The National Law Forum

USCIS Improvements Cut Naturalization Processing Time

USCIS is processing naturalization cases faster than they have in years, and the agency is managing to cut down on its naturalization backlog. Given the current average timing, eligible green card holders who applied early in the summer 2024 might be sworn in in time to vote in the upcoming November elections.

Of course, field offices vary in processing times, but USCIS stated it was effectively eliminating the net backlog of naturalization applications and reducing the median processing time from 10.5 months to as little as five months. This is a 50 percent drop in processing time since 2022, achieving the agency’s longstanding goal and significantly reducing waiting times for most individuals seeking U.S. citizenship. Naturalization has always been a target of note in the agency’s backlog reduction effort. This was achieved by increasing capacity, improving technology, and expanding staffing.

Naturalization cases often increase ahead of elections. Voting is not the only personal benefit of citizenship. Immigrants who become U.S. citizens may also serve on juries, travel on a U.S. passport, bring family members to the U.S. more easily, apply for certain federal jobs, run for federal office, become eligible for certain federal grants, scholarships and benefits, and, importantly, have the right to remain in the U.S. that cannot be taken away. Beyond that, findings show that naturalized citizens have higher employment rates and earn between 50 and 70 percent more than noncitizens. Increasing the number of citizens also helps the economy in general. It leads to an increase in tax revenue and greater home ownership.

When President Joe Biden came into office, he issued an executive order to reduce naturalization barriers to strengthen the integration of new Americans. About 100,300 naturalization petitions were denied in FY 2023, a 10 percent drop from the 111,600 petitions denied in FY 2022. The Biden Administration also made the naturalization application shorter and, while it raised the naturalization fee, a number of discounts are available.

Eligibility requirements for naturalization include age, continuous residence, physical presence, jurisdiction, knowledge of U.S. history, civics, and English, and good moral character.

Understanding Post-Bankruptcy Liquidation Trusts

A main goal in bankruptcy is to get in and out as quickly as possible to minimize costs. It is often the case that even though a substantial portion of a debtor’s assets have been liquidated in bankruptcy, some valuable assets will remain that can provide additional sources of recovery to creditors. These assets may include smaller pieces of real estate, accounts receivable, joint venture ownership interests, and claims and causes of action, among others.

In a chapter 11 case, the debtor exits bankruptcy by confirming a plan and having the plan go effective. When a debtor has assets remaining but is otherwise ready to exit the bankruptcy case – for example, because it has closed a sale of a substantial portion of its assets – the plan typically provides for the formation of a liquidation trust on the plan effective date. All remaining assets are transferred to the trust for liquidation, and any proceeds are distributed to creditors, i.e., the trust beneficiaries, in accordance with the plan.

The liquidation trust is established and governed by the plan and a liquidation trust agreement. A liquidation trustee is appointed to administer the trust and is granted broad powers to, among other things, liquidate assets, investigate, prosecute, and settle causes of action, object to, resolve, and pay claims, and make distributions to trust beneficiaries.

Trust beneficiaries typically appoint members of a trust advisory or oversight committee who have consultation and approval rights over certain actions proposed to be taken by the liquidation trustee. For example, the trustee may need approval from the oversight committee to resolve claims or causes of action above a certain amount, or to liquidate certain high-value assets.

Who serves as liquidation trustee and how many representatives each trust beneficiary appoints to the oversight committee are typically negotiated in connection with the plan process. The liquidation trustee may have been a professional involved in the bankruptcy, or it may be an outsider with experience serving in such a role. The oversight committee members may be creditors themselves or may be appointed as representatives of the creditors. Trust assets are typically used to compensate the liquidation trustee for its services and reimburse it for its costs and expenses, including for its retained professionals, though oftentimes initial seed funding is also required. Trust oversight committee members may receive modest compensation, which is typically capped, but which may offer an incentive for a creditor or a creditor-appointee to serve.

