Category: Supreme Court

What You Don’t Know Can’t Hurt You: SCOTUS Rules Inadvertent Legal Errors Cannot Overturn Copyright Infringement Decisions

“No harm, no foul.” That was the message the U.S. Supreme Court delivered Feb. 24 in ruling that a copyright infringement verdict should not have been overturned because of inaccurate information in the copyright registration asserted. The Court’s 6-3 opinion vacates a Ninth Circuit decision that threw out an infringement verdict on the ground that the registrant should have known the law regarding filing multiple works within one registration, a practice referred to as group registrations.

In Unicolors Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz LP, a jury found that Unicolors’ fabric pattern copyrights were violated and the district court entered judgment for H&M to pay nearly $800,000 for selling jackets that infringed on Unicolors’ copyrights.  H&M moved for judgment as a matter of law that Unicolor’s copyright registration was invalid because for group registrations, all works in the applications must be published “in the same unit of publication.”  Unicolor released some of the garments containing the protected patterns to private customers, and released the others to the public at a different time.  Thus, the asserted registration did not technically satisfy the requirements.  The district court denied H&M’s motion and found that safe harbor provision of the Copyright Act allows for innocent mistakes of fact and law.  In this case, Unicolor was not aware that all works in a group registration had to be published “in the same unit of publication.”

The Ninth Circuit overturned this ruling, siding with H&M that Unicolors’ copyright registration was invalid because of legal errors in the application, saying a safe harbor provision for copyright registration errors only applies to factual mistakes, not unintentionally misreading the law. Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for the majority, pushed back on this idea:

“In our view, however, §411(b) does not distinguish between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact. Lack of knowledge of either fact or law can excuse an inaccuracy in a copyright registration,” he wrote.

Justice Breyer also noted that many copyright applicants are often “novelists, poets, painters, designers, and others without legal training” and said Congress never intended to make it more difficult for those non-attorneys to successfully apply for a copyright. “Given this history, it would make no sense if §411(b) left copyright registrations exposed to invalidation based on applicants’ good-faith misunderstandings of the details of copyright law,” he said.

The Supreme Court’s decision is s a victory for creators’ rights and provides some peace of mind for those creators filing copyright applications without the assistance of an attorney.  However, this decision will focus discovery on whether any errors in a registration—be them factual or legal—were made “with knowledge that [the error] was inaccurate.”

Copyright © 2022 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.
For more articles about the U.S. Supreme Court, visit the NLR Litigation section.

SCOTUS’s HOUSE CALL on Healthcare Industry: The Economic Impact of Mandatory Vaccination

The Supreme Court of the United States in a per curiam opinion on Jan. 13 ruled that the Secretary of HHS (United States Department of Health and Human Services) did not exceed his statutory authority in requiring that, in order to remain eligible for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement, all healthcare providers except for physician offices not regulated by CMS (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services), organ procurement organizations, portable X-Ray suppliers and certain healthcare professionals solely engaged in fully remote telehealth, must insure that their employees be vaccinated against Covid-19. The Court in a 5-4 decision maintained that the Secretary had adequately examined alternatives to mandatory vaccination even though the Final Interim Rule went into effect immediately with no sunset provision nor any revisions or assessment of public comment which is usually required under 5 U.S.C. Sections 553(b), 553(c). Interestingly, the Court, both in its decision and its dissent, failed to consider the scientific data on natural immunity, the incident of Covid infection and recovery among healthcare workers, or the significant easing of both hospitalizations and mortality data from the most recent Covid mutation, which is now considered the dominant strain of infection, Omicron.[1] Of even greater concern coming from its decision is a possible grave consequence (unintended or not) of having nearly 3 million healthcare workers fired between the end of January and end of March 2022.

The decision will spur many healthcare providers to either consider downsizing its healthcare platform (eliminating elective surgeries, closing maternity wards, diverting critical patients to other facilities, moving patients into home care more rapidly, etc.) or seeking protection under the bankruptcy code to obtain some breathing room. According to the American Hospital Association (“AHA”), post-pandemic, and even before the Mandate decision, the collective turnover across ICU’s, nursing units and emergency departments has risen from 18% to 30%.[2] There is no doubt that when a nurse leaves a healthcare organization, the vacancy affects the cost of operation many more times the amount of salary paid to the nurse. According to Nursing Solutions, Inc., the average period of time it takes to fill a nursing position is 85 days — and more than three months for a specialized nursing position. While a replacement nurse is located, the healthcare organization must rely on “travelers” and direct care staffing agencies charging super competitive rates. Just in the last year the use of costly employment agencies to cover gaps in staffing is up by 250% over the last year, according to the Florida Health Care Association, Oct. 25, 2021. A turnover of a single nurse whose salary ranges from $28,800 to $51,700 can translate to an average of $3.6-$6.5 million cost to the healthcare organization, given such factors as the cost of reduced productivity of an employee in the weeks leading up to their departure, time between the departure and employee’s replacement, paid overtime to cover the replacement, hi-cost outside staffing agency fees, advertising for open positions, conducting background checks and credential verifications, training onboard new employees and climbing the learning curve on the new clinical culture.[3]

None of the above costs take into account additional expense burdens for healthcare organizations coming from the mounting labor shortage at the nursing assistant and home health aides level, which are considering leaving the healthcare setting in droves and making more money and less aggravation in the retail field. Bloomberg reports that there will be a shortfall of 3.2 million lower-wage workers among all the healthcare organizations by 2026.[4] What is the economic effect of the mandate on healthcare organizations? Well, it’s obvious that by early Spring of this year, there will be fewer healthcare workers and the costs of providing healthcare will go up in spite of an injection of an additional $10 billion of Phase 4 Provider Relief Funds under the CARES ACT. Will the economic stress create more interest in turning to bankruptcy alternatives to allow these organizations time to adjust to the new normal? Even before the mandate was issued, the AHA projected that hospitals would lose over $54 billion dollars in net income during 2021. That loss comes after accounting for the infusion of $176 billion in CARES ACT funding, which didn’t directly address the current dilemma of loss of manpower. It would be likely that the losses for 2022 will be even more dramatic. Additionally, what is not taken into account in these figures is the deepening insolvency affecting the Long Term Care Industry, where 86% of nursing homes and 77% of assisted living facilities have indicated that their workforce situation has gotten worse over the last three months.[5]

