Trademarks Archives - Page 2 of 3 - The National Law Forum

Names and Brand Names

A key aspect of trademarks has been at the forefront of both fiction and real-life sports news over the past few weeks: what makes a name a name and who can use a name as a trademark? While trademarks are commercial rights, trademark law also protects a person’s right to control their own identity, including well-known pseudonyms and nicknames.

Marvel’s She-Hulk: Attorney-at-Law is, like most TV shows about lawyers, often cavalier with how it represents the law, but when the question of the protagonist’s rights in her nom de guerre came up, it was more accurate than most courtroom dramas. Jen Walters (the civilian identity of the titular She-Hulk) discovers a “super-influencer” has launched a line of cosmetics under the SHE-HULK brand and based on that use, is claiming trademark rights in SHE-HULK, going so far as to sue Jen Walters for her use of the name She-Hulk. While much of the terminology is mangled, the show’s hearing on the issue reaches points that are relevant in the real world. First, does “She-Hulk” identify a living person? And second, would another’s use of SHE-HULK be “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association” (as set forth in 15 U.S. Code § 1125) of that user and the person known to the public as SHE-HULK? It being a superhero show, Jen Walters ultimately vindicates her rights to the She-Hulk name and SHE-HULK Mark.

Circumstances in the real world are rarely as cut-and-dried. In a proceeding before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, NBA player Luka Doncic is attempting to reclaim the trademark rights in his own name from his ex-manager, his mother. Doncic, born in 1999, was a basketball star from his early teens. During his meteoric rise in European basketball, his mother, with his consent at the time, registered a design trademark (consisting mainly of his name) for goods and services including soaps, recorded basketball games, apparel, sports equipment, and promotional and educational services, starting with an application in the European Union in 2015 (when Doncic was 16) and filing in the U.S. in 2018 (when he was 19).

Doncic, as stated in his petition to cancel that U.S. Registration, has since withdrawn his consent to his mother’s use and registration of his name as a trademark. Instead, he has, through his own company, Luka99, Inc., applied to register a few marks including his own name, which have been refused registration because of the existing registration owned by his mother. To clear the way for his own registrations, he is seeking to cancel hers on the basis that (as in the fictional example above) her use or registration is likely to make consumers believe the goods and services offered with her authorization are associated with or endorsed by him, and because he has withdrawn his consent, her registrations are no longer permitted to remain on the register.

As Doncic was a minor when he gave consent, he has a good chance of regaining control of his name. Not everyone is so lucky, so you should be especially careful when entering any agreement that allows someone to use your name as a trademark.

Article By David H. Siegel of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

War and Peace at Rospatent: Protecting Trademarks in Russia

Yes, we shall live, Uncle Vanya. Could Anton Chekhov ever have imagined that his literary work would be used to sell hamburgers? In March, a controversial application for an “Uncle Vanya” mark in connection with “snack bars, cafes, cafeterias, restaurants, bar services, canteens, cooking and home delivery services,” incorporated the red-and-yellow golden arches logo of McDonald’s. It was just one in a series of recent applications in Russia that have caused serious pearl-clutching among intellectual property lawyers.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, the country has faced numerous financial, trade and travel sanctions. It’s also been snubbed by major intellectual property partners. In a February 28 letter, a group of whistleblowers and staff representatives at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) called for the entity’s public condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the rapid closure of its Russia Office. The European Patent Office severed ties with Russia on March 1, and shortly thereafter the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) confirmed that it had “terminated engagement” with officials from Russia’s agency in charge of intellectual property, the Federal Service for Intellectual Property (Rospatent), and with the Eurasian Patent Organization.

In response, Russia has adopted an aggressive posture in the intellectual property realm where it once sought to peacefully engage with the world, an effort that began well before the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. When the USSR joined the Paris Convention in 1965, it eagerly sought to develop Soviet intellectual property. Yet in March, Russia issued Decree No. 299, which effectively nullifies the enforcement value of Russian patents owned by entities and individuals in “unfriendly” countries including the United States, European Union member states, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin also greenlighted the importation of branded products without the brands’ permission, creating gray market headaches. As Boris Edidin, deputy chairman of the Commission for Legal Support of the Digital Economy of the Moscow Branch of the Russian Bar Association, clarified in a recent legal commentary published by Moscow-based RBC Group: “entrepreneurs have the opportunity to import goods of well-known brands, regardless of the presence or absence of an official representative on the Russian market.”

Russia, like the EU, had traditionally adopted a tougher stance than the United States on parallel imports. Now, however, “both by ‘anti-crisis’ measures and by cloak-and-dagger methods” Russia is sure to do all it can to keep its planes flying and its factories running, said Peter B. Maggs, research professor of law at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and noted expert on Russian and Soviet law and intellectual property.’

