London–IBOR’s Falling Down, Falling Down

The IRS has released proposed regulations that provide a fluid transition to the use of references rates other than the interbank offered rates, such as the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), in debt instruments and financial products. In July 2017, the UK Financial Conduct Authority announced that the LIBOR might be phased out after 2021. The announcement came amid concerns of manipulation, a decline in the volume of funding from which the LIBOR is calculated, and recommendations for the development of a reference rate based on transactions in a more robust market. The Alternative Reference Rates Committee (ARRC), a group of private-market participants convened by the Federal Reserve Board and the New York Fed, recommended the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) as a replacement to the LIBOR, and petitioned the IRS for guidance on the tax consequences of the transition from the LIBOR to the SOFR.

In an effort to “minimize potential market disruption and . . . facilitate an orderly transition in connection with the phase-out” of the LIBOR and other similar reference rates, the IRS issued flexible proposed regulations based on the ARRC’s recommendations. The regulations address seven key areas of the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations impacted by the change in reference rates. These areas include: (1) the potential gain recognized on modification of debt instruments to change the reference rate; (2) the dissolution of integrated instruments as a result of termination or legging out of an integrated hedge; (3) the source and character of one-time payments used as an alternative to an adjustment to the spread between the LIBOR and SOFR; (4) the conversion of grandfathered debt instruments to registration-required obligations; (5) whether debt-instruments referencing the SOFR will qualify as variable rate debt instruments; (6) the preclusion of “regular interest” classification in a real estate mortgage investment conduit; and (7) foreign bank corporations’ use of the SOFR to calculate interest expense allocable to excess US-connected liabilities.

The regulations generally allow the SOFR to be a replacement for the LIBOR and provide guidance that ensures the tax impacts of the transition from LIBOR to SOFR will be minimal. For example, the parties may generally modify debt instruments to change the reference rate without triggering potential gain or loss that may normally result from material changes to the interest rate of a debt instrument under the significant modification rules.

Taxpayers may rely on these proposed regulations for changes made to debt instruments on or after October 9, 2019.


© 2019 Jones Walker LLP

World Trade Organization Approves U.S. Tariffs on European Union Goods to Counteract Civil Aviation Subsidies

The World Trade Organization (WTO) has approved U.S. duties on $7.5 billion in products from the European Union (EU) after ruling that the EU had unfairly subsidized the production of large civil aircraft, such as those produced by Airbus. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) will enforce 10 percent duties on imports of certain aircraft and 25 percent duties on imports of other goods (including agricultural products, apparel, machinery, and other products) beginning October 18, 2019.

The EU plans to impose retaliatory tariffs on $20 billion of U.S. exports in response to subsidies allegedly provided to American plane manufacturer Boeing. However, the EU will have to wait for WTO approval in separate proceedings. The United States and the EU have been involved in WTO dispute settlement proceedings regarding subsidies for large civil aircraft since 2004.

Duties of 10 percent apply to imports of passenger and cargo aircraft from France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom (where the majority of Airbus production is based), provided that they have an unladen weight exceeding 30,000 kg.1

Duties of 25 percent apply to imports of other products from all EU member states (or a subset of these member states, depending on the product category). These products include certain cheeses, pork, coffee, seafood, fruit, dairy spreads, wine, whisky, apparel, bedding, optical instruments, appliances, tools, folding knives, and magnets.

Military aircraft, civil helicopters, and parts or components of civil aircraft are not subject to the duties.2


1 Examples of subject aircraft over 30,000 kg are regional jets capable of seating more than 100 passengers (such as the Airbus A220) and any larger aircraft (including long-haul, wide-body jets). Smaller aircraft, including recreational aircraft, private jets, most turboprop aircraft, and most regional jets with a capacity of fewer than 100 passenger, have an unladen weight of less than 30,000 kg and are excluded.

2 Airbus has production facilities in the United States, that rely on components imported from the EU. Additionally, some EU companies produce certain components of military aircraft for export to the United States.