Certainly, the upcoming additional economic stress among heath care organizations from potential depletion of manpower will present several challenges within a bankruptcy setting. For one, practitioners will need to navigate how best to utilize post-petition cash between important manpower related objectives such as retention bonuses, paid time off, overtime payments, staffing agencies’ fees, recruiting, advertising, credentialling, and new employee policies, and equally demanding needs such as rent and other critical healthcare vendors. Particular attention will be given to carefully tailored DIP financing to insure the viability of the organization while in bankruptcy and through its exit. While private equity has taken larger and larger roles in healthcare, and its desire to utilize roll-ups and consolidations, specialists in healthcare financial advising will have to be employed to assist the economic constituencies in understanding the mechanism for exiting the bankruptcy, given the balancing act between workforce equilibrium and quality of continued care. Ultimately, more healthcare organizations will require strong healthcare insolvency professional guidance to find an appropriate refuge and fresh start in the trying months to come.

FOOTNOTES

[1]  Of note concerning the timing of its decision and its rationale based on the science, one of the Justices in oral argument believed that in January 2022, there were over 100,000 children in the US currently in the ICUs when the actual total was far less.  Additionally, though the Wall Street Journal reported on January 26, 2022 that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) stated that Covid-19 deaths in the U.S. topped 2,100 a day, the highest in nearly a year, the article quotes Robert Anderson, chief of mortality statistics, who says, “You can have a disease that is for any particular person less deadly than another, like Omicron, but if it is more infectious and reaches more people, then you’re more likely to have a lot of deaths.”  As this article is going to print, see, also, Dr. Martin Makary, “The High Cost of Disparaging Natural Immunity to Covid,” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 26, 2022, concluding that “the superiority of natural immunity over vaccinated immunity is clear”.

[2]  Dave Muoio, Pandemic-Era overtime, agency staffing costs U.S. hospitals an extra $24B per year, Fierce Healthcare, Oct. 8, 2021.

[3] See 2021 NSI National Health Care Retention & RN Staffing Report, published by NSI Nursing Solutions, Inc., March 2021.

[4]  Lauren Coleman Lochner, US Hospitals Pushed to Financial Ruin as Nurses Quit During Pandemic, Bloomberg, Dec. 21, 2021.

[5] See FTI Healthcare Industry Sector Outlook, FTI Consulting, December 2021.

This article was written by Frank P. Terzo of Nelson Mullins law firm. For more information about vaccine mandates, please click here.

U.S. Supreme Court Lifts Preliminary Injunctions on Healthcare Worker Vaccine Mandate

On January 13, 2022, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) Interim Final Rule (the “Rule”) in a 5-4 decision, staying the preliminary injunctions issued for 24 states by the District Courts for the Eastern District of Missouri and the Western District of Louisiana.  Therefore, the CMS vaccine mandate is in full effect for all states except Texas, which was not part of the cases before the Court.  The Rule requires nearly all workers at Medicare- and Medicaid-certified facilities—whether medical personnel, volunteers, janitorial staff, or even contractors who service the facilities—to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they qualify for a medical or religious exemption.

The Court based its holding on two main points.  First, the Court held that Congress clearly authorized CMS to put conditions on funding it provides to the Medicare and Medicaid certified facilities.  The Court opined that perhaps CMS’s “most basic” function is to ensure that regulated facilities protect the health and safety of their patients, noting that Medicare and Medicaid patients are often some of the most vulnerable to infection and death from COVID-19.  Because CMS determined that a vaccine mandate is necessary to protect patient health and safety, the Court held the mandate “fits neatly within the language of the [authorizing] statute.”  The Court acknowledged that CMS has never required vaccinations in the past, but attributed this in part to the fact that states typically already require necessary vaccinations like hepatitis B, influenza, and measles for healthcare workers.

Second, the Court held that the mandate is not arbitrary and capricious, and cautioned the district courts that their role is merely to make sure an agency acts within the “zone of reasonableness.”  The Court found the administrative record sufficient to explain CMS’s rationale for the mandate and also accepted that getting the vaccine mandate in place ahead of winter and flu season satisfied the “good cause” standard for skipping the notice and comment period.

Healthcare employers subject to the Rule should immediately start implementing vaccine requirements if they have not already.  It is anticipated that in all states but Texas, CMS will likely begin enforcement of the vaccine mandate in approximately 30 days.  On December 28, 2021, CMS released guidance to state surveyors with enforcement standards to use starting 30 days from the memo, though at the time the memo only applied to the 25 states that were not enjoined.  Healthcare employers should also keep in mind that this is not the end of the road: the Court’s holding only means that the CMS vaccine mandate is in force while the 5th and 8th Circuits complete their review of the underlying state challenges to the mandate.  While the Supreme Court’s opinion sends a strong message that lower courts should uphold the mandate, there is no guarantee they will do so.

The legal landscape continues to evolve quickly and there is a lack of clear-cut authority or bright line rules on implementation.  This article is not intended to be an unequivocal, one-size-fits-all guidance, but instead represents our interpretation of where applicable law currently and generally stands.  This article does not address the potential impacts of the numerous other local, state and federal orders that have been issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including, without limitation, potential liability should an employee become ill, requirements regarding family leave, sick pay and other issues.

Article By Keeley A. McCarty and Ashley T. Hirano of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more health law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

The OSHA Mandate — Supreme Court Oral Argument Preview

Tomorrow morning (Friday, January 7), the Supreme Court hears oral argument in the OSHA (10 a.m. EST) and CMS (11 a.m. EST) mandate cases.  (You can listen to the arguments live here.)  For the OSHA mandate, one group of petitioners consists of a coalition of twenty-seven States, led by Ohio, and the other consists of a coalition of business associations.  We’ve read the briefs, and here are our issues to look out for tomorrow:

Whether OSHA may only regulate occupational dangers.  The petitioners argue that because the OSH Act and OSHA regulations are all concerned with occupational hazards, OSHA cannot regulate against a virus presenting a risk to all Americans.  Meanwhile, OSHA argues that the OSH Act is not limited to dangers that are workplace-specific, especially given Congress’ previous endorsement of OSHA’s measures to encourage vaccination against bloodborne pathogens.