The role of the trust oversight committee is an important one, as the assets transferred to the trust may provide additional valuable sources of recovery to creditors. Trust beneficiaries are often creditors from different classes under the plan, and therefore may have differing interests and be entitled to different treatment. For example, a secured creditor with a lien on a parcel of real estate may be the sole beneficiary from the sale of such real estate, and therefore has an interest in overseeing how the property is marketed and sold. Even when trust beneficiaries share a right to recover from the same assets, such as from the prosecution of causes of action, they may have differing views or interests as to the potential value of the claims, whether it makes sense to settle them, and overall strategy.

When all assets are liquidated, claims resolved, distributions made, and the estates are otherwise wound down, the trust will be dissolved. Often, this does not occur until years later.

BIOSECURE Act: Anticipated Movement, Key Provisions, and Likely Impact

Last night, the House of Representatives passed the BIOSECURE Act (BIOSECURE or the Act) by a bipartisan vote of 306 to 81.

The BIOSECURE Act prohibits federal agencies from procuring or obtaining any biotechnology equipment or service produced or provided by a biotechnology company of concern. Subject to some exceptions, it also prohibits federal agencies from contracting with a company that uses equipment or services produced or provided by a biotechnology company of concern. Further, the Act prohibits recipients of a loan or grant from a federal agency from using federal funds to purchase equipment or services from a biotechnology company of concern.

The Senate version of BIOSECURE, sponsored by Sens. Gary Peters (D-MI) and Bill Hagerty (R-TN), was voted out of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental affairs with bipartisan support in March 2024. Given its passage in the House last night, the BIOSECURE Act is likely to be signed into law by the end of the year. The House version of BIOSECURE is likely to be the version that becomes law. President Biden is unlikely to veto the Act given its bipartisan support, his previous executive actions to support domestic biotechnology development, and his Administration’s approach towards competition with China.

The Act defines “biotechnology company of concern” as any entity that:

is subject to the jurisdiction, direction, control, or operates on behalf of the government of a foreign adversary (defined as China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia);
is involved in the manufacturing, distribution, provision, or procurement of a biotechnology equipment or service; and
poses a risk to U.S. national security based on:
- engaging in joint research with, being supported by, or being affiliated with a foreign adversary’s military, internal security forces, or intelligence agencies;
- providing multiomic data obtained via biotechnology equipment or services to the government of a foreign adversary; or
- obtaining human multiomic data via the biotechnology equipment or services without express and informed consent.

Somewhat unusually, the Act names specific Chinese companies as automatically qualifying as “biotechnology companies of concern”:

BGI (formerly known as the Beijing Genomics Institute);
MGI;
Complete Genomics;
WuXi AppTec; and
WuXi Biologics.

Both categories include any subsidiary, parent, affiliate, or successor entities of biotechnology companies of concern.

The Act also has very broad definitions of “biotechnology equipment or service.” The definition of equipment encompasses any machine, device, or subcomponent, including software that is “designed for use in the research, development, production, or analysis of biological materials.” The definition of services is similarly broad.

The BIOSECURE Act also requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to publish a list of additional biotechnology companies of concern. The list is prepared by the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Secretaries of the Departments of Health and Human Services, Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security, and State, as well as the Director of National Intelligence and National Cyber Director. This list of companies must be published by OMB within one year of BIOSECURE’s enactment and reviewed annually by OMB in consultation with the other Departments.

Guidance and Regulatory Authorities

OMB is also tasked with developing guidance and has 120 days from enactment of the statute to do so for the named companies. For the list of biotechnology companies of concern, OMB’s guidance must be established within 180 days after the development of the list.

Beyond OMB, the Act requires the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council to revise the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to incorporate its prohibitions. The FAR regulations must be issued within one year of when OMB establishes its guidance.

For named companies the Act’s prohibitions are effective 60 days after the issuance of the FAR regulations. For companies placed on the biotechnology company of concern list, the effective date for the Act’s prohibitions is 80 days after the issuance of FAR regulations.

Impact on Existing Business Relationships

In response to stakeholder concerns about disrupting existing commercial relationships and triggering delays in drug development, the House version of the BIOSECURE Act provides a five-year unwinding period for contracts and agreements entered into before the Act’s effective dates. Contracts entered into after the Act’s effective dates do not qualify for the five year unwinding period.

