Category: Whistleblower

A New Year for Whistleblowers? Emergency Action Needed to Make Current Whistleblower Laws Work

In 2021 the White House, in conjunction with every major executive agency, approved The United States Strategy on Countering Corruption. In this authoritative and non-partisan Anti-Corruption Strategy, the United States for the first time formally recognized the key role whistleblowers play in detecting fraud and corruption. Based on these findings it declared that it was the official policy of the United States to “stand in solidarity” with whistleblowers, both domestically and internationally. As part of the Anti-Corruption Strategy the United States recognized that whistleblower qui tam reward laws must play a major role in combating financial frauds, such as money laundering. The proven ability of whistleblowers to detect fraud among corporate and government elites led the United States government to formally identify them as key players in preventing fraud, strengthening democratic institutions, and combating corruption that threatens U.S. national security.

Despite these findings, leading federal agencies responsible for enforcing whistleblower rights have failed to implement the U.S. Anti-Corruption Strategy’s whistleblower-mandates. Many of their current rules and practices directly undercut and undermine the very whistleblower rights identified by the White House Strategy as playing an essential role in combating corruption.

The 118th Congress will end on January 3, 2025. Thus, there is one year remaining for Congress and the current-sitting executive officers to act on a number of pending whistleblower initiatives, all of which have strong bipartisan support, are based on the plain meaning of laws already passed by Congress, and which are individually or collectively essential for the implementation of the U.S. Anti-Corruption Strategy. Outside of political interference by those who stand to lose when whistleblowers are incentivized and protected, there is no legitimate reason why these reforms cannot be quickly approved. The actions listed below are needed for the Strategy to be implemented, but whose approval has been stalled or blocked by resistant executive agencies or a timid Congress:

  • AML Whistleblower Regulations. The Treasury Department must enact regulations fully implementing the money laundering and sanctions whistleblower provisions of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. This law has been in effect since January 1, 2021, but Treasury has failed to implement the required regulations. Congress did its job, but Treasury has dropped the ball on approving the regulations necessary to ensure that the law is enforced. President Biden must demand that his Secretary of Treasury fully implement the anti-corruption Strategy his White House has approved as a critical national security measure.
  • Justice Department Whistleblower Regulations. Since January 1, 2021 the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has been required, as a matter of law, to accept anonymous and confidential whistleblower disclosures concerning violations of the Bank Secrecy Act, including illegal money laundering and the use of crypto currency exchanges to facilitate violations of law. In December 2022, this requirement was by law extended to whistleblowers, worldwide, who wish to report violations of sanctions covering Russia, Hamas, ISIS, and other covered entities. In contempt of its legal requirements the Justice Department has ignored this law, and has failed to adopt regulations permitting anonymous whistleblowing. Congress did its job, Justice has dropped the ball. President Biden must demand that his Attorney General fully implement the anti-corruption Strategy his White House has approved as a critical national security measure.
  • SEC Whistleblower Regulations. Although the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Whistleblower Program has radically improved since its failure to respond to whistleblower disclosures regarding the fraudster Bernie Madoff, regulations approved over 12-years ago continue to violate the statutory rights granted whistleblowers under the Dodd-Frank Act and strip otherwise qualified whistleblowers of their rights. For example, although the law gives whistleblowers the right to provide “original information” to the SEC through a news media disclosure, the SEC has never enforced this right. This has resulted in numerous extremely important whistleblowers to be denied protection or compensation. In the context of foreign corruption, DOJ statistics inform that 20% of all Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) cases (which are covered under Dodd-Frank) are based on news media disclosures. Based on these numbers, one in five whistleblowers who report foreign corruption are illegally denied compensation under current SEC rules. An audit by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development released data regarding how whistleblowers were being harmed by the SEC’s interpretation of the law, including the failure to protect whistleblowers who make initial reports to international regulatory or law enforcement agencies, even if these agencies work closely with the United States. The SEC can resolve these issues by issuing clarifying decisions and exemptions consistent with the plain meaning of the Dodd Frank law and Congress’ clear intent. President Biden must demand that his appointments to the SEC fully implement the anti-corruption Strategy his White House approved.
  • Stop Repeal by Delay. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the SEC both fail to compensate whistleblowers in a timely manner. These delays, which the IRS admits average over 10-years, cause untold hardship to whistleblowers, many of whom have lost their jobs and careers, and their only hope for economic survival is the compensation promised under law. In response to these untenable and unjustifiable delays, Congress has introduced two laws to expedite paying legally required compensation to whistleblowers, the SEC Whistleblower Reform Act and S. 625, the IRS Whistleblower Reform Act. Both amendments have strong bipartisan support and should be/could be passed quickly. See https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-warren-reintroduce-bill-to-strengthen-sec-whistleblower-program and https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-wyden-wicker-cardin-introduce-bipartisan-bill-to-strengthen-irs-whistleblower-program.
  • Strengthen the False Claims Act. The False Claims Act (FCA) whistleblower qui tam provision has proven to be the most effective law ever passed protecting the government from greedy contractors, fraud in Medicare and Medicaid, and from criminal procurement practices. Over $70 billion has been recovered by the taxpayers directly from fraudsters, and countless billions has also been paid in criminal fines. Two bipartisan amendments to the FCA are languishing in Congress.  The first is designed to prevent federal contractors from colluding with government officials when trying to justify their frauds. The second permits the federal government to administratively sanction contractors in smaller cases, where prosecutors rarely file charges in court.  The Administrative False Claims Act, S. 659, has been unanimously passed by the Senate but is stalled in the House of Representatives. The False Claims Act Amendment targeting collusion has strong bipartisan support, but is awaiting votes in Congress.  See    https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/senators-introduce-bipartisan-legislation-to-close-loophole-in-fight-against-fraud    https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/bipartisan-fraud-fighting-bill-unanimously-passes-senate.
  • Pass the CFTC Fund Improvement Act. The whistleblower reward law covering violations of the Commodity Exchange Act has proven successful beyond the wildest dreams of Congress. Billions upon billions in sanctions has been recovered from fraudsters who have manipulated markets ripping off consumers across the globe. These unprecedented whistleblower-triggered prosecutions have created an unintended problem: there are inadequate funds available to compensate whistleblowers as required under law. It is unconscionable for Congress to pass a law mandating that whistleblowers obtain compensation when they risk their jobs, reputations, and even their lives to serve the public interest, but then refuse to allocate funding to pay the mandatory rewards. The CFTC Fund Improvement Act, S. 2500, which has strong bipartisan support, would fix this problem. It needs to be immediately passed. Congress must live up to its promises.  See  https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-nunn-and-hassan-lead-bipartisan-bicameral-effort-to-bolster-successful-whistleblower-program.
  • Demand that Federal Agencies Respect, Honor, and Compensate Whistleblowers. One of the most unacceptable and unjustifiable hardships facing whistleblowers is the continued resistance to protecting whistleblowers in numerous (most) federal agencies.  This is exemplified by the complete failure of agencies to use their discretionary powers to protect or compensate whistleblowers. The Department of Commerce/NOAA can reward whistleblowers who report illegal fishing or “IUU” fishing violations and crimes committed by large ocean fishing boats operated by countries like China. Yet they have repeatedly failed to implement their whistleblower laws. The same can be said of the Department of Interior/Fish and Wildlife Service which have ignored the Lacey and Endangered Species Acts’ strong whistleblower reward provisions, allowing billions in illegal international wildlife trafficking to fester. Likewise, the Coast Guard largely ignores the whistleblower provisions of the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, turning down numerous whistleblower tips and failing to conduct investigations. Worse still, is the Justice Department’s penchant for prosecuting whistleblowers – even those who report crimes voluntarily to the Department pursuant to whistleblower disclosure laws.  President Biden must take action and demand that all executive agencies use their discretionary authorities permitted under law to incentivize and protect whistleblowers consistent with the anti-corruption Strategy his administration has approved.

