Category: Uncategorized

The Fairness for High-Skilled Workers Act May Endanger Economy

The Fairness for High-Skilled Workers Act has passed the House of Representatives, and is pending before the Senate where it may pass by unanimous consent (i.e., with no actual vote or hearing).

On its face, the Fairness Act seems fair. By eliminating the 7% per country cap, Indian nationals and Chinese nationals who have been waiting and would continue to wait for years to capture green cards would be placed at the front of line. But this would be at the expense of workers from other countries who are also important to the United States.

About 25% of all STEM workers in the U.S., including those in the fields of healthcare, physical science, computer, and math, are foreign-born and that figure is on the rise. One quarter of all doctors in the U.S. are foreign-born — many from sub-Saharan Africa — and are particularly important in poor, rural areas of the country where physicians are scarce. One in five pharmacists and one in four dentists are foreign-born. Other types of healthcare workers come from Asia, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean and our need for these workers rises as baby boomers age.

If the Fairness Act were to pass, recruiting from countries other than India and China might become more difficult, and this talent may well turn elsewhere. New Zealand, Ireland, Australia and the UK are also dependent on foreign-trained doctors.

High-tech workers from India and China are also important to the U.S. and its economy; but our current immigration system is driving them out as well. This started in 2008, when it became difficult for high-tech companies to get the number of H-1B visas they needed. That frustration has grown with the increased scrutiny of H-1B petitions and the long green card waiting lines. Indian and Chinese talent is heading for other countries, and Canada is welcoming them and their companies with open arms. South Africa, Argentina, India, Chile, Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Israel, Australia, and Ireland also are popular competitors.

Quotas of one kind or another have been part of the U.S. immigration system since the early part of the 20th century. Literacy requirements limited immigration from some of the poorer countries of the world. Country-of-birth quotas benefited those from the UK, Ireland, and Germany at the expense even of those born in southern and eastern Europe. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (the Hart-Celler Act), which is the basis of our current system, abolished national origin quotas (to eliminate discrimination) and focused on family reunification. The 7% annual ceiling on the number of immigrants from any one country was established. The ceiling was not meant to be quota, but rather a “barrier against monopolization.”

Senator Rand Paul, who opposes the Fairness Act, introduced the BELIEVE Act (Backlog Elimination, Legal Immigration and Employment Visa Enhancement Act) (S. 2091) on July 11, 2019. That bill would simply quadruple the number of employment-based visas by doubling the number available annually and exempting dependents from being counted toward the annual quota of visas. His bill also would exempt all shortage occupations from green card limits.

The Fairness Act may be just an interim solution. Rather than pitting family-based immigration against employment-based immigration and rather than pitting one country against another or one industry against another, perhaps it is time for legislation like the BELIEVE Act that would simply increase the number of green cards available to everybody.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2019

For more on green card legislation, see the National Law Review Immigration law page.

Head Hacking: New Devices Gather Brainspray

For more than a decade I have been warning about the vulnerability of brainspray – the brain signals that can be captured from outside your head. In 2008, this article by Jeffery Goldberg demonstrated that an fMRI machine could easily interpret how a person felt about stimuli provided – which could be a boon to totalitarian governments testing for people’s true feelings about the government or its Dear Leader. Of course in 2008 the fMRI costs two million dollars and you must lie still inside it for a useful reading to emerge.

While fMRI mind reading and lie detection is not yet ready for the courtroom, its interpretations are improving all the time and mobile units are under consideration. And its wearable cousins, like iWatches and computerized head gear are reading changes from within your body, such as electrocardiogram, heart rate, blood pressure, respiration rate, blood oxygen saturation, blood glucose, skin perspiration, capnography, body temperature, motion evaluation, cardiac implantable devices and ambient parameters. Certain head gear is calibrated just for brain waves.

Some of this is gaming equipment and some helps you meditate.  Biofeedback headsets measure your brain waves, using EEG. They’re small bands that sit easily on your head and measure activity through sensors. Several companies like MindWave, NeuroSky, Thync, and Versus all make such equipment available to the general public.

Of course, if you really want to frighten yourself about how far this technology has advances, check in on DARPA and the rest of the US Military. DARPA has been testing brainwave filtering binoculars , human brainwave driven targeting for killer robots,  and soldier brain-machine interfaces for military vehicles. And these are just the things they are currently willing to dicuss in public.

I wrote six years ago about how big companies like Honda were exploring brainspray capture, and have spoken about how Google, Facebook and other Silicon Valley giants have sunk billions of dollars into creating brain-machine interfaces and reading brainspray for practical purposes.

I will write more on this later, but be aware that hacking of this equipment is always possible, which could give the wrong people access to your brain waves and pick up if you are thinking of your bank account PIN or other sensitive matter. Your thoughts of any sort should be protected from view.  Thought-crime has always been on the other side of the line.

Now that it is possible to read your brainspray with greater certainty, we should be considering how to regulate this activity.  I don’t mind giving the search engine my information in exchange of efficient immediate searches.  But I don’t want to open my head to companies or government.

Copyright © 2019 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.

For more in device hacking, see the Communications, Media & Internet law page on the National Law Review.

The CCPA Is Approaching: What Businesses Need to Know about the Consumer Privacy Law

The most comprehensive data privacy law in the United States, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), will take effect on January 1, 2020. The CCPA is an expansive step in U.S. data privacy law, as it enumerates new consumer rights regarding collection and use of personal information, along with corresponding duties for businesses that trade in such information.

While the CCPA is a state law, its scope is sufficiently broad that it will apply to many businesses that may not currently consider themselves to be under the purview of California law. In addition, in the wake of the CCPA, at least a dozen other states have introduced their own comprehensive data privacy legislation, and there is heightened consideration and support for a federal law to address similar issues.

Below, we examine the contours of the CCPA to help you better understand the applicability and requirements of the new law. While portions of the CCPA remain subject to further clarification, the inevitable challenges of compliance, coupled with the growing appetite for stricter data privacy laws in the United States generally, mean that now is the time to ensure that your organization is prepared for the CCPA.

Does the CCPA apply to my business?

Many businesses may rightly wonder if a California law even applies to them, especially if they do not have operations in California. As indicated above, however, the CCPA is not necessarily limited in scope to businesses physically located in California. The law will have an impact throughout the United States and, indeed, worldwide.

The CCPA will have broad reach because it applies to each for-profit business that collects consumers’ personal information, does business in California, and satisfies at least one of three thresholds:

  • Has annual gross revenues in excess of $25 million; or
  • Alone or in combination, annually buys, receives for commercial purposes, sells, or shares for commercial purposes, the personal information of 50,000 or more California consumers; or
  • Derives 50 percent or more of its annual revenues from selling consumers’ personal information

While the CCPA is limited in its application to California consumers, due to the size of the California economy and its population numbers, the act will effectively apply to any data-driven business with operations in the United States.

