Category: Whistleblower

International Groups Call for DOJ Whistleblower Program to Incorporate Best Practices

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is in the midst of developing a whistleblower award program. According to Acting Assistant Attorney General Nicole M. Argentieri, “the whole point of the DAG’s 90-day ‘policy sprint’ is to gather information, consult with stakeholders, and design a thoughtful, well-informed program.”

Since the Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco announced the policy sprint on March 7, whistleblower advocates in the U.S., including Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, have consulted with the DOJ, outlining key elements of other successful whistleblower programs which should be incorporated in the DOJ program.

On May 13, a coalition of anti-corruption organizations and law firms from over twenty countries sent a letter to the DOJ emphasizing that an effective DOJ whistleblower program could greatly aid international anti-corruption efforts.

“We, the undersigned organizations, believe that a U.S. Department of Justice whistleblower rewards program has the potential to be instrumental to each of our anti-corruption efforts,” write the organizations.

“However, without careful consideration for the unique risks of international whistleblowers and without the implementation of the best-practice protocols identified above, this program could be damaging for international whistleblowers, and their catalytic role in transnational anti-corruption efforts,” the letter continues.

In the letter, the organizations call on the DOJ to incorporate four proven best practices for whistleblower award programs. These best practices mirror those previously called for by Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto. Allison Herren Lee, former SEC Commissioner and currently Of Counsel at Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, outlined these four elements in a recent article for the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.

The four recommendations are:

1. Mandatory Awards of 10-30% of Proceeds Collected

2. Anonymous and Confidential Reporting Channels

3. Dedicated Whistleblower Office

4. Eligibility Requirements which Match the SEC Whistleblower Program

Geoff Schweller also contributed to this article.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2024. All Rights Reserved.
For more on the DOJ Whistleblower Program, visit the NLR Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

Poor Oversight: Healthcare Company & Owner to Pay $1 Million for Care Plan Oversight Service Billing Fraud

The United States announced that Chicago-based healthcare company Apollo Health Inc. (Apollo), and its owner, Brian J. Weinstein, will pay $1 million to resolve False Claims Act allegations. The claims state that Apollo, under the direction of Weinstein, submitted bills to Medicare for services that were never performed. The case was brought by two whistleblowers who will be rewarded for their efforts.

From December 2014 through March 2017, Apollo allegedly submitted Medicare claims for care plan oversight services (CPO) that did not occur. CPOs detail a physician’s duties to supervise a patient receiving complex medical care. Weinstein allegedly directed Apollo to submit 12,592 CPO service claims for over two dozen providers employed by Apollo, despite Weinstein’s knowledge that no services had been rendered to Medicare patients, and no CPO services were documented in medical records.
Medicare fraud undermines the trust and integrity of the healthcare system, resulting in significant financial burdens on taxpayers. When individuals or organizations engage in fraudulent activities, such as billing for services not rendered or submitting false claims, they siphon funds from Medicare’s intended beneficiaries. Medicare fraud diminishes the resources available for legitimate healthcare services for truly ill Medicare beneficiaries.
The settlement resolves claims brought by two whistleblowers, also known as relators, under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act. Javar Jones and Louis Curet, the relators in the case, will receive 20% of the settlement amount for bringing the fraudulent activity to the United States’ attention. Whistleblowers who report fraud against the government via a qui tam lawsuit can earn a 15-25% share of the government’s recovery.

© 2024 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP
For more news on Whistleblower Settlements, visit the Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Whistleblower Reward Program is a Force-Multiplier to Detect and Combat Terrorist Financing

Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Whistleblower Program

In a May 6, 2024 speech at the SIFMA AML Conference, the Director of the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Andrea Gacki discussed the success of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) in generating disclosures about money laundering and sanctions evasion:

[The whistleblower] program holds tremendous potential as an enforcement force-multiplier. Whistleblowers have submitted information relating to some of the most pressing policy objectives of the United States, from Iran- and Russia-related sanctions evasion to drug-trafficking to cyber-crimes and corruption. While efforts are underway to develop an online tip intake portal and other aspects of this important program, I want to note that even while these efforts are underway, the program is actively receiving, reviewing, and sharing tips with our enforcement partners.

We have received over 270 unique tips since the program’s inception, and many of the tips received have been highly relevant to many of Treasury’s top priorities.

The AMLA incentivizes whistleblowers to report money laundering and sanctions evasion by requiring the Department of the Treasury to pay an award where a whistleblower’s voluntary disclosure of original information leads to a successful enforcement action imposing monetary sanctions above $1,000,000. The minimum whistleblower award is ten percent of collected monetary sanctions and the maximum award is thirty percent. Awards are paid from penalties collected in successful enforcement actions stemming from whistleblower disclosures.

To determine the amount of an AMLA whistleblower award, Treasury will consider:

  • the significance of the information provided by the whistleblower to the success of the covered money laundering judicial or administrative action;
  • the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower and any legal representative;
  • the programmatic interest of Treasury in deterring the particular violations that the whistleblower disclosed; and
  • additional relevant factors that Treasury will promulgate, which will likely echo the factors that the SEC employs to determine the amount of an SEC whistleblower award.