©2019 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved

For more on international trade, see the National Law Review Antitrust & Trade Regulation or Global law pages.

U.S. Announces Possible Retaliatory Tariffs on European Union for Airbus Subsidies

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced in a Federal Register notice published July 5 that the agency is considering increasing duties on certain goods from the European Union (EU). This move is connected to a long-running World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute involving EU subsidies for Airbus, the aircraft manufacturing company.

The USTR has invited public comments on the proposed list and will hold a public hearing on Aug. 5, 2019.

Requests to appear at the hearing are due to the USTR by July 24, and written comments are due by Aug. 5. The public comment and hearing process will provide importers of goods from the EU, as well as domestic producers that compete with EU producers, the opportunity to be heard with regard to the products that may be subject to tariffs.

In April 2019, the USTR published a preliminary list of goods from the EU that could be targeted with tariffs, which included aircraft, motorcycles and wine. The July 5 list contains additional products, including whiskey, coffee, olives, pasta, cheese, pork, and metals, among other items. The goods on both lists are collectively worth about $25 billion of imports per year.

The tariffs stem from a WTO case filed by the United States in 2004, which was resolved by the WTO Appellate Body in 2011. In that case, European Communities and Certain member States — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (DS316), the Appellate Body found that certain EU subsidies for Airbus failed to comply with the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).

The EU made certain changes to its subsidy regime in response to the Appellate Body’s decision, but the U.S. later asked the WTO to determine that the EU had not fully complied with the decision. That request led to another Appellate Body decision published in May 2018, in which the Appellate Body agreed with the U.S. that the EU was still not in compliance with the SCM Agreement.

The WTO is expected to determine the amount of retaliatory tariffs the United States can impose sometime this summer, and the April and July 2019 tariffs proposed by the USTR are likely being prepared in anticipation of the WTO decision.

 

© 2019 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
For more from the Office of the US Trade Representative see the National Law Review page on Antitrust & Trade Regulation.

Kentucky to Begin Taxing Video Streaming Services under Telecom Tax

Legislators in Frankfort added a new “video streaming service” tax to the omnibus tax bill (HB 354) as part of a closed-door conference committee process before the bill was hastily passed in the House and Senate. Notably, the new video streaming service tax was not previously raised or discussed as part of HB 354 (or any other Kentucky legislation) before it was included in the final conference committee report that passed the General Assembly in March.

Specifically, as passed by the General Assembly, HB 354 will add “video streaming services” to the definition of “multichannel video programming service” subject to the telecom excise tax.  This is the same tax imposition that the Department of Revenue argued applied to video streaming services in the Netflix litigation—an argument that was rejected by the courts in Kentucky and then subsequently settled on appeal. Under existing law, Kentucky taxes “digital property” under the sales and use tax. The term is broadly defined and applies to audio streaming services, but expressly carves out “digital audio-visual works” (i.e., downloaded movies, TV shows and video; defined consistently with the SSUTA) from the scope of the sales and use tax imposition. HB 354 would not modify the treatment of digital goods and services under the sales and use tax, and changes that would be implemented are limited to the telecom excise tax imposed on the retail purchase of a multichannel video programming service.

As amended by HB 354, the definition of “multichannel video programming service” for purposes of the telecom excise tax would be expanded to mean “live, scheduled, or on-demand programming provided by or generally considered comparable to or in competition with programming provided by a television broadcast station and shall include but not be limited to: (a) Cable service; (b) Satellite broadcast and wireless cable service; and (c) Internet protocol television provided through wireline facilities without regard to delivery technology; and (d) video streaming services.” The legislation defines “video streaming services” as “programming that streams live events, movies, syndicated and television programming, or other audio-visual content over the Internet for viewing on a television or other electronic device with or without regard to a particular viewing schedule.” Thus, the “video streaming services” language in HB 354 would clearly subject over-the-top video streaming service providers to the excise tax on the retail purchase of a multichannel video programming service. As passed by the General Assembly, the new video streaming services excise tax in HB 354 would “apply to transactions occurring on or after July 1, 2019.”