A first step in changing the anti-whistleblower culture that undermines the public interest within most federal agencies is for the President to enforce the National Whistleblower Appreciation Day resolution that has been unanimously passed by the U.S. Senate over the past ten years. The resolution urges every executive agency to acknowledge the contributions of whistleblowers and educate their workforce as to these contributions. See https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/ten-years-running-grassley-wyden-lead-whistleblower-appreciation-day-resolution (S. Res. 298).

The importance of President Biden’s requiring all federal agencies to institute to Senate resolution is clear, based on the text of the resolution asking that all agencies “inform[] employees, contractors working on behalf of the taxpayers of the United States, and members of the public about the legal right of a United States citizen to ‘blow the whistle’ to the appropriate authority by honest and good faith reporting of misconduct, fraud, misdemeanors, or other crimes; and acknowledging the contributions of whistleblowers to combating waste, fraud, abuse, and violations of laws and regulations of the United States.”

These seven reforms all have bipartisan support and/or can be immediately implemented through executive action. There is simply no justification for delaying the implementation of these minimum and absolutely necessary reforms.

But the buck does not stop at the top. Strong and vocal public support can push all of these bipartisan reforms across the finish line. The American people – across all demographics, stand behind whistleblowers. How do we know this? The highly respected Marist polling agency conducted a scientifically valid survey of “likely American voters.” Their findings speak for themselves:

  • 86% of Americans want stronger whistleblower protections
  • 44% of “likely voters” state that the position of candidates on this issue would impact their vote. 

Despite the divisions within American society the Marist Poll findings demonstrated that the American public is united in supporting whistleblowers:

  • 84% of people without a college education want stronger protection for whistleblowers
  • 89% of people with a college education want stronger protection for whistleblowers
  • 85% of people earning under $50,000 want stronger protection for whistleblowers
  • 89% of people earning over $50,000 want stronger protection for whistleblowers
  • 86% of people living in urban areas want stronger protection for whistleblowers
  • 83% of people living in rural areas want stronger protection for whistleblowers
  • 86% of women want stronger protection for whistleblowers
  • 87% of men want stronger protection for whistleblowers
  • 88 % of Independents want stronger protection for whistleblowers
  • 78 % of Republicans want stronger protection for whistleblowers
  • 94 % of Democrats want stronger protection for whistleblowers

The only thing holding back effective whistleblower laws in the United States is the lobbying power of special interests and powerful government officials’ hostility toward dissent. This must end. Whistleblowing has proven to be the most effective means to detect waste, fraud, abuse and threats to the public health and safety. The United States Strategy on Countering Corruption represents a roadmap for action. It’s time for the President, Congress and those running agencies such as the Department of Treasury and the SEC to get the job done.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2023. All Rights Reserved.

by: Stephen M. Kohn of Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto 

For more news on Current Whistleblower Laws, visit the NLR Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

Despite Record Year, SEC Must Improve Whistleblower Program to Align with White House Anti-Corruption Initiative

SEC Chair Gary Gensler announced on October 25th that in the 2023 fiscal year, the Commission received a record number of 18,000 whistleblower tips.

The SEC Whistleblower Program has grown rapidly and effectively since its inception in 2010 – the 2022 Fiscal Year set a record of 12,300 whistleblower tips. This was a near doubling of the 2020 tips, which set a record of 6,911.

The SEC transnational whistleblower program responds to individuals who voluntarily report original information about potential misconduct. If tips lead to a successful enforcement action, the whistleblowers are entitled to 10-30% of the recovered funds. The programs have created clear anti-retaliation protections and strong financial incentives for reporting securities and commodities fraud.

The U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption is a White House initiative from December of 2021 that establishes the fight against corruption as a core tenant of national security interests. It outlines strategic pillars and objectives within each. The recommendations on improving the SEC’s whistleblower provisions as outlined below have the same goal of creating stronger processes to combat corruption.

Since the SEC Whistleblower Program was created in 2010, whistleblowers have played a crucial role in the SEC’s enforcement efforts. Overall, since the whistleblower program was established in 2010, “[e]enforcement actions brought using information from meritorious whistleblowers have resulted in orders for more than $6.3 billion in total monetary sanctions, including more than $4.0 billion in disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and interest, of which more than $1.5 billion has been, or is scheduled to be, returned to harmed investors,” according to the 2022 annual report.

This $6.3 billion recovered via sanctions is money that is put back into the pockets of investors and everyday Americans.

The SEC does not credit related enforcement actions to award notifications and sanctions in order to maintain the anonymity and confidentiality of whistleblowers, award notifications don’t tie to underlying enforcement action. The $6.3 billion does not include DOJ enforcement actions, which combined would show a much larger number.

Non-U.S. citizens who blow the whistle on potential securities frauds committed by publicly traded companies outside the United States are eligible to receive awards, as well as those whistleblowers who report violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. This anti-corruption legislation prohibits the payment of anything of value to foreign government officials in order to obtain a business advantage.

Whistleblowers from over 130 countries have used the SEC Whistleblower Program to report fraud in their workplace.

Despite the massive growth of tips received, many whistleblowers’ cases are dismissed by the SEC due to insubstantial filing errors and strict time parameters on forms, or reported to the news media, other U.S. government agencies, or international government workers in roles that are public abroad but private in the U.S.

Considering these narrow qualifications and to ensure that the process for qualifying as a whistleblower aligns with U.S. anti-corruption priorities, the National Whistleblower Center recommends that the program be improved by expanding the definition of voluntary, further the provisions of identity protection and rewards. These recommendations align with the White House drafted United States Strategy on Countering Corruption.

Whistleblowers identified in case investigations should be automatically eligible for rewards, rather than mandated to meet technical form requirements.

The SEC should maintain their “Three Conditions” qualifications standards and expand the definition of “voluntary.” The current language disqualifies whistleblowers who report fraud to the media, other government agencies, foreign law enforcement, or a U.S. embassy before the SEC, considering them “involuntary.” These restrictions dissuade potential whistleblowers from engaging with the program and thus interfere with federal anti-corruption objectives. The agency must ensure that whistleblowers who file complaints internally before coming to the SEC maintain award eligibility.