FinCEN Issues Advisory About Terrorist Financing

Among the violations that whistleblowers can help the government detect and combat are sanctions evasion and money laundering related to Islamic Republic of Iran-backed terrorist organizations. On May 8, 2024, FinCEN issued an Advisory to assist financial institutions in detecting potentially illicit transactions related to Islamic Republic of Iran-backed terrorist organizations. FinCEN Advisory to Financial Institutions to Counter the Financing of Iran-Backed Terrorist Organizations, FIN-2024-A001 (May 8, 2024).

The Advisory identifies the means by which certain terrorist organizations receive support from Iran and the techniques they use to illicitly access or circumvent the international financial system to raise, move, and spend funds. According to the Advisory, the sale of commodities, particularly oil, is the primary source of revenue for Iran to fund its terrorist proxies. Iran has “established large-scale global oil smuggling and money laundering networks to enable access to foreign currency and the international financial system through the illicit sale of crude oil and petroleum products in global markets.” FIN-2024-A001, at 3. In 2021, the National Iranian Oil Company sold approximately $40 billion worth of petroleum products and in 2023, Iran’s exports to the People’s Republic of China reached approximately 1.3 million barrels per day. Some of the proceeds of the sale of Iranian oil finances the activities of the IRGC-Qods Force and other terrorist groups.

Financial Institutions Can Serve as Intermediates for Terrorist Financing Transactions

Financial institutions located outside Iran become intermediaries for the IRGC-QF’s terrorist financing transactions. In particular, “third-country front companies—often incorporated as ‘trading companies’ or ‘general trading companies’—and exchange houses act as a global ‘shadow banking’ network that processes illicit commercial transactions and channels money to terrorist organizations on Iran’s behalf.” Those exchange houses and front companies rely on banks with correspondent accounts with U.S. financial institutions, especially to process dollar-denominated transactions. FIN-2024-A001, at 5.

The Advisory lists red flags of illicit or suspicious activity that financial institutions should consider in determining if a behavior or transaction is indicative of terrorist finance or is otherwise suspicious and therefore may warrant the filing of a Suspicious Activity Report:

  • A customer or a customer’s counterparty conducts transactions with Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)-designated entities and individuals, or transactions that contain a nexus to identifiers listed for OFAC-designated entities and individuals, to include email addresses, physical addresses, phone numbers, passport numbers, or CVC addresses.
  • Information included in a transaction between customers or in a note accompanying a peer-to-peer transfer include key terms known to be associated with terrorism or terrorist organizations.
  • A customer conducts transactions with a money services business (MSB) or other financial institution, including a VASP, that operates in jurisdictions known for, or at high risk for, terrorist activity and is reasonably believed to have lax customer identification and verification processes, opaque ownership, or otherwise fails to comply with AML/CFT best practices.
  • A customer conducts transactions that originate with, are directed to, or otherwise involve entities that are front companies, general “trading companies” with unclear business purposes, or other companies whose beneficial ownership information indicates that they may have a nexus with Iran or other Iran-supported terrorist groups. Indicators of possible front companies include opaque ownership structures, individuals and/or entities with obscure names that direct the company, or business addresses that are residential or co-located with other companies.
  • A customer that is or purports to be a charitable organization or NPO84 solicits donations but does not appear to provide any charitable services or openly supports terrorist activity or operations. In some cases, these organizations may post on social media platforms or encrypted messaging apps to solicit donations, including in CVC.
  • A customer receives numerous small CVC payments from many wallets, then transfers the funds to another wallet, particularly if the customer logs in using an Internet Protocol (IP) based in a jurisdiction known for, or at high risk for, terrorist activity. In such cases, financial institutions may also be able to provide associated technical details such as IP addresses with time stamps and device identifiers that can provide helpful information to authorities.
  • A customer makes money transfers to a jurisdiction known for, or at high risk for, terrorist activity that are inconsistent with their stated occupation or business purpose with vague stated purposes such as “travel expenses,” “charity,” “aid,” or “gifts.
  • A customer account receives large payouts from social media fundraisers or crowdfunding platforms and is then accessed from an IP address in a jurisdiction known for, or at high risk for, terrorist activity, particularly if the social media accounts that contribute to the fundraisers contain content supportive of terrorist campaigns.
  • A customer company is incorporated in the United States or a third-country jurisdiction, but its activities occur solely in jurisdictions known for, or at high risk for, terrorist activity and show no relationship to the company’s stated business purpose.

FIN-2024-A001, at 12-13.

© 2024 Zuckerman Law
For more news on the Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Whistleblower Reward Program, visit the NLR Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

A Guide for All Medicare Whistleblowers

Becoming a whistleblower and notifying federal authorities of Medicare fraud is a big public service and can even lead to a lucrative whistleblower award. Furthermore, the chief concern for interested whistleblowers is whether they could get reprimanded at their job for blowing the whistle on healthcare fraud or even fired, but any form of whistleblower retaliation is unlawful under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act.

If you think that you have uncovered evidence of Medicare fraud and want to learn more about what could happen next, here are four things to know.