Whether COVID-19 is a “grave danger” that represents a “new hazard.”  The States argue that the OSH ACT limits “grave danger” to those “from exposure to substances are agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful,” connoting toxicity and poisonousness.  Thus, it cannot refer to airborne viruses that are “both widely present in society” and “non-life-threatening to a vast majority of employees.”  OSHA argues that the statute’s disjunctive phrasing allows for an ETS targeting viruses that are physically harmful, or a “new hazard, even if not technically “toxic” in nature.

Whether there is an “emergency” to justify the ETS.  The petitioners continue to argue that nothing significant has changed over the past year the country had been living with the virus to justify finding an emergency.  OSHA responds by pointing to problems presented by the return to work, the Delta variant, and COVID fatigue.

Whether the ETS is “necessary.”  The States argue that the OSH Act imposes a higher standard:  while other regulations may be merely “reasonably necessary or appropriate,” the Act requires emergency regulations to be “necessary”—which the States read as essential or indispensable.  According to the States, the delay between the issuance of the ETS and the time it was supposed to go into effect dooms any argument that it is necessary.  The business associations, for their part, stress that OSHA could have gone through notice and comment proceedings months ago.  In OSHA’s view, the statute is not nearly so narrow and it is enough that workplaces contribute substantially to the spread of the virus and that vaccines are the best way to fight COVID-19.

The scope of relief.  The petitioners obviously want to stay the entire mandate—both the vaccine and masking/testing requirements.  OSHA argues that any stay should be limited to the vaccine requirement.

Major-questions doctrine and federalism canon.  The petitioners argue that these canons of construction require Congress to speak clearly when delegating major economic and political questions to agencies that alter the balance between federal and state governments.  OSHA argues that neither of these canons apply and, in any event, Congress did speak clearly, as evidenced by the fact that it recently allocated $100 million to OSHA to carry out COVID-19 related worker protection activities.

Facts outside the administrative record.   While the OSHA and CMS mandates are supposed to be judged according to the record — which makes much of the factual discussion seem a little dated in this fast-moving pandemic — we’ll be interested to see whether the Omicron variant, the recent spike in cases, and other relatively recent developments show up at oral argument.

And, maybe, a few Constitutional issues.  While constitutional issues like the Commerce Clause and Non-Delegation Doctrine might appear tomorrow, we expect the statutory arguments to dominate the discussion—exactly as they did in the parties’ Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit briefing and in most Sixth Circuit opinions.

We’ll be interested to see how the opinions of Judge Stranch, Judge Larsen, Judge Sutton, and Judge Bush influence the Justices’ approach to the legal and factual questions.

© Copyright 2022 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
For more about OSHA litigation, visit the NLR Coronavirus News section.

The Legal Challenges to the OSHA ETS and CMS Vaccine Mandate Move to the Supreme Court

On December 22, 2021, the Supreme Court of the United States issued orders granting review of legal challenges to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing Emergency Temporary Standard (“OSHA ETS”) and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Omnibus COVID-19 Health Care Staff Vaccination Interim Final Rule (“CMS Vaccine Mandate”). In a rare move, the Supreme Court set an accelerated timeline for the cases, scheduling oral arguments in both cases on January 7, 2022.

Following a ruling out of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on December 17, 2021, OSHA announced that it would not issue citations for non-compliance with any requirements of the OSHA ETS before January 10, 2022 and will not issue citations for noncompliance with testing requirements before February 9, 2022, so long as an employer is exercising reasonable, good faith efforts to come into compliance with the OSHA ETS. While it is unknown whether the Supreme Court will be able to issue a ruling by OSHA’s January 10, 2022 compliance date, the Supreme Court’s expedited schedule seems to indicate that it is attempting to give employers some finality concerning their obligations under the federal mandates.

Article By Lilian Doan Davis of Polsinelli PC

For more COVID-19 legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

Supreme Court to Consider Whether the FAA Mandates Arbitration of PAGA Actions

On Dec. 15, 2021, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, and likely will decide by summer 2022 whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts California public policy and requires enforcement of arbitration agreements that purport to waive an employee’s ability to pursue representative actions under the California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). Employers have been waiting for the Supreme Court to take up this issue and are watching the case with interest.

Currently, per the California Supreme Court’s decision in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, arbitration agreements that waive an employee’s right to pursue PAGA representative actions are considered void and unenforceable. In Iskanian, the California Supreme Court held the FAA does not preempt California state law prohibiting prospective PAGA waivers because PAGA actions are between the employer and the state, not the employee. Thus, the state of California is the real party in interest, not the employee bringing suit, and although the employee may have executed a binding arbitration agreement, the state of California did not. Thus, arbitration agreements that purport to waive the right, expressly or otherwise, to bring a PAGA representative action are not enforceable.

In Viking River, the employee filed a PAGA representative action seeking civil penalties for various alleged violations of the California Labor Code, despite signing an arbitration agreement with her employer agreeing to resolve all future employment-related disputes with the employer via individual arbitration. Relying on the agreement, the employer moved to compel the action to arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the denial citing California state law as articulated in Iskanian. The California Supreme Court subsequently denied the employer’s petition for review.

Viking River then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis. These decisions held that courts may not disregard bilateral arbitration agreements or reshape traditional individualized arbitration by mandating class-wide arbitration procedures without all parties’ consent. Viking River argued the Supreme Court needed to review the case to reaffirm the FAA and national policy in favor of arbitration. Viking River further argued review was necessary to ensure that Concepcion and Epic promote bilateral arbitration, rather than simply result in “representational litigation” under PAGA by those who agreed to arbitrate individually. In granting review, the Supreme Court will decide “[w]hether the Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement providing that an employee cannot raise representative claims, including under PAGA.”

This will be a closely watched decision for both sides of the bar and will likely have a groundbreaking effect on California employment litigation. Should the Supreme Court decide in Viking River’s favor, PAGA-only actions, which have become the preference of California plaintiffs’ attorneys in the face of arbitration agreements containing class action waiver provisions, will largely become a thing of the past for those employers who mandate individual arbitration for employees. Although it is by no means certain how the Supreme Court will decide this issue, employers should certainly be ready to revisit any arbitration agreements with California employees and consider what if any changes the ultimate ruling may warrant.

