Category: Trade

As Three Recent Settlements Demonstrate, Whistleblowers Are the Key to Enforcement of Section 301 Tariffs

The Section 301 tariffs on Chinese-made goods—at the time, known as the Trump Tariffs, although President Biden has embraced them as well—were put in place in 2018. Only recently, more than five years later, have enforcement efforts begun to show up publicly. And, as is often the case, whistleblowers are the tip of the enforcement spear. In particular, over the course of two weeks at the end of 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced settlements of three qui tam cases, brought under the False Claims Act, that alleged evasion of Section 301 tariffs. These are the first such settlements to be made public, but likely signal the beginning of a wave of settlements or litigation in the coming years.

Starting in July of 2018, and pursuant to Title III of the Trade Act of 1974 (Sections 301 through 310, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420), titled “Relief from Unfair Trade Practices,” and often collectively referred to as “Section 301,” the United States imposed additional tariffs on a wide range of products manufactured in China. The Section 301 tariffs were rolled out in tranches, but they fairly quickly covered a majority of all Chinese-made products imported into the United States. The Section 301 tariffs imposed an additional 25% customs duty on those products.

As is always the case when high tariffs are imposed on imported goods, the Section 301 tariffs were met with a mix of responses by importers. In some cases, importers simply paid the additional 25% duties. In some cases, the importers found new sources, outside of China, for the products they wished to import. And in many cases, the importers started cheating—evading the tariffs either by lying to Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) about what was being imported, or engaging to transshipping schemes to make it appear that the products were actually made in some country other than China.

Evasion of customs duties violates the False Claims Act, a federal law that, among other things, outlaws the making of false statements to avoid payment of money owed to the government. Evasion of customs duties will almost always involve such false statements because when goods are imported into the United States, the importer must provide CBP with a completed form, called an Entry Summary (also known as a Form 7501), in which the importer provides information about the nature, quantity, value, and country-of-origin of the goods being imported. To avoid or reduce the payment of duties, the importer will almost always lie on the Entry Summary about one or more of those, thus exposing the importer to liability under the False Claims Act.

The False Claims Act has a qui tam provision, which means that a private person or company may bring a lawsuit in the name of the government against the importer that has evaded payment of duties. If the qui tam lawsuit is successful, most of the money goes to the government. But the person or company that brought the lawsuit typically referred to as a whistleblower or, more technically, as the “relator”—gets an award that is between 15% and 30% of the amount recovered for the government.

When a qui tam case is first filed, it is put “under seal” by the court, meaning that it is secret and not available to the public. The case stays under seal, often for multiple years, as DOJ investigates the claims made in the case. But once DOJ decides to pursue a case, the seal is lifted, and the case becomes public. Often, this happens almost simultaneously with the announcement of a settlement of the case.

That is what happened with three cases that became public in late 2023. The first announcement came on November 29, 2023, when the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Georgia announced a $1.9 million settlement in a case captioned United States ex rel Chinapacificarbide Inc. v. King Kong Tools, LLC. In that case, the whistleblower that had brought the qui tam lawsuit was a competitor company which alleged that King Kong Tools was manufacturing cutting tools in a factory in China, shipping them to Germany, and then importing them from Germany into the United States, claiming falsely that the tools were made in Germany. The whistleblowing company received an award of $286,861.

The second such announcement came on December 5, 2023, when the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Texas announced a $2.5 million settlement in a case captioned United States ex rel. Reznicek et al. v. Dallco Marketing, Inc. In that case, the whistleblowers were two individuals who alleged that the defendants evaded the Section 301 tariffs by underreporting the value of the products they were importing from China into the United States. The whistleblowers received an award of $500,000.

The third such announcement case on December 13, 2023, when the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Texas announced a settlement of $798,334 in a case captioned United States ex rel. Edwards v. Homestar North America LLC. Like the Dallco Marketing case, the Homestar case was also brought by an individual who alleged that the importer had lied to the government about the value of the goods being imported from China into the United States, in order to avoid payment of Section 301 tariffs. The whistleblower received an award of $151,683.

Accordingly, over the course of just two weeks in late 2023, three Section 301 settlements were publicly announced in quick succession. And notably, all three were whistleblower qui tam cases. This demonstrates the key role that whistleblowers play in the enforcement of customs tariffs and duties. No doubt, many other such cases remain under seal, and will start to become public as DOJ concludes its investigations. And because the Section 301 tariffs remain in place to this day, additional qui tam cases will almost certainly continue to be brought by both individual whistleblowers and competing companies seeking to level the playing field. Accordingly, these three settlements are likely just the early signs of a wave of Section 301 cases that will crest in the coming years.

© 2024 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP
For more news on Whistleblowers and Section 301 Tariffs, visit the NLR Antitrust & Trade Regulation section.

G7 Sanctions Enforcement Coordination Mechanism and Centralized EU Sanctions Watchdog Proposed

On Feb. 20, 2023, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Wopke Hoekstra gave a speech titled “Building a secure European future” at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium where he made a plea to “(…) sail to the next horizon where sanctions are concerned.” The Dutch Foreign Minister said European Union (EU) “(…) sanctions are hurting the Russians like hell (…)” but at the same time the measures “(…) are being evaded on a massive scale.” Hoekstra believes this is in part because the EU has too little capacity to analyze, coordinate, and promote the sanctions. However, arguably, there is also a lack of capacity at the EU Member-State level to enforce sanctions.

Against this background the Dutch Foreign Minister proposed to set up a sanctions headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, i.e., a novel watchdog or body to tackle the circumvention of EU sanctions. Such a body might represent the nearest EU equivalent to the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). OFAC both implements and enforces U.S. economic sanctions (issuing regulations, licenses, and directives, as well as enforcing through issuing administrative subpoenas, civil and administrative monetary penalties, and making criminal referrals to the U.S. Department of Justice). In Hoekstra’s words:

“A place where [EU] Member States can pool information and resources on effectiveness and evasion. Where we do much more to fight circumvention by third countries. This new HQ would establish a watch list of sectors and trade flows with a high circumvention risk. Companies will be obliged to include end-use clauses in their contracts, so that their products don’t end up in the Russian war machine. And the EU should bring down the full force of its collective economic strength and criminal justice systems on those who assist in sanctions evasion. By naming, shaming, sanctioning, and prosecuting them.”