The increase in parallel imports makes trademark prosecution and maintenance more important than ever in Russia, but it’s not the only cause for concern. In March, as political tensions reached a crescendo, a Russian court declined to enforce the trademark rights for Peppa Pig, the famous British cartoon character, due to “unfriendly actions of the United States of America and affiliated foreign countries.” (See case No. A28- 11930/2021 in the Arbitration Court of the Kirov Region; an appeals court later overturned this holding, in a win for the porcine star.) RBC Group reported in March that it had tracked more than 50 trademark applications by Russian entrepreneurs and businesses for the marks of famous foreign brands, many in the fashion and tech sector. While most trademark applications were explicit copies of existing brands, in other cases applicants were content to imitate well-known trademarks and trade dress.

For example, a Russian entrepreneur from a design studio called Luxorta applied to register an IDEA brand that mimics the style and yellow-and-blue color schemes of famous Swedish brand IKEA. He told RBC that his business had suffered after IKEA suspended its Russian operations, and that he aspired to develop his own line of furniture and work with IKEA’s former suppliers. Other applicants RBC interviewed indicated they hoped to sell the marks back to foreign companies once those companies return.

On April 1, Rospatent published a press statement clarifying that “in case an identical or similar trademark has already been registered in the Russian Federation, it would be the ground for refusal in such registration.” More recently, the head of Rospatent, Yury Zubov, has responded with frustration to news coverage of trademark woes in Russia, noting that intellectual property legislation is unchanged and the “Uncle Vanya” hamburger mark had been withdrawn.

Prof. Maggs agreed that those trying to register or use close copies of foreign marks in Russia will likely fail. He cited a June 2 decision by the Court of Intellectual Property Rights to uphold lower court findings that the mark “FANT” for a carbonated orange soft drink violated unfair competition laws, because it was confusingly similar to the “FANTA” brand owned and licensed to third parties by Coca-Cola HBC Limited Liability Company. Russia’s consumer protection agency had originally brought the case.

The Court reasoned that “confusion in relation to two products can lead not only to a reduction in sales of the FANTA drink and a redistribution of consumer demand, but can also harm the business reputation of a third party, since the consumer, having been misled by the confusion between the two products, in the end receives a different product with different quality, taste and other characteristics.”

In addition, Prof. Maggs said, “the Putin Regime is and will be promoting Russian products as ‘just as good’ as foreign products. An example, obviously approved at high levels is the adoption of a totally different trademark for the sold McDonald’s chain,” he said, referring to the June 12 reopening of former McDonald’s restaurants in Moscow under the name “Vkusno & tochka” (“Tasty and that’s it”).

Brands should be wary of inadvertently jeopardizing their Russian marks by suspending local operations; a trademark may be cancelled in Russia after three years of uninterrupted non-use. While Article 1486 of the Russian Civil Code states that “evidence presented by the rightholder of the fact that the trademark was not used due to circumstances beyond his control [emphasis added] may be taken into account,” brands claiming infringement still risk being ineligible for damages or injunctive relief, because technically they are not losing sales while pausing business in Russia.

Moreover, if a company has suspended sales in Russia to show solidarity with Ukraine but seeks to stop sales in Russia by others, it may be accused of violating the good faith requirement of Article 10 of the Russian Civil Code, which states that exercising “rights for the purpose of limiting competition and also abuse of a dominant position in a market are not allowed.”

Russia remains a party to numerous intellectual property treaties, including the Paris Convention, the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the Hague Agreement. But as the Peppa Pig case illustrates, court decisions on intellectual property are not immune to political heat.

The question looming on the horizon is whether, if the current crisis escalates, the Russian government would outright cancel trademarks from hostile countries. It would not be the first time a state denied intellectual property rights during political conflicts. In the aftermath of the First World War, for example, the US government advocated for the “expropriation” of property, including intellectual property, of German nationals, perceived as responsible for the militarism of their government1. And in the 1930s, the German patent office removed Jewish patent-holders from its roster as part of its notorious “Aryanization” process. However, because Russia is not officially at war with the countries it has deemed “unfriendly,” these precedents are not directly on point.

Brands that have suspended business operations in Russia should monitor their trademark portfolios closely for infringement and consider how they can prove use of each mark during a prolonged absence from the Russian market. In other words: keep your eyes on Uncle Vanya.

FOOTNOTES

¹Caglioti DL. Property Rights in Time of War: Sequestration and Liquidation of Enemy Aliens’ Assets in Western Europe during the First World War. Journal of Modern European History. 2014;12(4):523-545. doi:10.17104/1611-8944_2014_4_523.

