May 2021 Legal Industry News Highlights: Attorney Moves, Law Firm Pro Bono Work & Innovation

We’ve returned with another edition of our legal industry news column for May. Read on for the latest news on attorney promotions, law firm recognition, pro bono work and legal technology and innovation:

Attorney Promotions & Moves

The International Financial Law Review (IFLR) recognized Blakes’ law firm partners Pamela Huff and Catherine Doyle as IFLR1000 Woman Leaders for the quality of their advice and the consistent recommendations of their clients and peers.

Ms. Huff is the head of the Blakes Restructuring & Insolvency group and advises on Canadian business law. Ms. Doyle is a leading member of Blakes’ Project & Financial Services group. Ms. Doyle has been a part of some of the most impactful infrastructure deals in Canada.

Jamie M. Ramsey joined Frost Brown Todd as the newest litigation member of the Cincinnati, Ohio office. Mr. Ramsey’s litigation experience includes breach of contract claims and trademark infringement to class action litigation. Mr. Ramsey also has experience helping clients navigate the legal framework impacting the collection, use, and protection of personal information.

“Jamie’s work with everyone from start-ups to Fortune 500 companies will provide our clients additional insight into how to manage risks to both their operations and reputations,” said Cincinnati Member-in-Charge Chris Habel. “He represents companies in both Ohio and Kentucky, and we couldn’t be more excited to have him in our Cincinnati office.”

Marjorie J. Peerce, managing partner of Ballard Spahr’s New York Office, is the new Vice President of the New York City Bar Association (NYCBA). Ms. Peerce served as Chair of the NYCBA Board of Directors since May 2020. She also formerly served as Chair of the NYCBA’s Criminal Law Committee and served on the Mass Incarceration Task Force. The NYCBA, founded in 1870, works to maintain the high ethical standards of the legal profession and includes over 150 committees.

Ms. Peerce is a founder and leader of Ballard Spahr’s Blockchain Technology and Cryptocurrency team, and handles high profile civil and criminal matters in state and federal courts in New York and around the US.

Adrian Cyhan joined Stubbs, Alderton and Markiles, LLP as a partner in the firm’s Intellectual Property & Technology Transactions practice. Mr. Cyhan is a patent attorney who focuses on identifying, protecting and leveraging intellectual property assets and providing related counsel and advice.

Mr. Cyhan manages intellectual property portfolios and handles intellectual property-related transactions such as joint ventures, acquisitions, and divestitures.

“I’ve known Adrian for several years and I’m thrilled we will be working together. He’s an exceptional attorney and a creative thinker. Bringing Adrian on-board reflects SA&M’s commitment to expanding our premier IP and technology law practice,” said Kevin D. DeBré, the Stubbs, Alderton and Markiles’ IP & Technology Transactions practice chair.

Law Firm Pro Bono & Philanthropy

Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP attorneys Corby C. AndersonMatthew S. DeAntonioErin Jane Illman, and Jonathan E. Schulz joined the 2020 class of the North Carolina Pro Bono Honor Society. The attorneys each provided more than 50 hours of pro bono legal services in 2020 to North Carolinians in need.

“Our Charlotte attorneys continue to go above and beyond to provide equal access to justice for all,” said Bradley Pro Bono Counsel Tiffany Graves. “We are very proud of their commitment to the community and their well-earned recognition by the North Carolina Pro Bono Honor Society.”

Bradley Arant Boult Cummings attorneys work with the Safe Alliance’s Victim Assistance/Legal Representation Program to help victims of domestic violence and the Charlotte Center for Legal Advocacy, which helps low income residents of the Charlotte metropolitan area and west-central North Carolina.

The North Carolina Pro Bono Honor Society is administered by the North Carolina Pro Bono Resource Center, which launched in 2016.

The American Bar Association (ABA) Standing Committee on Pro Bono and Public Service selected Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton as an individual recipient of its 2021 Pro Bono Publico Awards. The awards are scheduled to be presented on the opening day of the 2021 ABA Annual Meeting, which runs through Aug. 10.

The Committee selected Sheppard Mullin for its actions following the death of George Floyd. The firm launched the Active Bystandership for Law Enforcement (ABLE) project with Georgetown Law’s Innovative Policing Program, which came from an initiative to teach officers to become active bystanders and prevent misconduct in the New Orleans Police Department.

The initiative led to Sheppard Mullin successfully litigating cases in California to obtain disclosure of records of police misconduct, as well as executing a plan to manufacture and secure face shields for frontline workers in Los Angeles.

The Committee also selected Cynthia Chandler, the director of Bay Area Legal Incubator, Oakland, California, TerryAnn Howell of Nelson Mullins in Miami, Neal Manne of Susman Godfrey LLP in Houston and Rebecca Rapp of the Ascendium Education Group in Madison, Wisconsin as recipients of the 2021 Pro Bono Publico Awards.

Ms. Chandler grew the Bay Area Legal Incubator with the Alameda County Bar Association and Legal Access Alameda to help coach diverse attorneys on how to build successful, affordable law practices serving low and middle-income clients throughout California.

Ms. Howell helped launch a COVID-19 Small Business and Nonprofit Clinic with Legal Services of Greater Miami at Nelson Mullins through Lawyers for Good Government. She also volunteers alongside other Nelson Mullins attorneys at the Tenants’ Equal Justice Clinic (TEJC), a project of Legal Services of Greater Miami.

Mr. Manne dedicated 40 years of his career to high-impact pro bono work. His accomplishments include being recognized by the American College of Trial Lawyers for his pro bono work, as well as being named Attorney of the Year by Texas Lawyer. Most recently, Mr. Manne helped reform Houston’s money bail system and represented two death row exonerees.