The SEC should not incentivize or require whistleblowers to report internally before filing claims with the agency, as this exposes them to retaliation. If a whistleblower was removed from their position, they could no longer provide the Commission with the most updated information, which would harm the investigation.

By establishing a consistent inter-agency protocol concerning whistleblowers who have participated in the crime they report, the SEC can further protect the confidentiality and anonymity of whistleblowers in all ongoing federal investigations surrounding their disclosures.

Whistleblowers must receive the full force of related action provisions and rewards if the company or agency they report is simultaneously being investigated by another branch of government.

SEC regulations should contain strict deadlines for paying awards. These regulations should be premised on the fact that the SEC and Justice Department investigators and prosecutors will know the identity and contributions of all whistleblowers who would qualify for a reward in a particular case.

In the IRS (Internal Revenue Service) Whistleblower Program, procedures require that their investigators file whether or not there was a whistleblower involved in the case at the time the case file is closed. Agents thus know who the whistleblowers are, and the agency can process a claim quickly. The integration of affidavits and statements from front-line investigators into the decision-making process accelerates the reward payout.

Wait times for awards received are another disincentivizing factor for blowing the whistle. The SEC should establish and abide by a strict deadline for paying awards to ensure that whistleblowers are compensated fully and promptly. Rewards should not have a cap limit.

Such changes reinforce the White House Strategy’s objective to “bolster the ability of civil society, media, and private sector actors to safely detect and expose corruption,” “curb illicit finance,” and “enhance enforcement efforts” in the name of “modernizing, coordinating, and resourcing U.S. Government efforts to fight corruption.”

Enhancing the program ensures that whistleblowers whose information successfully leads to enforcement action on money laundering crimes are rewarded, no matter how they provide the information.

Such provisions will demonstrate to international whistleblowers that the risk of blowing the whistle on fraud is worth taking and the United States will support them through the process.

This article was authored by Sophie Luskin.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2023. All Rights Reserved.
For more news on the SEC Whistleblower Program, visit the NLR Securities & SEC section.

Crypto Fraud Remains Focus of CFTC Whistleblower Program

For the second straight year, the majority of whistleblower tips received by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Whistleblower Program were related to cryptocurrency fraud.

On October 31, the CFTC released its Annual Report on the Whistleblower Program for the 2023 Fiscal Year. The report revealed that during the fiscal year, the CFTC received a record 1,530 whistleblower tips.

According to the report, “the majority of tips received during the Period involved allegations of fraudulent solicitation and subsequent misappropriation of crypto/digital assets.” The report further explains that examples of these crypto frauds include “pump-and-dump schemes, fraudulent representations of moneymaking opportunities, or refusals to honor withdrawal requests.”

“The majority of the tips received this year involved crypto—an area that continues to have pervasive fraud and other illegality,” said CFTC Commissioner Christy Goldsmith Romero in a statement supporting the Whistleblower Program. “With the rise of crypto, more retail customers have come under the CFTC’s jurisdiction, making even more critical the efforts of the CFTC’s Whistleblower Program and the Office of Customer Education and Outreach.”

Through the CFTC Whistleblower Program, qualified whistleblowers are entitled to monetary awards of 10-30% of the sanctions collected by the CFTC in the enforcement action related to their disclosure. To qualify for an award, a whistleblower must voluntarily provide original information that leads to a successful enforcement action of at least $1 million.

Back in 2019, the CFTC Whistleblower Program issued a Whistleblower Alert drawing attention to how individuals can blow the whistle on cryptocurrency fraud. The Alert explains that “when a virtual currency is used in a derivatives contract, or if there is fraud or manipulation involving a virtual currency traded in interstate commerce, CFTC enforcement of the [Commodity Exchange Act] comes into play.”

Since then, the CFTC has filed a number of high-profile charges against entities for crypto fraud. For example, in 2021, BitMEX was ordered to pay $100 million for illegally operating a cryptocurrency trading platform and Coinbase was ordered to pay $6.5 million for false, misleading, or inaccurate reporting and wash trading. Earlier this year, the CFTC charged Binance and its founder, Changpeng Zhao, with operating an illegal digital asset derivatives exchange.

In December 2022, CFTC Chair Rostin Behnam testified before the U.S. Senate about the CFTC’s regulation of digital assets and cryptocurrency. Behnam highlighted the essential role the agency’s whistleblower program plays in its enforcement efforts in these areas. “In the absence of direct regulatory and surveillance authority in an underlying cash market, CFTC enforcement activity begins with a referral or whistleblower tip from an external source,” Behnam stated.

Over the past decade-plus, the CFTC Whistleblower Program has become an integral part of the CFTC’s enforcement efforts. Given that in recent years the agency has increasingly focused on cryptocurrency fraud, it is no surprise that the whistleblower program is playing a central role in the CFTC’s efforts on that front.

“Whistleblowers play a vital role in supporting CFTC investigations related to fraud and other illegality,” Commissioner Romero further stated. “The CFTC could not fully protect customers and markets without whistleblowers. Whistleblowers help identify fraud and other illegality, interpret key evidence, and save considerable Commission resources and time. The faster we can stop fraud, the more we can protect customers from harm.”

This article was authored by Geoff Schweller.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2023. All Rights Reserved.
For more news on Crypto Fraud and the CFTC Whistleblower Program, visit the NLR Communications, Media & Internet section.

CFTC Whistleblower Program’s FY23 Report to Congress Reveals Continued Success of the Program in Protecting Markets and Customers

CFTC Whistleblower Office Receives the Highest Number of Whistleblower Tips and Award Applications Since the Inception of the Program

Today the CFTC’s Whistleblower Program issued its annual report to Congress for FY23.  The report reveals that the program continues to be a key enforcement tool for the CFTC.  Since the inception of the program, the CFTC has awarded approximately $350 million to whistleblowers, and whistleblower disclosures have led to more than $3 billion in enforcement sanctions.  In a statement accompanying the report, Commissioner Christy Goldsmith Romero underscored the vital role of whistleblowers in helping the CFTC to protect customers and markets:

Whistleblowers play a vital role in supporting CFTC investigations related to fraud and other illegality.  The CFTC could not fully protect customers and markets without whistleblowers.  Whistleblowers help identify fraud and other illegality, interpret key evidence, and save considerable Commission resources and time.  The faster we can stop fraud, the more we can protect customers from harm.

Given the great benefit that whistleblowers provide to the CFTC’s enforcement efforts, it is critical for the CFTC to provide both incentives for whistleblowers to come forward, and protections for working with a federal whistleblower program.  The CFTC’s Whistleblower Program recognizes that whistleblowers put themselves at considerable professional and reputational risk in order to help the government.  The Program provides confidential protection to whistleblowers.  The Program also recognizes that incentives in the forms of monetary awards increase the number of whistleblower tips.  This Report confirms that fact, with 1,530 tips this year, the highest of any year.

