DHS Expands Use of Biometric Data in Immigration

Last week, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) announced plans to expand the use of biometric data in determining family relationships for immigration purposes. A proposed rule with the new protocols for biometrics use is expected to be published soon. This rule is also said to allow more uses of new technology as they become available.

The Use of Biometric Data in Immigration

The proposed rule will give the DHS the authority to require biometrics use for every application, petition, or related immigration matter. The current practice by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires biometrics only for applications that require background checks. This new rule is intended to give the DHS broad authority to use biometrics technology. The DHS can use voiceprints, iris scans, palm prints, and facial photos, as well as additional technologies developed in the future.

“As those technologies become available and can be incorporated as appropriate, it gives the agency the flexibility to utilize them. And then it also would give the agency the authority down the road, as new technologies become available and are reliable, secure, etc., to pivot to using those, as well,” said one USCIS official. And while children under age 14 are now generally exempt from the collection of biometric data, the proposed rule will also remove the age restriction.

DNA can be collected by the agency to verify a genetic relationship where establishing a genetic or familial relationship is a prima facie requirement of receiving an immigration benefit. Though the raw DNA will not be stored by the DHS, the test results will be saved in the immigrant’s Alien file, also known as the “A-file.” The A-file is the official file that the DHS maintains with all of the immigrant’s immigration and naturalization records. Any such information collected may be shared with law enforcement, but there is no procedural change in other agencies gaining access to the A-files.

Reactions From Immigration Leaders

The additional collection of biometric data will not result in an increase in existing filing fees, as the cost is covered under new filing fees set to go effect October 2, 2020. The DHS has emphasized that the biometrics rule is to be given top priority; nevertheless, it will undergo the standard review process.

This proposed rule quickly drew severe criticism from pro-immigration activists. Andrea Flores from the American Civil Liberties Union called it an “unprecedented” collection of personal information from immigrants and U.S. citizens. She said, “collecting a massive database of genetic blueprints won’t make us safer – it will simply make it easier for the government to surveil and target our communities and to bring us closer to a dystopian nightmare.”

DHS Acting Deputy Secretary Ken Cuccinelli welcomed the rule, stating that “leveraging readily available technology to verify the identity of an individual we are screening is responsible governing.” He added that “the collection of biometric information also guards against identity theft and thwarts fraudsters who are not who they claim to be.”


©2020 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved
For more articles on DHS, visit the National Law Review Immigration section.

App Developer Chronicles His Saga With Apple’s ‘Anti-Competitive’ App Store

In January 2018 Apple investors complained publicly about the lack of parental controls on their popular devices. At one point even CEO Tim Cook expressed concern about the addictive nature of social media. Vancouver-based app entrepreneur Justin Payeur saw this as validation for the Boomerang Parental Control app he was developing.

What is really needed, apparently, is an app to move apps through the Apple Store app approval process. Reasons for rejecting and requiring changes to the app were numerous, varied, changing, and frustrating. The whole ordeal can drag out for years. That was Payeur’s experience as he chronicled it in an open letter on the Boomerang blog, complete with the text of email exchanges with the Apple app review team and emails to Tim Cook. The most consistent bone Apple picked with the app was that private consumer data could be shared or compromised. Developers aren’t so sure about that. Apple also didn’t like an app that controlled or shut off Apple’s own apps, like Safari, based on parents’ settings.

In June 2018 Payeur was first told that the app didn’t comply with one or more of the App Review Guidelines. He was informed that more time was needed for review and that the use of Mobile Device Management (MDM) was no longer allowed. After some fixes, he was told via message that the app still installed MDM profiles for unapproved purposes. “Specifically, your app blocks or restricts access to third-party apps using MDM,” Apple said. Payeur appealed and was again rejected because, he was told, installing MDM profiles for parental controls was not appropriate for the App Store: “Apps may only use public APIs and must run on the currently shipping OS.”

Payeur continued to log his ping-pong journey with Apple that continued through 2019. During that time Apple requested more information and more time to review. Apple offered vague new reasons for rejecting versions of the app, e.g. “false information and features.” and also cited improper mention of Android because that violates Apple’s metadata guidelines.

‘The timing was suspect’

“We did not use any private APIs or any framework in unintended uses,” Payeur wrote in his January 2020 open letter. “So our internal conclusion … was simple: Apple wanted us out of the App Store …” He said the timing was suspect; Apple was about to launch iOS 12 with screen time controls.

Abandoning development of the app for child devices, Boomerang focused on the parent mode because many of its customers were parents with iPhones and kids with Androids, or the other way around. Revenues for the app tanked and users didn’t like it.

Then the press lit a fire.

In December 2018 it was a TechCrunch piece about the challenges facing third-party developers of iOS parental control apps. In April 2019 the New York Times wrote about Apple’s anti-competitive approach to these apps, to which Apple responded that several of the rejected apps posed privacy risks. Payeur found other developers experienced the same treatment from Apple.

One of those developers was OurPact, a competitor to Boomerang in the parental control app arena. In an article published on Medium.com in May 2019, OurPact also detailed its interactions with Apple, which were very similar to what Boomerang experienced. OurPact also was met with Apple’s alleged privacy concerns. OurPact was unconvinced. According to the developer, Apple stated that “its own MDM technology, used by millions, poses risks to user privacy and can be abused by hackers. This stands in contradiction to the fact that MDM technology was initially developed by Apple to ensure security of private data on remotely managed devices.”