The Dutch Foreign Minister’s proposal – which is also set out in a separate non-paper – apparently is backed and supported by some 10 or so EU Member States, including Germany, France, Italy, and Spain.

Additionally, on Feb. 23, 2023, the press reported the international Group of Seven (G7) is set to create a new tool to coordinate their enforcement of existing sanctions against the Russian Federation (Russia). The aim of the tool, tentatively called the Enforcement Coordination Mechanism, would be to bolster information-sharing and other enforcement actions.

Background

Like other Members of the G7, the EU has adopted throughout 2022 many economic and other sanctions to target Russia’s economy and thwart its ability to continue with its aggression against Ukraine. Nevertheless, currently EU Member States have different definitions of what constitutes a breach of EU sanctions, and what penalties must be applied in case of a breach. This could lead to different degrees of enforcement and risk circumvention of EU sanctions.

As we have reported previously, on Nov. 28, 2022, the Council of the EU adopted a decision to add the violation of restrictive measures to the list of so-called “EU crimes” set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which would uniformly criminalize sanctions violations across EU Member States. This proposal still needs the backing of EU Member States, which have traditionally been cautious about reforms that require amendments to their national criminal laws.

Next steps

The decision on when and how to enforce EU sanctions currently lies with individual EU Member States, who also decide on the introduction of the EU’s restrictive measures by unanimity. As such, the Dutch Foreign Minister’s proposal requires the backing and support of more EU Member States. If adopted, the new proposed body could send cases directly to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), assuming the separate “EU crimes” legislative piece was also adopted.

Notably, the Dutch Foreign Minister’s proposal appears to suggest a stronger targeting of third countries, which are not aligned with the EU’s sanctions against Russia or help in their circumvention (e.g., Turkey, China, etc.).

Whether or not an EU sanctions oversight body is established, the Dutch proposal signals the current appetite for enhanced multilateral coordination on economic sanctions implementation and tougher, more consistent enforcement of economic sanctions violations. The G7’s proposed Enforcement Coordination Mechanism points in the same direction.

©2023 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

FDA Finalizes FSVP Guidance for Importers of Human and Animal Food

On January 10, the FDA issued a final guidance for the Foreign Supplier Verification Programs (FSVP) for Importers of Food for Humans and Animals. As our readers know, under the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), FSVP requires that importers verify that the food which they import provides the same level of public health protection as the preventive controls or produce safety regulations (as appropriate) in the U.S. and to ensure that supplier’s food is not adulterated and is not misbranded with respect to allergen labeling.

The guidance is intended to assist importers in developing and implementing FSVP records, and following FSVP requirements for each food they import. The guidance includes recommendations on the requirements to analyze the hazards in food; how to evaluate a potential foreign supplier’s performance and the risk posed by the food; ways to determine and conduct appropriate foreign supplier verification activities; and how importers of dietary supplements or very small importers can meet modified FSVP requirements.

The guidance finalizes a 2018 draft guidance, and addresses comments received regarding what food the FSVP regulation applies to, what information must be included in the FSVP, and who must develop and perform the FSVP activities.

For more Biotech, Food, and Drug Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2023 Keller and Heckman LLP

EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation Enters Into Force In 2023

On December 23, 2022, Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of December 14, 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (FSR) was published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The FSR introduces a new regulatory hurdle for M&A transactions in the European Union (EU), in addition to merger control and foreign direct investment screening. The FSR’s impact cannot be overstated as it introduces two mandatory pre-closing filing regimes and it gives the Commission wide-reaching ex officio investigative and intervention powers. Soon, the Commission will also launch a public consultation on a draft implementing regulation that should further detail and clarify a number of concepts and requirements of the FSR.

The bulk of the FSR will apply as of July 12, 2023. Importantly, the notification requirements for M&A transactions and public procurement procedures will apply as of October 12, 2023.

We highlight the key principles of the FSR below and provide guidance to start preparing for the application of the FSR. We refer to our On The Subject article ‘EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation to Impact EU and Cross-Border M&A Antitrust Review Starting in 2023’ of August 2, 2022 for a more detailed discussion of the then draft FSR. We also refer to our December 8, 2022 webinar on the FSR. Given the importance of the FSR, we will continue to report any future developments.

IN DEPTH

FSR in a Nutshell

The FSR tackles ‘foreign subsidies’ granted by non-EU governments to companies active in the EU and which ‘distort the internal market’.

  • First, a ‘foreign subsidy’ will be considered to exist where a direct or indirect financial contribution from a non-EU country or an entity whose actions can be attributed to a non-EU country (public entities or private entities) confers a benefit on an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the EU internal market, and where that benefit is not generally available under normal market conditions but is, instead, limited, in law or in fact, to assisting one or more undertakings or industries. A ‘financial contribution’ covers a broad spectrum and encompasses, amongst others, positive benefits such as the transfer of funds or liabilities, the foregoing of revenue otherwise due (e.g., tax breaks, the grant of exclusive rights below market conditions, or the provision or purchase of goods or services).

  • Second, a ‘distortion in the internal market’ will be considered to exist in case of a foreign subsidy which is liable to improve the competitive position of an undertaking and which actually or potentially negatively affects competition in the EU internal market. The Regulation provides some guidance on when a foreign subsidy typically would not be a cause for concern:
    – A subsidy that does not exceed EUR 200,000 per third country over any consecutive period of three years is considered de minimis and therefore not distortive;
    – A foreign subsidy that does not exceed EUR 4 million per undertaking over any consecutive period of three years is unlikely to cause distortions; and
    – A foreign subsidy aimed at making good/recovering from the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences may be considered not to be distortive.

The FSR looks at ‘undertakings’, as is the case for merger control. Therefore, the Commission will not look merely at the legal entity concerned, but at the entire corporate group to which the entity belongs in order to calculate the total amount of foreign financial contributions granted to the undertaking. Even companies headquartered in the EU that have entities outside of the EU that have received foreign financial contributions are covered by the FSR.

The FSR introduces three tools for the European Commission (Commission): (i) a notification requirement for certain M&A transactions, (ii) a notification requirement for certain public procurement procedures (PPP) and (iii) investigations on a case by case basis.