Highlights of the report include:

  • During FY23, the CFTC granted seven applications for whistleblower awards, totaling approximately $16 million, to individuals who voluntarily provided original information that led to successful enforcement actions. Some of the whistleblowers provided information leading the CFTC to open the relevant investigations, while others provided substantial ongoing assistance and cooperation with the CFTC as the matter progressed.
  • The CFTC’s Whistleblower Office (“WBO”) received 1,530 whistleblower tips, which represents an increase of roughly 50 percent over the number of tips the WBO received in FY 2021 and FY 2020.
  • The WBO received tips regarding a wide range of alleged violations, including market manipulation, spoofing, insider trading, corruption, illegal swap dealer business conduct, recordkeeping or registration violations, and fraud or manipulation related to digital assets, precious metals, and forex trading.
  • The WBO received 301 whistleblower award applications, a new record for the CFTC Whistleblower Program – roughly doubling the previous record established in FY22.
  • The whistleblowers that received awards during FY23 conserved substantial CFTC resources and contributed in various ways, including: (1) providing a high degree of ongoing support to Enforcement Staff, including, among other things, interpreting key evidence, facilitating the appearance of another witness; (2) helping the CFTC expand its analysis of the misconduct and further analyze the harm suffered by customers as a result of the violations; and (3) providing information that was sufficiently specific, credible, and timely to cause Enforcement Staff to open an investigation leading to a successful covered action. In one of the orders granting an award, the CFTC noted that “[w]ithout the whistleblower’s information, DOE staff might not have learned of the violations at issue until much later and more customers could have been harmed.”

CFTC Whistleblower Reward Program

Under the CFTC Whistleblower Reward Program, the CFTC will issue rewards to whistleblowers who provide original information that leads to covered judicial or administrative actions with total civil penalties in excess of $1 million (see how the CFTC calculates monetary sanctions). A whistleblower may receive an award of between 10% and 30% of the total monetary sanctions collected.

Original information “leads to” a successful enforcement action if either:

  1. The original information caused the staff to open an investigation, reopen an investigation, or inquire into different conduct as part of a current investigation, and the Commission brought a successful action based in whole or in part on conduct that was the subject of the original information; or
  2. The conduct was already under examination or investigation, and the original information significantly contributed to the success of the action.

A covered “judicial or administrative action” is “any judicial or administrative action brought by the Commission under [the CEA] that results in monetary sanctions exceeding $1,000,000.”  7 U.S.C. § 26(a)(1).   In determining a reward percentage, the CFTC considers the particular facts and circumstances of each case. For example, positive factors may include the significance of the information, the level of assistance provided by the whistleblower and the whistleblower’s attorney, and the law enforcement interests at stake.

© 2023 Zuckerman Law
For more articles on whistleblowers, visit the NLR Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

Was This The Least Transparent Report In SEC History?

Professor Alexander I. Platt at the University of Kansas School of Law has just released a draft of a forthcoming paper that takes the Securities and Exchange Commission to task for the lack of transparency in its whistleblower program, Going Dark(er): The SEC Whistleblower Program’s FY 2022 Report Is The Least Transparent In Agency History.  As Professor Platt notes in a footnote, I have been complaining about the whistleblower’s lack of transparency since at least 2016.  See Five Propositions Concerning The SEC Whistleblower Program.  Last summer, I observed that “There is certainly no dearth of irony in a federal agency dedicated to full disclosure cloaking in secrecy a billion dollar awards program”.

Professor Platt offers four possible reasons for the SEC’s lack of transparency: (1) resource constraints; (2) lack of respect for public participation and accountability; (3) data problems; and/or (4) an intent to bury something controversial or embarrassing.  My concern is, and has been, that whatever the reason(s), the SEC’s lack of transparency creates an ideal substrate for fraud.  Unless the SEC drops its cloak of secrecy and exposes its whistleblower program to public scrutiny, it is highly likely that the next article will be about how the whistleblower program was used and abused.

Article By Keith Paul Bishop of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

For more SEC and securities legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2010-2023 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

Comparison of Three Federal Fraud and Abuse Laws

In the post-COVID era, health care fraud and abuse issues will be aggressively and swiftly enforced by the government. The legal framework and regulations in the health care space can be intimidating. Below is a comparison of three of the big federal fraud and abuse laws that the government actively enforces; but they are not an exclusive list.  The summary below is a primer on the three main federal fraud and abuse laws and is intended to increase your basic understanding of these laws.

False Claims Act (FCA)

PROHIBITIONS:

  • Prohibits the submission of false or fraudulent claims, false statements material to a false claim, and conspiracy to commit violation
  • Prohibits concealing or avoiding obligation to repay money to government (failure to return overpayments)
  • Claims that violate AKS or Stark can also be considered false claims
  • Common false claims include lack of medical necessity; quality of care; billing/coding issues; off-labeled marketing; retention of overpayments

EXCEPTIONS:

  • n/a

PENALTIES:

  • Treble damages and as of May 9, 2022 per claim penalties between $12,537 and $25,076
  • Regulated by the DOJ

Physician Self-Referral (Stark)

PROHIBITIONS:

  • Prohibits referrals of designated health services by a physician (or an immediate family member) if the physician has a financial relationship with the entity performing the designated health service
  • Regulates financial relationships with physicians (and physician’s immediate family members) only

EXCEPTIONS:

  • The arrangement must completely satisfy an exception or it violates the Stark law

PENALTIES:

  • No criminal enforcement; CMP enforcement for knowing violations: per violation penalties– 3x claims and/or per circumvention scheme penalties; Nonpayment of claims arising from prohibited arrangement; Recoupment of amounts received; Exclusion from federal health programs; FCA liability
  • Regulated by CMS

Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS)

PROHIBITIONS:

  • Prohibits offers of, solicitation of, or payment or receipt of remuneration intended to induce referrals for health care services covered by a government program
  • Covers provision of anything of value to a person who refers, orders/purchases or recommends

EXCEPTIONS:

  • Voluntary safe harbors exist, but arrangements are not required to fit within a safe harbors

PENALTIES:

  • Applies to either party involved in an arrangement that violates AKS; Criminal penalties $100,000 /violation, up to 10 years imprisonment); Civil penalties (CMP3x unlawful remuneration and $100,000/violation); Exclusion from federal health programs; FCA liability
  • Regulated by the OIG

Providers should also be aware of other enforcement statutes such as the Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery (“EKRA”), the Civil Monetary Penalties Act (“CMP”), and the Travel Act, to name a few, in addition to being well versed in the relevant state health care fraud and abuse frameworks.

Article By Courtney G. Tito of Nelson Mullins

For more criminal law and business crimes legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright ©2022 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP

SEC Awards $825,000 to Whistleblower

On October 11, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced a $825,000 whistleblower award issued to an individual who voluntarily provided the agency with original information about securities fraud.

