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The National Law Forum - Page 459 of 753 - Legal Updates. Legislative Analysis. Litigation News.

Wine Seller Victory in Illinois Qui Tam Lawsuit

Wine sellers received a second positive update just this week in the qui tam winery lawsuits in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. On September 3, 2015, Judge Margaret Ann Brennan granted Motions to Dismiss filed by Co-Defendants, 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc. and TSG, LLC in a two-count False Claims Act complaint. In Count I, the Relator alleged that the out-of-state wine-seller defendants failed to pay local sales tax, owed through obligations under the Illinois Liquor Control Act; and Count II was the all too familiar allegation that defendants failed to collect and remit tax on shipping and handling charges for the wine they sold and shipped into Illinois.

Whisle with closed zipper - 3D concept

After months of briefing and a lengthy oral argument, Judge Brennan granted our Motions to Dismiss both Counts I and II of Relator’s Second Amended Complaint. Regarding Count I, Judge Brennan said that the Wine Shippers License, required to be held by wine sellers in Illinois pursuant to the Illinois Liquor Control Act (“LCA”), does not obligate local tax collection or remittance as argued by Relator. Specifically, Relator alleged that because the out-of-state wine sellers failed to comply with the LCA by improperly selling some wine that they did not produce, that they must be considered Illinois retailers and thus must collect and remit local tax. The parties agreed that Defendants did collect and remit the 6.25% use tax required on sales made into Illinois, but Judge Brennan noted that it would take an absurd leap in interpreting the LCA to conclude that it obligated Defendants to collect local sales tax as well. Important points were also made that local tax is based on the location where the seller is in the “business of selling” and that all of the “selling activities” occurred outside Illinois. Also, the LCA contains its own remedies for failing to comply with the Wine Shippers License, none of which relate to tax collection.

Regarding Count II, Judge Brennan was convinced that the Defendants’ disclosure of shipping and handling charges deducted from their gross receipts on their monthly Illinois returns (ST-1s) was sufficient to take this claim out of a knowingly made, False Claims Act issue. The Defendants met their obligation of monthly filing and there was no proof that the Department felt Defendants should have been collecting and remitting tax on the shipping and handling charges. Even if it was ultimately deemed inaccurate in an audit by the Department, it was still a truthful disclosure to the Department, not a knowing, false statement.

What Does “with Prejudice” Mean?

Significantly, Judge Brennan dismissed the claims with prejudice, meaning the Relator cannot re-plead claims, in this case, for a fourth time. The only options for the Relator at this point would be a Motion to Reconsider (unlikely because the Judge was emphatic and thorough in her decision) or to appeal the decision to the Illinois Appellate Court. Because these same issues are in hundreds of other cases before Judge Mulroy, it is unlikely that Relator will appeal this one-off decision by Judge Brennan. If Relator appeals and the dismissal is upheld, that would create legal precedent that would hurt Relator in all of his other cases pending and yet to come before Judge Mulroy.

So while it is great news that Judge Brennan decided correctly on these issues, where Judge Mulroy has consistently held that questions of fact remain and the defendants are thus forced to pay large settlement amounts or litigate through trial, the sobering news is that her ruling is not legal precedent for Judge Mulroy, another Circuit Court Judge; and it is Judge Mulroy who oversees the vast majority of the winery qui tam lawsuits.

Moving Your Case to a New Judge

You are most certainly asking at this point: How do we move our case to Judge Brennan? Because of the protections put in place against forum and judge shopping, it is extremely difficult and depending on how far you are into the case, potentially impossible. The first step would seem to be a simple one, however, by taking advantage of the Illinois law allowing for a substitution of judge as long as no substantive rulings have been made by the judge yet.

© Horwood Marcus & Berk Chartered 2015. All Rights Reserved.

DHS Expected to Issue STEM OPT Rule in Early Fall

The Council for Global Immigration (CGI) has updated its members regarding the recent decision of a District Court judge which vacated the 17-month STEM OPT rule, but stayed the order until February 12, 2016.  The CGI recognizes that this will put the Department of Homeland Security on a short timeline to issue a rule with a proper notice and comment period, but expects that a proposed rule will be issued in late September or early October, with a 30 or 60 day comment period to follow thereafter.