“Apple alone issues certificates to third parties to communicate with their MDM servers, and Apple themselves are responsible for sending all MDM commands to user devices.” OurPact went on to say, “OurPact does not have access to any of this private information via MDM. It is impossible for us, hackers, or anybody else to obtain it. Apple is the only one who has access to and uses this data.”

In June 2019 Boomerang was invited to re-submit its parental control app and was told there was a new Mobile Device Management Capability form to complete. The updated app was approved with MDM, but before it was released Apple again said the app violated the rules. This time it was because the app contained Google Analytics, which could grab sensitive data, Apple maintained.

“This was false,” Payeur said. He fixed the app, pushed the update, then was told the app was in violation for using Google Firebase, which Apple again said risked disclosure of sensitive information. After more back and forth and more waiting, his appeal was rejected. When he removed any analytics, Boomerang Parental Control was approved in October 2019.

Are you sensing a pattern?

However, Apple changed its policies yet again, saying the app was not permitted to block Safari and the App Store itself. Apple was requiring “supervised mode” used by governments and large organizations, but the app timed out these applications based on parental controls, or when parents wanted the only browser on their kids’ phones to be the SPIN Safe Brower. The Boomerang app no longer has these features.

Today, Payeur says that parents are not aware that iOS includes screen time features because it’s buried in the device settings. Parents still have a mix of devices in their families, of course.

“Apple has shown that they will change their minds if there is negative press about them. These are some of the reasons why we continue to recommend Android devices for your kids first smartphone (and you can still control them from your iPhone!). … Any way you slice it, Apple continues to be anti-competitive,” Payeur wrote.

You might think it would be unwise for the owner of a small business to come out so vehemently against such a dominant player. So many developers count on their Apple relationship and the broad distribution it offers through its monopoly on apps on Apple devices to generate revenue. When it comes to Payeur, he told the MoginRubin Blog that he figures he has little to lose since he has turned his attention to Android and only updates his existing Apple apps.

“They neutered our app through all their guideline changes,” he said. “And people (parents) are unhappy that they can’t access on their iPhones the same or similar features that we offer on Android.”

“There are a lot of app developers and they are not multi-million businesses,” Payeur told us. “We provide these apps to do good. That was the biggest frustration. Apple labeled us as bad players with their user privacy angle. That rubbed me the wrong way. At no point did we create our service to [mine and sell user data]. We used Apple’s own technology, not ours, that’s used across the world. We got creative to create parental controls. They weren’t being up front.”

‘One of the most beloved companies in the world.’

The people at OurPact also addressed the David and Goliath nature of the playing field. They said they respect Apple as “one of the most beloved companies in the world,” but they “made a mistake” and “sometimes truth has to be spoken to power,” OurPact wrote. “Given that there are no privacy issues with properly vetted MDM apps like OurPact being on the App Store, we humbly request that we are reinstated and allowed to continue providing our million users with the service they love and depend on. If Apple truly believes that parents should have tools to manage their children’s device usage, and are committed to providing a competitive, innovative app ecosystem, then they will also provide open APIs for developers to utilize.”

Boomerang and OurPact are part of a group of developers who are calling for a Screen Time API, a cross-platform API that would allow developers to provide apps that monitor and control time spent on devices. “It aims to provide a generic API that can be used for a wide range of use cases, from personal health to remote parental controls to social media monitoring. It also aims to do this in a way that is respectful of the device owners privacy, by not providing more information than is necessary and using the platforms permissions system to access data.” The document they published shows how the API would look for iOS, MacOS and tvOS.

Global concerns.

Apple’s management of its store hasn’t just raised concerns in the U.S.

The European Commission recently began investigating whether Apple is fairly applying its rules. The investigations follow separate complaints by Spotify and by an e-book/audiobook distributor on the impact of the App Store rules on competition in music streaming and e-books/audiobooks. Margrethe Vestager, the EC’s competition policy chief, said, “Apple sets the rules for the distribution of apps to users of iPhones and iPads. It appears that Apple obtained a ‘gatekeeper’ role when it comes to the distribution of apps and content to users of Apple’s popular devices. We need to ensure that Apple’s rules do not distort competition in markets where Apple is competing with other app developers ….”

Even in Russia, not exactly a bastion for ethical behavior, Apple’s conduct came to the attention of the country’s Federal Antimonopoly Service when Russian antivirus software developer Kaspersky complained in March 2019. According to CNET and ZDNet, the Russian regulator last month found Apple abuses its power over iOS apps because iPhone and iPad owners must install them from Apple’s App Story. “Kaspersky alleged that it was forced to remove features like app control and Safari browser blocking from its Safe Kids iOS app to reduce its ability to compete with Apple’s own usage-monitoring Screen Time feature,” CNET reported. The irony of a Russian agency charging anyone with abusing power shouldn’t be lost on anyone.

Back in the USA, The Washington Post published an article last year titled, “How Apple uses its App Store to copy the best ideas.” In it, the paper wrote, “Developers have come to accept that, without warning, Apple can make their work obsolete by announcing a new app or feature that uses or incorporates their ideas. Some apps have simply buckled under the pressure, in some cases shutting down.”