What is considered “personal information” under the CCPA?

The CCPA’s definition of “personal information” is likely the most expansive interpretation of the term in U.S. privacy law. Per the text of the law, personal information is any “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”

The CCPA goes on to note that while traditional personal identifiers such as name, address, Social Security number, passport, and the like are certainly personal information, so are a number of other categories that may not immediately come to mind, including professional or employment-related information, geolocation data, biometric data, educational information, internet activity, and even inferences drawn from the sorts of data identified above.

As a practical matter, if your business collects any information that could reasonably be linked back to an individual consumer, then you are likely collecting personal information according to the CCPA.

When does a business “collect” personal information under the CCPA?

To “collect” or the “collection” of personal information under the CCPA is any act of “buying, renting, gathering, obtaining, receiving, or accessing any personal information pertaining to a consumer by any means.” Such collection can be active or passive, direct from the consumer or via the purchase of consumer data sets. If your business is collecting personal information directly from consumers, then at or before the point of collection the CCPA imposes a notice obligation on your business to inform consumers about the categories of information to be collected and the purposes for which such information will (or may) be used.

To reiterate, if your business collects any information that could reasonably be linked back to an individual, then you are likely collecting personal information according to the CCPA.

If a business collects personal information but never sells any of it, does the CCPA still apply?

Yes. While there are additional consumer rights related to the sale of personal information, the CCPA applies to businesses that collect personal information solely for internal purposes, or that otherwise do not disclose such information.

What new rights does the CCPA give to California consumers?

The CCPA gives California consumers four primary new rights: the right to receive information on privacy practices and access information, the right to demand deletion of their personal information, the right to prohibit the sale of their information, and the right not to be subject to price discrimination based on their invocation of any of the new rights specified above.

What new obligations does a business have regarding these new consumer rights?

Businesses that fall under the purview of the CCPA have a number of new obligations under the law:

  • A business must take certain steps to assist individual consumers with exercising their rights under the CCPA. This must be accomplished by providing a link on the business’s homepage titled “Do Not Sell My Personal Information” and a separate landing page for the same. In addition, a business must update its privacy policy (or policies), or a California-specific portion of the privacy policy, to include a separate link to the new “Do Not Sell My Personal Information” page.

A business also must provide at least two mechanisms for consumers to exercise their CCPA rights by offering, at a minimum, a dedicated web page for receiving and processing such requests (the CCPA is silent on whether this web page must be separate from or can be combined with the “Do Not Sell My Personal Information” page), and a toll-free 800 number to receive the same.

  • Upon receipt of a verified consumer request to delete personal information, the business must delete that consumer’s personal information within 45 days.
  • Upon receipt of a verified consumer request for information about the collection of that consumer’s personal information, a business must provide the consumer with a report within 45 days that includes the following information from the preceding 12 months:
    • Categories of personal information that the business has collected about the consumer;
    • Specific pieces of personal information that the business possesses about the consumer;
    • Categories of sources from which the business received personal information about the consumer;
    • A corporate statement detailing the commercial reason (or reasons) that the business collected such personal information about the consumer; and
    • The categories of third parties with whom the business has shared the consumer’s personal information.
  • Upon receipt of a verified consumer request for information about the sale of that consumer’s personal information, a business must provide the consumer with a report within 45 days that includes the following information from the preceding 12 months:
    • Categories of personal information that the business has collected about the consumer;
    • Categories of personal information that the business has sold about the consumer;
    • Categories of third parties to whom the business has sold the consumer’s personal information; and
    • The categories of personal information about the consumer that the business disclosed to a third party (or parties) for a business purpose.
  • Finally, a business must further update its privacy policy (or policies), or the California-specific section of such policy(s), to:
    • Identify all new rights afforded consumers by the CCPA;
    • Identify the categories of personal information that the business has collected in the preceding 12 months;
    • Include a corporate statement detailing the commercial reason (or reasons) that the business collected such personal information about the consumer;
    • Identify the categories of personal information that the business has sold in the prior 12 months, or the fact that the business has not sold any such personal information in that time; and
    • Note the categories of third parties with whom a business has shared personal information in the preceding 12 months.

What about employee data gathered by employers for internal workplace purposes?

As currently drafted, nothing in the CCPA carves out an exception for employee data gathered by employers. A “consumer” is simply defined as a “natural person who is a California resident …,” so the law would presumably treat employees like anyone else. However, the California legislature recently passed Bill AB 25, which excludes from the CCPA information collected about a person by a business while the person is acting as a job applicant, employee, owner, officer, director, or contractor of the business, to the extent that information is collected and used exclusively in the employment context. Bill AB 25 also provides an exception for emergency contact information and other information pertaining to the administration of employee benefits. The bill awaits the governor’s signature – he has until October 13, 2019 to sign.

But not so fast – Bill AB 25 only creates a one-year reprieve for employers, rather than a permanent exception. The exceptions listed above will expire on January 1, 2021. By that time, the legislature may choose to extend the exceptions indefinitely, or businesses should be prepared to fully comply with the CCPA.

California employers would thus be wise to start considering the type of employee data they collect, and whether that information may eventually become subject to the CCPA’s requirements (either on January 1, 2021 or thereafter). Personal information is likely to be present in an employee’s job application, browsing history, and information related to payroll processing, to name a few areas. It also includes biometric data, such as fingerprints scanned for time-keeping purposes. Employers who collect employees’ biometric information, for example, would be well advised to review their biometric policies so that eventual compliance with the CCPA can be achieved gradually during this one-year grace period.

Notwithstanding this new legislation, there remains little clarity as to how the law will ultimately be applied in the employer-employee context, if and when the exceptions expire. Employers are encouraged to err on the side of caution and to reach out to experienced legal counsel for further guidance if they satisfy any one of the above thresholds.

What are the penalties for violation of the CCPA?

Violations of the CCPA are enforced by the California Attorney General’s office, which can issue civil monetary fines of up to $2,500 per violation, or $7,500 for each intentional violation. Currently, the California AG’s office must provide notice of any alleged violation and allow for a 30-day cure period before issuing any fine.

Are there any exceptions to the CCPA?

Yes, there are a number of exceptions. First, the CCPA only applies to California consumers and businesses that meet the threshold(s) identified above. If a business operates or conducts a transaction wholly outside of California then the CCPA does not apply.

There are also certain enumerated exceptions to account for federal law, such that the CCPA is pre-empted by HIPAA, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act as it applies to personal information sold to or purchased from a credit reporting agency, and information subject to the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act.