Article By Cynthia Martens of Katten

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

A Primer on Practice at the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board

In a precedential decision rendered in an opposition proceeding, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (Board) took the lawyers for each side to task for ignoring Board rules in presentation of their case, but ultimately decided the case on a likelihood of confusion analysis. The Board found that the parties’ marks and goods were “highly similar” and sustained the opposition. Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC, Opposition Nos. 91223352; 91223683; 91227387 (June 15, 2022, TTAB) (Wellington, Heasley and Hudis, ALJs) (precedential).

Pharmavite sought registration of the standard character mark NATURE MADE for various foods and beverages based on allegations of bone fide intent to use in commerce. Made in Nature (MIN) opposed on the ground that Pharmavite’s mark so resembled MIN’s registered and common law “Made In Nature” marks as to cause a likelihood of confusion when used on the goods for which registration was sought.

In its brief to the Board, Pharmavite raised, for the first time, the Morehouse (or prior registration) defense. MIN objected to the Morehouse defense as untimely. The Board agreed, noting that defense is “an equitable defense, to the effect that if the opposer cannot be further injured because there already exists an injurious registration, the opposer cannot object to an additional registration that does not add to the injury.” The party asserting a Morehouse defense must show that it “has an existing registration [or registrations] of the same mark[s] for the same goods” (emphasis in original).

Here, the Board found that this defense was not tried by the parties’ express consent and that implied consent “can be found only where the non-offering party (1) raised no objection to the introduction of evidence on the issue, and (2) was fairly apprised that the evidence was being offered in support of the issue.” In this case, Pharmavite did introduce into the record its prior NATURE MADE registrations but only for the purpose of supporting Pharmavite’s “[r]ight to exclude; use and strength of Applicant’s mark.” The Board found that this inclusion did not provide notice of reliance on the Morehouse or prior registration defense at trial.

In sustaining the opposition, the Board commented extensively on the record and how it was used, “[s]o that the parties, their counsel and perhaps other parties in future proceedings can benefit and possibly reduce their litigation costs.”

Over-Designation of the Record as Confidential

The Board criticized the parties for over-designating as confidential large portions of the record, warning that only the specific “exhibits, declaration passages or deposition transcript pages that truly disclosed confidential information should have been filed under seal under a protective order.” If a party over-designates material as confidential, “the Board will not be bound by the party’s designation.”

Duplicative Evidence

The Board criticized the parties for filing “duplicative evidence by different methods of introduction; for example, once by Notice of Reliance and again by way of an exhibit to a testimony declaration or testimony deposition.” The Board noted that such practice is viewed “with disfavor.”

Overuse of Deposition Designations

The Board criticized both parties for over-designating extensive excerpts of discovery deposition testimony of their own witnesses under Trademark Rule 2.120(k)(4), which provides:

If only part of a discovery deposition is submitted and made part of the record by a party, an adverse party may introduce under a notice of reliance any other part of the deposition which should in fairness be considered so as to make not misleading what was offered by the submitting party. A notice of reliance filed by an adverse party must be supported by a written statement explaining why the adverse party needs to rely upon each additional part listed in the adverse party’s notice, failing which the Board, in its discretion, may refuse to consider the additional parts.

As the Board explained, “[i]t is not an appropriate use of Trademark Rule 2.120(k)(4) to introduce unrelated testimony, rather than just the additional necessary portions of discovery deposition excerpts that clarify the passages originally submitted.” In this case, the Board stated that both parties “are equally guilty of abusing Trademark Rule 2.120(k)(4), and [we] trust that the parties and their counsel will not repeat this practice in future matters before the Board.”

Limiting the Record to Pertinent Evidence

The Board noted that “sizeable portions of each party’s evidentiary materials were not pertinent to the issues involved in this rather straightforward priority and likelihood of confusion opposition proceeding, such that the Board was forced to spend needless time sifting through an inappropriately large record in search of germane proofs.” The Board pointedly noted that “[t]his is not productive. ‘Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in [the record].’”

Record Citations

The Board advised the parties to adhere to its Manual of Procedure at § 801.03. As to how evidence should be cited:

For each significant fact recited, the recitation of facts should include a citation to the portion of the evidentiary record where supporting evidence may be found. When referring to the record in an inter partes proceeding before the Board, parties should include a citation to the TTABVUE entry and page number (e.g., 1 TTABVUE 2) to allow the reader to easily locate the cited materials.

In this case, the Board criticized the parties for using their own exhibit numbering system rather than the TTABVUE docket number and, for testimony submitted by deposition transcripts, using the page and line numbers provided by the court reporters rather than the TTABVUE citations. As the Board noted, this encumbered the Board in its efforts “to provide evidentiary references for use in this opinion; lengthening the time for review of the record, drafting of the decision and ultimately for issuance of this opinion.”