Stakeholders will have a chance to comment on the proposed rule once it is issued and provide valuable input.

©2015 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

Marijuana-Legalization Efforts and Their Impact on the Presidential Race

With the race for the White House heating up, the “politics of marijuana” is looming as a possibly significant factor.

marijuana-leaf white background

Twenty-four state ballot initiatives on marijuana legalization in 16 states have been filed already and will be voted on in November 2016, including in the “swing states” of Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, and New Mexico.

This is important because marijuana-legalization ballot initiatives are widely acknowledged to “turn out the vote” of single-issue, first-time, and younger voters – all of whom disproportionately vote Democratic. In close races and swing states, they may make the difference. Insiders have reported that these voters have determined the outcome in several contested races and states in the last two election cycles (e.g., in Barack Obama’s defeat of Mitt Romney in Colorado in 2012).

Moreover, the marijuana-legalization issue is increasingly a focus in U.S. Senate and House races and in pro- and anti-marijuana bills. Recently, the House Republican leadership successfully stripped out pro-marijuana-legalization amendments to two pending bills.

Away from Capitol Hill, twenty-four states and Washington, D.C., already allow for “medical”-marijuana use – at least under some circumstances. Four states (Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington) and the District of Columbia allow adults to smoke marijuana “recreationally.”

However, proponents’ efforts to introduce marijuana into the legal and cultural mainstream have met with opposition in the workplace and the courts. Even as many states allow “medical” or “recreational” use of marijuana to some extent, the courts have upheld employers’ interests in maintaining drug-free workplaces against challenges by job applicants or employees who were not hired or have been terminated because of marijuana-related substance-abuse-prevention policy violations. Employers have prevailed in every court case brought by employees claiming a “medical”-marijuana justification for their positive drug tests after the company’s adverse employment action – including many decisions in California, Colorado, Michigan, Montana, Oregon, and Washington.

This litigation results from a clash between a culture that increasingly accepts marijuana and companies that prohibit illicit drug abuse because of legitimate safety and productivity concerns. The conflict ultimately will be resolved by Congress or the courts (four lawsuits currently are pending to invalidate Colorado’s legalization of marijuana). Meanwhile, the current Administration, through the U.S. Justice Department, has acquiesced in states legalizing marijuana, essentially by refusing to enforce the federal Controlled Substances Act in those states – an unprecedented policy. This policy could change on January 20, 2017, when a new president is inaugurated.

Thus far, most presidential contenders have shied away from the issue. However, former Texas Governor Rick Perry (R) has endorsed decriminalization. Kentucky Senator Rand Paul, a Libertarian, has consistently supported states’ rights to establish their own marijuana policies and supports decriminalizing marijuana possession. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (D) has hinted that she is comfortable letting the states continue to experiment.

Conversely, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie (R) and Texas Senator Ted Cruz (R) have strongly opposed marijuana legalization, and Florida Senator Marco Rubio (R) also is on record as opposing marijuana legalization.

What the Congress does between now and mid-2016 may be critical. Supporters of marijuana legalization are gearing up. The marijuana industry has hired well-positioned lobbying firms. One of their top issues is to fix the rules that bar marijuana businesses from using banks. The well-funded National Cannabis Industry Association (NCIA) is supporting legislation that would change federal law to recognize the rights of local jurisdictions, including Washington, D.C., to create and regulate their own marijuana laws.

Finally, the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee voted in support of opening banking services to state legal marijuana business. Senate Bill 683, the CARERS Act of 2015, introduced by New Jersey Senator Cory Booker (D), seeks to amend the federal Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.) to ensure that CSA would not apply to anyone acting in compliance with state law relating to the production, possession, and distribution of medical marijuana. The proposal transfers marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule II of the CSA and prohibits federal banking officials from discouraging depository institutions from providing financial services to a marijuana-related, state-permitted legal business. A similar amendment was passed by the full House of Representatives in 2014. The House has not yet taken up the issue in 2015. House Republicans, however, supported a budget plan that would prevent legal sales of marijuana in the District until at least 2017.

Estimates indicate that the value of the legalized marijuana industry currently approaches $3 billion nationwide and is growing. Obviously, a lot is at stake.