Would it be fair to say that the CCPA is not very clear, and maybe even a bit confusing?

Yes, it would. The CCPA was drafted, debated, and enacted into law very quickly in the face of some legislative and ballot-driven pressures. As a result, the bill as enacted is a bit confusing and even contains sections that appear to contradict its other parts. The drafters of the CCPA, however, recognized this and have included provisions for the California AG’s office to provide further guidance on its intent and meaning. Amendment efforts also remain underway. As such, it is likely that the CCPA will be an evolving law for at least the short term.

Regardless, the CCPA will impose real-world requirements effective January 1, 2020, and the new wave of consumer privacy legislation it has inspired at the state and federal level is likely to bring even more of the same. It is important to address these issues now, rather than when it is too late.

© 2019 Much Shelist, P.C.

For more on the CCPA legislation, see the National Law Review Consumer Protection law page.

A Dark Day for Franchising: Ninth Circuit Reinstates its Misguided Vazquez Decision, Undermining the Franchise Business Model

In the course of a politically-charged frenzy to eliminate the misclassification of employees as independent contractors, the franchise business model has been trampled without respect by both the courts and the legislature in California, disrupting commercial relationships that have been a vital driver of the state’s economy for more than fifty years.  Only five years ago, the California Supreme Court acknowledged the vital importance of franchising to the California economy in generating “trillions of dollars in total sales,” “billions of dollars” of payroll and the “millions of people” franchising employs.  Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC (2014) 60 Cal.4th 474, 489.

Taking into account the “ubiquitous, lucrative, and thriving” franchise business model and its “profound” effects on the economy, the Patterson court held that the usual tests for “determining the circumstances under which an employment or agency relationship exists” could not be applied to franchises.  Id. at 477, 489 and 503.  To avoid disruption of the franchise relationship and turning the model “on its head,” a different test that took into account the practical realities of franchising had to be applied to franchise relationships.  Id. at 498, 499 and 503.  The “imposition and enforcement of a uniform marketing and operational plan cannot automatically saddle the franchisor with responsibility.”  Id. at 478.  A franchisor is liable “only if it has retained or assumed a general right of control over factors such as hiring, direction, supervision, discipline, discharge, and relevant day-to-day aspects of the workplace behavior of the franchisee’s employees.”  Id. at 497-98.  The special rule for franchising has been commonly referred to as the “Patterson gloss.”

On September 25, 2019, a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court reinstated an opinion it had previously published on May 2, 2019, then withdrew on July 22, 2019, recklessly undermining the delicate framework of the franchise business model in derogation of the California Supreme Court’s “Patterson gloss.”  Vazquez v. Jan-Pro, 923 F.3d 575 (9th Cir. May 2, 2019), opinion withdrawn, 2019 US App. Lexis 21687 (July 22, 2019), opinion reinstated, 2019 BL 357978 (9th Cir. September 24, 2019).

The “Patterson gloss” arose from the California Supreme Court’s subtle appreciation for the historical development of the franchise business model.  At the heart of all franchise relationships is a trademark license.  At common law, trademark licenses were seen as a representation to the public of the source of a product.  An attempt to license a trademark risked the forfeiture of any right to royalties and the abandonment of the licensed mark.  See Lea v. New Home Sewing Mach. Co., 139 F. 732 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1905); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959).

Although the Trademark Act of 1905 did not allow for the licensing of trademarks, the Trademark Act of 1946, the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051, did allow a trademark to be licensed, but only where the licensee was “controlled by the registrant. . . in respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used.”  15 U.S.C. § 1127.   After the passage of the Lanham Act, a trademark could be licensed, as long as “the plaintiff sufficiently policed and inspected its licensees’ operations to guarantee the quality of the products they sold under its trademarks to the public.”  Dawn Donut, at 367.  After the Lanham Act had legitimized trademark licensing, the franchise model began to emerge in the 1950s, as the Patterson court noted (at 489), leading to the explosive growth of franchising over the last seven decades.

“Franchising is a heavily regulated form of business in California.”  Cislaw v. Southland Corporation (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1288.  Franchisors must provide prospective franchisees with detailed pre-sale disclosure documents under the California Franchise Investment Law, Corporations Code § 31000 et seq. and the FTC Rule, 39 Fed. Reg. 30360 (1974).  There are criminal, civil and administrative consequences for failure to comply.  Franchisees’ rights are protected by the California Franchise Relations Act, Business & Professions Code § 20000, et seq., which includes recently enhanced penalties for non-compliance.

Over the years, California courts have acknowledged the fundamental obligation of franchisors to impose controls over their licensees and have uniformly held that such controls do not create an employment or agency relationship.  See, e.g., Cislaw, 4 Cal.App.4th at 1295 (the owner of a brand may impose restrictions on a licensee “without incurring the responsibilities or acquiring the immunities of a master, with respect to the person controlled.”); Kaplan v. Coldwell Banker (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 746, (“If the law were otherwise, every franchisee who independently owned and operated a franchise would be the true agent or employee of the franchisor.”).  This doctrine came to be known as the “Patterson gloss” and is the glue that holds the franchise business model together—allowing the franchisor to exert the controls necessary to license a trademark without incurring the responsibilities of an employer.

In its September 25, 2019 decision in Vazquez, the Ninth Circuit once again discarded the Patterson gloss like an extra part found in the bottom of an Ikea box after the hasty assembly of an end table.  According to the Vazquez court, Patterson had no relevance because it was just a vicarious liability decision, not an employment decision.  But Patterson was an employment case.

Patterson was a Fair Employment and Housing claim brought by a teenage girl after her supervisor had repeatedly groped her breasts and buttocks.  Patterson, at 479.  It is hard to understand why the Vazquez court considered the wage order claims before it to be more significant than Taylor Patterson’s right to pursue legal claims for sexual harassment.

Even more disturbingly, the Vazquez court disregarded the “Patterson gloss” because Dynamex [Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903] had favorably cited two Massachusetts decisions that applied the ABC test in the franchise context.  Id. at 39.  The Massachusetts cases were cited in Dynamex only as examples of cases where it had been more efficient to address “the latter two parts of the [ABC] standard” on a dispositive motion, rather than all three prongs.  Dynamex, 4 Cal.5th at 48.  The court never mentions franchising or the inconsequential fact that the parties in cited cases were franchises.  The Dynamex court could not be fairly understood to have abandoned its stalwart embrace of the franchise business model in its 2014 Patterson decision, without ever bothering to mention the case or to make any reference to franchising.  Yet the Vazquez court concluded that a passing citation to cases that happened to involve franchise companies in the Dynamex opinion—to make a procedural point that was unrelated to franchising in any way—was an occult signal from the California Supreme Court that the “Patterson gloss” had been abandoned by implication five years after its creation.

