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Uncategorized Archives - Page 69 of 179 - The National Law Forum

Category: Uncategorized

Does Asking About Employee’s Alcohol Use Violate the ADA?

In Lansdale v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc., No. 16-4106 (July 23, 2019), the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota concluded that a jury had sufficient evidence to find that an employer’s discharge of an employee for suspected corporate credit card abuse following an investigation in which the employee was asked about his alcohol use and drinking habits did not constitute disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or corresponding state law.

Background

The employer had a policy prohibiting employees from using corporate credit cards for personal purchases and providing inaccurate expense reports. Following an audit that revealed discrepancies between the employee’s corporate credit card expenses and expense reports, the employer conducted an investigation. During the investigation, the employer interviewed the employee, who indicated that he had used his corporate card for personal charges in order to hide his alcohol consumption from his wife. During the interview, the employer asked the employee several questions about his drinking habits and how his drinking affected his health and family.  The following morning, the employer discharged the employee.

The employee contended that he had been asked impermissible disability-related questions and that his employment had been terminated based on his responses. Under the ADA, an employer “shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.”

Analysis

The court found that the jury had been provided sufficient evidence to find that, even if the questions posed to the employee had been disability-related inquiries, the inquiries had not caused the termination of his employment; rather, the employee’s acknowledgement that he had used his corporate credit card for personal use was a sufficient evidentiary basis for a jury to find that this admission by itself was the reason for the termination.

Additionally, while alcoholism may constitute a disability under the ADA and corresponding state laws, this case confirms that an employee so claiming must still establish that he or she had an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities, or that the employer regarded him or her as having such an impairment, and that it was a motivating factor in the termination decision.

Conclusion

Here, the court found that a reasonable jury, weighing the credibility of the witnesses—in  particular, the employee’s own testimony about his alcohol consumption and how it impacted him, his wife’s testimony that he drank nightly, and his doctor’s testimony that he drank more than what was recommended (though the doctor never applied any diagnostic criteria or noted any serious concerns)—could have found that the employee failed to prove that he suffered from an impairment that substantially limited one or more of his major life activities, that the employer regarded him as having such an impairment, and that it was a motivating factor in the termination decision. In the end, the employee’s belated attempts to claim a disability to excuse his corporate credit card and expense report abuses were insufficient to establish a disability discrimination claim.

© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more ADA questions see the Labor & Employment Law page on the National Law Review.

Louisiana Governor Declares Statewide Emergency After Cyber-Attacks Against School Systems

Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards, for the first time in history, declared a statewide cybersecurity emergency last week, following cyber-attacks against several school systems in the state.

By declaring a cybersecurity emergency, the state is able to garner needed resources, including cybersecurity experts from the Louisiana National Guard, State Police, the Office of Technology Services, the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Louisiana State University, and others to assist school systems in Sabine, Morehouse and Oachita parishes that were compromised with malware attacks.

According to the Governor’s office, although these resources are working on the incident, the threat is ongoing. The Governor established a statewide Cyber Security Commission in 2017 and stated that these incidents against school systems in the State are the reason the Commission was established.

Several states, but not all, have established Cyber Security Commissions or similar public-private partnerships in order to prepare for and respond to cyber-attacks that affect state resources. Setting up the Commission in advance of attacks like the ones that occurred in Louisiana will assist states in responding quickly to these attacks and provide appropriate resources and help to those affected.

Copyright © 2019 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.
This article is by Linn F. Freedman of Robinson & Cole LLP.
For more in cybersecurity issues, please see the Communications, Media & Internet law page on the National Law Review.

Going Beyond: When Can Courts Look Past the Record in an APA Review?

Regulated companies need to understand what material courts can consider when they review administrative decisions. The Administrative Procedure Act generally allows courts to consider only the existing administrative record when reviewing agency decision-making to determine whether agency decisions are arbitrary and capricious. But the Supreme Court recently reminded us that this rule is not absolute by looking beyond the record in Dep’t of Commerce v. New York to block an agency decision that it found to be based on a “contrived,” pretextual rationale.

Regulated companies may be able to ask courts to consider information beyond the administrative record if they can show that the agency acted in bad faith or exhibited improper behavior. A company’s ability to present the court with information beyond a record carefully constructed by an agency can be a powerful tool.