Process for Designating Companies

BIOSECURE specifies the process for designating a biotechnology company of concern. Critically, the Act does not require OMB to notify a company prior to the Department of Defense making the designation. Rather, a company will receive notice that it is being designated and placed on the biotechnology company of concern list. Moreover, the criteria for listing will only be provided “to the extent consistent with national security and law enforcement interests.” Thus, companies may face a circumstance where they are not provided the evidence supporting their designation.

Once a company receives the notice, it will have 90 days to submit information and arguments opposing the listing. The Act does not require a hearing or any formal administrative process. If practicable, the notice may also include steps the company could take to avoid being listed, but it is not required.

Safe Harbor, Waivers and Exceptions

The Act only has one safe harbor for biotechnology equipment or services that were formerly but no longer provided or produced by a biotechnology company of concern. This safe harbor seems intended to allow a biotechnology company of concern to sell their ownership of a product or service to another company without prohibitions applying to the new owner.

Agency heads may waive the Act’s prohibitions on a case-by-case basis, but only with the approval of OMB acting “in coordination with the Secretary of Defense.” Waivers must be reported to Congress within 30 days of being granted. The waiver may last for up to a year with an additional “one time” extension of 180 days allowed if an agency head determines it is “in the national security interests of the United States.” The 180-day extension must be approved by OMB and the agency head must notify and submit a justification to Congress within 10 days of the waiver being granted.

The Act has only two exceptions. First, its prohibitions do not apply to intelligence activities. Second, the prohibitions do not apply to health care services provided to federal employees, members of the armed services, and government contractors who are stationed in a foreign country or on official foreign travel.

Impact and Considerations for Clients

1. Increased Risk of Partnerships with Chinese Companies and Researchers:

Pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies that receive federal funding or contract with federal agencies should be prepared to wind down business ties to biotechnology companies in China. Impacted companies need to begin evaluating the risk to their supply chains, manufacturing capacity, and R&D pipelines in the event a business partner is listed.

Universities in the United States and other research institutes that receive federal funding will also need to undertake a similar assessment of their research partners and collaborators based in China.

2. Loss of CDMO capacity:

Wuxi App Tec is a large, global provider of contract development and manufacturing (CDMO) services to the life sciences industry. According to the New York Times “[b]y one estimate Wuxi has been involved in developing one-fourth of the drugs used in the United States.” BIOSECURE would effectively ban Wuxi from conducting business in the United States, and if passed, risks causing delays, shortages, and cost increases as companies seek to transition to other CDMOs. It will likely take years for competitors to replace the lost CDMO capacity.

3. Fate of Wuxi U.S. Facilities:

Wuxi has a large presence in the United States. It operates 12 facilities and employs almost 2,000 people. Normally, Wuxi would be expected to sell its U.S.-based facilities. However, based on Tiktok’s experience, it is unclear if the Government of China will permit Wuxi to sell its facilities as opposed to dismantling and/or relocating facilities outside of the United States.

4. OMB’s Management of Biotechnology Companies of Concern List

OMB does not typically manage processes like the one envisioned by BIOSECURE. How OMB interprets the broad criteria for listing companies will be critical. Which Departments, beyond the Department of Defense, will have the greatest influence on OMB’s decision making and how open OMB is to evidence from companies seeking to avoid listing will also need to be watched closely. Until OMB starts preparing its guidance and the FAR regulations are proposed, it is hard to anticipate the rate at which new companies will be added to the list. How the process established by BIOSECURE will interact with or leverage existing entity lists will be another development to closely monitor.

5. Retaliation by China

BIOSECURE’s passage is likely to trigger a response from the Government of China. Responses could range from imposing its own export controls to using the country’s sweeping national security laws to harass United States businesses and their employees. Companies doing business in China, particularly those in the pharmaceutical or biotech industries need to be prepared.

