Category: Unions

Supreme Court Set to Decide Whether NLRA Preempts State Law Claims for Property Damage Caused During Strikes

The U.S. Supreme Court’s upcoming term will include review of whether the National Labor Relations Act (the “Act”) preempts state court lawsuits for property damage caused during strikes, which could have significant implications for employers and unions.

Factual Background

The case – Glacier Northwest Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union No. 174 – began over five years ago when the Union in Washington State representing the Employer’s truck drivers went on strike.  The Union timed their strike to coincide with the scheduled delivery of ready-mix concrete, and at least 16 drivers left trucks that were full of mixed concrete, forcing the Employer to rush to empty the trucks before it hardened and caused damage.  The Employer was able to do so, but incurred considerable additional expenses and, because it dumped the concrete in order to avoid truck damage, lost its product.

Employer Brings State Law Suit for Property Damage

After the incident, the Employer sued the Union under Washington State law for intentional destruction of property.  The Union argued that the suit was preempted by the Supreme Court’s decision in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (“Garmon”).  In Garmon, the Supreme Court held that, although the Act does not expressly preempt state law, it impliedly preempts claims based on conduct that is “arguably or actually protected by or prohibited by the Act.”  The Supreme Court held in Garmon that conduct is “arguably protected” when it is not “plainly contrary” to the Act or has not been rejected by the courts or the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”).

State Court Holdings

The Washington State trial court dismissed the Employer’s suit for property damage because strikes are protected by the Act.  The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, holding that intentional destruction of property during a strike was not activity protected by the Act, and thus, not preempted under Garmon.

Finally, the Washington Supreme Court reversed again, holding that the Act impliedly preempts the state law tort claim because the intentional destruction of property that occurred incidental to a work stoppage was at least arguably protected, and the Board would be better-suited to make an ultimate determination on this legal issue.

Question Before the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court will now determine whether the National Labor Relations Act bars state law tort claims against a union for intentionally destroying an employer’s property in the course of a labor dispute.

Under Garmon, the Act does not preempt suits regarding unlawful conduct that is plainly contrary to the NLRA, and the Employer argues that the strike at issue here was plainly unprotected because of the intentional destruction of property.  In other words, the conduct is not even arguably protected by the Act such that the Act would preempt – it was, rather, plainly unprotected conduct, and thus, the proper subject of a lawsuit.  The Employer also cited the “local feeling” exception to Garmon, which creates an exception to preemption where the States may have a greater interest in acting, such as in the case of property damage or violence.

The Union argued in opposition to the Employer’s certiorari petition that the Employer merely challenged the Washington Supreme Court’s conclusion that the conduct was arguably protected by the Act, and not its reasoning.  Moreover, whether or not the conduct was protected should be decided by the Board, which is better-suited to decide the matter.

Takeaway

Employers should gain much greater clarity into whether they can seek relief from such conduct via a damages lawsuit.  If the Court finds that such conduct is not preempted and may be litigated in state court, such a ruling could go far in protecting employers’ interests in contentious labor disputes and potentially shift the balance of power towards employers during these disputes.

Article By Michael J. Lebowich, Joshua S. Fox, and Thomas B. Fiascone of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Supreme Court Declines to Resolve Circuit Split on Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction in FLSA Collective Actions

On June 6, 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to hear petitions seeking review of whether federal courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over claims of nonresident plaintiffs who join Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective actions when their claims are not connected to the defendant’s activities in the forum state. The petitions sought review of rulings on the issue by the First and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals in Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc. and Canaday v. The Anthem Companies, Inc., respectively. As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision declining to hear the petitions, there remains a circuit split as to whether the Court’s 2017 ruling in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court applies to FLSA collective actions, and employers with nationwide footprints remain subject to uncertainty depending on jurisdiction.

To date, only the First, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have ruled on the issue. On August 17, 2021, the Sixth Circuit was the first to address the issue in Canaday. There, the Court held that federal courts may not exercise personal jurisdiction over claims of nonresident plaintiffs who join FLSA collective actions when their claims are not connected to the defendant’s activities in the forum state. Just one day later, on August 18, 2021, the Eighth Circuit came to the same conclusion in Vallone v. CJS Solutions Group, LLC.

On January 13, 2022, in Waters, the First Circuit held to the contrary, concluding that federal courts do have personal jurisdiction over claims asserted by nonresident opt-in plaintiffs.