Notification Requirement for Certain M&A Transactions

M&A transactions (or “concentrations”) involving a buyer and/or a target that has received a foreign financial contribution shall be notifiable if they meet the following cumulative conditions:

  • At least one of the merging undertakings, the acquired undertaking (target, not buyer) or the joint venture is established in the EU and has an EU turnover of at least EUR 500 million, AND

  • The combined aggregate financial contributions provided to the undertakings concerned in the three financial years (combined) prior to notification amounts to more than EUR 50 million.

M&A transactions that meet these criteria will need to be notified and approved by the Commission prior to implementation. During its review, the Commission will determine whether the foreign financial contributions received constitute foreign subsidies in the sense of the FSR and whether these foreign subsidies actually or potentially distort or negatively affect competition in the EU internal market. The Commission likely will consider certain indicators including the amount and nature of the foreign subsidy, the purpose and conditions attached to the foreign subsidy as well as its use in the EU internal market. For example, in a case of an acquisition, if a foreign subsidy covers a substantial part of the purchase price of the target, the Commission may consider it likely to be distortive.

Notification Requirement for Certain Public Procurement Procedures

A notifiable foreign financial contribution in the context of PPP shall be deemed to arise where the following cumulative conditions are met:

  • The estimated value of the public procurement or framework agreement net of VAT amounts to at least EUR 250 million, AND

  • The economic operator was granted aggregate foreign financial contributions in the three financial years prior to notification of at least EUR 4 million from a non-EU country.

Where the procurement is divided into lots, the value of the lot or the aggregate value of all lots for which the undertaking bids for must, in addition to the two criteria set out above, also amount to at least EUR 125 million.

Through this procedure, the Commission will ensure that companies that have received non-EU country subsidies do not submit unduly advantageous bids in public procurement procedures.

During the Commission’s review, all procedural steps may continue except for the award of the contract.

Even if the thresholds are not met, the Regulation requires undertakings to provide to the contracting authority in a declaration attached to the tender a list of all foreign financial contributions received in the last three financial years and to confirm that these are not notifiable, which the contracting authority will subsequently send to the Commission.

Investigations on a Case-by-case Basis

The Commission may on its own initiative investigate potentially distortive foreign subsidies (e.g. following a complaint). These investigations are not limited to M&A transactions or PPP. However, on the basis of this power, the Commission may investigate M&A transactions and awarded contracts under PPP which do not fall within the scope of the notification requirements set out above.

If the Commission carries out an ex-officio review, its analysis will be structured in two phases: a preliminary examination and an in-depth investigation. Although these phases have no time limits, the Commission will endeavor to take a decision within 18 months of the start of the in-depth investigation.

HOW TO PREPARE FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE FSR

Application of the FSR – Timetable

As mentioned above, the FSR will apply as of July 12, 2023. The FSR shall apply to foreign subsidies granted in the five years prior to July 12, 2023 where such foreign subsidies create effects at present, i.e., they distort the internal market after July 12, 2023. By way of derogation, the FSR shall apply to foreign financial contributions granted in the 3 years prior to July 12, 2023 where such foreign financial contributions were granted to an undertaking notifying a concentration or notifying a PPP pursuant to the FSR.

The FSR shall not apply to concentrations for which the agreement was signed before July 12, 2023. The FSR shall also not apply to public procurement contracts that have been awarded or procedures initiated before July 12, 2023.

In general, the FSR shall apply from July 12, 2023 while the notification obligations for M&A transactions and PPP shall only apply from October 12, 2023. However, it is advisable to start preparing immediately for the application of the FSR, given the substantial scope of the regulation.

Actions to Take Now

Businesses which conduct activities in the EU, should put in place a system to monitor and quantify foreign financial contributions received since at least July 2020 – to cover the three-year review – and, preferably, July 2018. In particular, attention should be paid to positive benefits and reliefs from certain costs normally due by the company. External counsel can assist in determining whether these foreign financial contributions constitute a ‘foreign subsidy’.

As soon as a company decides to engage in an M&A or PPP in the EU, the company should map all relevant foreign financial contributions for the relevant time period to check whether the relevant notification thresholds are met. Subsequently companies must carefully consider whether any such financial contribution constitutes a foreign subsidy and, if so, whether such foreign subsidy may have a distortive effect. It is also advisable to determine whether there any positive effects relating to the subsidy that could be invoked. Companies should ensure that the preparation above is ably assisted by external counsel.

In particular with regard to M&A transactions, companies should carry out an FSR analysis in addition to merger control and foreign direct investment reviews. Even at the stage of due diligence, it would already be advisable to check whether the target has received any foreign financial contributions. If the transaction might eventually trigger a notification to the Commission, the M&A agreement should provide for Commission approval in the closing conditions. When acting as a bidder for a target that meets the EU turnover threshold, your bid will be much better viewed when accompanied with clear assurances that no FSR filing is required or, alternatively, that a filing may be required but that the foreign subsidies received are not distortive of competition.

© 2023 McDermott Will & Emery
For more Antitrust Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

FTC Starts Long-Awaited Green Guides Review

  • On December 14, 2022, at an open meeting of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”), FTC commissioners voted unanimously to publish a Notice in the Federal Register announcing a Request for Public Comments on potential amendments to the Commission’s Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims (“Green Guides” or “Guides”).
  • The FTC solicits comments on the ongoing need for the Guides and on specific claims addressed in the Guides, including “recyclable,” “recycled content,” “degradable,” “compostable,” and more. It also asks if it should initiate a rulemaking process and address claims it declined to consider during the last review, such as “organic” and “sustainable.”
  • Importantly, given the growth in some state laws that purport to restrict claims, the FTC asks for input on whether the Guides conflict with federal or state laws. This proceeding is expected to garner significant input.
  • Once the Notice is published in the Federal Register (which the FTC anticipates will be in mid-January 2023), interested stakeholders will have 60 days from the date of the Notice to submit comments to the FTC, unless an extension is granted.
  • For more information about the FTC Notice, please read our report here.

© 2022 Keller and Heckman LLP

For more Energy and Environmental Law news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Exporting U.S. Antitrust Law: Are We Really Ready for NOPEC?

The year is 1979. Inflation and lines at the gas pumps caused by a revolution in Iran have stunned Americans. Driven to action, the International Association of Machinists (IAM) files suit in the Central District of California against OPEC and its 14 member countries for participating in a cartel that controls the worldwide price of oil. None of the defendants made any kind of appearance before the court. Nonetheless, the union lost, and its case was dismissed.

