from the premises. A separate civil action must be filed against the tenant in order to recover the past due rent, late fees, damages, etc.

 

 

Department of State Releases July 2014 Visa Bulletin

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Bulletin shows nearly four years of advancement in the EB-2 category for applicants chargeable to India and minor advancement for applicants chargeable to China as well as significant advancement in the EB-3 category for applicants chargeable to the Philippines, minor advancement for applicants chargeable to India, and no change for applicants chargeable to China, Mexico, or the Rest of the World.

The U.S. Department of State (DOS) has released its July 2014 Visa Bulletin. The Visa Bulletin sets out per-country priority date cutoffs that regulate the flow of adjustment of status (AOS) and consular immigrant visa applications. Foreign nationals may file applications to adjust their statuses to that of permanent residents or to obtain approval of immigrant visas at a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad, provided that their priority dates are prior to the respective cutoff dates specified by the DOS.

What Does the July 2014 Visa Bulletin Say?

In July, the cutoff date for applicants in the EB-2 India category will advance by nearly four years, while the cutoff date for applicants in the EB-2 China category will advance by only 40 days. Meanwhile, the cutoff date in the EB-3 India category will advance by 17 days, while the cutoff date in the EB-3 China category will remain unchanged. The cutoff date in the F2A category for applicants from all countries will also remain unchanged.

EB-1: All EB-1 categories will remain current.

EB-2: The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to India will advance by nearly four years to September 1, 2008. The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to China will advance by 40 days to July 1, 2009. The EB-2 category for all other countries will remain current.

EB-3: The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to India will advance by 17 days to November 1, 2003. The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to China will remain unchanged at October 1, 2006. The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to the Philippines will advance by one year to January 1, 2009. The cutoff date for applicants chargeable to Mexico and all other countries will remain unchanged at April 1, 2011.

The relevant priority date cutoffs for foreign nationals in the EB-3 category are as follows:

China: October 1, 2006 (no movement)
India: November 1, 2003 (forward movement of 17 days)
Mexico: April 1, 2011 (no movement)
Philippines: January 1, 2009 (forward movement of 366 days)
Rest of the World: April 1, 2011 (no movement)

Developments Affecting the EB-2 Employment-Based Category

Mexico, the Philippines, and the Rest of the World

The EB-2 category for applicants chargeable to all countries other than China and India has been current since November 2012. The July Visa Bulletin indicates no change, meaning that applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to all countries other than China and India may continue to file AOS applications or have applications approved through July 2014.

China

The June Visa Bulletin indicated a cutoff date of May 22, 2009 for EB-2 applicants chargeable to China. The July Visa Bulletin indicates a cutoff date of July 1, 2009, reflecting forward movement of 40 days. This means that applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to China with a priority date prior to July 1, 2009 may file AOS applications or have applications approved in July 2014.

India

In December 2013, the cutoff date for EB-2 applicants chargeable to India retrogressed significantly to November 15, 2004 because of unprecedented demand in this category. This cutoff date remained constant through June. The July Visa Bulletin indicates a cutoff date of September 1, 2008, reflecting forward movement of nearly four years (1,386 days). This means that applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to India with a priority date prior to September 1, 2008 may file AOS applications or have applications approved in July 2014.

Developments Affecting the EB-3 Employment-Based Category

China

In late 2013 and early 2014, the cutoff date for EB-3 applicants chargeable to China advanced significantly to generate demand in this category. In June, to regulate demand, this cutoff date retrogressed by six years to October 1, 2006. The July Visa Bulletin indicates no change to this cutoff date. This means that only applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to China with a priority date prior to October 1, 2006 may continue to file AOS applications or have applications approved in July 2014.

India

The June Visa Bulletin indicated a cutoff date of October 15, 2003 for EB-3 applicants chargeable to India. The July Visa Bulletin indicates a cutoff date of November 1, 2003, reflecting forward movement of 17 days. This means that only EB-3 applicants chargeable to India with a priority date prior to November 1, 2003 may file AOS applications or have applications approved in July 2014.

Rest of the World

From September 2013 through April 2014, the cutoff date for EB-3 applicants in the worldwide category advanced by 3.75 years. In June, to regulate the high demand, the cutoff date in this category retrogressed by 549 days to April 1, 2011. The July Visa Bulletin indicates no change to this cutoff date. This means that only applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to the Rest of the World with a priority date prior to April 1, 2011 may file AOS applications or have applications approved in July 2014.

