Congress Passes ADVANCE Act to Accelerate Deployment of Advanced Nuclear Reactors

On June 18, the Senate passed the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy (ADVANCE) Act as a section of the Fire Grants and Safety Act (S.B. 870). The Senate approved House amendments to the bill with a vote of 88-2, opposed only by Senators Edward Markey (D-MA) and Bernie Sanders (I-VT). The ADVANCE Act has diverse backing from industry, government, and nonprofit stakeholders, and its passage reflects strong bipartisan support for promoting advanced nuclear reactors, which offer carbon-free dispatchable energy generation for both electricity and industrial applications. The ADVANCE Act now heads to President Biden, who is expected to sign the act into law.
The ADVANCE Act is the latest in a series of recent legislative and regulatory developments aimed at bolstering the development of a technology that may be necessary to meet the nation’s growing energy demand. Advanced reactors promise improvements over conventional, much larger light water reactors. These improvements include additional safety features, lower waste yields, and operational flexibility that can complement integration with intermittent renewable energy or energy storage. One category of advanced reactors, small modular reactors (SMR), is of particular interest; SMRs hold the potential of fitting within the footprint of industrial applications.
In 2019, President Trump signed into law the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA), which directed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to streamline its licensing process for advanced reactors and modified the fee structure for traditional and advanced reactors. The passage of the ADVANCE Act builds on NEIMA and provides even more support to deploy advanced nuclear reactors efficiently and successfully.

Key Provisions of the ADVANCE Act

PROMOTING NEW NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES

  • Reduced Fees for Advanced Nuclear Reactor Application Reviews. The Act amends NEIMA and sets a specific fee reimbursement rate for NRC’s review of advanced nuclear reactor licensing applications. While applicants are responsible for direct program salaries and benefits for the nuclear reactor safety program, the costs associated with indirect program and agency support expenses will not be passed onto applicants.
  • Prizes for Advanced Nuclear Reactors. To incentivize the successful development and deployment of advanced nuclear reactors, the Act establishes multiple prizes. The first entities to successfully deploy the specified types of advanced nuclear reactors can receive federal funding to cover the licensing and permitting costs associated with deployment.
  • Development, Qualification, and Licensing of Advanced Nuclear Fuel Concepts. The Act directs the NRC to improve its ability to qualify and license advanced nuclear fuel. The NRC must collaborate with the Department of Energy (DOE) to test and demonstrate accident-tolerant fuels and advanced nuclear reactor fuel concepts; operate a knowledge-sharing database for agencies and the private sector; and ensure both NRC and DOE have the technical expertise to support advanced nuclear fuel from the research stage through commercial application. A report detailing these efforts must be submitted to Congress within two years.
  • Licensing and Oversight for Nuclear Facilities on Brownfields and Retired Fossil-Fuel Plant Sites. The Act directs the NRC to identify and report on regulatory, guidance, or policy changes to streamline licensing reviews and oversight for nuclear facilities at brownfields and retired fossil-fuel electric generation sites. Within two years, the NRC must adopt strategies and initiate rulemaking to achieve these efficiency improvements. This provision recognizes the advantage of using existing power grid infrastructure to bring nuclear facilities online and the potential of advanced reactor construction to create more high-paying jobs for former fossil-fuel industry workers.
  • Licensing and Regulation of Microreactors and Nonelectric Applications of Nuclear Technology. The Act directs the NRC to develop strategies and guidance for licensing and regulating microreactors, covering items such as oversight and inspections, emergency preparedness, risk analysis methods, and the transportation of fueled microreactors. Additionally, the Act directs the NRC to submit a report to Congress detailing unique licensing issues or requirements for nonelectric applications of nuclear energy, along with a proposed budget and timeline for implementing regulatory guidance.

STRENGTHENING THE NUCLEAR WORKFORCE, FUEL CYCLE, SUPPLY CHAIN, AND INFRASTRUCTURE

  • Nuclear Energy Traineeship Program. The Act directs the NRC to coordinate with trade schools and institutions of higher education to establish a competitive nuclear energy traineeship program. The program must provide training that meets the critical mission needs of the NRC and nuclear workforce needs.
  • NRC Hiring and Compensation Improvements. The Act includes provisions to ensure the NRC is prepared to review licenses safely and successfully should the demand for NRC licensing and oversight services increase. Specifically, the Act empowers the NRC Chair to appoint up to 120 exceptionally well-qualified individuals into the excepted service and up to 20 exceptionally well-qualified individuals into term-limited positions during each fiscal year. In addition, the Act allows the NRC to determine the compensation for these positions without regard to the General Schedule classification and pay rates, subject to some limitations. The NRC may also award hiring bonuses and performance bonuses.
  • Biennial Reporting on Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste. The Act requires the Secretary of Energy to submit a report to Congress no later than January 1, 2026, and biennially thereafter, that describes spending related to (1) breaches of contract under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and (2) storage, management, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste (including the projected lifecycle costs for such activities). The report must also describe mechanisms and recommendations to improve accounting of liabilities and lifecycle costs for spent fuel and radioactive waste. Additionally, the report must describe any activities taken in the previous fiscal year by DOE with respect to interim storage and the development and deployment of technologies that enhance the safe transportation and storage of spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste.
  • Report on Advanced Manufacturing and Construction Methods. The Act directs the NRC to submit a report to Congress within 180 days on advanced manufacturing and construction techniques for nuclear energy projects. The report must, among other things, assess licensing issues, identify safety standard gaps, and provide recommendations to use the existing regulatory framework or engage in new rulemaking to support advanced manufacturing and construction methods.