  1. There are Lots of Known Ways to Defraud Medicare

Medicare is an $800 billion federal program, but estimates are that tens of billions, if not nearly $100 billion of that is lost to fraud every year – and that estimate is widely regarded as a conservative one.

A lot of this type of health care fraud can be categorized into one of the following types of schemes, many of them having to do with fraudulent billing tactics:

  • Phantom billing, where medical goods or services are billed against Medicare even though they were never provided or the purported patient does not exist
  • Double billing for the same goods or services
  • Providing medically unnecessary healthcare
  • Buying prescription drugs with Medicare drug plan money and then reselling them
  • Upcoding, or providing a healthcare service to a patient, but then billing Medicare for a similar but more expensive one
  • Unbundling, or billing for each service independently even though they are normally charged in a discounted package because they are often performed together
  • Paying or taking financial kickbacks for referring patients to a certain healthcare provider, or to a provider that the referring party has a financial stake in

However, these are just the types of Medicare fraud that have been discovered. There are likely other ways of defrauding the program that have yet to be detected. Therefore, even if the evidence that you have uncovered does not fit squarely into one of these types of Medicare fraud does not necessarily mean that it is not a problem.

  1. What Happens After Deciding the Blow the Whistle on Medicare Fraud

Most people are not completely familiar with how other civil or criminal cases move forward in the justice system. Because whistleblower cases are different and even more nuanced and complex, even fewer people understand the process – and those that presume that they are just like other cases find themselves misinformed.

Whistleblower cases are nearly unique in that they have three parties to them:

  1. The whistleblower
  2. The government
  3. The defendant

After you have found evidence of Medicare fraud and abuse, decided to report suspected fraud and become a whistleblower, and hired a law firm well versed in federal laws to represent you, you will continue to gather evidence to support your allegations. This is a sensitive endeavor, as most whistleblowers only have access to the incriminating evidence through their employment, and their employer may be actively trying to cover up the fraudulent activity.

Being represented by an experienced whistleblower lawyer is essential for this stage of the process. They will have gone through it before and will see how to gather evidence to support your case without exposing yourself to the risk of being detected for reporting fraud.

Once you have a strong case, the next step is to present it to the law enforcement agency that would have jurisdiction over your case. Typically you would present information to the Health and Human Services Office or Office of the Inspector General (OIG) hotline. For Medicare fraud, reports are often made to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, or CMS. The goal is typically to persuade agents there to intervene in your case, conduct the investigation that you started, and prosecute the fraudsters.

If the agency declines to intervene, you can still pursue the case on the government’s behalf.

  1. You Can Receive a Financial Award

One of the main incentives for whistleblowers is the award that they can receive for bringing the evidence to the attention of federal law enforcement. That award can be substantial.

Because Medicare is a federal program, most claims of Medicare fraud advance under the False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq.). This federal law provides an avenue for whistleblowers who have evidence of fraud against the government.

Importantly, the False Claims Act offers quite generous whistleblower awards, even when compared to other whistleblower statutes. The amount that you receive depends on several factors, the most important of which is whether the government intervened in your case or not. If it did, you can receive between 15 and 25 percent of the proceeds of the case. If it did not and you prosecuted the case on behalf of the government, you can recover up to 30 percent of the case’s proceeds.

Other factors include:

  • Whether there are other whistleblowers who played a role in the case
  • How important the evidence was that you brought to the table
  • Whether you played a part in the Medicare fraud
  1. Your Job is Protected 

Because workplace retaliation is such a foreseeable outcome of becoming a whistleblower, and because the federal government relies so heavily on whistleblowers, it should come as no surprise that the False Claims Act and other whistleblower statutes provide legal protections in the workplace for those who engage in lawful whistleblower activities.

For Medicare fraud whistleblowers, the False Claims Act’s anti-retaliation provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), is particularly strong. Not only does it protect you from retaliatory conduct that falls short of termination, like workplace harassment and threats to fire you, it also entitles you to significant remedies if your employer breaks the law and commits an act of reprisal.

Oberheiden P.C. © 2024
For more news on Medicare fraud whistleblowers, visit the NLR Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

Justice Department has Opportunity to Revolutionize its Enforcement Efforts with Whistleblower Program

Over the past few decades, modern whistleblower award programs have radically altered the ability of numerous U.S. agencies to crack down on white-collar crime. This year, the Department of Justice (DOJ) may be joining their ranks, if it incorporates the key elements of successful whistleblower programs into the program it is developing.

On March 7, the Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco announced that the DOJ was launching a “90-day policy sprint” to develop “a DOJ-run whistleblower rewards program.” According to Monaco, the DOJ has taken note of the successes of the U.S.’s whistleblower award programs, such as those run by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS), noting that they “have proven indispensable.”

Monaco understood that the SEC and IRS programs have been so successful because they “encourage individuals to report misconduct” by “rewarding whistleblowers.” But how any award program is administered is the key to whether or not the program will work. There is a nearly 50-year history of what rules need to be implemented to transform these programs into highly effective law enforcement tools. The Justice Department needs to follow these well defined rules.

The key element of all successful whistleblower award programs is very simple: If a whistleblower meets all of the requirements set forth by the government for compensation the awards must be mandatory and based on a percentage of the sanctions collected thanks to the whistleblower. A qualified whistleblower cannot be left out in the cold. Denying qualified whistleblowers compensation will destroy the trust necessary for a whistleblower program to work.