Supreme Court Holds Life Insurance Proceeds Paid to Closely-Held Corporation to Fund Buy-Sell Agreement Increases Estate Tax on Deceased Shareholder’s Estate

In Connelly v. U.S., 144 S.Ct. 1406 (June 6, 2024), the United States Supreme Court upheld an estate tax deficiency of $889,914 in a decision that will impact many families and closely-held businesses. A Buy-Sell Agreement is often used to ensure that a closely-held company will remain within the family after the deaths of its owners or otherwise ensure the continuity of the business after an owner’s death. Many Buy-Sell Agreements, such as the one in Connelly, provide that upon the death of an owner, the surviving owner has the option to purchase the deceased owner’s interest in the company, and if the surviving owner declines, the company must redeem the deceased owner’s interest. To ensure that the company will have funds for the redemption, the company will often obtain life insurance for its owners. For years, planners thought it possible to structure such an arrangement so that life insurance proceeds would not increase the value of the company for estate tax purposes. However, in Connelly, the Court held that the life insurance proceeds paid to a corporation upon the death of a shareholder do increase the value of the corporation’s stock for estate tax purposes and that the corporation’s obligation under a Buy-Sell Agreement to redeem the deceased shareholder’s shares does not offset the life insurance proceeds. Under the Court’s decision, the type of entity does not appear to be relevant, and the holding will equally apply to partnerships and limited liability companies. Thus, if any Buy-Sell Agreement is structured as a redemption funded with entity-owned life insurance, the insurance proceeds may increase the value of the deceased business owner’s interest for estate tax purposes.

In Connelly, two brothers, Michael and Thomas Connelly, owned a business supply corporation. Michael owned 77.18% of the company, and Thomas owned 22.82% of the company. The brothers entered into a Buy-Sell Agreement as described above. The brothers ignored provisions under the agreement that required them to value the company annually and obtain an appraisal upon a shareholder’s death. After Michael’s death in 2013, Thomas and Michael’s son simply agreed to a redemption price of $3 million for Michael’s shares. The company used $3 million of life insurance proceeds to redeem Michael’s shares, and Thomas, as Michael’s executor, reported the value of Michael’s shares as $3 million on Michael’s estate tax return without completing an appraisal. Upon audit of the estate tax return, Thomas belatedly obtained an appraisal that determined the fair market value of 100% of the company at Michael’s death to be $3.86 million, excluding the life insurance proceeds. Based on the valuation of the company at $3.86 million, Thomas argued that the value of Michael’s ownership interest was $3 million ($3.86 million x 77.18%).

Connelly rejects the position of the 11^th Circuit Court of Appeals in Blount v. Comm’r., 428 F. 3d 1338 (CA11 2005), that the life insurance proceeds paid to a company are offset by the company’s contractual obligation to redeem a deceased owner’s interest. Rather than allowing an offset for the redemption obligation, the Court focused on the value of the company before and after the redemption. If the entire company was worth $3.86 million, as claimed in Connelly, the value of Michael’s 77.18% would be $3 million and the value of Thomas’ 22.82% would be $860,000. The Court reasoned that upon redemption of Michael’s shares, Michael’s estate would receive $3 million, leaving Thomas with 100% ownership of a company worth $860,000. However, Thomas’ argument meant that post-redemption, 100% of the company that Thomas owned was worth $3.86 million. The Court refused to accept that a company which pays out $3 million to redeem shares was worth the same overall amount before and after the redemption. The Court found that the company’s value should be increased from $3.86 to $6.86 million, accounting for the insurance proceeds, increasing the value of Michael’s ownership from $3 to approximately $5.3 million ($6.86 million × 77.18%). The net result was an additional estate tax of $889,914.

Although the implications of Connelly are wide, there are limitations to the Court’s decision. Connelly will have little impact on a business owner whose estate is well under the estate tax exemption, which is currently $13.61 million for each individual and scheduled to be decreased by 50% in 2026. In addition, the Court did not address the application of Section 2703 of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides in relevant part that the value of a deceased owner’s interest in a business may be established by a Buy-Sell Agreement if certain requirements are met. Perhaps the Court did not review Section 2703 because the shareholders did not follow the valuation terms of the Buy-Sell Agreement and arbitrarily determined the redemption price instead. But because Section 2703 was not addressed in Connelly, it may yet be possible to avoid its impact with a properly structured and adhered to, Buy-Sell Agreement.