The Significance of Bristol-Myers

The Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers provides the basis for the current circuit split. Bristol-Myers involved a mass tort action under state law for alleged defects in a blood-thinning drug, Plavix, which the company manufactured. Residents and nonresidents of California sued Bristol-Myers in California state court, alleging injuries related to the drug. The nonresident plaintiffs claimed no relationship with the forum state, nor did they purchase Plavix in California or suffer any harm from it in California. The Supreme Court reasoned that any similarity between the resident and nonresident plaintiffs’ claims was an “insufficient basis” to exercise specific jurisdiction. Unless nonresident plaintiffs could demonstrate that their claims arose out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, personal jurisdiction over the company did not exist, no matter “the extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities in the State.”

In ruling that the California state court lacked jurisdiction over the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs, the Supreme Court acknowledged that its holding might ultimately generate more litigation in the form of separate actions by nonresident plaintiffs in their respective states. But the Supreme Court also noted that all plaintiffs to the action could have brought a mass tort action against Bristol-Myers in New York (the company’s headquarters) or Delaware (its place of incorporation) because courts in those states would have had general personal jurisdiction over the company. Instead, the California state court could exercise only specific personal jurisdiction over the company based on its activities in the state. Notably, Bristol-Myers was limited to Rule 23 class actions, leaving lower courts to determine whether its holding applied to FLSA collective actions, which differ procedurally.

The Circuit Split

In Canaday, the Sixth Circuit reiterated the basic tenet that, pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the question of whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant depends on the defendant’s contacts with the state in which the plaintiff filed the lawsuit. Because Anthem is both incorporated and headquartered in Indiana and not otherwise “at home” in the state of Tennessee, the district court in Tennessee lacked general jurisdiction over Anthem as a defendant. At issue was whether the district court in Tennessee had specific personal jurisdiction over Anthem, and thus, whether there was a claim-specific and Anthem-specific relationship between the nonresidents’ FLSA claims and the state of Tennessee.

Applying Bristol-Myers, the Sixth Circuit held that there was not. The court found that the nonresident plaintiffs did not bring claims arising out of or relating to Anthem’s conduct in Tennessee, because Anthem neither employed nor paid the nonresident plaintiffs within the state. The Sixth Circuit went on the explain that adherence to this approach should not change the way FLSA collective actions are filed, because plaintiffs traditionally file their actions where courts have general jurisdiction, or where the conduct occurred. Of note, Sixth Circuit Judge Bernice Donald dissented in Canaday, contending that Bristol-Myers does not apply to FLSA collective actions because the Supreme Court in that case addressed only the limitations of state courts, not federal courts, in their exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents.

In Waters, the First Circuit largely followed the reasoning in Judge Donald’s dissent, concluding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb “rest[ed] on Fourteenth Amendment constitutional limits on state courts exercising jurisdiction over state-law claims” and thus did not control whether a federal court could exercise jurisdiction over federal claims asserted by nonresident plaintiffs. The First Circuit also observed that the plain language of Rule 4(k) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merely concerns the service of summonses and does not “constrain[] a federal court’s power to act once a summons has been properly served, and personal jurisdiction has been established.”

Key Takeaways

The Supreme Court’s decision to deny the petitions means that employers with nationwide footprints continue to live with potentially inconsistent rulings on the question of whether a federal district court has jurisdiction to hear claims of out-of-state workers when the defendant is neither headquartered nor incorporated in the state. Canaday and Vallone stand to significantly limit the size and geographic scope of FLSA collective actions in the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, absent a district court’s exercise of general jurisdiction over a corporate defendant, while Waters permits nationwide jurisdiction in the First Circuit. For now, at least, multistate employers face continued uncertainty on the issue until courts of appeals in the remaining circuits weigh in.

Article By Maggie (Hanrahan) Santen, Monica Lacks, and Samuel H. Ottinger of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

How Changing Beneficial Ownership Reporting May Impact Activism

The SEC in February proposed amendments to Regulation 13D-G to modernize beneficial ownership reporting requirements. Adoption of the amendments as proposed will accelerate the timing – and expand the scope – of knowledge of certain activist activities. The deadline for comments on the proposed rules was April 11 and final rules are expected to be released later this year.

The current reporting timeline creates an asymmetry of information between beneficial owners on the one hand and other stockholders and issuers on the other. The SEC proposal is seeking to eliminate this asymmetry and address other concerns surrounding current beneficial ownership reporting. The accelerated beneficial ownership reporting deadlines will result in greater transparency in stock ownership, allowing market participants to receive material information in a timely manner and potentially alleviating the market manipulation and abusive tactics used by some investors.