The SEC Whistleblower Program offers monetary awards to qualified whistleblowers whose disclosures contribute to the success of enforcement actions. SEC whistleblower awards are for 10-30% of the funds collected by the government in the relevant enforcement action.

According to the SEC award order, the whistleblower “expeditiously provided detailed information that prompted the opening of the investigation.” Furthermore, the whistleblower “thereafter met with Commission staff in person and provided additional information after submitting the initial TCR.”

In addition to monetary awards, the SEC Whistleblower Program offers anti-retaliation protections to whistleblowers, including confidentiality. Thus, the SEC does not disclose any information that could identify a whistleblower.

Since the whistleblower program was established in 2010, the SEC has awarded more than $1.3 billion to over 280 individual whistleblowers. In August 2021, SEC Chair Gary Gensler stated that the program “has greatly aided the Commission’s work to protect investors” and noted that “the SEC has used whistleblower information to obtain sanctions of over $5 billion from securities law violators” and “return over $1.3 billion to harmed investors.”

Article By Mary Jane Wilmoth of Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto. Geoff Schweller also contributed to this article.

For more criminal law and business crimes legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2022. All Rights Reserved.

The “Iron Curtain” has Fallen: A Radical Shift in Lawyers Representing Whistleblowers

Whistleblower Network News (WNN) recently revealed, for the first time, that major corporate law firms specializing in representing defendants before the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have, in some cases, switched sides and are now representing whistleblowers who are turning in corporate fraudsters.  All but one of the firms identified by the SEC did not call public attention to their new-found client base – most likely because they did not want to upset their bread-and-butter corporate clients.  It appears that major corporate law firms now understand that the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower reward provisions are incredibly effective in incentivizing corporate insiders to report fraud, even when those insiders are executives usually on the other side of a whistleblower issue.  Lawyers who traditionally represent whistleblowers understand that Dodd-Frank is well designed and is being professionally implemented by the SEC.  Corporate lawyers and their firms have apparently caught on to this new reality and are now representing whistleblowers.

That defense firms are now actively engaged in representing whistleblowers cannot be denied.  Lists of law firms that have prevailed in Dodd-Frank whistleblower cases, disclosed in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests filed with the SEC, document that 9.3% of firms that have obtained rewards on behalf of whistleblowers were traditional defense firms.  These firms include some of the largest defense firms in the United States that represent numerous corporations subjected to SEC enforcement actions for violating securities laws as well as firms that have defended corporations against whistleblowers in retaliation cases.

If that statistic holds, it is clear hundreds of corporate defense firms or their attorneys are representing whistleblowers in confidential investigations.  Why are these cases still under review?  Dodd-Frank is still a young law, and the vast majority of cases have not yet resulted in formal reward determinations.  Cases often take five years or more to be finalized, and as of the end of Fiscal Year 2021 over 51,000 whistleblower cases had been filed with the SEC.  Furthermore, under the FOIA requests the SEC only released the names of law firms that prevailed in a whistleblower case.  The names of firms that did not prevail in a claim, or firms that represent whistleblowers in ongoing investigations, were not disclosed.

Time will tell whether defense firms’ representation of whistleblowers who accuse their employers (or other corporate wrongdoers) of fraud is a good or bad development.  But unique issues will arise whenever a firm that primarily generates its profits from representing corporations accused of wrongdoing switches sides and represents a whistleblower who has accused an executive of engaging in fraud.  Although such representations may be permitted under the attorney’s rules of ethics, this does not mean that such representations are always in the best interest of a lawyer’s clients.  There are inherent potential conflicts whenever a defense firm switches sides and decides to represent a whistleblower reporting major corporate crimes.

Regardless of where you stand on this issue, one thing is clear: the ethical, policy and legal implications of defense firms representing whistleblowers is a dramatic shift in legal practice and must be carefully evaluated.  Defense firms must understand that whenever they represent a whistleblower, they must zealously advocate on their behalf, even when the precedents set by their cases may be used against their corporate clients.  Likewise, whistleblowers need to be aware of the implications of choosing a lawyer whose primary practice is representing corporate crooks.  Conflicts of interest may not initially be visible but can unfold as a case progresses.

The Revelation

In August of 2022, Bloomberg Law and a draft non-peer-reviewed article published by University of Kansas Professor Alexander Platt raised the issue of which law firms represent whistleblowers.  Bloomberg and Platt obtained lists of law firms that prevailed in Dodd-Frank whistleblower cases.  They used the lists to identify a small number of firms, all of which could be classified as pro-whistleblower firms.  These firms’ practices are centered on fighting corporate fraud and speculated whether these firms were being given preferential treatment by the SEC. Neither publication offered proof of any wrongdoing.  But Platt and Bloomberg did not list all the law firms that prevailed in Dodd-Frank cases.  Significantly, neither even mentioned the fact that major defense law firms had already filed and won Dodd-Frank cases on behalf of whistleblowers.  Additionally, the two authors did not explore the special issues that could arise when firms dedicated to defending white-collar criminals quietly switch sides.

In response to Platt and Bloomberg, WNN filed its own Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to obtain access to the documents relied upon in the two articles.  The SEC released over 1000 pages of documents to WNN, including all its correspondence with Platt and all the records provided to Platt (and Bloomberg) that identified law firms that successfully represented whistleblowers.

On September 27, 2022, WNN revealed, for the first time, that the SEC had identified 64 law firms that successfully obtained a reward on behalf of a whistleblower.  Among those firms were six that primarily represent corporations and individuals accused of corporate crimes.  These defense firms included industry giants such as Winston & Strawn and Akin Gump.  Together, the defense firms have already obtained over $56 million in rewards on behalf of whistleblowers.  In response to the Platt, Bloomberg, and WNN FOIA requests, the SEC only identified firms that had already prevailed and obtained a reward on behalf of their clients. Approximately 50,000 cases are pending within the SEC’s reward program, and there is a long delay in processing whistleblower cases.  Therefore, one can assume that numerous other pending cases where these or other defense firms are actively representing whistleblowers that were not disclosed by the SEC.

It is important to note that the Dodd-Frank provisions only apply to large fraud cases.  No reward is available unless the SEC issues sanctions against the entity being investigated in excess of $1 million.  Thus, the cases previously targeted by the defense firms and currently under investigation by the SEC would implicate major frauds.

The defense firms identified by WNN as being listed in the SEC-released materials were:

Winston & Strawn, LLP:  Winston advertises itself as defending “companies and individuals in SEC enforcement and regulatory matters related to allegations involving securities fraud.”  But not mentioned on its webpage is that it also represented a securities law whistleblower who obtained a $2.2 million reward.

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP: Akin Gump also describes its practice as representing “companies and individuals” under investigation by various regulatory agencies, including the SEC.  Akin’s attorneys obtained a Dodd-Frank reward of $800,000 award.

Haynes and Boone, LLP: This 600-lawyer defense firm’s website explained that it has “represented employers” in “whistle blowing.”  However, the SEC documents revealed the firm also represented a whistleblower who obtained a “20%” award against a corporate fraudster.