Governor Matt Bevin signed HB 354 into law on March 26, 2019. The General Assembly subsequently passed a “cleanup bill” (HB 458) that was enacted into law last month, but it did not make any changes to the part of HB 354 that expanded the scope of the tax on multichannel video programming services to include video streaming services.

Kentucky is a member of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Governing Board. Taxation of electronically transferred audio-visual works is something specifically dealt with in the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA). The SSUTA also prohibit the enactment of so-called “replacement taxes” that have the effect of avoiding the provisions of the SSUTA.  Kentucky’s inclusion of streamed movies in its tax on multichannel video programming services, a regime outside the sales and use tax, could run afoul of the SSUTA’s prohibition on replacement taxes, potentially putting the state out of compliance with the SSUTA and exposing it to the risk of sanctions by the Governing Board.

Practice Note:  From an administrability and compliance point of view, enacting a new tax on digital goods and services as part of excise or gross receipts taxes outside the generally applicable sales and use tax poses significant problems. Many businesses that are not telecom providers simply do not have the compliance infrastructure to allow them to collect and remit taxes other than sales and use taxes. In addition, by taxing certain digital goods and services under a tax other than what is applicable to similar content sold via a tangible medium (such as a physical movie rental or viewing a movie in theater), the federal Permanent Internet Tax Freedom Act enacted by Congress may be implicated and pose a litigation risk to the state. Both the compliance nightmare and litigation risk could be easily avoided by imposing the tax under the sales and use tax (as opposed to miscellaneous excise or gross receipts taxes). We will continue to monitor the digital tax climate in Kentucky, and encourage companies impacted by this new imposition to contact the authors to discuss this issue in more detail.

© 2019 McDermott Will & Emery
Read more SALT news on the National Law Review’s Tax page.

Chicago and Cook County Amusement Tax

In previous posts, we have explored several local Illinois taxes, including the Chicago Personal Property Lease Transaction Tax and Cook County Parking Lot Tax. Also notable is the Chicago and Cook County Amusement Tax, which can apply more broadly than taxpayers often anticipate. Specifically the scope of the amusement tax has been expanded over the last few years to non-traditional amusements, including electronically transferred television shows, movies, videos, music, and games.

Imposition of The Amusement Tax

Although the Chicago and Cook County amusement tax are imposed similarly on taxpayers, they are independently administered taxes that feature key differences. Both the Chicago Amusement Tax Ordinance (“Chicago Ordinance”) and Cook County Amusement Tax Ordinance (“Cook County Ordinance”) impose the tax “upon the patrons of every amusement” within the city or county, but require the owner, manager, or operator of the amusement to collect the tax from each patron and remit the tax to the Chicago Department of Finance (“Chicago Department”) or the Cook County Department of Revenue (“Cook County Department”).[1] Further, both Ordinances define “amusement” as “any exhibition, performance, presentation or show for entertainment purposes”.[2]

Where the Chicago and Cook County Ordinances deviate, however, are the examples used to define “amusement”, the rates of tax, and applicable exemptions. For example, although the Ordinances provide similar examples of qualifying amusements, including a motion picture show, athletic contest, or any theatrical, musical or spectacular performance, the Chicago Ordinance also includes “paid television programming” viewed within or outside the home.[3] In contrast, the County Ordinance does not include such language. Additionally, whereas the Chicago Ordinance imposes the amusement tax at a rate of 9 percent of the admission fees or other charges paid for the privilege to enter, witness, view or participate in the amusement, the County Ordinance imposes the tax at a rate of 3 percent (unless a lower rate applies, as addressed below).[4]