It is not the possibility of money that incentives individuals to report misconduct but the promise of money. Blowing the whistle is an immense risk and individuals are only compelled to take such a risk when there is real guarantee of an award.

This dynamic has been laid clear in recent legislative history. There is a long track record of whistleblower laws and programs failing when awards are discretionary and then becoming immensely successful once awards are made mandatory.

For example, under the 1943 version of the False Claims Act awards to whistleblowers were fully discretionary. After decades of ineffectiveness, in 1986, Congress amended the law to set a mandate that qualified whistleblowers receive awards of 15-30% of the proceeds collected by the government in the action connected with their disclosure.

The 1986 Senate Report explained why Congress was amending the law:

“The new percentages . . . create a guarantee that relators [i.e., whistleblowers] will receive at least some portion of the award if the litigation proves successful. Hearing witnesses who themselves had exposed fraud in Government contracting, expressed concern that current law fails to offer any security, financial or otherwise, to persons considering publicly exposing fraud.

“If a potential plaintiff reads the present statute and understands that in a successful case the court may arbitrarily decide to award only a tiny fraction of the proceeds to the person who brought the action, the potential plaintiff may decide it is too risky to proceed in the face of a totally unpredictable recovery.”

In the nearly four decades since awards were made mandatory, the False Claims Act has established itself as America’s premier anti-fraud law. The government has recovered over $75 billions of taxpayer money from fraudsters, the vast majority from whistleblower initiated cases based directly on the 1986 amendments making awards mandatory.

Similar transformations occurred at both the IRS and SEC where ineffective discretionary award laws were replaced by laws which mandated that qualified whistleblowers receive a set percentage of the funds collected thanks to their whistleblowing. Since these reforms, the whistleblower programs have revolutionized these agencies’ enforcement efforts, leading directly to billions of dollars in sanctions and creating a massive deterrent effect on corporate wrongdoing.

Most recently, Congress reaffirmed the importance of mandatory whistleblower awards when it reformed the anti-money laundering whistleblower law. The original version of the law, which passed in January 2021, had no set minimum amount for awards, meaning that they were fully discretionary. After the AML Whistleblower Program struggled to take off, Congress listened to the feedback from whistleblower advocates and passed the AML Whistleblower Improvement Act to mandate that qualified money laundering whistleblowers are awarded.

Monaco states that the DOJ has long had the discretionary authority to pay whistleblower awards to individuals who report information leading to civil or criminal forfeitures and has “used this authority here and there — but never as part of a targeted program.”

The most important step in turning an underutilized and ineffective whistleblower award law into an “indispensable” whistleblower award program has been made clear over the past decades. Qualified whistleblowers must be guaranteed an award based on a percentage of the sanctions collected in connection with their disclosure.

By administering its whistleblower program in a way that mandates award payments, the DOJ would go a long way towards creating a whistleblower program which revolutionizes its ability to fight crime. The Justice Department has taken the most important first step – recognizing the importance of whistleblowers in reporting frauds. It now must follow through during its “90-day sprint,” making sure reforming the management of the Asset Forfeiture Fund works in practice. Whistleblowers who risk their jobs and careers need real, enforceable justice.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2024. All Rights Reserved.
For more news on DOJ Whistleblower Programs, visit the NLR Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

DOJ Plan to Offer Whistleblower Awards “A Good First Step”

The Department of Justice (DOJ) will launch a whistleblower rewards program later this year, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco, announced today. Monaco stated that other U.S. whistleblower award programs, such as the SEC, CFTC, IRS and AML programs, “have proven indispensable” and that the DOJ plans to offer awards for tips not covered under these programs.

“This is a good first step, but the Justice Department has miles to go in creating a whistleblower program competitive with the programs managed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC),” said Stephen M. Kohn.

“We hope that the DOJ will follow the lead of the SEC and CFTC and establish a central Whistleblower Office that can accept anonymous and confidential complaints. Such a program has been required under the anti-money laundering whistleblower law for over three years, but Justice has simply failed to follow the law,” added Kohn, who also serves as Chairman of the Board of the National Whistleblower Center.

According to Monaco, “under current law, the Attorney General is authorized to pay awards for information or assistance leading to civil or criminal forfeitures” but this authority has never been used “as part of a targeted program.” The DOJ is “launching a 90-day sprint to develop and implement a pilot program, with a formal start date later this year,” she stated.

While the specifics of the program have yet to be announced, Monaco did state that the DOJ will only offer awards to individuals who were not involved in the criminal activity itself.

“The Justice Department’s decision to exclude persons who may have had some involvement in the criminal activity is a step backwards and demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding as to why the Dodd-Frank and False Claims Acts work so well,” continued Kohn. “When the False Claims Act was signed into law by President Abraham Lincoln in 1863 it was widely understood that the award laws worked best when they induced persons who were part of the conspiracy to turn in their former associates in crime. Justice needs to understand that by failing to follow the basic tenants of the most successful whistleblower laws ever enacted, their program is starting off on the wrong foot.”

