Law Firm Email Marketing: It’s Time to Own Your Communications Platform

The importance of having complete control over the platform you use to communicate with current and prospective clients has never been more apparent following the Facebook data debacle. The platform that is easiest for law firms to control is email marketing, which means that building a strong email list should be one of your top priorities.

But it’s not always easy to get people to give you their email addresses unless you give them good reasons to do so. Here are some tips for building your email marketing list:

Use social media.

Even with some spectacular stumbles, social media will continue to be relevant to your law firm marketing goals. Every one of your social media pages should include a link to your email subscription page so your followers can opt in. Use social media ads to promote a special offer — something you give away in exchange for email sign-ups.

Check in on inactive subscribers.

With most email service providers, you can generate a list of recipients who have not opened your emails. Since they did opt in at some point, check in with them and ask why they’re not opening them — is your subject matter off-target? Are the emails going to the junk folder? Even if they ask to be removed, that’s better than having a list populated with people no longer interested in you.

Craft content for sharing.

When you are creating content for your e-newsletter or other email, keep sharing in mind. You want to have people on your list share with others so you can expand your influence beyond your list.

Use your blog.

The content you send out to email subscribers doesn’t have to be original. Using blog posts that you know have already resonated with your target market makes it more likely your email will be shared.

Share lists with a strategic referral partner.

A strategic referral partner is someone who is in a different business than you are but has the same target market. While you don’t want to give your email marketing list to another business — this could violate the terms under which you got those email addresses — you can offer to send an email for your referral partner’s business to your list, and then they reciprocate. Encourage your subscribers to sign up for your referral partner’s emails in exchange for the same from the other business.

Rethink your business cards.

The typical business card lists your name, the firm’s name, address and phone, and your email. But don’t stop there. Use the other side of the card to list all your social media accounts as well as a landing page where they can subscribe to your email list.

Ask for email addresses.

Every encounter you have is an opportunity to ask for an email address. Ask their permission to add their email address to your list and let them know the benefits of subscribing.

The effort to build a good email marketing list never ends, but it’s worth it since your email list is something you own and totally control. Plus, research keeps telling us that email is still the most effective and least costly way to communicate with clients and prospects.

© The Rainmaker Institute, All Rights Reserved
This article was written by Stephen Fairley of The Rainmaker Institute

Design Thinking in Law Firms: Q&A with Kate White and Andy Peterson of Design Build Legal on Upcoming Workshop at LSSO RainDance Conference

The Legal Sales and Service Organization (LSSO) and the RainDance Conference were started 15 years ago to provide the legal industry with a venue to grow and explore new trends in sales and service. Over the years, RainDance has become known for introducing new approaches to generating revenue and delivering value. This year, we are excited to bring you our first Design Thinking Workshop at RainDance 2018 on June 6 & 7 in Chicago, IL.

Design thinking is a method for creative generation of practical ideas that can be applied to architectural, engineering and business problems in a way that is focused on the users, customers or clients.   Unlike analytical thinking, to which law firms are so accustomed, design thinking includes “building up” ideas, with few, or no, limits during a “brainstorming” phase that is driven by user-focused empathy. The following Q&A with the workshop leaders, Kate White and Andy Peterson of Design Build Legal, offers a peak into the world of design thinking:

What is legal design thinking?

Design thinking, at its core, is about gaining empathy for the users of your product or service, identifying a challenge they are facing, and rapidly designing a solution. This is how the first Apple mouse was invented. It’s how many of those companies selling you new technology are identifying what you care about, and building you things you didn’t even know you needed. In fact, it’s a practice being used in most major industries, from retail to financial services.

The steps in design thinking include: empathize, define the problem, ideate, prototype, and test. The process is best done as a cross-functional team, bringing together designers, subject matter experts, technologists, data analysts, administrators, etc.

We teach and facilitate a version of this that we call “legal design thinking.” It’s not just “design thinking plus lawyers,” but rather we’ve adapted the model to fit the culture of law firms and legal departments — namely, to ensure that we’re using the audience’s time wisely by focusing on designing client-centered solutions to real-world legal and business challenges. Our workshops can run anywhere from two hours to a full day and leave the audience, whether it’s law firm lawyers and staff or corporate legal teams, with concrete prototypes that they can take back to their organizations and further develop with clients.

How are law firms using it?

Law firms are starting to see the opportunity to develop “productized services” – services that are priced on a fixed fee, scalable, and highly valuable to clients. Leveraging legal design thinking to identify and launch these services ensures that they are based on client needs and that the firm’s resources will be used wisely to develop something in which clients are prepared to invest.

Firms are also aware that investing in solutions that help them gain greater client loyalty are some of the most worthwhile investments they can make. If a firm can bring something to a client that hits home by reducing the cost of compliance or managing risk, helps them better serve their business clients, or just simply makes their lives easier, they’ve just really deepened that relationship.