The following cases illustrate that a movant may not need to conclusively prove that the agency behaved improperly to convince a court to review evidence beyond the administrative record. But the evidence must form a picture that gives the court reason to believe there was bad faith or improper behavior. Here’s a breakdown of several case examples:

Dep’t of Commerce v. New York Goes Beyond the Record

Dep’t of Commerce v. New York presented the Court with a challenge to Secretary of Commerce Ross’s decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census. In defense of his decision, the Secretary presented a record showing that the Department of Justice had asked that the question be added so it could more effectively enforce the Voting Rights Act. But extra-record discovery revealed that the DOJ’s request was not the real reason that Secretary Ross had added the question. Rather, extra-record discovery showed that the Secretary had planned to add the question all along and had, in fact, solicited the request for the question from the DOJ. Viewed in that light, the Supreme Court determined that the Voting Rights Act rationale was “contrived” and affirmed the lower court’s decision to bar the Department of Commerce from asking the question.

Writing for the majority of a fractured Court, the Chief Justice acknowledged that while “[i]t is hardly improper for an agency head to come into office with policy preferences and ideas . . . and work with staff attorneys to substantiate the legal basis for a preferred policy,” the Court “cannot ignore the disconnect between the decision made and the explanation given.” The Court noted that to confine itself to the administrative record and ignore the Secretary’s extra-record actions would be “to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.”

To understand why this decision is important, observers need to take a deep-dive into the Court’s decision. Why could the courts look beyond the administrative record here? Because the district court invoked—maybe prematurely in this case—an exception to the rule against extra-record discovery from Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe. This exception gives courts discretion to go beyond the existing administrative record if the party challenging the agency action makes “a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior” underlying the agency decision.

When Do Courts Use Overton Park to Look Beyond the Record?

While every circuit has recognized the Overton Park exception—and most also recognize other, circuit-specific exceptions that allow for a party challenging an agency decision to supplement the record—the overwhelming majority of courts have declined to use Overton Park’s exception to look beyond the administrative record. In his Dep’t of Commerce v. New York dissent, Justice Thomas followed this school of thought. He disagreed that plaintiffs had made a sufficiently “strong showing” of bad faith or improper behavior by Secretary Ross and noted that the Supreme Court “ha[s] never before found Overton Park’s exception satisfied.”

Given the fact that the APA requires courts to defer to agency decision-making, the courts’ reluctance to embrace Overton Park is unsurprising. Nonetheless, some have looked beyond the record.

In Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Babbitt, for example, the district court allowed the party challenging the agency decision to supplement the record after it made a strong showing of improper behavior behind a decision of the Department of the Interior. There, three Indian tribes had applied to the United States to convert a greyhound racing facility into an off-reservation casino. When the Department denied the application, citing the “strong opposition of the surrounding communities,” the tribes challenged the decision. The tribes argued that the Department’s reason was pretextual and pointed to unexplained procedural delays; suspicious communications between opposition tribes, senators, lobbyists, and White House staff; and a draft report from the Indian Gaming Management Staff, which had recommended that the application be approved.

The court initially limited its review to the record because plaintiffs had not proven improper behavior. But it then reversed course and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, noting that Overton Park’s “strong showing” requirement did not—and, logically, could not—require conclusive evidence of improper behavior. Instead, the court was satisfied that the plaintiff had “suppl[ied] sufficient evidence . . . as to raise suspicions that defy easy explanations.”

Following Babbitt’s lead, the district court in United States v. Sanitary Dist. of Hammond also allowed extra-record discovery, there after the party challenging an EPA decision had made a sufficient showing of bad faith. In that case, an EPA official recused herself from a dispute to avoid the appearance of partiality. But suspicions were later raised when she, without explanation, reinstated herself after receiving poignant, critical questions from her chosen successor’s counsel. The court allowed extra-record discovery to reveal any potential impropriety behind her decisions. The court noted that while it had “not f[ound] that bad faith or improprieties in fact influenced the [decision],” the defendant had made “a ‘strong showing’ that the evidence of record ‘suggests’ that bad faith or improprieties ‘may have influenced the decision maker.’”

