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The National Law Forum - Page 472 of 753 - Legal Updates. Legislative Analysis. Litigation News.

Data Breach Case Survives Rule 12 – Sony Employee Negligence Claims Still Kicking

A familiar refrain of some corporate clients discussing data breaches is: “We’re not a health care company. We also don’t process customer credit card transactions. We really don’t collect protected health information or personally identifiable information from customers in any way. Do we need to be worried about data breaches?” A June 15, 2015 decision from the U.S. Central District of California reaffirms that the answer is a resounding, unqualified YES for any company that has employees, which means almost any company of any kind, regardless of whether it provides health-care-related services or processes customer credit card transactions.

In Corona v. Sony Pictures Entertainment (14-CV-09600 RGK (Ex)), Judge Klausner handed Sony employees a significant victory, holding that their negligence and California Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Sec. 17200, “UCL”) claims were viable. As with most Rule 12data breach class action challenges, Sony’s first line of attack was that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing under the U.S. Constitution because they had suffered no “injury in fact.” The court disagreed, finding that the allegations that the protected health information (“PHI” such as medical information) and personally identifiable information (“PII” such as financial information) of the employees were posted on file-sharing websites for identity thieves to download, and that the employees had been threatened with physical harm by identity thieves were sufficient to state an injury in fact.

Sony also argued as to the negligence claims that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately allege the element of injury, and that the claims were barred by the economic loss doctrine. The court again disagreed, finding sufficient allegations of injury because of public disclosure of PII and PHI on file-sharing websites and that the economic loss doctrine did not bar the claims because a special relationship existed between the employees and Sony that required the plaintiffs to provide their PII and PHI to Sony in exchange for compensation and benefits.

The UCL claims likewise survived because of sufficient allegations of injury in fact, and the court deemed Sony’s attack on the injunctive and declaratory relief claims premature.

As to the other claims, the court dismissed the breach of implied contract claims with prejudice because there were no facts indicating that Sony intended to frustrate the common purpose of the employment agreements (employment in exchange for compensation and benefits). The court also dismissed the California Customer Records Act (Cal. Civ. Code Sec. 1798.80, et seq.) claims with prejudice because the statute was intended to protect customers, not employees, and there were no allegations that Sony had violated the statute as to customers. And the court dismissed, without prejudice, the Virginia and Colorado data breach notification statute (Va. Code Sec. 18.2-186.6(B), Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 6-1-716(2)) claims because the plaintiffs had not alleged any injury arising from the alleged untimely notification.

This decision once again highlights that data breach is a problem that affects virtually any corporation, regardless of the nature of its business, because to receive compensation and benefits, employees generally must share PII and PHI with the corporation (creating obligations for the corporation to protect and respond to any breach of that information). Potential data breach class action adversaries are not just external to the corporation. The claims can also come from insiders.

ARTICLE BY Blaine C. Kimrey of Vedder Price
© 2015 Vedder Price

US Department of State Visa Systems Continue to Experience Technical Failures

Expect delays in the coming weeks in US visa and passport issuance.

The US Department of State (DOS) announced yesterday that it is experiencing technical problems with visa issuance at US embassies and consulates around the world. The DOS stated that officials are working “around the clock” to fix the problem, noting that it does not expect to have the problem fixed before next week. The DOS further noted that the system failure stems from a hardware issue that began on June 9 that is preventing the DOS from processing and transmitting biometric data checks at visa-issuing embassies and consulates. Domestic passport operations are functioning, and the DOS continues to issue passports to US citizens with urgent overseas travel needs.

Please be aware that many posts have had to reschedule visa appointments this week as a result of this outage. Urgent medical and other humanitarian cases are being prioritized, along with H-2A agricultural workers.

Be aware that this outage may cause a delay in visa issuance throughout the consular system. Although the DOS expects to fix the issue shortly, the delays may affect visa processing for the next several weeks. Please keep this in mind when making travel plans this summer, and allow for extra time when scheduling visa appointments or requesting visa reissuance by mail.

The DOS will continue to post regular updates on its website.

ARTICLE BY Eleanor Pelta & Eric S. Bord of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
Copyright © 2015 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

Federal Circuit Issues First Reversal & Remand of an Inter Partes Review in Microsoft Corporation v. Proxyconn, Inc. Addressing Claim Construction and Amendment Standards

The Federal Circuit issued its first reversal and remand of a final decision in an inter partes review issued by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”). In Microsoft Corporation v. Proxyconn, Inc., No. 14-1543, a panel composed of Chief Judge Prost, Judge Lourie, and Judge Gilstrap (sitting by designation) held that the PTAB’s constructions of the phrases “two other computers,” “sender/computer,” and “receiver/computer” were unreasonably broad, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The Court’s decision marks the first ever reversal of an inter partes review decision by the PTAB, after 18 straight affirmances. Of the 18, fifteen have been affirmances without opinion issued under Federal Circuit Rule 36.

In brief, the Court upheld the PTAB’s use of the broadest reasonable interpretation (“BRI”) standard, but explained that the standard does not justify giving claims an unreasonably broad or legally incorrect interpretation. The Court then examined the statute and regulations governing amendment practice and concluded that the PTAB’s interpretation was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with them. Last, in reference to the PTAB’s case-by-case interpretation of the same statute and regulations, the Court explained that while “[a] fluid, case-based interpretation by the PTO of its own regulations risks leaving interested members of the public in a state of uncertainty, without ascertainable standards and adequate notice to comply . . . we cannot say that the PTO has abused its discretion in choosing adjudication over rulemaking.”

In the underlying proceedings before the PTAB, Microsoft challenged Proxyconn’s patent directed to a system for increasing access speed in a packet-switched network. The PTAB concluded that all of the challenged claims, with the exception of one, were unpatentable. Both parties appealed. In addition to contesting the merits, Proxyconn challenged the PTAB’s used of the BRI standard, as well as the PTAB’s denial of Proxyconn’s motion to amend. We discuss each aspect in more detail below.

Broadest Reasonable Interpretation

With respect to BRI generally, the Court stated that it was bound by the panel decision in In re Cuozzo – the first appeal of an inter partes review decided earlier this year, which blessed the Office’s adoption of the hundred year old standard for use in inter partes review. In re Cuozzo is pending a decision on Cuozzo’s request for rehearing en banc, and several amici have submitted briefs expressing concern about the outcome. But practitioners troubled by the Office’s adoption and application of BRI can take some consolation. In this case, the panel rejected the PTAB’s construction as “unreasonably broad,” relying on precedent that constrains the Office’s application of the BRI to interpretations that are legally correct under the canons set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp. Indeed, the panel dropped a footnote stating that its construction would have come out the same under the Phillips standard.

On the merits, the Court reviewed the Board’s claim constructions de novo. The Court carefully analyzed the technical merits and set forth a detailed interpretation of the claim terms appealed by both parties. This suggests that a meritorious claim construction dispute appealed to the Federal Circuit is likely to receive the same careful consideration and attention to detail that appellants have come to expect from the Court. It also shows that “unreasonably broad” claim interpretations that are inconsistent with settled principles of claim construction are reversible on appeal.

Proxyconn’s Motion to Amend

This appeal also presented the question of whether the PTAB impermissibly relied on the requirements it set forth in Idle Free Systems, Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., in denying Proxyconn’s motion to amend. In this case, the panel was not troubled by the PTAB’s reliance on its own decisions, like Idle Free, to promulgate standards for motions to amend. The Court agreed with the Office that the regulation itself “is not an exhaustive list of grounds upon which the Board can deny a motion to amend.” The Court also agreed that it is permissible for the Office to use adjudicative decisions like Idle Free, rather than traditional notice and comment rule-making, to set forth all the conditions that a patentee must meet in order to satisfy its burden of amendment. In that regard, the Court recognized that:

Some question the wisdom of the PTO’s approach. Since IPRs were created, they have rapidly become a popular vehicle for challenging the validity of issued patents. Patentees who wish to make use of the statutorily provided amendment process deserve certainty and clarity in the requirements that they are expected to meet. A fluid, case-based interpretation by the PTO of its own regulations risks leaving interested members of the public in a state of uncertainty, without ascertainable standards and adequate notice to comply. Despite such concerns, we recognize that ‘the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the [agency’s] discretion.’ . . . [W]e cannot say that the PTO has abused its discretion in choosing adjudication over rulemaking.

Slip. Op. at 24 (internal citations omitted).

The Court ultimately concluded that the PTAB reasonably interpreted the amendment rules as requiring the patentee to show that its substitute claims are patentable over the prior art of record. But the Court also stressed that “this case does not call on us to decide whether every requirement announced by the Board in Idle Free constitutes a permissible interpretation of the PTO’s regulations.” Slip. Op. at 25, n.4. It noted that the Idle Free decision itself was not before the Court, and expressly declined to address the other requirements that the Board relied upon—highlighting in particular Idle Free’s requirement that the patentee show patentable distinction over all “prior art known to the patent owner.” Idle Free, 2013 WL 5947697, at *4.

Practical Takeaways

Microsoft v. Proxyconn demonstrates the Court’s willingness to give appellants a meaningful review of PTAB decisions despite its track record of issuing summary affirmances. This applies particularly to claim construction appeals, which in most cases will be afforded de novo review – subject to Teva.4 This case also clarifies that remands to the PTAB are possible, though it remains unclear how the PTAB will deal with that remand. Those concerned about the PTAB’s use of the BRI should take heart that its application must still be both reasonable and legally correct. The Court acknowledged the uncertainty parties face when the Office uses adjudication rather than rulemaking to set standards and practices in these new proceedings. However, the Court’s willingness to analyze the PTAB’s application of Idle Free suggests that such decisions themselves are reviewable and should be appealed if their interpretation is improper.

ARTICLE BY Jon E. Wright & Pauline M. Pelletier of Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox P.L.L.C.
© 2015 Sterne Kessler

Federal Circuit Issues First Reversal & Remand of an Inter Partes Review in Microsoft Corporation v. Proxyconn, Inc. Addressing Claim Construction and Amendment Standards

The Federal Circuit issued its first reversal and remand of a final decision in an inter partes review issued by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”). In Microsoft Corporation v. Proxyconn, Inc., No. 14-1543, a panel composed of Chief Judge Prost, Judge Lourie, and Judge Gilstrap (sitting by designation) held that the PTAB’s constructions of the phrases “two other computers,” “sender/computer,” and “receiver/computer” were unreasonably broad, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The Court’s decision marks the first ever reversal of an inter partes review decision by the PTAB, after 18 straight affirmances. Of the 18, fifteen have been affirmances without opinion issued under Federal Circuit Rule 36.

In brief, the Court upheld the PTAB’s use of the broadest reasonable interpretation (“BRI”) standard, but explained that the standard does not justify giving claims an unreasonably broad or legally incorrect interpretation. The Court then examined the statute and regulations governing amendment practice and concluded that the PTAB’s interpretation was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with them. Last, in reference to the PTAB’s case-by-case interpretation of the same statute and regulations, the Court explained that while “[a] fluid, case-based interpretation by the PTO of its own regulations risks leaving interested members of the public in a state of uncertainty, without ascertainable standards and adequate notice to comply . . . we cannot say that the PTO has abused its discretion in choosing adjudication over rulemaking.”

In the underlying proceedings before the PTAB, Microsoft challenged Proxyconn’s patent directed to a system for increasing access speed in a packet-switched network. The PTAB concluded that all of the challenged claims, with the exception of one, were unpatentable. Both parties appealed. In addition to contesting the merits, Proxyconn challenged the PTAB’s used of the BRI standard, as well as the PTAB’s denial of Proxyconn’s motion to amend. We discuss each aspect in more detail below.

Broadest Reasonable Interpretation

With respect to BRI generally, the Court stated that it was bound by the panel decision in In re Cuozzo – the first appeal of an inter partes review decided earlier this year, which blessed the Office’s adoption of the hundred year old standard for use in inter partes review. In re Cuozzo is pending a decision on Cuozzo’s request for rehearing en banc, and several amici have submitted briefs expressing concern about the outcome. But practitioners troubled by the Office’s adoption and application of BRI can take some consolation. In this case, the panel rejected the PTAB’s construction as “unreasonably broad,” relying on precedent that constrains the Office’s application of the BRI to interpretations that are legally correct under the canons set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp. Indeed, the panel dropped a footnote stating that its construction would have come out the same under the Phillips standard.

On the merits, the Court reviewed the Board’s claim constructions de novo. The Court carefully analyzed the technical merits and set forth a detailed interpretation of the claim terms appealed by both parties. This suggests that a meritorious claim construction dispute appealed to the Federal Circuit is likely to receive the same careful consideration and attention to detail that appellants have come to expect from the Court. It also shows that “unreasonably broad” claim interpretations that are inconsistent with settled principles of claim construction are reversible on appeal.

Proxyconn’s Motion to Amend

This appeal also presented the question of whether the PTAB impermissibly relied on the requirements it set forth in Idle Free Systems, Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., in denying Proxyconn’s motion to amend. In this case, the panel was not troubled by the PTAB’s reliance on its own decisions, like Idle Free, to promulgate standards for motions to amend. The Court agreed with the Office that the regulation itself “is not an exhaustive list of grounds upon which the Board can deny a motion to amend.” The Court also agreed that it is permissible for the Office to use adjudicative decisions like Idle Free, rather than traditional notice and comment rule-making, to set forth all the conditions that a patentee must meet in order to satisfy its burden of amendment. In that regard, the Court recognized that:

Some question the wisdom of the PTO’s approach. Since IPRs were created, they have rapidly become a popular vehicle for challenging the validity of issued patents. Patentees who wish to make use of the statutorily provided amendment process deserve certainty and clarity in the requirements that they are expected to meet. A fluid, case-based interpretation by the PTO of its own regulations risks leaving interested members of the public in a state of uncertainty, without ascertainable standards and adequate notice to comply. Despite such concerns, we recognize that ‘the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the [agency’s] discretion.’ . . . [W]e cannot say that the PTO has abused its discretion in choosing adjudication over rulemaking.

Slip. Op. at 24 (internal citations omitted).

The Court ultimately concluded that the PTAB reasonably interpreted the amendment rules as requiring the patentee to show that its substitute claims are patentable over the prior art of record. But the Court also stressed that “this case does not call on us to decide whether every requirement announced by the Board in Idle Free constitutes a permissible interpretation of the PTO’s regulations.” Slip. Op. at 25, n.4. It noted that the Idle Free decision itself was not before the Court, and expressly declined to address the other requirements that the Board relied upon—highlighting in particular Idle Free’s requirement that the patentee show patentable distinction over all “prior art known to the patent owner.” Idle Free, 2013 WL 5947697, at *4.

Practical Takeaways

Microsoft v. Proxyconn demonstrates the Court’s willingness to give appellants a meaningful review of PTAB decisions despite its track record of issuing summary affirmances. This applies particularly to claim construction appeals, which in most cases will be afforded de novo review – subject to Teva.4 This case also clarifies that remands to the PTAB are possible, though it remains unclear how the PTAB will deal with that remand. Those concerned about the PTAB’s use of the BRI should take heart that its application must still be both reasonable and legally correct. The Court acknowledged the uncertainty parties face when the Office uses adjudication rather than rulemaking to set standards and practices in these new proceedings. However, the Court’s willingness to analyze the PTAB’s application of Idle Free suggests that such decisions themselves are reviewable and should be appealed if their interpretation is improper.

ARTICLE BY Jon E. Wright & Pauline M. Pelletier of Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox P.L.L.C.
© 2015 Sterne Kessler

Autonomous Driving Means Big Bucks For Everyone

New insights from McKinsey & Company demonstrate one common theme: the more autonomous vehicles take over the world, the more money saved and the more revenue earned by almost everyone. McKinsey interviewed over 30 industry experts around the world and came up with Ten Ways Autonomous Driving Could Redefine the Automotive World. Interestingly, they are all cash positive.

How will we all make money? Here is just a partial list according to McKinsey:

  • Labor cost savings. These are already being seen in mining and farming applications today. In those areas, autonomous vehicles can work in closed, private environments without the general safety concerns of the open road. As McKinsey notes, look for construction and warehousing sectors to adopt next.

  • Uber has disrupted the taxi business. Investors just might salivate at the chance to back a similar company – with no concerns about drivers at all.

  • Auto insurance may be totally different. If everyone owns an autonomous vehicle, traditional coverage for liability for accidents will no longer need to be a primary concern. Manufacturers of autonomous vehicles though will need significantly more coverage. Who bears this cost, and who gets the cost savings on insurance will be an interesting question.

  • Supply chain logistics will surely be more efficient with autonomous vehicles. This will also lead to flexibility, which surely will lead to cost savings.

  • Productivity. What is your commute time? Do you drive? For all people that drive to/from work, autonomous vehicles will free up substantial time during the day. During this time, more work can be done. Of course, for those who do not work, digital media revenues could explode as people seek ever more entertainment on their phones. How much time? McKinsey put the global number of saved commuting time at over one billion (billion!) hours. One billion hours of work, or, watching cat videos.

  • Decreased accidents = decreased costs. McKinsey cites that roadway crashes cost the US economy $212 billion in 2012. Cutting that even in half is a huge savings.

Autonomous vehicles are coming. Their impact is still speculative. But there is no doubt that when they do finally arrive, one generation will suddenly find itself thinking that the idea of driving your own car is impossible to fathom.

ARTICLE BY Jeffrey A. Soble of Foley & Lardner LLP
© 2015 Foley & Lardner LLP

A Look Ahead to The Supreme Court’s 2015-16 Term

As the Supreme Court winds down its 2014-15 term, the Benefits Law Advisor looks ahead to the ERISA cases and issues the Supreme Court may confront in its next terms. The Supreme Court’s recent ERISA jurisprudence has touched on issues such as remedies (CIGNA Corp. v. Amara and US Airways v. McCutchen), retiree entitlement to healthcare benefits (M&G Polymers v. Tackett), time-based defenses to ERISA claims (Tibble v. Edison Int’l and Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins.), and the now-defunct “presumption of prudence” that lower courts had applied to ERISA plans’ decision to offer employer stock as an investment option (Fifth Third Bank v. Dudenhoeffer).

As of this writing, the Court has only granted certiorari in one ERISA case for next year’s term, Montanile v. Board of Trustees, No. 14-723, cert. granted Mar. 30, 2015. The Montanile case arose from the familiar situation where an ERISA plan seeks to recover medical benefits paid to an injured participant, after that participant receives a tort recovery for those injuries. Both lower courts granted summary judgment to the plan, with the additional proviso that the plan could impose an equitable lien (under the terms of the plan) on Montanile’s settlement proceeds, even if those monies have been dissipated.

In granting Montanile’s petition, the Court interprets, once again, the term “equitable relief” in ERISA §502(a)(3) – an issue the Court has addressed has repeatedly revisited. In particular, the Montanile case gives the Court a chance to address an open question from its equitable-remedies jurisprudence: is there an “equitable tracing” requirement that obligates ERISA plaintiffs to identify a specific sum of money that may be the subject of an equitable recovery?

The existence of an equitable-tracing requirement has been hotly debated since at least 2003, when the Court’s decision in Great West Life & Annuity v. Knudson firmly established that equitable relief under ERISA was limited to those forms of relief traditionally available in the courts of equity. Since Knudson, many ERISA defendants have successfully argued that equitable relief was only available where plaintiff could identify a particular asset or sum of money that could be made subject to a restitutionary recovery, constructive trust or equitable lien. As a result, the Court has struggled (in this author’s view) with how to apply traditional “tracing” rules, because the Court’s answer could have far-reaching implications both for plans seeking reimbursement, and for participants invoking ERISA §502(a)(3) for redress in fiduciary-breach claims or other violations of ERISA.

It seems that the Court is ready to answer that question in Montanile, judging from the question presented in the Court’s writ. Another similar case, Elem v. AirTran Airways, No. 14-1061 (cert. pet. filed Feb. 27, 2015). is pending before the Court on the participant’s petition.

Beyond Montanile, the Court has several other writ petitions pending, including three cases where the Court has invited the Solicitor of Labor to weigh in with an amicus brief. These cases include:

  • Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan – In this case, the lower courts dismissed benefits claims on grounds of improper venue. In doing so, the lower courts held that an exclusive-venue provision in the plan required the participant to bring his benefits suit in the specified venue. The Department of Labor (DOL) had submitted an amicus brief to the Sixth Circuit, arguing that venue-selection provisions ran afoul of ERISA’s goal of providing participants with ready access to the courts. The Sixth Circuit, however, rejected DOL’s position and enforced the plan’s venue provision. A Supreme Court decision on this issue would likely be significant, because many plan sponsors are using the plan document to “hard wire” certain defenses to benefits claims – for example, the Court’s recent Heimeshoff decision approved a limitations period established by the plan.
  • Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. – This case presents a pre-emption question – specifically, whether ERISA pre-empts a Vermont law requiring healthcare payors (including ERISA plans) to submit certain claims data to the state. A split panel of the Second Circuit held the Vermont law was pre-empted because it imposed additional reporting requirements on those already imposed by ERISA. At the Court’s invitation, DOL filed an amicus brief opining that ERISA does not pre-empt the Vermont statute because it applies to non-ERISA entities, as well, and does not impose significant reporting burdens. The DOL brief added, however, that the Court’s review was not currently warranted, and suggested that “further percolation” of the issue in the appellate courts would be beneficial. Given that the Court’s last decision on ERISA pre-emption was over 10 years ago, the Court may nevertheless be signaling its readiness to take the case, and to issue further guidance on ERISA’s pre-emptive reach.
  • RJR Pension Inv. Comm. v. Tatum – The Tatum case arose from a dispute over plan fiduciaries’ decision to divert the plan of company stock, at a time when the stock was distressed. After the company stock recovered dramatically, participants asserted ERISA claims that plan fiduciaries had acted imprudently in selling the stock at a time when the price was down significantly. The Fourth Circuit held, among other things, that (1) the burden of proving loss causation shifted to plan fiduciaries, upon a showing that the fiduciaries had breached their duty of prudent investment; and (2) plan fiduciaries must show a hypothetical prudent fiduciary “would have” (as opposed to “could have”) made the same investment decision, where there was no evidence that the plan’s fiduciaries had undertaken robust deliberations before divesting the plan’s holdings in company stock. The Court invited the DOL to brief both issues. If the Court takes the case, its decision could be significant. On the former issue, a decision from the Court would resolve diverging lower-court decisions on whether the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof (including loss causation), or whether the burden-shifting approach of trust law – requiring a trustee, upon a showing of a breach of duty, to demonstrate that the breach did not cause the loss – is more appropriate for ERISA cases. On the latter issue, a decision from the Court could provide much-needed guidance on the proper scope of judicial review of fiduciary decision-making.

Although the Court has taken no action yet on the petition, it may be worth watching to see whether the Court takes up the case of UnitedHealthcare of Arizona, Inc. v. Spinedex Physical Therapy USA, Inc., No. 14-1286 (cert. pet. filed April 24, 2015). There, the Ninth Circuit held that a claims administrator is a proper party defendant in a medical benefits claim, even though it otherwise had no obligation as the benefits payer. Because ERISA §502(a)(1)(B) only authorizes suit for “benefits due … under the terms of his plan,” the Ninth Circuit’s reading of the statute – which purports to make claims administrators liable for benefits in a manner not contemplated by “the terms of the plan” – clearly seems overbroad. If left unaddressed, the Spinedexdecision could ultimately prove counter-productive, in that it will inevitably raise costs for service providers, which in turn, will be passed along to the plans, and ultimately to the participants in the form of higher premiums, larger deductibles, or less-generous coverage.

The Supreme Court has demonstrated some enthusiasm for ERISA in recent years. The Montanile case represents a significant beginning to the Court’s ERISA work for the next term. Given the cases and issues before it, however, the odds are that the Court will consider more ERISA cases in the next twelve months.

This post was written with contributions from William H. Payne IV.

ARTICLE BY Charles F. Seemann III of Jackson Lewis P.C.
Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2015

Colorado Employers Can Fire Workers for Off-Duty Medical Marijuana Use

The Colorado Supreme Court ruled on June 15, 2015, that an employee can be fired for using medical marijuana even though the drug is legal in Colorado and the employee was not at work at the time. The unanimous decision upholds lower courts’ opinions that an employer has the right to terminate an employee for violating a company’s zero-tolerance policy for controlled substances, despite a Colorado law protecting employees from being punished for legal, off-duty activities.

This decision is significant because it confirms an employer’s right to terminate an employee who violates a company’s drug policy, notwithstanding Colorado’s legalization of marijuana. Colorado is one of only four states to date to legalize marijuana for both medical and recreational use. The Court’s ruling, which is similar to a California decision, provides support and guidance for non-Colorado employers who may have employees travelling to Colorado for work or recreation. Other states are in various stages of considering legalizing medical and/or recreational marijuana.

At issue before the state’s highest court was a suit filed by Brandon Coats, a former employee of Dish Network, LLC, whose employment had been terminated by Dish after a random drug test revealed the presence of THC, the psychoactive chemical in marijuana, in Coats’ system. Coats was a registered medical marijuana patient who consumed medical marijuana at home, and after work, and in accordance with his license and Colorado state law.

In his suit against Dish for wrongful termination, Coats argued that the company violated Colorado’s “lawful activities statute,” which makes it an unfair and discriminatory labor practice to discharge an employee based on the employee’s “lawful” outside-of-work activities. Dish filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Coats’ medical marijuana use was not lawful for purposes of the statute under either federal or state law. The trial court granted Dish’s motion and dismissed Coats’ claim.

The Colorado Court of Appeals, in a split decision, affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of Coats’ lawsuit, but on a different ground. It found that because the use of marijuana is prohibited under the federal Controlled Substances Act, Coats’ conduct was not a “lawful activity” protected by the Colorado statute. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that “lawful” for purposes of Colorado’s “lawful activities statute” means activities that comply with applicable law, including state and federal law. Because Coats’ use of medical marijuana was unlawful under federal law, it was not protected under the Colorado statute.

ARTICLE BY Kimberly A. Smiley, Bradley M. Bakker, John P. Hasman, Jeremy M. Brenner, Shelley I. Ericsson & Bradley S. Byars of Armstrong Teasdale
Eric Walters and Calvin Matthews also contributed to this article.
© Copyright 2015 Armstrong Teasdale LLP. All rights reserved

Healthcare Quarterly Update: Cybersecurity and Health Data Privacy by Bloomberg BNA

Washington, DC

Join Bloomberg BNA for this essential event that explores concerns relating to cyber-security and health data privacy. Healthcare industry experts Kirk Nahra and David Holtzman will join HHS’s Iliana Peters for a comprehensive examination of:
• Big data in the healthcare sector and how to protect information
• Protecting patient and organization information
• Federal enforcement of HIPAA Privacy, Security, Data Breach rules
• Practical up to date information on current issues
• And so much more.

Click here to register today!

Identify actionable issues, secure your organization, and earn CLE credits.

A breakfast panel with accomplished scholars and an HHS representative. This conversation will address practical considerations for ensuring that patient’s data is being properly handled in full compliance with all regulations and ethical responsibilities. Healthcare practitioners are increasingly required to address concerns of Data privacy and Cyber-security; attending this panel will assist you in identifying actionable points in the law common to many legal practices.

United Airlines to Pay over $1 Million To Settle EEOC Disability Lawsuit

In a case that garnered nationwide attention, air transportation giant United Airlines Inc. has agreed to pay more than $1 million and implement changes to settle a federal disability lawsuit filed by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency announced today.U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Seal

The EEOC’s lawsuit charged that United’s competitive transfer policy violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The law requires an employer to provide reasonable accommodation to an employee or job applicant with a disability, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship for the employer. By requiring workers with disabilities to compete for vacant positions for which they were qualified and which they needed in order to continue working, the company’s practice frequently prevented employees with disabilities from continuing employment with United, the EEOC said.

The consent decree settling the suit, signed by Hon. Judge Harry Leinenweber and entered today, requires United to pay $1,000,040 to a small class of former United employees with disabilities and to make changes nationally. United will revise its ADA reassignment policy, train employees with supervisory or human resource responsibilities regarding the policy changes, and provide reports to the EEOC regarding disabled employees who were denied a position as part of the ADA reassignment process.

This resolution concludes a lengthy and complicated lawsuit. Although the EEOC originally filed the lawsuit on June 3, 2009 in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California – San Francisco, United successfully moved for a change of venue to the Northern District of Illinois. Bound by an earlier precedent which held that a competitive transfer policy similar to United’s policy did not violate the ADA, the lower court dismissed the EEOC’s case in February 2011.  However, in a decision reviewed by the full court, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the EEOC that EEOC v. Humiston Keeling, 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000) “did not survive” an intervening Supreme Court decision, U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).  The Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court’s dismissal and found that “the ADA does indeed mandate that an employer assign employees with disabilities to vacant positions for which they are qualified, provided that such accommodations would be ordinarily reasonable and would not present an undue hardship to the employer.” The Supreme Court refused United’s subsequent request for review on May 28, 2013. EEOC Appellate Attorney Barbara Sloan handled the appeal and Supreme Court briefing for the agency.

“The appellate court’s decision provided an important clarification regarding an employer’s responsibility under the ADA to provide a reasonable accommodation so qualified employees may lead economically independent lives,” said EEOC General Counsel David Lopez. “I am pleased this major decision also served as a springboard for the strong monetary and non-monetary remedies in today’s resolution.”

EEOC Regional Attorney William Tamayo said, “If a disability prevents an employee from returning to work in his or her current position, an employer must consider reassignment. As the Seventh Circuit’s decision highlights, requiring the employee to compete for positions falls short of the ADA’s requirements. Employers should take note: When all other accommodations fail, consider whether your employee can fill a vacant position for which he or she is qualified.”

EEOC San Francisco Acting District Director Michael Connolly noted, “We commend United for agreeing to make these important companywide changes that will enable employees with disabilities to stay employed at jobs they are qualified to do, as was intended under the ADA’s protections.”

According to the company website, United Airlines has almost 84,000 employees in every U.S. state and in many countries around the world. The air carrier has the world’s most comprehensive route network, including U.S. mainland hubs in Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, New York / Newark, San Francisco and Washington, D.C. and operates an average of nearly 5,000 flights a day to 373 airports across six continents.

The EEOC enforces federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination. Further information about the EEOC is available on its web site at www.eeoc.gov.

ARTICLE BY U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
© Copyright U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Draft EPA Study Finds Fracking Has Not Led to Widespread Drinking Water Contamination

The EPA released a draft of its study, U.S. EPA Assessment of the Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing for Oil and Gas on Drinking Water Resources (External Review Draft), EPA, Washington, DC, EPA/600/R-15/047, 2015, assessing the impact of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) on drinking water in early June (the draft Assessment). According to the EPA’s press release, the study finds that “hydraulic fracturing activities have not led to widespread, systemic impacts to drinking water resources,” but “identifies important vulnerabilities.” Fracking opponents, however, argue that the study vindicates their position.

The draft Assessment evaluated the potential impact of fracking at each stage of the Hydraulic Fracturing Water Cycle: water acquisition, chemical mixing, well injection, flowback, and wastewater treatment and waste disposal. The study’s objective was to “assess the potential impacts of hydraulic fracturing on drinking water resources, if any, and to identify the driving factors that may affect the severity and frequency of such impacts.” The draft Assessment “provides a review and synthesis of available scientific literature and data to assess the potential for hydraulic fracturing for oil and gas to impact the quality or quantity of drinking water resources, and identifies factors affecting the frequency or severity of any potential impacts.”

According to Dr. Thomas A. Burke, EPA’s Science Advisor and Deputy Assistant Administrator of EPA’s Office of Research and Development, the draft Assessment “is the most complete compilation of scientific data to date, including over 950 sources of information, published papers, numerous technical reports, information from stakeholders and peer-reviewed EPA scientific reports.”

[H]ydraulic fracturing activities have not led to widespread, systemic impacts to drinking water resources . . .

Supporters of fracking, such as American Petroleum Institute Upstream Group Director Erik Milito,say that the evidence gathered by EPA confirms that “[h]ydraulic fracturing is being done safely under the strong environmental stewardship of state regulators and industry best practices.” Meanwhile, opponents note that the EPA’s review found specific instances where well integrity and wastewater management related to hydraulic fracturing activities impacted drinking water resources. “The EPA’s water quality study confirms what millions of Americans already know – that dirty oil and gas fracking contaminates drinking water,” said Sierra Club Executive Director Michael Brune.

Numerous peer-reviewed EPA scientific reports were also released on the same day as the draft Assessment. Those reports were a part of EPA’s overall hydraulic fracturing drinking water study and contributed to the findings outlined in the draft assessment. More than 20 peer-reviewed articles or reports were published as part of this EPA’s draft Assessment.

The draft Assessment will be finalized after review by the Science Advisory Board (SAB) and public review and comment. The Federal Register Notice with information on the SAB review and how to comment on the draft assessment can be found here.

ARTICLE BY Edward Casmere of Schiff Hardin LLP

© 2015 Schiff Hardin LLP