Further, the Chicago and Cook County Ordinances often exempt different activities. For example, although both Ordinances exempt admission fees to witness in person “live theatrical, live musical or other live cultural performances that take place in any auditorium, theater or other space”[5] with a certain limited capacity (“Small Venue Exemption”), the Ordinances include a different capacity limitation. Under the Chicago Ordinance, the Small Venue Exemption renders the amusement tax inapplicable where the maximum capacity of the venue, including all balconies and all sections, is not more than 1,500 persons.[6] In contrast, under the Cook County Ordinance, the Small Venue Exemption only applies where the venue has a capacity of not more than 750 persons.[7] Further, if the venue has a capacity of more than 750 persons, but fewer than 5,000 persons, the Cook County amusement tax applies at a rate of 1 percent rather than the general rate of 3 percent.[8] This serves as a notable example of where the Ordinances may appear to be substantially similar but in fact feature key differences. Additionally, whereas the City clarified in a 2004 Amusement Tax Ruling that “primarily educational” activities are not taxable amusements, Cook County has not released similar guidance.[9] The result is that depending on the nature of the activity, amusement tax may apply in one but not both jurisdictions.

Identifying Taxable “Admission Fees”

A contested issue in applying the amusement tax in both Chicago and Cook County is the amount that compromises the taxable “admission fees or other charges paid for the privilege to enter, witness, view” such amusement.[10] For example, in 2014, the Illinois Court of Appeals held that under the Cook County Ordinance, for club seats and luxury suites to Chicago Bears home football games, “admission fees or other charges” include the amenities available to holders of club seat tickets and tangible personal property included in the luxury suite admission price, not just the value of the home seat games.[11] The Court determined that because a fan cannot witness a game from a club seat without paying the club privilege fee and annual licensing fee, it is not possible to separate the “other charges” from the fee paid to enter the stadium.[12] As a result, the Illinois Appellate Court determined the full price paid by club seat holders and luxury suite licensees is subject to the County’s amusement tax. This decision may lead to efforts by the Chicago Department and Cook County Department to expand a taxpayer’s taxable base beyond the mere value of a “seat”. For example, both the County and the City have been aggressive in their application of the amusement tax to service fees despite clear language in the Ordinances that exempts separately stated optional charges.[13]

Expanding the Scope to Electronically Transferred Amusements

The Chicago Department has recently become aggressive in its expansion of the scope of the Chicago Ordinance. In a 2015 Amusement Tax Ruling, the Chicago Department asserted that the amusement tax is imposed “not only [on] charges paid for the privilege to witness, view or participate in amusements in person but also charges paid for the privilege to witness, view or participate in amusements that are delivered electronically.”[14] As a result, the Chicago Department intended to clarify that the Chicago amusement tax applies to fees or charges for the following if delivered in the City: (1) watching electronically delivered television shows, movies or videos; (2) listening to electronically delivered music; and (3) participating in games, on-line or otherwise.[15] Although treated with resistance by taxpayers[16], the implication is that the City Department has the authority to impose the amusement tax on users of streaming services such as Netflix and Spotify, and online gaming, such as PlayStation. Following the Mobile Telecommunication’s Sourcing Conformity Act[17], the amusement tax applies to customers whose residential street address or primary business address is in Chicago, as reflected by their credit card billing address, zip code or other reliable information.[18]

Further, as explored briefly above, the Chicago Ordinance treats “paid television programming” as a taxable amusement.[19] “Paid television” means programming that can be viewed on a television or other screen, and is transmitted by cable, fiber optics, laser, microwave, radio, satellite or similar means to members of the public for consideration.[20] Additionally, an “owner” includes “any person operating a community antenna television system or wireless cable television system, or any other person receiving consideration from the patron for furnishing, transmitting, or otherwise providing access to paid television programming.”[21]

In 2014, the Chicago Department began auditing and assessing amusement tax on a number of restaurants and bars located through the City who subscribed to paid satellite television programming and who did not collect the amusement tax[22]. In a move to clarify the application of the tax, in November 2016, the Chicago Department released an Informational Bulletin that provided additional information to business subscribers of satellite television regarding their obligation to collect and remit the Chicago amusement tax. As a result, bars, restaurants and any other businesses that subscribe to satellite television are required to remit the Chicago amusement tax on charges paid for satellite television services used in Chicago.