When we partner with law firms to facilitate legal design thinking workshops, we encourage them to find a client that is important to them, one with which they want to differentiate their firm from their competitors. The workshop generally provides a crash course in design thinking, but most importantly features a client listening session that helps the audience quickly gain empathy for the in-house counsel or legal operations professional, in most cases. Clients are nearly always willing to participate, and generally walk away with the impression that the firm cares about their experience, is thinking creatively about how to solve their problems, and is making investments in designing enhanced services that create more value. We’ve also facilitated workshops focused on improving service for internal clients, such as leading a group of law firm staff through an exercise to take on a challenge faced by partners, and this can be a good place to start for a firm that is curious, but skeptical.

How did you get started in this area?

We were introduced to the concept almost five years ago when a friend at Nordstrom invited us to join their design thinking boot camp. Over two days, we were immersed in the design thinking process, including developing prototypes based on our empathy interviews, and testing those prototypes with shoppers in downtown Seattle. Design, prototype, test, incorporate feedback. Multiple times through the cycle. Our boot camp culminated in a presentation of our prototypes to the president of the Nordstrom Rack and other executives. By the end, we were exhausted, frankly, but also energized by the potential of design thinking. The question was: how do we apply this in law firms?

Following that, we visited one of the original homes of design thinking, the Stanford Design School. Kate completed Stanford’s Legal Design Thinking Bootcamp, offered by fellows bridging the gap between the law school and d.school there. We then spent many years reading as much as we could about design thinking and running experiments in the law firm setting when we were in-house. These experiments have resulted in multiple useful solutions – ranging from one firm’s first ever client dashboard to a regulatory audit tool that can save clients six-figures in government agency fines.

So why should law firms be interested in it?

Law firms have an opportunity to truly set themselves apart by designing services with clients at the center.

What is the workshop you are doing at RainDance?

Our RainDance workshop will give people a two-hour introduction to legal design thinking. We will tee up the idea, and then get straight into it, starting with an empathy interview. After that, it will be hands-on, small-group activities intended to get you out of your seat, stretch your mind, and teach you legal design thinking techniques that you can take back to your firm.

What can attendees expect to walk away with?

As mentioned, when we work with law firms or legal departments, we are keenly focused on creating solutions to real client or firm challenges. But at RainDance, with an audience from a diverse group of firms, our goals are to educate attendees about legal design thinking, and energize them to try it. It’s not exactly a “train the trainer” event, but you’ll know just enough about legal design thinking to be dangerous! (Which, in a law firm means to “go back and challenge assumptions.”) And you’ll know to call us when you want help implementing these techniques more robustly to design client-centered products or services.

RainDance 2018 will be held on June 6 & 7 in Chicago, IL.

Copyright ©2018 National Law Forum, LLC

U.S. Supreme Court: Immigration Act Unconstitutionally Vague on Removal for Aggravated Felony

The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that any alien convicted of an “aggravated felony” after entering the United States is subject to deportation. The Supreme Court has decided, 5-4, that the statute’s defining an aggravated felony as “a crime of violence” is unconstitutionally vague. Sessions v. Dimaya, No. 15–1498 (Apr. 17, 2018). Justice Neil Gorsuch sided with the liberals on the Court.

According to the INA, an aggravated felony includes “a crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.” In a residual clause, a crime of violence is defined as an offense “that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”

James Dimaya, a legal permanent resident, was twice convicted of first degree burglary. The Supreme Court held that the residual clause was too unpredictable and arbitrary and created “grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by the crime.” The Court, in an opinion by Justice Elena Kagan in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Gorsuch joined (at least in part), also stated that a high threshold on vagueness should apply in this case because of the “grave nature of [civil] deportation” versus other civil penalties.

Justice Gorsuch agreed that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. He noted that the law requires fair notice and that this notice requirement “serves as a faithful expression of ancient due process and separation of powers principles the Framers recognized as vital to ordered liberty under the Constitution.” He also stated that the legislature may not “‘abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards of the criminal law’ by leaving judges the power to decide” the issues. Gorsuch did not accept the government’s argument about the power of the executive in these matters as stated by Deputy Solicitor General Edwin Kneedler: “I think it is important for the court to understand that immigration provisions and grounds for deportation are often written in very broad and general terms and given content by the executive branch in which Congress has vested authority.” He wrote in his concurrence: “To acknowledge that the President has broad authority to act [in the immigration area] supplies no justification for allowing judges to give context an impermissibly vague law.”

Where Gorsuch differed from the majority was that he does not believe in a hierarchy of notice thresholds for different types of cases or that deportation should be singled out. Fair notice is his touchstone throughout.

Dimaya was originally argued before the Supreme Court in 2017 after Justice Antonin Scalia’s death. At that time, the case ended in a 4-4 deadlock. It has been suggested that Justice Scalia would have stood with the liberals on the Court regarding the vagueness analysis in this case, in accordance with his prior opinions.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2018
This article was written by Amy L. Peck of Jackson Lewis P.C.

CMS Benefit and Payment Rule: What is Success for the ACA?

On Monday, CMS published a number of policies changing the dynamics of the individual market, including the Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2019 Final Ruleguidance on hardship exemptions, and a bulletin on transitional (grandmothered) plans. When interpreting all of these policies it’s important to keep in mind the following: What is success? And who is defining it?