The shortened filing deadlines should benefit a company’s overall shareholder engagement activities. The investor relations team at a company will have a more accurate and up-to-date picture of its institutional investor base throughout the year, which should result in more timely outreach to such shareholders.

INVESTOR ACCUMULATION OF SHARES BEFORE DISCLOSURE

Although issuers will likely view the proposed rules as beneficial, many commentators have predicted a negative impact on shareholder activism. Under the current reporting requirements, certain activist investors may benefit by having both additional time to accumulate shares before disclosing such activities and potentially more flexibility in strategizing with other investors.

Many commentators have argued that the proposed shorter timeline for beneficial ownership reporting will negatively impact an activist shareholder’s ability to accumulate shares of an issuer at a potentially lower price than if market participants had more timely knowledge of such activity and intent. In many cases a company’s stock price is impacted once an investor files a Schedule 13D with clear activist intent. This can even occur in some cases once a Schedule 13G is filed by a known activist investor without current activist intent.

If the shorter reporting deadlines reduce such investors’ profit, it is expected that an investor’s incentive to accumulate stock in order to initiate change at a company will also be reduced. Activists instead may be encouraged to engage more with management. In other words, the shorter reporting period may deter short-term activists and encourage more long-term focused activism.

TIMING OF ISSUER RESPONSE

The shorter reporting deadlines are also expected to result in management having earlier notice of any takeover attempt and to give a company the opportunity to react more quickly to any such attempt. There is potential for this to lead to increased use of low-threshold poison pills. But the SEC stated in the proposed rules release that it believes the risk of abundant reactionary low-threshold poison pills is overstated due to scrutiny of such poison pills from courts and academia, limitations imposed by state law and the unlikelihood that the beneficial ownership would trigger the low-threshold poison pills.

Companies that have low-threshold poison pills – such as one designed to protect a company’s net operating losses – may want to review them to confirm that the proposed rules would not be expected to have any impact. For example, such poison pills may link the definition of beneficial ownership to the SEC rules, including Schedule 13D and 13G filings.

‘GROUP’ REPORTING

Another proposed change expected to affect shareholder activism is the expanded definition of ‘group’ for the purposes of reporting under Schedule 13D. The current rules require an explicit agreement between two or more persons to establish a group for purposes of the beneficial ownership reporting thresholds.

Commentators believe that under the current rules, certain investors seeking change at a company may share the fact that they are accumulating shares of a company with other shareholders or activists, which can then act on this information before the general public is aware; in other words, before public disclosure in and market reaction to the Schedule 13D filing. This activity may result in near-term gains for the select few involved before uninformed shareholders can react.

Under the SEC’s proposed amended Rule 13d-5, persons who share information with another regarding an upcoming Schedule 13D filing are deemed to have formed a group within the meaning of Section 13(d)(3) regardless of whether an explicit agreement is in place, and such concerted action will trigger reporting requirements. This proposed change is expected to benefit companies and shareholders overall by preventing certain investors from acting in concert on information not known to a company and its other shareholders.

The full impact of the proposed rule changes on shareholder activism cannot be accurately predicted, but we believe that at a minimum, issuers will find it beneficial to have more regularly updated information on their institutional investor base for, among other things, their shareholder engagement efforts.

Article By Alexandra Clark Layfield and Rachel Solino of  Jones Walker LLP

For more Securities and SEC news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Jones Walker LLP

Changing Course: “Contract Coverage” is the New Standard for Unilateral Action

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) departed from precedent last week when it addressed whether an employer’s unilateral action under a collective bargaining agreement was lawful.

The case in question – M.V. Transportation, Inc. and Amalgamated Transit Union Local #1637, AFL–CIO, CLC., Case 28– CA–173726 – concerned what standard the Board should apply to determine whether a collective bargaining agreement grants an employer the right to take certain unilateral actions, without further bargaining with the union. Under prior case law, the Board had applied the “clear and unmistakable waiver” standard, under which the employer would be found to have violated the Act unless a provision of the collective bargaining agreement specifically refers to the type of employer decision at issue, or mentions the kind of factual situation that the case presents.

