Category: Supreme Court

Supreme Court Poised to Strike Down Union Agency Fees for Public Employees?

The U.S. Supreme Court, in argument on Jan. 11, from all accounts appears poised to strike down its prior decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education and conclude that mandatory agency fees paid by public employees to unions that represent them are unconstitutional.Classroom Supreme Court teachers decision

​In Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, the petitioners contend that mandatory fair share dues to cover the cost of collective bargaining and other representational activities violate the free-speech rights of nonunion workers.  Chief Justice John Roberts summarized the issue similarly: “The problem that’s before us is whether or not individuals can be compelled to support political views that they disagree with.”

The case, which poses a significant threat to the funding of public employee unions in the 20 states that allow so-called fair share fees, has generated substantial interest and coverage. The SCOTUS Blog is an excellent stepping off point to review coverage of the case.

Court watchers are suggesting that Friedrichs will overturn Abood not only because of the tone of the questioning during argument but in large part because of the Court’s 2014 decision in Harris v. Quinn in which the Court’s 5-4 majority wrote of Abood and its “questionable foundations.”

Article By Gerald F. Lutkus of Barnes & Thornburg LLP
© 2015 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Testing Waters: Supreme Court Agrees To Hear Army Corps’ Clean Water Act Determinations Challenge

On Friday, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear a challenge to the Eighth Circuit’s April 2015 ruling that U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (“Army Corps”) jurisdictional determinations are final agency actions subject to judicial review. The Eighth Circuit’s decision is contrary to a July 2014 Fifth Circuit ruling and thus created a circuit split. The Supreme Court’s decision could resolve that split and settle the question of whether parties may challenge Army Corps’ jurisdictional determinations.

Many types of development projects may impact “waters of the U.S.” under the Clean Water Act (CWA). Such activities might therefore be subject to the Army Corps’ requirements for permitting and implementation of mitigation measures. Whether “waters of the U.S.” may be impacted by a project is often far from clear, so project developers and property owners frequently request jurisdictional determinations from the Army Corps before proceeding with a project. The Army Corps’ long-standing position is that its jurisdictional determinations are not judicially reviewable final decisions since a party is not required to act or refrain from acting based solely on the decision. Rather, the Army Corps has taken the position that a party’s rights are not affected until a party is either denied a permit or subject to enforcement proceedings for acting without a permit. Developers and property owners have long struggled with this position, since a party must either go through the time intensive and costly permitting process before being able to seek review of the underlying jurisdictional decision, or choose to act without a permit and then possibly be subject to enforcement proceedings.

The Fifth Circuit Decision

In Belle Co. LLC et al. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014), the Army Corps had issued a jurisdictional determination that a portion of the property in question was a “water of the U.S.”

On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Court decided that the Army Corps’ jurisdictional determinations are not final agency actions subject to judicial review, but are simply “notifications” regarding a property’s classification. The Fifth Circuit explained that for an agency action to be final it must: 1) be the “consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking”, and 2) the action must be a vehicle “by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” The Fifth Circuit ruled that although jurisdictional determinations are the consummation of agency action, they do not determine legal rights or consequences, these decisions merely serve as a “notice.” Agreeing with the Army Corps’ position, the Court reasoned that the jurisdictional determination did not force the companies to refrain from acting on the property, and did not impose a penalty scheme for continuing with the project.

The Eighth Circuit Decision

The more recent Eighth Circuit decision, Hawkes Co., Inc., et al v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015), dealt with the Hawkes Company’s plan to mine peat. The Army Corps determined there were “waters of the U.S.” on the proposed mining site so the company would need a CWA permit before it could start mining. At the first stage of judicial review, the District Court denied Hawkes’ challenge, agreeing with the Fifth Circuit’s view that the determination was not a final agency action. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that Army Corps’ jurisdictional determinations are judicially reviewable final agency actions under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Eighth Circuit held that the Fifth Circuit had misapplied the law in ruling otherwise.

The Eighth Circuit noted that without judicial review the Hawkes Company had no choice other than “to incur substantial compliance costs (the permitting process), forego what they assert is lawful use of their property, or risk substantial enforcement penalties.” These options adversely affected the property and business interests of the company. The Court reasoned: “the prohibitive costs, risk, and delay of these alternatives to immediate judicial review evidence a transparently obvious litigation strategy: by leaving [property owners] with no immediate judicial review and no adequate alternative remedy, the Corps will achieve the result its local officers desire . . . without having to test whether its expansive assertion of jurisdiction” would ultimately be upheld in the courts. The Eighth Circuit found the jurisdictional determination process analogous to the administrative order process at issue in the 2012 Supreme Court decision in Sackett. There the Court ruled “[t]here is no reason to think that the Clean Water Act was uniquely designed to enable the strong-arming of regulated parties into ‘voluntary compliance’ without the opportunity for judicial review – even judicial review of the question whether the regulated party is within the [federal agency’s] jurisdiction.” Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012).