Nor was it valid for the Vazquez court to confine the “Patterson gloss” to vicarious liability cases.  As Witkin points out, California law on vicarious liability and employment developed together, so that most “of the rules relating to duties, authority, liability, etc. are applicable to employees as well as other agents.”  Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed., Agency & Employment, § 4).  The core obligation to control a trademark licensee—hard-wired by the Lanham Act into every franchise relationship—must be respected in both vicarious liability and employment cases if the franchise business model is to be preserved.

The Vazquez court had it right when it withdrew and de-published its original decision on July 22, 2019.  When the court certified the retroactivity issue to the California Supreme Court that day, it could have also certified the franchise issue back to the court that created the Patterson gloss, but it did not do so.  Franchisors are now left to wonder how they are to maintain existing long-term commercial relationships and to continue to sell franchises after the Vazquez opinion has taken from them the fundamental right to license trademarks without incurring the unintended liabilities of employers.

© 2019 Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP

Read more on the topic on the National Law Review Franchising Law page.

EEOC Provides Guidance on Reporting Non-Binary Gender Employees

Over the last few years, many employers have implemented diversity and inclusion programs, whether official or unofficial, emphasizing a work force that includes a wide variety of individuals based on, among other categories, race, gender, and sexual orientation.

Internally, companies have updated employment policies, expanded the scope of anti-harassment trainings, created avenues for diverse mentorship, and implemented changes to create workplaces that include and support a diverse office culture.

Externally, a number of states too have begun to update government documents to accommodate diverse individuals, including those who identify their gender as non-binary. For example, California recently enacted legislation permitting individuals to identify as female (F), male (M), or non-binary (X) on their drivers’ licenses.

Yet many employers with non-binary employees have been concerned as to how to appropriately report all of their employees on the federal EEO-1 reports and still comply with the law. As we previously reported, in 2017, the EEOC made it clear that the protections offered by Title VII include an “individual’s transgender status or the individual’s intent to transition,” “gender identity,” and “sexual orientation.”

The EEOC guidance also went further, stating that “using a name or pronoun inconsistent with the individual’s gender identity in a persistent or offensive manner” is sex-based harassment.  It is clear, therefore, that non-binary individuals must be afforded protections regarding their gender identity.  However, the EEO-1 report, which requires employers with over 100 employees to submit data specific to their employees’ gender and race/ethnicity, limits the gender categories to either male or female.  Employers with non-binary employees therefore have had no category to indicate the correct gender identity of these individuals, and several questioned whether it was appropriate (or even legally compliant) to request that non-binary employees choose a marker for which they do not identify.

Last month, the EEOC offered guidance by updating its Frequently Asked Questions to address this issue.  In the FAQ, the EEOC advises that employers “may report employee counts and labor hours for non-binary gender employees by job category and pay band and racial group in the comment box on the Certification Page,” and further provides examples as to how employers may comply with submitting the EEOC-required data in the future for those employees who identify as non-binary.

While describing these details in a comment box as opposed to checking a pre-marked gender identity box is not as streamlined or efficient as some employers would have hoped, it is at least a step toward ensuring that employers have a means to comply with reporting requirements and support their employees by acknowledging the gender identity of their choice.

© 2019 Foley & Lardner LLP

For more on diversity in the workplace, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Finally, the Final Part 541 Rule: $35,568 Is the New Salary Threshold for Exempt Employees

In its final part 541 overtime rule, the U.S. Department of Labor’s (DOL) Wage and Hour Division (WHD) set the salary level or amount test at $684 per week/$35,568 per year for exempt executive, administrative, and professional employees of section 13(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The total annual compensation test for a highly compensated employee is $107,432. The standard salary level test of $684 is comparable to the amount proposed earlier this year since the WHD used the same methodology as it applied in the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). The total annual compensation level for highly compensated employees of $107,432 is lower than that proposed earlier this year in its NPRM because it is based on the 80th percentile of weekly earnings of full-time salaried employees nationally.

According to the DOL, which released the final rule on September 24, 2019, this final part 541 overtime rule “has been submitted to the Office of the Federal Register (OFR) for publication, and is currently pending placement on public inspection at the OFR and publication in the Federal Register.” These new thresholds for exemption from both the overtime and minimum wage provisions of the FLSA go into effect on January 1, 2020.

This final rule is the culmination of a long-term effort to increase these salary and total annual compensation requirements—set forth in part 541 of title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations—which were last increased in 2004. These regulations define and delimit the exemptions for bona fide executive, administrative, and professional employees. As we wrote previously, the DOL/WHD published a notice of proposed rulemaking in March 2019, with a 60-day comment period that expired on May 21, 2019. After its review of the comments, the DOL submitted its draft final rule to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of the Office of Management and Budget on August 12, 2019. OIRA completed its review of the final overtime rule and returned it to the DOL on September 13, 2019.

In addition to finalizing the salary amount test for exempt employees and the total annual compensation requirement for highly compensated employees, the final rule also permits employers to apply non-discretionary bonus and other incentive payments to satisfy up to 10 percent of the standard salary level, provided such non-discretionary payments are paid at least annually or more frequently. Also in keeping with its proposed rule, the final overtime rule does not include a provision that automatically would increase the salary level test or total annual compensation amount on some regular or periodic basis. Most significantly, the final overtime (part 541) rule does not make any changes to any of the duties tests for these exemptions.

As you may recall in 2016, employer-aligned interests brought suit to challenge the final overtime rule issued during the final year of the Obama administration. The litigation was successful, and the 2016 final rule was enjoined by a federal district court in Texas and has never gone into effect. The 2019 final part 541 rule formally rescinds the 2016 final rule. At this juncture, it is difficult to predict whether employee advocates will mount a similar legal challenge to this rulemaking. While several have expressed interest in doing so, almost all of these advocates argue that the salary level test in the 2019 final rule is insufficient. Instead, they support a salary level requirement along the lines of that published in the 2016 rulemaking that set the salary level test at $913 per week/$47,476 per year for exempt executive, administrative, and professional employees..

© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more DOL regulation, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment Law page.

FTC Attorney on Endorsement Guide Compliance

Influencer marketing and review websites have attracted a great deal of attention recently by states and federal regulatory agencies, including the FTC.  The FTC’s Endorsement Guides addresses the application of Section 5 of the FTC Act to the use of endorsements and testimonials in advertising.