Article By Ashley M. Farrell Pickett and Radha D.S. Kulkarni of Greenberg Traurig, LLP

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.
©2021 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

California Supreme Court Cases Employers Should Be Watching in 2022

The California Supreme Court has been busy in 2021 deciding cases that affect employers from how to pay meal and rest period penalties to when the statute of limitations for a failure to promote runs.

While the state’s high court answered some big questions in this last year, they still have several cases pertaining to employment law awaiting their attention.

Here are the cases employers should be watching in the new year and why.

People ex rel. Garcia-Brower v. Kolla’s Inc.

In this case, a complainant filed a timely retaliation complaint with the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (“DLSE”) claiming immediate termination after complaining about non-payment of wages. Her complaint did not allege any disclosure to a governmental agency, but the retaliatory act of termination upon her direct complaint to her employer. The DLSE undertook an investigation and determined that respondents had violated several Labor Code sections, notably 1102.5 (“Section 1102.5”), California’s whistleblower statute. The DLSE notified the parties involved of its determination on December 22, 2015. Respondents were ordered to do several things, including paying the complainant lost wages and civil penalties of $20,000 each for violations of sections 1102.5 and 98.6. Respondents never complied.

On October 17, 2017, the Labor Commissioner filed an enforcement action against Respondents under the authority of section 98.7, subdivision (c)(1)5, alleging violations of these statutory provisions. Eventually, through a lack of response by the employer-defendant, the Labor Commissioner sought to take a default judgment.

The trial court, however, determined that the Labor Commissioner had not stated a claim under section 1102.5, because the complainant had not approached a governmental agency until after her termination. The trial court found that retaliation under the statute required the complainant to have been terminated as a result of disclosure to a governmental agency, which was not alleged. The trial court also found insufficient evidence for the claimant’s unpaid wages, and that the penalties under Section 98.6 were not appropriate.

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court’s reasoning, but nevertheless affirmed the denial of Section 1102.5 claim as it found the after-termination complaint to be defective. It also reversed as to the penalties awarded under Section 98.6 and remanded that portion of the judgment.

The question before the California Supreme Court is limited to whether Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b), which protects an employee from retaliation for disclosing unlawful activity, applies when the information is already known to that person or agency.

Why Employers Should Watch This Case

Depending on the direction the California Supreme Court takes, its holding will affect the burden on employers defending against whistleblower claims – especially those arising out of allegations that an employee told an employer or agency information that the employer or agency was already aware of.

Grande v. Eisenhower Medical Center

FlexCare, LLC (“FlexCare”), a temporary staffing agency, assigned Plaintiff to work as a nurse at Eisenhower Medical Center (“Eisenhower”). Plaintiff alleged that during her employment at Eisenhower, FlexCare and Eisenhower failed to ensure she received the required meal and rest periods, wages for certain periods she worked, and overtime wages. She then filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of FlexCare employees assigned to hospitals throughout California. Plaintiff’s claims were based solely on her work on assignment to Eisenhower. FlexCare settled with the class and plaintiff executed a release of claims. The trial court entered a judgment incorporating the settlement agreement.

A year later, Plaintiff brought a second class action suit against Eisenhower, who had not been named in the previous lawsuit, alleging the same labor law violations. FlexCare intervened in the action asserting Plaintiff could not bring the separate lawsuit against Eisenhower because she had settled her claims in the prior class action.

The trial court held a limited trial on the issue of the propriety of the lawsuit and ruled that Eisenhower was not a released party under the settlement agreement. Accordingly, Eisenhower could not avail itself of the doctrine of res judicata because the hospital was neither a party to the prior litigation nor in privity with FlexCare. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court.

Why Employers Should Watch This Case

This case could affect staffing agency employers who may want to utilize broad releases if their “clients” are not also named to avoid duplicative litigation – for which they may have to pay twice – through indemnity clauses.

Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc.

This case will explore whether the evidentiary standard set forth in Labor Code section 1102.6 (“Section 1102.6”) replaces the McDonnell Douglas test as the relevant evidentiary standard for retaliation claims brought under section 1102.5.

In this case, Defendant was a manufacturer of paint, stains, caulks, and other products. Plaintiff Lawson (“Lawson”) was a territory manager whose duties included merchandising and claims that he was directed by his supervisor to handle a product in a way that fraudulently removed a slow-selling product from its inventory. Lawson told his supervisor he would not do this, then reported the directive to the company’s ethics hotline on two separate occasions. The second report to the ethics hotline resulted in an investigation. During this time, Lawson received poor ratings for his work, was placed on a performance improvement plan, and eventually, Defendant terminated his employment.

Lawson then filed a complaint against the company in the United States District Court, alleging that he was retaliated against as a whistleblower.

The trial court applied the McDonnell Douglas test, which employs burden-shifting between the plaintiff and the employer. This test originated in the context of Title VII, the federal statute governing workplace discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. The trial court concluded that Lawson failed to carry his burden to raise triable issues of fact regarding pretext and granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

On appeal, Lawson argued to the 9th Circuit that the trial court should have applied the evidentiary standard outlined in Section 1102.6. Section 1102.6 states that once it has been demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the whistleblower activity was a contributing factor in the retaliation against the employee, the employer’s burden of proof is to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged action would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons.

In its question to the California Supreme Court, the 9th Circuit noted that application of the McDonnell Douglas test to whistleblower claims under Labor Code section 1102.5 “seems to ignore [a] critical intervening statutory amendment” by which the California legislature established the evidentiary burdens of the parties participating in a civil action or administrative hearing involving a violation of the statute. Though this statement by the Circuit seems like a decision, the 9th Circuit pointed out three published California appellate court decisions that expressly applied McDonnell Douglas after the amendment.

This contradiction between California’s statute and the court rulings is the root of the 9th Circuit’s question.

Why Employers Should Watch This Case

If the California Supreme Court rules that the evidentiary requirement under Section 1102.6 applies, disposing of whistleblower retaliation claims prior to trial will become extremely difficult due to the high clear and convincing evidentiary standard imposed on the employer.

Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc.

This case involves a class of security guards who alleged meal break violations and sought premium wages, waiting time penalties, inaccurate pay stub penalties, and attorney’s fees.

The Court of Appeal held that unpaid premium wages for meal period violations did not entitle employees to pay stub penalties or waiting time penalties.