Likelihood of Confusion

After its chapter and verse critique of the presentation by the parties, the Board embarked on an exhaustive Trademark Act § 2(d) analysis, considering and balancing each of the DuPont factors, and ultimately concluded that MIN had sustained its opposition.

Article By Paul Devinsky of McDermott Will & Emery

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Green Innovation Being Fast Tracked by USPTO

The USPTO now fast tracks applications involving greenhouse gas reduction technologies. The new Climate Change Mitigation Pilot Program targets impact on the climate by accelerating examination of patent applications for innovations that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Qualifying applications may be advanced out of turn for examination (granted special status) until a first action on the merits—typically the first substantive examination—is complete. Advantageously, qualifying applications do not incur the petition to make special fee and is not required to satisfy the other requirements of the accelerated examination program.

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) accept petitions to make special under this program until June 5, 2023, or the date when 1,000 applications have been granted special status under this program, whichever occurs earlier. “This program aligns with and supports Executive Order 14008, dated January 27, 2021, and supports the USPTO’s efforts to secure an equitable economic future, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and mitigate the effects of climate change.” The new program takes steps toward working to incentivize and expedite clean energy technologies that will help reduce greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate the effects of climate change.

To qualify for the Program:

Patent Applications must contain one or more claims to a product or process that mitigates climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and be: (a) a non-continuing original utility non-provisional application; and (b) an original utility non-provisional application that claims the benefit of the filing date under 35 U.S.C. 120, 121, 365(c), or 386(c) of only one prior application that is either a non-provisional application or an international application designating the United States. Note: Claiming the benefit under 35 U.S.C. 119(e) of one or more prior provisional applications or claiming a right of foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. 119(a)-(d) or (f) to one or more foreign applications will not affect eligibility for this pilot program.
The application or national stage entry and the requisite petition form must be electronically filed by use of the Patent Center of the USPTO, and the specification, claims, and abstract must be submitted in DOCX format.
Applicants must file the petition to make special with the application or entry into the national stage under 35 U.S.C. 371 or within 30 days of the filing date or entry date of the application. The fee for the petition to make special under 37 CFR 1.102(d) has been waived for this program.
Applicants must use Form PTO/SB/457—which contains the petition and requisite certifications—to request participation in this program.
Petition filing limitations: Applicants may not file a petition to participate in this pilot program if the inventor or any joint inventor has been named as the inventor or a joint inventor on more than four other non-provisional applications in which a petition to make special under this program has been filed.

In a recent blog post announcing the Climate Change Mitigation Pilot Program, USPTO Director Kathi Vidal said, “It’s essential to protect these transformative energy innovations with intellectual property (IP). Innovation is a primary driver of the U.S. economy, and IP is the bridge between an idea and bringing that innovation to market. Industries based on innovation and the protection of intellectual property generate almost $8 trillion ($7.8 trillion) in GDP, and account for 44% of all U.S. jobs. Workers in patent-intensive industries earn almost $1,900 per week. That is 97% higher than the average weekly wage of workers in non-IP intensive industries.”

Vidal also said, “Startup companies that have a patent are far more likely to be successful in raising funding than those that have not secured intellectual property protection. When used as collateral, a patent increases venture capital funding by 76% over three years, and increases funding from an initial public offering by 128%, the approval of a startup’s first patent application increases its employee growth by 36% over the next five years, and after five years, a new company with a patent increase its sales by a cumulative 80% more than companies that do not have a patent.”

Moving forward to protect essential green energy transition technology can be helpful for future corporate and strategic goals. This new Climate Change Mitigation Pilot Program opens the door to accelerating potential patent protection for many of these developing technological fields.

Article By Jeffrey S. Whittle, Karthika Perumal, Ph.D., Christopher Kent, Kevin J. Davis, Ph.D., and Samuel A. Savanich of Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP

For more environmental, energy, and resources news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Not So Fast—NCAA Issues NIL Guidance Targeting Booster Activity

Recently, the NCAA Division I Board of Directors issued guidance to schools concerning the intersection between recruiting activities and the rapidly evolving name, image, and likeness legal environment (see Bracewell’s earlier reporting here). The immediately effective guidance was in response to “NIL collectives” created by boosters to solicit potential student-athletes with lucrative name, image, and likeness deals.

In the short time since the NCAA adopted its interim NIL policy, collectives have purportedly attempted to walk the murky line between permissible NIL activity and violating the NCAA’s longstanding policy forbidding boosters from recruiting and/or providing benefits to prospective student-athletes. Already, numerous deals have been reported that implicate a number of wealthy boosters that support heavyweight Division I programs.