Applicability to Ticket Resellers and Agents

An area of uncertainty within both the Chicago and Cook County amusement tax is the potential applicability to ticket resellers and agents. The issue dates back to 2006 when the Chicago Department amended the Chicago Ordinance to require not only a “reseller” but also a “reseller’s agent” to collect and remit amusement tax.[23]This amendment set the stage for the Chicago Department to attempt to collect the tax from StubHub as a reseller’s agent. StubHub is an internet auction listing service that operates a “platform” where it charges buyers and sellers a fee to buy and sell ticket to various events.

On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the Court entered a significant decision for online auctioneers, holding that municipalities may not require electronic intermediaries to collect and remit amusement taxes on resold tickets.[24] The basis of the Court’s ruling is that although the Illinois Ticket Sale and Resale Act (the “Act”) [25]gives municipalities the authority to require sellers and resellers of tickets to collect the amusement tax, municipalities do not have the authority to require internet auction listing services, such as StubHub, to collect the tax.[26] Although both the Chicago and Cook County Ordinance still define an “operator” as a person who “sells or resells a ticket”, the Stubhub decision resulted in the removal of the term “reseller’s agent” and “auctioneer” from the Chicago Ordinance.[27]

Conclusion

Although the Chicago and Cook County amusement tax are similarly imposed, there are notable differences between the applicability of the Chicago and Cook County Ordinances. These differences are particularly noteworthy with respect to potential exemptions and electronically transferred amusements. Accordingly, taxpayers should not assume that because the amusement tax applies in one locality, it applies in both Chicago and Cook County.


[1] Municipal Code of Chicago (“M.C.C.”) § 4-156-020(A), 4-146-030(A); Cook County Ordinance (“C.C.O.”) § 74-392(a), 74-395(a).

[2] M.C.C. § 4-156-010; C.C.O. § 74-391.

[3] M.C.C. § 4-156-010.

[4] M.C.C. § 4-156-020; C.C.O. § 74-392.

[5] The Chicago and Cook County Ordinance define “live theatrical, live musical or other live cultural performance” identically as a “live performance in any of the disciplines which are commonly regarded as part of the fine arts, such as live theater, music, opera, drama, comedy, ballet, modern or traditional dance, and book or poetry readings. The term does not include such amusements as athletic events, races, or performances conducted as adult entertainment cabarets.” M.C.C. § 4-156-010; C.C.O. § 74-391. In this regard, the Chicago Department and Cook County Department appear to play the role of an art critic, defining which activities qualify as “fine arts”. See a prior post exploring the issue in the context of disc jockeys.

[6] M.C.C. § 4-156-020(D).

[7] C.C.O. § 74-392(d).

[8] C.C.O. § 74-392(f)(1).

[9] Chicago Amusement Tax Ruling #1, ¶ 2.

[10] M.C.C. § 4-156-020; C.C.O. § 74-392.

[11] Chi. Bears Football Club v. Cook County Dep’t of Revenue, 16 N.E.3d 827, 835 (2014).

[12] Id. at 834. In determining the full price paid by club seat ticket holders and luxury suite licensees is subject to the amusement tax, the Court affirmed the reasoning of the court in Stasko v. City of Chicago, 997 N.E.2d 975, 993 (2013)(holding that the Chicago Ordinance applied because purchasing the permanent seat license was a prerequisite to viewing the game).

[13] M.C.C. § 4-156-020(H); C.C.O. § 74-392(e)(3).

[14] Chicago Amusement Tax Ruling #5.

[15] Chicago Amusement Tax Ruling #5, ¶ 8.