The Eighth Circuit found the Army Corps’ contention that Hawkes had adequate alternative remedies – either seeking a permit or acting without one and then challenging any compliance action that resulted – was untenable and failed to consider that Hawkes could never recover the time it lost or expense it incurred in taking either action.

Practical Implications of a Supreme Court Decision

The Supreme Court’s upcoming decision could have important practical implications for project developers and property owners. The Army Corps’ long-term position has left the regulated community with few pre-permitting or enforcement options. The Eighth Circuit decision, and the Supreme Court’s decision to review this issue, provide some hope to developers and property owners that they may soon be able to seek judicial review of jurisdictional determinations before going through the permitting process.

Article By Sarah A. Slack & Amanda K. Beggs of Foley & Lardner LLP

© 2015 Foley & Lardner LLP

Supreme Court Rejects States’ Request for 30 Day Filing Extension on DACA, DAPA

On Tuesday, December 1, the U.S. Supreme Court handed the Obama administration a “small procedural victory” and refused the request of Texas and other states for a 30-day extension to file briefs in support of the lawsuit blocking the Obama administration’s immigration executive action on DACA and DAPA. Instead, the Court accepted the Justice Department’s eight day extension request. The Supreme Court will likely decide in January whether or not to hear the case this term. If the Supreme Court hears the case during the current term, the decision would likely be published in June, providing quite the fan-flaming event during the 2016 presidential election.

The lawsuit itself is related to President Obama’s executive action expanding the Deferred Action for Children and creating Deferred Action for Parents (of U.S. Citizen or permanent resident children).

On Monday, over 220 organizations filed in favor of lifting the injunction on the executive action. These groups focused on the tangible benefits of expanding DACA and implementing DAPA and left the legal arguments to the Department of Justice.

Article By Immigration Practice at Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.
©1994-2015 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

Supreme Court to Decide Whether Government can Freeze a Defendant’s Lawful Assets Pre-Conviction

Whether the government can freeze all of a defendant’s assets before trial, even where those assets are not tainted by any connection to alleged federal offenses, thereby preventing a defendant from paying for his own defense, will be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Luis v. United States, No. 14-419.

The federal Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA”) requires that defendants convicted of crimes committed by “fraud or deceit” compensate victims for the full amount of the victims’ losses. Often, however, by the time there is a conviction, criminal defendants do not have any assets to satisfy those judgments. Seeking to address this problem, the United States has invoked the Fraud Injunction Act to freeze legitimate assets pre-conviction to pay a later judgment.

The Fraud Injunction Act statute authorizes a “restraining order” against assets when a person is “alienating or disposing of property, or intends to alienate or dispose of property” that is “obtained from” or “traceable to” certain federal offenses. In such cases, the statute permits a court to prohibit the use of tainted property “or property of equivalent value” before trial to ensure that sufficient assets are available to satisfy any judgment.

In 2012, the federal government charged Sila Luis with conspiracy to commit Medicare fraud – a scheme allegedly amounting to over $45 million, stemming from claims for home health services that were neither medically necessary nor actually performed. Using the Fraud Injunction Act, the federal government asked the district court to freeze all of Luis’s assets, including those that were not even allegedly obtained through fraud, totaling approximately $15 million. The district court agreed to impose the freeze. .

Luis then requested that the district court release her untainted assets so she may retain her lawyer. The district court denied the request, explaining that, because the government could locate “only a fraction of the assets” Medicare had paid Luis’s companies, her “untainted” assets also could be frozen. The district court likened Luis’s situation to that of a bank robber indicted for stealing $100,000; That is, if the robber has already spent the allegedly stolen money which he could not use to hire his preferred lawyer in any case, he also should not be able to spend a different $100,000 he “just happens” to have to hire the lawyer he wants.

Luis appealed the district court’s decision, arguing she was being deprived of her Fifth Amendment right to due process of law and her Sixth Amendment right to counsel of her choosing. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Atlanta, upheld the district court’s denial of her request to release her legitimate assets, stating that Luis’s arguments were foreclosed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kaley v. United States (2014) and other decisions.