Ms. Rapp helps increase access to areas dubbed as “legal deserts” due to a shortage of attorneys, including a project to provide legal help to technical colleges around Wisconsin. She also assists clients at legal clinics and serves on the boards and committees of several access-to-justice organizations. Ms. Rapp also testified before the Wisconsin Supreme Court on removing limitations on pro bono services.

Legal Aid Service of Broward County (LAS) and Coast to Coast Legal Aid of South Florida (CCLA) announced the recipients of their 2021 Annual Recognition Awards.

LAS and CCLA presented the awards in a series of live presentations via Facebook Live May 4–7, 2021.

The 2021 recipients include:

●               Lauren Alperstein, Esq., of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP received the Attorney of the Year Award.

●                Van Horn Law Group received the Law Firm of the Year award.

●               Ofer Shmucher, Esq. and Shera Anderson, Esq. of Shmucher Law, PL received the Spirit of Justice Award.

●               Theresa Edwards, Esq., of American Justice, P.A. received the Commitment to Justice Award.

●                Anthony J. Karrat, Esq., Executive Director of Legal Aid Service of Broward County received the Russell E. Carlisle Advocacy Award.

●               Edwin Cordova, Esq.Supervising Attorney of the Housing Unit at Legal Aid Service of Broward County received the Jacquelyn and Bruce Rogow Employee of the Year Award.

Law Firm Innovation & Technology

Winstead law firm partnered with Texas Health Catalyst at Dell Medical School at The University of Texas at Austin to support entrepreneurs who are in the early stages of developing healthcare technology products.

Winstead provides entrepreneurs with resources on legal matters such as entity formation, licensing from universities, IP strategy, funding, lease agreements, OSHA, privacy/global agreements, as well as educational programming and opportunities to meet and network with other startup professionals.

“Winstead is committed to moving healthcare technology and the latest innovations in the life sciences industry forward,” said Winstead Shareholder Lekha Gopalakrishnan. “Our collaboration with Texas Health Catalyst is intended to advance their mission of addressing unmet needs in healthcare through technology innovation.”

Davidoff Hutcher & Citron LLP (DHC), a New York-based commercial law and government relations firm, formed their Cannabis Practice Group to help clients navigate regulations around adult recreational marijuana in New York State. DHC’s Cannabis Practice Group builds upon DHC’s decades of experience in highly regulated and similar industries, such as New York’s wine, liquor and packaged goods industries.

“The Office of Cannabis Management will be implementing laws and regulations governing the growing and evolving cannabis industry in New York. They will be similar to those that govern entities regulated by the State Liquor Authority, and both will exist under a tiered system,” said Steve Malito, Chair of the Cannabis Practice Group. “Davidoff Hutcher & Citron is uniquely qualified to advise our clients in the cannabis space as they navigate the complexities of these regulations.”

In line with recent Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) efforts nationwide, Schiff Hardin announced the formation of their new ESG Team to help companies develop programs and company disclosures that incorporate the many ESG principles. Amy Antoniolli leads the team along with key members Sarah FittsJane Montgomery, and Katherine Walton.

“Stakeholders have made clear that corporate responsibility is not just a fad or a slogan, and industry is responding as quickly as possible,” said Ms. Antoniolli. “Schiff has seen ESG quickly become an integral part of a company’s reporting and a significant factor in successful business deals. With stakes this high, companies have the opportunity to meet ESG metrics that protect their bottom line and their reputation.”


Copyright ©2021 National Law Forum, LLC
For more articles on the legal industry, visit the NLRLaw Office Management section.

Judge Looks “Kind”ly Upon Certifying Class in Snack Bar Advertising Suit

In a recent opinion out of the Southern District of New York, Judge William H. Pauley III certified three classes of plaintiffs in New York, California, and Florida who allege that KIND LLC, the manufacturer of KIND Bars, deceptively marketed several products as “all natural” and “non-GMO,” even though they purportedly contain synthetic and genetically modified ingredients.  In re KIND LLC “Healthy and All Natural” Litig., No. 15-md-02645 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2021).

The court began its analysis by examining each of the four Rule 23(a) requirements—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy—and determining that each weighed in favor of class certification.  Most notably, the court found that common questions predominated despite the absence of any uniform definition of the term “natural” because, in its view, all the definitions plaintiffs advanced were consistent with one another.  Plaintiffs offered definitions of “natural” from the dictionary, FDA policy, the USDA, and Congress. In considering these various definitions, Judge Pauley recognized that “these formulations of the definition ‘natural’ differ,” but dismissed these concerns because he believed none “exclude[d] another.”

This decision is somewhat surprising, given the deep reservoir of class certification decisions finding that, where plaintiffs fail to establish a controlling definition for a key term or phrase in the challenged advertisement, individual issues predominate and class certification should be denied.  A number of courts have reached this conclusion in the “natural” labeling sphere:

  • In Astiana v. Kashi Co., the court refused to certify a class bringing “all natural” claims, in part because the plaintiffs were unable to show that “all natural” had a shared meaning amongst the proposed class. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108445, *40 (S.D. Cal. 2013)
  • In Thurston v. Bear Naked, Inc., a federal judge in the Southern District of California found commonality and predominance lacking because the plaintiffs “fail[ed] to sufficiently show that ‘natural’ has any kind of uniform definition among class members.” 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151490, *25 (S.D. Cal. 2013).
  • In Randolph v. J.M. Smucker Co., the court denied class certification where plaintiff had “not demonstrated that an objectively reasonable consumer would agree with her interpretation of ‘all natural,’” while also noting that this failure “unequivocally exposes the fact that there is a lack of consensus” surrounding what constitutes a “natural” product. 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176731, *14 (S.D. Fla. 2014).

Courts regularly adopt this reasoning in other contexts also. See Pierce-Nunes v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149847 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that the predominance requirement was not satisfied where plaintiffs could not establish a common meaning for the term “LED TV”); In re 5-Hour Energy Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220969 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (same based on “energy”); In re Tropicana Orange Juice Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102566 (D.N.J. 2019) (same based on “pasteurized”).

The FDA also has not adopted, and has actually declined to adopt, a formal definition of the term “natural,” citing the “many facets of this issue” the agency would have to carefully consider if it were to undertake the task of defining the term.  See 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2407 (Jan. 6, 1993).  In doing so, the FDA noted “the ambiguity surrounding use of this term.”  It is difficult to square this ambiguity with the KIND court’s certification decision.

Watch this space as we monitor whether this decision is part of a shifting tide in “natural” certification decisions, or merely an outlier amidst continuing struggles to reach consensus on what “natural” even means.

© 2021 Proskauer Rose LLP.


For more articles on food class actions, visit the NLRLitigation / Trial Practice section.

Not With a Bang but a Whimper

In a non-precedential Order issued by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—on remand from the US Supreme Court’s April 2021 decision upholding Google’s fair use defense to Oracle’s copyright infringement claim—the Court recalled its mandate in the case “solely with respect to fair use,” leaving intact the Federal Circuit’s May 2014 judgment favoring Oracle on the question of copyrightability. Oracle America Inc. v. Google LLC, Case Nos. 17-1118; 1202 (Fed. Cir. May 14, 2021)(PER CURIAM). After recalling its mandate, the Federal Circuit issued its order without further briefing by the parties.


© 2021 McDermott Will & Emery

For more articles on IP law, visit the NLRIntellectual Property section.

The Need for Speed: Five Drivers Affecting Developments in Climate Action

Current climate action around the globe and in the U.S. signals the very real possibility that efforts to address climate change are not moving fast enough for some. The landmark Dutch court decision ordering Royal Dutch Shell PLC to cut 2019 greenhouse gas emissions levels by 45% by 2030 and the results of recent energy company shareholders’ meetings provide two examples, highlighting that change is in the air. We list five drivers, among many, affecting recent developments in climate action:

1. The Courts – Recent court verdicts are accelerating climate change action at home and abroad. In the U.S. Supreme Court, decisions on climate-related cases lodged by state and local governments are advancing climate issues toward a future Supreme Court ruling on whether climate torts belong in state or federal court. Citing its recent BP PLC et al. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore decision, the high court vacated and remanded First, Ninth, and Tenth circuits decisions, to allow for expanded jurisdictional reviews. In the Netherlands, a Dutch court ordered Royal Dutch Shell PLC to cut its greenhouse gas emissions to align with the Paris Agreement. This result could trigger “a wave of climate-related litigation.”

2. The Biden Administration – The Biden Administration’s “whole-of-government” approach to climate change is having an enormous impact. The President’s decision to rejoin to the Paris Agreement sends a message heard around the world that the U.S. is serious about climate change. The Administration’s full court press on climate issues encompasses everything from policies to federal appointees to the Social Cost of Carbon to a sustainable federal supply chain to the acceleration of the electric vehicle transformation.

3. Financial Governance  The Treasury Department’s new climate hub as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission’s anticipated climate-related disclosures requirement reflect the depth and breadth of renewed focus on climate change within the financial sector. Additional emphasis on Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) initiatives will include an environmental justice focus.

4. Investors – Climate action affected the latest shareholder votes within the energy industry. ExxonMobil shareholders elected two environmentally conscious directors to the board, while Chevron shareholders pushed the company to cut greenhouse gas emissions. Increasingly, those who finance businesses are getting involved in the climate change battle, as witnessed by Goldman Sachs’ $750B climate commitmentCitibank’s $1.5T sustainability program, and the global banking and insurance industry coalition, Glasgow Finance Alliance for Net Zero.

5. Demographics – It is clear that new voices are entering the climate change debate, with increasing influence. Millennials, Generation Z, and environmental justice communities in general view the climate issue differently than generations past. Industry must account for their perspectives and influence both today and tomorrow.

With these changes in the air, the regulated community will want to consider how to adapt to an accelerating climate change focus.

© 2021 Beveridge & Diamond PC


For more articles on climate, visit the NLR Environmental, Energy & Resources section.

A Return to Normal?

On Friday, May 28th, Governor Murphy will be lifting the State of New Jersey’s mask and social distancing mandate for mo2st businesses. That said, the most recent Executive Order makes clear that businesses can require mask use if they want and cannot stop people from wearing masks, if they so choose.

“Indoor public spaces” will no longer require masks or social distancing, HOWEVER, this does NOT include indoor worksites of employers that do not open their indoor spaces to the public for purposes of sale of goods, attendance at an event or activity, or provision of services. So in the typical closed office environment, individuals continue to be required to wear face coverings, subject only to exceptions that have previously existed, such as when employees are at distanced workstations or in their own offices, and shall continue to maintain six feet of distance from others to the maximum extent possible, except in the circumstances described therein. That said, if you have a business where customers are coming into the building to get products or services, mask use and social distancing will not be required by law. Additionally those who are not vaccinated are “strongly encouraged” to continue to wear a mask when indoors.

© 2021 Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, P.C. All Rights Reserved


ARTICLE BY Jay S. Becker,  Jeri L. Abrams and

For more articles on COVID-19, visit the NLR Coronavirus News section.

“We are not going to be moving slowly” SEC Director on ESG Disclosure Requirements

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requests public comments to be made ahead of their decision to possibly strengthen Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance (ESG) disclosures for corporations. Specifically, this action would hold companies more accountable for their possible contributions to global climate decline. While the comment period is open until June 13th, SEC Director of the Division of Corporation Finance John Coates urges submissions sooner rather than later.

“We’re not going to be moving slowly,” Coates said in a round table discussion of the SEC action hosted by New York University Vincent C. Ross Institute of Accounting Research on April 30th. “We’re going to be moving relatively promptly on this front, and if you really want your contributions read, I would send them in earlier than June 13th.”

Coates assured that more detailed attention will go into the submissions received ahead of the deadline.

“If you get them in earlier… we will be able to spend more time carefully reading them right away. We will eventually process all of them, just to be clear, but it may take more time for the ideas of them to get into our head so sooner rather than later, would be great.”

Among the comments already submitted, there is a wide range of opinions on whether the SEC is overstepping its responsibilities in taking on climate issues by requiring more transparency from companies. While some commenters tell the SEC to leave any climate policy to elected officials, others are enthusiastic about more uniform and structured approaches to accountability.

Some opinions fall in the middle, where commenters want to see the SEC simply enforce existing guidelines, set by organizations such as the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) and the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), instead of creating new and possibly confusing procedures. This is in response to arguments that the current course of action in climate reporting is insufficient, and corporations have found ways to escape sharing climate impact with their shareholders in the past.

Kelsey Condon, a whistleblower attorney at Kohn, Kohn and Colapinto, published an article on this issue stating, “This policy change is important for whistleblowers to be aware of because a corporation’s misleading statements on these subjects are now likely to be treated as material by the SEC and may actually be prosecuted. Corporate insiders, i.e., whistleblowers, are well-positioned to report to the SEC when they know that a company’s statements about climate and ESG are false or designed to be misleading.”

And that, “Whistleblowers are a crucial source of information and evidence, providing a window into the opaque and sophisticated worlds of corporate inner workings and criminal networks, which law enforcement would otherwise not have. In this way, whistleblowers are our best hope for holding corporations to their environmental promises through such reporting. Now, the SEC may actually take action on such reports, and whistleblowers will enjoy the safeguards that come with reporting to the SEC, such as anti-retaliation protection, anonymity, and awards.”

With stricter regulations would come a greater need for those ready to blow the whistle on companies still failing to accurately communicate their environmental impact.

To read previously submitted comments, or submit your own, click here.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2021. All Rights Reserved.


ARTICLE BY Grace Schepis of Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto

For more articles on the SEC, visit the NLR Securities & SEC section.

Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, and The Picture of Dorian Gray

It isn’t every day that the Law Court addresses claims of civil conspiracy or aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty, but that is exactly what the court did in Meridian Medical Systems, LLC v. Epix Therapeutics, Inc. – with a bit of literary allusion thrown in.

In Meridian, the Court clearly stated for the first time that

“civil liability can attach for aiding and abetting another’s tortious conduct.”

Meridian involved a business relationship gone bad.  Ken Carr, in his capacity as assignee of the claims of Meridian, sued corporate defendants which had a relationship with Meridian as a result of a licensing agreement.  The complaint asserted that the value of Meridian’s technology was not maximized due to the conduct of Ken Carr’s co-managers at Meridian, which allegedly was encouraged by the defendants.  The complaint included counts for “conspiracy” and “aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty.”

Reviewing the order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court emphasized that it must carefully “parse” a complaint to determine whether “its allegations meet the elements of a viable claim.”  Rhetoric and the sheer size of a complaint cannot alone carry the day.  Citing The Picture of Dorian Gray, Oscar Wilde’s famous story of the price of moral corruption, Justice Connors noted that terms such as “corrupt” may “own literary value, [but] it adds no substance to a legal cause of action.”

Meridian stands for two propositions of particular note – there is no tort for “conspiracy” under Maine law, but there can be a claim for “aiding and abetting” in the civil context.  The first was already settled under Maine law, but the second was not.  Until Meridian Medical Systems, the status of the aiding and abetting doctrine has been “uncertain in the civil context.”

The Court ended that uncertainty, stating flatly that a party can be civilly liable for aiding and abetting tortious conduct.  Unlike conspiracy, aiding and abetting focuses not on agreement but on “assistance in committing the underlying tort.” Proof of aiding and abetting in the civil context requires

  1. knowledge that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty, and
  2. substantial assistance or encouragement to the other to so conduct himself.

Thus, “the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury,” and the defendant must “be generally aware of his role as part of . . . tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance” and “must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation.”

The Court, however, provided two important caveats.  “First, the aider and abettor must have actual – and not merely constructive – knowledge that the principal tortfeasor is engaged in tortious conduct.”  This provides an important limit on the scope of civil liability.  “Second the defendant must commit acts constituting substantial assistance in the commission of the underlying tort.”  Substantiality depends on a variety of factors, including the amount of assistance and the defendant’s state of mind.

The Law Court ultimately held that the plaintiff failed to allege knowing, substantial assistance in any breach of fiduciary duty.  Nevertheless, after Meridian, it is clear that while there may be no liability for conspiracy – or even corruption on the scale of The Picture of Dorian Gray – a party may be liable for aiding and abetting tortious conduct.

©2021 Pierce Atwood LLP. All rights reserved.
For more articles on civil conspiracy, visit the NLR Litigation / Trial Practice section.

PREP Act Immunity and Its Application in Shareholder Derivative Litigation: A Modest Proposal

Much has been published recently about the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREP Act” or “Act”) in the COVID-19 era.[1]  Its protections, including broad immunity from liability, have been extended to individuals and companies involved in the design, manufacture, distribution and administration of  “countermeasures” against the SARS-CoV-2 virus.  Although the PREP Act has been around for more than 15 years, its defensive application in litigation before COVID-19 was limited.  Now, more than a year into the pandemic, application of the PREP Act is being more actively litigated, primarily in the context of COVID-19 deaths in skilled nursing and assisted living facilities.[2] 

Still unresolved, however, is whether there is any basis for using the PREP Act defensively in shareholder derivative suits which allege that “materially deceptive statements” made by companies trying to make vaccines and other “countermeasures” are covered by the PREP Act.  While there has been no definitive judicial assessment of this question, there are reasons that companies facing such claims should consider seeking such a determination.

The PREP Act: Background

In 2005, Congress passed the PREP Act as a tool to combat public health emergencies.  It empowered the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“Secretary”) to issue a “Declaration” that “a disease or other health condition or other threat to health constitutes a public health emergency, or that there is a credible risk that the disease, condition, or threat may in the future constitute such an emergency.”[3]  If such a Declaration is issued, immunity from liability will apply to persons and companies engaged in providing “countermeasures” to combat the perceived public health threat.  Such a Declaration was issued by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in March 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.  Through various subsequent amendments to the Declaration, as well as guidance and advisory opinions, the scope of immunity was further illuminated and in some ways expanded.

Historical Application of the PREP Act

Prior to COVID-19, few cases invoked the PREP Act.  Among those that did, most favored supporting immunity despite various forms of harm.  Unsurprisingly, most of the cases focused on the vaccine for the H1N1 virus.

In Parker v. St. Lawrence County Public Health Department,[4] the claim was that a child was immunized against the H1N1 virus without parental consent.  The court disposed of this claim, holding that the PREP Act “preempts plaintiff’s state law claims for negligence and battery.”[5]

In Kehler v. Hood,[6] a plaintiff sued a physician and the physician’s employer, claiming that the defendants failed to obtain the plaintiff’s informed consent before administering the H1N1 vaccine.  This led to the development of “a severe case of transverse myelitis.”[7] The defendants then brought a third-party action against the vaccine manufacturer, Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics.  Novartis moved to dismiss all claims against it under the PREP Act.  The court agreed, held that Novartis enjoyed absolute immunity from liability pursuant to the PREP Act, and dismissed those claims.

Not all cases allowed a defendant to benefit from the PREP Act.  In Casabianca v. Mount Sinai Medical Center,[8]the claim centered on the failure to administer a flu vaccine, which allegedly led to various serious medical consequences.  The Trial Order—not an officially published opinion—determined that withholding a vaccine (as opposed to administering it) was not covered by the statute.  In the COVID-19 context, this reasoning may not apply since the amendments of the Declaration related to the COVID-19 pandemic make clear that failure to administer a covered activity may still be covered by the PREP Act if withholding from one person is related to the need to administer to another.[9]

Application of the PREP Act During the COVID-19 Pandemic

COVID-19 has seen a plethora of lawsuits in which the PREP Act has been invoked.  Many involve skilled nursing or assisted living facilities where COVID-19 countermeasures were not administered and patients/residents passed away.[10]  Some decisions hinged on a determination as to whether the withholding of countermeasures was causally related to the administration of countermeasures to another person.  In other words, were there limited resources and the sued entity made decisions about who would have access to those limited resources?  In most cases, courts ruled that such withholding was not a resource issue and declined to rule that the PREP Act applied.[11] 

In Haro v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,[12] an employee of a Kaiser Foundation Hospital was required to report for work 15 minutes before her shift began for COVID-19 medical screening, without compensation for that extra time.  Here, the court also held that the PREP Act did not apply.[13]

PREP Act Immunity and Shareholder Derivative Suits

An unresolved question is whether the PREP Act provides protection to companies and their executives who are sued in shareholder class action suits.  A number of recently filed cases allege that manufacturers who engaged in efforts to formulate COVID-19 vaccines and other therapies, but failed to achieve regulatory approval in the U.S., committed violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“Securities Act”).  These complaints allege generally that (a) the companies and key executives made intentionally false and misleading statements that led investors to purchase securities; (b) the value of the securities was artificially inflated by the allegedly fraudulent statements; and (c) the value then declined upon the failure of the promised vaccine or other countermeasures to obtain regulatory approval.[14]

Undoubtedly, these companies can assert a number of different arguments which may militate in favor of dismissal of these putative class action complaints, most prominently that any statements made were not intentionally false, as required by the Securities Act.  One argument that has not been a traditional defense in shareholder derivative suits is PREP Act immunity.  The argument will need to focus on whether the terms of the PREP Act contemplate immunity to the type of injury alleged in shareholder derivative suits.

The terms of the PREP Act provide a starting point for this defense.  The PREP Act provides a list of the kinds of claims it seeks to limit by virtue of the grant of broad immunity.  Certainly, “garden variety” personal injury claims are covered, including when the harm alleged includes:

(i)    Death;

(ii)   Physical, mental or emotional injury, illness, disability or condition;

(iii)  Fear of physical, mental or emotional injury, illness, disability, or condition, including any need for medical monitoring.[15]

However, the PREP Act also includes an additional category of loss that, by its terms, clearly goes beyond personal injury:

(iv)  Loss of or damage to property, including business interruption loss.[16] 

The question is whether shareholder damages, e.g., the loss in share value alleged in recent shareholder claims, could be a “loss of or damage to property” under the PREP Act.[17]

Shareholder claims generally allege that false or misleading statements by a company and its executives induced a member of the public to purchase shares at inflated value, which subsequently diminished in value when the falsity of the statements became known.  Although there are several cases alleging shareholder losses due to allegedly “false or misleading” claims by companies involved in the manufacture or sale of COVID-19 “countermeasures,”[18] none of the cases considered the question whether “loss of or damage to property” could include diminution in value of the shares in such a company.  Indeed, none of the defendants appear to have pleaded the PREP Act as a defense. There are arguments to be made as to why they should consider doing so.

Like personal injury claims, fraud is a tort, albeit an intentional one.[19]  The PREP Act certainly envisions that some types of covered claims might not merely be ones of negligence or accidental torts since the compensation scheme provides for special treatment of conduct that constitutes “willful misconduct.”[20]  The section on “willful misconduct” makes clear that the only injuries for which there may be an exception to the blanket immunity otherwise granted by the Act, is willful misconduct that results in serious physical injury or death.[21]  The plain meaning of the text shows that for other kinds of “willful misconduct”—for example, willful misconduct causing “loss of or damage to property”—immunity still applies and no damages will be permitted outside of the limited compensation scheme under the PREP Act.[22] 

The question remains whether the statute applies to any harm—intentional or otherwise—other than personal injury.  Rules of statutory construction require that any such inquiry starts with the terms of the statute and whether the language “has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”[23]  The United States Supreme Court has made clear that ‘‘[o]ur inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’’’[24]  Here, the statute unambiguously creates a category of harm that is clearly different from the descriptions of personal injuries (or fear of personal injury) described in the preceding three definitional sections.  “Loss of property” suggests a pecuniary loss and supports the notion that the kinds of harm contemplated by the statute is broad enough to include the financial harm described in the shareholder suits.[25]

The terms of the PREP Act are further illuminated by the Declaration, which is statutorily required to invoke the PREP Act to combat a public health crisis.[26]  In his Declaration of March 17, 2020, the Secretary acknowledged that COVID-19 constituted a public health emergency and declared PREP Act immunity to be in effect to encourage “the design, development, clinical testing, or investigation, manufacture, labeling, distribution, formulation, packaging, marketing, promotion, sale, purchase, donation, dispensing, prescribing, administration, licensing, and the use of the Covered Countermeasures.”[27]  Thus, the “desirability of encouraging”[28] these activities lends credence to the argument that statements made in the course of “design, development, clinical testing or investigation”[29] are related to these countermeasures and fall within the purview of the grant of PREP Act immunity.  Clearly, the record shows that Congress recognized the need to impose limits on liability across a range of matters to encourage private industry participation in addressing the current public health crisis.  Extending immunity for shareholder derivative suits is consistent with this goal.[30]

Even the legislative history of the PREP Act provides evidence that the broadest interpretation of the kinds of harm that are covered by the statute’s grant of immunity is appropriate.  While the legislative history surrounding the PREP Act is sparse, particularly regarding the provision regarding “loss of or damage to property,” there is certainly some evidence to support the idea that the immunity should be read broadly.  Although there does not seem to be any specific consideration as to whether allegedly fraudulent statements by “covered persons” are covered by the PREP Act, several opponents of the Act voiced their concern about the breadth of immunity contemplated by the Act and, in doing so, provide guidance as to the legislative intent behind the statute.  For example, then-Senator Joe Biden stated:

[T]his is no typical grant of immunity. No, the breadth of this provision is staggering. A drug maker can be grossly negligent in making or distributing a drug, and still escape liability. It can even make that drug with wanton recklessness and escape scott-free after harming thousands of people.[31]

Then-Senator Hillary Clinton also weighed in on the scope of immunity and implicitly acknowledged that the PREP Act applied to more than just physical injury:

Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to object to insertion of a provision in the Department of Defense appropriations bill that would provide sweeping immunity protections to pharmaceutical manufacturers . . . . [T]his provision would grant immunity to all claims of loss, including death and disability, for a broad range of products, including any drug that the Secretary designated as one that would limit the harm caused by a pandemic—a definition so broad as to encompass nearly any drug.[32]

Senator Patrick Leahy also expressed alarm at the breadth of the grant of immunity:

Knowing violations as well as gross negligence would be immunized from accountability. Even if the drug company acted with the intent to harm people, it would nevertheless be immune from criminal conduct unless the Attorney General or Secretary of Health and Human Services initiates an enforcement action against a drug company that is still pending at the time a personal claim is filed.[33]

While it may be true that some opponents of this broad immunity were mainly concerned about immunizing conduct that resulted in physical injury to people, the conduct covered by the immunity granted by this legislation is clearly more than just conduct that causes physical injury.  As Senator Clinton’s comment reflects, there are reasons to conclude that it covers claims of allegedly fraudulent statements made by “covered persons” involved in the manufacture, distribution and administration of “countermeasures.”

Reasons to think otherwise do exist.  For example, the Act does not specifically mention loss of share value as a covered “loss.”  Nor does it reference “fraudulent conduct” as protected by immunity.  And, viewed as a whole, some might argue that the PREP Act seems mostly concerned with protecting “covered persons” from liability for personal injury claims.  Indeed, it might seem counterintuitive that Congress would have wanted to immunize a company or its executives in the face of knowingly false and misleading statements.  This argument, however, misses an important point.  Such conduct would not be completely immunized since the federal government would still be empowered to prosecute such false statements under various laws, including the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Act of 1934, pursuant to a carve-out in the PREP Act:

Nothing in this section shall be construed to abrogate or limit any right, remedy, or authority that the United States or any agency thereof may possess under any other provision of law . . . .[34]

Thus, the intent of the PREP Act would actually be promoted by protecting companies involved in trying to create vaccines or other types of treatment for COVID-19 from the burdens placed on those companies by shareholder derivative suits; while preserving the possibility of criminal prosecution by the U.S. Department of Justice and civil liability through governmental action mainly through the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.[35]

Conclusion

Until this is tested in the courts, no one can be sure if the hypothesis is correct—that PREP Act immunity should cover certain shareholder derivative suits.  But there appears to be good reason to put this to the test.  Asserting the Act’s immunity in affirmative defenses and moving for dismissal is the best way to find out if the courts will agree.


[1]See, e.g., Erik K. Swanholt, John J. Atallah & Jessica N. Walker, HHS Expands and Clarifies Scope of Immunity under the PREP Act, The National Law Review (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/hhs-expands-and-clarifies-scope-immunity-under-prep-actSee also Eric Kraus & Jennifer Shah, COVID-19 Vaccines Unlikely to Create Litigation Opportunities, Law360 (Dec. 7, 2020)

[2] See, e.g., Estate of Smith ex rel. Smith v. Bristol at Tampa Rehab. & Nursing Ctr., LLC, No. 8:20-cv-2798-T-60SPF, 2021 WL 100376 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2021).

[3] 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(b).

[4] Parker v. St. Lawrence Cnty. Public Health Dep’t, 102 A.D.3d 140 (3rd Dep’t 2012).

[5]Id. at 142.

[6] Kehler v. Hood, 2012 WL 1945952, No. 4:11CV1416, 2012 WL 1945952 (E.D. Mo. May 30, 2012).

[7]Id. at *1

[8]Casabianca v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., No. 112790/10, 2014 WL 10413521  (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Dec. 2, 2014).

[9] 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d; Fourth Amendment to Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 79,190-01, 79,197 (Dec. 9, 2020).  See also  Advisory Opinion 21-01 on the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act Scope of Preemption Provision, https://www.hhs.gov/guidance/sites/default/files/hhs-guidance-documents/2101081078-jo-advisory-opinion-prep-act-complete-preemption-01-08-2021-final-hhs-web.pdf (Jan. 8, 2021).

[10]Anson v. HCP Prairie Vill. KS OPCO LLC, No. 20-2346, 2021 WL 308156 (D. Kan. Jan. 29, 2021).

[11] See, e.g.Baskin v. Big Blue Healthcare, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-2267, 2020 WL 4815074 (D. Kan. Aug. 19, 2020); Eaton v. Big Blue Healthcare, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 3d 1184 (D. Kan. 2020).

[12] No. 20-CV-6006, 2020 WL 5291014 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2020).

[13] Id.

[14] See, e.g.Leung v. Bluebird Bio, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-00777 (E.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 12, 2021) changed venue to No. 1:21-cv-10335 (D. Mass. filed Feb. 26, 2021); Monroe Cnty. Emps’. Ret. Sys. v. AstraZeneca PLC, No. 1:21-cv-00722 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 26, 2021); Zhukov v. AstraZeneca PLC, No. 1:21-cv-00825 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 29, 2021). [As of Apr. 29, 2021, Monroe Cnty. Emps’. Ret. Sys. v. AstraZeneca PLC and Zhukov v. AstraZeneca PLC were consolidated to In re AstraZeneca PLC Secs. Litig., No. 1:21-cv-00722 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 26, 2021)].

[15] 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1)(A)(i-iii).

[16] 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1)(A)(iv) (emphasis added).

[17] The term “loss of or damage to property, including business interruption loss” has been, and continues to be, extensively litigated in COVID-19-related insurance coverage disputes.  Although the terminology is similar, these cases do not address the PREP Act but rather focus on the terms of the policies at issue.  In some cases, where the policy required “direct physical loss,” courts have ruled that the policy requires “tangible damage” and denied coverage.  See, e.g., Turek Enters., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 484 F. Supp. 3d 492 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 3, 2020). Other cases denied coverage on the basis of a policy’s express “virus exclusion.” See, e.g., Martinez v. Allied Ins. Co. of Am., 483 F. Supp. 3d 1189 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2020).

On the other hand, there are cases where the business plaintiff seeking coverage successfully drew a distinction between “loss of” and “damage to” property.  See, e.g., Studio 417, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 478 F. Supp. 3d 794, 800-03 (W.D. Mo. 2020) (insurers’ motion to dismiss denied, holding that plaintiff stated a claim, and that “direct physical loss” included the suspension of business due to COVID-19 and related governmental restrictions).

[18] See, e.g., Monroe Cnty. Emps’. Ret. Sys., supra note 9; Leungsupra note 9; Zhukovsupra note 9.

[19] Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Econ. Harm § 9 (2020).

[20] 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(c).

[21] 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(d)(1).

[22]See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e (which provides for the establishment of an “emergency fund” in the Treasury “designated as the ‘Covered Countermeasure Process Fund’ [to] provid[e] . . . compensation to eligible individuals”).

[23] See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). ‘‘A statute generally ‘should be enforced according to its plain and unambiguous meaning.’’’ Greathouse v. JHS Sec. Inc., 784 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Livecchi, 711 F.3d 345, 351 (2d Cir. 2013)).

[24]Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)).

[25] Dictionary definitions provide further support for this view.  For example, the Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines property as “something to which a person or business has a legal title.” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/property (last visited May 13, 2021).  See also The Oxford English and Spanish Dictionary, which defines property as “[t]he right to the possession, use, or disposal of something; ownership.”  https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/property  (last visited May 13, 2021).

[26] 42 U.S.C § 247d-6d(b)(1).

[27] Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,198-01, 15,201 (Mar. 17, 2020).

[28] 85 Fed. Reg. 15,198-01, 15,201.

[29]Id.

[30] Albeit in another context, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed that a statutory scheme that provided liability protections to encourage private industry participation in an effort to develop nuclear power was proper and constitutional.  Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env’t Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).

[31] 151 Cong. Rec. S14,242-01, S14,242 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden).

[32]Id. at S14,243 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton) (emphasis added).