In M.V. Transportation, the Board noted that several appeals courts have rejected the “clear and unmistakable waiver” standard in favor of a “contract coverage” standard, including, importantly, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which, by statute, has full jurisdiction to review NLRB decisions.  Under the “contract coverage” standard, the decision-maker must examine the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement to determine whether the action taken by an employer was within the “compass or scope of contractual language granting the employer the right to act unilaterally. The Board cited the example of a collective bargaining agreement that broadly grants the employer the right to implement new rules and policies and to revise existing ones, noting that under such circumstances, an employer would not violate the law by unilaterally implementing new attendance or safety rules or by revising existing disciplinary or off-duty-access policies.

While the Board did choose to adopt the “contract coverage” standard, it did not totally abandon the “waiver” concept. It warned that if an agreement does not clearly cover the employer’s disputed act, and that act has materially, substantially and significantly changed a term or condition of employment constituting a mandatory subject of bargaining, the employer will have violated the law unless it demonstrates that the union clearly and unmistakably waived its right to bargain over the change, or that its unilateral action was privileged for some other reason.

In a move that is becoming more common in NLRB cases, the Board also decided to apply the new standard retroactively in all pending unilateral change cases where the determination of whether the employer violated the law turned on whether contractual language granted the employer the right to make the change in question.

Under the new standard, employers should take care in collective bargaining to make sure that the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement supports any unilateral action that the employer wants to reserve the right to take. The language should be clearly written and explicit in its grant of authority, and its meaning should be clear when applying ordinary principles of contract interpretation. By doing that, the employer can assure that its unilateral action does not violate the law or the agreement.

Copyright © 2019 Godfrey & Kahn S.C.

Michigan Bill Would Bar Student-Athlete Unionization

Jackson Lewis Law firm

With a National Labor Relations Board decision on whether football players at Northwestern may proceed with their unionization efforts looming, Michigan is considering a bill that would prevent student-athletes from similarly attempting to unionize.

The bill, sponsored by Rep. Al Pscholka, would prevent student-athletes at Michigan’s public universities from exercising collective bargaining rights based on their participation in a university sports team. It states, “a student participating in intercollegiate athletics on behalf of a public university in [Michigan]…is not a public employee entitled to representation or collective bargaining rights….”

Michigan has seven public universities competing at the Division I level. The bill would bar student-athletes at these universities from engaging in unionization efforts similar to the ones undertaken by the football players at Northwestern.

While none of the seven universities has faced a union organizing campaign from any of its student-athletes, prompting one opponent of the bill, Rep. Andy Shor, to describe the bill as a solution to a nonexistent problem.

“I don’t understand the tremendous rush on this,” Shor said. “We’re taking an action that addresses something that’s happening in Evanston, Illinois.”

However, if the Board finds in favor of the football players at Northwestern, universities across the country likely will face similar unionization efforts from other student-athletes. Michigan’s may be an attempt to get out in front of such efforts.

According to Ramogi Huma, the president of the organization spearheading the unionization campaign at Northwestern, the College Athletes Players Association, Michigan’s bill is “backhanded confirmation that student-athletes are state employees by including them in a list of workers who can’t bargain effectively.” However, the bill does not categorize student-athletes as employees and, indeed, it states that “individuals whose position does not have sufficient indicia of an employer-employee relationship” are also prevented under the bill from engaging in collective bargaining.

Huma also warned that if the bill passes, it would have a negative impact on the ability of Michigan’s public universities to recruit student-athletes because prospective student-athletes interested in being part of a union could elect instead to go to either private universities in Michigan or universities in states with no restrictions on their unionization efforts.

Thus far, none of the seven Division I public universities in Michigan have commented publicly on the bill. However, the bill likely is being closely followed by them as well as public universities in other states and major athletic conferences, such as the Big Ten, home to Northwestern, Michigan, Michigan State, and Ohio State.

ARTICLE BY

Michael B. Ackerstein
OF
Jackson Lewis P.C.

NLRB Finds Facebook Posts Go Too Far for the Act's Protection

Neal Gerber

As we reported previously, social media issues are troublesome for employers who must navigate unsettled or even conflicting federal and state laws and decisions.  A recent ruling from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) demonstrates that employers can still protect their business against inappropriate online activity by employees.  Specifically, the NLRB ruled that an Employer acted lawfully in rescinding two employees’ rehire offers, finding that the Facebook conversations between the two were so egregious as to lose protection under the National Labor Relations Act and render the two individuals unfit for further service with the Employer.