Under the Constitution, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. A district court has no power to decide a case over which it has no subject matter jurisdiction. The requirement cannot be waived or avoided; a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction has no legal authority to entertain the matter. A federal statute known as the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976 (FSIA) limits the court’s jurisdiction in cases involving foreign sovereigns and, subject to a few specific exceptions, grants foreign states immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. The court in IAM v. OPEC raised the FSIA on its own (there being no defendants present) and, finding the OPEC states immune (OPEC itself could not be served), dismissed the case. Thusly did the IAM lose its antitrust case against defendants who never even showed up in court.

The judiciary has resisted the innumerable attempts since 1979 to hold the OPEC cartel accountable for violating U.S. antitrust laws, even though the court’s IAM decision has proven erroneous. Acts by a sovereign “based upon a commercial activity” in the U.S., or affecting U.S. commerce, do not enjoy immunity under FSIA. Although the district court in IAM didn’t think so, the Ninth Circuit on appeal made clear that pricing of oil on world markets is indeed commercial activity that affects the U.S. economy and, therefore, not entitled to sovereign immunity. But the Appeals Court nonetheless sidestepped the case, taking refuge in the judge-made Act-of-State doctrine. The doctrine is prudential, as opposed to jurisdictional, and amounts to a voluntary renunciation of jurisdiction by a court when its decision could interfere with the conduct of foreign policy by the executive branch. Indeed, it is easy to see how a suit against the members of OPEC for price fixing might intrude into a sensitive foreign policy area.

In the four decades since IAM, these considerations have obstructed U.S. courts from holding OPEC accountable for a cartel formed for the purpose of and with the effect of stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce, which is illegal per se. As recently as 2010, the Obama administration urged the Fifth Circuit to dismiss an antitrust suit brought by private plaintiffs on Act-of-State grounds, it being up to the executive branch and not the courts to conduct foreign policy and protect national security interests.

Since 2000, when the first No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels (NOPEC) Act was introduced in the House, the same legislation has been introduced no less than four times. NOPEC came closest to passage in 2007, when different versions of the bill passed the House and the Senate but were not reconciled. The House and Senate judiciary committees have now both approved the bill, and the latest version is on the Senate’s legislative calendar. Congress could act quickly if there is bipartisan support, otherwise it will take several months and require reintroduction in 2023.

NOPEC consists of three operative parts.

  • First, it would amend the Sherman Antitrust Act by adding a new Section 7(a) that explicitly makes it illegal for any foreign state to act collectively with others to limit production, fix prices, or otherwise restrain trade with respect to oil, natural gas, or other petroleum products. Judicial enforcement and a remedy would be available only to the Department of Justice, so the bill does not create a private right of action.

  • Second, it would amend FSIA to explicitly grant jurisdiction to U.S. court against foreign sovereigns to the extent they are engaged in a violation of the new Section 7(a).

  • Third, the legislation clarifies that the Act-of-State doctrine does not prevent U.S. courts from deciding antitrust cases against sovereigns alleged to have violated the new Section 7(a).

Calls for taking a harder line against OPEC are growing stronger in light of recent actions taken by the cartel. In May, for example, Saudi Arabia and 10 other OPEC members voted to slash oil production – resulting in high gas prices – as the U.S. and other nations imposed embargoes on Russian oil. OPEC’s production cuts provided Russia with a substantial lifeline in its increasingly difficult, costly, and prolonged invasion of Ukraine.

The Senate bill is sponsored by ​​Senate Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Chuck Grassley and cosponsors Sens. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) Mike Lee (R-UT), and Patrick Leahy (D-VT), who argue that OPEC’s price-fixing goes directly against the idea of fair and open markets, with current laws leaving the U.S. government “powerless” over OPEC. But are we really ready for NOPEC?

The concern over interference with foreign policy is far from trivial.

The American Petroleum Institute (API) recently sent a letter to Congress opposing the NOPEC bill, stating it would harm U.S. military, diplomatic, and business relations. API President and CEO Mike Sommers warned that while NOPEC is a noble endeavor designed to protect consumers, it would open the U.S. up to reciprocal lawsuits by foreign entities, writing that this could devastate certain political relations and trigger retaliation from OPEC countries. Other NOPEC critics say OPEC countries may limit other business dealings with the U.S., including lucrative arms deals or by pulling in their investments, as Saudi Arabia threatened to do in 2007, when the Deputy Saudi Oil Minister said the country would pull out of a multi-billion Texas oil refinery project unless the DOJ filed a statement of interest urging dismissal of an antitrust case then pending in the U.S. courts. In 2019, Saudi Arabia and OPEC threatened to start selling their oil in currencies other than the dollar, which would weaken the dollar’s position as the global vehicle currency.

For these reasons, it’s not clear what the White House would do if NOPEC passes. The Biden administration’s view of the measure seems to have shifted a bit, but it hasn’t come out strongly one way or the other. This is hardly surprising given the delicate and complex nature of the issue, the ongoing impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine, and the great importance voters place on the price of gas. Then-Press Secretary Jen Psaki said on May 5, 2022, that the “potential implications and unintended consequences of this legislation require further study and deliberation.” More recently, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Brian Deese, President Biden’s Director of the National Economic Council, said that nothing is off of the table – that the administration is assessing the situation and inviting recommendations. On Oct. 5 the Department of Energy said it would release another 10 million barrels of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. In making that announcement, Sullivan and Deese said the administration will consult with Congress on “additional tools and authorities to reduce OPEC’s control over energy prices.” They also reiterated the importance of investing in clean American-made energy to reduce reliance on foreign fossil fuels.

OPEC has such tremendous sway over U.S. gas prices and national security it is no wonder Congress continues to try to do something to free U.S. from OPEC’s whims and hold it accountable for going against the ideals of free markets. But whether NOPEC is the right approach remains an open question.

The antitrust laws represent a national ideological perspective on the most beneficial way to organize an economy. Policy differences between nations are supposed to occur in the diplomatic arena, not in the courts of one country or another. And if OPEC or its members lose an antitrust case in a U.S. court, how will the court enforce its judgment?