In Kaley, the Supreme Court held that when the government, following a grand jury indictment, restrains tainted assets needed to retain a lawyer, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not require a pretrial hearing at which the defendant can challenge a grand jury’s finding of probable cause.

Luis asked the Supreme Court to review the case. The Court agreed to do so and recently heard argument. A decision is expected by next June.

Article By Ramsay C. McCullough of Jackson Lewis P.C.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2015

Obergefell Uncertainty re: Same Sex Spousal Benefits

On June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court removed a cloud of uncertainty for same-sex couples when it ruled, in the landmark decision of Obergefell v. Hodges, that the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment require all states to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples seeking to marry and to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed in other states. We previously discussed the ruling in our blog post, Same-Sex Marriage Decision: Uniformity in All States. However, as discussed below, the Obergefell ruling left at least two unanswered questions.

Retroactivity

Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority in Obergefell did not state whether the decision should be applied retroactively. Retroactive application could require employers to revisit their past practices in providing employee benefits to same-sex couples. To date, no guidance has been issued by the IRS or other federal agencies to assist employers in this respect. Some news outlets have reported that the Social Security Administration intends to apply the Obergefell decision retroactively, but to date no official guidance has emerged.

The retroactivity conundrum is highlighted in at least two lawsuits initiated in Federal courts over the past year that challenge employers’ denials of health benefits to the same-sex spouses of employees.

  • In Cote v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., an employee sought repeatedly to have her same-sex spouse added to her health insurance but was denied. While Wal-Mart did extend benefits to same-sex spouses in the wake of the Windsor decision, the employee and her spouse had accumulated significant medical bills prior to Windsor. The employee is challenging Wal-Mart’s pre-Windsor denials and is seeking class-action status for the suit.

  • In Considine v. Brookdale Senior Living, an employee’s request to have her same-sex spouse added to her health plan was denied because Brookdale Senior Living did not offer health insurance coverage to same-sex spouses. After requesting briefs in mid-July on the impact of the Obergefell decision, the court recently sent the parties to arbitration based on an arbitration clause in Ms. Considine’s employment agreement.

In both of these cases the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) found probable cause that the defendants had discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis of their gender, a theory the EEOC has advanced in such cases since 2012.

Some courts interpreting state law have already found in favor of the retroactive recognition of same-sex marriages, including a federal court in Alabama and a state court in Pennsylvania. The Alabama case involved a wrongful death suit where state law required damages to be distributed under the laws of intestate succession. The plaintiff prevailed in having his same-sex marriage recognized retroactively and received the proceeds of the suit, even though the marriage ceremony was performed in 2011 and the plaintiff’s same-sex spouse died that same year, which was before Alabama recognized same sex marriage.

In the Pennsylvania case, the plaintiff sought to receive spousal death benefits from various benefits providers, inheritance tax treatment as a spouse, and access to a jointly-owned safety deposit box following the death of her common-law same-sex spouse. Finding in the plaintiff’s favor, a state judge recognized the 2001 same-sex common law marriage despite the fact that it was not recognized under state law when celebrated, and the plaintiff’s same-sex spouse died before same-sex marriage was recognized in Pennsylvania.

Self-Insured Health Plans

Another lingering question concerns Obergefell’s effect on employers that sponsor self-insured health plans. After Obergefell, will state and/or federal anti-discrimination laws require those plans to offer benefits to same-sex spouses? ERISA generally preempts state regulation of self-insured health plans, and there is nothing in ERISA or other federal law prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation. Obergefell does not appear to apply. However, as noted above, the EEOC has taken the position that discrimination against an employee based on the employee’s sexual orientation equates to discrimination based on gender. The EEOC’s approach is currently being tested in the courts. In the meantime, any employer that elects not to offer self-insured medical benefits to spouses of same-sex couples risks attracting the attention of the EEOC.

Article By Jeremy T. Coffey, William B. Duff, Edward Spacapan Jr, B. Frank Thorn
Schiff Hardin LLP

© 2015 Schiff Hardin LLP

The Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Same-Sex Marriage: Employer Next Steps

What should employers be thinking about in the benefits arena now that the US Supreme Court has ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges that all states must issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and fully recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed out of state?

We suggest that employers consider whether the following plan design changes, health plan amendments, and/or administrative modifications are necessary:

  • Review employee benefit plans’ definition of “spouse” and consider whether the Court’s decision will affect the application of the definition (e.g., if the plan refers to “spouse” by reference to state laws affected or superseded by the Obergefell decision). Qualified pension and 401(k) plans generally conformed their definitions of spouse to include same-sex spouses post-Windsor to comply with Internal Revenue Code provisions that protect spousal rights in such plans, but health and welfare plans may not have been so conformed.