Key Takeaways

A court’s decision to go beyond the record—as explained by the lower court in Dep’t of Commerce v. New York—is most often “based on a combination of circumstances that [when] taken together, [are] most exceptional.” Observers may note that the Court’s decision to go beyond the record in Dep’t of Commerce v. New York seems to conflict with last term’s decision in Trump v. Hawaii. But maybe they can be reconciled. There, the state of Hawaii and three U.S. citizens challenged Presidential Proclamation No. 9645—colloquially referred to as the “travel ban”—which placed elevated immigration restrictions on eight countries, six of which were predominantly Muslim. The plaintiffs argued that the President’s extra-record statements showed that the national security justifications behind the ban were, in fact, pretext for the Proclamation’s true animus: religious discrimination. Given the nature of then-Candidate Trump’s public statements, the case seemed to present the Court with the opportunity to consider evidence of pretext that went beyond the record.

But of course Trump v. Hawaii, unlike Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, did not involve any agency decision-making. It instead involved a challenge leveled directly at the Executive itself on a matter squarely within its traditional province: national security. This distinction compelled the Court to defer to the Executive and limited the Court’s consideration of extra-record material. Thus, the Court applied a rational basis review and found that even if the challenging party could demonstrate pretext, the President’s non-religious justifications rationally supported the entry restrictions.

Ultimately, Dep’t of Commerce v. New York reminds us that an administrative record may be permeable under the right circumstances. And although the “substantial showing” bar remains high, perhaps courts will now be more apt to allow extra-record discovery when reviewing agency decision-making. That willingness could enable companies to more effectively challenge agency decisions based on pretextual reasoning—reasoning that would not be reflected in the administrative record.

© 2019 Schiff Hardin LLP
Article by J. Michael Showalter and James Cromley of Schiff Hardin LLP.
For more on the Administrative Procedure Act see the Administrative & Regulatory page on the National Law Review.

Are Your AI Selection Tools Validated? OFCCP Provides Guidance for Validation of AI-Based Algorithms

We have long counseled employers using or contemplating using artificial intelligence (“AI”) algorithms in their employee selection processes to validate the AI-based selection procedure using an appropriate validation strategy approved by the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (“Uniform Guidelines”).  Our advice has been primarily based on minimizing legal risk and complying with best practices.  A recently updated Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQ”) from the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”) provides further support for validating AI-based selection procedures in compliance with the Uniform Guidelines.

On July 23, 2019, the OFCCP updated the FAQ section on its website to provide guidance on the validation of employee selection procedures.  Under the Uniform Guidelines, any selection procedure resulting in a “selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact,” which in turn requires the validation of the selection procedure.  These validation requirements are equally applicable to any AI-based selection procedure used to make any employment decision, including hiring, termination, promotion, and demotion.

As stated in the Uniform Guidelines, and emphasized in the FAQ, the OFCCP recognizes three methods of validation:

  1. Content validation – a showing that the content of the selection procedure is representative of important aspects of performance on the job in question;

  2. Criterion-related validation – production of empirical data demonstrating that the selection procedure is predictive or significantly correlated with important aspects of job performance; and

  3. Construct validation – a showing that the procedure measures the degree to which candidates possess identifiable characteristics that have been determined to be important in successful performance on the job.

With the exception of criterion-related validating studies, which can be “transported” from other entities under certain circumstances, the Uniform Guidelines require local validation at the employer’s own facilities.

If a selection procedure adversely impacts a protected group, the employer must provide evidence of validity for the selection procedure(s) that caused the adverse impact. Thus, it is crucial that employers considering the implementation of AI-based algorithms in the selection process both conduct adverse impact studies and be prepared to produce one or more validation studies.

The new FAQ also provides important guidelines on the substantial methods utilized by OFCCP in evaluating potential adverse impact.  In accordance with the Uniform Guidelines, OFCCP will analyze the Impact Ratio – the disfavored group’s selection rate divided by the favored group’s selection rate.  Any Impact Ratio of less than 0.80 (referred to as the “Four – Fifths Rule”) constitutes an initial indication of adverse impact, but OFCCP will not pursue enforcement without evidence of statistical and practical significance.  For statistical significance, the OFCCP’s standard statistical tests are the Fisher’s Exact Test (for groups with fewer than 30 subjects) and the Two Independent-Sample Binomial Z-Test (for groups with 30 or more subjects).

With the publication of this new FAQ, employers – and particularly federal contractors – should be sure to evaluate their use of AI-based algorithms and properly validate all selection procedures under the Uniform Guidelines.  Moreover, although not addressed in the OFCCP’s new FAQ, employers should also ensure that their AI-based algorithms are compliant with all other state and federal laws and regulations.