CMS_LogoTOPlittlePieces.jpg

The Obama Administration managed ACA implementation with the clear intention of making sure the outcome met the goals of the law: more people covered, more choices of coverage for those people, and lower premiums.  While the success of their efforts can be debated, the intention was always known.

For the Trump Administration, it is not necessarily clear how successful implementation of this next rule will be judged.  Are they trying to maximize the number of people covered, maximize the number of choices available or lower premiums?  What is the organizing principle?  Is it as simple as providing additional regulatory flexibility?

There are two other stakeholders who also have to determine their definition of success in the face of this rule: states and insurers.  For states, they will have to determine if and how they will use the additional flexibility granted to them under their rule.  Insurers, with the loss of the individual mandate and CSRs, and the looming threat of STLDIs and AHPs, have to decide if the rule provides a stable environment for participation.

From now through the start of the next open enrollment period, we expect significant backstage drama as insurers, states, and the Administration answer these questions.  The offerings and premiums available to Americans six days before the midterm elections depend on these decisions.

Now to the substance of the regulation …

We will start with essential health benefits (EHBs). Under the Benefits and Payment Final Rule, CMS is allowing states a variety of options to set EHB standards. CMS believes that this is an opportunity to increase state flexibility in how states select their EHB-benchmark plans. From the state perspective, this change grants them some flexibility to require fewer benefits to be covered in Marketplace plans, which could lower the costs of plans for consumers but ultimately provide less coverage. For some states, especially those with bare counties or those seeing rising premium costs, this could be an opportunity to bring lower cost plans to needed areas. However, it is important to note that this rule does not require states to change anything. States are still in control at setting the EHB-benchmark – they just have more choices to set the bar lower. It is likely that many states will continue their current benchmark levels.  How insurers react will likely depend on what happens at the state level. Plan offerings will only change if the state chooses to make that decision.

Next up is the Navigator program. Under the Benefits and Payment Final Rule, CMS is removing the following requirements: 1) that each Marketplace have at least two Navigator entities, 2) that one of the Navigators entities be a community and consumer-focused nonprofit group, and 3) that each Navigator entity maintain a physical presence in the service area. From CMS’s perspective, they drastically cut Marketplace Navigator advertising or outreach for plan year 2018 and there was not a significant change in enrollment. States also saw what happened despite limited funding for Navigators, and they watched grassroots groups take the lead in driving enrollment. This change can allow the provision of grant funding to groups that might not have been considered before. It can also can allow states to scale back their Navigator programs, which arguably may not be as useful as they were in the first few years of the ACA. However, insurers and consumer advocates will want Navigators to exist and be funded. They want people to have a stable and reliable place that they can go to get information regarding their coverage options.

Then there is the medical loss ratio (MLR). The ACA required plans on the individual market to spend at least 80% of income on actual patient care. The Benefits and Payment Final Rule will allow states to lower the MLR if they can prove that it will help stabilize the Marketplace. States could in theory argue that if they have limited plan options, lowering the MLR will bring more plans into the state. However, overall the Benefits and Payment Final brings us back to the place we were before the ACA. Depending on your perspective, is that a place you want to be?

On top of the Final Rule, CMS also issued guidance that expanded the Hardship Exemption, which allows individuals to basically be exempt from the individual mandate. So if you thought tax reform killed the individual mandate, CMS took an additional step to make sure the individual mandate is really dead. The Hardship Exemption was expanded to individuals who live in counties with no issuers or only one issuer, and those who live in areas where all plans cover abortion services.

And finally, we have the CMS Bulletin that extends transitional (or grandmothered) insurance plans for one more year (until December 31, 2019). These plans were intended to end in 2014, but were continued under Obama and now again under the Trump Administration. With STLDI and AHPs on the horizon and the changes in the Benefits and Payment Final Rule, the continuation of transitional plans is just one of the many options states, plans, and beneficiaries have to pick a non-ACA complaint plan.

We are beginning to find ourselves closer and closer to returning to the regulatory place we were a decade ago. How states make decisions regarding the flexibilities provided through these changes will not only drive distinct differences across states, but also drive insurer participation. How this all shakes out is not yet known. And what is a successful Marketplace depends on your perspective.

©1994-2018 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

Navigating a Cook County Department of Revenue Audit and the Procedure for a Formal Protest

A recent national trend in the practice field of state and local tax has been the uptick in local jurisdictions’ audit activity. The Cook County Department of Revenue (“Cook County” or “Department”) is no exception to this trend where in recent years, the Department has increased its audit activity, and much to the chagrin of taxpayers, has taken aggressive positions in the interpretation of its tax ordinances. Consequently, this has led to increased litigation in the administrative proceedings before the Cook County Department of Administrative Hearings (“D.O.A.H.”). This post provides an overview of the Department’s audit and ensuing D.O.A.H. processes and will highlight some of the procedural differences compared to other jurisdictions such as Chicago and Illinois. This background should assist any taxpayer in navigating the pitfalls and traps they will likely face if they receive a notice of Tax Assessment and Determination (“Assessment”).