One booster, through two of his affiliated companies, reportedly spent $550,000 this year on deals with Miami football players.¹ Another report claims that a charity started in Texas—Horns with Heart—provided at least $50,000 to every scholarship offensive lineman on the roster^.2 As the competition for talent grows, the scrutiny on these blockbuster deals is intensifying.

Under the previous interim rules, the NCAA allowed athletes to pursue NIL opportunities while explicitly disallowing boosters from providing direct inducements to recruits and transfer candidates. Recently, coaches of powerhouse programs have publicly expressed their concern that the interim NIL rules have allowed boosters to offer direct inducements to athletes under the pretense of NIL collectives.³

The new NCAA guidance defines a booster as “any third-party entity that promotes an athletics program, assists with recruiting or assists with providing benefits to recruits, enrolled student-athletes or their family members.”⁴ This definition could now include NIL collectives created by boosters to funnel name, image and likeness deals to prospective student-athletes or enrolled student-athletes who are eligible to transfer. However, it may be difficult for the NCAA to enforce its new policy given the rapid proliferation of NIL collectives and the sometimes contradictory policies intended to govern quid pro quo NIL deals between athletes and businesses.

Carefully interpreting current NCAA guidance will be central to navigating the new legal landscape. Businesses and students alike should seek legal advice in negotiating and drafting agreements that protect the interests of both parties while carefully considering the frequently conflicting state laws and NCAA policies that govern the student’s right to publicity.

ENDNOTES

1. Jeyarajah, Shehan, NCAA Board of Directors Issues NIL Guidance to Schools Aimed at Removing Boosters from Recruiting Process, CBS Sports (May 9, 2022, 6:00 PM).

2. Dodd, Denis, Boosters, Collectives in NCAA’s Crosshairs, But Will New NIL Policy Be Able To Navigate Choppy Waters?, CBS Sports (May 10, 2022, 12:00 PM).

3. Wilson, Dave, Texas A&M Football Coach Jimbo Fisher Rips Alabama Coach Nick Saban’s NIL Accusations: ‘Some People Think They’re God,’ ESPN (May 19, 2022).

4. DI Board of Directors Issues Name, Image and Likeness Guidance to Schools, NCAA (May 9, 2022, 5:21 PM).

Article By Jonathon K. Hance, Joshua H. Gold-Quirós, and Drew Taggart of Bracewell LLP

For more entertainment, art, and sports news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Protection for Voice Actors is Artificial in Today’s Artificial Intelligence World

As we all know, social media has taken the world by storm. Unsurprisingly, it’s had an impact on trademark and copyright law, as the related right of publicity. A recent case involving an actor’s voice being used on the popular app TikTok is emblematic of the time. The actor, Bev Standing, sued TikTok for using her voice, simulated via artificial intelligence (AI) without her permission, to serve as “the female computer-generated voice of TikTok.” The case, which was settled last year, illustrates how the law is being adapted to protect artists’ rights in the face of exploitation through AI, as well as the limits of current law in protecting AI-created works.

Standing explained that she thinks of her voice “as a business,” and she is looking to protect her “product.” Apps like TikTok are taking these “products” and feeding them into an algorithm without the original speaker’s permission, thus impairing creative professionals’ ability to profit in an age of widespread use of the Internet and social media platforms.

Someone’s voice (and aspects of their persona such as their photo, image, or other likeness) can be protected by what’s called the “right of publicity.” That right prevents others from appropriation of one’s persona – but only when appropriation is for commercial purposes. In the TikTok case, there was commercial use, as TikTok was benefiting from use of Standing’s voice to “narrate” its users’ videos (with some user videos apparently involving “foul and offensive language”). In her Complaint, Standing alleged TikTok had violated her right of publicity in using her voice to create the AI voice used by TikTok, and relied upon two other claims: false designation of origin under the Lanham Act and copyright infringement, as well as related state law claims. The false designation of origin claim turned on whether Standing’s voice was so recognizable that another party’s misappropriation of it could confuse consumers as to whether Standing authorized the Tik Tok use. The copyright infringement claim was possible because Standing created the original voice files for a company that hired her to record Chinese language translations. TikTok subsequently acquired the files but failed to get a license from Standing to use them, as TikTok was legally obligated to do because Standing was the original creator (and therefore copyright owner) of the voice files.

As with other historical technological innovations (one of the earliest being the printing press), the law often plays catch-up, but has proven surprisingly adaptable to new technology. Here, Standing was able to plead three legal theories (six if you count the state statutory and common law unfair competition claims), so it seems artists are well-protected by existing law, at least if they are alleging AI was used to copy their work or persona.