  • Communicate any changes in the definition of spouse or eligibility for benefits to employees and beneficiaries, as applicable.

  • Update plan administration and tax reporting to ensure that employees are not treated as receiving imputed income under state tax law for any same-sex spouses who are covered by their employer-sponsored health and welfare plans (to the extent that coverage for opposite-sex spouses would otherwise be excluded from income).

  • If an employer currently covers unmarried domestic partners under its benefit plans, it may want to consider whether to eliminate coverage for such domestic partners on a prospective basis (and therefore only allow legally recognized spouses to have coverage). Employers that make that type of change also will need to determine the timing and communication of such a change.

  • Employers with benefit plans that treat same-sex spouses differently than opposite-sex spouses should consider whether to maintain that distinction. Even though nothing in Obergefell expressly compels employers to provide the same benefits to same-sex and opposite-sex spouses, and self-insured Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) health and welfare plans are not subject to state and municipal sexual orientation discrimination prohibitions, we believe these types of plan designs are likely to be challenged.

ARTICLE BY Andy R. Anderson & Lindsay M. Goodman of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

Copyright © 2015 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

In Light of Supreme Court’s Spider-Man Case, Which Antitrust Precedents are Ripe for Overturning?

On June 22, 2015, the US Supreme Court in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment LLC declined on stare decisis grounds to overturn a criticized intellectual property precedent on royalty payments. In both the majority and dissenting opinions, the justices said that their respect for precedent would have been less had it been one interpreting the Sherman Antitrust Act. These comments prompt the question: Which old and criticized antitrust precedent might be subject to reversal?

Kimble had a patent on a device that allowed a user to shoot webs—really, just pressurized foam string—from the palm of his hand. Kimble and Spider-Man’s owner, Marvel, reached an agreement that allowed Marvel to sell such toys in exchange for a lump sum payment to Kimble plus a 3% annual royalty that had no end date. After years of payments, Marvel discovered Brulotte v. Thys Co., a 1964 Supreme Court case that had read the patent laws to prevent a patent owner from receiving royalties for sales made after the patent’s expiration. The Court considered such arrangements illegal per se because they were attempts to extend the patent’s monopoly beyond the patent’s life. Relying on that precedent, Marvel convinced lower courts that its payments to Kimble should stop with the 2010 expiration of the patent.

Kimble asked the Court to overturn Brulotte and replace it with a rule of reason analysis. Six justices declined that invitation, saying the long-standing precedent was based on an interpretation of patent statutes that Congress could, but had declined to, amend and that contracting parties might have relied on. The dissent would have overturnedBrulotte because its rationale was based on now-discredited antitrust policy, not statutory interpretation.

Perhaps more interesting to antitrust practitioners, the two opinions discussed the lower level of respect for the Court’s antitrust precedents. As the majority opinion pointed out, Congress “intended [the Sherman Act’s] reference to ‘restraint of trade’ to have ‘changing content,’ and authorized courts to oversee the term’s ‘dynamic potential.’” As a result, the Court has “felt relatively free to revise our legal analysis as economic understanding evolves.” The dissent agreed, saying “we have been more willing to reexamine antitrust precedents because they have attributes of common-law decisions.”

Given that seeming-unanimity on the weakness of antitrust precedents, the next obvious question for antitrust lawyers is which antitrust precedents might be overturned. One candidate is the so-called baseball exemption. In 1922’s Federal Baseball Club v. National League, the Court found that the “business [of] giving exhibitions of base ball” did not constitute interstate commerce and so was not reached by the Sherman Act. Commentators and even subsequent Court opinions have termed the decision an “anomaly” (though refusing to overturn it).  Even retired Justice Stevens criticized the breadth of the exemption in a recent speech. In reaching this conclusion, Stevens relied on his experience on the Court, his early representation of the former A’s owner, and his work for Congress in the 1950s as it studied the exemption. Yet, while lower court decisions and The Curt Flood Act of 1998 have narrowed its scope, the exemption is still very much alive and has been used recently to cut short actions involving both the Cubs and the A’s. The Court could revisit the exemption yet again if it accepts the cert petition from the City of San Jose in the case involving the latest possible relocation of the A’s franchise.