Authority to Tax

The Illinois Constitution grants a home rule unit, which includes a county that has a chief executive officer elected by electors of the county, with authority to exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs, including the power to tax.  Ill. Const. Art. VII, § 6(a), 55 ILCS 5/5-1009. For taxes that are measured by income or earnings or that are imposed upon occupations, Cook County only has the power provided by the General Assembly.  Ill. Const. Art. VII, § 6(e). Cook County, however, is not preempted from imposing a home rule tax on (1) alcoholic beverages; (2) cigarettes or tobacco products; (3) the use of a hotel room or similar facility; (4) the sale or transfer of real property; (5) lease receipts; (6) food prepared for immediate consumption; or (7) other taxes not based on the selling or purchase price from the use, sale or purchase of tangible personal property.  55 ILCS 5/5-1009.

Audit Overview

Cook County, like the Illinois Department of Revenue and the City of Chicago Department of Finance, initiates an audit by issuing an individual or business a notice of audit to the taxpayer. The notice will generally identify the taxes subject to review, the periods under audit, and the time and location where the Department will undertake the audit. The notice will likely also include document requests and/or questionnaires that the Department has requested to review as part of audit. In some instances, however, if the Department believes that a taxpayer is not reporting a tax that the Department believes it is subject to, the Department will skip the audit and issue a “jeopardy assessment.” A jeopardy assessment assesses liability based on the books and records of who the Department deems to be similarly situated taxpayers.

Additionally, as my colleague Samantha Breslow discussed in ” Navigating a Chicago Audit and the Procedure for a Formal Protest“, taxpayers should take the Department’s information requests seriously.  It is especially important that the taxpayer stays engaged and responsive to Department auditors as a failure to do so may result in the Department issuing a jeopardy assessment. Cook County Code of Ordinances (“C.C.O.”) § 34-63(c)(2).[1]

Protest

While the Department’s audit process is very similar to Illinois, Chicago, and most other jurisdictions for that matter, the Department’s tax appeals process differs significantly. Unlike the Chicago Department of Finance which affords taxpayers 35 days to protest a notice of tax assessment, and the Illinois Department of Revenuewhich affords taxpayers 30-60 days to protest a notice of tax assessment, a taxpayer subject to a Department tax assessment must file its protest within 20 days of the Department’s mailing the notice of tax determination and assessment. C.C.O § 34-80. The taxpayer must either personally serve the Department with its protest, or place its protest in an envelope, properly addressed to the Department and postmarked within twenty days of the Department’s mailing of the protest. C.C.O. 34-79. At a minimum, a protest must identify the date, name, street address of the taxpayer, tax type, tax periods, the amount of the tax determination and assessment, and the date the county mailed the notice of assessment. The protest should also include an explanation of reasons for protesting the assessed tax and penalties. The Department has published a ” Protest and Petition for Hearing” form which must be used by a protesting taxpayer.  The form must be signed, and must include a power of attorney if the taxpayer is represented by someone other than the taxpayer.

Taxpayers should pay attention to the extremely short time frame in which to a protest must be filed. When considering the Department is only required to serve this notice by United States registered, certified or first class mail, a taxpayer is often left with less than 15 calendar days to file its protest. This is especially true for corporate taxpayers whose headquarters may differ from the address of its tax or legal department or the individual responsible for protesting tax assessments.

Administrative Proceedings

Upon timely receipt of a taxpayer protest, the Department will determine whether any revisions to the Assessment are warranted. This stage may result in a continuation of the audit where the Department will request additional documentation from the taxpayer and the Director of the Department does have the authority to amend the Assessment. While nothing prohibits the Department from increasing the Assessment during this stage, generally if a revision to the Assessment is made, the result is a reduction in the Assessment.[2]

If the parties are unable to resolve the audit, the Department then institutes an administrative adjudication proceeding by forwarding a timely filed protest to the D.O.A.H. C.C.O. § 34-81; C.C.O. § 2-908. The Director of the D.O.A.H. is appointed by the President of the County Board, and is subject to approval by the County Board of Commissioners. C.C.O. § 2-901(b).The Director appoints hearing officers, or administrative law judges (“ALJ”), who are independent adjudicators authorized to conduct hearings for the Department.C.C.O. § 2-901(a). The ALJ has authority to hold settlement conferences, hear testimony, rule upon motions, objections and admissibility of evidence. C.C.O. § 2-904. Note, however, the ALJ is prohibited from hearing or deciding whether any ordinance is facially unconstitutional. C.C.O. § 34-81.

At all proceedings before the ALJ, the Department will be represented by the State’s Attorney. The ALJ will set the matter for an initial pre-hearing status where the parties should be prepared to provide the ALJ with a brief overview of the facts and issues in dispute. The parties will then work to narrow the issues for presentment of findings by the ALJ. This will likely be accomplished by pre-hearing motion practice and the parties’ attempt to stipulate to facts and legal issues to be decided by the ALJ. Ultimately, the taxpayer and the Department will participate in a hearing, or trial, before the ALJ prior to the ALJ issuing a final order with findings of fact and conclusions of law. C.C.O. §  2-904.