The Employer operates a Teen Center that provides afterschool activities to students.  During a period between school sessions, just before the employees would have been rehired for the coming school year, the two individuals engaged in a series of Facebook conversations during which they repeatedly talked, in profane terms, about what they intended to do when they returned to work. The messages contained numerous indications that the two would refuse to follow the rules and policies of the Employer, would refuse to work with management or get required permissions, would engage in various acts to undermine the school’s leadership, and they detailed specific acts of intended insubordination.

The NLRB agreed that the exchange of messages (which certainly discussed their displeasure over working conditions) was “protected concerted activity” under the Act. Normally, such protected activity cannot be the basis of any adverse employment action. However, the Board determined that the conduct constituted “pervasive advocacy of insubordination which, on an objective basis, was so egregious as to lose the Act’s protection.”

In finding the conduct unprotected, the Board relied on the fact that the individuals repeatedly described a wide variety of planned insubordinations in specific detail. According to the Board, these acts were beyond brief comments that might be explained away as a joke or hyperbole divorced from any likelihood of implementation. Rather, the Board concluded that the magnitude and detail of insubordinate conduct advocated in the posts reasonably gave the Employer concern that the two individuals would act on their plans, a risk that a reasonable employer would refuse to take by returning the individuals to the workforce. The Board concluded that the Employer was not required to wait for the employees to follow through on the misconduct they advocated.

This decision gives employers some relief that there are limits to what employees can say on social media, even if the subject of their conversations or postings is “protected” and “concerted”. However, before an employer can take adverse employment action against an employee who engages in such activity, the employer must be able to demonstrate that, on an objective basis, the activity is egregious and pervasive and is of such magnitude and of such detail that it is reasonably likely to be acted upon rather than being mere hyperbole.

[Richmond District Neighborhood Center, 361 NLRB No. 74 — October 28, 2014]

ARTICLE BY

Howard L. Bernstein
OF
Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP

The Unions Are Coming…The Unions Are Coming! We Don’t Need Paul Revere’s Lantern To See Who’s Coming!

Michael Best Logo

On December 16, 2014, the term of NLRB Board Member Nancy Schiffer ends.  This is a critical date for the union movement because on that date the pro-Union members of the Board will lose their 3-2 majority status and their effective control over the NLRB. So what’s coming next for private employers?

On July 29, 2014, the General Counsel of the NLRB issued an advice memorandum to the NLRB Regional Directors identifying his game plan regarding re-establishing a new definition for joint employer, to make it easier for unions to organize:

“The new broader standard will allow employees to use traditional economic weapons to exert lawful economic pressure on those parties to realistically control the economics of their relationship even if they do not directly control working conditions.”

Prior to that public announcement, the General Counsel had stated that the objective of the Board has been to consistently uphold unions organizing very small subsets of employees, called “micro-units,” instead of the traditional wall-to-wall bargaining units.  Quite simply, these “micro units” are easier for unions to gerrymander and, ultimately, to organize.

The final step in this trifecta is the most troubling for employers – the new NLRB Election Rules.  Through rule-making, the NLRB is seeking to re-write the NLRA in such a way as to greatly speed up the elections.  The new rules reduce the timeline for elections from over 35 days to under 20 days between the time of the petition and the election.  These “quickie” or “ambush” elections will undoubtedly benefit unions, because it gives the employer less time to explain to the employee the pros and cons of joining a union.  These rules are on a fast track and clearly support the union movement.

So, undoubtedly, the unions are indeed coming after management!  This is a watershed moment for the unions.  The union’s financial coffers have been depleted as the union membership numbers continue to plummet. If they don’t get their act together and start to effectively unionize, then they will have to stop blaming employers and/or the NLRB for their organizing failures.

Under the new NLRB Election Rules, nearly all election-related issues will be resolved after the election.  This process would be similar to the approach taken in the recent Northwestern University football players’ case, in which the NLRB held the election and then impounded the ballots.  The NLRB will sort out any issues after the fact so long as the objections don’t impact more than 20% of the bargaining units.

Employers had better gear up and get ready because the unions are locked and loaded and ready to attack. The stage has been proactively set by the NLRB to give unions their best-ever opportunity to succeed in union organizing. If employers don’t prepare now, they will jeopardize their freedom to deal directly with their employees and reduce their flexibility in running their company. The NLRB Regional Offices are already gearing up to explain the new changes in NLRB election procedure, starting in November, so here come the unions!

© MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP
ARTICLE BY

Amy O. Bruchs
Carlos R. Pastrana-Torres
Robert W. Mulcahy
Farrah N.W. Rifelj
Brian P. Paul
OF
Michael Best & Friedrich LLP

Micro Bargaining Units Coming To a Workplace Near You

Steptoe Johnson PLLC Law Firm

It is no secret that many employers take steps to try and keep their workplaces union-free.  One of the newer concerns for employers in that camp is the possibility that employees could form a “micro bargaining unit,” which is a unit of employees that make up only a small portion of the workforce. 

Act Now! to Preserve Your Collective Bargaining Rights!

In a 2011 case, Specialty Healthcare, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) established a new standard for determining appropriate bargaining units.  Specifically, the Board stated that, in evaluating a potential unit, it would focus on the community of interest among the petitioning employees.  According to the Board in that case, factors such as the extent of common supervision, interchange of employees, and geographic considerations should all be taken into account when evaluating a proposed unit.

Specialty Healthcare also placed a significant burden on employers trying to challenge smaller units.  The Board stated that, if an employer wished to argue that a unit should include additional employees, the employer needs to show that employees in a larger unit have an “overwhelming” community of interest with those in the proposed smaller unit.  That’s a higher burden than what has been applicable in the past, and not one easy to meet.

The effects of Specialty Healthcare were evident in a more recent Board decision.  In Macy’s Inc., the Board recently confirmed that 41 Macy’s cosmetic and fragrance department sales employees could form a bargaining unit.  Those 41 employees made up about one-third of the employees at that Macy’s store.  Macy’s argued that this unit was inappropriate because cosmetic and fragrance employees shared an overwhelming community of interest with the other sales employees, but the Board saw it differently.

The Board noted several factors that established the community of interest among the cosmetic and fragrance employees: they all worked in the same department, were supervised by the same manager, had limited contact with other sales employees, and were paid on the same commission-based based structure.  Additionally, the Board pointed out that Macy’s rarely transferred employees between the cosmetic and fragrance department and other store departments.

While the Macy’s, Inc. case was not a positive development for employers, the NLRB then rejected a proposed micro-unit about a week later in a different case at Bergdorf-Goodman, a Nieman Marcus subsidiary.  In that case, the Board found that salon shoes salespeople and contemporary shoe salespeople lacked a community of interest.  In so deciding, the Board noted that the proposed unit in that case was not created based on any administrative or operational lines established by the employer.  Additionally, the employees had different department managers, different floor managers, and different directors of sales.

While both of these cases dealt with the retail industry, the results are important to employers in any sector, since the Specialty Healthcare standard certainly can be applied to create micro-bargaining units in other industries.  In fact, employers can probably expect unions to try organizing smaller bargaining units within larger companies, particularly where efforts to organize larger groups have proved unsuccessful.  This strategy allows unions to select pro-union employee groups and increase their likelihood of winning an election.

If there’s one proactive takeaway from these cases, it’s that employers need to think in advance about how they can make themselves less vulnerable to micro-unit organizing.  For example, cross-training employees and having them work in different departments makes it less likely a union could demonstrate a community of interest among a small group of employees.  Of course, any steps taken to combat against micro-unit organizing also need to be evaluated for their operational feasibility.  In most cases, it’s probably best that employers contact experienced legal counsel to weigh the pros and cons involved.

Supreme Court Gives Second Win in Two Days to Caregivers Challenging Compulsory Union Dues

Odin-Feldman-Pittleman-logo

The United States Supreme Court acted today in another case involving a scheme to siphon millions of dollars in compulsory union dues from home caregivers assisting public aid recipients.  On June 30, 2014, the Court decided Harris v. Quinn and held that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the collection of a compulsory agency fee from rehabilitation program personal assistants who do not want to join or support the union.  Today, the Court applied Harris to Schlaud v. Snyder, vacating the judgment, and remanding the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further consideration in light of Harris v. Quinn.  As the Schlaud case continues, look for another blow to the forced-dues arrangment perpretrated by various union officials and their friends in government.

Schlaud and other plaintiffs in the case are home childcare providers in Michigan who sought class-action certification in their First Amendment challenge to the state’s compulsory deduction of union dues from subsidies paid to home childcare providers.  In January 2009, the Michigan Department of Human Services (DHS) began deducting 1.15% from subsidy payments made to home childcare providers. The funds were forwarded to the union, which was a joint venture between the United Auto Workers union and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees union.  According to the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the union collected $2,000,019.09 in 2009 and at least $1,821,635.21 in 2010.