Why Employers Should Watch This Case

This case will resolve a long-standing debate on whether waiting time penalties are recoverable for meal and rest period violations. If the California Supreme Court disagrees with the lower courts, it will increase potential penalties for California meal and rest period violations, as violations could be compounded by alleged pay stub penalties and waiting time penalties.

Article By Leonora M. Schloss and Karen Luh of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more litigation and legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2021

SCOTUS Shelves Request to Review 11th Circuit Dark Tower Decision, Ending Copyright Saga

The Supreme Court’s refusal to review the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in DuBay v. King marks an end to a 4-year copyright battle concerning the lead character of Stephen King’s acclaimed series, The Dark Tower.  The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirmed that the King’s anti-hero, Roland Deschain, is not substantially similar to William DuBay’s The Rook comic book character, Restin Dane. The decision illustrates the complexity of literary copyright infringement disputes, where a claim is brought based on a mix of original and stock character elements.

In 2017 William DuBay’s heir, Benjamin DuBay, sued novelist Stephen King, Marvel Entertainment, Sony Entertainment, and others for various counts of copyright infringement, alleging that King copied DuBay’s artistic expression based on purported similarity between lead characters of The Rook (Restin Dane) and The Dark Tower (Roland Deschain). The district court granted summary judgment to King, determining (1) that any similarities between the characters comprise unprotectable general ideas and scènes à faire elements; and (2) that the protectable original character elements in dispute are different, such that “no reasonable jury…could find the works substantially similar.” DuBay appealed.

The principal issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in assessing substantial similarity.  DuBay argued that the characters were substantially similar based on several shared characteristics, including: (1) similar names; (2) interaction with time-travel related towers; (3) having a bird as a companion; (4) having knightly characteristics; (5) wearing Western-style clothing; (6) surviving a fictionalized interpretation of The Alamo; (7) the use of knives; and (8) traveling back in time to save a young boy who becomes a gunslinger. DuBay also argued that the unique combination of these elements made Dane a distinctive character, and that Deschain is a copy of DuBay’s artistic expression in that character.

The Eleventh Circuit addressed DuBay’s contentions in two parts.

First, the court assessed whether each of the claimed character elements merit copyright protection. The court affirmed the district court’s holding that “character names do not merit copyright protection,” since mere words and short phrases cannot be protected under copyright law.  The court reiterated that only original elements of a copyrighted work can be afforded protection, and that certain claimed elements (i.e., “knightly heritage,” time travel to “different times and parallel worlds,” “western attire,” “fictionalized Alamo histories,” and “knife wielding”) are merely general ideas or scènes à faire that are “too general to merit copyright protection.”  The court then reviewed the remaining elements to determine whether the shared characteristics rendered the characters substantially similar.  Although both characters may be broadly similar in having bird companions, a relationship to towers and tower imagery, and past time travel experiences involving the rescue of a young boy, the court found that the depiction of these elements was different in each work.  For example, whereas Dane lives in and travels via tower shaped structures shaped like the namesake chess piece, Deschain embarks on an endless mission to find an elusive Gothic tower that connects parallel worlds and time periods.  Because the portrayals of each original element are distinguishable, the court determined that no reasonable jury could have concluded that the works were similar.

Second, the court examined whether the characters are substantially similar based on each character’s combination of the claimed elements (or the “look and feel” of the characters).  The Court recognized of the potential dangers of comparing works based on individual similarities alone because an original combination of unoriginal elements can potentially sustain a claim of copyright infringement.  However, the court found that any similarities of combined elements were “superficial” at best, and that the “look and feel” analysis actually hurt, rather than helped, DuBay’s case by highlighting differences in expression of shared original character elements.

Takeaway:

The Supreme Court’s refusal to hear Dubay reinforces the basic tenet of copyright law that general ideas or scènes à faire cannot be protected by copyright.  It also reminds litigants that although a combination of original and non-original elements can be protected under copyright law, broad similarities are usually insufficient to sustain a copyright infringement claim.

The case is DuBay v. King, 844 Fed. Appx. 257 (11thCir. 2019), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 490 (2021).

Article By Spencer K. Beall and Margaret A. Esquenet of Finnegan

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2021 Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP

Review of McGirt v. Oklahoma – How the Supreme Court and Justice Gorsuch’s Revolutionary Textualism Brought America’s “Trail of Tears” Promise to the Creek Nation Back From the Dead

How does a child sex offender’s appeal of his criminal conviction result in half the State of Oklahoma – 113 years after it was admitted as the 46th State in the Union – being declared “Indian Lands” and given back to the Creek Nation Native Americans? That is the crazy plot not of a Best-Selling novel, but of the United States Supreme Court case McGirt v. Oklahoma, No. 18-9526, decided 5-4 late this term on July 9, 2020 in a ground-breaking majority opinion written by Justice Neil Gorsuch.

To understand McGirt’s impact we must start with its historical context. Roughly 180 years ago, a group of indigenous Native Americans known as the Five Civilized Tribes – the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek and Seminole – lived as autonomous nations throughout the American Deep South, as they had for hundreds of years before. As our new United States nation grew, however, European Americans were growing in number and had designs on the land for expansion of the young country. Not surprisingly, these designs didn’t include a place for Native Americans.

The “Indian Problem”

To remedy this so-called “Indian Problem,” the federal government imposed a forced relocation plan to remove the Native Americans from the Deep South. This plan, first championed by George Washington, evolved and was codified in American law and history by President Andrew Jackson, when he successfully pushed the Indian Removal Act of 1830 through Congress (over pioneer Davy Crockett’s fervent, raccoon-capped objection!). It was the Indian Removal Act of 1830 that authorized the federal government to extinguish all Indian title to Deep South lands, and to fully and finally remove the Native Americans by any means necessary.

To peacefully execute this plan, the federal government made a promise to the Five Civilized Tribes that if they agreed to remove themselves voluntarily, they would forever be granted replacement land out in the frontier American West. Had they not agreed, of course, the federal government was more than ready to remove them by force. Realizing they’d been given a Godfather-like “offer you can’t refuse,” the Tribes agreed that they would remove West, in reliance on this promise. One of the Five Civilized Tribes who accepted the government’s offer was the Creek Nation (who, while not a party to McGirt, became the biggest beneficiary of its ultimate holding). That almost 200-year-old promise is where the story of McGirt v. Oklahoma begins.