Article By Jonathan Rubin of MoginRubin

For more antitrust and trade regulation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© MoginRubin LLP

USTR Seeks Comments on Section 301 Tariffs on Chinese Goods; Portal Opens Nov. 15

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced Oct. 17 that starting Nov. 15, it will begin soliciting comments on the effectiveness of Section 301 tariffs the Trump administration placed on Chinese goods. The notice and request for comments relate to USTR’s ongoing four-year statutory review of the Section 301 investigation of China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation.

In the Federal Registrar Notice, USTR said it is seeking “public comments on the effectiveness of the actions in achieving the objectives of the investigation, other actions that could be taken, and the effects of such actions on the United States economy, including consumers.”

The USTR is specifically interested in comments on the following:

  • The effectiveness of the actions in obtaining the elimination of China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation.
  • The effectiveness of the actions in counteracting China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation.
  • Other actions or modifications that would be more effective in obtaining the elimination of or in counteracting China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation.
  • The effects of the actions on the U.S. economy, including on U.S. consumers.
  • The effects of the actions on domestic manufacturing, including in terms of capital investments, domestic capacity and production levels, industry concentrations, and profits.
  • The effects of the actions on U.S. technology, including in terms of U.S. technological leadership and U.S. technological development.
  • The effects of the actions on U.S. workers, including with respect to employment and wages.
  • The effects of the actions on U.S. small businesses.
  • The effects of the actions on U.S. supply chain resilience.
  • The effects of the actions on the goals of U.S. critical supply chains.
  • Whether the actions have resulted in higher additional duties on inputs used for additional manufacturing in the United States than the additional duties on particular downstream product(s) or finished good(s) incorporating those inputs.

The continuing assessment of these additional duties has been criticized by some business groups and lawmakers who believe they have hurt both U.S. businesses and U.S. consumers but have not checked China’s behavior. They also have called for the reinstatement of previously issued exclusions and for a new, robust tariff exclusion process. Some labor and civil society groups, however, want the tariffs to remain in place. The fate of these tariffs is closely tied to the Biden administration’s ongoing review and the overall U.S.–China trade relationship. The controversial tariff program that covers upwards of $300 billion worth of imports from China has sparked lawsuits from more than 3,500 importers.

The comment period begins on Nov. 15 and extends until Jan. 17. USTR said it will post specific questions on its website Nov. 1 before the portal opens.

Article By Laura Siegel Rabinowitz, Donald S. Stein, and Madeline Orlando of Greenberg Traurig, LLP

For more trade regulation news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

Threats of Antitrust Enforcement in the Supply Chain

With steep inflation and seemingly constant disruptions in supply chains for all manner of goods, the Biden Administration has turned increasingly to antitrust authorities to tame price increases and stem future bottlenecks. These agencies have used the myriad tools at their disposal to carry out their mandate, from targeting companies that use supply disruptions as cover for anti-competitive conduct, to investigating industries with key roles in the supply chain, to challenging vertical mergers that consolidate suppliers into one firm. In keeping with the Administration’s “whole-of-government” approach to antitrust enforcement, these actions have often involved multiple federal agencies.

Whatever an entity’s role in the supply chain, that company can make a unilateral decision to raise its prices in response to changing economic conditions. But given the number of enforcement actions, breadth of the affected industries, and the government’s more aggressive posture toward antitrust enforcement in general, companies should tread carefully.

What follows is a survey of recent antitrust enforcement activity affecting supply chains and suggested best practices for minimizing the attendant risk.

Combatting Inflation as a Matter of Federal Antitrust Policy

Even before inflation took hold of the U.S. economy, the Biden Administration emphasized a more aggressive approach to antitrust enforcement. President Biden appointed progressives to lead the antitrust enforcement agencies, naming Lina Kahn chair of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Jonathan Kanter to head the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division (DOJ). President Biden also issued Executive Order 14036, “Promoting Competition in the American Economy.” This Order declares “that it is the policy of my Administration to enforce the antitrust laws to combat the excessive concentration of industry, the abuses of market power, and the harmful effects of monopoly and monopsony….” To that end, the order takes a government-wide approach to antitrust enforcement and includes 72 initiatives by over a dozen federal agencies, aimed at addressing competition issues across the economy.

Although fighting inflation may not have been the initial motivation for the President’s agenda to increase competition, the supply disruptions wrought by the COVID-19 pandemic and persistent inflation, now at a 40-year high, have made it a major focus. In public remarks the White House has attributed rising prices in part to the absence of competition in certain industries, observing “that lack of competition drives up prices for consumers” and that “[a]s fewer large players have controlled more of the market, mark-ups (charges over cost) have tripled.” In a November 2021 statement declaring inflation a “top priority,” the White House directed the FTC to “strike back at any market manipulation or price gouging in this sector,” again tying inflation to anti-competitive conduct.

The Administration’s Enforcement Actions Affecting the Supply Chain

The Administration has taken several antitrust enforcement actions in order to bring inflation under control and strengthen the supply chain. In February, the DOJ and FBI announced an initiative to investigate and prosecute companies that exploit supply chain disruptions to overcharge consumers and collude with competitors. The announcement warned that individuals and businesses may be using supply chain disruptions from the COVID-19 pandemic as cover for price fixing and other collusive schemes. As part of the initiative, the DOJ is “prioritizing any existing investigations where competitors may be exploiting supply chain disruptions for illicit profit and is undertaking measures to proactively investigate collusion in industries particularly affected by supply disruptions.” The DOJ formed a working group on global supply chain collusion and will share intelligence with antitrust authorities in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK.

Two things stand out about this new initiative. First, the initiative is not limited to a particular industry, signaling an intent to root out collusive schemes across the economy. Second, the DOJ has cited the initiative as an example of the kind of “proactive enforcement efforts” companies can expect from the division going forward. As the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement put it in a recent speech, “the division cannot and will not wait for cases to come to us.”

In addition to the DOJ’s initiative, the FTC and other federal agencies have launched more targeted inquiries into specific industries with key roles in the supply chain or prone to especially high levels of inflation. Last fall, the FTC ordered nine large retailers, wholesalers, and consumer good suppliers to “provide detailed information that will help the FTC shed light on the causes behind ongoing supply chain disruptions and how these disruptions are causing serious and ongoing hardships for consumers and harming competition in the U.S. economy.” The FTC issued the orders under Section 6(b) of the FTC Act, which authorizes the Commission to conduct wide-ranging studies and seek various types of information without a specific law enforcement purpose. The FTC has in recent months made increasing use of 6(b) orders and we expect may continue to do so.

Amid widely reported backups in the nation’s ports, the DOJ announced in February that it was strengthening its partnership with and lending antitrust expertise to the Federal Maritime Commission to investigate antitrust violations in the ocean shipping industry. In a press release issued the same day, the White House charged that “[s]ince the beginning of the pandemic, these ocean carrier companies have been dramatically increasing shipping costs through rate increases and fees.” The DOJ has reportedly issued a subpoena to at least one major carrier as part of what the carrier described as “an ongoing investigation into supply chain disruption.”

The administration’s efforts to combat inflation through antitrust enforcement have been especially pronounced in the meat processing industry. The White House has called for “bold action to enforce the antitrust laws [and] boost competition in meat processing.” Although the DOJ suffered some well-publicized losses in criminal trials against some chicken processing company executives, the DOJ has obtained a $107 million guilty plea by one chicken producer and several indictments.

Most recently, the FTC launched an investigation into shortages of infant formula, including “any anticompetitive [] practices that have contributed to or are worsening this problem.” These actions are notable both for the variety of industries and products involved and for the multitude of enforcement mechanisms used, from informal studies with no law enforcement purpose to criminal indictments.

Preventing Further Supply-Chain Consolidation

In addition to exposing and prosecuting antitrust violations that may be contributing to inflation and supply issues today, the Administration is taking steps to prevent further consolidation of supply chains, which it has identified as a root cause of supply disruptions. DOJ Assistant Attorney General Kanter recently said that “[o]ur markets are suffering from a lack of resiliency. Among many other things, the consequences of the pandemic have revealed supply chain fragility. And recent geopolitical conflicts have caused prices at the pump to skyrocket. And, of course, there are shocking shortages of infant formula in grocery stores throughout the country. These and other events demonstrate why competition is so important. Competitive markets create resiliency. Competitive markets are less susceptible to central points of failure.”

Consistent with the Administration’s concerns with consolidation in supply chains, the FTC is more closely scrutinizing so-called vertical mergers, combinations of companies at different levels of the supply chain. In September 2021, the FTC voted to withdraw its approval of the Vertical Merger Guidelines published jointly with the DOJ the year before. The Guidelines, which include the criteria the agencies use to evaluate vertical mergers, had presumed that such arrangements are pro-competitive. Taking issue with that presumption, FTC Chair Lina Khan said the Guidelines included a “flawed discussion of the purported pro-competitive benefits (i.e., efficiencies) of vertical mergers” and failed to address “increasing levels of consolidation across the economy.”

In January 2022, the FTC and DOJ issued a request for information (RFI), seeking public comment on revisions to “modernize” the Guidelines’ approach to evaluating vertical mergers. Although the antitrust agencies have not yet published revised Guidelines, the FTC has successfully blocked two vertical mergers. In February, semiconductor chipmaker, Nvidia, dropped its bid to acquire Arm Ltd., a licenser of computer chip designs after two months of litigation with the FTC. The move “represent[ed] the first abandonment of a litigated vertical merger in many years.” Days later Lockheed Martin, faced with a similar challenge from the FTC, abandoned its $4.4 billion acquisition of missile part supplier, Aerojet Rocketdyne. In seeking to prevent the mergers, the FTC cited supply-chain consolidation as one motivating factor, noting for example that the Lockheed-Aerojet combination would “further consolidate multiple markets critical to national security and defense.”

Up Next? Civil Litigation

This uptick in government enforcement activity and investigations may lead to a proliferation of civil suits. Periods of inflation and supply disruptions are often followed by private plaintiff antitrust lawsuits claiming that market participants responded opportunistically by agreeing to raise prices. A spike in fuel prices in the mid-2000s, for example, coincided with the filing of class actions alleging that four major U.S. railroads conspired to impose fuel surcharges on their customers that far exceeded any increases in the defendants’ fuel costs, and thereby collected billions of dollars in additional profits. That case, In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litigation, is still making its way through the courts. Similarly, in 2020 the California DOJ brought a civil suit against two multinational gas trading firms claiming that they took advantage of a supply disruption caused by an explosion at a gasoline refinery to engage in a scheme to increase gas prices. All indicators suggest that this trend will continue.

Reducing Antitrust Risk in the Supply Chain and Ensuring Compliance

Given the call to action for more robust antitrust enforcement under Biden’s Executive Order 14036 and the continued enhanced antitrust scrutiny of all manner of commercial activities, companies grappling with supply disruptions and rampant inflation should actively monitor this developing area when making routine business decisions.

As a baseline, companies should have an effective antitrust compliance program in place that helps detect and deter anticompetitive conduct. Those without a robust antitrust compliance program should consider implementing one to ensure that employees are aware of potential antitrust risk areas and can take steps to avoid them. If a company has concerns about the efficacy of its current compliance program, compliance reviews and audits – performed by capable antitrust counsel – can be a useful tool to identify gaps and deficiencies in the program.

Faced with supply chain disruptions and rampant inflation, many companies have increased the prices of their own goods or services. A company may certainly decide independently and unilaterally to raise prices, but those types of decisions should be made with the antitrust laws in mind. Given the additional scrutiny in this area, companies may wish to consider documenting their decision-making process when adjusting prices in response to supply chain disruptions or increased input costs.

Finally, companies contemplating vertical mergers should recognize that such transactions are likely to garner a harder look, and possibly an outright challenge, from federal antitrust regulators. Given the increased skepticism about the pro-competitive effects of vertical mergers, companies considering these types of transactions should consult antitrust counsel early in the process to help assess and mitigate some of the risk areas with these transactions.

Article By Elizabeth A. N. Haas, Ian T. Hampton, and Kate E. Gehl of Foley & Lardner LLP

For more antitrust legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Foley & Lardner LLP

War and Peace at Rospatent: Protecting Trademarks in Russia

Yes, we shall live, Uncle Vanya. Could Anton Chekhov ever have imagined that his literary work would be used to sell hamburgers? In March, a controversial application for an “Uncle Vanya” mark in connection with “snack bars, cafes, cafeterias, restaurants, bar services, canteens, cooking and home delivery services,” incorporated the red-and-yellow golden arches logo of McDonald’s. It was just one in a series of recent applications in Russia that have caused serious pearl-clutching among intellectual property lawyers.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, the country has faced numerous financial, trade and travel sanctions. It’s also been snubbed by major intellectual property partners. In a February 28 letter, a group of whistleblowers and staff representatives at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) called for the entity’s public condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the rapid closure of its Russia Office. The European Patent Office severed ties with Russia on March 1, and shortly thereafter the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) confirmed that it had “terminated engagement” with officials from Russia’s agency in charge of intellectual property, the Federal Service for Intellectual Property (Rospatent), and with the Eurasian Patent Organization.

In response, Russia has adopted an aggressive posture in the intellectual property realm where it once sought to peacefully engage with the world, an effort that began well before the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. When the USSR joined the Paris Convention in 1965, it eagerly sought to develop Soviet intellectual property. Yet in March, Russia issued Decree No. 299, which effectively nullifies the enforcement value of Russian patents owned by entities and individuals in “unfriendly” countries including the United States, European Union member states, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin also greenlighted the importation of branded products without the brands’ permission, creating gray market headaches. As Boris Edidin, deputy chairman of the Commission for Legal Support of the Digital Economy of the Moscow Branch of the Russian Bar Association, clarified in a recent legal commentary published by Moscow-based RBC Group: “entrepreneurs have the opportunity to import goods of well-known brands, regardless of the presence or absence of an official representative on the Russian market.”

Russia, like the EU, had traditionally adopted a tougher stance than the United States on parallel imports. Now, however, “both by ‘anti-crisis’ measures and by cloak-and-dagger methods” Russia is sure to do all it can to keep its planes flying and its factories running, said Peter B. Maggs, research professor of law at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and noted expert on Russian and Soviet law and intellectual property.’

The increase in parallel imports makes trademark prosecution and maintenance more important than ever in Russia, but it’s not the only cause for concern. In March, as political tensions reached a crescendo, a Russian court declined to enforce the trademark rights for Peppa Pig, the famous British cartoon character, due to “unfriendly actions of the United States of America and affiliated foreign countries.” (See case No. A28- 11930/2021 in the Arbitration Court of the Kirov Region; an appeals court later overturned this holding, in a win for the porcine star.) RBC Group reported in March that it had tracked more than 50 trademark applications by Russian entrepreneurs and businesses for the marks of famous foreign brands, many in the fashion and tech sector. While most trademark applications were explicit copies of existing brands, in other cases applicants were content to imitate well-known trademarks and trade dress.

For example, a Russian entrepreneur from a design studio called Luxorta applied to register an IDEA brand that mimics the style and yellow-and-blue color schemes of famous Swedish brand IKEA. He told RBC that his business had suffered after IKEA suspended its Russian operations, and that he aspired to develop his own line of furniture and work with IKEA’s former suppliers. Other applicants RBC interviewed indicated they hoped to sell the marks back to foreign companies once those companies return.

On April 1, Rospatent published a press statement clarifying that “in case an identical or similar trademark has already been registered in the Russian Federation, it would be the ground for refusal in such registration.” More recently, the head of Rospatent, Yury Zubov, has responded with frustration to news coverage of trademark woes in Russia, noting that intellectual property legislation is unchanged and the “Uncle Vanya” hamburger mark had been withdrawn.

Prof. Maggs agreed that those trying to register or use close copies of foreign marks in Russia will likely fail. He cited a June 2 decision by the Court of Intellectual Property Rights to uphold lower court findings that the mark “FANT” for a carbonated orange soft drink violated unfair competition laws, because it was confusingly similar to the “FANTA” brand owned and licensed to third parties by Coca-Cola HBC Limited Liability Company. Russia’s consumer protection agency had originally brought the case.

The Court reasoned that “confusion in relation to two products can lead not only to a reduction in sales of the FANTA drink and a redistribution of consumer demand, but can also harm the business reputation of a third party, since the consumer, having been misled by the confusion between the two products, in the end receives a different product with different quality, taste and other characteristics.”

In addition, Prof. Maggs said, “the Putin Regime is and will be promoting Russian products as ‘just as good’ as foreign products. An example, obviously approved at high levels is the adoption of a totally different trademark for the sold McDonald’s chain,” he said, referring to the June 12 reopening of former McDonald’s restaurants in Moscow under the name “Vkusno & tochka” (“Tasty and that’s it”).

Brands should be wary of inadvertently jeopardizing their Russian marks by suspending local operations; a trademark may be cancelled in Russia after three years of uninterrupted non-use. While Article 1486 of the Russian Civil Code states that “evidence presented by the rightholder of the fact that the trademark was not used due to circumstances beyond his control [emphasis added] may be taken into account,” brands claiming infringement still risk being ineligible for damages or injunctive relief, because technically they are not losing sales while pausing business in Russia.

Moreover, if a company has suspended sales in Russia to show solidarity with Ukraine but seeks to stop sales in Russia by others, it may be accused of violating the good faith requirement of Article 10 of the Russian Civil Code, which states that exercising “rights for the purpose of limiting competition and also abuse of a dominant position in a market are not allowed.”

Russia remains a party to numerous intellectual property treaties, including the Paris Convention, the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the Hague Agreement. But as the Peppa Pig case illustrates, court decisions on intellectual property are not immune to political heat.

The question looming on the horizon is whether, if the current crisis escalates, the Russian government would outright cancel trademarks from hostile countries. It would not be the first time a state denied intellectual property rights during political conflicts. In the aftermath of the First World War, for example, the US government advocated for the “expropriation” of property, including intellectual property, of German nationals, perceived as responsible for the militarism of their government1. And in the 1930s, the German patent office removed Jewish patent-holders from its roster as part of its notorious “Aryanization” process. However, because Russia is not officially at war with the countries it has deemed “unfriendly,” these precedents are not directly on point.

Brands that have suspended business operations in Russia should monitor their trademark portfolios closely for infringement and consider how they can prove use of each mark during a prolonged absence from the Russian market. In other words: keep your eyes on Uncle Vanya.

FOOTNOTES

1 Caglioti DL. Property Rights in Time of War: Sequestration and Liquidation of Enemy Aliens’ Assets in Western Europe during the First World War. Journal of Modern European History. 2014;12(4):523-545. doi:10.17104/1611-8944_2014_4_523.