Geoff Schweller also contributed to this article.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2024. All Rights Reserved.
For more news on the DOJ’s Whistleblower Award Program, visit the NLR Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

Road to Victory Just Got a Little Easier for Whistleblowers

In 2017, a federal jury found whistleblower Trevor Murray was wrongfully terminated after he refused “to change his research on commercial mortgage-backed securities.” He won over $900,000. On appeal in 2022, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned Murray’s award, finding whistleblowers who bring a retaliation claim against their employer under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) must prove their employer acted with “retaliatory intent.”

Earlier this month, the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in, issuing a unanimous decision in Trevor Murray v. UBS Securities LLC, et al. The justices found that the Second Circuit was wrong. That is, “when it comes to a plaintiff’s burden of proof on intent under SOX, they only need to show that their protected activity contributed to an unfavorable personnel action, such as a firing.” Once the plaintiff does this, the Supreme Court found the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove that “it would have taken the same adverse action regardless of the employee’s protected activity.” The justices found the law is intended ”to be plaintiff-friendly.”

In light of this development, employers should continue to be diligent in documenting the reasons that lead to an employee’s termination. This is especially true if that employee may be found to have engaged in a protected activity, cloaking them with certain whistleblower protections.

In siding with whistleblower Trevor Murray, the justices rejected UBS’ position that a separate finding of retaliatory intent is required for whistleblower protection under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, or SOX, which governs corporate financial reporting and recordkeeping.
© 2024 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
For more on Whistleblowers, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

SEC Enforcement Targets Anti-Whistleblower Practices in Financial Firm’s Settlement Agreements with Retail Clients by Imposing Highest Penalty in Standalone Enforcement Action Under Exchange Act Rule 21 F-17(a)

As the year gets underway, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) is continuing its ongoing enforcement efforts to target anti-whistleblower practices by pursuing a broader range of entities and substantive agreements, including the terms of agreements between financial institutions and their retail clients. The most recent settlement with a financial firm signifies that the SEC is imposing increasingly steep penalties to settle these matters while focusing on confidentiality provisions that do not affirmatively permit voluntary disclosures to regulators. We discuss below the latest SEC enforcement actions in the name of whistleblower protection and offer some practical tips for what firms and companies may do to proactively mitigate exposure.

On 16 January 2024, the SEC announced a record $18 million civil penalty against a dual registered investment adviser and broker-dealer (the Firm), asserting that the use of release agreements with retail clients impeded the clients from reporting securities law violations to the SEC in violation of Rule 21F-17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).1

The SEC found that from March 2020 through July 2023, the Firm regularly required its retail clients to sign confidential release agreements in order to receive a credit or settlement of more than $1,000. Under the terms of these releases, clients were required to keep confidential the existence of the credits or settlements, all related underlying facts, and all information relating to the accounts at issue, or risk legal action for breach of the agreement. The agreements “neither prohibited nor restricted” the clients from responding to any inquiries from the SEC, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), other regulators or “as required by law.” However, the agreements did not expressly allow the clients to initiate voluntary reporting of potential securities law violations to the regulators. The SEC found that this violated Rule 21F-17(a) “which is intended to ‘encourag[e] individuals to report to the Commission.’”2 While the Firm did report a number of the underlying client disputes to FINRA, the SEC found this insufficient to mitigate the lack of language in the release agreements that expressly permitted the clients to report potential securities law violations to the SEC.

The SEC initiated a settled administrative proceeding against the Firm, which neither admitted nor denied the SEC’s findings. In addition to the $18 million civil monetary penalty, the settlement requires that the Firm cease and desist from further violations of Rule 21F-17(a). Notably, the SEC credited certain remedial measures promptly undertaken by the Firm, including revising the at-issue release language and affirmatively alerting affected clients that they are not prohibited from communicating with governmental and regulatory authorities.

This enforcement action is significant for several reasons. First, it signals a broader enforcement focus by the SEC with respect to Rule 21F-17(a) in that this is the first action involving the terms of agreements between a financial institution and its retail clients, which are prevalent throughout the financial services industry. Previously, enforcement had focused squarely on restrictive confidentiality provisions involving employees, such as those found in employment or severance agreements or in connection with internal investigation interviews.

Second, the unprecedented magnitude of the penalty in a standalone Rule 21F-17(a) case underscores the SEC’s emphasis on preventing practices that it views as obstructions of whistleblower rights. SEC Enforcement Director Gurbir Grewal’s statement announcing the settlement reflects this position, “Whether it’s in your employment contracts, settlement agreements or elsewhere, you simply cannot include provisions that prevent individuals from contacting the SEC with evidence of wrongdoing.” Companies (public and private), broker-dealers, investment advisers, and other market participants should expect to see continued enforcement investigations in connection with the SEC’s ongoing attention toward compliance with Rule 21F-17(a), as discussed further below.