Asked about this article, Payeur told us in an email, “The tough part is that apps are making money. Apple copies them and offers the same or similar functionality for free, built into their platform. It’s tough to compete with ‘good enough.’”

It’s especially tough when you’re developing apps on your own dime and can’t predict the changing rules of the game.

Edited by Tom Hagy for MoginRubin LLP.


© MoginRubin LLP
For more articles on Apple, visit the National Law Review Communications, Media & Internet section.

Tracey Goldvarg joins the National Law Review as Business Development Director

CHICAGO (PRWEB) SEPTEMBER 15, 2020

The National Law Review (NLR), one of the highest volume business law news services in the United States, announced that Tracey Goldvarg joined the company as Business Development Director. Goldvarg brings extensive legal business development and B to B publishing experience from her previous leadership roles at American Lawyer Media (ALM), Today’s General Counsel, and Inside Counsel. Goldvarg’s wealth of knowledge and legal industry know-how will enhance the National Law Review’s initiatives involving various advertising, promotional and other new product offerings.

The National Law Review is a leading source of information for companies and individuals looking for guidance on compliance and regulatory matters. The NLR’s COVID-19 pandemic coverage garnered over 4.3 million readers in both March and April of this year, and the NLR’s pandemic coverage continues following Congressional and Executive directives and local Coronavirus mandates.

Goldvarg joins the National Law Review at an exciting time, when the company is poised for exponential growth as traffic levels to the National Law Review have tripled in the last year.

Jennifer Schaller, Managing Director of the National Law Review:

“We are excited to welcome Tracey to our team. Her depth of experience in the publishing and in the legal and financial services fields is invaluable as we continue to grow and develop new markets, expand coverage in new areas and amplify our product offerings to our clients and in new verticals. Tracey’s upbeat attitude and exceptional commitment to client service is just what we need to keep our momentum going.”

Goldvarg:

“I am thrilled to be joining such a dynamic and nimble organization at such a pivotal time in its growth. I look forward to continuing our on-going collaboration and welcome the opportunity to join a women-owned organization, that values the insights and talents of its team-members and has such high standards of customer service to its clients. Their client retention numbers are unparalleled.”

The NLR is a certified women-owned business enterprise that reports breaking legal news on emerging and on-going business issues ranging from business immigration to the regulatory and operational challenges of the Coronavirus pandemic.

The National Law Review’s U.S based editorial team publishes around the clock and optimizes legal thought leadership for search engine visibility, and for distribution via news syndication partners. The NLR also promotes our published content through their extensive social media network, and to their over 135,000 daily newsletter subscribers.

About the National Law Review: The National Law Review is a daily legal news website with a mission to provide objective, reliable and practical litigation, legislative and administrative legal news and analysis through partnership with law firms, other legal and business organizations and our own staff journalists. The NLR’s online platform was developed by corporate attorneys and is the online descendant of a legal publication tracing its roots back to 1888. With the talents of our own writers and contributing authors, the National Law Review has grown into one of the highest volume business law publications in the U.S., with an average of 2 million visitors each month. Visit us at www.NatLawReview.com.

Contact:

JENNIFER BUECHELE SCHALLER
E. EILENE SPEAR
708-357-3317

ITC to Investigate Supply Chain Challenges of COVID-19 Products

On August 21, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) stated that it will conduct an investigation and prepare a report containing more detailed information on supply chain challenges and constraints for COVID-19-related products, including medical devices, personal protective equipment, and pharmaceuticals. Specifically, ITC’s investigation and report will provide information on:

  • Key U.S. industry sectors producing COVID-19-related goods, including information on U.S. production, employment and trade.
  • Detailed case studies on key products (e.g., N95 respirators, ventilators, vaccines and COVID-19 test kits), particularly products with reported shortages in the first half of 2020 due to supply chain fragility, blockages or barriers.

The case studies will draw upon all available information, including information on key products, the U.S. market and manufacturing industry, and U.S. imports of finished goods and inputs. The case studies will also examine supply chain challenges and constraints, including factors (such as regulatory requirements) that may have inhibited domestic production and foreign trade barriers and restrictions affecting U.S. imports of finished goods or inputs needed for domestic production.

Companies importing COVID-19 products that are currently subject to duties — either based on their tariff classification or pursuant to the Section 301 retaliatory duties against Chinese origin goods — may want to take this opportunity to reiterate the impact those duties have on the U.S. health care industry, production of domestic products, and U.S. consumers. These companies may also want to draw attention to any shortages or inability to procure certain raw materials or finished products domestically. The ITC’s request for comments also presents a renewed opportunity to advocate on the breadth of COVID-19 products that may be outside of the ITC’s initial review. Also, for those companies that submitted Section 301 COVID-19 exclusion requests for products imported from China, this may be another opportunity to advocate that the administration exclude your product from Section 301 duties.

The investigation and report are intended to build on a first investigation by ITC that identified and examined tariffs on products needed to combat COVID-19. The purpose of the first investigation was to assist the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Ways and Means and U.S. Senate Committee on Finance in addressing shortages in the domestic supply chain. The first report was released by the ITC on May 4, 2020.

The final report for the current investigation is scheduled to be completed by December 15, 2020 and will be made available to the public. There will also be a virtual public hearing in connection with the investigation on September 23, 2020. Requests to appear at the public hearing should be filed with the ITC Secretary by September 11, 2020.