On the other hand, the case for protecting creative expression produced in whole or in part by AI is much more difficult. Some believe AI deserves its own form of copyright, since innovative technology has increasingly made its own music and sounds. Currently, protection for these sounds is limited, since only humans can be identified as authors for the purposes of copyright. Ryan Abott, a professor of law and health science at the University of Surrey in Britain, is attempting to bring a legal case against the U.S. Copyright Office to register a digital artwork made by a computer with AI as its author. The fear, says Abott, is that without rights over these sounds, innovation will be stifled — individuals will not have incentive to create AI works if they cannot protect them from unauthorized exploitation.

Article By Jeanne Hamburg of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more communications, media, and internet news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Shijiazhuang Market Supervision Bureau Fines Trademark Agency 50,000 RMB for Attempting to Trademark Olympic Gold Medalist’s Social Media Account

On May 18, 2022, the Shijiazhuang Yuhua District Market Supervision Administration issued an Administrative Penalty Decision against a Shijiazhuang trademark agency for attempting to trademark the name of Eileen Gu’s Douyin account (TikTok’s sister app in China). Eileen Gu won three gold medals in the Beijing Winter Olympics earlier this year and has become extremely popular in China.

On February 11, 2022, Wang XX, the legal representative of the trademark applicant Hebei Yi Biotechnology Co., Ltd., contacted Wang YY, a staff member of a trademark agency in Shijiazhuang, China, to apply for trademarks for Frog Princess Eileen in English and Chinese. Frog Princess Eileen is the name of the 2022 Winter Olympics champion and model Eileen Gu’s (Gu Ailing) Douyin registered account. This account has released videos since August 29, 2018. Ms. Gu won gold medals in big air and halfpipe and a silver medal in slopestyle at the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing. She then received a lot of media coverage and became famous, with a great reputation and influence. Therefore, Ms. Gu has the prior rights to the names of her Douyin registered account “Frog Princess Eileen” and due to their high popularity and influence, the scope of protection for “Frog Princess Eileen” is more powerful than the general right of trade names.

A promotional image from Gu’s recent campaign with Louis Vuitton. Credit: Louis Vuitton

At the same time, Ms. Gu made outstanding contributions to my China’s gold medal list in this Winter Olympics. Applicants other than Ms. Gu herself that register and apply for the trademarks “Frog Princess Eileen” not only damages the prior rights of the Winter Olympic champion Gu but also damages the public interests of the society, which is easy to cause social damage and adverse effects. In this case, the trademark agency in Shijiazhuang, as a trademark agency agency for many years, nonetheless applied for a trademark even though it should have known or knew that the trademark would damage the existing prior rights of others.

Accordingly, the trademark agency was fined 50,000 RMB and Wang YY and Li (business personnel) were each fined 5,000 RMB.

The full text of the punishment is available here (Chinese only) courtesy of 知识产权界: 行政处罚决定书.

Article By Aaron Wininger of Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.

For more intellectual property news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Thailand’s Personal Data Protection Act Enters into Force

On June 1, 2022, Thailand’s Personal Data Protection Act (“PDPA”) entered into force after three years of delays. The PDPA, originally enacted in May 2019, provides for a one-year grace period, with the main operative provisions of the law originally set to come into force in 2020. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, however, the Thai government issued royal decrees to extend the compliance deadline to June 1, 2022.

The PDPA mirrors the EU General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) in many respects. Specifically, it requires data controllers and processors to have a valid legal basis for processing personal data (i.e., data that can identify living natural persons directly or indirectly). If such personal data is sensitive personal data (such as health data, biometric data, race, religion, sexual preference and criminal record), data controllers and processors must ensure that data subjects give explicit consent for any collection, use or disclosure of such data. Exemptions are granted for public interest, contractual obligations, vital interest or compliance with the law.

The PDPA applies both to entities in Thailand and abroad that process personal data for the provision of products or services in Thailand. Like the GDPR, data subjects are guaranteed rights, including the right to be informed, access, rectify and update data; restrict and object to processing; and the right to data erasure and portability. Breaches may result in fines between THB500,000 (U.S.$14,432) and THB5 million, plus punitive compensation. Certain breaches involving sensitive personal data and unlawful disclosure also carry criminal penalties including imprisonment of up to one year.

Article By Hunton Andrews Kurth’s Privacy and Cybersecurity of Hunton Andrews Kurth

For more communications, media & internet news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Trade Mark Infringement – Muslim Dating App Meets its Match [.com]

A recent Intellectual Property Enterprise Court Decision (IPEC) on 20 April 2022 has decided that ‘Muzmatch’, an online matchmaking service to the Muslim Community has infringed Match.com’s registered trade marks.

The decision by Nicholas Caddick Q.C was that Muzmatch’s use of signs and its name amounted to trade mark infringement and/or passing off of Match.com’s trade marks. This case follows successful oppositions by Match.com to Muzmatch’s registration of its marks in 2018, and unsuccessful attempts by Match.com to purchase Muzmatch between 2017 and 2019.