The Court also explicitly stated in a footnote that the holding does not mean that a redemption obligation can never decrease a corporation’s value. The Court implies that if a company is required to sell an operating asset to redeem shares, the redemption obligation might reduce the company’s value.

The Court acknowledged that a differently structured Buy-Sell Agreement can avoid the risk that insurance proceeds would increase the value of a deceased shareholder’s shares. Specifically, the Court referenced a “cross-purchase agreement” in which business owners, rather than the company, agree to purchase the others’ ownership upon death using proceeds from non-company owned policies. In addition to avoiding the Connelly result, a cross-purchase agreement provides an increased tax basis for the surviving owners who purchase a deceased owner’s interests. However, the more owners a business has, the more complicated a life insurance-funded cross-purchase will be. Other options to avoid the Connelly result may include a life insurance partnership or limited liability company or creatively structured split-dollar arrangements.

After Connelly, all business owners with Buy-Sell Agreements funded with entity-owned life insurance, or with other entity-owned insurance vehicles (split-dollar plans, key-person life insurance, etc.) should evaluate and consider restructuring their arrangements. In some cases, the restructuring of a Buy-Sell Agreement may require the transfer of life insurance policies which raises other tax issues, such as in-kind corporate distributions, S corporation elections, transfer-for-value rules, and incidents of ownership.

California Legislature Sends Governor Bill Prohibiting Employer ‘Captive Audience’ Meetings

On August 31, 2024, the California Legislature passed the California Worker Freedom from Employer Intimidation Act, Senate Bill (SB) No. 399. The bill heads to Governor Gavin Newsom, who has until September 30, 2024, to sign it. If he does so, the act will add new Labor Code Section 1137.

Quick Hits

California’s SB 399 would limit an employer’s ability to communicate with employees regarding political or religious matters during mandatory meetings.
The bill’s definition of “political matters” includes matters relating to union organizing.
The act provides employees with a private right of action that includes punitive damages.

If signed by the governor, SB 399 would limit an employer’s ability to communicate with employees regarding political or religious matters during mandatory meetings during working hours. Importantly, the legislation’s definition of “political matters” includes union organizing.

Prohibition against certain “captive audience meetings.” The California Senate Committee on Labor, Public Employment and Retirement defined “captive audience meetings” as “mandatory meetings during work hours, organized by an employer where employees are paid for their time attending the meeting and are required to attend or face discipline.”

The legislation would prohibit employers from “subject[ing], or threaten[ing] to subject, an employee to discharge, discrimination, retaliation, or any other adverse action because the employee declines to attend an employer-sponsored meeting or affirmatively declines to participate in, receive, or listen to any communications with the employer or its agents or representatives, the purpose of which is to communicate the employer’s opinion about religious or political matters.” The act requires that employers pay any employee who works during the meeting but declines to attend it.

“Political matters” includes union-related issues. SB 399’s legislative history and text make clear that the legislature intended to prohibit employers from forcing employees to listen to employer communications during union organizing campaigns. The bill defines “political matters” to include “the decision to join or support any political party or political or labor organization.” (Emphasis added.)

Exemptions. SB 399 identifies entities and/or activities to which it would not apply. The legislation specifically excludes religious institutions or groups that are exempt from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or California prohibitions against employment discrimination. It also would not apply to educational institutions that require students or instructors to attend lectures that include religious and/or political matters as part of coursework.

Additionally, employees would not be permitted to use SB 399 to escape from harassment or inclusiveness training. SB 399 expressly does not apply to “[a]n employer requiring employees to undergo training to comply with the employer’s legal obligations, including obligations under civil rights laws and occupational safety and health laws.” (Emphasis added.)