IMPROVING NRC EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS

  • Updated NRC Mission Statement. The Act provides that the NRC must update its mission within a year to include that licensing and regulation will be conducted “in a manner that is efficient and does not unnecessarily limit” the civilian use of radioactive materials, the benefits of civilian use of radioactive materials, or the benefits of nuclear energy technology to society.
  • Periodic Review of Performance Metrics and Milestones. The Act amends NEIMA and directs the NRC to review its performance metrics and milestones at least once every three years and to revise them as necessary to reflect the most efficient metrics and milestones reasonably achievable.
  • Nuclear Licensing Efficiency. The Act mandates that the NRC establish techniques and guidance for evaluating nuclear reactor license applications that support efficient, timely, and predictable regulatory reviews and the safe use of nuclear reactors.
  • Modernization of Environmental Reviews. To streamline the approval of new nuclear reactor license applications, the Act directs the NRC to improve the efficiency, timeliness, and predictability of NEPA environmental reviews through the expanded use of categorical exclusions, environmental assessments, and generic environmental impact statements. The NRC must submit a report on these efforts to Congress within 180 days.
  • Report on Oversight and Inspection Program Improvements. The Act requires the NRC to provide a report to Congress within a year that identifies potential improvements to NRC’s oversight and inspection programs for nuclear reactors and materials. The report must assess options to maximize program efficiency through the use of risk-informed, performance-based procedures; information technologies; staff training; improved planning; and licensee innovations that may advance nuclear reactor operational efficiency and safety.

ADVANCING INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LEADERSHIP

  • Export and Innovation Activities. The Act directs the NRC to support interagency and international coordination related to nuclear reactor import and export licensing. Specifically, the Act directs the NRC to engage in international coordination to promote (1) international technical standards for licensing and regulating nuclear reactor design, construction, and operation; (2) competent nuclear regulatory organizations and frameworks in countries seeking to develop civil nuclear industries; and (3) exchange programs and training for foreign countries to improve their regulation and oversight of nuclear reactors and radioactive materials. The Act empowers the NRC to establish an “International Nuclear Export and Innovation Branch” to support these efforts.
  • DOE Global Nuclear Energy Assessment. The Act directs the Secretary of Energy to conduct a study in consultation with the Secretary of State, Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the NRC that evaluates the global status of the civilian nuclear energy industry and its supply chains. The study must provide recommendations to strengthen the United States’ engagement with nuclear energy in foreign policy and modernize regulatory requirements to improve domestic supply chains of civilian nuclear energy.
  • Prohibitions on Russian and Chinese Enriched Uranium. The Act prohibits possession and ownership of enriched uranium fuel fabricated by an entity in Russia or China. A person may obtain a license to possess or own such fuel, but the Act provides that the NRC may only issue such a license in consultation with the Secretaries of Energy and State.
  • Foreign Ownership of Nuclear Facilities. Under the Atomic Energy Act, nuclear reactor licenses could not be issued to foreign corporations and other entities. The Act modifies this restriction and allows the NRC to issue licenses to governments, corporations, citizens, and foreign nationals of Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development member countries and India if issuance is not contrary to national security or public health and safety.

Other Recent Developments

  • DOE Funding for Small Modular Reactors. On June 17, DOE issued a Notice of Intent to distribute $900 million to support the deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs). Part of the funding comes from President Biden’s Bipartisan infrastructure Law.
  • Reappointment of NRC Chair. On June 18, the current Chairman of the NRC, Christopher Hanson, was sworn in for a second term – running through 2029. In his confirmation hearings, Senators pressed him to work harder on NRC reform.
  • NRC Rulemaking for Advanced Reactors. In response to NEIMA, the NRC has drafted proposed revisions to create a risk-informed, performance-based, and technology-inclusive framework for advanced reactors. An analysis by Van Ness Feldman lawyers found that the NRC has substantial headroom within its Congressional safety mandate to reduce the risk aversion and restrictiveness in its licensing and permitting process.
 
© 2024 Van Ness Feldman LLP

China’s Supreme People’s Court Releases Two Recent Patent-Related Typical Anti-Monopoly Cases

On June 24, 2024, China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) released five recent typical anti-monopoly cases, two of which relate to patents. The SPC stated that the cases were released so that Courts can “correctly apply the revised Anti-Monopoly Law and accurately understand the new judicial interpretation of anti-monopoly civil litigation issued today, fairly and efficiently hear monopoly cases, ensure the correct implementation of the Anti-Monopoly Law, and maintain fair competition in the market.”

Explanations from the SPC regarding the two cases follows:

Case No.:【案号】（2020）最高法知民终1140号

[Basic facts of the case] Yang XX Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd. and its subsidiaries (collectively referred to as Yang) are the manufacturers of the anti-allergic drug desloratadine citrate tablets with the trade name “Beixue.” Hefei Yi XX Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. owns the relevant patents for desloratadine citrate. The company and its subsidiaries and affiliated companies (collectively referred to as Yi) are the only suppliers of the desloratadine citrate API required for the production of “Beixue”. In addition to producing desloratadine citrate API, Yi also produces desloratadine citrate hard capsules. Yi and Yang are both the supply and demand parties of the desloratadine citrate API involved in the case, and are also competitors in desloratadine citrate preparations. Yang believed that Yi used its dominant position in the market of desloratadine citrate API to restrict Yang to only purchase the API involved in the case from it, significantly raised the price of the API involved in the case, and threatened to stop supplying the API involved in the case to force Yang to accept other commercial arrangements unrelated to the API transaction involved, causing huge losses to Yang and therefore constituting an abuse of market dominance. Yang requested that Yi stop abusing its market dominance and compensate Yang for losses and reasonable expenses of 100 million RMB. The court of first instance found that Yi had abused its market dominance by restricting transactions, setting unfair high prices, and attaching unreasonable transaction conditions, and ordered it to immediately stop the above-mentioned behaviors and compensate Yang more than 68 million RMB. Both parties were dissatisfied and appealed to the Supreme People’s Court.