Most taxpayers and practitioners are surprised to learn that the D.O.A.H. has no formal discovery. In fact, the parties are only entitled to conduct discovery with leave of the ALJ. Cook County D.O.A.H. General Order No. 2009-1 (“General Order”), Rule 6.3.In our experience,the ALJ will occasionally permit limited interrogatories and requests to admit, but requests to produce have been denied, and depositions arestrictlyprohibited. This is true even where a party intends on introducing an expert witness at the hearing.  Notably, because the Illinois Supreme Court rules do not apply, there is also no corresponding requirement that an expert submit its conclusions and opinions of the witness and bases thereof to the adverse party. See  Ill. S. Ct. R. 213(f). The ALJ may subpoena witnesses and documents which the ALJ deems necessary for the final determination. General Order, Rule 6.4. The lack of procedure naturally increases the likelihood of surprise at final hearing.

After the completion of any pre-hearing motions and the narrowing of the issues, the parties proceed to a hearing where each party will present its case. This is where the record is made for purposes of appeal. No additional evidence is permitted to be introduced at the Circuit Court. The Petitioner, often the Department, must present its case first and bears the initial burden.[3] However, the Department’s Assessment is deemed to be prima facie correct. C.C.O. § 34-64.Thus, a taxpayer has the burden of proving with documentary evidence, books and records that any tax, interest or penalty assessed by the Department is not due and owing.  C.C.O. § 34-63. The formal and technical rules of evidence do not apply at the hearing. C.C.O. § 2-911. A taxpayer can also present fact and expert witnesses in support of its position and may wish to call Department personnel such as the auditor and supervisor as adverse witnesses to support its case.

After both parties have concluded their case, each may request an opportunity to present a closing argument. General Order, Rule 9.4. In lieu of, or in addition to a closing argument, the ALJ may request the parties to file post hearing briefs. It is during the closing argument and/or brief, that the parties will have the opportunity to present its legal and factual defense to the Assessment.

After the hearing and review of post-trial briefs, the ALJ will issue a final order which includes findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings of the ALJ are subject to review in the Circuit Court of Cook County pursuant to the Administrative Review and the aggrieved party has 35 calendar days to file an appeal. C.C.O. 2-917.

Conclusion and Takeaways:

The D.O.A.H. presents some unique litigation and procedural challenges for a taxpayer wishing to protest a Department Assessment. The major takeaways for a taxpayer protesting an assessment are (1) a taxpayer must file its protest within 20 days of the Department’s mailing of the assessment; (2) the D.O.A.H. has limited discovery rules and prohibits the use of depositions which can inhibit a taxpayer’s ability to build a case. Accordingly, a taxpayer must present adequate witnesses and documentation to support its case at hearing; and (3) a taxpayer must build a record at the administrative proceeding because it will be foreclosed from doing so at the circuit court if an appeal is necessary. These takeaways can go a long way in assisting a taxpayer’s chances of success in what is at times, an unpredictable venue.


[1] If a Taxpayer believes that it has paid a prior amount of tax, interest, or penalty in error to the department, in addition to amending its return, the taxpayer must file a claim for credit or refund in writing on forms provided by the Department. Cook County Code of Ordinances (“C.C.O.”) § 34-90.  The claim for refund must be made not later than four years from the date on which the payment or remittance in error was made. Id.  

[2] If the assessment is revised, the Taxpayer should determine whether the revisions are documented in an official “Revised Notice of Assessment and Determination” or alternatively, whether the revisions were documented in something less formal such as revised schedules or workpapers.  If it is the former, while the Ordinance does not expressly require an Amended Protest to be filed, the issue of whether a revised protestmust be filedwithin 20 daysof the Revised Assessment has been raised in administrative proceedings before the Department. 

[3] We have seen instances where the Taxpayer is identified as the Petitioner in the captioned matter.  In fact, the Taxpayer is identified as Petitioner in the Department’s Protest and Petition for Hearing Form.  However, because the Department submits the matter to DOAH, the taxpayer has no choice on whether it is identified as Petitioner or Respondent in the proceeding, and the Department’s inconsistency often leads to confusion regarding burden of proof issues.

 

© Horwood Marcus & Berk Chartered 2018. All Rights Reserved.
This post was written by David W. Machemer of Horwood Marcus & Berk Chartered 2018.

U.S. DOL Issues Three Opinion Letters After Nine-Year Hiatus

On April 12, 2018, the Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) issued the first Opinion Letters since the Bush administration, as well as a new Fact Sheet.  The Obama administration formally abandoned Opinion Letters in 2010, but Secretary of Labor Alexander Acosta has restored the practice of issuing these guidance documents.  Opinion Letters, as Secretary Acosta states in the DOL’s April 12 press release, are meant to explain “how an agency will apply the law to a particular set of facts,” with the goal of increasing employer compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and other laws.  Not only do Opinion Letters clarify the law, but pursuant to Section 10 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, they provide a complete affirmative defense to all monetary liability if an employer can plead and prove it acted “in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on” an Opinion Letter.  29 U.S.C. § 259; see also 29 C.F.R. Part 790.  For these reasons, employers should study these and all forthcoming Opinion Letters closely.