Agency enforcement. If enacted, SB 399 would authorize the California Labor Commissioner to enforce the law through its already-established citation process.

Penalty. An employer that violates the act would be subject to a $500 penalty per employee per violation.

Civil enforcement. Affected employees would be permitted to bring a civil action in lieu of administrative enforcement. The act would expressly authorize punitive damages.

If the governor signs SB 399, California would join a growing list of states attempting to ban “captive audience” meetings about religious and/or political matters. Other states with similar laws include Connecticut, Illinois (effective January 1, 2025), Maine, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington.

Even if Governor Newsom signs the bill into law, employer groups likely will seek to enjoin the act on the basis that it infringes on employers’ First Amendment right to express their viewpoints about unionization.

Plaintiff’s Attorney Spencer Sheehan Sanctioned

- Spencer Sheehan is a Plaintiff’s attorney who has filed hundreds of class action lawsuits against food companies for allegedly deceptive labeling and marketing. A small percentage of these lawsuits survive the motion to dismiss stage, let alone succeed on the merits. Indeed, many of his losses are suffered many times over as he has a practice of refiling essentially identical lawsuits in different jurisdictions, even after unfavorable rulings.
- His practices have increasingly drawn the ire of the courts, and this summer a United States District Court in Florida issued an order sanctioning him and making him responsible for attorney’s fees in the case.
- Specifically, the Court applied Florida fee shifting statutes, one mandatory and one discretionary, to hold Plaintiff and Sheehan responsible for the legal fees. However, the Court went further and sanctioned Sheehan for bad faith conduct. The Court noted Sheehan’s practice of re-filing failed lawsuits in other jurisdictions after “collect[ing] consumer plaintiffs through social media advertising.” Particularly troublesome to the Court was the contention that Sheehan was not an attorney of record for the Plaintiff even when his name appeared on the pleadings. The Court found that this was part of a broader practice of flagrantly violating court rules and that Sheehan had not been admitted pro hac vice to any of the twelve cases in which he is involved that are currently pending in the same district.
- Briefing in case continues as the Court decides on the final monetary award and whether or not to hold the local Florida counsel jointly responsible.
© 2024 Keller and Heckman LLP

by: Food and Drug Law at Keller and Heckman LLP

For more news on Attorney Sanctions, visit the NLR Professional & Malpractice

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As the Season Changes, Don’t Fall Behind: 4 Key Employment Law Trends

As the seasons change, so do manufacturers’ priorities. Fall is typically one of the busiest hiring periods of the calendar year, so many manufacturers are likely bracing themselves for this challenge. That said, there were several significant labor and employment updates this spring and summer of which manufacturers should be aware; below are four key trends that may require action to ensure compliance.

1. Worker Classification – Independent Contractor Versus Employees

Earlier this year, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) issued a final rule regarding employee and independent contractor status under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The new rule, which took effect March 11, 2024, adheres to a “totality of the circumstances” approach and involves consideration of six factors. Manufacturers who rely on independent contractors to perform work and provide services should consider reviewing those relationships to ensure they are adequately characterized as independent contractors rather than employees.

2. Salary Threshold for Exempt Employees Increasing

This past spring, the U.S. DOL issued a final rule that included raising in the federal minimum salary threshold for exempt employees. Previously, the salary threshold for executive, administrative, and professional employees was $684 per week (or $35,568 per year). Effective July 1, 2024, however, the salary threshold became $844 per week ($43,888 per year), and on January 1, 2025, it will once again rise to $1,128 per week ($58,656 per year). The final rule also states that the threshold will increase on July 1, 2027, and every three years thereafter. Manufacturers should review these thresholds, as well as any state or local thresholds that may exist to ensure compliance and prepare for the January 1, 2025, increase.