The Supreme People’s Court held in the second instance that Yi has a dominant market position in the desloratadine citrate API market in China, but its dominant market position has been weakened to a certain extent due to the strong indirect competition constraints from the downstream second-generation antihistamine preparation market. Based on the existing evidence, it is difficult to determine that it has abused its dominant market position. First, desloratadine citrate falls within the scope of protection of Yi’s patent rights. The time and scope of Yi’s restriction that Yang can only purchase the patented API involved in the case from it do not exceed the scope of the legitimate exercise of patent rights, and the resulting market blocking effect does not exceed the statutory exclusive scope of patent rights, so it does not constitute a restricted transaction behavior that abuses the dominant market position. Second, considering the internal rate of return after the price increase and the matching degree of price and economic value, it is more likely that the initial price of the patented API involved in the case is a promotional price, and the subsequent large price increase is likely to be a reasonable adjustment from the promotional price to the normal price. The fact that the price increase is significantly higher than the cost increase is not enough to determine that there is an unfair high-price behavior that abuses the dominant market position. Third, the existing evidence is insufficient to prove that Yi has explicitly or implicitly bundled the sales of the patented API involved in the case with unrelated products, so it is difficult to determine that there is an act of attaching unreasonable transaction conditions. Therefore, the judgment was revoked and the first-instance judgment was changed to dismiss Yang’s lawsuit request.

[Typical Significance] This case is the first monopoly civil lawsuit in China involving raw material pharmaceuticals. The judgment clarified the consideration of indirect competition constraints from the downstream market when judging the market dominance of intermediate input operators, the relationship between the market blocking effect of limited trading behavior and the statutory exclusive scope of patent rights, and the basic ideas and specific methods for judging unfair high prices. It has positive significance for promoting the accurate application of the Anti-Monopoly Law and effectively maintaining fair competition in the pharmaceutical market.

【案号】（2021）最高法知民终1482号

[Basic facts of the case] Ningbo XX Magnetics Co., Ltd. is an enterprise engaged in the production of sintered NdFeB materials in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province. A Japanese metal company has more than 600 sintered NdFeB patents in the field of rare earth materials worldwide. After licensing eight companies in China to implement its patented technology, it decided not to add new licensees. From March 2014 to March 2015, Ningbo XX Magnetics Co., Ltd. repeatedly requested a license from the Japanese metal company but was rejected. Therefore, it filed a lawsuit in December 2014, requesting that the Japanese metal company stop the abuse of market dominance such as refusal to trade and compensate Ningbo XX Magnetics Co., Ltd. for economic losses of 7 million RMB. The court of first instance determined that the Japanese metal company had a dominant position in the patent licensing market for essential patents for sintered NdFeB and that its refusal to trade had no legitimate reason. Therefore, it ordered the Japanese metal company to stop abusing its market dominance by refusing to trade and compensate Ningbo XX Magnetics Co., Ltd. for economic losses of 4.9 million RMB. The Japanese metal company was dissatisfied with the decision and filed an appeal.

The Supreme People’s Court held in the second instance that the evidence in this case was insufficient to prove that the sintered NdFeB patent of a Japanese metal company was irreplaceable, nor was it sufficient to prove that there was an independent licensing market for patents necessary for the production of sintered NdFeB. Therefore, it was difficult to determine that the relevant market in this case was the patent licensing market for patents necessary for the production of sintered NdFeB owned by the Japanese metal company. In this case, based on the demand substitution of sintered NdFeB material production technology, the relevant market in this case should be defined as the global sintered NdFeB material production technology market, including patented technologies and non-patented technologies with close substitution. Given that sintered NdFeB material production technology is used to produce sintered NdFeB materials, and the market share of sintered NdFeB materials (products) and other conditions can more accurately and conveniently reflect the market conditions of sintered NdFeB production technology, the market power of the technology owner in the relevant market involved in the case can be evaluated through the market share of the sintered NdFeB material market. Taking into account the evidence in the case, the Japanese metal company does not have a dominant position in the global sintered NdFeB material production technology market. Therefore, the court ruled to revoke the first-instance judgment and dismiss the lawsuit filed by the Ningbo magnetic company.

[Typical Significance] This case is a typical case in which intellectual property rights and antitrust are intertwined, and has received widespread attention. The second-instance judgment properly handled the relationship between the exercise of patent rights and antitrust, and through scientific and reasonable definition of the relevant market, revised the judgment in accordance with the law to determine that the foreign right holder’s refusal to license the patent involved did not constitute monopoly behavior. The judgment in this case demonstrates the judicial concept of Chinese courts to equally protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese and foreign parties and the trial ideas of antitrust cases involving intellectual property abuse in accordance with the law, and actively responded to the concerns of the industry at home and abroad.

The original text including three additional cases is available here (Chinese only).

© 2024 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.
For more news on Chinese Patent Litigation, the NLR Intellectual Property section.

SCOTUS Freezes States’ Efforts to Resolve Water Conflict

What Happened?

On June 21, 2024, the Supreme Court narrowly held that three states could not enter a consent decree to settle their interstate water dispute without the support of the intervening federal government. The ruling halts the agreement between Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado to settle Texas’s claims and reconfigure water allocation under the Rio Grande Compact going forward. The decision frustrates multi-year efforts by the states to fairly apportion shrinking water supplies and continues uncertainty for water users dependent on flows from the Rio Grande. More generally, the decision highlights the federal government’s power in cases arising under interstate compacts where federal interests are “inextricably intertwined” with the outcome.