Levine Lee LLP:  Although this firm markets itself as successfully representing clients accused of violating anti-fraud laws, like the other defense firms, it has apparently started a whistleblower practice and obtained a reward of $10 million on behalf of a whistleblower.

Leader Berkon Colao & Silverstein LLP:  This defense firm prevailed in cases filed on behalf of two separate whistleblowers and had considerable success.  Their whistleblower clients obtained $15 million and $27 million in awards.

Sallah Astarita & Cox, LLC: Although this firm “regularly represents financial institutions” in “fraud” cases, the firm also represented a whistleblower who obtained a $1.8 million award.  Sallah Astarita was the only firm that listed its Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower case on its website as among the victories achieved by one of its partners.

The SEC’s Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program

Professor Platt and Bloomberg Law criticized the SEC’s Dodd-Frank program as having a bias in favor of a small number of whistleblower-rights law firms that had employed former SEC lawyers.  However, the information revealed by WNN completely refuted this negative implication raised by Platt and Bloomberg.  Instead, the FOIA documents support a finding that the SEC program is a paradigm of fairness and openness.  The extensive correspondence between Platt and the SEC demonstrates that the Commission freely disclosed the names of the firms that had won cases while carefully balancing the confidentiality needs of the whistleblower clients.  These numbers illustrate a program open to law firms regardless of their reputation or whether they employ former government lawyers.  They also reveal a program open to working directly with whistleblowers and rewarding them even if they had no lawyer.  Not one document produced provided any evidence whatsoever of wrongdoing, bias, or unprofessionalism.  The numbers speak for themselves:

  • Over 50 pro se whistleblowers won cases on their own behalf.  This high percentage of unrepresented applicants who successfully navigated the SEC’s program is remarkable.  In other legal programs, pro se whistleblowers (and other unrepresented persons) lose the vast majority of their cases.  Not so under Dodd-Frank. This demonstrates a high level of commitment by the SEC to helping individual whistleblowers who could not afford or obtain lawyers.
  • Of the 64 law firms that prevailed in a Dodd-Frank reward claim, only 12 had hired former SEC lawyers to assist in the cases.  Thus, the vast majority of successful law firms (52 of the 64) had no “insider” connection to the SEC.   This fact demonstrates the Commission’s staff’s willingness to work closely with attorneys who had no “friends” in the agency and whose information was solely merit-based. Moreover, a significant percentage of the firms that did employ former SEC or Justice Department lawyers were the very defense firms that Bloomberg Law and Platt did not discuss or analyze.
  • The Commission’s staff demonstrated no bias against firms based on their practice areas.  The Commission’s enforcement staff and Whistleblower Office worked with law firms that were defense-based (6) and law firms that traditionally represent whistleblowers or employees in lawsuits against companies (many of the remaining 58).

The FOIA documents support a finding that the Commission’s staff is open to whistleblowers, regardless of whether they represent themselves or whether or not the firms raising the concerns have any “insider” connections.   Organizations such as the National Whistleblower Center, which regularly works with whistleblowers, have widely praised the program, as have the last three Chairs of the SEC, appointed by Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden.  The Commission itself confirmed that as of September 2021, it returned over $1.3 billion to harmed investors based on whistleblower cases.

The Future Role of Defense Firms in Dodd-Frank Cases

The SEC cannot implement special rules that would be prejudicial to traditional defense firms that file whistleblower cases.   Likewise, whistleblowers have the right to hire counsel of their choice and, in most cases, can knowingly waive potential conflicts of interest.  But the mere fact that traditional defense firms can lawfully represent whistleblowers without violating any SEC or local Bar rules does not address the special problems that may exist when a defense firm represents a whistleblower.  For example, such representations can result in significant conflicts of interest that may not be apparent at the commencement of a case. This may result in the whistleblower’s attorneys not advocating for legal precedents that could harm their other corporate clients.

Traditional defense firms should implement internal procedures to guard against potential problems based on the obvious conflicts that can arise when they represent clients on both sides of whistleblower-disclosure cases.  More significantly, it is absolutely crucial that whistleblowers fully understand the potential for conflicts of interest when deciding on the best attorneys to hire.  Attorneys working for defense firms must clearly spell out these issues and ensure that when representing a whistleblower, their prospective client is fully aware of all the risks and limitations.

Among the rules, procedures, and practices that defense firms should implement or carefully consider are:

  1. At the very least, defense firms representing whistleblowers should identify this on their websites.  Corporate clients should know that the firm also represents whistleblowers and should be able to question counsel on these matters so they feel comfortable that no conflicts would arise.
  2. Whistleblower clients need full disclosure of how the defense firm’s primary practice may impact the representation.  This is particularly true whenever a case would require advocacy on behalf of a whistleblower that could expand legal interpretations benefiting whistleblowers.  It is hard to reconcile how a law firm defending some clients against whistleblowers can effectively argue before administrative agencies or courts of law legal precedents that could expand the rights of whistleblowers.  These expanded rights could and would ultimately not be to the advantage of corporate clients accused of wrongdoing.
  3. Similarly, defense firms need to reconcile how they can advocate for a whistleblower who engaged in tactics, such as removing documents or one-party tape recording, that their corporate clients may find offensive.  This is particularly true when the zealous representation of a whistleblower requires expanding the ability of whistleblowers to obtain evidence of wrongdoing, and the precedent this advocacy establishes may be used against the firm’s current or future corporate clients.
  4. The potential for a conflict of interest needs to be fully explored in every case.  One issue that firms and clients may not be fully aware of is how the “related action” provisions of the laws impact potential conflicts.  Once the SEC obtains a sanction of over $1 million in any case, all “related actions” become eligible for a reward.  Sanctions issued by other law enforcement or regulatory agencies based on “related” claims can form the basis of a reward.   When examining whether a conflict exists, law firms need to look beyond the SEC action and determine witnesses, parties, and issues that may be implicated in a “related action.” This determination is critical even if the related action is not based on any securities law violation.
  5. Defense firms can also explore ways to refer potential whistleblower clients to attorneys whose practices are based solely on representing whistleblowers.  These referrals would help ensure that the defense firm is not conflicted (either as a matter of ethics or marketing) and that the client can obtain the best counsel.

Conclusion: The Iron Curtain has Fallen

Whistleblower representation is entering a new world.  The “iron curtain” that formerly separated law firms that represent corporate crooks from those that represent whistleblowers has fallen. This new reality is not without serious risks to whistleblowers (and corporate clients).  Whistleblowers must be fully aware of the dangers of having a corporate law firm represent them.  Corporate law firms must institute procedures to guard against conflicts of interest and to ensure they can zealously represent whistleblowers.  Zealous representation is needed even when the precedents established in these cases may create trouble for their other client base.