The SEC’s Whistleblower Protection Program

Established in 2011 pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, the SEC Whistleblower Program provides monetary awards to individuals who “tip” the SEC with original information that leads to an enforcement action resulting in monetary sanctions that exceed $1 million. Through the end of the SEC’s FY2023, the SEC has awarded almost $2 billion to 385 whistleblowers.3 In FY2023 alone, the SEC received over 18,000 whistleblower tips and awarded more than $600 million in whistleblower awards to 68 individuals.4

In furtherance of the Whistleblower Program, the SEC also issued Exchange Act Rule 21F-17(a), which provides that “no person may take any action to impede an individual from communicating directly with the Commission staff about a possible securities law violation, including enforcing, or threatening to enforce, a confidentiality agreement . . . with respect to such communications.”5

SEC Struck Several Blows in 2023 Against Companies that Failed to Carve out Whistleblower Protections in Their Confidentiality Agreements

The SEC has been aggressively enforcing Rule 21F-17(a) since its first enforcement action in 2015 with respect to that Rule,6 through several waves of enforcement actions. During 2023, the SEC was especially active with a number of settled enforcement actions asserting violations of Rule 21F-17(a) in which the respondents neither admitted nor denied the SEC’s findings:

  • In February 2023, the SEC fined a video game development and publishing company $35 million for violating federal securities laws through its inadequate disclosure controls and procedures. The settled action also included a finding that the company had violated Rule 21F-17(a) by executing separation agreements in the ordinary course of its business that required former employees to provide notice to the company if they received a request for information from the SEC’s staff.7
  • In May 2023, the SEC imposed a $2 million fine on an internet streaming company for: (i) retaliating against an employee who reported misconduct to the company’s management prior to and after filing a complaint with the SEC; and, (ii) impeding the reporting of potential securities law violations, by including provisions in employee severance agreements requiring that departing employees waive any potential right to receive a whistleblower award, in violation Rule 21F-17(a).8
  • In September 2023, in another standalone enforcement action for violations of Rule 21F-17(a), the SEC imposed a $10 million civil monetary penalty on a registered investment adviser (RIA) for requiring that its new employees sign employment agreements that prohibited the disclosure of “Confidential Information” to anyone outside of the company, without an exception for voluntary communications with the SEC concerning possible securities laws violations.9 Further, the RIA required many departing employees to sign a release in exchange for the receipt of certain deferred compensation and other benefits affirming that, among other things, the employee had not filed any complaints with any governmental agency. Although the RIA later revised its policies and issued clarifications to employees that they were not prevented from communicating with the SEC and other regulators, the RIA failed to amend its employment and release agreements to provide the carve out.
  • Also in September 2023, the SEC charged two additional firms with violations of Rule 21F-17(a). In one case imposing a $375,000 civil penalty, the SEC found that a commercial real estate services and investment firm impeded whistleblowers by requiring its employees, as a condition of receiving separation pay, to represent that they had not filed a complaint against the firm with any federal agency.10 In another case, the SEC imposed a $225,000 civil penalty against a privately-held energy and technology company for requiring certain departing employees to waive their rights to monetary whistleblower awards.11 This particular action underscores that Rule 21F-17 applies to all entities, and not only to public companies.

Mr. Grewal, in an October 2023 speech before the New York City Bar Association Compliance Institute, emphasized that potential impediments to the SEC’s Whistleblower Program would be a continued focus of the agency’s enforcement efforts, stating, “we take compliance with Rule 21F-17 very seriously, and so should each of you who work in a compliance function or advise companies. You need to look at these orders and the violative language cited by the Commission and think about how those actions may impact your firms. And if they do, then take the steps necessary to effect compliance.”12

Key Take-Aways

The SEC’s recent enforcement actions demonstrate that violations of Rule 21F-17(a) can carry significant fines and reach virtually any confidentiality agreement that does not carve out communications between a firm’s current or former employees or customers and the SEC or other regulators about potential securities violations. Moreover, although many of the enforcement actions relate to language in agreements, Rule 21F-17 is not so limited and can also apply to language in internal policies, procedures, guidance, manuals, or training materials. The message from the SEC is clear: it will continue to enforce Rule 21F-17 with respect to public companies, private companies, broker-dealers, investment advisers, and other financial services entities.

The SEC in its recent orders has provided credit to companies for cooperation as well as for instituting remedial actions.13 Being proactive in identifying and correcting potential violations in advance of any investigation by the SEC can result in mitigation of any action or penalties.

Legal and compliance officers may want to consider the following steps in order to evaluate and potentially mitigate any potential exposure to an enforcement action:

  • Conduct a review of all employee-facing and client-facing documents or contracts with confidentiality provisions and remove or revise any content that may be viewed as impeding (even unintentionally) a person’s ability to report potential securities law violations to the SEC. Depending on the circumstances, this may involve including a reference expressly permitting communications with the SEC and other government or regulatory entities without advance notice or disclosure to the company.
  • Remove any language from the templates that could be interpreted as hindering an employee’s or client’s ability to communicate with the SEC concerning potential securities law violations, including language threatening disciplinary action against employees for disclosing confidential information in their communications with government agencies when reporting potential violations.
  • Prepare addenda or updates to current employee- and client-facing agreements that reflect the revised confidentiality clauses.
  • Include reference in written anti-retaliation policies that employees’ communications and cooperation with the SEC and other government agencies will not result in retaliation from the company.
  • Conduct trainings for company managers and supervisors regarding appropriate communications to employees regarding their interactions with the government.
  • Implement policies that prevent any company personnel from taking steps to block or interfere with an employee’s use of company platforms or systems to communicate with the SEC and other government agencies.14

1 In the Matter of JP Morgan Securities LLC, Admin. Proc. No. 3-21829 (Jan. 16, 2024), https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2024/34-99344.pdf.