Opinion Letter FLSA2018-18 addresses the compensability of travel time under the FLSA, considering the case of hourly-paid employees with irregular work hours who travel in company-provided vehicles to different locations each day and are occasionally required to travel on Sundays to the corporate office for Monday trainings.  The Opinion Letter reaffirms the following guiding principles: First, as a general matter, time is compensable if it constitutes “work” (a term not defined by the FLSA).  Second, “compensable worktime generally does not include time spent commuting to or from work.”  Third, travel away from the employee’s home community is worktime if it cuts across the employee’s regular workday.  Fourth, “time spent in travel away from home outside of regular working hours as a passenger on an airplane, train, boat, bus, or automobile” is not worktime.

With these principles in mind, this letter provides two non-exclusive methods to reasonably determine normal work hours for employees with irregular schedules in order to make an ultimate judgment call on the compensability of travel time.  Under the first method, if a review of an employee’s hours during the most recent month of regular employment reveals typical work hours, the employer can consider those the normal hours going forward.  Under the second method, if an employee’s records do not show typical work hours, the employer can select the average start and end times for the employee’s work days.  Alternatively, where “employees truly have no normal work hours, the employer and employee … may negotiate … a reasonable amount of time or timeframe in which travel outside the employees’ home communities is compensable.”  Crucially, an employer that uses any of these methods to determine compensable travel time is entitled to limit such time to that accrued during normal work hours.

Opinion Letter FLSA2018-19 addresses the compensability of 15-minute rest breaks required every hour by an employee’s serious health condition (i.e., protected leave under the FMLA).  Adopting the test articulated by the Supreme Court in the Armourdecision—whether the break primarily benefits the employer (compensable) or the employee (non-compensable)—the letter advises that short breaks required solely to accommodate the employee’s serious health condition, unlike short, ordinary rest breaks, are not compensable because they predominantly benefit the employee.  The letter cautions, however, that employers must provide employees who take FMLA-protected breaks with as many compensable rest breakers as their coworkers, if any.

Opinion Letter CCPA2018-1NA addresses whether certain lump-sum payments from employers to employees are considered “earnings” for garnishment purposes under Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (the “CCPA”).  The letter articulates the central inquiry as whether the lump-sum payment is compensation “for the employee’s services.” The letter then analyzes 18 types of lump-sum payments, concluding that commissions, bonuses, incentive payments, retroactive merit increases, termination pay, and severance pay, inter alia, are earnings under the CPA, but lump-sum payments for workers’ compensation, insurance settlements for wrongful termination, and buybacks of company shares are not.

Finally, Fact Sheet #17S addresses the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime requirement exemptions for employees who perform bona fide executive, administrative, professional, and outside sales duties (known as the “white collar exemptions”) in the context of higher education institutions.  Specifically, the letter provides guidance as to the exempt status of faculty members, including coaches, non-teacher learned professionals (e.g., CPAs, psychologists, certified athletic trainers, librarians, and postdoctoral fellows), administrative employees (e.g., admissions counselors and student financial aid officers), executive employees (e.g., department heads, deans, and directors), and student-employees (i.e., graduate teaching assistants, research assistants, and student residential assistants).  Of note, the letter confirms that the DOL is undertaking rulemaking to revise the regulations that govern the white collar exemptions.

Carly Baratt contributed to this post.

©2018 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.
This article was written by Jeffrey H. Ruzal of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

President Trump’s Confirmations Keep Being Delayed

Scott Mugno’s confirmation to head OSHA appears to be one of three key Department of Labor nominees caught up in political arm wrestling. Republicans are blaming Democrats for delaying the process by drawing out debates to the full 30 hours permitted by the Senate Rules.  Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) voiced his frustration on April 9thwarning that “[t]he Senate’s workweek will not end until all of these amply qualified nominees are confirmed.”  It should also be noted that a Senate vote on Mugno has yet to be calendared.

There are concerns that OSHA has lacked leadership and direction since Trump took office in January, 2017.  Senate Democrats have indicated that they are prepared to work with Mugno at the helm of OSHA – though they seem to expect that he will be a tough enforcer against violators rather than a follower of Trump’s deregulation agenda.

Currently, there is no indication when Mugno will be confirmed.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2018
This article was written by Tressi L. Cordaro of Jackson Lewis P.C.

Breaking A Sticker Doesn’t Break Your Warranty: How The FTC Is Taking Aim At Manufacturers of Game Consoles, Electronics and Automobiles

We’ve all seen them: hard-to-remove stickers that say, “Warranty void if removed,” or “Tampering with this sticker voids the warranty.” Or perhaps a company states or implies that your use of a third-party repair service will void the warranty. These threats are especially common with sales of expensive electronics (I’m looking at you, Sony, Microsoft, and Apple). But as the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) affirmed again in a press release this week, these threats haven’t been effective since 1975. Manufacturers of gaming systems, cars, phones, and other electronic devices should pay particular attention to this article—and the recommended legal solution—to avoid potential FTC scrutiny.

Congress increased the FTC’s jurisdiction regarding warranties in 1975.

The law at issue is the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301et seq, a consumer-protection statute enacted by Congress in 1975 (the “MMWA”). The MMWA is primarily enforced by the FTC and generally applies to any consumer product that costs more than $15 and is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes. So does the MMWA cover Xboxes? Check. iPhones? Check again. A single box of tissues? No, they’re too cheap. Jackhammers? Probably not, as that’s not a typical “household” item.