3. Pay Transparency Laws

Pay transparency laws, including those requiring employers to provide the pay range to applicants, candidates, and employees or to include it in job postings, continue to be passed in states nationwide. On July 31, 2024, Massachusetts passed a law requiring employers to include a “pay range” in all job postings, including those posted by third parties, such as recruiters. Massachusetts joins several other states, including Washington, DC, which passed a similar law that recently took effect on June 30, 2024; Maryland, which passed a law taking effect on October 1, 2024; laws in Minnesota and Illinois that both take effect on January 1, 2025; and a Vermont law will take effect on July 1, 2025. Notably, the Massachusetts law also contains pay data reporting requirements for employers that are subjected to annual federal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) report requirements, which includes many manufacturers. Specifically, covered manufacturers must submit an annual report of pay data categorized by race, ethnicity, sex, and job category to the Secretary of the Commonwealth, with the first report due no later than February 1, 2025. Manufacturers might consider reviewing the pay transparency and pay data reporting laws in the states in where they employ employees or engage in recruiting.

4. Paid Sick Leave Laws

While paid sick leave has been trending for a number of years, there have been significant developments in recent months. In Connecticut, the sick leave law was recently expanded significantly, and now nearly all private employees are entitled to such leave. New York has also recently become the first state in the nation to enact paid prenatal leave benefits for pregnant workers. Specifically, effective January 1, 2025, pregnant workers will be entitled to up to 20 hours of paid leave in a 52-week period to attend prenatal medical appointments and procedures. This leave is not accrued; rather, it must be immediately available to employees, and it is in addition to the paid sick and safe leave to which employees are already entitled. Manufacturers who are multi-state employers should consider engaging in a comprehensive review of their PTO and sick leave policies to ensure compliance with these recent advancements.

SEC Enforcement Takes Broad View of Anti-Whistleblower Rule in Latest Action Targeting Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealer

On 4 September 2024, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced that it settled charges against affiliated investment-advisers and a broker-dealer over the use of restrictive language in confidentiality agreements, in violation of Rule 21F-17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The firms agreed to pay a combined $240,000 in civil penalties to settle the charges. The enforcement action is the latest in the SEC’s ongoing focus on confidentiality provisions in release agreements; an emphasis that has increasingly focused on investment advisers and broker-dealers.

Rule 21F-17(a) prohibits companies from impeding an individual’s ability to communicate with the SEC regarding possible violations of the US securities laws. The SEC has read the Rule broadly and objected to what it views as restrictive language in the confidentiality provisions of a variety of agreements. In January 2024, for example, the SEC announced a $18 million civil penalty against a dual registered investment adviser and broker-dealer based on a confidentiality provision in release agreements with retail clients that the SEC interpreted as not permitting affirmative reporting.

The agreements at issue in today’s settlement similarly included language the SEC viewed as limiting an individuals’ ability to report. The SEC viewed these agreements as permitting a response to a Commission inquiry only if the “inquiry [was] not resulting from or attributable to any actions taken by [client].” The SEC also took issue with language that it viewed as requiring clients to certify both they had not made previous reports and that they would refrain from future reporting.

The Order makes clear that the SEC is aggressively enforcing Rule 21F-17(a), interpreting carveouts in confidentiality provisions narrowly and focusing instead on a client’s “reasonable impression” after reviewing the agreement. Firms should take a second look at the confidentiality provisions in their agreements, using the SEC’s strict standard, to ensure that they measure up.

EPA Delays TSCA PFAS Reporting Deadlines

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) just issued a direct final rule amending reporting deadlines for per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).

As described in our prior client alert, EPA finalized a rule last fall that requires entities that manufacture (including import) or have manufactured PFAS in any year since January 1, 2011 to submit a one-time comprehensive report regarding PFAS uses, production volumes, byproducts, disposal, exposures, and environmental or health effects.

Since EPA is still developing its reporting application to collect this data, and it will not be fully functional by November 2024, EPA has bumped back the start of the data submission period from November 12, 2024 to July 11, 2025.

The data submission period now ends on January 11, 2026, except for article importers that are also considered small manufacturers. Their submission period will end on July 11, 2026.

EPA is not proposing any changes to the scope of reporting under TSCA.