The resolution of the marijuana-legalization issue, at both the federal and state levels, could play a significant role in determining the outcome of the upcoming presidential election.

Using Copyright Protection in Architectural Works to Police Unauthorized Photographs

Can I stop photographers from taking, displaying, and selling photographs of my building? The answer is, like the answer to so many other questions, maybe.

This issue often arises in the context of photographers who license their photographs for a fee through online stock image sites. The photographs are taken without authorization and present a building (and potentially the owner or occupants) in a negative light or disclose features of the building that the owner or architect would prefer remain visible only to those who see the them first hand.

If the area of concern is a building’s interior, the first step in limiting unauthorized photographs is to expressly prohibit photography. If you can show proof of such policies, most websites will remove the photographs without further question. But for various reasons, you may not have an express policy posted in your building. If that is the case, another option may be to enforce your intellectual property rights in the building itself.

Copyright protection subsists in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, including architectural works. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8). An owner of a copyright in an architectural work may prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial representations of the work, if the building in which the work is embodied is not located in or ordinarily visible from a public place. See id. § 120(a). Thus, if a building embodying a design to which you own the copyright is the subject of someone else’s photograph, you can potentially stop the display and distribution of that photograph.

Whether you own the relevant copyright should not be difficult to determine. It either belongs to the creator of the building’s design (i.e., the architect) or, by agreement, to someone else (perhaps the building’s owner). Whether your building is a building for purposes of the Copyright Act is slightly more complicated. According to legislative history, the term “buildings” includes “habitable structures such as houses and office buildings. It also covers structures that are used, but not inhabited, by human beings, such as churches, pergolas, gazebos, and garden pavilions.” H.R. Rep. No. 101-735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1990).

Assuming your structure is a “building,” the final question is whether it is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place. Legislative history does not provide guidance on the interpretation of this phrase, presumably because the legislature believed public place would be understood according to its plain meaning—i.e., “any location that the local, state, or national government maintains for the use of the public, such as a highway, park, or public building.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Courts have likewise been silent on the issue.

Nevertheless, stock image sites are reluctant to simply accept a presumption. Their business depends on their users being able to take and license photographs, and, for them, a more expansive view of public place is preferable. In our experience, many sites will argue that any property open to the public is a public place, regardless of whether the property is privately owned. This interpretation, however, would render buildings like churches and museums not protectable despite the clear intent that such structures be eligible for protection.

Moreover, other areas of the law support the proposition that opening private property to the public does not affect a property’s private nature. For example, a person granted a license to enter a property is still liable for trespass if she exceeds the scope of the license. Similarly, a property owner does not surrender her right to exclude simply by allowing invitees to enter her property. In addressing the nature of private property open to the public, the United States Supreme Court stated the following in the context of First Amendment public forum analysis: “Property does not lose its private character merely because the public is generally invited to use it  . . . the essentially private character of a store and its privately owned abutting property does not change by virtue of being large or clustered with other stores in a modern shopping center.” Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).

In light of the foregoing, the logical conclusion is that an otherwise private place open to the public is still private and not a “public place” under the Copyright Act. Applying this conclusion to 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), interior spaces of buildings located on private property should be entitled to protection, because they are not located in or ordinarily visible from a public place. Whether a building’s exterior is protectable, however, would depend on whether the building is visible from a public place, such as a road or sidewalk. Assuming the building is not visible from a public place, your copyright entitles you to stop others from taking, displaying, and selling photographs of the building.

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©2015 All Rights Reserved. Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP

Let the NFL Season Begin: Judge Overturns Arbitration Award Suspending Tom Brady

Tom Brady will begin the 2015 NFL season as the starting quarterback of the New England Patriots for the 14th consecutive season following U.S. District Court Judge Richard Berman’s grant of the National Football League Players Association’s motion to vacate NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell’s July 28, 2015, arbitration award imposing a four-game suspension on Brady. This forestalled the suspension before it was scheduled to take effect on September 5.

Judge Berman found the NFL failed to show it applied Article 46 of its collective bargaining agreement with the NFLPA fairly and consistently.