Schlaud and her co-plaintiffs sought the return of the compulsory union dues that were collected in violation of their First Amendment rights. The district court denied certification of the plaintiffs’ proposed class — all home childcare providers in Michigan — because it concluded a conflict of interest existed within the class: some members voted for union representation and others voted against union representation.  The Sixth Circuit affirmed, and Schlaud sought review by the Supreme Court.

Attorneys at the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation filed and have litigated both Shlaud and Harris on behalf of personal assistants and home childcaregivers.  In Harris, the Supreme Court did not reach the issue of the constitutionality generally of compelling public sector employees to pay union dues or agency fees, but it strongly signaled that the legal analysis of a 1977 Supreme Court decision, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, which found compulsory agency-fee requirements to be constitutional, was “questionable.” The Harris opinion opens the door, cracked initially in Knox v. Service Employees, for the Court to revisit the constitutionality of compelling public employees to pay union dues or agency fees as a condition of employment.

Article By:

Timothy M. McConville
Of:
Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C.

 

Unpaid Employer Contributions as Plan Assets: Expansion Of Liability Under ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act)

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The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”), requires trustees of multiemployer pension and benefit funds to collect contributions required to be made by contributing employers under their collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) with the labor union sponsoring the plans. This is not always an easy task—often, an employer is an incorporated entity with limited assets or financial resources to satisfy its contractual obligations. In some instances, an employer will resort to filing for bankruptcy to obtain a discharge of its debts to the pension or benefit funds.

In a distinct trend, federal courts have found that, depending on the text of the underlying plan documents, unpaid employer contributions due under a CBA may be viewed as plan assets, such that the representatives of an employer who exercise fiduciary control over those plan assets can be held individually liable for the unpaid amounts (together with interest and penalties) under ERISA. These cases will no doubt help plan trustees and administrators collect monies owed to the plan. They also should serve as cautionary warnings to contributing employers to ensure that they fully understand the obligations that they are undertaking when they agree to contribute to ERISA funds pursuant to CBAs.

Background

In the typical scenario, an employer will agree under one or more of its CBAs to make specified contributions to fund the pension and health and welfare benefits promised to plan participants under the trust fund’s plan of benefits. If an employer fails to timely remit those payments in violation of the CBA and the plan’s rules, the trustees of the fund have a legal duty to attempt to recover the unpaid contributions unless, after fully examining the facts and circumstances, the trustees conclude that the likelihood of recovery is outweighed by its costs. What happens if the trustees expend the fund’s resources to seek to collect the unpaid obligations and obtain a judgment against the employer, only to find the company’s coffers empty? Or what if the company files for bankruptcy?

Unlike employee contributions, which under U.S. Department of Labor regulations are explicitly deemed to be plan assets, employer contributions are typically found to be contractual obligations that do not become plan assets until such amounts are paid by the employer to the trust fund. Hence, while an employer’s failure to remit an employee contribution relegates the employer to the status of an ERISA plan fiduciary because it is has authority and control over plan assets, employer contributions have generally been held not to constitute plan assets. As a result, an employer who fails to make its contributions due under the CBA may have committed a contractual violation but has not breached an ERISA fiduciary duty.

The Potential for Individual Fiduciary Liability

Recently, courts have regularly carved out an exception to the general rule that unpaid contributions are not plan assets by finding that employer contributions are plan assets where the CBA explicitly defines them as such. In such cases, these courts will then proceed to consider the next question of whether the officers, directors or other representatives of such employer exercised a level of control over corporate assets sufficient to make them an ERISA plan fiduciary and thus individually liable for the contributions—effectively stripping them of the protections of the corporate form. Furthermore, if elevated to the status of a fiduciary breach, the debt may not be dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, the plan could proceed to collect the unpaid contributions against the principals of the debtor personally.

For over a decade, some federal district courts in the Second Circuit have applied a two-part test in delinquent employer contribution cases to find that: (i) such contributions are plan assets when so specified by the CBA; and (ii) the principals of the employer are an ERISA plan fiduciary. More recently, the Second Circuit concluded that delinquent contributions were not plan assets where there were no provisions in the relevant plan documents that stated that unpaid contributions are assets of the plan. See In re Halpin, 566 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2009). The Court expressly stated, however, that “the trustees were free to contractually provide for some other result.” It further noted that merely finding that delinquent contributions constitute plan assets does not end the inquiry. A court must also determine whether an individual defendant has exercised sufficient fiduciary conduct over the unpaid contributions to be found to be a plan fiduciary under ERISA.