[16] The Chicago amusement tax, as it applies to certain electronically delivered amusements, such as paid television, was challenged but held by the Cook County Circuit Court to be constitutional in Labell v. City of Chicago, Case No. 15 CH 13399 (Cook Cnty. Cir. Ct. May 24, 2018). In this application, the amusement tax is often derisively referred to as the “ Cloud Tax” or the “Netflix Tax“.

[17] 35 ILCS 638.

[18] Chicago Amusement Tax Ruling #5, ¶ 13.

[19] M.C.C. § 4-156-010.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] For additional background regarding the Department’s efforts to collect the Chicago amusement tax from satellite providers, see a prior post.

[23] Under the Chicago Ordinance, a reseller’s agent is a “person who, for consideration, resells a ticket on behalf of the ticket’s owner or assists the owner in reselling the ticket. The term includes but is not limited to an auctioneer, a broker or a seller of tickets for amusements, as those terms are used in 65 ILCS 5/11-42-1, and applies whether the ticket is resold by bidding, consignment or otherwise, and whether the ticket is resold in person, at a site on the Internet or otherwise.” M.C.C. § 4-156-010 (amended May 24, 2006).

[24] City of Chicago v. Stubhub, Inc., 979 N.E.2d 844, 845 (2011).

[25] 720 ILCS 375/0.01 et seq. (2010).

[26] Stubhub, Inc., 979 N.E.2d at 857.

[27] M.C.C. § 4-156-010; C.C.O. § 74-391.

 

© Horwood Marcus & Berk Chartered 2019. All Rights Reserved.

IRS Periods of Limitation on Refunds, Assessment of Tax, and Collection

Statutes of limitation prescribe a period of limitation for the bringing of certain types of action. There are three such statutes of limitation that come into play when dealing with the Internal Revenue Service. These limitations periods relate to tax refunds, IRS examination and assessment, and IRS collections.

How long do you have to file a claim for refund?

Under IRC 6511(a), a taxpayer has three years from the date of filing a tax return to claim a credit or refund, or two years from the date the tax was paid, whichever is later. If a taxpayer files his/her return or makes payment prior to the date prescribed for doing so, the return or payment is considered filed or paid on that last day for doing so. Further, for claims for refund not filed within the three year period, the amount of the refund is limited to the portion of the tax that was paid within the two years preceding the filing of the claim. IRC 6511(b). There are exceptions to these general rules, however, and you should consult with a tax attorney to see if those exceptions apply in your case.

The IRS estimates that it has $1.4 billion in refunds for taxpayers that did not file an income tax return (Form 1040) for the 2015 tax year. In order to be entitled to their refunds, most taxpayers must file their 2015 return no later than April 15, 2019. If the 2015 tax return is not filed by that date, the tax refund will become property of the U.S. Treasury.

How long does the IRS have to audit your return? 

Generally speaking, the IRS has three years from the due date of your tax return or three years from the date it was filed, whichever is later, to audit your return and make an assessment. However, there are exceptions that may apply to extend the audit period:

  1. If there is a substantial omission of gross income, then the IRS has six years to make an assessment. A substantial omission of gross income is one that amounts to more than 25 percent of the amount reported on the tax return.
  2. If the additional tax is related to undisclosed foreign financial assets and the omitted income is more than $5,000, the IRS has six years to make an assessment.
  3. The statute of limitation is open indefinitely if the taxpayer has filed a false or fraudulent tax return.

Keep in mind, the statute of limitation on assessment does not start to run until a tax return has been filed. If a tax return has not been filed, the statute for assessment remains open.

How long can the IRS collect a tax liability?

Generally speaking, the statute of limitation for the IRS to collect on a tax debt, plus penalties and interest, is 10 years from the date of assessment. Note that this is 10 years from the date of the assessment, not 10 years from the due date of the return. In addition, this 10-year period can be suspended under certain circumstances, including:

  • if the taxpayer has filed for bankruptcy protection, plus an additional six months
  • if the taxpayer resides outside of the US for at least six months
  • if the taxpayer files a request for a collection due process hearing
  • if the taxpayer files a claim for innocent spouse relief
  • if the taxpayer files for an offer-in compromise (OIC)
  • while there is a pending installment agreement request

Finally, the IRS can take action to collect beyond the 10-year limitation period by filing suit to reduce the assessments to judgment.