2 Id. (quoting Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Adopting Release, Release No. 34-63434 (June 13, 2011)).

3 SEC Office of the Whistleblower Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2023 (Nov. 14, 2023), https://www.sec.gov/files/2023_ow_ar.pdf; SEC Whistleblower Office Announces Results for FY 2022 (Nov. 15, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/files/2022_ow_ar.pdf; 2021 Annual Report to Congress Whistleblower Program (Nov. 15, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/files/owb-2021-annual-report.pdf; 2020 Annual Report to Congress Whistleblower Program (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/files/2020_owb_annual_report.pdf.

4 SEC Office of the Whistleblower Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2023 (Nov. 14, 2023), https://www.sec.gov/files/2023_ow_ar.pdf.

5 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17.

6 In the Matter of KBR, Inc., Admin. Proc. No. 3-16466 (Apr. 1 2015), https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2015/34-74619.pdf (imposing a US$130,000 fine on a company in a settled enforcement action for requiring that witnesses in certain internal investigations sign confidentiality agreements warning that they could be subject to discipline if they discussed the matters at issue outside the company without prior approval of the company’s legal department).

7 In the Matter of Activision Blizzard, Inc. Admin. Proc. No. 3-21294 (Feb. 3, 2023), https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2023/34-96796.pdf.

8 In the Matter of Gaia, Inc. et. al., Admin. Proc. No. 3-21438 (May 23, 2023), https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2023/33-11196.pdf.

9 In the Matter of D.E. Shaw & Co., L.P., Admin. Proc. No. 3-21775 (Sep. 29, 2023), https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2023/34-98641.pdf.

10 In the Matter of CBRE Inc., Admin. Proc. No. 3-21675  (Sept. 19, 2023), https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2023/34-98429.pdf.

11 In the Matter of Monolith Res., LLC, Admin. Proc. No. 3-21629 (Sept. 8, 2023), https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2023/34-98322.pdf.

12 Gurbir S. Grewal, Remarks at New York City Bar Association Compliance Institute (Oct. 24, 2023), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/grewal-remarks-nyc-bar-association-compliance-institute-102423.

13 See, e.g., In the Matter of CBRE Inc., Admin. Proc. No. 3-21675  (Sept. 19, 2023), https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2023/34-98429.pdf (crediting respondent’s remediation program, which included, among other measures, an audit of relevant agreements, updates to policies with respect to Rule 21F-17, and mandatory trainings); In the Matter of Monolith Res., LLC, Admin. Proc. No. 3-21629 (Sept. 8, 2023), https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2023/34-98322.pdf (crediting respondent’s prompt remedial acts including revisions to the at-issue release language and affirmatively alerting affected clients that they are not prohibited from communicating with governmental and regulatory authorities.)

14 Cf.  In the Matter of David Hansen, Admin Proc. 3-20820 (Apr. 12, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/enforce/34-94703-s (settled SEC enforcement action against former Chief Information Officer of a technology company for violating Rule 21F-17(a) by, among other things, removing an employee’s access to the company’s computer systems after the employee raised concerns regarding misrepresentations contained in the company’s public disclosures).

Copyright 2024 K & L Gates
For more news on SEC enforcement, visit the NLR Securities and SEC section.

Supreme Court Upholds Corporate Whistleblower Protections in Landmark Ruling

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous ruling holding that whistleblowers do not need to prove that their employer acted with “retaliatory intent” to be protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). The decision in the case, Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC, has immense implications for a number of whistleblower protection laws.

“This is a major win for whistleblowers and thus a huge win for corporate accountability,” said leading whistleblower attorney David Colapinto, a founding partner of Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto.

“A ruling in favor of UBS would have overturned more than 20 years of precedent in SOX whistleblower cases and made it exceedingly more difficult for whistleblowers who claim retaliation under many similarly worded federal whistleblower statutes,” Colapinto continued.

“Thankfully, the Court was not swayed by UBS’ attempt to ignore the plain meaning of the statute and instead upheld the burden of proof that Congress enacted to protect whistleblowers who face retaliation,” added Colapinto.

In an amicus curiae brief filed in the case on behalf of the National Whistleblower Center, the founding partners of Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto outlined the Congressional intent behind the burden of proof standard in SOX.

“In crafting the unique ‘contributing factor’ test for whistleblowers, Congress left an incredibly straight-forward legislative history documenting the value of whistleblowers’ contributions, the risks and retaliation whistleblowers faced, the barriers the previous burden of proof presented for whistleblowers, and Congress’ explicit intention to lower that burden of proof for whistleblowers,” the brief states.