©2019 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Court Lets Trader Joe’s Out of Sticky Situation Over Honey Advertising

A magistrate judge in the Northern District of California recently dismissed a putative class action alleging that Trader Joe’s misled its consumers about the purity of its manuka honey.  Moore v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. 4:18-CV-04418-KAW, 2019 WL 2579219 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2019).

Plaintiffs commenced a putative class action lawsuit alleging that Trader Joe’s engaged in “false, misleading, and deceptive marketing” by representing that its Trader Joe’s Manuka Honey product was “entirely” manuka honey when, purportedly, the product’s manuka honey content had been “adulterated by the inclusion of cheaper honey.” Manuka honey is produced from the nectar of New Zealand’s manuka tree and is said to have numerous medicinal benefits.

Plaintiffs specifically challenged the product’s “100% New Zealand Manuka Honey” label and the ingredient statement that lists “manuka honey” as the sole ingredient because Plaintiffs’ laboratory tests demonstrated that only between 57.3% and 62.6% of the pollen found in the product was from the manuka flower, with the remainder deriving from “other floral sources.” Plaintiffs claimed Trader Joe’s mixed manuka honey with non-manuka honey, and in doing so violated “consumer protection and similar laws in all fifty states” – which allegedly incorporate the adulteration and misbranding provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the “FDCA”) – and committed common-law fraud and breach of warranty.

In her opinion, Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore cut straight to the point and rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the honey was adulterated. Citing hearing testimony, she noted that Plaintiffs’ adulteration allegation was premised on “bees visiting different floral sources and returning to the hive resulting in a lower manuka pollen count, rather than the manufacturer purposefully mixing Manuka honey with non-manuka honey.” Under Section 342(b) of the FDCA, a product is adulterated only:

(1) If any valuable constituent has been in whole or in part omitted or abstracted therefrom; or (2) if any substance has been substituted wholly or in part therefor; or (3) if damage or inferiority has been concealed in any manner; or (4) if any substance has been added thereto or mixed or packed therewith so as to increase its bulk or weight, or reduce its quality or strength, or make it appear better or of greater value than it is.

None of those definitions was met in this case, Judge Westmore held, because any impurities in the honey were introduced by the bees that made it, and not by Trader Joe’s. She, therefore, granted Trader Joe’s motion to dismiss without leave to amend as plaintiffs “could not plead sufficient facts to support their adulteration theory.” Judge Westmore also ruled that to the extent the applicable state laws imposed different standards than the FDCA, they were preempted.

Along similar lines, Judge Westmore found that the product’s label was not misleading. According to FDA guidance, honey is a “single ingredient food” that may be labeled with the plant or blossom name so long as that plant or blossom is the “chief floral source.” Trader Joe’s argued that “100%” in the phrase “New Zealand Manuka Honey” could refer to either manuka honey or the fact that the honey comes entirely from New Zealand. Because Plaintiffs’ adulteration theory failed and the “chief floral source [was] undisputedly Manuka,” Judge Westmore held that the label was accurate and that a reasonable person would not be misled. She dismissed Plaintiffs’ common law fraud and breach of express warranty causes of action on similar grounds.

© 2019 Proskauer Rose LLP.
This article was written by Lawrence I Weinstein, Carl Mazurek and Marc Palmer of Proskauer Rose LLP.

Employers Beware: SC Abolishes Common-Law Marriage

On July 24, 2019, South Carolina joined the ranks of Alabama, Pennsylvania, and others in abolishing future recognition of common law marriages in the state.  The state will continue to recognize all common law marriages in effect before this date, but they will be subject to a higher standard of proof.  On and after July 25, 2019, all South Carolina marriages will require the issuance of a marriage license.

This ruling from the South Carolina Supreme Court came after many legislative attempts at abolishing common law marriage failed.  The court determined the paternalistic reasons behind the original recognition of a common law marriage, e.g., the stigma of unwed mothers, children out of wedlock, and the logistics of the “circuit minister” or other official required to cover a large territory, no longer apply.  With the elimination of future common law marriage recognition, the court also handed down a new standard of proof parties must meet to continue to be considered married under common law.  Probate cases in South Carolina use the “clear and convincing evidence” standard to prove marriage, and now this standard applies to the living too.