© 2019 Varnum LLP
This post was written by Angelique M. Neal of Varnum LLP.

Did You Send Notice to the Partners?

The implementation of the centralized partnership audit regime (CPAR) has finally arrived. Enacted by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, CPAR wasn’t effective until tax years beginning after December 31, 2017. Many taxpayers and tax practitioners placed it behind the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act on their list of priorities. Now 2019 brings the first filing season under CPAR as 2018 tax returns are filed.

Most partnerships and LLCs that qualify will choose to elect out of CPAR’s application. The election out is available if (1) each partner is an individual, a C corporation, a foreign entity that would be treated as a C corporation were it domestic, an S corporation, or an estate of a deceased partner, and (2) the partnership is required to furnish 100 or fewer Form K-1s for the year. To elect out, a partnership must make an affirmative election each year on its timely filed tax return and file a Schedule B-2 that sets forth the name and taxpayer identification number of every partner and every shareholder of an S corporation that is a partner. The schedule also requires that the type of partner (e.g., individual, C corporation, etc.) be identified.

Electing out of CPAR is straightforward for qualifying partnerships. The partnership tax return Form 1065 specifically asks whether the partnership is electing out and instructs taxpayers to complete a Schedule B-2. However, there is one more requirement. Did you notify all the partners of the election? The Internal Revenue Code requires that a partnership notify each of its partners that it has elected out of CPAR, and the final regulations require that the notice be delivered to the partners within 30 days of the election being made.

There is no prescribed form or manner for the notice, nor is requirement of the notice addressed on Form 1065 or Schedule B-2. The preliminary comments to the proposed regulations say it may be in writing, electronic or other form chosen by the partnership. The IRS has said that it intends to “carefully review” a partnership’s decision to elect out of CPAR to determine whether the election is valid. Partnerships and tax return preparers using tax-preparation software should make sure the partner notification is on the Form K-1s, and if it is not, notice should be sent by whatever manner within 30 days of the tax return’s filing.

 

© 2019 Jones Walker LLP
This post was written by Robert E. Box, Jr. of Jones Walker LLP.

Be Thankful I Don’t Take It All – France Moves to Tax the Value of Data

Were the Beatles still recording today, they might have to add this verse to Taxman. As what will surely be the opening salvo in government efforts to find ways to recapture the value of the personal data upon which so much of our digital economy now seems to depend and return it to consumers, France is now set to become the first European country to implement what is effectively a “data tax”.

About 30 companies, mostly from the US, may soon have to pay a 3% tax on their revenues. The tax will mostly affect companies that use customer data to sell online advertising. Justifying the new tax, French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire clearly drew the battle lines:

This is about justice . . . . These digital giants use our personal data, make huge profits out of these data . . . then transfer the money somewhere else without paying their fair share of taxes.

The bill would apply to digital companies with worldwide revenues over 750 million euros ($848 million), including French revenue over 25 million euros. Not surprisingly, Google, Amazon and Facebook are squarely in the crosshairs of the new tax.

According to European Commission figures, the FANG companies and their ilk pay on average 14 percentage points less tax than other European companies. France took unilateral action after a similar proposal at the EU level failed to get unanimous support from member states, although Le Maire said he would now push for an international deal by the end of the year.

Lest you think this is just a European phenomenon, you need only look west to California, where Governor Newsom has commissioned the study of “data dividends” to help address the digital divide. In fact, the much-discussed California Consumer Privacy Act already contains provisions encouraging digital companies to compensate consumers for the use of their personal data. See our recent alert on data dividends and the CCPA here.