© 2020 Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved.
For more articles on trade, visit the National Law Review Antitrust, Mergers, FTC & Unfair Competition News section.

SEC Adopts Expansion of “Accredited Investor” Definition

On August 26, 2020, the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted amendments to Rule 501, Rule 144A and other related rules (the Amendments) to expand the definition of “accredited investor” under the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act). The amendments were adopted largely as proposed and broaden the scope of natural persons and entities that may qualify to participate in private offerings of securities that are exempt from registration under the Securities Act.

In particular, the “accredited investor” designation will now include the following:

  • Natural persons holding certain professional certification and designations. The SEC will periodically issue orders designating those professional certificates, designations or credentials that, when held by a natural person, would qualify such person as an accredited investor. Contemporaneously with the Amendments, the SEC designated holders in good standing of the Series 7, Series 65 and Series 82 licenses as qualifying for accredited investor status. In evaluating additional professional designations for qualifying status, the SEC will consider a non-exhaustive list of attributes established by the Amendments.
  • “Knowledgeable Employees” of private funds as defined under the Investment Company Act, but only with respect to investment in such private fund. A Knowledgeable Employee’s spouse will also be considered an accredited investor with respect to joint investments in the private fund.
  • Certain enumerated entities, including:
    • federal- or state-registered investment advisers and exempt reporting advisers, regardless of the level of assets under management;
    • rural business investment companies (RBICs), as defined in Section 384A of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act;
    • limited liability companies that have total assets in excess of $5 million and were not formed for the purpose of acquiring the securities offered1 ; and
    • any entity with at least $5 million in investments (as defined under the Investment Company Act of 1940) that has not been formed for the purpose of investing in the securities offered, in order to encompass entities such as Indian tribes, foreign entities and local government bodies that were not previously covered by Rule 501.
  • “Family offices” and their “family clients,” each as defined under the Advisers Act, provided the family office has at least $5 million in assets under management, was not formed for the purpose of acquiring the securities offered and was directed to make the investment by a person who has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters such that the family office is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the investments.

The Amendments would also clarify that spousal equivalents can pool finances when determining qualification as an accredited investor and update the definition of “qualified institutional buyer” under the Securities Act to conform with the new accredited investor definition.

The expansion of the accredited investor definition has many implications for asset managers, including updates to offering and subscription documents and questionnaires, consideration of expanded options for funding GP commitments via the expanded pool of knowledgeable employees and affiliated professionals and evaluation of fund-raising opportunities. Commissioners adopted the amendments on a 3-2 vote, with commenters disagreeing with the SEC’s decision not to index the wealth thresholds, which were initially adopted in 1982, for inflation.

The Amendments will go effective 60 days after publication in the Federal Register.

_________________________________________________

1 While Rule 501 did not explicitly include LLCs meeting these requirements prior to the Amendments, the SEC historically has taken the position that such LLCs qualify as accredited investors.


© 2020 Vedder Price
For more SEC news, visit the National Law Review Securities, SEC, & Financial Institution Law News section.

DOL Issues Additional FFCRA Guidance as Schools Reopen

On Aug. 27, 2020, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) issued three new Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) related to the reopening of schools in various formats and employee paid leave eligibility under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA).

The FFCRA requires employers with fewer than 500 employees to provide up to 80 hours of paid leave to employees for certain reasons related to the 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic under the Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act (PSLA) and expands the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to provide employees up to 12 weeks of emergency job-protected leave to care for a child as a result of school or child care closings due to a public health emergency. The recent FAQ address caregiver leave associated with the closure of schools, which, if eligible, entitles employees to two-thirds’ pay up to $200 per day ($10,000 in aggregate).

NEW FAQ ADDRESSING SCHOOL CLOSURES

The following is an overview of DOL’s three newly issued FAQ regarding school closures:

A child attends a school operating on an alternate day basis

The DOL confirmed in FAQ #98 that an employee will be eligible for paid leave on an intermittent basis to accommodate a hybrid school schedule whereby children attend school both in-person and remotely. For purposes of the FFCRA and its implementing regulations, the school is effectively closed on days that a child cannot attend in person and leave is available on remote-learning days. The DOL cautions in its guidance that even under these circumstances, leave is only available if no other suitable person is available to care for the child.

A parent chooses remote learning when in-person instruction is available

FAQ #99 makes clear that FFCRA leave is not available to take care of a child whose school is otherwise open for in-person attendance. As a result, if a child needs care because the employee chose a virtual or remote school option, the employee is ineligible for leave. The DOL notes, however, that if the child is home due to a quarantine order or has been advised by a health care provider to self-isolate or self-quarantine, an employee may be eligible to take paid leave to care for the child.

School begins with remote learning, but shifts to in-person instruction if conditions change

FAQ #100 clarifies that leave eligibility will change as schools adopt different teaching models. Using the example of a school that starts virtually with the hope of returning to in-person teaching in the future, the DOL explains that an employee will be eligible for leave during the remote learning period for so long as the school remains closed, but eligibility will end when the school converts to in-person instruction.

ADDITIONAL FFCRA RESOURCES

Consider reviewing the following resources to learn more about the FFCRA:


Copyright © 2020 Godfrey & Kahn S.C.

ARTICLE BY Margaret R. Kurlinski and Christine McLaughlin of Godfrey & Kahn S.C. 