In the Court’s opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor likewise pointed to the Congressional intent of SOX’s contributing-factor burden of proof standard:

“To be sure, the contributing-factor framework that Congress chose here is not as protective of employers as a motivating-factor framework. That is by design. Congress has employed the contributing-factor framework in contexts where the health, safety, or well-being of the public may well depend on whistleblowers feeling empowered to come forward. This Court cannot override that policy choice by giving employers more protection than the statute itself provides.”

This article was authored by Geoff Schweller.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2024. All Rights Reserved.
For more news on Supreme Court Whistleblower Rulings, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

As Three Recent Settlements Demonstrate, Whistleblowers Are the Key to Enforcement of Section 301 Tariffs

The Section 301 tariffs on Chinese-made goods—at the time, known as the Trump Tariffs, although President Biden has embraced them as well—were put in place in 2018. Only recently, more than five years later, have enforcement efforts begun to show up publicly. And, as is often the case, whistleblowers are the tip of the enforcement spear. In particular, over the course of two weeks at the end of 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced settlements of three qui tam cases, brought under the False Claims Act, that alleged evasion of Section 301 tariffs. These are the first such settlements to be made public, but likely signal the beginning of a wave of settlements or litigation in the coming years.

Starting in July of 2018, and pursuant to Title III of the Trade Act of 1974 (Sections 301 through 310, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420), titled “Relief from Unfair Trade Practices,” and often collectively referred to as “Section 301,” the United States imposed additional tariffs on a wide range of products manufactured in China. The Section 301 tariffs were rolled out in tranches, but they fairly quickly covered a majority of all Chinese-made products imported into the United States. The Section 301 tariffs imposed an additional 25% customs duty on those products.

As is always the case when high tariffs are imposed on imported goods, the Section 301 tariffs were met with a mix of responses by importers. In some cases, importers simply paid the additional 25% duties. In some cases, the importers found new sources, outside of China, for the products they wished to import. And in many cases, the importers started cheating—evading the tariffs either by lying to Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) about what was being imported, or engaging to transshipping schemes to make it appear that the products were actually made in some country other than China.

Evasion of customs duties violates the False Claims Act, a federal law that, among other things, outlaws the making of false statements to avoid payment of money owed to the government. Evasion of customs duties will almost always involve such false statements because when goods are imported into the United States, the importer must provide CBP with a completed form, called an Entry Summary (also known as a Form 7501), in which the importer provides information about the nature, quantity, value, and country-of-origin of the goods being imported. To avoid or reduce the payment of duties, the importer will almost always lie on the Entry Summary about one or more of those, thus exposing the importer to liability under the False Claims Act.

The False Claims Act has a qui tam provision, which means that a private person or company may bring a lawsuit in the name of the government against the importer that has evaded payment of duties. If the qui tam lawsuit is successful, most of the money goes to the government. But the person or company that brought the lawsuit typically referred to as a whistleblower or, more technically, as the “relator”—gets an award that is between 15% and 30% of the amount recovered for the government.

When a qui tam case is first filed, it is put “under seal” by the court, meaning that it is secret and not available to the public. The case stays under seal, often for multiple years, as DOJ investigates the claims made in the case. But once DOJ decides to pursue a case, the seal is lifted, and the case becomes public. Often, this happens almost simultaneously with the announcement of a settlement of the case.

That is what happened with three cases that became public in late 2023. The first announcement came on November 29, 2023, when the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Georgia announced a $1.9 million settlement in a case captioned United States ex rel Chinapacificarbide Inc. v. King Kong Tools, LLC. In that case, the whistleblower that had brought the qui tam lawsuit was a competitor company which alleged that King Kong Tools was manufacturing cutting tools in a factory in China, shipping them to Germany, and then importing them from Germany into the United States, claiming falsely that the tools were made in Germany. The whistleblowing company received an award of $286,861.

The second such announcement came on December 5, 2023, when the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Texas announced a $2.5 million settlement in a case captioned United States ex rel. Reznicek et al. v. Dallco Marketing, Inc. In that case, the whistleblowers were two individuals who alleged that the defendants evaded the Section 301 tariffs by underreporting the value of the products they were importing from China into the United States. The whistleblowers received an award of $500,000.

The third such announcement case on December 13, 2023, when the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Texas announced a settlement of $798,334 in a case captioned United States ex rel. Edwards v. Homestar North America LLC. Like the Dallco Marketing case, the Homestar case was also brought by an individual who alleged that the importer had lied to the government about the value of the goods being imported from China into the United States, in order to avoid payment of Section 301 tariffs. The whistleblower received an award of $151,683.

Accordingly, over the course of just two weeks in late 2023, three Section 301 settlements were publicly announced in quick succession. And notably, all three were whistleblower qui tam cases. This demonstrates the key role that whistleblowers play in the enforcement of customs tariffs and duties. No doubt, many other such cases remain under seal, and will start to become public as DOJ concludes its investigations. And because the Section 301 tariffs remain in place to this day, additional qui tam cases will almost certainly continue to be brought by both individual whistleblowers and competing companies seeking to level the playing field. Accordingly, these three settlements are likely just the early signs of a wave of Section 301 cases that will crest in the coming years.

© 2024 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP
For more news on Whistleblowers and Section 301 Tariffs, visit the NLR Antitrust & Trade Regulation section.