At their core, the FTC Endorsement Guides (the “Guides”) reflect the basic truth-in-advertising principle that endorsements must be honest and not misleading.  The Guides suggest several best practices, including, but not limited to the following:

  1. Influencers must be legitimate and bona fide users, and endorsements must reflect honest opinions.
  2. Endorsers cannot make claims about a product that would require proof the advertiser does not have.  Blogger and brands are potentially subject to liability for claims with no reasonable basis therefor.
  3. Clearly and conspicuously disclose material connections between advertisers and endorsers (e.g., a financial or family relationship with a brand)
  4. To make a disclosure “clear and conspicuous,” advertisers should use plain and unambiguous language and make the disclosure stand out.  Consumers should be able to notice the disclosure easily.  They should not have to look for it.  Generally speaking, disclosures should be close to the claims to which they relate; in a font that is easy to read; in a shade that stands out against the background; for video ads, on the screen long enough to be noticed, read, and understood; and for audio disclosures, read at a cadence that is easy for consumers to follow and in words consumers will understand.
  5. Never assume that a social media platform’s disclosure tool is sufficient.  Some platforms’ disclosure tools are insufficient.  Placement is key.
  6. Avoid ambiguous disclosures like #thanks, #collab, #sp, #spon or #ambassador.  Clarity is crucial.  Material connection disclosures must be clear and unmistakable.
  7. Do not rely on a disclosure placed after a CLICK MORE link or in another easy-to-miss location.
  8. Advertisers that use bloggers and other social media influencers to promote products are responsible for implementing reasonable training, monitoring and compliance programs (e.g., educating members about claim substantiation requirements and disclosing material connections, searching for what people are saying and taking remedial action).
  9. Statements like “Results not typical” or “Individual results may vary” are likely to be interpreted to mean that the endorser’s experience reflects what others can also expect.  Therefore, advertisers must have adequate proof to back up the claim that the results shown in the ad are typical, or clearly and conspicuously disclose the generally expected performance in the circumstances shown in the ad.
  10. Brands can ask customers about their experiences and feature their comments in ads.  If they have no reason to expect compensation or any other benefit before they give their comments, consult with an FTC CID and defense attorney to assess whether a disclosure is necessary.  If customers have been provided with a reason to expect a benefit from providing their thoughts about a product, a disclosure is probably necessary.

What about affiliate marketers with links to online retailers on their websites that get compensated for clicks or purchases?  According the FTC, the material relationship to the brand  must be clearly and conspicuously so that readers will be able to decide how much weight to give the endorsement.  In some instances – like when the affiliate link is embedded in a product review – a single disclosure may be adequate.

When the review has a clear and conspicuous disclosure of a material relationship and the reader can see both the review containing that disclosure and the link at the same time, readers may have the information they need.  However, if the product review containing the disclosure and the link are separated, readers may not make the connection.

Never put disclosures in obscure places, behind a poorly labeled hyperlink or in a “terms of service” agreement.  That is not enough.  Neither is placing a disclosure below the review or below the link to the online retailer so readers would have to keep scrolling after they finish reading.

Consumers should be able to notice disclosures easily.

U.S. regulators are not the only ones policing influencer disclosures.  In fact, the Competition and Markets Authority, the British government agency that regulates advertising, recently sent numerous warning letters to British celebrities and other social media influencers.  The CMA has also recently released its guidelines for influencers.

The FTC has already demonstrated that it monitors accounts of popular influencers.  It has also demonstrated that it can and will initiate investigations and enforcement actions.  Brands are well-advised to review promotional practices, implement written policies and monitoring protocols.

© 2019 Hinch Newman LLP

For more on influencers, endorsement & advertising, see the National Law Review Communications, Media & Internet law page.

Changing Course: “Contract Coverage” is the New Standard for Unilateral Action

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) departed from precedent last week when it addressed whether an employer’s unilateral action under a collective bargaining agreement was lawful.

The case in question – M.V. Transportation, Inc. and Amalgamated Transit Union Local #1637, AFL–CIO, CLC., Case 28– CA–173726 – concerned what standard the Board should apply to determine whether a collective bargaining agreement grants an employer the right to take certain unilateral actions, without further bargaining with the union. Under prior case law, the Board had applied the “clear and unmistakable waiver” standard, under which the employer would be found to have violated the Act unless a provision of the collective bargaining agreement specifically refers to the type of employer decision at issue, or mentions the kind of factual situation that the case presents.

In M.V. Transportation, the Board noted that several appeals courts have rejected the “clear and unmistakable waiver” standard in favor of a “contract coverage” standard, including, importantly, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which, by statute, has full jurisdiction to review NLRB decisions.  Under the “contract coverage” standard, the decision-maker must examine the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement to determine whether the action taken by an employer was within the “compass or scope of contractual language granting the employer the right to act unilaterally. The Board cited the example of a collective bargaining agreement that broadly grants the employer the right to implement new rules and policies and to revise existing ones, noting that under such circumstances, an employer would not violate the law by unilaterally implementing new attendance or safety rules or by revising existing disciplinary or off-duty-access policies.

While the Board did choose to adopt the “contract coverage” standard, it did not totally abandon the “waiver” concept. It warned that if an agreement does not clearly cover the employer’s disputed act, and that act has materially, substantially and significantly changed a term or condition of employment constituting a mandatory subject of bargaining, the employer will have violated the law unless it demonstrates that the union clearly and unmistakably waived its right to bargain over the change, or that its unilateral action was privileged for some other reason.

In a move that is becoming more common in NLRB cases, the Board also decided to apply the new standard retroactively in all pending unilateral change cases where the determination of whether the employer violated the law turned on whether contractual language granted the employer the right to make the change in question.

Under the new standard, employers should take care in collective bargaining to make sure that the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement supports any unilateral action that the employer wants to reserve the right to take. The language should be clearly written and explicit in its grant of authority, and its meaning should be clear when applying ordinary principles of contract interpretation. By doing that, the employer can assure that its unilateral action does not violate the law or the agreement.

Copyright © 2019 Godfrey & Kahn S.C.

New York Times v. Sullivan Supreme Court Decision and its Impact on Libel Law: the Case, the Context and the Consequences

Aimee Edmondson, Ph.D. and Associate Professor and Director for Graduate Studies at Ohio University, has recently published a new book, In Sullivan’s Shadow on the landmark libel US Supreme Court case New York Times v. Sullivan. In the current contentious climate where even the weather has become a political topic, and with President Trump courting a combative relationship with the news media, this case from the Civil Rights Era (1964) has a new resonance. It seems appropriate to re-examine the case, the historical context surrounding it, and why it still matters today.