For more on DOL guidance, see the National Law Review Labor and Employment Legal and Regulatory Law News section.

Courageous Spanish Whistleblower Roberto Macías Becomes the First to Test the EU’s Pledge to Protect Whistleblowers

This year, the European Union passed a Whistleblower Directive specifically designed to protect citizens who report fraud and other legal violations. Yet as twenty-six countries begin the process of transposing this directive, a Spanish whistleblower is fighting for his freedom.

As reported by the New York Times earlier this week, Roberto Macías, the whistleblower responsible for a leak that led to one of the largest anti-corruption prosecutions Spain has seen, is now desperately filing an appeal with the European Union. In this appeal he claims that the new directive protects him from the two-year prison sentence handed down by the court for disseminating allegedly confidential documents. It is clear to observers, including some Spanish lawmakers, that Mr. Macías’ sentence is, in fact, retaliation for exposing fraud. The exact conduct the directive was created to protect.

Although whistleblowers like Mr. Macías can already appeal to the EU to protect such rights, his case shows just how important it will be for nations such as Spain, which have little to no protection for whistleblowers, to step up and created comprehensive programs to protect those who risk everything to expose wrongdoing. We can only hope that the law and policymakers currently making statements in support of Mr. Macías make good come time for Spain to implement the directive.


Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2020. All Rights Reserved.

A Lawyer, C.I.A. Analyst and a Crisis Management Specialist Walk Into a Bar…

Before James Comey headed up the F.B.I., he served as general counsel of Lockheed Martin Corporation. While at Lockheed, he spoke at the National Security Agency about how studying law is similar to the education intelligence analysts receive. “You read a case and decipher…relevant facts, the [outcome] of the case…you are drilled on your reasoning, challenged by other interpretations…clear writing matters…facts matter.”  He went on to praise legal training “because it is an extraordinarily valuable tool in the world of intelligence.”

He elaborated on what he called a “uniquely lawyerly ability…to transport ourselves to another time and place. The ability to present facts to an imaginary future fact-finder, in an environment very different from the one in which we face current crisis and decision…we know that our actions, and those of the agencies we support, will be held up in a quiet, dignified, well-lit room, where they can be viewed with the perfect, and brutally unfair, vision of hindsight.”

Comey talked about how lawyers “must know how to say both ‘yes’ and ‘no,’ even when ‘no’ must be spoken into a storm of crisis, with loud voices all around, with lives hanging in the balance…and often, ‘no’ must be spoken in competition with the voices of other lawyers who do not have the courage to echo it.”

While I find Mr. Comey’s short remarks to be thoughtful and on target, I do take exception to his assertion that presenting facts to an imaginary future fact-finder is “uniquely lawyerly.”  I would argue that same skill set is present in the men and women who practice the specialized art and craft of crisis management and crisis communications.  They, too, must be able to quickly perform a situation analysis (often within the fog of information overload), look for connections and quickly play out a variety of scenarios, also knowing they will be second-guessed if things go awry.  And just as important as lawyers giving red light-green light counsel, so must crisis management counsel be able to take a stand – and speak truth to power.

Bad things do happen to good people, to good companies, agencies, nonprofits, schools and hospitals.  But as Greek philosopher Epictetus said, “It’s not what happens to you, but how you react to it that matters.”  And when those things do happen, it’s important to have both lawyers and seasoned crisis managers in the room, each with the ability to say “yes” or “no” with conviction, backed up with the kind of experience that can’t be found in a book.

In that talk at the National Security Agency, Comey said, “It takes far more than a sharp legal mind to say ’no’ when it matters most.  It takes moral character.  It takes an ability to see the future.  It takes an appreciation of the damage that will flow from an unjustified ‘yes’ (and) when it can be, to ‘no’ when it must be.”

I couldn’t agree more.


© 2020 Hennes Communications. All rights reserved.

See the National Law Review Law Office Management section for similar topics.

Subpoena Motion Practice in Multidistrict Litigation: The Conflict on Authority Over Subpoena-Related Disputes

A key purpose of multidistrict litigation (MDL) is centralized management of pretrial proceedings to avoid duplicative discovery and resolve common issues in an efficient manner.  An MDL court becomes sufficiently familiar with the facts, scientific issues, and procedural history of the litigation to often allow a just and efficient resolution of complex discovery disputes.

One type of dispute common in MDL proceedings concerns third-party discovery.  Often, third parties are essential sources of critical information about a claim—such as physicians who treated a plaintiff in product liability litigation.  Just as frequently, these third parties are located outside the district of the MDL judge, forcing parties to serve extra-district subpoenas to obtain such discovery.

When disagreements arise over the scope or content of a subpoena, Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires such disputes to be brought in the “district court where compliance is required,” which is rarely the MDL court.  Those situations raise the question whether the MDL court can exercise jurisdiction over subpoena-related disputes despite the mandate of Rule 45.  This article analyzes the apparent conflict between Section 1407’s authorization of MDL courts to resolve pretrial disputes and Rule 45’s subpoena requirements, and how courts have resolved this conflict for MDL litigants.

  1. The Conflict Between the MDL Court’s Authority to Manage Pretrial Proceedings and Rule 45’s “Where Compliance Is Required” Requirement.