In what is known in American history as the “Trail of Tears,” beginning in the 1820s and into the 1830s, approximately 60,000 Native American men, women and children were uprooted from their ancestral homes and forced as refugees to pick up and walk hundreds of miles West on faith that the federal government’s promise would be honored. The “Trail of Tears” is a traumatic part of Native American history, as more than 4,000 Native Americans died from exposure, disease and starvation before ever reaching their promised lands. A promise that was made, but never fully fulfilled.

As Justice Gorsuch summarized in his majority opinion:

On the far end of the Trail of Tears was a promise. Forced to leave their ancestral lands in Georgia and Alabama, the Creek Nation received assurances that their new lands in the West would be secure forever. In exchange for ceding “all their land, East of the Mississippi river,” the U.S. government agreed by treaty that ‘[t]he Creek country west of the Mississippi shall be solemnly guarantied to the Creek Indians.” Treaty with the Creeks, Arts. I, XIV, Mar. 24, 1832, 7 Stat. 366, 368 (1832 Treaty).

It was against this great historical backdrop that the otherwise unremarkable criminal appeal of McGirt v. Oklahoma arose.

An Otherwise Unremarkable Appeal

By all accounts, Jimcy McGirt, a Native American, was an unsavory character and is by no means a hero of this story. In 1997, the State of Oklahoma convicted him of molesting, raping and forcibly sodomizing a four-year-old girl, his wife’s granddaughter. His other appellate grounds apparently unconvincing, and the individual circumstances of his case so horrific, his appellate lawyers – as good lawyers do – instead focused elsewhere, on an issue that had been simmering under the surface of Oklahoma state law for years. Perhaps, the lawyers argued, regardless of Mr. McGirt’s heinous conduct, his conviction is null and void for reasons other than the facts of the underlying case all together? Perhaps Oklahoma did not even have jurisdiction – the power – to criminally prosecute and/or to convict him in the first place, because the crime, as heinous as it was – was committed not on state land, but instead on federal “Indian Lands.” Land that Oklahoma has owned and controlled for over 100 years, but that the Creek Nation had been promised, pursuant to treaty, long ago.

Great headwinds worked against McGirt and his appellate counsel, not the least of which was that all of the main parties involved – the United States, the State of Oklahoma – and even the Creek Nation itself – had acquiesced to Oklahoma’s criminal jurisdiction and control over the land for the past 100 years.

As Justice Gorsuch succinctly put it, the question presented in McGirt was “did [McGirt] commit his crimes in Indian Territory?” Or was the crime committed on lands, as everyone seemed to assume for the past century, owned and controlled by State of Oklahoma?

If Eastern Oklahoma (including the large city of Tulsa) was in fact “Indian territory,” i.e. a reservation granted by the United States after the “Trail of Tears” promise, then it would be federal land and pursuant to the Major Crimes Act (MCA), McGirt could not be prosecuted by the State of Oklahoma, but could only be prosecuted by the federal government in federal court. And if that were the case, then McGirt’s conviction would be void, as Oklahoma had no more power to prosecute and convict McGirt of his crimes than you or I do sitting in our comfiest chair.

On its face, the question sounds almost ridiculous. Oklahoma has been a State prosecuting and convicting criminals, including in the areas of Eastern Oklahoma, for over 100 years. Land that McGirt now argues were never under Oklahoma’s power to control, but instead were always part of the Creek Reservation. Oklahoma countered, of course, with what seems like the more logical and pragmatic answer to that question – that through subsequent legislation, Oklahoma’s statehood in 1907, and the passage of generations without recognizing the Creek Nation’s sovereignty over these lands – that even if the land had been the Creek Nation’s at one point, that ended long ago. Oklahoma presented its argument as if it were a “no brainer.”

Justice Gorsuch’s “Textualist” Approach

Justice Gorsuch saw it differently. Siding with the 4 more liberal Supreme Court Justices, Justice Gorsuch wrote for the majority of the Court finding that the land did belong to the Creek Nation, that it was not a part of Oklahoma, and that therefore McGirt’s conviction must be vacated.

Most compelling, however, was how Justice Gorsuch boldly advanced his “textualist” approach in this opinion, regardless of whether it led to a “liberal” or “conservative” outcome.

Justice Gorsuch was President Donald J. Trump’s first Supreme Court appointee. He was championed as a staunch political conservative who would push the Supreme Court to the right. While no one can doubt Justice Gorsuch’s conservative bona fides, what was less understood by the talking heads in the media was that his true convictions are not to political ideology – but to his own brand of “textualist” legal philosophy.

Through this “textualist” lens, Justice Gorsuch ignored all of the numerous arguments over whether the argued outcomes would be best, most reasonable, or most fair and just. Instead, he focused squarely on the words used by Congress when it made and carried out its “Trail of Tears” promise to the Creek Nation. To that end, Justice Gorsuch posited the premise that once a reservation is established by Congress, the only question is whether Congress ever took that reservation away. You can’t look to the States. The law is clear that the States do not have any power to declare or negate a federally granted Indian Reservation. You also can’t look to the Courts. The Courts cannot judicially legislate a reservation into, or out of, existence. Therefore, what must be focused on exclusively is whether Congress ever expressly broke its “Trail of Tears” promise and ended the Creek Nation’s reservation. For that “[t]here is only one place we may look:” Justice Gorsuch said matter-of-factly, “the Acts of Congress.”

In applying this purely “textualist” approach, Justice Gorsuch was unyielding:

History shows that Congress knows how to withdraw a reservation when it can muster the will. Sometimes, legislation has provided an “explicit reference to cessation” or an “unconditional commitment … to compensate the Indian tribe for its opened land.” Ibid. Other times, Congress has directed that tribal lands shall be “restored to the public domain.” Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 412 (1994)(emphasis deleted). Likewise, Congress might speak of a reservation as being “discontinued”, “abolished”, or “vacated.” Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504, n. 22 (1973). Disestablishment has “never required any particular form of words,” Hagen, 510 U.S., at 411. But it does require that Congress clearly express its intent to do so, “commonly with an explicit reference to cessation or other language evidencing the present and total surrender of all tribal interests.” Nebraska v. Parker, 577 U.S. 481 (2016).

Oklahoma attempted to argue that either a reservation was never established, or the text of the subsequent Acts of Congress, if not expressly, at least effectively terminated any reservation that may have ever existed. But in Justice Gorsuch’s deft hands, this argument was doomed to fail. As Justice Gorsuch famously and efficiently proclaimed in his now famous Bostock v. Clayton County Title VII opinion earlier this term: “(o)nly the written word is law, and all persons are entitled to its benefit.” This is the textualist (almost religious) creed, and to ignore it as the foundation of any argument before this Court in its current make-up is done at one’s own peril.

To Justice Gorsuch (and most times a majority of this Court), one must set aside all else – what “chaos” may ensue from a ruling, what the conventional wisdom is on an issue (or here, has been for over a hundred years), or – more controversially put – what may be the best or most just outcome of a dispute – and decide disputes based solely on the written words of the law at issue. To a textualist, all citizens should be able to rely on the law as written, regardless of what even a majority may believe was intended by the law, or what an individual jurist may believe in a given case is a more just outcome. It is Judge Gorsuch’s purely textualist approach that dictated the outcome in this case, more than any political ideology or concern.

Once Justice Gorsuch rejected Oklahoma’s argument on the text of the law, he further applied his own textualist principles to dismiss the others. Oklahoma’s argument that the “historical practices and demographics, both around the time of, and long after the enactment of, all the relevant legislation” controlled was soundly rejected. To ignore the plain meaning of the words of a statute based upon matters outside the text, in Justice Gorsuch’s thinking, would risk, as he stated, “substituting stories for statutes.” Stories, to a textualist, are inherently more unreliable than the plain meaning of words on a page. Here, historical stories also typically favor history’s victors and undermine its victims. In this case, Justice Gorsuch found an exemplar case to divorce his “textualist” approach from previous criticism from the left that it is merely a conservative tool, or means to dictate conservative ends. Once you accept stories over the written word of law, to Justice Gorsuch, then the law itself is unmoored and subject only to the prevailing political winds of the time.

Justice Roberts’ Striking Dissent

Almost as striking as Justice Gorsuch’s triumphant planting of his textualist flag this term in Bostock and now McGirt, was Justice Roberts’ continued trend towards a more pragmatic and cautious legal approach. While that trend was highlighted more by pundits in cases where he sided with the more liberal justices, in McGirt, Justice Roberts again (even though he sided with the conservatives) championed the narrower and less ideological approach.

Writing for the four dissenting Justices, Justice Roberts concluded that “a century of practice confirms that the Five Tribes’ prior domains were extinguished.” The dissent ignored what Justice Gorsuch and the other majority justices could not. That to hold as such would be to allow Oklahoma to re-cast its decades of illegal practices, usurpation of authority, and mistreatment of the Creek Nation into “historical custom and practice” that it could then use to justify its dishonoring the “Trail of Tears” promise.

McGirt most assuredly creates sensational headlines due to its massive shift of power and authority from Oklahoma to the Creek Nation. Most articles reviewing this case focus on the uncertainty it will cause in matters between Native Americans and States within whose borders Indian Reservations exist. However, McGirt is also important for another, less sensational, but perhaps more impactful assertion regarding the rule of law in America going forward – the rise of Justice Gorsuch’s brand of “textualism.”

Takeaways

To Justice Gorsuch, the rule of law and the word of the law are paramount to all other interests. As the saying goes – one’s word is their bond. And it is that word – and that word alone – that should always be honored, whether you are a person, or a country. Justice Gorsuch closed his opinion consistently:

Today, we are asked whether the land these treaties promised remains an Indian reservation for purposes of federal criminal law. Because Congress has not said otherwise, we hold the government to its word.

While perhaps over 100 years late, in McGirt, the United States Supreme Court affirmed that what you promise must be honored, and in doing so, belatedly (and surprisingly) fulfilled a “Trail of Tears” promise most thought died long ago.

Copyright 2020 © Burg Simpson Eldredge Hersh & Jardine, P.C.

Review of Chiafalo and Baca: The “Faithless Electors” Supreme Court Cases

The role the Electoral College plays in American life has confused and confounded many, especially since the U.S. Presidential election of 2016, when the winner of the national popular vote, Hillary Clinton, actually lost the election to President Donald Trump by vote of State-appointed electors in the Electoral College.

The Electoral College was intended by the Founding Fathers to be a buffer between the passions of the masses and the rule by edict of only an elite few, but how much of a buffer and how autonomous the electors within the Electoral College actually are was never fully addressed by the Supreme Court until its decisions late this term in Chiafalo v. Washington, 19-465, (Decided July 6, 2020) and Colorado Dept. of State v. Baca, 18-1173 (Decided July 6, 2020). (The Supreme Court issued its full opinion in Chiafalo).

As a country, we have grown accustomed to watching the national news on election night as states are called for each candidate, and electoral vote tallies are updated to show to us who is “winning” the election when, in reality, all of this is a mere projection, as none of those “electoral votes” are assured, or even cast, until the electors actually cast those votes at a time and place long after November 4.

So who are these “electors” who vote in the Electoral College? Are they “rubber stamps” bound to follow the popular vote of the State who appointed them? Can the State require the electors to sign a pledge to vote consistent with their state’s popular vote winner? If so, can the State punish that elector, including removal as an elector if they violate that pledge and vote for someone else? Or is an elector more of a “free agent” in the vein of those elected as State representatives in Congress? Congressional representatives, of course, are not bound by the State or its citizens’ desires when casting a vote in Congress (though they are held to account for their votes in the next congressional election). If electors are not to use their own judgment, then why does the Constitution call them an “elector” (which connotes some amount of discretion) instead of a delegate, or a proxy, or any number of other terms that would signify a lack of individual authority? Or, more simply, why have electors at all?

In Chiafalo and Baca, electors in Washington and Colorado were appointed by their respective States and were required to make, and did make a pledge when they were appointed as electors to vote consistent with the popular vote of their states. Yet, when the time came to cast their vote in the Electoral College, they didn’t vote consistent with the winner of the State’s popular vote as they had pledged. They voted for another candidate instead, forever earning the moniker of “faithless electors”.  They weren’t the first electors ever to have done that. In fact, it has happened 180 times in our country’s history. The question presented to the Court then was – can they do that?