Our workforce is transient.  Employees residing in South Carolina often move across state lines for work and personal reasons.  And many companies with principal offices outside South Carolina choose to open locations in South Carolina.  For that reason, this ruling reaches beyond state lines, and it is important for all employers to understand its implications upon benefit plans and leaves of absence.

After July 24, 2019, it no longer is enough for employees claiming an employee is a “spouse” for employee benefit plan purposes simply to establish they were married under the common law of South Carolina.  Now, the critical factor is the date as of which that marriage was established.  The documents submitted to prove the marriage (e.g., tax returns, documents filed under penalty of perjury, introductions in public, contracts, and checking accounts) must also reflect this timing.

This Court decision will also have implications for employees in South Carolina seeking to take a leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act to care for a spouse with a serious health condition.  Before July 25, 2019, eligible employees could take a leave of absence under the FMLA to care for a common law spouse with a serious health condition.  Yet after this Court ruling, employees can only take FMLA leave to care for a common law spouse if that common law marriage was established on or before July 24, 2019.  Employers should remember that under the Department of Labor’s FMLA Regulations, employees can be required to provide reasonable documentation evidencing the existence of a valid marriage.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2019

Reading the Supreme Court Tea Leaves in Dex Media Inc. v. Click-to-Call Technologies, LP

On June 24, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari in Dex Media Inc. v. Click-to-Call Technologies, LP. Next term, the Court will determine whether 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) permits appeal of the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s decision to institute inter partes review upon finding that 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)’s time bar did not apply.

The Dex Media case has traveled a long and tortuous path. Its journey began with the service of a complaint in 2001 which was dismissed without prejudice in 2003, and the filing of a new complaint in 2012. The petition for inter partes review was filed in May 2013, and a final written decision of the Board issued in October 2014 finding that the asserted claims are invalid. From there, the case visited the Federal Circuit twice, the Supreme Court once and is now on its way back for a second time. On appeal, the dispute has focused on whether the petition for inter partes review was time barred by § 315(b), and whether the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to hear the appeal of that issue.

Facts of the Case

In 2001, Inforocket.com, Inc., an exclusive licensee to the patent-in-suit, filed a district court action against Keen, Inc. The complaint asserting infringement was served on September 14, 2001. While the case was pending, Keen acquired Inforocket as its wholly owned subsidiary and stipulated to a voluntary dismissal of the district court action without prejudice in 2003. Keen later changed its name to Ingenio. Click-to-Call subsequently acquired the patent-in-suit, and on May 29, 2012, filed patent infringement lawsuits against multiple parties, one of which was Ingenio.

On May 28, 2012, just under one year after being served with the complaint in the Click-to-Call action, Ingenio and two other defendants filed a petition for inter partes review (IPR) of the patent-in-suit. In its preliminary response, Click-to-Call contended, among other things, that § 315(b) statutorily barred institution of the IPR proceedings, noting that Ingenio’s predecessor-in-interest was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent-in-suit in 2001. Section 315(b) states, “An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real part in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.”

The Board instituted the proceeding, and based on Federal Circuit precedent found that dismissal of an infringement suit without prejudice nullifies the effect of the service of the original complaint against Keen. Therefore, service of the 2001 complaint did not bar the petition. Click-to-Call again argued that the petition was time-barred in its patent owner response; and in its final written decision, the Board reaffirmed its earlier conclusion on that point and found that the challenged claims were invalid.

In the case being reviewed by the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit first had to decide whether it had jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the § 315(b) time bar in light of § 314(d), which states, “No Appeal. – The determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and unappealable.” The Federal Circuit, relying upon its en banc ruling in Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018), held that time-bar determinations under § 315(b) are appealable.

In Wi-Fi One, the Federal Circuit based its finding on the rationale that the time-bar determination “is not akin to either the non-initiation or preliminary-only merits determinations for which unreviewability is common in the law,” and the fact that the time bar “sets limits on the Director’s statutory authority to institute.” Id. at 1373-74. Having decided the question of appealability, the Click-to-Call court then held en banc that the time-bar decision applies to bar institution of an IPR when a petitioner was served with a complaint for patent infringement more than one year before filing its petition, but the action was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.