At the end of the day, the fact that defense law firms are now representing whistleblowers affirms the success of Dodd-Frank.  It is an affirmation of the critical nature of the information whistleblowers provide to the government and the role of this insider information in stopping otherwise hard to detect corporate crimes.  The “iron curtain” has fallen, but it has fallen in the direction that helps whistleblowers.  It has fallen in the direction that affirms the quality of their disclosures. It refutes the often-repeated slander that whistleblowers are somehow simply disgruntled employees.

Whistleblowers are essential to ensuring fairness in the markets, holding wrongdoers accountable, and deterring future wrongdoing.  The SEC has publicly recognized this, and now leading corporate defense attorneys have quietly recognized it. Defense firms like Akin Gump, Winston and Strawn, and Hayes and Boone got it right when they advocated for paying whistleblowers substantial rewards.  Whistleblowers whose information holds corporate criminals accountable deserve large rewards. These rewards are in the public interest, and the SEC Dodd-Frank whistleblower program must be protected, enhanced and expanded.

Sources:

  1. Whistleblower Network News, “WNN Exclusive: SEC FOIA Documents Reveal Big Law Defense Firms are Confidentially Representing Dodd-Frank Whistleblowers,” (September 27, 2022)
  2. List of Law Firms that Obtained Rewards in Whistleblower Cases as of 2021
  3. List of Awards Obtained by the Six Defense Law Firms
  4. List of pro se Cases where Whistleblowers Obtained a Reward
  5. FAQ on the SEC’s Dodd-Frank Act program
  6. FAQ on Confidentiality of Dodd-Frank Act claims

Article By Stephen M. Kohn of Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto

For more criminal law and business crimes legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2022. All Rights Reserved.

Whistleblower Receives $11 Million for Reporting Pharmaceutical Fraud

September 16, 2022.  The United States Department of Justice settled a case against the pharmaceutical manufacturer Bayer Corporation.  Under the terms of the settlement, Bayer paid $40 million.  A former employee in the pharmaceutical company’s marketing department filed two qui tam lawsuits alleging violations of the False Claims Act.  For reporting fraud, the whistleblower received approximately $11 million, and they pursued both cases after the Department of Justice (DOJ) declined to intervene.

According to the allegations, the pharmaceutical company was paying kickbacks to healthcare providers to “induce them to utilize the drugs Trasylol and Avelox, and also marketed these drugs for off-label uses that were not reasonable and necessary.”  This lawsuit was filed in the District of New Jersey and alleged that the because of these kickbacks, the pharmaceutical company caused submission of false claims to Medicare and Medicaid.  The lawsuit that was transferred to the District of Minnesota entailed the pharmaceutical company knowingly misrepresenting the safety and efficacy of Baycol, a statin drug, and also renewing contracts with the Defense Logistics Agency based on these misrepresentations.  To settle these allegations, Bayer paid $38,860,555 to the United States and $1,139,445 to the Medicaid Participating States.  The Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General remarked about this settlement, “Today’s recovery highlights the critical role that whistleblowers play in the effective use of the False Claims Act to combat fraud in federal healthcare programs.”

The False Claims Act incentivizes private citizens to report fraud against the government and holds accountable companies that financially benefit from participation in government contracts and government-sponsored programs.  The Department of Justice needs whistleblowers to the be the antidote to pharmaceutical fraud.

Article By Renée Brooker and Eva Gunasekera of Tycko & Zavareei LLP

For more whistleblower and white collar crime legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP

NAVEX Report Reveals Increase in Whistleblower Retaliation and Reporting of Misconduct

NAVEX’s 2022 Risk & Compliance Hotline & Incident Management Benchmark Report reveals an increase in internal reporting about misconduct and an increase in allegations of retaliation.  The analysis of data from 3,470 organizations that received more than 1.37 million individual reports identified the following trends (see the full report for a discussion of additional trends and analysis of the data):

  • “More actual allegations of misconduct, rather than inquiries about policies or possible misconduct. Ninety percent of all reports in 2021 were allegations of misconduct, up from 86 percent last year and hitting an all-time high since our first benchmark report more than ten years ago.”

  • “Reports about retaliation, harassment and discrimination jumped – especially retaliation. In 2021, reports of retaliation nearly doubled . . . Taken altogether, these findings suggest employees are more attuned to workplace civility issues. That would fit with external trends such as more talk about systemic racism, income inequality and political divisions; as well as increasing protection for whistleblowers and employees’ awareness of  those protections.”

  • “Substantiation rates continue to edge upward. Overall substantiation rates rose from 42 percent in 2020 to 43 percent in 2021, and up from 36 percent a decade ago. The reports substantiated most often were data privacy concerns (63 percent), environmental issues (59 percent), and confidential and proprietary information (54 percent). The reports substantiated least often were about retaliation (24 percent).”

  • “The substantiation rate for reports of retaliation also went up slightly, from 23 percent in 2020 to  24 percent in 2021 – the highest substantiation rate seen since 2016. While steady, this substantiation rate is significantly below the overall median case substantiation rate of 43 percent in 2021. These cases, though difficult to prove, warrant attention.”

  • “Reports of harassment exceeded levels from the height of the #MeToo movement.”

Corporate Whistleblower Protections

Whistleblower retaliation remains all too prevalent.  A September 14, 2022 Bloomberg article titled Whistleblower retaliation remains all too prevalent discusses how “choosing to be a whistle-blower can also be a lonely, risky road” and identifies many deterrents to speaking up – “[t]hey may be afraid of litigation, ruining their reputations, losing security clearances or facing jail time.”

Fortunately, federal and state laws afford corporate whistleblowers remedies to combat retaliation, and whistleblower reward laws incentivize whistleblowers to take the considerable risks entailed in reporting fraud and other wrongdoing to the government.  For example, the

SEC Whistleblower Program offers awards to eligible whistleblowers who provide original information that leads to successful SEC enforcement actions with total monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million. A whistleblower may receive an award of between 10% and 30% of the total monetary sanctions collected in actions brought by the SEC and in related actions brought by other regulatory or law enforcement authorities. The SEC Whistleblower Program allows whistleblowers to submit tips anonymously if represented by an attorney in connection with their tip.

What is Whistleblower Retaliation?

Whistleblower retaliation laws prohibit a broad range of retaliatory actions against whistleblowers, including any act that would dissuade a worker from engaging in protected whistleblowing.  Examples of actionable whistleblower retaliation include:

  • Terminating a whistleblower;

  • Constructively discharging a whistleblower;

  • Demoting a whistleblower;

  • Suspending a whistleblower;

  • Harassing a whistleblower or subjecting the whistleblower to a hostile work environment;

  • Reassigning a whistleblower to a position with significantly different responsibilities;

  • Issuing a performance evaluation or performance improvement plan that supplies the necessary foundation for the eventual termination of the whistleblower’s employment, or a written warning or counseling session that is considered discipline by policy or practice and is routinely used as the first step in a progressive discipline policy;

  • Placing the whistleblower on administrative leave;

  • Threatening to take an adverse action against a whistleblower;

  • Subjecting a whistleblower to a retaliatory investigation or retaliatory surveillance;

  • Suing a whistleblower for the purpose of retaliating against the whistleblower;

  • Outing a whistleblower;

  • Intimidating a whistleblower;

  • Initiating a law enforcement investigation or facilitating an employee’s detention by U.S. ICE after the employee reported a serious injury; or

  • Discriminating against a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment because of whistleblowing.

The DOL Administrative Review Board has emphasized that statutory language prohibiting discrimination “in any way” must be broadly construed and therefore a whistleblower need not prove that a retaliatory act had a tangible impact on an employee’s terms and conditions of employment.

What Damages Can a Whistleblower Recover in a Whistleblower Retaliation Case?

Whistleblower retaliation can exact a serious toll, including lost pay and benefits, reputational harm, and emotional distress.  Indeed, whistleblower retaliation can derail a career and deprive the whistleblower of millions of dollars in lost future earnings.

Whistleblowers should be rewarded for doing the right thing, but all too often they suffer retaliation and find themselves marginalized and ostracized.  Federal and state whistleblower laws provide several remedies to compensate whistleblowers that have suffered retaliation, including:

  • back pay (lost wages and benefits);

  • emotional distress damages;

  • damages for reputational harm;

  • reinstatement or front pay in lieu thereof;

  • lost future earnings; and

  • punitive damages.

Combating Whistleblower Retaliation: How to Maximize Your Recovery

Whistleblower protection laws can provide a potent remedy, but before bringing a retaliation claim, it is crucial to assess the options under federal and state law and develop a strategy to achieve the optimal recovery.  Key issues to consider include the scope of protected whistleblowing, the burden of proof, the damages that a prevailing whistleblower can recover, the forum where the claim would be litigated, and the impact of the retaliation claim on a whistleblower rewards claim.

Scope of Protected Whistleblowing

There is no federal statute that provides general protection to corporate whistleblowers.  Instead, federal whistleblower protection laws protect specific types of disclosures, such as disclosures of securities fraud, tax fraud, procurement fraud, or consumer financial protection fraud.  The main sources of federal protection for corporate whistleblowers include the whistleblower protection provisions of the following:

  • The False Claims Act (FCA) — protecting disclosures about fraud directed toward the government, including actions taken in furtherance of a qui tam action and efforts to stop a violation of the FCA;

  • The Defense Contractor Whistleblower Protection Act (DCWPA) — protecting whistleblowing about gross mismanagement of a federal contract or grant; a gross waste of federal funds; an abuse of authority relating to a federal contract or grant or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, or a violation of law, rule, or regulation related to a federal contract;

  • The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) — protecting disclosures about mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, a violation of any SEC rule, or shareholder fraud;

  • The Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) — protecting whistleblowing to the SEC about potential violations of federal securities laws;

  • The Taxpayer First Act (TFA) — protecting disclosures about tax fraud or tax underpayment;

  • The Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA) — protecting disclosures concerning violations of Consumer Financial Protection Bureau rules or federal laws regulating unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices in the provision of consumer financial products or services; and

  • The Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) — protecting disclosures about violations of the Bank Secrecy Act.

While most of these anti-retaliation laws protect internal disclosures (e.g., reporting to a supervisor), whistleblower protection under the DFA is predicated on a showing that the whistleblower disclosed a potential violation of federal securities law to the SEC prior to suffering an adverse action.

State law may also provide a remedy, including the anti-retaliation provisions in state FCAs.  And approximately 42 states recognize a common law wrongful discharge tort action (a public policy exception to at-will employment), which generally protects refusal to engage in illegal activity and the exercise of a statutory right.

Burden of Proof

To maximize the likelihood of winning a case (or at least getting the case before a jury), it is useful to select a remedy with a favorable causation standard (the level of proof required to link the protected whistleblowing to the adverse employment action).  SOX has a favorable “contributing factor” causation standard, i.e., the whistleblower prevails by proving that their protected whistleblowing affected in any way the employer’s decision to take an adverse action.  In contrast, the FCA and DFA require the whistleblower to prove “but for” causation, i.e., the adverse action would not have happened “but for” the protected whistleblowing (albeit there is no need to prove that it was the sole factor).

Damages and Remedies in Whistleblower Retaliation Cases

Variations in the remedies available to whistleblowers under federal anti-retaliation laws may warrant bringing more than one claim.  For example, the DCWPA authorizes an award of back pay (the value of lost pay and benefits), and the FCA authorizes an award of double back pay.  If the whistleblower’s disclosures are protected under both statutes, then the whistleblower should bring both claims.

While a prevailing whistleblower can recover back pay under both the DFA and SOX (double back pay under the former and single back pay under the latter), the DFA does not authorize special damages, i.e., damages for emotional distress and reputational harm.  In contrast, SOX authorizes uncapped compensatory damages.  Therefore, a whistleblower protected under both statutes should bring the SOX claim within the much shorter SOX statute of limitations (180 days) to recover both double back pay and special damages.

State law may also provide a remedy, and if the whistleblower can pursue both a statutory remedy and a wrongful discharge tort, the latter may offer the opportunity to seek punitive damages.

Forum Selection and Administrative Exhaustion

When selecting the optimal remedy to combat retaliation, a whistleblower should consider the forum where the claim would be tried and determine whether the claim must initially be investigated by a federal agency before the whistleblower can litigate the claim.  SOX provides an unequivocal exemption from mandatory arbitration, but Dodd-Frank claims are subject to arbitration.  Accordingly, a whistleblower protected both by SOX and Dodd-Frank should file a SOX claim within the 180-day statute of limitations to preserve the option to try the case before a jury.

Several of the corporate whistleblower protection laws require that the whistleblower file the claim initially at a federal agency and permit the agency to investigate the claim before the whistleblower can litigate the claim.  This is called administrative exhaustion, and failure to comply with that requirement can waive the claim.  In contrast, the FCA and DFA do not require administrative exhaustion.

Impact of Whistleblower Retaliation Claim on Whistleblower Rewards Claim

Another important consideration is the potential impact of a retaliation case on a qui tam or whistleblower rewards case.  Filing an FCA retaliation claim while a qui tam suit is under seal poses some risk of violating the seal, which could bar the whistleblower from recovering a relator share.  Therefore, counsel should consider filing the FCA retaliation claim under seal along with the qui tam suit.

Further, whistleblowers pursuing rewards claims at federal agencies (e.g., SEC or IRS whistleblower claims) while simultaneously pursuing related retaliation claims (e.g., a SOX or TFA claim) should assess the potential impact of the retaliation claim and the potential discoverability of submissions to the SEC or IRS on the rewards claim(s).

Although the patchwork of whistleblower protection laws fails to protect disclosures about certain forms of fraud, there are important pockets of protection.  To effectively combat retaliation, whistleblowers should avail themselves of all appropriate remedies.

Article By Jason Zuckerman and Matthew Stock of Zuckerman Law

For more criminal law / business crimes legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Zuckerman Law