As it turns out the answer isn’t that simple. To understand how we got here, you need to go back to the Founding Fathers and the debates that forged the U.S. Constitution and the country itself. Let’s start with the misconception that the Constitution provides for a direct popular election of the President by the vote of its citizens.  It doesn’t. At the birth of our country, there was fierce debate over who would elect our President. One group argued for a free and democratic vote, where the (white) (male) citizens directly chose their nation’s leader based upon a direct popular vote. Another group, more skeptical about the passions (and frankly, the ability) of the masses, called instead for a group of wise men to be tasked with choosing the President.  This debate was resolved in an “eleventh hour” compromise at the close of the Constitutional Convention, which attempted to bridge the gap by expressly stating only:

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States shall be appointed an Elector.

U.S. Constitution, Article II, §1, cl. 2.  Originally, the Article continued on to describe the process for the vote, but that process was quickly found unworkable and the States scrapped it.

Instead, in 1804, the States replaced the process the electors were to follow with the Twelfth Amendment:

The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President…, they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to [Congress, where] the votes shall then be counted.

Yet even after this amendment, the Constitution remained silent as to what the electors’ role beyond merely casting their vote was to be.

In Chiafalo, the “faithless electors” argued that electors could vote for whomever they wished, based on three main arguments: (1) a textual argument that focused heavily on the word “elector”; (2) a historical argument based upon the fact that from early on there were electors who voted contrary to their state’s popular vote; and (3) the “federal function” argument, that once they had been appointed by the State as an elector, that the State no longer had the power to control their vote since they were now engaged a “federal function” of electing the President and Vice President. Central to their arguments was the concept that the right to vote inherently includes the discretion to choose whom they will vote for. And more, that an elector should not be subject to punishment by the State based upon how they cast their vote. While a State can set requirements for electors, i.e. that they be state residents, etc., the electors argued that those requirements end when it comes to the electors’ exercise of their appointed function – the vote.  The faithless electors argued that electors were akin to legislators and that discretion by the voter was inherently part of the Electoral College process. Once the State appointed an elector, they argued, the State did not have the power to “stand over the shoulder” of the elector as they carried out their constitutional function of voting for President and Vice-President. Otherwise, why have electors?  Why not have the States simply report who they had voted for?

The States countered that, consistent with Supreme Court precedent, along with the express power to appoint the electors, came with it the reciprocal and concurrent power to also remove the electors, and therefore States could set conditions of removal on its electors, including punishments for the way in which they vote, such as a pledge that they vote as the state’s voters had in the popular election or suffer a $1,000 fine.  The States argued that this outcome was dictated by a plain textual reading that these powers had been delegated to the States, that the federal government has limited power and authority, and that any powers not expressly given to the federal government in the U.S. Constitution, remain forever within the States’ exclusive right to control.

The gravity of the question the Supreme Court faced in these cases was real. While the outcome of the 2016 election was not changed by these faithless electors’ actions, with our country so closely divided, it is quite possible that faithless electors could change the outcome of future elections.  If the Court had decided that electors were “free agents” who, once appointed, could vote (or not vote) as they wish, then not only could an elector or group of electors “switch sides” and change the winner of the Presidential election, but also, if they instead chose not to vote, they could deny both candidates the 270 votes necessary to win the election, and the matter would be sent to the House of Representatives for a “contingent election.” In a contingent election, each State must cast a single vote, and the victor of that vote becomes President regardless of who won the national popular vote or won States with more than 270 electoral votes combined.

As many publications recognized in advance of the Court’s ruling, this case legally presented a close call.  The Founding Fathers provided little help, as even they couldn’t agree on the best approach – hence the compromise – and essentially just “kicked the can down the road.” A dispositive purely textual analysis (which this Court in its current make-up is increasingly fond of) was unavailing.  The sole clear point is the unconditional power given to the States by the Constitution to choose the electors.

In deciding Chiafalo and Baca, the Supreme Court struck a pragmatic approach. Listening to the oral arguments, once could sense the concern with potential for “chaos” – the “chaos question” Justice Breyer called it – about the “chaos” that could ensue if the Supreme Court suddenly declared all electors to be “free agents” untethered from the will of the States and their citizens, to be instead courted and lobbied by nefarious actors from both home and abroad to vote for candidates regardless of who won the actual popular vote of each State’s elections. A fear that once may have seemed far-fetched, seems much more real today, after 2016, when foreign actors clearly engaged in attempts to manipulate the Presidential election. Consider, as the Court did, the risk of a foreign power hacking the computers of electors and blackmailing them to change their votes. Or the risk of a rich and elite few enticing electors to switch their votes for personal gain. It was these practical rather than legal concerns that seemed a loud and constant undercurrent of the entire debate.

In the end, the Justices, even the most fervent originalists among them, appeared to look more at how electors and the Electoral College is understood today than how the Founding Fathers had actually potentially intended it to work at the beginning.

Writing for the majority, Justice Elena Kagan quoted James Madison’s maxim that “a regular course of practice” can “liquidate & settle the meaning of” disputed or indeterminate “terms & phrases.”  She then reviewed that regardless of what may or may not have been envisioned as an elector’s role 200 years ago, the historical reality is that over time electors have evolved into merely a “rubber stamp” for the vote of the people within their States. (The faithless electors stressed that since the founding, electors have cast some 180 faithless votes for either President or Vice President without objection, but the Court shrugged off this inconvenient fact, concluding “that is 180 out of over 23,000” electoral votes cast).

For a Court that has tacked toward textualism and divining the original intent of the Founding Fathers, its decision as expressed in Chiafalo and Baca was instead a square and practical one. If a State holds an election for President, and the State declares “winner take all” for its electoral votes, then the State has the power to require the electors to vote as the States wants, including the power to condition their service and to mete out punishment on the electors if and when they do not comply. The country has evolved to a place where it is now assumed by the general public that their votes count, and that electors will simply carry out the proxy of the State who appoints them. To change that assumption now would not just upset the apple cart – but may well have destroyed it – disenfranchising millions of citizens and creating grave risks of political corruption that, in the Justices’ eyes, was too much to bear.

© The National Law Forum LLC
Article by David K. TeSelle Trial Lawyer at Burg Simpson and
The National Law Review’s Guest Contributor.
For more on the Electoral College see the National Law Review Election Law & Legislative News section.