Predictions for the Supreme Court

Often, even without the presence of a circuit court split, the Supreme Court takes cases on appeal from the Federal Circuit to reign in and overrule the Appellate Court. In fact, the Supreme Court has reversed 70 percent of the Federal Circuit cases it has heard since 2007. There are two important factors to suggest that the Supreme Court will for a second time reverse the Federal Circuit in this case.

  • First, in a prior appeal of this case to the Federal Circuit in 2015, the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on its prior precedent in Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. v. Apple Inc., which was subsequently overruled by Wi-Fi One. Click-to-Call petitioned the Supreme Court for review, and in June 2016, the Supreme Court granted cert, and vacated and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit to consider in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee. This suggests that, at the time, the Supreme Court thought there was a clear path for the Federal Circuit to hold that § 315(b) rulings are appealable, as the Federal Circuit did in both Wi-Fi One and its ruling that is currently under review. Since then, the composition of the Supreme Court has changed, with Justice Kennedy’s retirement and the confirmation of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh. It seems now that at least four of the justices of the newly constituted Court may believe that the Federal Circuit’s decision is not consistent with § 314(d).
  • This contention also is supported by the fact that the Supreme Court declined to review both of the questions presented by the petition for cert. Dex Media, Inc., the successor-in-interest to Ingenio, also requested that the Supreme Court decide whether § 315(b) bars institution of an inter partes review when the previously served patent infringement complaint, filed more than one year before the IPR petition, had been dismissed without prejudice. The Supreme Court declined to hear that issue. One might suppose that if the Supreme Court believes the time-bar question is appealable, the Court also would want to rule on whether a dismissal without prejudice negates the effect of service of the complaint under the time bar statute. It is entirely possible that the Court declined to make that determination because the question will be moot once the Court determines there is no appellate jurisdiction over the time-bar issue.

Implications of the Ruling

If the Supreme Court affirms the Federal Circuit’s ruling and finds that § 315(b) questions are appealable, the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence regarding when the one-year period begins will remain binding, at least until the Supreme Court decides to hear that issue anew. This means that entities looking to file IPR petitions must be alert to the fact that a predecessor-in-interest may have been served with a complaint triggering the one-year time limit as well as whether to file a petition with other entities who (directly or through a predecessor-in-interest) may have been served with complaints that could bar the entire petition.

In contrast, what will happen if the Supreme Court reverses the Federal Circuit’s ruling and Orders dismissal of the appeal on the grounds that § 314(d) prohibits appeal of the time bar issue? Prior to the Federal Circuit’s ruling, the Board had consistently found, as they did in this case, that dismissal of a complaint without prejudice constituted a nullity in terms of the time-bar statute. If the Federal Circuit’s opinion in this case is overruled, its opinion would not be precedential and the Board could either interpret the statute as they had previously or alter the interpretation in view of the Federal Circuit’s opinion, though they would be under no obligation to do so. It also is possible that this becomes one of the many issues that are panel-dependent, forcing petitioners who were served with complaints that have been dismissed without prejudice to “roll the dice” on the issue.

PTAB practitioners should be watching the outcome of this case closely and consider all of the implications of the ruling before filing a petition for inter partes review. As the facts of this case highlight, they also should perform a thorough due diligence review of all “real parties in interest” related to the contemplated petitioner.

©2019 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved

Game Over: Obviousness Can Be Based on a Single Prior Art Reference

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) obviousness decision, finding that obviousness can be based on a single prior art reference if modifying that prior art reference is found to be obvious. Game and Technology Co., Ltd. v. Activision Blizzard Inc., Case No. 18-1981 (Fed. Cir., June 21, 2019) (Wallach, J).

Game and Technology (GAT) owns a patent directed to a method for generating a “gamvatar” by combining game items with layers of an avatar in online games. Activision Blizzard and Riot Games sought and were granted inter partes review of the patent. During the proceeding, the PTAB construed the term “gamvatar” to be a combination of an avatar with a game item function, and construed the term “layers” to mean display regions. The PTAB issued a final written decision finding the challenged claims obvious based on a user manual for a video game called Diablo II. GAT appealed.

On appeal, GAT argued that the PTAB erred in construing the terms “gamvatar” and “layers,” and further argued that the PTAB erred in its determination that the claimed method would have been obvious over the Diablo II manual.

Addressing claim construction, GAT argued that the PTAB’s construction of “gamvatar” was broader than the broadest reasonable interpretation BRI, and argued that “gamvatar” should mean “concurrently usable online and in the game.” The Federal Circuit rejected GAT’s argument, finding that the PTAB did not err in construing the term “gamvatar” because the claims and specification both showed that “gamvatar” is a combination of an avatar with a game item function and is not limited to “concurrently useable online and in the game.” As to the term “layers,” GAT argued that the term should be construed as regions for displaying graphical objects where the layers are displayed on the avatar. The Court disagreed, finding that the claim and the specification supported the PTAB’s construction of the term “layers” to mean display regions.

Turning to obviousness, GAT argued that the PTAB erred in using the user manual to find obviousness because a “a single reference . . . cannot support obviousness.” The Federal Circuit rejected GAT’s argument as a matter of law, finding that a patent can be obvious based on a single prior art reference if it would have been obvious to modify the reference to arrive at the claims invention. Applying that standard here, the Federal Circuit found that the PTAB did not err in its obviousness decision because the PTAB’s finding that the Diablo II manual teaches the “gamvatar” and the “layers” limitations was supported by substantial evidence.

 

© 2019 McDermott Will & Emery
For more in PTAB cases, please see the Intellectual Property type of law page on the National Law Review.

U.S. District Court Upholds Short-Term Limited Duration Insurance Rule

The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia upheld a rule that expanded the maximum length of time for short-term, limited duration insurance (STLDI).

STLDI is coverage that lasts a limited period of time and is exempt from many of the requirements that apply to plans in the individual health insurance market. Concerned that STLDI was drawing healthy lives away from the individual health insurance market that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) sought to support, the Obama administration shortened the length of time an individual could enroll in STLDI from 12 months to three months. Seeing STLDI as a low cost alternative to individual insurance, the Trump administration reversed course. Final regulations issued last year restored the period to 12 months and allowed for up to two renewals, for a total period of 36 months of coverage. One month later, seven organizations representing small health insurers, mental health patients and providers, and others brought suit challenging these regulations.

The court denied the challenge. It found that the ACA–and HIPAA, which first introduced STLDI–did not define the length of time STLDI could remain in effect and that the U.S. Departments of Treasury, Labor, and Health and Human Services could extend the length of time STLDI may remain available to enrollees without posing a threat to the ACA’s “structural core.”

The plaintiffs have already expressed their intent to appeal the decision. In the meantime, states continue to consider the question of whether and how to regulate the availability and terms of STLDI policies issued within their borders.

Copyright © by Ballard Spahr LLP
This article is by Edward I. Leeds  and Paige A. Haughton of Ballard Spahr LLP.
For more on health insurance, please see the National Law Review Health Law & Managed Care page.

Modernization at Last: Insight to the Newly Published EB-5 Modernization Rules … Now the Race is On …

On July 23, 2019, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) regulations to update the Immigrant Investor Program were published in the Federal Register. The new EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program Modernization rules (New Rules) amend the historic Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regulations governing the employment-based, fifth preference (EB-5) immigrant investor classification and associated regional centers to reflect statutory changes and modernize the EB-5 program. The New Rules are creating quite a buzz in the EB-5 community with good reason. Of particular note, the New Rules modify the EB-5 program by:

  • Increasing the required minimum investment amounts;

  • Providing the long-awaited priority date retention to EB-5 investors in certain cases;

  • Amending targeted employment area (TEA) designation criteria;

  • Centralizing TEA determination;

  • Clarifying USCIS procedures for the removal of conditions on permanent residence fulfilment;

  • Providing for periodic minimum investment increases henceforth; and

  • Implementing a myriad other amendments.

The New Rules are effective 120 days from publication, which is November 21, 2019. The effective date of the New Rules presupposes that Congress will extend the EB-5 Program’s current sunset date of September 30, 2019. USCIS clarified that it will adjudicate investors, who file a Form I-526 petition before November 21, 2019, under the current EB-5 program rules. Now the race is on to initiate and complete investments by the effective date.

The “New” EB-5 Program: A Closer Look at Certain Changes.

Increased Minimum Investment. To account for inflation since the commencement of the EB-5 Program, the New Rules increase the minimum investment amount per investor to participate to $900,000 (from $500,000) if the project is located in a TEA or to $1.8 million (from $1 million) if not in a TEA. This increased amount commences on November 21, 2019. For many this is good news as the minimum investment amount increase is substantially lower than DHS’ initial proposal to increase to $1.35 million. To further adjust for inflation, the New Rules provide for periodic increases henceforth to the minimum investment every five years. USCIS proposes that this fixed schedule will create “predictability and consistency” by allowing EB-5 participants to plan accordingly.

TEA Determination. The amendments to TEA’s determination procedures that commence on and after November 21, 2019, are a hot topic. The biggest change in the New Rules is the abolishment of state sovereignty in the TEA determination process. No longer will the state in which the project is located determine TEA qualification. USCIS, which operates under DHS, will review and determine the designation of high-unemployment TEAs. EB-5 program stakeholders believe this change alone will dramatically limit the number of projects that qualify as a TEA, which could lead to an obsolescence of the EB-5 program. Also of note, the New Rules provide that any city or town with a population of 20,000 or more, whether inside or outside of a metropolitan statistical area, may qualify as a TEA henceforth. The New Rule also provides that a TEA may consist of a census tract or contiguous census tracts in which the new commercial enterprise (NCE) is principally doing business if the NCE is located in more than one census tract, and the weighted average of the unemployment rate for the tract or tracts is at least 150% of the national average. The applicability of TEA status to rural areas remains unchanged. Thus, only projects in metropolitan areas are at risk of no longer qualifying as a TEA under the New Rules after November 20, 2019.

DHS supports these steps with the position that the New Rules will ensure consistency in TEA adjudications by directing investment to areas most in need and increase the consistency of how high-unemployment areas are defined in the program. Of note, the New Rules do not include any preference for rural and urban distressed areas, notwithstanding the proposals for visa set-asides for such project. In addition, the New Rules do not integrate TEA determination with the new qualified opportunity zone designations under the 2017 Tax Cuts and Job Creation Act. These provisions might be addressed legislatively by Congress as part of a reauthorization bill this year. Some EB-5 stakeholders believe that Congress might overrule the New Rules in part (i.e., regarding the minimum investment amount and TEA changes) plus enact additional modernization rules such as authorizing additional visas, etc.

Priority Date Retention. For many years, both Congress and USCIS have recognized the value of a modification to the EB-5 Program to permit EB-5 investors to retain their visa priority date if they are required to amend their EB-5 petition for reasons unrelated to their own doing. The New Rules will allow EB-5 investors to use the priority date of a previously approved EB-5 petition. If and when an investor needs to file a new EB-5 petition, they can now retain the priority date of the previously approved petition, subject to certain exceptions.

An EB-5 immigrant petition’s priority date is normally the date on which the petition was properly filed. In general, when demand exceeds supply for a particular visa category, an earlier priority date is more advantageous. DHS will allow an EB-5 immigrant petitioner to use the priority date for a subsequently filed petition for the same classification for which the petitioner qualifies (unless the petition is revoked for material error, fraud or willful misrepresentation). We note that the New Rules allow an EB-5 petitioner to retain the priority date from an approved Form I-526 petition for a subsequently filed Form I-526 on or after November 21, 2019.

Removal of Conditions on Permanent Residence. The New Rules clarify that derivative family members must file their own Form I-829 to remove conditions on their permanent residence if they are not included in the principal petitioner’s I-829 petition. In addition, the New Rules streamline the adjudication process for removing conditions by providing flexibility in interview locations.

What happens next?

Until November 21, 2019, foreign investors, regional centers, developers and job-creating entities can rely on the existing rules. We urge those considering participation in the EB-5 program who desire to be grandfathered under the current law and the minimum investment amount of $500,000 to invest as soon as possible. As discussed above, if a project’s location in the market no longer qualifies as a TEA, then the minimum investment amount increases to $1.8 million, not just to $900,000. Accordingly, we recommend amending offering documents to include a discussion of the additional risks caused by the New Rules; principal among them is the potential inability to raise funds after November 21.

Regarding future viability of the EB-5 program, the increased investment amount may cause foreign investors to look to other United States programs, such as the L-1 and EB-1, as multinational executive or may look to the immigrant investor programs in other countries with a lower investment amount than the United States.[1]

[1] https://www.eb5investors.com/eb5-basics/international-immigrant-investor-programs

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California
Article by Debbie A. Klis of Polsinelli PC.
For more on EB-5 immigration developments, see the National Law Review Immigration Law page.