Background

In 2013, Texas sued New Mexico and Colorado, claiming that New Mexico’s increased groundwater pumping was diminishing flows from the Rio Grande, unfairly shorting water allocated to the Lonestar state. This claim arose under the Rio Grande Compact, a 1938 allocation agreement between the three states that depend on the Rio Grande’s waters. The Supreme Court allowed the federal government, although not a party to the Compact, to intervene in the dispute in 2014, based on the federal interests in delivering water to Mexico under a 1906 treaty, in operating a Bureau of Reclamation reservoir and irrigation project closely connected to Compact compliance, and in fulfilling potential federal obligations to Indian tribes. The Supreme Court held that the federal government’s interests were “inextricably intertwined” with the case.

Since that decision, the states sought a compromise, recognizing that the 1938 Compact failed to predict severe droughts and dwindling water supplies, new circumstances that require adaptation. Despite this negotiated solution, the federal government refused to sign the agreement. The federal government claimed that the settlement undermines the Compact’s plain language, which cannot be modified without congressional approval, and that the negotiated agreement would impose new obligations on the federal reservoir and irrigation project. Based on its intervenor status, the federal government asked the Supreme Court to reject the deal in the absence of its consent.

Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Jackson explained that the Court’s 2018 decision to allow federal claims in the case to proceed “leads inexorably” to the federal government’s approval being necessary before a valid resolution. Justice Gorsuch, writing for the dissent, cautioned that this deference to the intervenor risks federalizing interstate water disputes and limiting the necessary discretion for states to independently manage their waters. Despite previously authoring a unanimous 2018 decision that green-lighted the federal claims, his dissent pointed back to “a century’s worth” of precedent, holding that the Reclamation Act requires the federal government to comply with state control of water resources and not to assert incompatible federal interests. The majority reasoned, by contrast, that the federal government’s interest was particular to the Compact, where compliance depends on federal action.

Analysis

The Court’s acknowledgment of the federal interest in the three states aligning Rio Grande Compact compliance with contemporary water realities is expressly tailored to the unique federal role in this situation. The problem the Court focused on was the proposed resolution’s failure to include the federal government, given its intervenor status and its integral role in managing a reservoir and irrigation project essential to the Compact. This does not authorize federal interference in all interstate water compacts, as the dissent fears, but others may be “inextricably intertwined” with federal interests. Still, the pointed dissent may signal that a significant court minority stands ready to guard state control of water resources when the federal government overreaches. The decision’s immediate impact will perpetuate uncertainty for water users in all three states as the parties are forced back to trial or the negotiating table.

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Cracks Down on Employer Non-Disclosure Provisions

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) has now joined the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in taking a stand against broad non-disclosure provisions in employment agreements.

Last week, the CFTC announced a settlement with Trafigura Trading LLC, in which the company agreed to pay a $55 million penalty, in part because it required employees to sign agreements that impeded voluntary communications with the CFTC.

In its decision, the CFTC specifically found:

Between July 31, 2017 and 2020, Trafigura required its employees to sign employment agreements, and requested that former employees sign separation agreements, with broad non-disclosure provisions that prohibited the sharing of Trafigura’s confidential information with third parties. These nondisclosure provisions did not contain carve-out language expressly permitting communications with law enforcement or regulators like the Commission.

The CFTC concluded that such non-disclosure provisions violate Regulation 165.19(b), 17 C.F.R. § 165.19(b) (2023), implementing Section 23(h)-(j) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 26(h)–(j), even without any additional actions impeding communications.

As a result of this finding, among others involving misappropriation of material nonpublic information and manipulative conduct, the CFTC not only levied a significant fine on Trafigura, but imposed a host of conditions and undertakings with which Trafigura was required to comply. Relevant here, the CFTC required that Trafigura modify its non-disclosure provisions to include language making clear that “no term in any such Agreement should be understood to limit or prevent the filing of a complaint with; or voluntary, lawful communication with; or disclosure of information to any federal, state, or local governmental regulatory or law enforcement agency.”

Director of the Whistleblower Office Brian Young commented, “This is the first CFTC action charging a company under regulations designed to prevent interference with whistleblower communications. This groundbreaking action demonstrates the CFTC’s commitment to protecting potential whistleblowers and puts the market on notice that the CFTC will not tolerate contractual arrangements that could impede communication by potential witnesses.”

We have long reported on the SEC’s targeting of employment agreements. With the CFTC following suit, employers should expect additional agencies to scrutinize language in employment agreements, separation agreements and other employment-related documents, such as employee handbooks and Codes of Conduct. To minimize such scrutiny and exposure employers should take action to modify non-disclosure and other provisions such as non-disparagement and confidentiality clauses that might have the purpose or effect of impeding agency communications. Such modifications must include carve-out language clarifying that nothing precludes current and former employees from communicating in any way with a government agency, such as the CFTC or the SEC. It is more important than ever for employers to work with counsel to conduct a comprehensive review of their policies, practices, and agreements for language that such agencies may find problematic.

©2024 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.
For more news on Employer Non-Disclosure Provisions, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

A Lawyer’s Guide to Understanding AI Hallucinations in a Closed System

Understanding Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the possibility of hallucinations in a closed system is necessary for the use of any such technology by a lawyer. AI has made significant strides in recent years, demonstrating remarkable capabilities in various fields, from natural language processing to large language models to generative AI. Despite these advancements, AI systems can sometimes produce outputs that are unexpectedly inaccurate or even nonsensical – a phenomenon often referred to as “hallucinations.” Understanding why these hallucinations occur, especially in a closed systems, is crucial for improving AI reliability in the practice of law.

What are AI Hallucinations
AI hallucinations are instances where AI systems generate information that seems plausible but is incorrect or entirely fabricated. These hallucinations can manifest in various forms, such as incorrect responses to prompt, fabricated case details, false medical analysis or even imagined elements in an image.