This decision is the fourth time a legal authority has challenged the NFL’s application of Article 46, following U.S. District Judge David Doty in the Adrian Peterson case, former Federal Judge Barbara Jones in the Ray Rice arbitration, and former NFL commissioner Paul Tagliabue in his opinion regarding the Saints players in Bountygate.

While judges rarely vacate arbitration awards, Judge Berman identified specific problems with the Brady arbitration hearing held by Goodell, including denial of access to key witnesses, which can be grounds to vacate an arbitration award. He found problematic the denial of NFLPA attorneys’ request to question NFL general counsel Jeffrey Pash, who edited the Wells Report before its release.

In addition, Judge Berman criticized Goodell for using the League’s collectively bargained steroid punishment policy to justify the suspension. Recognizing that the policy’s procedures are irrelevant to the allegations made against Brady, Judge Berman wrote that the steroid policy “cannot reasonably be used as a comparator for Brady’s four-game suspension for alleged ball deflation by others.”

Judge Berman also found decisions cited by the NFL to support confirming the arbitration award to be distinguishable. While Article 46 authorizes the League to use Goodell as the arbitrator for player appeals, Judge Berman concluded the “law of the shop,” requiring fairness and consistency, prohibits Goodell from rendering a decision that may have been compromised by bias.

The next phase of this litigation has already begun. The NFL recognizes that a motion seeking a stay of Judge Berman’s decision would require a showing of “irreparable harm,” and its argument would fall short on this score.

The NFL filed a Notice of Appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit within hours of Judge Berman’s decision.

Therefore, the immediate impact of Judge Berman’s decision is that Tom Brady can play in the first four games of the upcoming NFL season. Indeed, because of the Notice of Appeal, Judge Berman’s decision does not yet have precedential authority. However, the long-term effect of Judge Berman’s decision is far-reaching and considerable for the NFL, the NFLPA, and any private arbitral process governed by a collective bargaining agreement.

The NFL’s appeal faces the burden of convincing two appellate judges that Judge Berman misapplied the law.

Each case presents unique issues and facts, appellate courts typically do not reverse district court judges on their orders to vacate or confirm arbitration awards. The NFL likely will rely on strong legal precedent discouraging federal judges from interfering with a private arbitrator’s decision. In his 40-page decision, Judge Berman reasoned that the NFL failed to provide notice to Brady that being aware of deflated footballs and obstructing an investigation were misconduct justifying a four-game suspension. The NFL will undoubtedly argue that the “lack of notice” argument is irrelevant where the collective bargaining agreement gives the Commissioner complete authority to evaluate the definition of “conduct detrimental” to the League and to issue punishments based upon that determination. This is the authority provided by the NFLPA to the Commissioner under the current collective bargaining agreement and the NFL will argue it was not required to provide such “notice.” The NFL likely will also stress that Judge Berman’s decision to vacate Brady’s suspension reflects a complete disregard of judicial precedents confirming arbitration awards.

Clearly, this matter is not about Tom Brady, deflated footballs, or even NFL’s investigation. Rather, the appeal is about the NFL seeking to protect its internal arbitral process. Indeed, 38-year-old Tom Brady may even be retired by the time the appeals are ultimately resolved and a final determination is made.

Should the Second Circuit affirms Judge Berman’s decision, it will create a stronger precedent for the NFLPA to challenge future discipline issued through the NFL’s arbitral process. The Second Circuit’s precedent also will have potential far-reaching implications on all employers who utilize a private arbitration governed by a collective bargaining agreement, especially in light of the broad authority afforded to the Commissioner in the NFL’s collective bargaining agreement.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2015

Expanding Retaliation: Fourth Circuit Rejects “Manager Rule” in Title VII Cases

After helping an employee report a complaint of harassment, a manager expresses concern over the company’s handling of the situation and tells the employee the complaint is being mishandled. After the complaining employee files (and then settles) a Title VII against the company, the manager is fired for failing to take a “pro-employer” stance and act in the company’s “best interests.” Does the manager have a Title VII retaliation claim? That is the exact question recently decided by the United States Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit in DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic.

According to the complaint, which the court accepted as true for purposes of its review, J. Neil DeMasters began working as an employee assistance program consultant for Carilion in 2006. Two years later, DeMasters was consulted by an employee who complained that his supervisor was sexually harassing him. DeMasters relayed the substance of the complaint to human resources, which investigated the allegations and fired the supervisor. The employee was told the supervisor would never be back in the workplace, but a few days later the employee’s department manager allowed the supervisor to return to collect belongings. The employee complained to DeMasters that he felt uncomfortable at work and that he was facing increasing hostility from the supervisor’s allies and friends.

Upon learning this, DeMasters contacted HR to express his concern with how the situation was being handled, and HR confirmed it was aware the employee was being harassed by co-workers. DeMasters offered to coach the HR department on better ways to handle harassment complaints. HR declined, stating it would handle the situation. However, the employee reported to DeMasters that the harassment continued to get worse on a daily basis. DeMasters then opined to the employee that the complaints were being mishandled by HR. With that, DeMasters stopped having contact with the complaining employee.

Two years later, however, the employee filed a Title VII claim, which was settled. A few weeks after the settlement, DeMasters was called into a meeting with corporate counsel, the vice president of HR, and his own department director. DeMasters was told that by not taking the “pro-employer side,” he had put the company at risk of substantial liability. Two days later, DeMasters was fired for, among other reasons explained to him in writing, failing to act in the company’s best interests and failing to protect the company.

DeMasters filed a Title VII retaliation claim, which was dismissed by the federal district court for two reasons. First, the district court found that when DeMasters’ actions were examined individually, each action failed to constitute “protected activity” under Title VII. Second, even if he had engaged in protected activity, the “manager rule” prevented him from bringing a Title VII retaliation claim because he was acting within the scope of his job duties when reporting the complaints of the employee and discussing the matter with the company.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit roundly rejected both aspects of the district court’s reasoning. The appellate court found the district court’s individualized assessment of DeMasters’ actions to be “myopic.” The correct approach, the appellate court counseled, was to examine the totality of the circumstances in a “holistic approach.” As the court put it, just as a play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its scenes, so a discrimination claim cannot be understood without looking at the overall scenario. With this in mind, the Fourth Circuit had no difficulty finding DeMasters engaged in protected activity by complaining to the company that he felt the complaining employee was still being subjected to unlawful conduct.

The court then turned to the “manager rule,” which finds its origin in the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and requires an employee to “step outside” his role of representing the company in order to engage in protected activity. Under this theory, DeMasters’ job duties required him to counsel the employee and relay complaints to HR, and therefore his actions were not protected activities.

The Fourth Circuit again roundly rejected the application of the “manager rule” to the Title VII context. The court first found that whatever statutory support the “manager rule” had in the FLSA context did not exist in the Title VII context because the statutory language of Title VII differs from the FLSA in important considerations.

The court then found that two separate Title VII concepts counseled against the “manager rule.” First, under Fourth Circuit case law, an employer can escape Title VII liability if an employee’s conduct at work is sufficiently insubordinate, disruptive, or nonproductive. If the “manager rule” requires an employee to step outside his job duties in order to engage in protected activities, then it would put an employee in the dilemma of needing to step outside their job duties to have Title VII’s protections but then risk those same protections because stepping outside job duties could be seen as sufficiently insubordinate. Second, because Title VII offers employers the affirmative defense in certain harassment claims that complaining employees failed to follow the company’s internal reporting procedures, implementing a “manager rule” that could discourage employees responsible for helping other employees, such as DeMasters, from reporting concerns of discrimination. Thus, the “manager rule” would prevent Title VII’s overall goal of preventing and eliminating discrimination and harassment in the workplace.

The Fourth Circuit became just the second appellate court to look at and decide the “manager rule” question in the Title VII context in a published opinion. The Sixth Circuit similarly decided that it did not apply, but the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have non-precedential opinions adopting the “manager rule” in the Title VII context. Continued split among the federal courts on this issue increases the likelihood the Supreme Court may one day decide the issue.

For employers, the case serves as another reminder that concerns and complaints expressed by managers in harassment claims should be taken seriously and that great care needs to be taken to ensure employees are not retaliated against. Courts and the EEOC have been taking an increasingly expanded view of what constitutes protected activity and retaliation, and employers not mindful of these developments ignore them at their peril.

Gonzalez Saggio & Harlan LLP | Copyright (c) 2015

Expanding Retaliation: Fourth Circuit Rejects "Manager Rule" in Title VII Cases

After helping an employee report a complaint of harassment, a manager expresses concern over the company’s handling of the situation and tells the employee the complaint is being mishandled. After the complaining employee files (and then settles) a Title VII against the company, the manager is fired for failing to take a “pro-employer” stance and act in the company’s “best interests.” Does the manager have a Title VII retaliation claim? That is the exact question recently decided by the United States Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit in DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic.

According to the complaint, which the court accepted as true for purposes of its review, J. Neil DeMasters began working as an employee assistance program consultant for Carilion in 2006. Two years later, DeMasters was consulted by an employee who complained that his supervisor was sexually harassing him. DeMasters relayed the substance of the complaint to human resources, which investigated the allegations and fired the supervisor. The employee was told the supervisor would never be back in the workplace, but a few days later the employee’s department manager allowed the supervisor to return to collect belongings. The employee complained to DeMasters that he felt uncomfortable at work and that he was facing increasing hostility from the supervisor’s allies and friends.

Upon learning this, DeMasters contacted HR to express his concern with how the situation was being handled, and HR confirmed it was aware the employee was being harassed by co-workers. DeMasters offered to coach the HR department on better ways to handle harassment complaints. HR declined, stating it would handle the situation. However, the employee reported to DeMasters that the harassment continued to get worse on a daily basis. DeMasters then opined to the employee that the complaints were being mishandled by HR. With that, DeMasters stopped having contact with the complaining employee.

Two years later, however, the employee filed a Title VII claim, which was settled. A few weeks after the settlement, DeMasters was called into a meeting with corporate counsel, the vice president of HR, and his own department director. DeMasters was told that by not taking the “pro-employer side,” he had put the company at risk of substantial liability. Two days later, DeMasters was fired for, among other reasons explained to him in writing, failing to act in the company’s best interests and failing to protect the company.

DeMasters filed a Title VII retaliation claim, which was dismissed by the federal district court for two reasons. First, the district court found that when DeMasters’ actions were examined individually, each action failed to constitute “protected activity” under Title VII. Second, even if he had engaged in protected activity, the “manager rule” prevented him from bringing a Title VII retaliation claim because he was acting within the scope of his job duties when reporting the complaints of the employee and discussing the matter with the company.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit roundly rejected both aspects of the district court’s reasoning. The appellate court found the district court’s individualized assessment of DeMasters’ actions to be “myopic.” The correct approach, the appellate court counseled, was to examine the totality of the circumstances in a “holistic approach.” As the court put it, just as a play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its scenes, so a discrimination claim cannot be understood without looking at the overall scenario. With this in mind, the Fourth Circuit had no difficulty finding DeMasters engaged in protected activity by complaining to the company that he felt the complaining employee was still being subjected to unlawful conduct.

The court then turned to the “manager rule,” which finds its origin in the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and requires an employee to “step outside” his role of representing the company in order to engage in protected activity. Under this theory, DeMasters’ job duties required him to counsel the employee and relay complaints to HR, and therefore his actions were not protected activities.

The Fourth Circuit again roundly rejected the application of the “manager rule” to the Title VII context. The court first found that whatever statutory support the “manager rule” had in the FLSA context did not exist in the Title VII context because the statutory language of Title VII differs from the FLSA in important considerations.

The court then found that two separate Title VII concepts counseled against the “manager rule.” First, under Fourth Circuit case law, an employer can escape Title VII liability if an employee’s conduct at work is sufficiently insubordinate, disruptive, or nonproductive. If the “manager rule” requires an employee to step outside his job duties in order to engage in protected activities, then it would put an employee in the dilemma of needing to step outside their job duties to have Title VII’s protections but then risk those same protections because stepping outside job duties could be seen as sufficiently insubordinate. Second, because Title VII offers employers the affirmative defense in certain harassment claims that complaining employees failed to follow the company’s internal reporting procedures, implementing a “manager rule” that could discourage employees responsible for helping other employees, such as DeMasters, from reporting concerns of discrimination. Thus, the “manager rule” would prevent Title VII’s overall goal of preventing and eliminating discrimination and harassment in the workplace.

The Fourth Circuit became just the second appellate court to look at and decide the “manager rule” question in the Title VII context in a published opinion. The Sixth Circuit similarly decided that it did not apply, but the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have non-precedential opinions adopting the “manager rule” in the Title VII context. Continued split among the federal courts on this issue increases the likelihood the Supreme Court may one day decide the issue.

For employers, the case serves as another reminder that concerns and complaints expressed by managers in harassment claims should be taken seriously and that great care needs to be taken to ensure employees are not retaliated against. Courts and the EEOC have been taking an increasingly expanded view of what constitutes protected activity and retaliation, and employers not mindful of these developments ignore them at their peril.

Gonzalez Saggio & Harlan LLP | Copyright (c) 2015

Addressing and Preventing Workplace Violence

The subject of workplace violence has unfortunately made headlines once again after a news anchor and cameraman were killed by a former co-worker in Virginia last week. Employers are understandably concerned and have questions about what they can do to help prevent workplace violence.

workplace violence businessmen pointing gunsThe Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) requires employers to maintain a place of employment that is “free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees.” While it might seem that workplace violence would be reduced by refusing to hire or retain individuals with a criminal record or propensity for violence, making employment decisions based on these considerations may pose other legal issues. Federal, state and city laws limit the ability to make employment decisions based on criminal history, and the Americans with Disabilities Act and similar state and local laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of a disability, whether actual or perceived. Making an employment decision based on an employee’s propensity for violence stemming from an actual or perceived mental illness can therefore trigger liability for disability discrimination.

So what can employers do to help prevent workplace violence?

  • Institute a workplace violence policy: Employers can develop a policy that clearly states that workplace violence will not be tolerated, and that employees who engage in threatening or violent behavior will be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including termination.

  • Develop a comprehensive violence prevention program: Educate employees on resources and procedures if they feel threatened at work, and train supervisors, human resources personnel and security officers to look for “warning signs” such as changes in behavior and/or job performance that may predict a violent incident.

  • Remind employees about your Employee Assistance Program (EAP) if you have one: EAPs can provide assistance to troubled employees, including access to counselors and medical professionals.

  • Deal with workplace issues before they escalate: Remind managers and supervisors to promptly report all claims of discrimination or harassment to Human Resources and assist in expediting a response to the employee in need of help.

  • Review your policy on criminal background checks: Although criminal background checks may reveal information about an individual’s propensity for violent behavior, their use in employment decisions is limited by federal, state and local laws.

Although, as recent events have shown, violent incidents may be difficult to predict, having the policies and resources to address workplace violence is the first step to preventing them.

2015 Proskauer Rose LLP.

USCIS Announces Changes to ELIS Immigrant Visa Fee Payment Procedures

USCIS announced on August 31, 2015, that the agency has simplified the process for paying the $165 immigrThe July 2015 Visa Bulletin Brings Little Changeant visa (“IV”) fee through its electronic immigration system, known as ELIS. The IV fee is required of those foreign nationals immigrating to the United States to produce permanent resident cards, known as “green cards.” A “green card” will not be issued without having paid this fee, with the exception of very limited situations. This fee is payable to USCIS and is separate and apart from the immigrant visa fee payable to the National Visa Center in connection with the U.S. Department of State processing of immigrant visa applications.

Amongst the announced changes are a reduction in the amount of information an immigrant must provide to USCIS as part of creating an ELIS account and ordering the production of their green card. Of particular note is that USCIS will now permit other individuals, including family members, attorneys, or accredited representatives to submit payment on behalf of the applicant, so long as the payee possesses the applicant’s Alien Registration Number (“A-Number”) and their Department of State Case ID. Until this change was announced, USCIS restricted the ability to create an account and pay the IV fees through ELIS to the applicant herself.  These system improvements reflect the Agency’s continuing efforts to simplify its systems and procedures.

©2015 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

Jurors Use Social Media To Research Case Details [VIDEO]

Jurors sometimes use social media sites to research case details, but surprisingly, doing so is not always grounds for reversal of a verdict. This video outlines case examples of this behavior, along with practical steps you can take to reduce the risk of having social media  impact your next case.