The following are the facts of this case. In the early ’60s, the New York Times (NYT) published a full-page advertisement by the supporters of Martin Luther King, Jr, criticizing the Montgomery Alabama police, and specifically L.B. Sullivan, the Montgomery Police commissioner, for the department’s mistreatment of Civil Rights protesters. Sullivan sued the paper for defamation, and the trial court ruled in his favor. The NYT appealed to the Supreme Court in Alabama, which affirmed, and then the NYT appealed to the U.S Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court heard the case and returned a unanimous decision 9-0, that the underlying decisions violated the First Amendment. This 1964 Supreme Court landmark decision is foundational in support of the First Amendment’s right of freedom of the press and ultimately demonstrates that the freedom of speech protections in the First Amendment restrict the ability of public officials to sue for defamation. This decision also created the “actual malice” standard, which required that the publication of false or erroneous information had to be done with actual intent to harm the public figure.

Libel litigation has really kicked up in recent years. While the “actual malice” standard is still firmly in place, a few high-profile libel actions have pressed forward. A few examples are the following: Sarah Palin suing the NYT; the Covington Catholic students, specifically Nicholas Sandmann and his ultimately dismissed lawsuit against the Washington Post (WP); and former Sheriff Joseph Arpaio’s lawsuit against the NYT and editorial writer Michelle Cottle which was also dismissed. Additionally, Trump frequently uses his Twitter feed to proclaim that libel suits “are out of reach” but continues to threaten libel action when unflattering press is published. To be clear, his threats have remained threats; to this date, he has not filed lawsuits regarding libel.

With this history and cultural context in mind, I am very grateful that Professor Edmondson took the time to speak with me regarding the state of libel litigation in the United States.

The NLR: The Sullivan case dates back to the ’60s and came out of the Civil Rights Movement when the NYT was sued by the Montgomery, Alabama police commissioner, L.B. Sullivan. Why is this precedent especially relevant now?

Sullivan is relevant for at least these three reasons.

First, journalism faces tough challenges. Local print journalism is withering. The president of the United States has launched an assault on news media. And manipulators, some of them foreign, are abusing technology with fakery and confusion. As the free press struggles, our Republic is well served by existing protection again libel abuse.

Second, we as a nation go to great lengths to protect free speech, even unpopular and hateful expression. The Supreme Court recently ruled that the government could not deny vulgar trademarks citing the First Amendment (Iancu v. Brunetti, decided June 24, 2019). Citizens who chant “send her back” at a Trump rally are protected. Journalists who cover controversy likewise should be protected from libel abuse.

When the nation’s Founders gathered to amend the Constitution through the Bill of Rights, they positioned freedom of speech and the free press side-by-side, as complementary. As we protect free speech, we also should protect the free press.

Third, the abuse of libel is an instinctive default position of authority facing criticism. When authority is irritated by the message, it can seek ways to injure or chill the messenger. America should guard against abuse of libel. Justice William Brennan wrote in the 1964 landmark Sullivan case that, left unchecked, abuse of libel can “threaten the very existence of an American press virile enough to publish unpopular views on public affairs and bold enough to criticize the conduct of public officials.”

In this era of divided citizenry, profound technological changes, and nervousness about the future, Sullivan is perhaps more relevant because it checks the misuse of libel.

The NLR:  Based on your research of libel prior to Sullivan, what can you tell us about the use and abuse of libel before Sullivan?

In the Jim Crow South, libel was weaponized against the press and individuals who challenged the racial status quo. The Sullivan case was the culmination of an onslaught of libel claims designed to brake progress, silence criticism, and bankrupt agents of change as the civil rights movement was gaining momentum.

The intersection of libel, race, and journalism can be tracked to the early years of our nation. In 1830, abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison was indicted in Baltimore for publishing a newspaper report of 75 enslaved people shipped from Baltimore to New Orleans. He was locked up for 49 days in part for criticizing the institution of slavery. Garrison’s lawyer, Charles Mitchell of Baltimore, described libel abuse as an “engine of tyranny.”

My book primarily focuses on civil rights-era libel litigation, mainly, but not exclusively, in the South. Chapter One is set in Los Angeles. The local Klan sued the African American editor-publisher of the California Eagle in 1925 after the newspaper published a Klan strategy memo on how to manipulate black voters in Watts. The judge ruled in favor of the paper, concluding that the Klan document, which had been handed over to police and then to journalists, was privileged. (In court, the Klan said the paper was fake.)

The win-loss record of libel cases was mixed before Sullivan was taken up by the nation’s high court. Defendants settled some cases to avoid expense and exposure. Some judges ruled that truth was a defense against libel claims.

Regardless of the legal outcomes, the pile-on of libel lawsuits against the press and civil rights leaders was draining financially. For example, Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth was a named defendant in the Sullivan case, even though he didn’t know that his name appeared in the full-page ad in NYT that prompted Sullivan’s lawsuit. Alabama courts awarded Commissioner Sullivan $500,000, a record-high judgment at the time. While the case was on appeal, authorities seized Reverend Shuttlesworth’s Plymouth, which brought $400 at auction to help pay the judgment. Land owned by three other ministers who also were defendants was sold at auction for $4,350.

By the time the U.S. Supreme Court heard the Sullivan case, there was plenty of evidence in multiple jurisdictions showing that libel abuse was weighing on the First Amendment.

The NLR: After the Sullivan ruling in 1964, the press went on to break some fairly fantastic stories. I am thinking about Watergate, in the early ’70s, specifically. What were the implications of Sullivan regarding press coverage of civil rights, Vietnam, Watergate, and other contentious news?

Yes. My colleague Christopher B. Daly at Boston University (author of “Covering America”) makes the profound point that Americans need a free and robust press in wartime and peacetime. He cites coverage of the Pentagon Papers, the My Lai Massacre, and the Abu Ghraib torture scandal.

I close my book by pointing out that Sullivan freed the press to ramp up its watchdog reporting on a wide range of issues. The press’ scrutiny must continue as a cornerstone of our democratic tradition.

Balancing police authority/public safety with respect for individual freedoms and free expression was at the core of much of the libel litigation before and after Sullivan. The Sullivan case at its heart was about criticism of police brutality against civil rights protesters in Montgomery, Alabama, which was a cradle of the Confederacy during the Civil War. As a result of Sullivan, today’s public criticism of law enforcement, such as press coverage of  “Hands up, don’t shoot,” and “I can’t breathe” are not actionable libel claims.

The NLR: Earlier this year, Justice Clarence Thomas suggested that the Supreme Court should take a look at Sullivan, after 55 years, to modify the standard on actual malice. The rest of the Court did not voice similar sentiments. What point is Justice Thomas making/what is on his mind, and do you think the Court will revisit libel anytime soon?