At the heart of the dispute over where parties should bring subpoena-related motions in MDL proceedings is the conflict between Rule 45 and Section 1407.  In ordinary cases, Rule 45(d) provides that a party must move to enforce or quash a subpoena in “the district where compliance is required”—typically, the district where the individual or entity resides.  But in enacting Section 1407, Congress centralized management of pretrial proceedings in a single federal court to ensure the “just and efficient” conduct of the litigation.[1]  Indeed, a key role of multidistrict consolidation is to “avoid duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings and conserve judicial resources.”[2]

To further these goals, Section 1407 also provides MDL courts with the authority to “exercise the powers of a district judge in any district for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions.”[3]  Thus, whether this statutory language authorizes MDL courts to manage subpoena disputes involving extra-district nonparties requires courts to confront the “apparent conflict” between Rule 45 and Section 1407.[4]

  1. Who Has Jurisdiction Over Extra-District Nonparty Subpoenas?

  1. Leading Decisions Hold that MDL Courts Have Broad Authority to Enforce Extra-District Subpoenas Under Section 1407

The two leading decisions analyzing the conflict between Section 1407 and Rule 45 arose out of a multidistrict qui tam action consolidated in the District Court for the District of Columbia in U.S. ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Centers of America, Inc.  In Pogue, the relator served subpoenas duces tecum on nonparty businesses headquartered in Tennessee.[5]  After the parties failed to resolve disagreements over the scope of the subpoenas, the relator sought to enforce them in the MDL district court.  The nonparties opposed enforcement there, contending that under Rule 45, the subpoenas could only be enforced “where compliance is required”—in that case, the Middle District of Tennessee.[6]

The MDL court noted that “[w]ere this an ordinary case, [the nonparties] would be correct and this case would be easily disposed of” given Rule 45.[7]  But it observed that this was “not an ordinary case” because the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation had “transferred to this Court related qui tam actions pending across the country under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1407.”[8]  The court explained that the purpose of MDL actions is to ensure the “just and efficient” conduct of pretrial proceedings involving common issues and “to eliminate duplicative discovery, pretrial rulings, and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel and the judiciary.”[9]  It then held that “to that end, § 1407 bestows upon the transferee court the power to exercise the powers of a district judge in any district for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions in MDL cases.”[10]

Although the MDL court found that while it was not “a settled question” whether it had jurisdiction over extra-district subpoenas, “the weight of authority and effectuation of the purposes of multidistrict litigation support a finding of jurisdiction,” and that “§ 1407 confers on MDL judges the power to supervise depositions taking place in other jurisdictions.”[11]  The court also found that the use of the term “shall” in Section 1407(b) “mandates that such motions be heard by the MDL court.”[12]  Thus, the court determined that it had jurisdiction over the relators’ motions to compel the extra-district nonparties to comply with the subpoenas.[13]

In a later appeal, the Sixth Circuit[14] agreed with the MDL court, observing that “the Federal Rules are designed to ensure that district courts remain firmly in control of those depositions and document productions involving nonparties located in their districts.”[15]  Because the Federal Rules “could hamstring an MDL court’s ability to conduct coordinated pretrial proceedings over cases that have been consolidated from far-flung foreign districts, the MDL statute empowers an MDL judge to act as a judge of the deposition or discovery district.”[16]  The court, therefore, held that “[a] judge presiding over an MDL case” could rule on subpoena-related motions “notwithstanding the nonparty’s physical situs in a foreign district where discovery is being conducted.”[17]

  1. Courts Have Expressed Conflicting Views on Whether an MDL Court Can Enforce an Extra-District Subpoena Duces Tecum

As one court has observed, “[t]he overwhelming majority of courts that have considered the issue of whether Section 1407(b) authorizes a transferee judge the power to act as any judge of any district for pretrial depositions as well as subpoenas duces tecum, have found that it does.”[18]  For example, the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico in In re San Juan Plaza Hotel Fire Litig. found that to effectuate the purpose of multidistrict litigation, it is “necessary to append to the transferee judge enforcement powers in relation to subpoenas issued in the deposition district, including depositions and subpoenas addressed to nonparties.”[19]  Likewise, the District Court for the District of Kansas in In re EpiPen Mktg., Sales Practices and Antitrust Litig. observed that the “statute’s remedial purpose of eliminating the potential for conflicting contemporaneous pretrial rulings would be frustrated if the MDL court could not entertain motions to compel [compliance with subpoenas in other districts].”[20]  Other courts have reached similar conclusions when presented with the conflict between Rule 45 extra-district subpoenas and Section 1407.[21]

A small minority of courts, however, has narrowly construed Section 1407(b) as authorizing an MDL court to enforce deposition subpoenas—but not document subpoenas.  For example, in In re Packaged Seafood Prod. Antitrust Litig., the MDL court declined to exercise jurisdiction over enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum.  The court acknowledged that Section 1407(b) authorized it to exercise the powers of a district judge in any district “for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions,” and that “may necessarily include the power to enforce deposition subpoenas.”[22]  But it drew a distinction between a deposition subpoena and a subpoena duces tecum—a distinction which it found “makes a difference.”[23]  In refusing to enforce the subpoena duces tecum, the court reasoned that “[t]he extension of jurisdiction in MDL cases to the conduct of pretrial depositions” is not “tantamount to extending jurisdiction to enforce document subpoenas on third parties.”[24]