[33]Id. at S14,247 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).

[34] 42 U.S.C § 247d-6d(f).

[35] See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5.  See also Securities Act of 1933 § 24 (“Securities Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 77x; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).

© 2021 Phillips Lytle LLP


For more articles on PREP Act Immunity, visit the NLRCorporate & Business Organizations section.

Hello Again, Worlds: A Failed Gaming IPR Leads to § 101 Success

The tides have turned again in the litigation campaign against gaming companies by Worlds, Inc., who many may recognize as one of the named parties in often-cited Federal Circuit case law on real-parties in interest (“RPI”). In 2018, the Federal Circuit shook up the IPR landscape with a series of RPI decisions, starting with Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp.which held that the PTAB’s time-bar determinations under § 315(b) are appealable. A series of frequently-cited Federal Circuit decisions followed, including Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp. and Worlds, Inc. v. Bungie, Inc.

In Worlds, Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., the PTAB issued final written decisions holding 34 out of 40 challenged claims unpatentable. On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the petitioner bears the burden of persuasion for proving that the petition is not time-barred under § 315(b), meaning Bungie had the burden of persuasion to show that Activision—which had been served with a complaint more than one year before Bungie filed its petition—was not an RPI. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, and on remand, the PTAB vacated its final written decisions.

Those vacated IPR decisions laid the groundwork for invalidating Worlds’ patents. Recently, a U.S. District Court (D. Mass.) invalidated the asserted patents under § 101, based in part on the PTAB’s substantive analysis. See Worlds, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., et al., No. 12-cv-10576-DJC, Dkt. 358 (D. Mass. Apr. 30, 2021) (“Decision”). The Court noted that the PTAB decisions were vacated on procedural grounds and considered the PTAB findings as persuasive authority. “Although now vacated, the substance of the PTAB’s prior rulings serves to support the Court’s analysis below that the client-side and server-side filtering of position information is not inventive.” Decision at 7-8.

The parties focused on four representative claims, including claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 7,945,856 (the “’856 patent”).

For Step 1, World’s prior arguments, including in the IPR, were used against it. Worlds had argued that its patents were directed at a method of “crowd control” and that these claims are the filtering function to do so. Citing to those characterizations, the Court held the claims to be directed to “the abstract idea of ‘filtering’ (here of ‘position’ information”) which amounts to ‘crowd control.’” Decision at 14.

Activision argued that such filtering is “a fundamental and well-known concept for organizing human activity,” and that the claims do nothing more than recite a general client-server computer architecture to perform routine functions of filtering information to address the generic problem of crowd control. See Decision at 14 (citing BASCOM Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). The Court agreed that this conclusion was consistent with MayoAlice, and other cases.

For Step 2, Worlds’ briefing relied heavily on BASCOM’s holding that an inventive concept “may arise … in the ordered combination of the limitations.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1349 (emphasis added). Worlds argued that the claims teach an inventive ordered combination of steps: “a multistep process whereby a server receives position information of avatars associated with network clients; the server filters the received positions and then sends selected packets to each client,” whereby a client can then further determine which avatars to display.” See Decision at 17.

However, the Court held that “there is nothing in the ordering of the steps in the claims (i.e., receiving, determining, comparing) that make them inventive; the ‘steps are organized in a completely conventional way.’” Decision at 18. “The steps of the claims here use only ‘generic functional language to achieve the purported solution’ of filtering of position information for crowd control.” Id. (citing Two-way Media, Ltd. V. Comcast Cable Comms. LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). “None of the remaining claims are limited to ‘any specific form or implementation of filtering . . . .” Id.

While Worlds emphasized technical-sounding terminologies, such as clients, servers, avatars, networks, and packets, the Court noted that “[c]lient-server networks, virtual worlds, avatars, or position and orientation information are not inventions of Worlds but rather, their patents seek to demonstrate their use in a technological environment.” Decision at 19. “That is, Worlds’ asserted claims use a general-purpose computer to employ well-known filtering or crowd control methods and means that ultimately use same to display graphical results and generate a view of the virtual world, none of which is inherently inventive or sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Id.

Notably, the briefing and the Court’s decision did not appear to rely on expert testimony or evidence in the district court litigation. Therefore, the PTAB’s technical analysis from its vacated decisions played an important role, providing the foundation for the Court’s conclusion that “client-side and server-side filtering of position information is not inventive.” Decision at 7-8.

While gaming companies must be mindful of the many potential procedural pitfalls in PTAB challenges, this recent decision shows the importance of attacking non-inventive patents using both § 101 and IPRs.

Copyright © 2021, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.


For more articles on gaming IPR, visit the NLRIntellectual Property section.

The Food Safety Aspects of Edible Insects

Recently growing concerns about the environmental effects of food production has led to an interest in the possibility of using insects as a viable nutrient source in both human diets and animal feed (due to the low carbon, water and ecological footprints associated with insect farming and edible insects can be a good source of protein, fatty acids, vitamins and minerals).

The primary objective of FAO’s publication (see link below) is to provide an overview of the potential food safety issues that should be considered, including biological agents (bacterial, viral, fungal, parasitic) as well as chemical contaminants (pesticides, toxic metals, flame retardants). Determination of food safety hazards will help to establish appropriate hygiene and manufacturing practices in this sector.

In addition to the food safety aspects, other challenges facing this emerging sector are briefly discussed. These include general absence of insect-specific regulations governing the production and trade of insects as food and feed, issues related to upscaling the production of insects, among others.

Interested in learning more about FAO’s report ‘Looking at edible insects from a food safety perspective’ ? Click on the link.

© 2021 Keller and Heckman LLP


For more articles on edible insects, visit the NLR Biotech, Food, Drug section.