Justice Thomas often treads his own path in the area of First Amendment law. He is a noted defender of advertising (commercial speech), questioning why it should be more heavily regulated than other types of speech, even political speech. He has questioned laws that regulate political contributions, and strongly supported less government regulation of street and lawn signs. However, he has opposed free speech protections for high school students and prisoners.

I see Sullivan as a civil rights case as well as a libel case. How ironic that Justice Thomas, the only African-American on the Supreme Court, is calling for a retreat on civil rights-era protections in Sullivan. He made this remark in a concurring opinion released early this year when the court turned down an appeal from Kathrine McKee, who accused Bill Cosby of sexual assault. She sued Cosby for libel after his lawyers called her dishonest (McKee v. Cosby). As Justice Thomas says:

New York Times and the Court’s decisions extending it were policy-driven decisions masquerading as constitutional law. Instead of simply applying the First Amendment as it was understood by the people who ratified it, the Court fashioned its own “‘federal rule[s]’” by balancing the “competing values at stake in defamation suits.” (quoting Gertz v. Welch and Sullivan). We should not continue to reflexively apply this policy-driven approach to the Constitution. Instead, we should carefully examine the original meaning of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. If the Constitution does not require public figures to satisfy an actual-malice standard in state-law defamation suits, then neither should we.

As you noted in your question, Thomas’ colleagues on the Supreme Court have not publicly joined his push to roll back Sullivan. I do not expect that Court will revisit Sullivan immediately. But predicting what the Court will do is virtually impossible. Sometimes, the seeds planted by a single justice, like Thomas’ remarks about Sullivan, yield results later.

Generally, critics say Sullivan stacks the deck against the plaintiff, that actual malice is an impossible standard, and the press should not have license to run amuck.

The NLR: Sullivan set the standard pretty high for public officials seeking to win libel claims, they have to show “actual malice.” Does this, and other existing protections of the press, make it virtually impossible to win a libel claim?

Journalists are not totally protected from libel suits, nor should they be. Truth is the ultimate defense in a libel suit. If reporters get it wrong, certainly there can be ramifications.

If reporters get it wrong and the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, the reporters may lose a libel case if actual malice is proven in court. Actual malice is publishing content that is knowingly wrong, or journalists should have known it was incorrect.

After a 15-day trial, a jury in New York awarded $75,000 in damages to Barry Goldwater, the Republican nominee for president in 1964 (Goldwater v. Ginzburg). A federal appeals court affirmed the outcome in 1969, and the Supreme Court declined to review the case. Ralph Ginzburg, publisher of Fact magazine, ran an article that said Goldwater was paranoid, unfit for office, and troubled by “intense anxiety about his manhood.” This unflattering claim was based on a survey mailed to psychiatrists. Some of the respondents had warned that psychological evaluations must take place in clinical settings, but Ginzburg published anyway. He cited the Sullivan case when Goldwater took him to court, to no avail.

Rolling Stone settled multiple libel claims after retracting its 2014 story of gang rape at a University of Virginia fraternity. The flawed 9,000-word article portrayed an associate dean as “chief villain” of the incident. She won a $3 million verdict in court and then settled. Rolling Stone settled with the fraternity for $1.65 million, and also settled with members of the fraternity.

In June, a jury in Ohio awarded $44.4 million in punitive and compensatory damages to family-owned Gibson’s Bakery to be paid by Oberlin College (Gibson’s Bakery v. Oberlin College). Bakery owners said the college defamed and harmed their business after a shoplifting incident. “Even a college as influential as Oberlin,” noted conservative blogger Cornell Law Professor William Jacobson, “may be held accountable for its actions in a court of law.”

The NLR: What has candidate Donald Trump/President Trump said about libel?

In 2016 in Fort Worth, Texas, then-candidate Trump took aim at libel laws directly: “One of the things I’m going to do if I win, and I hope we do and we’re certainly leading. I’m going to open up our libel laws so when they write purposely negative and horrible and false articles, we can sue them and win lots of money. We’re going to open up those libel laws. So when The New York Times and Washington Post . . . writes a hit piece, we can sue them and win money instead of having no chance of winning because they are totally protected.”

President Trump lamented in 2018 that “totally false” reports are out of reach of libel law:

Trump Tweet

Trump has threatened libel action against both the media and individuals. For example, candidate Trump threatened to sue NYT in 2016 after NYT’S publication containing claims by women of his alleged inappropriate touching. In response, a NYT attorney said if Trump thinks “the law of this land forces us and those who would dare to criticize him to stand silent or be punished, we welcome the opportunity to have a court set him straight.”

Trump did not sue.

Threatening libel action is part of Trump’s broader effort, aimed at his voter base and the electorate, to de-legitimize the press.

The NLR: Defamation-libel litigation is very active lately. What are today’s courts saying about libel?

Legal outcomes vary because circumstances vary. There is significant activity on libel, in state and federal courts, showcasing the durability of the legal standard set more than a half-century ago in Sullivan.

The Sullivan standard resonates throughout the 11-page opinion dismissing former Sheriff Joseph Arpaio’s lawsuit against NYT and editorial writer Michelle Cottle. “Because plaintiff has failed to plead actual malice, his false light claim must fail as well,” wrote US District Court Judge Amit P. Mehta (District of Columbia) in a decision issued August 9, 2019. Arpaio was longtime sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona, before running for Congress in 2018. After Arpaio lost in the primary, NYT published an opinion piece by Cottle criticizing the sheriff’s treatment of immigrants (“he was so much more than a run-of-the-mill immigrant basher”). Arpaio, a public figure, claimed the column harmed his reputation and his chances to run for the U.S. Senate in 2020. The judge said Arpaio’s complaint “comes nowhere close to pleading sufficient facts that plausible establish ‘actual malice.’” (Arpaio v Cottle, August 9, 2019). This case is remarkably similar to the multiple libel suits filed by legendary southern lawman Lawrence Rainey, a former Neshoba County, Mississippi sheriff who sued multiple journalists and even Orion Pictures for his depiction in the film, Mississippi Burning, in 1989.

Current libel claims highlight the inflation in the amount of damages sought by plaintiffs. In the early 1960s, Sullivan (as well as then Alabama Governor John Patterson) sued NYT for $500,000. In 1982, General William Westmoreland sued CBS for $120 million regarding a Vietnam documentary (Westmoreland settled during the trial, ending the case without payment, retraction, or apology from CBS).

This year, a high school student from Kentucky sued WP for $250 million, the purchase price of the newspaper when Amazon founder Jeff Bezos bought it in 2013. On July 26, U.S. District Court Judge William O. Bertelsman (Eastern District of Kentucky) dismissed the case (Nicholas Sandmann v. The Washington Post). Publication of opinion is not actionable libel, the judge concluded. This case involved coverage of Sandmann’s encounter with Native American activist Nathan Phillips on the National Mall on January 19, 2019.