George Washington’s Whisky Distillery, 21st Century Edition

You might think the laws of King Edward I of England (1239-1307), George Washington’s whisky distillery, and an 1807 “Treatise on the Law of Idiocy and Lunacy” have little to do with the federal criminal code of 2024. And you might think they have even less to do with contemporary federal regulation of cannabis. But the Supreme Court’s test for the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms requires litigants and courts to become historians scouring the archives. So, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held a federal criminal statute barring unlawful users of controlled substances from possessing firearms and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), was unconstitutional as applied. The government’s prosecution of a “non-violent, marijuana smoking gunowner” was dismissed (United States v. Connelly, — F.4th — (5th Cir. 2024).

Those intrigued by the ins and outs of historical firearms regulations, and the back and forth between the Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit on that issue, can study the court’s opinion. The facts, however, were straightforward and seemingly commonplace. The defendant “would at times smoke marijuana as a sleep aid and for anxiety.” So do countless Americans, in full compliance with applicable state laws allowing just such uses. The defendant owned a firearm. Again, nothing remarkable there. Yet federal officials charged the defendant with violating criminal law. The Fifth Circuit put an end to the prosecution, as it did in a similar case last year, United States v. Daniels, 77 F.4th 337 (5th Cir. 2023), vacated, 144 S. Ct. 2707 (2024) (for reconsideration in the light of United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024)), which we discussed last year here.

Three takeaways stand out for the industry:

1. The federal classification of cannabis does not trump constitutional rights.

Noticeably absent from the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning was any deference to the federal scheduling of cannabis as a controlled substance. That may be due to the unique historical test applicable to the Second Amendment. Still, the opinion shows the Constitution has no cannabis exception. Judicial statements like “[m]arijuana user or not,” the defendant “is a member of our political community and thus” has constitutional rights are a welcome change in emphasis. When facing an enforcement challenge, industry participants should evaluate constitutional challenges they may have. The Constitution may just win the day.

2. Analogies to regulation of alcohol carried more weight than analogies to other regulatory schemes.

The government tried to analogize cannabis users to several regulatory schemes, including a tenuous (at best) analogy to mental health. Nothing doing there. The Fifth Circuit instead analogized to alcohol regulation, concluding that both alcohol and cannabis can cause a temporary, potentially “impairing influence.” So, just as the federal government does not charge firearms owners with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) because they occasionally consume alcohol, the government could not prosecute the defendant because she occasionally consumed cannabis.

This decision suggests that future enforcement targets might find success in analogizing cannabis to alcohol. Subject to appropriate regulatory control and responsible personal use, alcohol consumption is an accepted part of American society. Indeed, as the Fifth Circuit took pains to note, American acceptance of alcohol consumption dates to the colonial period. Just ask George Washington. And it’s still going strong today. Manufacturers and distributors of alcoholic beverages can advertise their products widely — watch the Super Bowl — and they benefit from access to the banking system, stock market, and other financial opportunities closed to the cannabis industry. Situating the cannabis industry in that established history may help show that cannabis should follow a similar pattern. And it may call into question differential regulatory treatment of the two industries.

3. Supposed “dangerousness” cannot justify treating cannabis differently.

The Fifth Circuit declined the government’s invitations to analogize cannabis users to “dangerous” persons, like political traitors, whom the Constitution might permit disarming. That is, of course, a marked shift from the historical justification for the federal ban on cannabis — a supposed propensity to “incite[] violent crimes,” that modern medicine shows is false.

Rejecting the supposed “dangerousness” of occasional cannabis users furthers questions about whether prohibitions on cannabis serve a legitimate purpose. Recall Justice Clarence Thomas’s 2021 statement questioning the federal approach as a contradictory and unstable “half-in, half-out regime” that “strains basic principles of federalism and conceals traps for the unwary” (Standing Akimbo, LLC v. United States, 594 U.S. 2236 (2021) (Thomas, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari)). As more courts reject federal attempts to treat cannabis users differently from other citizens, future litigants may consider asserting constitutional due process or equal protection challenges to regulations. After all, as Connelly shows, courts stand ready to vindicate constitutional rights, “[m]arijunana user or not.”

The National Law Forum

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