Article By Cynthia Martens of Katten

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

UK Prohibits Certain Investment in Russia

From 19 July 2022,1 it is a violation of UK financial sanctions for any person who knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that they are carrying out, directly or indirectly, certain investment activity in Russia. These prohibitions follow the UK Government’s 6 April 2022 announcement of its intention to introduce an outright ban on all new outward investment in Russia.

The prohibitions are subject to exceptions and do not impact acts undertaken to satisfy obligations under a contract concluded before 19 July 2022, or an ancillary contract necessary for the satisfaction of that contract, subject to notifying Her Majesty’s Treasury at least five working days before the day on which any related act is carried out. There is also the option to apply for a specific Treasury licence, such as to enable humanitarian assistance activity or if connected with the provision of medical goods or services.

Furthermore, General Licence INT/2022/2002560 has been granted, taking effect from 19 July 2022 and expiring on 26 July 2022, allowing a seven-day wind-down period in respect of the prohibited activities.

What Is Prohibited?

The Regulations prohibit:

  • Directly or indirectly establishing any joint venture with a person connected with Russia;
  • Opening representative offices or establishing branches or subsidiaries in Russia;
  • Directly or indirectly acquiring any ownership interest in Russian land and persons connected with Russia for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available directly or indirectly to, or for the benefit of, persons connected with Russia;
  • Directly or indirectly acquiring any ownership interest in or control over a relevant entity or persons (other than an individual) with a place of business in Russia for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, persons connected with Russia; and
  • The provision of investment services directly related to all the activities summarised above.

Definitions

A “person connected with Russia” means:

  • any individual or group of individuals who are ordinarily resident or located in Russia, or an entity which is incorporated or constituted under Russian law or domiciled in Russia;2

and is not:

  • A Schedule 2 Entity, as detailed in the Regulations;3 or
  • An entity domiciled outside of Russia or a branch, or subsidiary, of such a non-Russian entity.4

A “branch”5 means, in relation to a person other than an individual, a place of business which forms a legally dependent part of that person and which carries out all or some of the transactions inherent in the business of that person.

A “relevant entity”6 means a person, other than an individual, which has a place of busines located in Russia, but is not a person connected with Russia.

A person directly or indirectly “acquiring any ownership interest in or control over a person or entity”7 means:

  • Acquiring any share in the person or entity;
  • Acquiring any voting rights in the person or entity;
  • Acquiring any right to appoint or remove a majority of the board of directors of the person or entity; or
  • Acquiring any means of ensuring that the affairs of the person or entity are conducted in accordance with the wishes of the person.

Exceptions

The exceptions8 introduced enables a person to deal directly or indirectly with:

  • A transferable security otherwise prohibited by Regulation 16;
  • A relevant security issued by a person connected with Russia; or
  • A relevant security issued by a relevant entity.

Full definitions of the terms above are included within Regulation 60ZZA.

From 19 July 2022,1 it is a violation of UK financial sanctions for any person who knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that they are carrying out, directly or indirectly, certain investment activity in Russia. These prohibitions follow the UK Government’s 6 April 2022 announcement of its intention to introduce an outright ban on all new outward investment in Russia.

The prohibitions are subject to exceptions and do not impact acts undertaken to satisfy obligations under a contract concluded before 19 July 2022, or an ancillary contract necessary for the satisfaction of that contract, subject to notifying Her Majesty’s Treasury at least five working days before the day on which any related act is carried out. There is also the option to apply for a specific Treasury licence, such as to enable humanitarian assistance activity or if connected with the provision of medical goods or services.

Furthermore, General Licence INT/2022/2002560 has been granted, taking effect from 19 July 2022 and expiring on 26 July 2022, allowing a seven-day wind-down period in respect of the prohibited activities.

What Is Prohibited?

The Regulations prohibit:

  • Directly or indirectly establishing any joint venture with a person connected with Russia;
  • Opening representative offices or establishing branches or subsidiaries in Russia;
  • Directly or indirectly acquiring any ownership interest in Russian land and persons connected with Russia for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available directly or indirectly to, or for the benefit of, persons connected with Russia;
  • Directly or indirectly acquiring any ownership interest in or control over a relevant entity or persons (other than an individual) with a place of business in Russia for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, persons connected with Russia; and
  • The provision of investment services directly related to all the activities summarised above.

Definitions

A “person connected with Russia” means:

  • any individual or group of individuals who are ordinarily resident or located in Russia, or an entity which is incorporated or constituted under Russian law or domiciled in Russia;2

and is not:

  • A Schedule 2 Entity, as detailed in the Regulations;3 or
  • An entity domiciled outside of Russia or a branch, or subsidiary, of such a non-Russian entity.4

A “branch”5 means, in relation to a person other than an individual, a place of business which forms a legally dependent part of that person and which carries out all or some of the transactions inherent in the business of that person.

A “relevant entity”6 means a person, other than an individual, which has a place of busines located in Russia, but is not a person connected with Russia.

A person directly or indirectly “acquiring any ownership interest in or control over a person or entity”7 means:

  • Acquiring any share in the person or entity;
  • Acquiring any voting rights in the person or entity;
  • Acquiring any right to appoint or remove a majority of the board of directors of the person or entity; or
  • Acquiring any means of ensuring that the affairs of the person or entity are conducted in accordance with the wishes of the person.

Exceptions

The exceptions8 introduced enables a person to deal directly or indirectly with:

  • A transferable security otherwise prohibited by Regulation 16;
  • A relevant security issued by a person connected with Russia; or
  • A relevant security issued by a relevant entity.

Full definitions of the terms above are included within Regulation 60ZZA.

FOOTNOTES

1 Regulation 18B introduced via The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 12) Regulations 2022 [2022 No. 801], in force as of 19 July 2022.

2 Regulation 19A(2), The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 [2019 No. 855] – as amended.

3 See pp. 123-124.

4 Regulation 16(4D), Ibid.

5 Regulation 18B(8), The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 12) Regulations 2022 [2022 No. 801].

6 Regulation 18B(8), Ibid.

7 Regulation 18B(8), Ibid.

8 Regulation 60ZZA, Ibid.

Article By Annabel Thomas, Jo Rickards, Gavin Costelloe, Bethany Histed, Kara M. Bombach, and Erik de Bie of Greenberg Traurig, LLP

For more global law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.