Like any other law, the MMWA has a lot of moving parts, but what’s relevant to this article is that it controls what a company can offer (and what it may not withhold) in a written warranty. The MMWA governs both the text of a warranty (which must use “simple and readily understood language”) and the conditions of a warranty (you don’t have to offer a warranty, but if you do, it has to meet certain minimum requirements). Specifically, the MMWA forbids a company from “tying” its warranty to a particular brand of part or service.

What does “tying” mean under the MMWA?

The language at issue here is found at 15 U.S.C. § 2302(c): “No warrantor of a consumer product may condition his written or implied warranty of such product on the consumer’s using, in connection with such product, any article or service (other than article or service provided without charge under the terms of the warranty) which is identified by brand, trade, or corporate name….”  In other words, a company may not say that its warranty will only be honored if the consumer uses a specific product or service. Or put another way, Apple may not tell you (or threaten) that you’ll void the warranty on your iPhone if you replace a broken screen with non-Apple glass.1

The MMWA does have exceptions. For example, if Toyota only honored its warranty to cover work done by Toyota-branded mechanics, that would breach the MMWA—unless those mechanics did the warranty work absolutely free of charge to the consumer. But even then, Toyota may not refuse to honor the warranty just because the consumer had installed aftermarket parts. Unless, that is, Toyota can prove that the aftermarket part caused the problem for which the consumer is seeking warranty coverage. Sorting this out can get complicated.2

If these warranty conditions have been illegal since 1975, why do companies still use this language?

The simple answer is that companies still recite these conditions because they can get away with it. The vast majority of people believe it when a company says that it won’t honor a warranty if you cut that sticker, so they don’t cut it. And most people won’t go through the hassle of a court proceeding over a company’s refusal to cover a $50 repair charge. Even if someone does take the company to court, it’s usually far cheaper for the company to pay out a settlement than to change the way the business is run.3 But all this may change if the FTC steps up its enforcement on “tied” warranties.

Why is the FTC ramping up enforcement of the MMWA?

In its April 10, 2018 press release, the FTC said that it was warning six as-yet-unnamed “major companies”4 who make cars, phones, and gaming systems that their warranties appeared to violate the MMWA and so could be considered “deceptive” under the FTC Act. The FTC explained that it found these warranties offensive because the warranty was conditioned on the use of a specific brand of parts, or on an intact “warranty seal.” If the six companies don’t comply with the FTC’s friendly warning within 30 days, it may result in an enforcement action.

To be clear, if you make or sell something, you don’t want the FTC to decide that you acted deceptively. The FTC (often acting in concert with a state attorney general) will sue you. And while you will likely be able to settle, it will probably cost you a hefty sum to do so. Between July 2016 and June 2017, courts entered orders in favor of the FTC totaling more than $12.7 billion in cases that alleged unfair or deceptive business practices.

So what should a company do to comply with the MMWA and avoid FTC scrutiny?

Companies should be aware that the FTC has been taking a closer eye at warranty issues under the MMWA. In 2015, the FTC issued guidance clarifying that a company cannot “tie” its warranty to a particular brand under the MMWA or even imply that the warranty is tied to a specific brand. That same year, BMW settled an FTC lawsuit on this exact issue under the MMWA after BMW told consumers that they would void their warranty unless they used BMW’s parts and dealers to perform maintenance and repair work. BMW doesn’t appear to have paid a fine as part of its 2015 settlement. But now we are in 2018 and if these six not-yet-identified companies (and more companies to follow) don’t revise their warranties to comply with the MMWA, the FTC is not likely to be so lenient with them.

There is a clear legal solution. To avoid exposure, a company should never tie its warranty to the use of a particular brand of part or servicer unless it is certain that it will fall under one of the narrow exceptions to the MMWA. Neither should a company’s warranty be written in dense legalese or in such a way that a consumer might reasonably *think* that the warranty is contingent on use of a particular brand.

Are your company’s warranties potentially problematic under the MMWA?

Copyright © 2018 Ryley Carlock & Applewhite. A Professional Association. All Rights Reserved.

Ninth Circuit’s Decision Holds That Salary History Is Not a Defense to Equal Pay Claims

The federal Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) mandates equal pay for equal work regardless of sex.  Employers that pay men and women different wages for the same work are strictly liable for violations of the EPA unless they can show that one or more of four exceptions apply to explain the wage disparity. The four statutory exceptions are seniority, merit, the quantity or quality of the employee’s work, or “any other factor other than sex.”  The Ninth Circuit recently took up the question of the meaning of the fourth, catchall exception – “any factor other than sex” – in order to consider whether an employer may rely, in whole or in part, on an employee’s prior salary as a basis for explaining a pay differential in Aileen Rizo v. Jim Yovino.

Rizo was a math consultant who worked for the Fresno County Office of Education (“County”). After learning that comparable male employees were earning more for the same work, Rizo filed suit against her employer, alleging that its practice of calculating the salaries for newly hired employees based on their salary history violated the EPA. The County did not dispute that Rizo was paid less than her male counterparts, but it argued that basing her salary on past earnings was a lawful reason for the pay differential as it constituted a “factor other than sex” under the EPA.