Match.com is one of the largest and most recognisable dating platforms in the UK. It first registered a word mark ‘MATCH.COM’ in 1996 and also owns other dating-related brands including Tinder and Hinge with other marks including the word mark ‘TINDER’. Match.com used a 2012 TNS report to illustrate its goodwill and reputation and 70% of people surveyed would be able to recall Match.com if prompted, 44% unprompted and 31% of people would name Match.com as the first dating brand off the ‘top of their head.’

Muzmatch is a comparatively niche but growing dating platform, which aims to provide a halal (i.e. in compliance with Islamic law) way for single Muslim men and women to meet a partner. Muzmatch is comparatively much smaller and was founded in 2011 by Mr Shahzad Younas and now has had around 666,069 sign-ups in the UK alone.

The Court considered that the marks ‘Muzmatch’ and ‘MATCH.COM’ and each company’s graphical marks, had a high degree of similarity in the services provided. The marks were also similar in nature orally and conceptually and the addition of the prefix ‘Muz’ did not distinguish the two marks, nor could the lack of the suffix ‘.com’ or stylistic fonts/devices.

The key issue of the case relates to the idea of the term ‘Match’ which is used by both marks to describe the nature of the business: match[ing]. Muzmatch argued that as both marks share this descriptive common element, so it is difficult to conclude that there is a likelihood of confusion between the two marks as the term just describes what each business does.

The Court found that finding that there is a likelihood of confusion for a common descriptive element is not impossible, as the descriptive element can be used distinctively. The average consumer would conclude that the portion ‘Match’ is the badge of origin for Match.com due to its reputation as a brand and the very substantial degree of distinctiveness in the dating industry. An average consumer would have seen the word ‘Match’ as the dominant element in the Match.com trade marks and Match.com is often referred to as just ‘Match’ in advertisements.

Aside from its marks, Muzmatch utilised a Search Engine Optimisation strategy from January 2012 whereby it utilised a list of around 5000 keywords which would take a user to a landing page on the its website. In the list of the keywords used, Muzmatch used the words ‘muslim-tinder’, ‘tinder’ and ‘halal-tinder’ which were accepted by Muzmatch during the litigation to have infringed Match’s trade marks of the Tinder brand including the word mark ‘TINDER’. Muzmatch’s SEO use was also found to cause confusion based on some of its keywords including ‘UK Muslim Match’, which again uses the term Match distinctively, therefore a consumer may confuse a link to ‘UK Muslim Match’ with ‘Match.com’.

Therefore, the Court found that there was likely to be confusion between Muzmatch and Match.com because of the distinctive nature of the term ‘Match’ in the world of dating platforms. An average consumer would conclude that Muzmatch was connected in a material way with the Match.com marks, as if it was targeted at Muslim users as a sub-brand, so this confusion would be trade mark infringement under S10(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1994.

The Court also considered that Muzmatch had taken unfair advantage of Match.com’s trade marks and had therefore infringed those marks under S10(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1994. This was due to the reputation of Match.com’s trade marks and because a consumer would believe that Muzmatch was a sub-brand of Match.com.

The Court rejected Muzmatch’s defence of honest concurrent use and found that Match.com would also have an alternative claim in the tort of passing off.

Key Points:

The Court found that a common descriptive element can acquire distinctiveness in an area, solely because of a company’s reputation and influence in that market.

The use of Search Engine Optimisation strategies can also constitute a trade mark infringement.

The lack of the suffix ‘.com’ in a mark is not sufficient to distinguish use from a household brand such as Match.com, so care should be taken with brands such as ‘Match.com’, ‘Booking.com’[1]

Source:

[1] Match Group, LLC, Meetic SAS, Match.Com International Limited v Muzmatch Limited, Shahzad Younas [2022] EWHC 941 (IPEC)

[1] Note- Blog Post of July 6 2020 Relating to Booking.com- https://www.iptechblog.com/2020/07/us-supreme-court-opens-doors-to-generic-com-trademarks/

Article By Connor Sargeant and the Intellectual Property and Technology Practice Group at Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP .

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Trademark Infringement in the Metaverse: Nike Sues Online Resale Platform Alleging Infringing Use of Logo in StockX NFT

In the 3D virtual world known as the metaverse, pioneering enterprises are exploring ways to capitalize on this new frontier’s growing popularity. As expected, the use of company marks and brands is becoming an issue to watch. Take Nike’s recent lawsuit against online resale platform StockX. The suit alleges StockX NFTs that incorporate images of Nike sneakers infringe on Nike’s famous trademarks. The complaint presents novel legal issues that, once decided, have the potential to define the scope of trademark rights in the world of NFTs.

What is an NFT?