The Nature of Closed Systems
A closed system in AI refers to a context where the AI operates with a fixed dataset and pre-defined parameters, without real-time interaction or external updates. In the area of legal practice this can include environments or legal AI tools which rely upon a selected universe of information from which to access such information as a case file database, saved case specific medical records, discovery responses, deposition transcripts and pleadings.

Causes of AI Hallucinations in Closed Systems
Closed systems, as opposed to open facing AI which can access the internet, rely entirely on the data they were trained on. If the data is incomplete, biased, or not representative of the real world the AI may fill gaps in its knowledge with incorrect information. This is particularly problematic when the AI encounters scenarios not-well presented in its training data. Similarly, if an AI tool is used incorrectly by way of misused data prompts, a closed system could result in incorrect or nonsensical outputs.

Overfitting
Overfitting occurs when the AI model learns the noise and peculiarities in the training data rather than the underlying patterns. In a closed system, where the training data can be limited and static, the model might generate outputs based on these peculiarities, leading to hallucinations when faced with new or slightly different inputs.

Extrapolation Error
AI models can generalize from their training data to handle new inputs. In a closed system, the lack of continuous learning and updated data may cause the model to make inaccurate extrapolations. For example, a language model might generate plausible sounding but factually incorrect information based upon incomplete context.

Implication of Hallucination for lawyers
For lawyers, AI hallucinations can have serious implications. Relying on AI- generated content without verification could possibly lead to the dissemination or reliance upon false information, which can grievously effect both a client and the lawyer. Lawyers have a duty to provide accurate and reliable advise, information and court filings. Using AI tools that can possibly produce hallucinations without proper checks could very well breach a lawyer’s ethical duty to her client and such errors could damage a lawyer’s reputation or standing. A lawyer must stay vigilant in her practice to safe guard against hallucinations. A lawyer should always verify any AI generated information against reliable sources and treat AI as an assistant, not a replacement. Attorney oversight of outputs especially in critical areas such as legal research, document drafting and case analysis is an ethical requirement.

Notably, the lawyer’s chose of AI tool is critical. A well vetted closed system allows for the tracing of the origin of output and a lawyer to maintain control over the source materials. In the instance of prompt-based data searches, with multiple task prompts, a comprehensive understanding of how the prompts were designed to be used and the proper use of same is also essential to avoid hallucinations in a closed system. Improper use of the AI tool, even in a closed system designed for legal use, can lead to illogical outputs or hallucinations. A lawyer who wishes to utilize AI tools should stay informed about AI developments and understand the limitations and capabilities of the tools used. Regular training and updates can provide a more effective use of AI tools and help to safeguard against hallucinations.

Take Away
AI hallucinations present a unique challenge for the legal profession, but with careful tool vetting, management and training a lawyer can safeguard against false outputs. By understanding the nature of hallucinations and their origins, implementing robust verification processes and maintaining human oversight, lawyers can harness the power of AI while upholding their commitment to accuracy and ethical practice.

© 2024 McGivney, Kluger, Clark & Intoccia. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
For more on Artificial Intelligence, visit the NLR Communications Media Internet section.

The SEC Continues Its War On Crime Victims

More than a decade ago, I expressed concern when the Securities and Exchange Commission charged Koss Corporation and one its CEO, Mr. Koss, with filing materially false financial statements after the corporation had discovered that it had been the victim of employee embezzlement. In the post, I decried the SEC’s decision to punish the victims of crime:

The SEC’s decision to prosecute this case is troubling. Surely, neither Koss Corporation nor Mr. Koss intended or wanted to be the victim of a criminal embezzlement. It is also hard to see how the shareholders’ benefited from the company incurring the legal costs associated with defending and settling the SEC investigation. While the SEC did force the return of bonus compensation, the injunctive relief ordering the company and Mr. Koss not to do this again strikes me as silly. Does it really make sense for the court to order a company not to be the victim of a theft?

I was therefore heartened by the recent statement by Commissioners Hester Peirce and Mark Uyeda on the SEC’s recent settlement of administrative proceeding against R.R. Donnelly & Sons, Co.:

Also concerning is the Commission’s decision to stretch the law to punish a company that was the victim of a cyberattack. While an enforcement action may be warranted in some circumstances, distorting a statutory provision to form the basis for such an action inappropriately amplifies a company’s harm from a cyberattack.

According to the SEC’s press release, R.R. Donnelly & Sons, Co. “cooperated throughout the investigation, including by reporting the cybersecurity incident to staff prior to filing a disclosure of the incident, by providing meaningful cooperation that helped expedite the staff’s investigation, and by voluntarily adopting new cybersecurity technology and controls”. Nonetheless, the SEC thought a just resolution required payment of a $2.125 million civil penalty for transfer to the U.S. Treasury. I remain unconvinced that the expropriation of millions of dollars from a crime victim to the U.S. Treasury protects, much less helps, the shareholders of R.R. Donnelly & Sons, Co.

© 2010-2024 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP
For more news on SEC Punishing Crime Victims, visit the NLR Securities SEC section.

Supreme Court Rules Against Taxpayers in IRC Section 965 Case

On June 20, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a 7-2 opinion in Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. __ (2024), ruling in favor of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

Moore concerned whether US Congress and the IRS could tax US shareholders of controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) on those corporations’ earnings even though the earnings were not distributed to the shareholders. The case specifically focused on the so-called “mandatory repatriation tax” under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 965, a one-time tax on certain undistributed income of a CFC that is payable not by the CFC but by its US shareholders. Some viewed the case as hinging upon whether Congress has the power to tax economic gains that have not been “realized.” (i.e., In the case of a house whose value has appreciated from $500,000 to $600,000, the increased value is “realized” only when the house is sold and the additional $100,000 reaches the taxpayer’s coffers.)

However, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson, rejected that position on the ground that the mandatory repatriation tax “does tax realized income,” albeit income realized by a CFC. On this basis, they reasoned that the question at issue was whether Congress has the power to attribute realized income of a CFC to (and tax) US shareholders on their respective shares of the undistributed income. This group of justices ultimately decided Congress does have the power.

The majority went out of its way to avoid expressing any opinion as to whether Congress can tax unrealized appreciation, with Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s concurrence and Justice Clarence Thomas’s dissent asserting that it cannot. Perhaps the Court was signaling a distaste for the Billionaire Minimum Income Tax proposed by US President Joe Biden, which would impose a minimum 20% tax on the total income of the wealthiest American households, including both realized and unrealized amounts, among other Democratic proposals.

Practice Point: We previously noted that certain taxpayers should consider filing protective refund claims contingent on the possibility that Moore would be decided in favor of the taxpayers. In light of the case’s outcome, however, those protective claims are now moot.

© 2024 McDermott Will & Emery
For more news on US Shareholders of Foreign Corporations Taxes, visit the NLR Tax section.

EEOC Unveils Final Rule Implementing Pregnant Workers Fairness Act PWFA

Go-To Guide:
  • Effective June 18, employers covered by the Pregnancy Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) are required to offer reasonable workplace accommodations to workers who are pregnant or have a condition related to pregnancy or childbirth.
  • PWFA applies to covered entities, which include public and private employers with 15 or more employees, unions, employment agencies, and the federal government.
  • A preliminary injunction was entered on June 17, which “postpones the effective date of the Final Rule’s requirement that covered entities provide accommodation for purely elective abortions of employees that are not necessary to treat a medical condition related to pregnancy” for the states of Louisiana and Mississippi.
  • Covered employers should review the requirements of the PWFA to ensure that their workplace policies and procedures allow for the requisite accommodations under the Act and follow current challenges to accommodations regarding elective abortions under the law.

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) final rule implementing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) went into effect June 18, 2024, but not without legal challenge.

The final rule, covered in a previous GT Alert, requires employers to offer reasonable workplace accommodations to workers who are pregnant or have a condition related to pregnancy or childbirth. The rule includes an exception for employers if the requested accommodation would cause the business an undue hardship.

However, the requirement of a workplace accommodation for “purely elective abortions” has been enjoined from implementation and enforcement in the states of Louisiana and Mississippi and against four Catholic organizations. On June 17, 2024, Judge David C. Joseph in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana ruled that the EEOC overstepped its authority by requiring workplace accommodations for “purely elective abortions.”

The motions for preliminary injunction, filed by the states of Louisiana and Mississippi, as well as four entities affiliated with the Catholic Church, sought injunctive relief to the extent that the PWFA requires employers to accommodate purely elective abortions of employees. The court rejected the EEOC argument “that Congress could reasonably be understood to have granted [it] the authority to interpret the scope of the PWFA in a way that imposes a nationwide mandate on both public and private employers – irrespective of applicable abortion-related state laws enacted in the wake of Dobbs – to provide workplace accommodation for the elective abortions of employees.”

Based on its analysis, the court entered a preliminary injunction which “postpones the effective date of the Final Rule’s requirement that covered entities provide accommodation for the elective abortions of employees that are not necessary to treat a medical condition related to pregnancy” for the states of Louisiana and Mississippi and any agency thereof, any covered entity under the final rule with respect to all employees whose primary duty station is located in Louisiana or Mississippi, and the entities affiliated with the Catholic Church that sought the court’s involvement.1

What should employers know to ensure compliance with the PWFA, given the limited injunctive relief issued? Below is a summary of the law and considerations for implementing the rule, which is now effective.

Application

  • The PWFA applies to employees, which include applicants and former employees where relevant based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.
  • The PWFA applies to covered entities, which include public and private employers with 15 or more employees, unions, employment agencies, and the federal government.
  • The states of Louisiana and Mississippi; employers located in Louisiana and Mississippi and with employees whose primary duty station is located within the states; and the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Society of the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Lake Charles, the Society of the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Lafayette, and the Catholic University of America are not required to provide accommodations for the elective abortions of employees that are not necessary to treat a medical condition related to the pregnancy.

What Is Considered a ‘Known Limitation’?

  • A limitation is “known” to a covered entity if the employee, or the employee’s representative, has communicated the limitation to the covered entity.
  • The physical or mental condition may be a modest or minor and/or episodic impediment or problem.
  • An employee affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions that had a need or a problem related to maintaining their health or the health of the pregnancy. “Pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” includes uncomplicated pregnancies, vaginal deliveries or cesarian sections, miscarriage, postpartum depression, edema, placenta previa, and lactation.
  • An employee affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions who sought health care related to pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition itself.
  • There is possible overlap between the PWFA and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because in these situations, the qualified employee may be entitled to an accommodation under either statute, as the protections of both may apply.

What Is an ‘Undue Hardship’?

  • An employer or covered entity does not need to provide a reasonable accommodation if it causes an undue hardship, meaning significant difficulty or expense, to the employer.

The PWFA Prohibits the Following Conduct by Covered Employers

  • Failure to make a reasonable accommodation for the known limitations of an employee or applicant, unless the accommodation would cause an undue hardship;
  • Requiring an employee to accept an accommodation other than a reasonable accommodation arrived at through the interactive process;
  • Denying a job or other employment opportunities to a qualified employee or applicant based on the person’s need for a reasonable accommodation;
  • Requiring an employee to take leave if another reasonable accommodation can be provided that would let the employee keep working;
  • Punishing or retaliating against an employee or applicant for requesting or using a reasonable accommodation for a known limitation under the PWFA, reporting or opposing unlawful discrimination under the PWFA, or participating in a PWFA proceeding (such as an investigation); and/or
  • Coercing individuals who are exercising their rights or helping others exercise their rights under the PWFA.

Non-Exhaustive List Of Examples of ‘Reasonable Accommodations’

  • Additional, longer, or more flexible breaks to drink water, eat, rest, or use the restroom;
  • Changing food or drink policies to allow for a water bottle or food;
  • Changing equipment, devices, or workstations, such as providing a stool to sit on, or a way to do work while standing;
  • Changing a uniform or dress code or providing safety equipment that fits;
  • Changing a work schedule, such as having shorter hours, part-time work, or a later start time;
  • Telework;
  • Temporary reassignment;
  • Temporary suspension of one or more essential functions of a job;
  • Leave for health care appointments;
  • Light duty or help with lifting or other manual labor; or
  • Leave to recover from childbirth or other medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth.

Employer Training

  • Employers should consider training supervisors on how to respond to requests for accommodation.
  • Unlike requests for accommodation under the ADA, an accommodation pursuant to the PWFA may include a temporary suspension of essential job functions for qualified individuals (barring undue hardship to the employer).
  • Employees do not need to use specific words to request an accommodation to begin the interactive process.
  • Employers may not require that the employee seeking an accommodation be examined by a health care provider selected by the employer.
1 Further efforts to enjoin the implementation of the Rule were thwarted when the U.S. District Court for the District of Arkansas denied a motion for injunctive relief filed by a group of Republican state attorneys general on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the rule.
©2024 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.
For more on the PWFA, visit the NLR Labor Employment section.

Junk Science or Relevant Evidence: Supreme Court Says Experts May Now Aid in Determining Criminal Intent

In criminal cases, oftentimes the most significant element in dispute is whether the defendant harbored the intent to “knowingly” or “willfully” violate the criminal law at issue. If the defendant denies that he knew what he was doing was illegal, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the required mens rea — or mental state — to violate the law. The government does this by presenting circumstantial evidence that it argues supports a reasonable inference that the defendant had the required mental state to violate the law. And defense lawyers test that evidence largely on cross examination and by presenting counterevidence.

The more complicated the law — think tax, securities, or federal election conduit contribution laws — the riskier it is that a person can be held criminally liable for what seemed like innocent or at least not illegal conduct. In these cases, experts may be called to testify about how a certain industry or regulatory regime is structured or how it operates, and the parties can argue to the jury whether the facts of the case circumstantially prove the reasonable inference that the defendant knowingly or willfully violated a criminal law related to that industry or regulatory regime. But Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) prohibits an expert from stating an opinion about whether a criminal defendant “did or did not have the mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.” FRE 704(b) was adopted in response to President Ronald Reagan’s shooter, John Hinkley, being found not guilty by reason of insanity after competing experts offered opinions on the ultimate issue of Hinkley’s sanity. So FRE 704(b) now requires that a jury alone must decide whether the defendant intended to commit a crime. And the answer to this question is often the difference between freedom or years in prison.

In Diaz v. United States, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2024 WL 3056012 (June 20, 2024), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that FRE 704(b) does not preclude expert testimony about the likelihood that the defendant intended to commit a crime based on the defendant’s membership in a particular group. Diaz was charged with “knowingly” transporting drugs across the U.S.-Mexican border. She argued the “blind mule” defense: she did not know there were drugs in the car, therefore she did not knowingly transport them. The government called as an expert a Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent to testify that “in most circumstances, the driver knows they are hired to take drugs from point A to point B.” The Agent said that drug-trafficking organizations would expose themselves to too much risk by using unknowing couriers. The Agent admitted on cross examination that he was not involved in Diaz’s case, and that drug-trafficking organizations sometimes use unknowing couriers. The jury found Diaz guilty and she was sentenced to 84 months in prison.

Diaz argued that the Agent’s expert testimony violated FRE 704(b)’s proscription of expert’s providing opinions about whether a defendant did or did not have the required state of mind to violate the law. The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion that the Agent’s expert testimony did not violate FRE 704(b) because the expert “did not express an opinion about whether Diaz herself knowingly transported [drugs].” Instead, he testified that “most” drug couriers know they are hired to drive drugs from point A to point B. “That opinion does not necessarily describe Diaz’s mental state. After all, Diaz may or may not be like most drug couriers.” The Court acknowledged that it would have violated Rule 704(b) if the Agent had testified that “all” drug couriers know they are transporting drugs, since Diaz would be included in that drug courier group thus making it an opinion about Diaz’s mental state.

The Court said that FRE 704(b) only proscribes expert opinions “in a criminal case that are about a particular person (‘the defendant’) and a particular ultimate issue (whether the defendant has ‘a mental state or condition’ that is ‘an element of the crime charged or of a defense.’).” Because the Agent “did not give an opinion ‘about whether’ Diaz herself ‘did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense,’ his testimony did not violate Rule 704(b).”

In her concurrence, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson inferred that “what’s good for the goose is good for the gander” when she wrote that criminal defendants were now free to offer expert testimony “‘on the likelihood’ that the defendant had a particular mental state, ‘based on the defendant’s membership in a particular group.’” For example, “Diaz could have offered expert testimony on the prevalence and characteristics of unknowing drug couriers.” Justice Jackson said that the Diaz opinion will now allow psychiatrists to testify as experts “to tell the jury that when people with schizophrenia as severe as a defendant’s commit acts of violence, it is generally because they do not appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct.” This would not create a “spectacle of dueling experts on the defendant’s mental state,” Justice Jackson wrote, but instead “could help jurors better understand a defendant’s condition and thereby call into question a mens rea that might otherwise be too easily assumed…given the biases, stereotypes, and uneven knowledge that many people have about mental health conditions.”

Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote a terse dissent that was joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. The dissent said the Agent’s probabilistic assessment that “most” couriers know they are transporting drugs violated FRE 704(b) because it was a statement “about whether the defendant” had a “mental state . . . that constitutes an element of the crime charged.” The word “about” is defined as “concerning, regarding, with regard to, with reference to; in the matter of.” And according to the dissent, expert testimony about what most drug couriers know was testimony about the likelihood of what Diaz knew. Justice Gorsuch warned of “warring experts” on the issue of a defendant’s intent, which he says will make the criminal justice system less reliable as lawyers may try and find probabilistic expert opinions on intent rather than doing the hard work of gathering circumstantial evidence and arguing about what that evidence reasonably infers about a defendant’s intent.

© 2024 Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone PLC

Implications of Executive Action for Family Unity and Retention of DACA Talent for Employers and Individuals

Highlights

  • On June 18, the executive branch announced one of the most significant executive actions affecting U.S. immigration since establishing the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program in 2012
  • The family unity action would allow many undocumented spouses of U.S. citizens to obtain green cards in the U.S. without needing to depart the country
  • The DACA provisions would make it easier for some DACA recipients to qualify for a work visa

On June 18, 2024, the Biden administration announced one of the most significant executive actions promoting family unity and streamlining the process for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) recipients seeking to transition to work visas using existing legal authority.

Family Unity and Parole in Place for the Undocumented Spouses of U.S. Citizens

The executive actions initiate a process that will allow certain non-citizen spouses of U.S. citizens to apply for their green cards without leaving the U.S. Currently, a U.S. citizen can sponsor their non-citizen, foreign-born spouse for permanent residency by filing an I-130 immigration petition for the individual, regardless of their immigration status. Immigrant visas are available in this category without backlogs, unlike many other categories. However, undocumented spouses who didn’t enter the U.S. legally typically don’t qualify under current law to complete the permanent residency process in the U.S. In these situations, the spouse typically must depart from the U.S. to complete the process at a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad, thereby triggering a 10-year penalty to lawful readmission under immigration law unless waived due to hardship to a qualifying relative. This process is lengthy, uncertain and expensive, discouraging many of these families from pursuing these steps.

To provide relief, the Biden administration proposes to use the humanitarian parole authority of the executive branch to place qualifying individuals in a legal “parole,” which would then allow them to apply for adjustment of status. Approximately half a million spouses and stepchildren of U.S. citizens in “mixed-status” households could benefit from this change, if implemented.

The availability of this program, also known as Parole in Place, for qualifying non-citizen spouses will be formalized through a rule-making process and publication in the Federal Register. However, the subsequent announcement by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on June 18 included the following specifics for individuals to qualify:

  • Continuously resided in the U.S. for 10 years since June 17, 2014
  • Physically present in the U.S. on June 17, 2024
  • Legally married to a U.S. citizen as of June 17, 2024
  • Entered the U.S. without admission or parole and do not currently hold any lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status
  • Have not been convicted of any disqualifying criminal offense
  • Do not pose a threat to national security or public safety
  • Merits a favorable exercise of discretion

This program would also include non-citizen children of these spouses (i.e., stepchildren).

All requests will consider the applicant’s previous immigration history, criminal history, the results of background checks, national security, and public safety vetting, and any other relevant information available to or requested by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

Employers may stand to benefit from a substantial new group of individuals who will be work authorized and whose statuses could be legalized in the U.S. if this program proceeds.

DACA Recipients and Undocumented College Students

The administration subsequently announced that it is also taking additional steps to facilitate the process for DACA recipients to obtain work visas. DACA was created in 2012 by President Barack Obama as a means for immigrant youth who met certain eligibility requirements to qualify for work authorizations and obtain “deferred action.” While DACA protection has enabled hundreds of thousands of individuals to legally work and live in the U.S., the program has faced considerable uncertainty since 2017, when the Trump administration initially sought to terminate the program but was prevented from doing so in the federal courts.

The program continues to face legal challenges, and additional litigation before the U.S. Supreme Court is very likely. Fundamentally, DACA is not a legal status – the reliance on “deferred action” simply reflects DHS’ decision not to bring immigration removal proceedings against a specific individual. While many DACA recipients and their employers have since sought to transition to a work visa or other legal status that Congress specifically established in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the process for doing so is uncertain, expensive and cumbersome. Since DACA recipients either entered without authorization or were out of status when they received DACA protection, they are typically ineligible for a transition to a lawful status within the U.S.

Instead, they are required under immigration law to “consular process” outside the U.S. and obtain a work visa at a U.S. consulate. The individual’s departure from the U.S. could trigger removal bars (similar to those described above), requiring the individual to obtain a temporary waiver of inadmissibility from the government. These waivers, known as “d3 waivers” based on the section of the INA to which they relate, can take months to obtain and the outcome of such a waiver is not certain. These cumulative issues have chilled the interest of many employers and DACA recipients in pursuing these waivers.

In the coming weeks, the administration is expected to announce additional steps to streamline the availability of d3 waivers. The U.S. Department of State will announce changes to its process for granting such waivers to DACA recipients through updates to the Foreign Affairs Manual, and DHS has indicated that it will adopt the State Department’s policy changes. These steps, if implemented, are very good news for many employers and the DACA recipients that they employ by providing a more efficient, robust and reliable process for transitioning DACA recipients to a more stable and lawful status in the U.S.

© 2024 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
For more on the DACA Provisions, visit the NLR Immigration section.