While the Court’s statements were extraneous to the holding of the case, some district courts within the Second Circuit have seized upon this language and have cited In re Halpin for the proposition that employer contributions can be plan assets where the plan documents so provide. See, e.g., Trustees of Sheet Metalworkers Int’l Assoc. v. Hopwood, 09-cv-5088, 2012 WL 4462048 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012); Sullivan v. Marble Unique Corp., 10-cv-3582, 2011 WL 5401987, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011).

Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, in ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011 (11th Cir. 2003), held that delinquent contributions can constitute plan assets when explicitly provided for in the plan documents and corporate officers are plan fiduciaries with respect to those assets. The Court demanded a high level of clarity in the plan documents, however, regarding the delinquent contribution’s status as plan assets. It explained that when a corporation is delinquent in its contributions, the fund “has a sufficient priority on the corporation’s available resources that individuals controlling corporate resources are controlling fund assets. This in effect places heavy responsibilities on employers, but only to the extent that . . . an employer freely accepts those responsibilities in collective bargaining.”

In addition, district courts in the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have found that employer contributions constitute plan assets when the plan documents so provide. See, e.g., Trustees of Construction Industry and Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. Archie, No. 2:12-cv-00225 (D. Nev. Mar. 3, 2014) (holding that unpaid contributions were plan assets based upon the CBA’s language and finding that the company principals’ acts and responsibilities demonstrated sufficient control and authority over the company’s operations and financials to qualify as ERISA fiduciaries); Galgay v. Gangloff, 677 F. Supp. 295, 301 (M.D. Penn. 1987) (refusing to dismiss fiduciary breach claims for alleged failure to pay delinquent contributions based upon the “clear and undisputed language [of the agreement] stating that title to all monies ‘due and owing’ the plaintiff fund is ‘vested’ in the fund,” rendering “any delinquent employer contributions vested assets of the plaintiff fund.”; Connors v. Paybra Mining Co., 807 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (S.D.W.V. 1992) (finding company officers personally liable for delinquent contributions that were plan assets based upon CBA’s language since they breached their fiduciary duty by exercising authority over those assets by favoring other creditors over the fund); see also Secretary of Labor v. Doyle, 675 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that district court erred in failing to determine whether payments collected from various employers were plan assets subject to ERISA).

District courts in the Sixth Circuit have even signaled support for finding that contributions are plan assets as soon as they become due, “regardless of the language of the benefit plan.” See, e.g., Plumbers Local 98 Defined Benefit Funds v. M&P Master Plumbers of Michigan, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 873, 879 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (holding company principal personally liable for delinquent contributions since “the CBA and trust agreements . . . treat these unpaid contributions as inalienable plan assets” and signaling support for holding delinquent contributions plan assets “regardless of the language of the benefit plan.”).

In a related context, a federal bankruptcy court recently refused to discharge a debtor’s debt for delinquent contributions based upon the Bankruptcy Code’s “defalcation in the performance of fiduciary duty” exception. See In re Fahey, 494 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013). Although the court initially found that the debtor lacked the necessary discretion for fiduciary status under ERISA because the “option to breach a contract does not constitute discretion in the performance of one’s duty,” the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit reversed. The Panel ruled that “even if an ERISA fiduciary does not per se satisfy the § 523(a)(4) requirement for ‘fiduciary capacity,’ an analysis of [the Debtor’s] control and authority over the plan in functional terms nonetheless yields the conclusion that he acted as a fiduciary of a technical trust imposed by common law.” On remand, the bankruptcy court found that the debtor prioritized payments that were personally beneficial over his obligations to the ERISA funds and, consequently, committed defalcation as contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code.

View from Proskauer

Although the general rule that employer contributions do not constitute plan assets until actually received by the trust fund continues, recent decisions indicate an increased willingness by courts to carve out an exception to this rule. Funds looking to protect their ability to collect contributions should explicitly define in the plan documents and agreements with employers that plan assets also include all unpaid contributions in the hands of the employer. Employers should be fully cognizant of these provisions; otherwise its officers, directors and other representatives who choose to pay other creditors rather than the trust fund might be held personally liable for the unpaid amounts and interest and penalties, and possibly be unable to escape this liability through bankruptcy.

Article By:

Neal S Schelberg
Aaron Feuer
Of:
Proskauer Rose LLP.