Before we get into infringement, we need to understand the landscape in play. Non-fungible tokens, or NFTs, are unique digital assets stored on the blockchain, which is a digital and non-centralized ledger that publicly discloses who owns a particular NFT. NFTs act as a digital representation of ownership of tangible and nontangible items in the real world, such as artwork, real estate, and video game skins. Each NFT has a unique address associated with its owner that enables proof of ownership. NFTs can exist in any form of digital media, ranging from images to songs. Among some of the famous examples are the Bored Ape Yacht Club NFTs, which act as both a digital avatar and a ticket to an exclusive online social club.

Bored Ape Yacht Club NFTs are represented by a digital avatar of a uniquely designed ape. The middle image is a Bored Ape owned by Tonight Show host, Jimmy Fallon, who purchased the NFT for over $200,000.

While the first NFT was minted back in May 2014, they have only recently gained mainstream attention following celebrity buy-in and reports of NFTs selling for millions of dollars. In 2021, a crypto entrepreneur purchased Twitter founder Jack Dorsey’s first-ever tweet as an NFT for $2.9 million. As pricy NFTs garnered mainstream attention, many were left wondering why someone would pay millions of dollars to purchase what appears to be a simple image or video that is readily available to view online for free. While it is possible to screengrab and download copies of digital art that someone has purchased as an NFT, the NFT purchaser still remains the owner of the original work and such ownership is recorded on the blockchain. While someone may have a print of one of Monet’s impressionist landscapes hanging in his or her living room, only one original copy of the painting exists and ownership of that original carries significant value despite the existence of copies.

Nike Swooshes In

Nike brought an action in February 2022 for trademark infringement against StockX, a large online resale marketplace. StockX is a streetwear reseller that, unlike other marketplaces, also acts as an intermediary that provides authentication services to its customers. Recently, StockX expanded this authentication service by launching its own collection of NFTs, which it claims are linked to authenticated physical goods. Many of the NFTs being minted by StockX are comprised of images of Nike sneakers. Nike alleges such use of Nike’s famous marks constitutes trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and trademark dilution, among other violations.

StockX’s Nike NFTs.

The case hinges on whether StockX’s NFTs represent proof of ownership of physical goods or whether the NFTs themselves are virtual products.

StockX contends its NFTs are simply a method to track ownership of physical Nike products sold on the StockX marketplace and held in StockX’s custody. In denying that its NFTs are virtual products, StockX points to its redemption process in which NFTs may be redeemed by an owner at any time in exchange for delivery of the physical shoes. Importantly, this novel method for tracking ownership facilitates a more efficient and sustainable resale process. Instead of physical goods that are frequently sold and traded among consumers being repeatedly shipped following each sale, users can simply sell and exchange an NFT.

Nike argues that StockX’s Nike-branded NFTs are themselves virtual products, and not simply a representation of ownership of physical Nike sneakers. While StockX touts its customers’ ability to redeem an NFT in exchange for possession of the physical product as evidence that their NFTs act simply as proof of ownership, such redemption process is currently unavailable, with no indication as to when, if ever, such service will become available. Instead of presenting a new and efficient method for trading goods, Nike alleges that StockX is minting NFTs to profit from Nike’s goodwill and reputation in the streetwear scene. Indeed, the potential profit from selling Nike-branded NFTs is significant – a physical pair of Nike Dunk Low shoes have a resale price of $282 on StockX, but the StockX NFT purportedly linked to this shoe has traded for over $3,000, an almost 1,000 percent price difference between the physical shoe and the NFT. Nike concludes that the StockX NFTs are collectible virtual products, created and distributed by StockX using Nike branding without authorization.

Nike has a particularly strong interest in avoiding brand confusion in this case, as it recently acquired RTFKT Studios (pronounced “artifact”), a digital art and collectibles creative studio engaged in the creation of NFTs, in the hopes of combining blockchain technology with sneaker culture and fashion. Through this new acquisition, Nike has released NFTs through RTFKT, including collectible digital sneakers. Notably, Nike additionally has multiple pending trademark applications before the US Patent and Trademark Office to register its sneakers as virtual goods.

The Nike case is poised to be key to the development of metaverse jurisprudence because of its potential to address the scope of a trademark owner’s right to regulate unauthorized uses of its marks in NFTs. While the outcome of this case remains to be seen, other major brands are already seeking protection of their branding in this emerging space by filing trademarks to specifically protect virtual goods and services. Given the nascent uncertainty of how our current legal framework will apply in the metaverse, seeking registration for virtual goods and services is a prudent step for brand owners as we conduct business in the fast-growing digital economy.

Article By Catherine E. O’Brien with Katten.

For more articles about copyright infringement, visit the NLR Intellectual Property Law section.

Category: Trademarks

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