“The Court accepts Sandmann’s statement that, when he was standing motionless in the confrontation with Phillips, his intent was to calm the situation and to not impede or block anyone”, the judge said. “However, Phillips did not see it that way. He concluded that he was being ‘blocked’ and not allowed to ‘retreat.’ He passed these conclusions on to The Post. They may have been erroneous, but . . . they are opinion protected by the First Amendment. The Post is not liable for publishing these opinions.”

Days after the Sandmann case was dismissed in federal court, eight of Sandmann’s classmates (“John Does 1 through 8”) from Covington Catholic High School in Park Hills, Kentucky, filed a defamation suit in state court against 12 individuals. Defendants include two members of Congress, comic Kathy Griffin, and a batch of commentators and journalists.

Also, in August, a federal appeals court reinstated Sarah Palin’s defamation suit against NYT. Therefore, a court will consider whether a NYT editorial on gun violence exhibited “actual malice” against Palin, a former vice presidential candidate.

The NLR: You’ve raised some excellent points. How does all of this fit together?  What are we to make of this landscape in today’s contentious and media-saturated environment?

Truth-seeking is a primary mission of journalism. News reporting inspires debate. Reporting controversy does not constitute libel. Publication of malicious, reckless, falsehood is actionable libel.

Newsgathering is an ongoing process, as events evolve. Courts appear to understand this dynamic, with the media’s constant deadlines, and do not view updating as a story evolves as actual malice. It’s quite the opposite. We write what we know to be the truth as we know it.

It’s important to note that Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Sullivan protected even false information, as long as that information was published by accident (without actual malice). Later libel cases built on Sullivan with the U.S. Supreme Court declaring that “pure opinion” is also constitutionally protected speech (Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Company). The First Amendment, then, ensures that free speech isn’t “chilled” and thus clears the way for journalists to write about fast-moving and-or controversial issues without fear of costly libel litigation.

As we ponder the big picture, let’s remember Justice Louis Brandeis’ time-honored advice: “the answer to bad speech is more speech, not ‘enforced silence.’”

The NLR: Many thanks to Dr. Edmondson for her insights and useful examples on this important and timely matter.

Copyright ©2019 National Law Forum, LLC

For more freedom of speech issues, see the Constitutional Law page on the National Law Review.

House Vote on Cannabis Industry-Related SAFE Banking Act Scheduled for September 2019

As early as September 23, 2019, the United States House of Representatives is expected to vote on the widely anticipated Secure and Fair Enforcement (SAFE) Banking Act. First introduced in both chambers of Congress in 2017, re-introduced in the House in March of 2019, and amended this past June, the SAFE Banking Act has garnered bipartisan support as a necessary solution to the dilemma created by conflicting federal and state cannabis law regimes, particularly as it relates to financial service providers.

According to a press release issued by the House Committee on Financial Services on March 26, 2019, committee chairwoman, Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA), remarked, the SAFE Banking Act “addresses an urgent public safety concern for legitimate businesses that currently have no recourse but to operate with just cash.” The Act joins the ranks of congressional efforts such as the Rohrabacher-Farr amendment to omnibus spending bills, Section 728 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2019, the pending Blumenauer amendment, and proposed Strengthening the Tenth Amendment Through Entrusting States (STATES) Act—all of which seek to reconcile the federal government’s failure to enact comprehensive marijuana and, until recently, hemp policy despite widespread support on the state and local level. Status in the Senate is uncertain, as the chair of the Banking Committee has indicated an intent to poll those in Idaho, a state that has failed to legalize any form of cannabis, regarding the issue.

Today’s cannabis industry encompasses the growth, processing, distribution, and other ancillary services related to both hemp and marijuana. While hemp and marijuana are both derived from the plant Cannabis sativa L, they are legally distinguished on both a federal and state level by their THC content. As a result, marijuana remains a controlled substance under federal law, while hemp, boasting lower THC levels, is classified as an agricultural product within the purview of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). This federal distinction, however, has not prevented more than 40 states from legalizing marijuana for medical and/or recreational adult use. Unfortunately, the businesses that choose to take advantage of such progressive state marijuana laws must do so without the support of traditional financial institutions that businesses, particularly minority and women-owned, rely on to fund and protect their financial growth.

According to §4(a) of the bill’s text, the SAFE Banking Act will shield depository institutions that serve cannabis-related businesses from federal penalties in states and Indian country where “cultivation, production, manufacture, sale, transportation, display, dispensing, distribution, or purchase” of cannabis is legal. In particular, the Act will prohibit regulators from terminating or limiting deposit or share insurance of financial instruments because an institution’s client participates directly or indirectly in the cannabis industry. Regulators will also be prohibited from penalizing institutions for authorizing, processing, clearing, settling, billing, transferring, reconciling, or collecting payments for a legitimate cannabis-related business for payments made by any means, including a credit, debit, or other payment card, an account, check, or electronic funds transfer. Perhaps, most importantly, the Act will also require the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) to develop uniform guidance and examination procedures for depository institutions serving cannabis-related businesses.

For financial institutions and insurance providers operating in states where cannabis is legal, this creates an immense opportunity and incentive to assist industry participants as they strive to protect and invest their monetary assets without putting the institutions they rely on at risk of federal prosecution. However, because protections under the SAFE Banking Act only apply when legitimate cannabis-related businesses are involved, monitoring clients’ compliance with relevant state laws will be particularly important. In the absence of clear federal marijuana policy and official hemp regulations under the 2018 Farm Bill, in addition to constantly evolving state laws and regulations, this may prove especially challenging. As such, in anticipation of the Act’s passage, financial institutions should enlist the support of experienced legal counsel to ensure the necessary processes for monitoring clients’ compliance are in place. In addition, those seeking to benefit under the Act should still pay close attention to due diligence requirements promulgated by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), although many concerns should be alleviated by the Act’s prohibition on civil or criminal prosecution solely based on the provision of financial services or investing income derived from such services.

NOTE: Cannabis as defined under the Act only references marijuana. However, in practice, the bill’s passage should alleviate apprehension surrounding hemp, as many financial institutions and their affiliates have refrained from offering services to hemp businesses under the current financial legal framework, even in the wake of the 2018 Farm Bill and pending USDA regulations.

Read the bill’s text here.

© 2019 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.

This article was written by Jennifer K. Mason, Michael G. Dailey and Ambur C. Smith of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP.
For more marijuana & cannabis legislation, see the National Law Review Biotech, Food & Drug law page.