Other courts have also interpreted Section 1407 narrowly.  In VISX, Inc. v. Nidek Co., et al., the District Court for the Northern District of California found that “§ 1407(b) expands a transferee court’s discovery powers only to pretrial depositions,” and that “[h]ad Congress wanted to expand these powers to document subpoenas, it would have said so.”[25]  In In re Monat Hair Care Prod. Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., the District Court for the Southern District of Florida found “the reasoning of In re Packaged Seafood and VISX persuasive” that “Section 1407(b) does not expressly exempt MDL courts from Rule 45’s dictates; rather, it expressly gives MDL courts the discretion to exercise the powers of a district judge in any district only for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions.”[26]  Thus, given that “Section 1407(b) makes no reference to subpoenas for the production of documents,” the court held that Rule 45 mandated that only the Middle District of Florida had jurisdiction to enforce the nonparty, nonresident subpoena.[27]

That said, courts holding that MDL courts lack jurisdiction over extra-district document subpoenas are in the minority.  Indeed, the 6th Circuit in Pogue noted that while “[a]n argument can be made that the Section 1407(b)’s grant of authority to the MDL judge to oversee nonparty discovery occurring outside of the MDL district does not extend to enforcement of documents-only subpoenas,” the “rationale underlying the MDL statute of ‘just and efficient’ resolution of pretrial proceedings requires the conclusion that Section 1407(b)’s grant of authority applies to both deposition and document-only subpoenas.”[28]  Most other courts that have considered the issue have similarly agreed that “[i]n keeping with the efficiency goals of the MDL statute,” an MDL court’s authority “extends to overseeing subpoenas for documents.”[29]

  1. A Motion to Transfer to the MDL Is a Viable Alternative

If an opposing party has already moved under Rule 45(d) to quash or modify a subpoena in the “district where compliance is required,” or an MDL court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the initial subpoena-related motion, a Rule 45(f) transfer for “exceptional circumstances” to the MDL court can be appropriate.  Although the term “exceptional circumstances” is not defined in Rule 45, the Advisory Committee Notes provide that while the “prime concern” when considering transfer “should be avoiding burdens on local nonparties subject to subpoenas,” in “some circumstances . . . transfer may be warranted in order to avoid disrupting the issuing court’s management of the underlying litigation[.]”[30]  And courts have found “exceptional circumstances warranting transferring subpoena-related motions . . . when transferring the matter is in the interests of judicial economy and avoiding inconsistent results.”[31]

In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig. provides an especially applicable analysis of Rule 45(f) and MDL subpoenas.  Here, plaintiffs issued a subpoena duces tecum to a nonresident third party, which ultimately refused to comply with the subpoena.[32]  Plaintiffs moved to enforce the subpoena in the MDL court, which found that it lacked authority to rule on the motion because, under Rule 45, “a party seeking to compel compliance with a subpoena must file its motion in ‘the district where compliance is required.’”[33]  Following the MDL court’s ruling, plaintiffs filed an action in the District Court for the District of Columbia—where compliance was sought—to transfer the subpoena-enforcement motion to the MDL court under Rule 45(f) or, in the alternative, enforce the subpoena.[34]  After engaging in an exacting analysis, the district court found that transfer of the motion to enforce the subpoena to the MDL proceeding was appropriate.

First, the court observed that the “MDL status of the underlying litigation is surely an ‘exceptional circumstance’ that weighs strongly in favor of transfer to the Issuing Court under Rule 45(f), because the same concerns about orderliness and disruption that led to the consolidation of actions as an MDL in the first place arise with respect to pretrial disputes regarding subpoenas issued in the context of that complex litigation.”[35]  Second, the court noted that it was “highly unlikely” that the respondent would need to travel to the MDL court in Florida, as a telephonic hearing on the motion was likely, and thus there was no undue burden to the nonresident respondent.[36]  And lastly, given the that the MDL was a “rather a highly complex case and potentially a class action asserting nationwide antitrust claims against five large corporate defendants,” the district court found that the MDL court was best situated to decide whether the subpoena should be enforced.[37]  Thus, given that the “factors that weigh in favor of transferring this subpoena dispute” were abundant, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion and transferred the motion to the MDL court.[38]

  1. Conclusion

While the language of Rule 45 suggests that subpoena-related disputes can only be resolved in the “district where compliance is required,” MDL litigants should be aware of the authority granted to MDL courts under Section 1407.  The MDL court is often better suited to resolve such disputes given its extensive knowledge of the facts and science surrounding the litigation and the history of the litigation.  In the event that an MDL court declines to exercise direct jurisdiction over a dispute concerning a subpoena duces tecum, a Rule 45(f) transfer of a motion from the local district to the MDL court is a feasible alternative.  With either approach, MDL litigants can better ensure that complex subpoena-related disputes are resolved by the MDL court in an efficient manner that reduces the potential for inconsistent rulings or duplicative discovery.


[1] In re New York City Mun. Sec. Litig., 572 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.).

[2] In re Air Disaster, 486 F. Supp. 241, 243 (J.P.M.L. 1980).

[3] 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b).

[4] E.g.In re Mentor Corp. Obtape Transobturator Sling Prod. Liab. Litig., No. CIV.A. 09-3073JAP, 2009 WL 3681986, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2009); In re Subpoenas Served on Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering & Goodwin Proctor LLP, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2003).

[5] 238 F. Supp. 2d. 270, 273 (D.D.C. 2002).