There will be lots more action in the “value for data” space in coming days. While academics debate whether data is more like labor or more like capital, we expect state and federal regulators to look to the value of data as a means to address the challenges of artificial intelligence and income inequality.

 

Copyright © 2019 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.
Read more international news on the NLR’s Global Type of Law Page.

Impact of Government Shutdown on IRS Collections

The government shutdown has impacted many government offices, including the Internal Revenue Service. After the longest government shutdown in history, IRS employees returned to work on January 28, 2019, in most offices across the country. Unfortunately, due to extreme weather conditions in parts of the US, including Michigan, local offices were closed most days during this first week of the IRS reopening. If a taxpayer has outstanding balances with the IRS, the lingering question is what impact did the shutdown have on IRS collections.

While it will take some time for the IRS to resume normal operations, on January 29, 2019 the IRS issued a number of FAQs to assist taxpayers and tax professionals with collection issues that were affected by the shutdown.

Things to Keep in Mind

IRS revenue officers were furloughed during the shutdown. Meaning that they were put on a leave of absence that prohibited them from performing their duties. If you were working with a revenue officer to resolve your balance due account, the officer will be reviewing inventory and should be reaching out to taxpayers within the next week or so. If an appointment was missed, it should be rescheduled. If a payment or information was due during the shutdown, you should have that payment and/or information ready and available when contacted so that you can move your case toward resolution.

Government shutdown stamp over Form 1040 documentThe government shutdown did not affect federal tax law as it relates to the filing of returns and the making of payments to the IRS. Thus, penalties for failure to file, failure to pay, federal tax deposit penalties and estimated tax payment penalties may still apply. Further, since compliance is critical for all collection alternatives, including installment agreements, offers-in-compromise, and currently not collectible status, your collection alternative can be subject to default procedures.

The government shutdown did not affect statutory deadlines for filing timely appeals from enforced collection actions, including the time frame within which to request a Collection Due Process Hearing from the issuance of a Final Notice of Intent to Levy or from a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing. Thus, you may find yourself in jeopardy of levy action on income and financial assets.

 

© 2019 Varnum LLP
This post was written by Angelique M. Neal of Varnum LLP.
Read more news on the IRS and other Tax issues on the NLR Tax Type of Law Page.

New Illinois Employee Reimbursement Law Effective January 1, 2019

Beginning January 1, 2019, employers in Illinois will have new requirements for reimbursing employee expenses. An amendment to the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA) is the first Illinois law regulating employer reimbursement for employees’ business-related expenditures.

Previously, the IWPCA did not address employee reimbursement, so employers were free to implement their own rules and procedures for reimbursing employees for business expenses. Under the IWPCA amendment, employers must reimburse employees for “all reasonable expenditures or losses required of the employee in the discharge of employment duties” for the primary benefit of the employer and authorized or required by the employer. An employer is not required to reimburse an employee for losses caused by the employee’s negligence, losses due to normal wear, or losses due to theft (unless the theft was the result of the employer’s negligence).

To initiate the reimbursement process, an employee must submit the expenditure, with supporting documentation, to the employer within 30 days of incurring the expense. If the employee lost a receipt or never received one, the employer must accept the employee’s signed statement as documentation for the expense.

The new law permits employers to place certain limitations on reimbursement by implementing a written expense reimbursement policy. If an employee fails to comply with the written policy, the employer will not be required to reimburse the employee. Additionally, if such a policy establishes specifications or guidelines for expenditures, the employer will not be required to pay any portion of the expenditure that exceeds the specifications. However, the written policy may not provide for no reimbursement or “de minimis” reimbursement and may not shorten the 30-day period for submitting expenditures.

To avoid any penalties associated with this IWPCA amendment, which include potential liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees, employers should review the law, 820 ILCS 115/9.5, to ensure compliance. Employers are also advised to contact their legal counsel with any questions regarding the new law or to create a written expense reimbursement policy in compliance with the IWPCA.

© 2018 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.

This post was written by Zachary J. Weber of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP.