Category: Trade

USTR Seeks Comments on Section 301 Tariffs on Chinese Goods; Portal Opens Nov. 15

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced Oct. 17 that starting Nov. 15, it will begin soliciting comments on the effectiveness of Section 301 tariffs the Trump administration placed on Chinese goods. The notice and request for comments relate to USTR’s ongoing four-year statutory review of the Section 301 investigation of China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation.

In the Federal Registrar Notice, USTR said it is seeking “public comments on the effectiveness of the actions in achieving the objectives of the investigation, other actions that could be taken, and the effects of such actions on the United States economy, including consumers.”

The USTR is specifically interested in comments on the following:

  • The effectiveness of the actions in obtaining the elimination of China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation.
  • The effectiveness of the actions in counteracting China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation.
  • Other actions or modifications that would be more effective in obtaining the elimination of or in counteracting China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation.
  • The effects of the actions on the U.S. economy, including on U.S. consumers.
  • The effects of the actions on domestic manufacturing, including in terms of capital investments, domestic capacity and production levels, industry concentrations, and profits.
  • The effects of the actions on U.S. technology, including in terms of U.S. technological leadership and U.S. technological development.
  • The effects of the actions on U.S. workers, including with respect to employment and wages.
  • The effects of the actions on U.S. small businesses.
  • The effects of the actions on U.S. supply chain resilience.
  • The effects of the actions on the goals of U.S. critical supply chains.
  • Whether the actions have resulted in higher additional duties on inputs used for additional manufacturing in the United States than the additional duties on particular downstream product(s) or finished good(s) incorporating those inputs.

The continuing assessment of these additional duties has been criticized by some business groups and lawmakers who believe they have hurt both U.S. businesses and U.S. consumers but have not checked China’s behavior. They also have called for the reinstatement of previously issued exclusions and for a new, robust tariff exclusion process. Some labor and civil society groups, however, want the tariffs to remain in place. The fate of these tariffs is closely tied to the Biden administration’s ongoing review and the overall U.S.–China trade relationship. The controversial tariff program that covers upwards of $300 billion worth of imports from China has sparked lawsuits from more than 3,500 importers.

The comment period begins on Nov. 15 and extends until Jan. 17. USTR said it will post specific questions on its website Nov. 1 before the portal opens.

Article By Laura Siegel Rabinowitz, Donald S. Stein, and Madeline Orlando of Greenberg Traurig, LLP

For more trade regulation news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

Threats of Antitrust Enforcement in the Supply Chain

With steep inflation and seemingly constant disruptions in supply chains for all manner of goods, the Biden Administration has turned increasingly to antitrust authorities to tame price increases and stem future bottlenecks. These agencies have used the myriad tools at their disposal to carry out their mandate, from targeting companies that use supply disruptions as cover for anti-competitive conduct, to investigating industries with key roles in the supply chain, to challenging vertical mergers that consolidate suppliers into one firm. In keeping with the Administration’s “whole-of-government” approach to antitrust enforcement, these actions have often involved multiple federal agencies.

Whatever an entity’s role in the supply chain, that company can make a unilateral decision to raise its prices in response to changing economic conditions. But given the number of enforcement actions, breadth of the affected industries, and the government’s more aggressive posture toward antitrust enforcement in general, companies should tread carefully.

What follows is a survey of recent antitrust enforcement activity affecting supply chains and suggested best practices for minimizing the attendant risk.

Combatting Inflation as a Matter of Federal Antitrust Policy

Even before inflation took hold of the U.S. economy, the Biden Administration emphasized a more aggressive approach to antitrust enforcement. President Biden appointed progressives to lead the antitrust enforcement agencies, naming Lina Kahn chair of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Jonathan Kanter to head the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division (DOJ). President Biden also issued Executive Order 14036, “Promoting Competition in the American Economy.” This Order declares “that it is the policy of my Administration to enforce the antitrust laws to combat the excessive concentration of industry, the abuses of market power, and the harmful effects of monopoly and monopsony….” To that end, the order takes a government-wide approach to antitrust enforcement and includes 72 initiatives by over a dozen federal agencies, aimed at addressing competition issues across the economy.

Although fighting inflation may not have been the initial motivation for the President’s agenda to increase competition, the supply disruptions wrought by the COVID-19 pandemic and persistent inflation, now at a 40-year high, have made it a major focus. In public remarks the White House has attributed rising prices in part to the absence of competition in certain industries, observing “that lack of competition drives up prices for consumers” and that “[a]s fewer large players have controlled more of the market, mark-ups (charges over cost) have tripled.” In a November 2021 statement declaring inflation a “top priority,” the White House directed the FTC to “strike back at any market manipulation or price gouging in this sector,” again tying inflation to anti-competitive conduct.

The Administration’s Enforcement Actions Affecting the Supply Chain

The Administration has taken several antitrust enforcement actions in order to bring inflation under control and strengthen the supply chain. In February, the DOJ and FBI announced an initiative to investigate and prosecute companies that exploit supply chain disruptions to overcharge consumers and collude with competitors. The announcement warned that individuals and businesses may be using supply chain disruptions from the COVID-19 pandemic as cover for price fixing and other collusive schemes. As part of the initiative, the DOJ is “prioritizing any existing investigations where competitors may be exploiting supply chain disruptions for illicit profit and is undertaking measures to proactively investigate collusion in industries particularly affected by supply disruptions.” The DOJ formed a working group on global supply chain collusion and will share intelligence with antitrust authorities in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK.

Two things stand out about this new initiative. First, the initiative is not limited to a particular industry, signaling an intent to root out collusive schemes across the economy. Second, the DOJ has cited the initiative as an example of the kind of “proactive enforcement efforts” companies can expect from the division going forward. As the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement put it in a recent speech, “the division cannot and will not wait for cases to come to us.”

In addition to the DOJ’s initiative, the FTC and other federal agencies have launched more targeted inquiries into specific industries with key roles in the supply chain or prone to especially high levels of inflation. Last fall, the FTC ordered nine large retailers, wholesalers, and consumer good suppliers to “provide detailed information that will help the FTC shed light on the causes behind ongoing supply chain disruptions and how these disruptions are causing serious and ongoing hardships for consumers and harming competition in the U.S. economy.” The FTC issued the orders under Section 6(b) of the FTC Act, which authorizes the Commission to conduct wide-ranging studies and seek various types of information without a specific law enforcement purpose. The FTC has in recent months made increasing use of 6(b) orders and we expect may continue to do so.

Amid widely reported backups in the nation’s ports, the DOJ announced in February that it was strengthening its partnership with and lending antitrust expertise to the Federal Maritime Commission to investigate antitrust violations in the ocean shipping industry. In a press release issued the same day, the White House charged that “[s]ince the beginning of the pandemic, these ocean carrier companies have been dramatically increasing shipping costs through rate increases and fees.” The DOJ has reportedly issued a subpoena to at least one major carrier as part of what the carrier described as “an ongoing investigation into supply chain disruption.”

The administration’s efforts to combat inflation through antitrust enforcement have been especially pronounced in the meat processing industry. The White House has called for “bold action to enforce the antitrust laws [and] boost competition in meat processing.” Although the DOJ suffered some well-publicized losses in criminal trials against some chicken processing company executives, the DOJ has obtained a $107 million guilty plea by one chicken producer and several indictments.

Most recently, the FTC launched an investigation into shortages of infant formula, including “any anticompetitive [] practices that have contributed to or are worsening this problem.” These actions are notable both for the variety of industries and products involved and for the multitude of enforcement mechanisms used, from informal studies with no law enforcement purpose to criminal indictments.

Preventing Further Supply-Chain Consolidation

In addition to exposing and prosecuting antitrust violations that may be contributing to inflation and supply issues today, the Administration is taking steps to prevent further consolidation of supply chains, which it has identified as a root cause of supply disruptions. DOJ Assistant Attorney General Kanter recently said that “[o]ur markets are suffering from a lack of resiliency. Among many other things, the consequences of the pandemic have revealed supply chain fragility. And recent geopolitical conflicts have caused prices at the pump to skyrocket. And, of course, there are shocking shortages of infant formula in grocery stores throughout the country. These and other events demonstrate why competition is so important. Competitive markets create resiliency. Competitive markets are less susceptible to central points of failure.”

Consistent with the Administration’s concerns with consolidation in supply chains, the FTC is more closely scrutinizing so-called vertical mergers, combinations of companies at different levels of the supply chain. In September 2021, the FTC voted to withdraw its approval of the Vertical Merger Guidelines published jointly with the DOJ the year before. The Guidelines, which include the criteria the agencies use to evaluate vertical mergers, had presumed that such arrangements are pro-competitive. Taking issue with that presumption, FTC Chair Lina Khan said the Guidelines included a “flawed discussion of the purported pro-competitive benefits (i.e., efficiencies) of vertical mergers” and failed to address “increasing levels of consolidation across the economy.”

In January 2022, the FTC and DOJ issued a request for information (RFI), seeking public comment on revisions to “modernize” the Guidelines’ approach to evaluating vertical mergers. Although the antitrust agencies have not yet published revised Guidelines, the FTC has successfully blocked two vertical mergers. In February, semiconductor chipmaker, Nvidia, dropped its bid to acquire Arm Ltd., a licenser of computer chip designs after two months of litigation with the FTC. The move “represent[ed] the first abandonment of a litigated vertical merger in many years.” Days later Lockheed Martin, faced with a similar challenge from the FTC, abandoned its $4.4 billion acquisition of missile part supplier, Aerojet Rocketdyne. In seeking to prevent the mergers, the FTC cited supply-chain consolidation as one motivating factor, noting for example that the Lockheed-Aerojet combination would “further consolidate multiple markets critical to national security and defense.”

Up Next? Civil Litigation

This uptick in government enforcement activity and investigations may lead to a proliferation of civil suits. Periods of inflation and supply disruptions are often followed by private plaintiff antitrust lawsuits claiming that market participants responded opportunistically by agreeing to raise prices. A spike in fuel prices in the mid-2000s, for example, coincided with the filing of class actions alleging that four major U.S. railroads conspired to impose fuel surcharges on their customers that far exceeded any increases in the defendants’ fuel costs, and thereby collected billions of dollars in additional profits. That case, In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litigation, is still making its way through the courts. Similarly, in 2020 the California DOJ brought a civil suit against two multinational gas trading firms claiming that they took advantage of a supply disruption caused by an explosion at a gasoline refinery to engage in a scheme to increase gas prices. All indicators suggest that this trend will continue.

Reducing Antitrust Risk in the Supply Chain and Ensuring Compliance

Given the call to action for more robust antitrust enforcement under Biden’s Executive Order 14036 and the continued enhanced antitrust scrutiny of all manner of commercial activities, companies grappling with supply disruptions and rampant inflation should actively monitor this developing area when making routine business decisions.

As a baseline, companies should have an effective antitrust compliance program in place that helps detect and deter anticompetitive conduct. Those without a robust antitrust compliance program should consider implementing one to ensure that employees are aware of potential antitrust risk areas and can take steps to avoid them. If a company has concerns about the efficacy of its current compliance program, compliance reviews and audits – performed by capable antitrust counsel – can be a useful tool to identify gaps and deficiencies in the program.

Faced with supply chain disruptions and rampant inflation, many companies have increased the prices of their own goods or services. A company may certainly decide independently and unilaterally to raise prices, but those types of decisions should be made with the antitrust laws in mind. Given the additional scrutiny in this area, companies may wish to consider documenting their decision-making process when adjusting prices in response to supply chain disruptions or increased input costs.

Finally, companies contemplating vertical mergers should recognize that such transactions are likely to garner a harder look, and possibly an outright challenge, from federal antitrust regulators. Given the increased skepticism about the pro-competitive effects of vertical mergers, companies considering these types of transactions should consult antitrust counsel early in the process to help assess and mitigate some of the risk areas with these transactions.

Article By Elizabeth A. N. Haas, Ian T. Hampton, and Kate E. Gehl of Foley & Lardner LLP

For more antitrust legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Foley & Lardner LLP

War and Peace at Rospatent: Protecting Trademarks in Russia

Yes, we shall live, Uncle Vanya. Could Anton Chekhov ever have imagined that his literary work would be used to sell hamburgers? In March, a controversial application for an “Uncle Vanya” mark in connection with “snack bars, cafes, cafeterias, restaurants, bar services, canteens, cooking and home delivery services,” incorporated the red-and-yellow golden arches logo of McDonald’s. It was just one in a series of recent applications in Russia that have caused serious pearl-clutching among intellectual property lawyers.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, the country has faced numerous financial, trade and travel sanctions. It’s also been snubbed by major intellectual property partners. In a February 28 letter, a group of whistleblowers and staff representatives at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) called for the entity’s public condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the rapid closure of its Russia Office. The European Patent Office severed ties with Russia on March 1, and shortly thereafter the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) confirmed that it had “terminated engagement” with officials from Russia’s agency in charge of intellectual property, the Federal Service for Intellectual Property (Rospatent), and with the Eurasian Patent Organization.

In response, Russia has adopted an aggressive posture in the intellectual property realm where it once sought to peacefully engage with the world, an effort that began well before the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. When the USSR joined the Paris Convention in 1965, it eagerly sought to develop Soviet intellectual property. Yet in March, Russia issued Decree No. 299, which effectively nullifies the enforcement value of Russian patents owned by entities and individuals in “unfriendly” countries including the United States, European Union member states, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin also greenlighted the importation of branded products without the brands’ permission, creating gray market headaches. As Boris Edidin, deputy chairman of the Commission for Legal Support of the Digital Economy of the Moscow Branch of the Russian Bar Association, clarified in a recent legal commentary published by Moscow-based RBC Group: “entrepreneurs have the opportunity to import goods of well-known brands, regardless of the presence or absence of an official representative on the Russian market.”

Russia, like the EU, had traditionally adopted a tougher stance than the United States on parallel imports. Now, however, “both by ‘anti-crisis’ measures and by cloak-and-dagger methods” Russia is sure to do all it can to keep its planes flying and its factories running, said Peter B. Maggs, research professor of law at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and noted expert on Russian and Soviet law and intellectual property.’

The increase in parallel imports makes trademark prosecution and maintenance more important than ever in Russia, but it’s not the only cause for concern. In March, as political tensions reached a crescendo, a Russian court declined to enforce the trademark rights for Peppa Pig, the famous British cartoon character, due to “unfriendly actions of the United States of America and affiliated foreign countries.” (See case No. A28- 11930/2021 in the Arbitration Court of the Kirov Region; an appeals court later overturned this holding, in a win for the porcine star.) RBC Group reported in March that it had tracked more than 50 trademark applications by Russian entrepreneurs and businesses for the marks of famous foreign brands, many in the fashion and tech sector. While most trademark applications were explicit copies of existing brands, in other cases applicants were content to imitate well-known trademarks and trade dress.

For example, a Russian entrepreneur from a design studio called Luxorta applied to register an IDEA brand that mimics the style and yellow-and-blue color schemes of famous Swedish brand IKEA. He told RBC that his business had suffered after IKEA suspended its Russian operations, and that he aspired to develop his own line of furniture and work with IKEA’s former suppliers. Other applicants RBC interviewed indicated they hoped to sell the marks back to foreign companies once those companies return.

On April 1, Rospatent published a press statement clarifying that “in case an identical or similar trademark has already been registered in the Russian Federation, it would be the ground for refusal in such registration.” More recently, the head of Rospatent, Yury Zubov, has responded with frustration to news coverage of trademark woes in Russia, noting that intellectual property legislation is unchanged and the “Uncle Vanya” hamburger mark had been withdrawn.

Prof. Maggs agreed that those trying to register or use close copies of foreign marks in Russia will likely fail. He cited a June 2 decision by the Court of Intellectual Property Rights to uphold lower court findings that the mark “FANT” for a carbonated orange soft drink violated unfair competition laws, because it was confusingly similar to the “FANTA” brand owned and licensed to third parties by Coca-Cola HBC Limited Liability Company. Russia’s consumer protection agency had originally brought the case.

The Court reasoned that “confusion in relation to two products can lead not only to a reduction in sales of the FANTA drink and a redistribution of consumer demand, but can also harm the business reputation of a third party, since the consumer, having been misled by the confusion between the two products, in the end receives a different product with different quality, taste and other characteristics.”

In addition, Prof. Maggs said, “the Putin Regime is and will be promoting Russian products as ‘just as good’ as foreign products. An example, obviously approved at high levels is the adoption of a totally different trademark for the sold McDonald’s chain,” he said, referring to the June 12 reopening of former McDonald’s restaurants in Moscow under the name “Vkusno & tochka” (“Tasty and that’s it”).

Brands should be wary of inadvertently jeopardizing their Russian marks by suspending local operations; a trademark may be cancelled in Russia after three years of uninterrupted non-use. While Article 1486 of the Russian Civil Code states that “evidence presented by the rightholder of the fact that the trademark was not used due to circumstances beyond his control [emphasis added] may be taken into account,” brands claiming infringement still risk being ineligible for damages or injunctive relief, because technically they are not losing sales while pausing business in Russia.

Moreover, if a company has suspended sales in Russia to show solidarity with Ukraine but seeks to stop sales in Russia by others, it may be accused of violating the good faith requirement of Article 10 of the Russian Civil Code, which states that exercising “rights for the purpose of limiting competition and also abuse of a dominant position in a market are not allowed.”

Russia remains a party to numerous intellectual property treaties, including the Paris Convention, the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the Hague Agreement. But as the Peppa Pig case illustrates, court decisions on intellectual property are not immune to political heat.

The question looming on the horizon is whether, if the current crisis escalates, the Russian government would outright cancel trademarks from hostile countries. It would not be the first time a state denied intellectual property rights during political conflicts. In the aftermath of the First World War, for example, the US government advocated for the “expropriation” of property, including intellectual property, of German nationals, perceived as responsible for the militarism of their government1. And in the 1930s, the German patent office removed Jewish patent-holders from its roster as part of its notorious “Aryanization” process. However, because Russia is not officially at war with the countries it has deemed “unfriendly,” these precedents are not directly on point.

Brands that have suspended business operations in Russia should monitor their trademark portfolios closely for infringement and consider how they can prove use of each mark during a prolonged absence from the Russian market. In other words: keep your eyes on Uncle Vanya.

FOOTNOTES

1 Caglioti DL. Property Rights in Time of War: Sequestration and Liquidation of Enemy Aliens’ Assets in Western Europe during the First World War. Journal of Modern European History. 2014;12(4):523-545. doi:10.17104/1611-8944_2014_4_523.

Article By Cynthia Martens of Katten

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

UK Prohibits Certain Investment in Russia

From 19 July 2022,1 it is a violation of UK financial sanctions for any person who knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that they are carrying out, directly or indirectly, certain investment activity in Russia. These prohibitions follow the UK Government’s 6 April 2022 announcement of its intention to introduce an outright ban on all new outward investment in Russia.

The prohibitions are subject to exceptions and do not impact acts undertaken to satisfy obligations under a contract concluded before 19 July 2022, or an ancillary contract necessary for the satisfaction of that contract, subject to notifying Her Majesty’s Treasury at least five working days before the day on which any related act is carried out. There is also the option to apply for a specific Treasury licence, such as to enable humanitarian assistance activity or if connected with the provision of medical goods or services.

Furthermore, General Licence INT/2022/2002560 has been granted, taking effect from 19 July 2022 and expiring on 26 July 2022, allowing a seven-day wind-down period in respect of the prohibited activities.

What Is Prohibited?

The Regulations prohibit:

  • Directly or indirectly establishing any joint venture with a person connected with Russia;
  • Opening representative offices or establishing branches or subsidiaries in Russia;
  • Directly or indirectly acquiring any ownership interest in Russian land and persons connected with Russia for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available directly or indirectly to, or for the benefit of, persons connected with Russia;
  • Directly or indirectly acquiring any ownership interest in or control over a relevant entity or persons (other than an individual) with a place of business in Russia for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, persons connected with Russia; and
  • The provision of investment services directly related to all the activities summarised above.

Definitions

A “person connected with Russia” means:

  • any individual or group of individuals who are ordinarily resident or located in Russia, or an entity which is incorporated or constituted under Russian law or domiciled in Russia;2

and is not:

  • A Schedule 2 Entity, as detailed in the Regulations;3 or
  • An entity domiciled outside of Russia or a branch, or subsidiary, of such a non-Russian entity.4

A “branch”5 means, in relation to a person other than an individual, a place of business which forms a legally dependent part of that person and which carries out all or some of the transactions inherent in the business of that person.

A “relevant entity”6 means a person, other than an individual, which has a place of busines located in Russia, but is not a person connected with Russia.

A person directly or indirectly “acquiring any ownership interest in or control over a person or entity”7 means:

  • Acquiring any share in the person or entity;
  • Acquiring any voting rights in the person or entity;
  • Acquiring any right to appoint or remove a majority of the board of directors of the person or entity; or
  • Acquiring any means of ensuring that the affairs of the person or entity are conducted in accordance with the wishes of the person.

Exceptions

The exceptions8 introduced enables a person to deal directly or indirectly with:

  • A transferable security otherwise prohibited by Regulation 16;
  • A relevant security issued by a person connected with Russia; or
  • A relevant security issued by a relevant entity.

Full definitions of the terms above are included within Regulation 60ZZA.

From 19 July 2022,1 it is a violation of UK financial sanctions for any person who knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that they are carrying out, directly or indirectly, certain investment activity in Russia. These prohibitions follow the UK Government’s 6 April 2022 announcement of its intention to introduce an outright ban on all new outward investment in Russia.

The prohibitions are subject to exceptions and do not impact acts undertaken to satisfy obligations under a contract concluded before 19 July 2022, or an ancillary contract necessary for the satisfaction of that contract, subject to notifying Her Majesty’s Treasury at least five working days before the day on which any related act is carried out. There is also the option to apply for a specific Treasury licence, such as to enable humanitarian assistance activity or if connected with the provision of medical goods or services.

Furthermore, General Licence INT/2022/2002560 has been granted, taking effect from 19 July 2022 and expiring on 26 July 2022, allowing a seven-day wind-down period in respect of the prohibited activities.

What Is Prohibited?

The Regulations prohibit:

  • Directly or indirectly establishing any joint venture with a person connected with Russia;
  • Opening representative offices or establishing branches or subsidiaries in Russia;
  • Directly or indirectly acquiring any ownership interest in Russian land and persons connected with Russia for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available directly or indirectly to, or for the benefit of, persons connected with Russia;
  • Directly or indirectly acquiring any ownership interest in or control over a relevant entity or persons (other than an individual) with a place of business in Russia for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, persons connected with Russia; and
  • The provision of investment services directly related to all the activities summarised above.

Definitions

A “person connected with Russia” means:

  • any individual or group of individuals who are ordinarily resident or located in Russia, or an entity which is incorporated or constituted under Russian law or domiciled in Russia;2

and is not:

  • A Schedule 2 Entity, as detailed in the Regulations;3 or
  • An entity domiciled outside of Russia or a branch, or subsidiary, of such a non-Russian entity.4

A “branch”5 means, in relation to a person other than an individual, a place of business which forms a legally dependent part of that person and which carries out all or some of the transactions inherent in the business of that person.

A “relevant entity”6 means a person, other than an individual, which has a place of busines located in Russia, but is not a person connected with Russia.

A person directly or indirectly “acquiring any ownership interest in or control over a person or entity”7 means:

  • Acquiring any share in the person or entity;
  • Acquiring any voting rights in the person or entity;
  • Acquiring any right to appoint or remove a majority of the board of directors of the person or entity; or
  • Acquiring any means of ensuring that the affairs of the person or entity are conducted in accordance with the wishes of the person.

Exceptions

The exceptions8 introduced enables a person to deal directly or indirectly with:

  • A transferable security otherwise prohibited by Regulation 16;
  • A relevant security issued by a person connected with Russia; or
  • A relevant security issued by a relevant entity.

Full definitions of the terms above are included within Regulation 60ZZA.

FOOTNOTES

1 Regulation 18B introduced via The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 12) Regulations 2022 [2022 No. 801], in force as of 19 July 2022.

2 Regulation 19A(2), The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 [2019 No. 855] – as amended.

3 See pp. 123-124.

4 Regulation 16(4D), Ibid.

5 Regulation 18B(8), The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 12) Regulations 2022 [2022 No. 801].

6 Regulation 18B(8), Ibid.

7 Regulation 18B(8), Ibid.

8 Regulation 60ZZA, Ibid.

Article By Annabel Thomas, Jo Rickards, Gavin Costelloe, Bethany Histed, Kara M. Bombach, and Erik de Bie of Greenberg Traurig, LLP

For more global law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

FTC Takes First Actions Under New Made in USA Labeling Rule, Fining Battery Companies for Violations

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently cracked down on Lithionics Battery, LLC, and Lions Not Sheep Products, LLC, for violating the FTC’s Made in USA Labeling Rule. These are some of the first enforcement actions after the FTC codified its longstanding informal Made in USA guidance, which makes it easier for the FTC to seek damages and levy fines. Under the proposed settlement, Lithionics will pay a $100,000 fine for falsely labeling batteries as US-made, while Lions Not Sheep will be required to pay $211,335 for falsely labeling clothing as US-made.

The Made in USA Labeling Rule

Under the Made in USA Labeling Rule, marketers suspected of making unqualified Made in USA claims must prove that their products:

  1. are all or virtually all made in the US;
  2. that all significant processing occurred in the US; and
  3. that the final assembly occurred in the US.

Although Congress enacted legislation authorizing the FTC to seek relief for Made in USA fraud almost thirty years ago, the FTC long remained silent on enforcement due to a general consensus that this specific type of fraud should not be penalized. The 2021 Made in USA Labeling Rule alters this perspective, codifying the FTC’s enforcement policy. With the Commission now being allowed to levy fines, seek damages, penalties, and/or redress on marketers who deceptively and fraudulently represent that their products are made in the US, the FTC has stepped up its enforcement efforts.

The FTC’s Recent Allegations with Lithionics and Lions Not Sheep

Lithionics

Lithionics is a Florida-based company best known for its battery products. The company has become a regular brand throughout American households. It designs and sells products for vehicles, as well as amusement parks.

The FTC alleged that Lithionics has been in violation of the Made in USA Labeling Rule since at least 2018 by intentionally misrepresenting the origin of Lithionics products. According to the Complaint, Lithionics’ products are labeled “Proudly Designed and Built in the USA” and feature an American flag. The claims were also featured across company websites, social media platforms, videos, and printed catalogs. However, according to the FTC, “all Lithionics battery and battery module products contain imported lithium ion cells” and “other significant imported components,” which, if true, would render Lithionics’ Made in USA claims false or unsubstantiated under the Made in USA Labeling Rule.”

Under the proposed order, Lithionics and its owner must stop making these claims unless they can prove their statements are true. As noted above, the company must also pay $100,000 for the alleged activity.

Lions Not Sheep

Lions Not Sheep is a self-proclaimed lifestyle brand that sells sweatshirts, hats, and shirts online.

In its allegations against Lions Not Sheep, the FTC alleged that the company has violated the Made in USA Labeling Rule since May 2021. According to the Complaint, the company intentionally removed tags disclosing that items were made in a foreign country. Instead of leaving the original tags, the FTC alleged that the company replaced them with Made in USA tags despite the products being “wholly imported with limited finishing work performed in the United States.” To make matters worse, the FTC found a video posted on the internet featuring the company’s owner blatantly claiming he could hide the fact that his shirts were made in China.

In addition to charging the company with violating the Made in the USA Labeling Rule, the FTC charged the company with violating mandatory country-of-origin labeling rules, which require all products covered by the Textile Act to include labels disclosing the manufacturer or marketer name and country where the product was manufactured. The company will be prohibited from making these claims and forced to pay $211,335.

Primary Takeaway

With the FTC now levying significant fines under the new Made in USA rule, the potential cost of non-compliance has also significantly increased. Companies should provide notice to their marketing teams and carefully review any existing claims to ensure that Made in USA claims are adequately substantiated and that marketing materials are not conveying unintended implied claims.

Article By Anthony V. Lupo, Dan Jasnow, and Destiny Planter of ArentFox Schiff LLP

For more antitrust legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 ArentFox Schiff LLP

The Way to Protect Your Business? What You Need to Know About Trade Secrets

What do Coca-Cola’s secret formula, McDonalds’ special sauce, and Google’s search algorithm have in common? Each is a protected trade secret. In other words, they are proprietary information vital to these companies’ survival and are among their most valuable corporate secrets.

A trade secret can be anything of value to your company that is unique and not known to persons outside the company. For example, a trade secret can be a recipe, process, formula, strategy, technique, or device that your competitors do not know, do not have, and cannot use.

Trade secret law can be less risky in some respects than other forms of intellectual property like patents, copyrights, and trademarks. The application process for a patent requires that a company disclose the secret itself. With that comes an inherent risk—should the application be denied, the secret is no longer a secret. While the protection afforded by trade secret law may be considered fragile, meaning constant vigilance is required to maintain secrecy, the secret remains a secret; while a patent, even after issuance, carries some risk of post-grant invalidation. By contrast, a trade secret owner may ultimately enjoy greater certainty by maintaining protection, potentially forever. However, a trade secret is entitled to protection only for as long as it is kept a secret. If the information is lawfully disclosed to the public, it is no longer confidential and loses its trade secret protection forever.

Governing Law: Both federal and state law recognize the time and money invested to gain competitive advantages like trade secrets and protect those advantages. Federal Law: Under the controlling federal legislation passed by Congress in 2016, the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) defines a trade secret as something used in a company’s business that (a) is not known or readily accessible by competitors, (b) has commercial value or that provides a competitive advantage in the marketplace, and (c) the owner of the information protects from disclosure through reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. Prior to the DTSA’s enactment in 2016, no federal statute promulgated a federal trade secret private right of action.

In addition to the DTSA’s rules regarding trade secrets, additional federal rules apply. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 makes the theft of trade secrets a federal crime. The Act prohibits the theft of a trade secret by a person intending or knowing that the offense will injure a trade secret owner. The Act also makes it a federal crime to receive, buy, or possess trade secret information knowing it to have been stolen. The Act allows the government to punish thefts of trade secrets by imprisonment up to 15 years and/or fines up to $5 million, depending on whether the defendant is an individual or a corporation. A private party can still sue for trade secret theft even if the federal government files a criminal case under the Economic Espionage Act.

New York State Law: Prior to federal law, most states had some form of trade secret law that varied state to state. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) was published in 1979 and amended in 1985 to provide a uniform trade secret law. Many states, including Pennsylvania in 2004 and New Jersey in 2012, adopted the UTSA. Notably, New York did not adopt the UTSA and does not have its own state trade secret statute, and thus relies on the common law.

Under New York common law, “misappropriation” refers to the acquisition of a trade secret by someone who knows that the trade secret was acquired by improper means—theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach, or inducement of a breach of duty to maintain secrecy. The New York statute of limitations requires that any action for misappropriation be filed three years from the date the misappropriation is discovered. Further, New York law requires that the use of the trade secret be continuous in the operation of a business, rather than one-time use.

Cartier v. Tiffany: Cartier recently filed suit against its luxury rival Tiffany & Co. in New York state court. Cartier v. Tiffany & Co., et al.,650925/2022 (N.Y. Sup.). Richemont-owned Cartier sets out claims against LVMH’s Tiffany & Co. for various contractual and tort claims and trade secret misappropriation against both defendants [Who is the other defendant?]. Cartier seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to require defendants to refrain from using the allegedly misappropriated information and return it to Cartier, as well as a judgment for any “compensatory damages that may be caused by [Tiffany’s] wrongful conduct.”

The complaint states that Tiffany & Co. lured former Cartier employee Megan Marino away from her role as its Assistant Manager for Jewelry Merchandising to learn more about Cartier’s “High Jewelry” collection, where pieces typically cost $50,000 to $10 million.

Cartier claims Marino was bound by non-disclosure and non-solicitation agreements she had signed as part of her role at Cartier and that she breached those agreements by using Cartier’s confidential business information to benefit Tiffany. This information includes Cartier’s “very sensitive and valuable” internal company documents that Marino forwarded to her personal email. Specifically, Marino “referenced a [Cartier] Excel spreadsheet” that “detailed Cartier’s confidential, High Jewelry assortment information.” Based on that spreadsheet, Cartier alleges, Marino “created a new Excel document, derived entirely from Cartier’s confidential information,” including “the total number of High Jewelry pieces at various Cartier locations in the U.S.” Cartier maintains this information is “only accessible by a limited number of Cartier employees [and] not known outside of Cartier” and “allow[s] a sophisticated competitor to replicate key strategies and, with relative ease, to reverse engineer how Cartier allocates, merchandises, and prices its High Jewelry stock.” Cartier claims the proprietary and confidential nature of this information amounts to a trade secret-protected asset.

Cartier further claims Tiffany has a history of poaching employees and maintains a “disturbing culture of misappropriating competitive information.” Given the alleged pattern, Cartier asserts that Tiffany now possesses “a substantial amount of [its] confidential and trade secret information that it obtained from Marino and other former Cartier employees” as a result of their “unlawful taking of Cartier’s valuable confidential information and trade secrets.”

Even if Cartier successfully establishes that it maintains trade secret information that Tiffany misappropriated, the case is hardly straightforward. Establishing damages in cases like this is particularly challenging, as it is difficult to assign a dollar value to trade secret information that will compensate the plaintiff for the economic loss caused by the defendant’s misappropriation. As a result, courts generally have quite a bit of discretion in fashioning damages awards.

Article By David H. Siegel of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

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©2022 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Takes Effect: What Importers Need to Know

The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) is in effect as of June 21, 2022. Congress passed the Act in December 2021 to increase enforcement of longstanding U.S. policy prohibiting the importation of goods, or components thereof, made with forced labor and to create a “rebuttable presumption” that merchandise from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) or by an entity on the UFLPA Entity List is made with forced labor and thereby prohibited from entry into the United States. The rebuttable presumption applies to downstream products that incorporate inputs from XUAR, regardless of where the finished products are manufactured, including goods from outside XUAR in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), or in third countries. There is no de minimis provision in the law – any prohibited content, no matter how small, will make a product subject to the rebuttable presumption made by the law. If an importer can demonstrate by “clear and convincing” evidence that the goods were not produced wholly or in part by forced labor, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) will grant an “exception” to the presumption. The UFLPA provides for increased detentions and seizures of merchandise and potential civil and criminal penalties. See prior GT Alerts on the UFLPA.

Pursuant to the UFLPA, a multi-agency task force chaired by the Department of Homeland Security was mandated to develop a strategy for the Act’s implementation. On June 17, in anticipation of the June 21 effective date, DHS released the “Strategy to Prevent the Importation of Goods Mined, Produced, or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People’s Republic of China” (Enforcement Strategy), which includes:

  • An assessment of risk of importing goods mined, produced, or manufactured, wholly or in part, in the PRC; according to the strategy, complex supply chains that touch XUAR are “highly susceptible to contamination by goods made using forced labor.”
  • A list of entities affiliated with forced labor; therefore, their products are subject to the presumption that their goods are prohibited from entry. The Entity list will be updated multiple times per year and will be publicly available.
  • A list of high priority sectors and products including apparel and textiles, cotton and cotton products, polysilicon, and tomato products. Other products listed include footwear, nails, electronics, and toys.
  • Guidance to importers advising that companies need heightened due diligence to ensure compliance with UFLPA and to identify potential supply chain exposure to Xinjiang. Supply chain tracing is the general method to demonstrate that goods are free of inputs from Xinjiang, but CBP expects that barriers to supply chain tracing may make it difficult for importers to be compliant and has stated that third-party audits alone are insufficient to demonstrate due diligence.

Should CBP detain goods on suspicion of being made wholly or in part with forced labor, the importer has options. It can re-export the goods (up until CBP seizes them); it can abandon the goods; it can seek an “exception” for the goods, to get them released from CBP custody; it can also provide information to CBP demonstrating that the goods are not subject in any way to the Act. The evidence and documentation needed for the latter two must be “clear and convincing.”

It should be noted that in order to obtain an “exception” for goods that have been detained, an importer must meet all three of the following requirements:

  • Provide clear and convincing evidence that the detained goods were not made in whole or in part with forced labor, or were sourced from entities on the Entity List.
  • Fully and substantively respond to any questions from CBP.
  • Show that it has complied with all of the requirements set out in the Enforcement Strategy and CBP’s Operational Guidance (i.e., due diligence, supply chain tracing and management, etc.).

The Enforcement Strategy document provides importers with guidance in the following three areas:

  • Due diligence, effective supply chain tracing, and supply chain management measures to ensure that no goods violating the Act enter the importer’s supply chain.
  • The type, nature, and extent of evidence that demonstrates that goods originating in China were not mined (or grown), produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in Xinjiang.
  • The type, nature, and extent of evidence that demonstrates goods originating in China, including goods detained under Section 307 of the Tariff Act, were not mined (or grown), produced, or manufactured wholly or in part with forced labor.

CBP has made it clear that should there be a detention, participants in the Customs and Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program (C-TPAT) will be prioritized for review of submissions to rebut the presumption that the merchandise was made with forced labor.

Importers may wish to plan for contingencies should CBP detain imported merchandise, map complex supply chains and review purchase agreements and supplier codes of conduct.

Article By Laura Siegel Rabinowitz and Donald S. Stein of Greenberg Traurig, LLP

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©2022 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

Health Care Providers on Alert: Two Hospitals Penalized for Continuous Noncompliance with the Hospital Price Transparency Rule

We previously discussed the requirements of the Hospital Price Transparency Rule (“Rule”) on health care providers and health plans, as well as CMS’s proposal to increase penalties for a hospital’s failure to comply with the Rule.  About a year and a half after the Rule became effective, CMS has now imposed its first set of civil monetary penalties (“CMPs”) on Northside Hospital Atlanta and Northside Hospital Cherokee, which have been fined $883,180 and $214,320, respectively.

The Rule requires, in part, hospitals to make public a machine-readable file containing a list of all standard charges for all items and services, such as, e.g., supplies, room and board, and use of the facility, among other items.  See 45 C.F.R. § 180.40(a); id. at § 180.20.  The Rule also requires hospitals to display shoppable services in a consumer-friendly manner.  See id. at § 180.60(d)(2); id. at § 180.60(b).  The goal of these specific requirements, in addition to those set forth in the remainder of the Rule, is to provide consumers with sufficient information about the charges for certain items and services by requiring health care providers and health plans to be publicly transparent about such charges.

Based on CMS’s CMP letters, dated June 7, 2022, Northside Hospital Atlanta and Northside Hospital Cherokee were non-compliant with the aforementioned specific requirements of the Rule.  The chronology of events is important to understand how CMS ended up issuing its CMP letters.

Northside Hospital Atlanta

For Northside Hospital Atlanta:

  • CMS documented the hospital’s non-compliance since March 24, 2021.
  • CMS issued a Warning Letter, dated April 19, 2021, to the hospital and provided it the opportunity to respond and to provide supporting documentation to CMS.
  • Northside Hospital Atlanta did not respond.
  • On September 2, 2021, CMS reviewed the hospital’s website and determined that the non-compliance persisted.
  • On September 30, 2021, CMS issued a Request for Corrective Action Plan (CAP) to the hospital, stating that it was non-compliant with the aforementioned specific requirements of the Rule.
  • On November 15, 2021, in response to the Request for CAP, the hospital stated that patients could request specific price estimate quotes by calling or emailing Northside Hospital Atlanta, which CMS determined was insufficient in response to its Request for CAP and to comply with the Rule.
  • On December 20, 2021, CMS requested a revised CAP from the hospital.
  • Northside Hospital Atlanta did not respond.
  • On January 11, 2022, CMS conducted a technical assistance call with the hospital, during which the hospital confirmed that it was non-compliant with the Rule and explained that it had intentionally removed all previously posted pricing files.
  • On January 24, 2022, CMS, again, requested a revised CAP from the hospital.
  • Northside Hospital Atlanta did not respond.

Based on the foregoing, CMS imposed an $883,180 CMP on Northside Hospital Atlanta, calculated as follows, pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 180.90:

  • $36,300
    • $300 per day of non-compliance times 121 days.
    • 121 days represents the number of calendar days during 2021 that Northside Hospital Atlanta was non-compliant with the Rule (September 2, 2021 through December 31, 2021), pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 180.90(2)(i).

 plus

  • $846,880
    • $10 per bed per day times 536 beds times 158 days.
    • 158 days represents the number of calendar days during 2022 that Northside Hospital Atlanta was non-compliant with the Rule (January 1, 2022 through the date of CMS’s CMP letter, June 7, 2022), pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 180.90(2)(ii).

Northside Hospital Atlanta has until 60 calendar days from the date of CMS’s CMP letter to pay.  Until the hospital notifies CMS that all non-compliance has been corrected, CMPs will continue to accrue.

Northside Hospital Cherokee

For similar reasons as Northside Hospital Atlanta, Northside Hospital Cherokee was fined $214,320.  CMS noted that Northside Hospital Cherokee was non-compliant since April 16, 2021, and notified the hospital by Warning Letter, dated May 18, 2021.  CMS reviewed the hospital’s website on September 9, 2021, and issued a Request for CAP on October 27, 2021—to which the hospital did not respond.  Similar to Northside Hospital Atlanta, CMS held a technical assistance call on January 11, 2022, during which Northside Hospital Cherokee notified CMS that it had intentionally removed all previously posted pricing files.  CMS requested a Request for CAP on January 24, 2022—to which the hospital did not respond.

Similar to Northside Hospital Atlanta, Northside Hospital Cherokee was penalized $214,320, calculated as follows:

  • $34,200
    • $300 per day of non-compliance times 114 days.
    • 114 days represents the number of calendar days during 2021 that Northside Hospital Cherokee was non-compliant with the Rule (September 9, 2021 through December 31, 2021), pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 180.90(2)(i).

plus

  • $180,120
    • $10 per bed per day times 114 beds times 158 days.
    • 158 days represents the number of calendar days during 2022 that Northside Hospital Cherokee was non-compliant with the Rule (January 1, 2022 through the date of CMS’s CMP letter, June 7, 2022), pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 180.90(2)(ii).

Similar to Northside Hospital Atlanta, CMS noted that Northside Hospital Cherokee continues to be non-compliant and, thus, CMPs will continue to accrue.

Takeaways

These fines reflect CMS’s willingness to take material enforcement action where the Rule’s regulatory requirements are largely ignored and CMS’s subsequent efforts to obtain compliance are rejected.  Non-compliance carries heavy fines that are calculated, in part, by the number of days of non-compliance and by bed count.  Health care providers should take notice and ensure that they are compliant or, at least, making efforts towards compliance with the Rule’s requirements.  Critically, CMS will not accept a refusal to comply, as reflected in CMS’s responses to Northside Hospital Atlanta’s and Northside Hospital Cherokee’s refusals to submit CAPs.  As noted in CMS’s CMP letters to these providers, CMS is scanning websites and subsequently notifying providers that appear to be non-compliant with the Rule—which are ignored at the provider’s peril.

Article By Edward S. Kornreich and Matthew J. Westbrook of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more health law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.

States Target Infant Formula Price Gouging

There has been a nationwide shortage of infant formula following a recall and temporary closure of a major infant formula manufacturing facility in February 2022. This facility supplied as much as 40% of the nation’s infant formula. In the wake of these events, state attorneys general are on the lookout for unlawful price gouging of infant formula. Sellers of infant formula should make sure that they do not inadvertently run afoul of state price gouging restrictions.

State price gouging laws prohibit price increases above certain thresholds during a period of emergency. Several state governments have recently issued declarations or proclamations that trigger price increase limitations for infant formula, including in California (CA Exec. Order N-10-22, 6/7/2022), Oregon (OR Exec. Procl., 5/13/2022), Colorado (CO Exec. Order D-2022-021, 5/25/2022), New Jersey (NJ Exec. Order No. 296, 5/17/2022), and Kentucky (KY Exec. Order 2022-321, 6/9/2022). Each of these states has a different price gouging restriction. For instance, infant formula sold in California cannot exceed the February 17, 2022 price by more than 10% except in certain limited circumstances. Other states may have a different price increase threshold or a different benchmark date. Multi-state sellers must take care to comply with the restrictions in each state.

Several states, such as Colorado and Nevada, enacted new price gouging laws in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-730; NRS § 598.09235. Enforcers have not had much experience enforcing these statutes, which may mean greater uncertainty for sellers in those states.

Most, but not all states have a price gouging law. In states that do not have a price gouging law, attorneys general will often seek to enforce their state’s unfair or deceptive trade practices act against reports of price gouging. For example, the attorney general of New Mexico, a state without a price gouging law, issued a press release on May 31, 2022 announcing that he is investigating complaints regarding infant formula price gouging. Similar to the COVID-19 pandemic, the infant formula shortage is triggering a variety of different price gouging restrictions in different states at the same time. Navigating the differences from state-to-state can be challenging, particularly in light of the new laws and amended laws that have been recently enacted. Sellers should review their normal pricing practices and make necessary changes to avoid inadvertently running afoul of the restrictions in a particular state.

Article By Leo Caseria and Thomas L. Tyson of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more antitrust and trade regulation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Inflation Woes: Four Key Ways for Companies to Address Inflation in the Supply Chain

The U.S. economy is grappling with the highest inflation in decades, with extensive inflation in the supply chain affecting companies worldwide. Supply chain disruptions undoubtedly have contributed to rising inflation, as extensive delays and skyrocketing costs continue to plague the industry.

In March 2022, the consumer-price index (or CPI) — a measure of the prices consumers pay for products — rose at an annual rate of 8.5%, which is the highest increase in 47 years.1 Meanwhile, the producer-price index (or PPI) — a measure of inflation meant to gauge the impact on suppliers — similarly rose significantly at an annual rate of 11.2%.2 Finally, the employer cost index (or ECI) demonstrates that, from March 2021 to March 2022, total compensation rose 4.5%, wages and salaries rose 4.7%, and benefit costs rose 4.1%.3

Because inflation increases the prices of goods or services, negotiations about who bears that risk in business partner relationships and the consequences of that risk allocation will have significantly greater financial impacts than we have seen in recent memory. As a result, ensuring your business teams are well versed on the impacts of and means of mitigating inflation in new contracts has a direct impact on your bottom line.

In this article, we provide ways for companies in the supply chain to address high inflation and alleviate associated pressures, including (1) how to revisit and use existing agreement provisions to address inflation risk, (2) approaches to negotiating new agreements and amendments to existing agreements, (3) approaches to limit inflationary exposure, and (4) strategies for cost reduction.

Figure 1:

Percent Change in CPI March 2021 versus March 2022

CPI March Chart

Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Consumer Price Index – March 2022, issued April 12, 2022

Four Key Ways to Mitigate the Effects of Increasing Inflation in the Supply Chain

1. Revisit and Use Provisions in Existing Agreements

Companies faced with rising costs must review their supply agreements to determine if they already contain mechanisms the company can use to address inflation. On the buy side, companies should look in their agreements for terms relating to fixed prices. On the sell side, companies should investigate ways to pass increased costs on to customers. Most supply contracts contain a variety of provisions that may assist in combatting inflationary pressures.

(a) Pricing Provisions

From a seller’s perspective, a contract may include index-based price escalation provisions, which tie contract prices to one or more indices. The underlying indices may be (i) broad economic indices such as the PPI or “market basket” indices tied to all items and all urban consumers, (ii) targeted indices such as ECI for a specific location, or (iii) tied to the cost of a specific commodity used in the underlying product. Contracts will sometimes incorporate several commodity indices based on the percentage those commodities are used in the product that is the subject of the agreement, in order to accurately reflect the costs associated with producing the good.

Allocations under these pricing provisions vary depending on negotiation power. They could put all of the risk on one party, share the risk equally, or share the risk according to particular percentages. The latter two options represent ways to avoid a “win/lose” approach.

Sellers will want to see whether their agreements allow for periodic negotiations for updated prices and take advantage of those opportunities. A buyer, meanwhile, may look for provisions that allow it the flexibility to limit the quantities ordered, enabling it to reduce costs as necessary or to seek a more cost efficient alternative. A buyer also will want to determine if the contract prohibits the seller from changing prices.

Regardless of the existing provisions, the real impact of inflation is likely to trigger commercial discussions to address rising costs; this is true both for hard goods supply agreements and indirect services agreements with longer terms such as outsourcing and managed services relationships.

(b) Force Majeure as a Mechanism to Adjust Price?

Outside of pricing provisions such as the above, however, a party may look to other contract provisions, such as force majeure, to see if its performance under the contract could be excused; increased costs alone are not enough to constitute a force majeure event. In order for a force majeure to arguably apply, the increase in costs must be caused by an event that itself is a qualifying force majeure event under the terms of the applicable contract (which may include events like a labor strike or pandemic).

Force majeure provisions are intended to excuse performance under a contract but not to act as a pricing adjustment mechanism. However, force majeure and its extra-contractual cousin, commercial impracticability, can be used as tools to bring the parties to the negotiating table where events beyond either party’s reasonable control are impacting the ability to produce and deliver products.

2. Negotiate Amendments to Existing Agreements

To the extent sellers have fixed-price contracts with their customers, sellers should consider negotiating with such customers to adjust these contracts in order to keep the prices they charge their customers in line with their input costs. When entering these discussions, companies that wish to implement a price adjustment, or eliminate fixed pricing entirely, should consider meaningful ways to incentivize their customers to agree to such changes. Would the customer be willing to agree to a price adjustment in order extend the agreement or adjust the quantity? Any items that maintain the relationship between the parties while also allocating cost increases in an equitable way should be considered.

Conversely, buyers faced with price-increase requests should carefully consider their options:

  • First, a customer receiving a price-adjustment request should confirm the request is actually tied to inflation and not just an attempt by a supplier to increase its bottom line. Seek detailed calculations supporting the price adjustments, and require suppliers to demonstrate how much their costs have increased above expectations.
  • Second, customers should consider what items they would like to request in return for accepting a given price-adjustment request, such as whether they would like to adjust their quantity or timing of delivery.
  • Third, a customer faced with a price increase request should consider whether the request should include the opportunity for the customer to obtain pricedowns in the future, in the event there are changes in the pricing environment.

3. Pricing Tied to Indexing and Other Ways to Limit Future Inflationary Exposure when Drafting New Agreements

When drafting new agreements, companies should consider how best to mitigate the effects of inflation.

For nearly 40 years, we have enjoyed relatively low and steady levels of inflation, which explains why existing agreements may not adequately address the allocation of significant and unexpected economic change.

Many of those at the upper echelons of leadership today have never dealt with a high inflationary environment. To put it in perspective, the CEO of Walmart, the No. 1 company on the Fortune 500 list for 2021, was 19 years old when inflation was last a newsworthy topic.

In the future, however, we expect far fewer agreements to have long-term fixed prices, as sellers negotiating agreements will want to incorporate a variety of strategies that allow for pricing flexibility and avoid longstanding, fixed prices. One such strategy is tying prices to an index. As discussed above, this could be a general index such as the CPI or PPI or be much more specific depending on the item sold. There are numerous indices for various products and commodities that parties may use to reflect accurately the costs of producing the goods that are the subject of their agreement. Parties may consider incorporating a mechanism for revisiting these provisions, especially in the event that inflation slows. Caps on inflation risk also may be incorporated as a backstop.

If not tying prices to an index, selling parties will want to shorten the term of their agreements or require the parties to renegotiate prices at set points throughout the duration of their agreements. Alternatively, parties may consider price increases of a certain percentage that are automatically implemented periodically. The seller may even want to leave the pricing open and establish pricing at the time the order is placed.

On the other hand, customers will want to incorporate provisions that cause the supplier to bear the inflationary risk. Principally, this means locking in prices for as long of a period as the seller will agree to and ensuring prices are fixed upon the issuance of purchase orders.

If and when sellers push back on extended fixed-pricing provisions, there are a variety of methods parties may use to meet in the middle:

  • Pricing arrangements that are tied to one or more indices may be capped to a certain percentage, ensuring the customer will know its upward exposure.
  • Include thresholds of index movement such that the price remains static unless and until the percentage threshold is exceeded.
  • Allocate increased cost exposure so a certain percentage range of index movement is allocated to one party and then the next percentage range is allocated to the other party. Parties then may share any exposure above those ranges.
  • Additionally, index-based pricing can be clarified to include both upward and downward movement, ensuring that customers, while risking inflationary costs, may also receive the benefits of deflationary environments.

4. Think Strategically to Reduce Costs

Aside from considering purely contractual methods to combat inflation, companies should think strategically about ways to reduce costs more efficiently.

  • Streamlining. In order to pursue this strategy, companies need to determine which areas are driving increased spending and consider ways those areas may be managed differently. For example, companies may consider whether there are different inputs that can be used to lower costs or processes that may be streamlined. Companies can review their inventory management, labor inputs, and other areas to determine where cost cutting may be an option without sacrificing product or service quality. This streamlining might include ending product lines with lower levels of profitability.
  • Technology & Innovation. In addition, with labor constituting such a high percentage of the cost increases companies are experiencing, a company may want to double down on technology and innovation that reduces headcount. Or, as prices rise, a company may pursue other pricing models. For example, a heavy equipment manufacturer may opt for a pay-per-use model in lieu of the traditional sale model.
  • Diversification of the Supply Chain. Another method companies may use is diversifying their supply chains, ensuring they provide the flexibility and sustainability needed to weather turbulent periods. Though adding links to supply chains will not lower costs in the near term, it can help ensure a business continues to function smoothly even in the event of price shocks, material shortages, or other disruptions.

The stressors driving inflation are unlikely to be relieved any time soon. Companies should use every resource available to leverage their current contracts and negotiate new terms to address inflation’s serious repercussions on their bottom line.

FOOTNOTES

1 How High Is Inflation and What Causes It? What to Know, Wall Street Journal (April 12, 2022).

2 Supplier Prices Rose Sharply in March, Keeping Upward Pressure on U.S. Inflation, Wall Street Journal (April 13, 2022).

3  Employment Cost Index – March 2022, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (April 29, 2022).

Article By Vanessa L. Miller, Kathleen E. Wegrzyn, Leah R. Imbrogno, James R. Kalyvas, and Austin R. Kissinger of Foley & Lardner LLP

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© 2022 Foley & Lardner LLP