Developments Affecting the F2A Family-Sponsored Category

In March, as a result of heavy demand in the F2A category from applicants chargeable to Mexico, the cutoff date in this category retrogressed significantly to April 15, 2012. In June, this cutoff date retrogressed again to March 15, 2011. The July Visa Bulletin indicates no change to this cutoff date. This means that only those applicants from Mexico with a priority date prior to March 15, 2011 will be able to file AOS applications or have applications approved in July 2014.

During fiscal year 2013, in an effort to generate demand in the F2A category from applicants from all countries other than Mexico, the cutoff date in this category advanced significantly. This advance resulted in a dramatic increase in demand, followed in June by a further retrogression of the cutoff date to May 1, 2012. The July Visa Bulletin indicates no change to this cutoff date. This means that only those F2A applicants from countries other than Mexico with a priority date prior to May 1, 2012will be able to file AOS applications or have applications approved in July 2014. Further retrogression of the worldwide F2A category should not be ruled out.

How This Affects You

Priority date cutoffs are assessed on a monthly basis by the DOS, based on anticipated demand. Cutoff dates can move forward or backward or remain static. Employers and employees should take the immigrant visa backlogs into account in their long-term planning and take measures to mitigate their effects. To see the July 2014 VisaBulletin in its entirety, please visit the DOS website here.

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Wisconsin Federal Court Recognizes Same-Sex Marriage: How Does This Affect the Administration of an Employer’s Employee Benefits?

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On Friday, June 6, 2014, Judge Crabb of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin issued a decision finding that Wisconsin’s constitutional amendment recognizing marriages only between men and women violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Unlike several other federal judges who have considered the issue, Judge Crabb did not make her ruling immediately effective. Instead the Court asked the plaintiffs’ lawyers in the case to help her fashion an injunction to implement her ruling. The plaintiffs have until June 16, 2014, to submit this proposal. The State asked for clarification on the June 6, 2014 ruling and requested that the court stay its decision until it made a final decision on the scope of the injunctive relief. On June 9, 2014, the court denied the State’s motion. In response, the State appealed Judge Crabb’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago and requested an immediate stay of Judge Crabb’s order. The Seventh Circuit has solicited arguments from the parties to determine whether it has jurisdiction of the matter.

In response to Judge Crabb’s decision, many of the State’s counties have begun issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples in the state. Others have declined to do so and have, instead, sought guidance from counsel or the Attorney General.

Addressing the Change

Judge Crabb’s decision, and issuance of Wisconsin same-sex marriage licenses, has injected some uncertainty into benefit plan administration in Wisconsin. Based upon the state of the prior law, it is likely that a Wisconsin employer will have more employees with domestic partners than employees with same-sex spouses through legal marriages formed elsewhere. Nevertheless, same-sex benefits are certainly an evolving issue for employers.

Family and Medical Leave

Registered and unregistered domestic partners were already covered under the Wisconsin Family and Medical Leave Act. Because an unregistered domestic partnership does not require a formal filing with a county clerk, it appears that the state law in this context is relatively unaffected.

On the other hand, the federal FMLA is substantially affected. The definition of spouse under the federal regulations requires that the marriage must be recognized by the state of residence. Most FMLA policies do not distinguish between same-sex and opposite-sex partners. Consequently, if Judge Crabb’s decision stands, requests for FMLA leave relating to same-sex spouses must be recognized under both federal and Wisconsin law if the leave is otherwise appropriate under the law.

Until the ramifications of the injunctive language are known, employers should pay particular attention to the language of their FMLA policies before making any determination about FMLA requests. Depending on how the courts ultimately rule, an employer’s FMLA policy may or may not require amendment. Regardless, if an employee asks about leave for a same-sex spouse, legal counsel should be consulted.

Benefits

The status of the law will remain uncertain until Judge Crabb makes a decision regarding whether to issue an injunction and the form such an order would take. If an injunction is issued and then stands following the anticipated appeal, employers who employ employees who have a same-sex spouse would no longer impute Wisconsin income tax for health coverage, and would otherwise recognize such spouse for all legal purposes. Because of the uncertainty in the current climate, employers should consider whether to continue imputing income for benefits provided to same-sex spouses until such time as transitional guidance is issued by the Wisconsin Department of Revenue on this issue.

Nothing has changed as it relates to unmarried domestic partners—these individuals are still subject to imputed income where the individual obtains coverage on behalf of his or her domestic partner.

Because employee benefits rules are largely governed by federal law, many same-sex marriage changes in employee benefits have been observed already since the U.S. Supreme Court’s Windsor decision of last year. If the Judge Crabb ruling stands, the most significant change for Wisconsin employers will likely pertain to Wisconsin tax treatment of family health coverage.

What should employers do in response?

  • Account for those same-sex couples who may have been married in a state that permitted same-sex marriage or who are newly married in Wisconsin following Judge Crabb’s decision;
  • Examine if modification of FMLA policy/forms is warranted based upon the changes; and
  • Examine if modification to benefit plan materials may be necessary.
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Do Public School Athletic Leagues Have To Admit Private Schools?

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Liberty Christian Academy (LCA), a private high school in Lynchburg, Virginia, has filed an antitrust action against the Virginia High School League (VHSL), a non-profit organization of public high schools in Virginia.  The lawsuit was filed June 2, 2014 in the Charlottesville Division of the Western District of Virginia.

The VHSL organizes public schools into districts and regions for purposes of conducting athletic competitions and statewide playoffs.  LCA filed its lawsuit because, as a private school, LCA is barred from membership in the VHSL and claims to be unable, with limited exceptions, to schedule athletic games with the nearby public schools.  LCA complains that it has to travel far distances to play games against inferior opponents.  LCA argues that the VHSL’s rules are akin to a group boycott and constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of federal and state antitrust laws.  The relevant markets alleged in the Complaint are the markets for commercial exhibition of high school football contests and basketball contests in Virginia.

Although some states allow private high schools to join their public high school athletic leagues, other states have separate private and public leagues, such as Virginia, Maryland and Texas.  In the lawsuit, LCA argues that the prohibition on non-public high school membership in the VHSL has no pro-competitive purpose and cannot be justified on any claimed basis that it is necessary to promote fair on-field competition.  I suspect that the ability of private schools to recruit and give scholarships to football and basketball players from a wide geographic area (unlike public schools who have to find players within their own geographic district) would be one of the reasons for the VHSL’s rule.

The Complaint’s reference to the “integration of public and private schools into one athletic association” appears to suggest a strained analogy to civil rights and the racial integration of public schools in Virginia.  LCA should be very careful in suggesting any such analogy, given that LCA was specifically founded in 1967 as a segregation academy in response to the integration of public schools in Virginia.  There is no small amount of irony in LCA’s complaint that it is being excluded and segregated from public school athletic competition.

Several public high school athletic programs are described in the Complaint.  These schools are very familiar to my ears: T.C. Williams in Alexandria, famous from the movie Remember the Titans; football powerhouse Oscar Smith High School in Chesapeake; and Brookville High School outside Lynchburg, my fathers’ almar mater and the arch rival of my high school, Jefferson Forest.

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Supreme Court Decides CTS Corp. v. Waldburger Evaluating Whether CERCLA Precludes State-Law Statutes of Repose

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On June 9, 2014, the Supreme Court decided CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, holding that a North Carolina statute of repose was not preempted by Section 9658 of theComprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).

From 1959 until 1985, CTS Corporation manufactured electronics on a piece of property in North Carolina.  CTS sold the property in 1987.  Owners of both the former CTS property and adjacent property filed state-law nuisance claims in 2011, alleging that they had learned from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) in 2009 that their groundwater was contaminated.  A district court relied on N. C. Gen. Stat. §1-52(16), a North Carolina statute which bars property damage claims made “more than 10 years from the last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action,” to dismiss the claims, finding that CTS’s last act occurred in 1987, when the property was sold.  Relying on CERCLA Section 9658, the Fourth Circuit re-instated the nuisance claims because it concluded that CERCLA pre-empted the North Carolina statute.

The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, holding that the North Carolina statute was not pre-empted and that CERCLA Section 9658 was limited to “statutes of limitations.”  While noting that there is common ground between “statutes of limitations,” which create “time limit[s] for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued,” and “statutes of repose,” which “put[] an outer limit on the right to bring a civil action,” “each has a distinct purpose and each is targeted at a different actor.”  The Court found that, when Congress passed Section 9658, the language it chose limited the provision to statutes of limitations.  Additionally, the Court found that CERCLA expressed neither any intent to provide “a general cause of action for all harm caused by toxic contamination” nor a clear intent to supersede traditional police powers of the states.

Two points are worth mention:

First, the CTS decision is not the “usual” CERCLA decision.  The decision does not alter the mechanism under which federal or state agencies investigate, characterize, and remediate properties.  Indeed, based on the case history, the groundwater contamination alleged in the CTS litigation was discovered by EPA in 2009, two years before CTS suit was filed.  In 2012, the involved property was added to EPA’s National Priorities List, a designation reserved for sites EPA has identified as being among its priorities.  Similarly, it does not alter the federal causes of action parties may use to recover costs related to their remediation activities.

Second, the CTS decision appears to be based on a straightforward reading of CERCLA.  The Court held that CERCLA does not preclude a state’s choice to have legislative statutes of repose which apply to certain categories of tort cases.  While a few states have these, the majority of states do not.[1]  Each of the federal environmental statutes – to a degree – seeks to shape state action.  There is no indication in CERCLA that it intended to “trump” state ability to form independent tort-related law for any situation related to contamination.  Had it been Congress’s intent to supersede all state statutes of repose related to actions related to contamination, Congress could have done so.  In the Court’s view anyway, the language Congress chose did not do so here.

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[1] States with statutes of repose which were identified in the course of the CTS litigation include Connecticut, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584; Kansas, see Kan. Stat. § 60-513(b); North Carolinia, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16); and Oregon, see Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.115(1).  Alabama has a 20-year common-law statute of repose.  See, e.g.Abrams v. Ciba Specialty Chems. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 2d 1225) (S.D. Ala. 2009).

Supreme Court Finds that CERCLA Does Not Preempt Statutes of Repose – Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

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On June 9th, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger et al., No.13-339 (June 9, 2014) (slip op.) [link], in which it held that CERCLA section 309, 42 U.S.C. § 9658, does not preempt statutes of repose, reversing the Fourth Circuit.  Section 9658(a) preempts state law statutes of limitation for personal injury and property damage claims related to the release of a hazardous substance.  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, reaffirmed the oft-repeated “presumption against preemption” in reasoning that Section 9658 does not preempt state statutes of repose.  Statutes of limitations bar claims after a specified period of time based on when the claim accrued, whereas statutes of repose bar suits brought after a specified time since the defendant acted, regardless of whether the plaintiff has discovered the resulting injury.

CTS Corporation (“CTS”) operated an electronics plant in Asheville, North Carolina from 1959 to 1985.  CTS, which manufactured and disposed of electronics and electronic parts, contaminated its property with chlorinated solvents.  CTS sold the facility in 1987, and portions of the property were sold off.  Owners of those parcels, and adjacent landowners, brought suit against CTS in 2011, alleging that they discovered contamination on their properties in 2009.

The District Court found that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16), North Carolina’s statute of repose, barred the suit.  That section prohibits a “cause of action [from] . . . accru[ing] more than 10 years from the last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action.”  The Fourth Circuit reversed on the basis of CERCLA preemption, finding that section 9658 was ambiguous because it did not explicitly list “statutes of repose.”

The main issue at oral argument before the Supreme Court was whether the distinction between statutes of repose and statutes of limitation actually existed when Congress enacted Section 9658.  As Justice Scalia said, “. . . I used to consider them when I was in law school and even as late as 1986 [when section 1958 was added by Congress], I would have considered that a statutes of limitations.  Now, you think Congress is smarter.  They know the law better.”  Although other justices seemed to agree—and the distinction had only begun to be made in the 1980s—a 1982 Senate Superfund Study Group Report made that distinction and recommended that the few states that have statutes of repose repeal them.  Despite the overlap between statutes of repose and statutes of limitation, the Court found the distinctions important—statutes of repose are not related to the accrual of any cause of action and  cannot be tolled.  Because the Study Report made the distinction between the two, and because section 9658 fails to mention “statute of repose” and is not written in a way to suggest that it is intended to include both, the Court reversed.

The Court cited, as additional support for its conclusion the “well-established ‘presumptions about the nature of pre-emption.’”  The presumption against preemption counsels courts, when interpreting the text of a preemption clause susceptible of more than one possible reading, to “ordinarily accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.”   The Fourth Circuit failed to mention this presumption (although the dissent relied on it).

This opinion follows recent Superfund cases in the Supreme Court in two respects.  First, the Supreme Court attempts to apply the “natural reading” of the statutory text rather than to reach out to interpret the statute broadly to effectuate its “remedial purpose.”  Indeed, Justice Kennedy explicitly derides that rationale for interstitial lawmaking.  Second, the Supreme Court attempts to preserve ordinary state law principles to the greatest extent possible.  So, for example, United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998), was very respectful of state corporation law, and so too Waldburger is respectful of state tort law.  In this way, one might consider today’s decision to be fairly unremarkable.

The majority does not even address Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in which she and Justice Breyer worry that personal injuries with long latencies—like cancers—will go uncompensated.  But some of the long latencies arise not from the progress of some disease but of slow migration of a hazardous substance, in a groundwater plume for example.  Indeed, to the extent that many environmental toxic tort claims rest on allegations of property damage or diminution in value, the cancer model may be misplaced.