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b); Man. for Complex Litig. (Third) § 21.424 (2002)) (internal quotations omitted).

[11] Id. at 273-74 (citing In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 662 F.2d 875, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).

[12] Id. at 275.

[13] Id. at 279.

[14] As noted in the 6th Circuit’s opinion, appeal from exercise of an MDL judge’s authority to act as a judge of the deposition or discovery district “lies in the circuit court embracing that deposition or discovery district.”

[15] U.S. ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 444 F.3d 462, 468 (6th Cir. 2006).

[16] Id. at 468.

[17] Id. at 468-69.

[18] In re: Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., No. 05-1717-JJF, 2007 WL 9612142, at *3 (D. Del. May 18, 2007), report and recommendation adopted, No. 05-1717-JJF, 2007 WL 9612141 (D. Del. June 14, 2007); see also In re Mentor Corp. Obtape Transobturator Sling Prod. Liab. Litig., No. CIV.A. 09-3073JAP, 2009 WL 3681986, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2009) (finding that “most courts which have addressed this issue have concluded that section 1407(b) empowers an MDL transferee court to exercise the powers of any other district court, including the enforcement of subpoenas.”).

[19] 117 F.R.D. 30, 32 (D.P.R. 1987).

[20] 2018 WL 2926581, *3 (D. Kan. June 11, 2018).

[21] See, e.g.In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 2325, 2017 WL 1090029 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 21, 2017); In re Neurontin Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 245 F.R.D. 55 (D. Mass. 2007); In re Accutane Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 804MD2523T30TBM, 2006 WL 1000311 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2006).

[22] No. 15-MD-2670-JLS-MDD, 2018 WL 454440, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2018) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b)).

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] 208 F.R.D. 615, 616 (N.D. Cal. 2002).

[26] No. 18-MD-02841, 2020 WL 1950463, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2020).

[27] Id.

[28] U.S. ex rel. Pogue, 444 F.3d. at 468 n.2.

[29] In re Photochromic Lens Antitrust Litig., No. 8:10–md–2173–T–27, 2012 WL 12904391, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2012) (collecting cases); see also In re Bank of New York Mellon Corp. Forex Transactions Litig., No. 11 CIV. 9175 LAK JLC, 2014 WL 2884726, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2014) (“Despite [Section 1407(b)’s] limiting language as to depositions, however, it is widely accepted that this authority extends to all pretrial proceedings, including governance of non-party, extra-district subpoenas.”).

[30] Rule 45(f), 2013 Advisory Committee Note.

[31] Wultz v. Bank of China, Ltd., 304 F.R.D. 38, 46 (D.D.C. 2014); see also In re Braden, 344 F. Supp. 3d 83, 91 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that transfer of subpoena-related motion to Southern District of Ohio “is appropriate to avoid disrupting the underlying litigation.”).

[32] 306 F. Supp. 3d 372, 374 (D.D.C. 2017).

[33] Id.

[34] Id.

[35] Id. at 378.

[36] Id. at 379-81.

[37] Id. at 381 (internal quotations omitted).

[38] Id. at 383.


© 2020 Winston & Strawn LLP

For more on subpoenas, see the National Law Review Civil Procedure Law section.

Register for the 51st Annual PLI Estate Planning Institute

Live Webcast: Sept 14 – 15, 2020, 9 a.m. EDT

Click here to register.

The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (the “2017 Act”), which was enacted on December 22, 2017, included significant changes to the federal transfer tax regime and related income tax provisions.  More recently, the financial and societal impact of the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 continues to reverberate and create uncertainty in the future.

This program will review the transfer tax and related income tax developments with the 2017 Act as a starting point, and will discuss how such developments impact estate, trust and income tax planning, and the administration of decedents’ estates.  Moreover, the program will review other recent developments regarding estate, trust and transfer tax and income tax planning.  Further, the COVID-19 crisis and the related estate, trust and income tax legislation and rulings promulgated in response to such crisis will be discussed.

What You Will Learn

  • Advising clients in a time of unprecedented uncertainty
  • An update on recent developments in all areas of estate, trust and transfer tax planning including legislation and rulings issued as a result of the COVID-19 crisis
  • A review of the interaction between the federal transfer tax regime and state transfer tax regimes
  • A review of the transfer tax and related income tax provisions of the 2017 Act
  • Income tax planning for estates and trusts
  • Administering estates and trusts during and after the COVID-19 pandemic
  • A review of the SECURE Act of 2019
  • A review of international estate planning and tax changes
  • FATCA and its progeny
  • A discussion of trust planning and divorce
  • Ethical considerations for attorneys
  • Elder law and special needs planning considerations
  • A review of tax issues for art collectors
  • An update on charitable donation planning
  • A review of electronic Wills and modern-day estate planning
  • Asset protection planning in a pandemic world

…and much more!

Special Features

  • Full hour of ethics credit

Who Should Attend

Attorneys and other professionals advising on estate planning and/or transfer tax planning, including accountants, financial planners and anyone else whose practice requires a solid understanding of estate planning.

Program Level: Overview

Prerequisites: Attendees should have a basic understanding of trusts and estates terminology and a foundational background in tax

Intended Audience: Attorneys, accountants, financial planners, and other professionals who specialize in estate planning, life insurance products and/or transfer tax planning

Advanced Preparation: None

See other upcoming events from PLI here.