On April 9, 2018, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc rejected the County’s argument. The Court held that “prior salary alone or in combination with other factors cannot justify a wage differential.” Writing for the majority, Judge Reinhart stated that justification of a pay disparity based on “‘any other factor other than sex’ is limited to legitimate, job-related factors such as a prospective employee’s experience, educational background, ability, or prior job performance.” The Court explained that the terms “job-related” and “business-related” are not synonymous and that an employer cannot explain a pay differential based on the benefit to the business as opposed to a legitimate work-motivated consideration.  Some examples of job-related factors identified by the Court included shift differentials, job hazards, physical job requirements, and training.  Unlike each of these things, past salary was not a “job-related” factor but rather, potentially, a business-related factor.

The Court further opined that permitting an employer to rely on historical pay information was inconsistent with the purpose of the EPA, which was to correct past pay discrepancies caused by sex discrimination.  “It is inconceivable,” wrote Reinhart, “that Congress, in an Act the primary purpose of which was to eliminate long-existing ‘endemic’ sex-based wage disparities, would create an exception for basing new hires’ salaries on those very disparities….”  Thus, the majority concluded that relying on past salary in order to explain a wage differential was improper, even if it was only one of the factors ultimately considered.  Confusingly, the Court also noted that there could be instances in which past salary might play a role in individualized negotiations and declined to resolve whether past salary could be taken into account in such circumstances.  However, given the broad pronouncement against factoring past compensation into current salary considerations, it would seem unlikely that the current court would countenance such an exception.

In finding that past salary may never be considered, the Rizo decision overrules the Ninth Circuit’s prior ruling in Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co. 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).  Kouba held that past salary could be one of the factors considered by employers in evaluating pay, as it was a “factor other than sex” permissible to justify pay gaps between men and women under the EPA.  Notably, four of the eleven judges on the panel concurred with the decision in Rizo, because salary history was the sole reason for the pay disparity, but separated from the majority on the issue of excluding salary history from consideration under any circumstance.  The Rizo decision has also exacerbated a circuit split on whether salary history may be considered, and to what extent.  While certain circuits have taken an approach similar to the concurring judges in Rizo, permitting it as long as it is not the sole basis for a pay disparity, the Seventh Circuit has held that salary history is always a legitimate factor other than sex.

While California employers are no longer entitled to inquire about past salary as part of the job application process as of January 1, 2018, in light of the Rizo decision, employers with operations in California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Arizona, Alaska, and Hawaii may wish to take actions to ensure that any pay disparities are not based on salary history, such as not asking about salary history during the hiring process (even in states where this practice is not prohibited by law) and conducting pay equity audits.

 

©2018 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.
Read more on equal pay at the National Law Review’s Labor and Employment Page.

USPTO Director Outlines Challenges to the Patent System at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Patent Policy Conference

The USPTO released a copy of the “Remarks” made by Director Andrei Iancu, that read like a major policy summary regarding challenges to the US patent system. Specific solutions were not suggested, but Iancu identified two areas that need review and may subsequently be changed, particularly since the US Chamber’s 6th Annual International IP index showed the USPTO had fallen in the rankings from 10th to 12th in the world.

What makes this talk important is the Director’s recognition that the Mayo/Alice/Myriad “Rules” are rife with uncertainty for all of the stakeholders. He emphasized that the Office cannot ignore Supreme Court precedent, but he felt that the Office can also “simplify the eligibility determination for our examiners through forward-looking guidance.” (His comments about reviewing all aspects of IPR were more general in nature.)

Of course, I hope that Iancu comes to the recognition that most of the uncertainty and lack of clarity afflicting life sciences patenting comes from the PTO’s sua sponte decision to read and apply both Mayo and Myriad more broadly than the facts and the ultimate Supreme Court decisions require. Mayo involved the old use of an old compound – the correlation between the metabolite levels and side effects or efficacy of a known class of drugs does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the discovery of a previously unknown naturally-occurring correlation and its utility as a diagnostic agent should be deemed patent-ineligible.

Likewise, the limited holding that an isolated human gene or fragment thereof is a natural product does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that isolated polypeptides or fragments thereof also natural products, and are patent ineligible. I hope that the Director will read Judge Rich’s elegant opinion in Bergy II justifying patent-eligibility of useful organisms (such as antibiotics)  discovered in, and isolated from environments (such as dirt)  which environments prevented their practical utility. In any case, the PTO took the opposite position and has been rejecting claims to naturally-sourced chemicals unless the isolation/purification step renders them “markedly different” from the chemical in its natural state.

Perhaps all that I have written here adds up to an “open letter” to the Director, suggesting just a few changes in PTO policy that he could implement without offending the Supreme Court. The Federal Circuit is another matter, but I still cling to the hope that at least some of the Judges would welcome the chance to read Mayo more narrowly, so as not to remove entire art areas from patent protection. In fact, the Director spent most of his remarks emphasizing the importance of patent protection as a driver for the entire R&D community. The Director has outlined areas that need “legal help.” Now, I hope that he will use his “Remarks” as a starting point for meaningful action.

© 2018 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.
This article was written by Warren Woessner of Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.