Another candidate is the per se rule against tying, the only remaining vertical restraint to which the per se rule applies. In a tying arrangement, a seller agrees to sell one product (“tying product”) but only on the condition that the buyer also purchase a different product (“tied product”). Early Court cases applied the per se rule and described the arrangements harshly, saying they “serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition.” More recently, the Court has recognized that tying might be pro-competitive in certain circumstances. It has retained a rule that it calls per se; however, unlike per se rules against horizontal price fixing and the like, the tying per se rule requires proof of the seller’s power in the market for the tying product. If an appropriate case reaches the Court, it might complete the evolution of vertical restraints analysis and make all tying arrangements subject only to the rule of reason.

Finally, the Court’s 1963 Philadelphia National Bank opinion has faced severe criticism. In that case, the Court found that a merger that “produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms” is presumptively anticompetitive. While that presumption has been significantly weakened in the various iterations of the DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, it still plays a role at least when the agencies challenge a merger in court. FTC Commissioner Wright has called it bad law based on outdated economics and has criticized its continued use by the agencies. DOJ Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer, on the other hand, has called the presumption a useful tool for the agencies when challenging mergers in court. Because so few merger cases go beyond the preliminary injunction standard, let alone all the way to the Supreme Court, this precedent might remain safe.

ARTICLE BY Steven J. Cernak, Gregory L. Curtner & William M. Hannay

© 2015 Schiff Hardin LLP

How Does the King v. Burwell Decision Affect the Affordable Care Act?

The Supreme Court handed the Obama administration a key victory, upholding the tax credits that allow many low-income Americans to purchase health care insurance in states where the federal government is running the insurance marketplace. These tax credits, available to Americans with household incomes between 100% and 400% of the federal poverty line, operate as a form of premium assistance that subsidizes the purchase of health insurance.

The petitioners in King v. Burwell, No. 14-114 (U.S. June 25, 2015), challenged a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and claimed that a phrase in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) indicating that the subsidies are only available to consumers buying insurance in a state-run exchange prohibited the federal government from providing tax credits where states have not established their own exchanges. Arguing that the text of the law should be read literally, they challenged an IRS regulation that makes these tax credits available regardless of whether the exchange is run by a state or the federal government.

But the Supreme Court sided with the Obama administration in its 6-3 decision, emphasizing that language allowing tax credits for health insurance purchased on “an Exchange established by the State” must be interpreted in context and within the larger statutory scheme. Chief Justice Roberts, who authored the majority opinion, wrote that the phrase “an Exchange established by the State” was ambiguous, and therefore required the Court to look to the broader structure of the law. He wrote that the larger statutory scheme required the Court to reject the petitioners’ interpretation, which would have destabilized the individual insurance market and would create the exact same “death spirals” of rising premiums and declining availability of insurance that the law was crafted to avoid. In passing the law, he added, Congress sought “to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them.”

The Supreme Court’s analysis went a step beyond the traditional framework used by courts to review agency actions. This two-step analysis, first announced in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and widely known as the Chevrontwo-step, first considers whether the statutory language is clear—and if it is, the inquiry ends there. But if the language of the law is silent or ambiguous, a court next considers whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable, granting considerable deference to the agency’s interpretation. Because the tax credits under the ACA are central to the reforms created by the law, Chief Justice Roberts explained, Congress would not have delegated such an important question to any agency, and especially not to the IRS, which lacks expertise in crafting health insurance policy. He wrote that in this case, the task of determining the correct reading of the statute belonged to the Court.

For most providers and companies involved in the health care system, the result of this decision means business as usual. But the decisive victory for the law today means that the ACA is here to stay, and will have a permanent effect on how patients access care. Insurers and providers still must overcome hurdles to achieve affordable premiums and provide improved care for patients across the country. And as more laws are sorted out in the courts, the Supreme Court’s reliance on context in interpreting the statute today could set an important precedent of emphasizing the purpose of major legislation when analyzing its trickier provisions.

ARTICLE BY Anna S. Ross of Foley & Lardner LLP

© 2015 Foley & Lardner LLP

Supreme Court Decisions Raise Questions about Future Judicial Scrutiny of EPA’s Clean Power Plan

Two of the Supreme Court’s major, end-of-term decisions turn on the deference the Court gives to agency determinations of the meaning of ambiguous clauses in complex regulatory statutes, applying the familiar Chevron framework.  The Court’s less deferential applications of Chevron raise important questions about the deference courts might be expected to give to the scope of EPA’s exercise, in its Clean Power Plan, of its statutory authority to establish carbon dioxide emission reduction standards for existing fossil-fuel power plants under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act.

In King v. Burwell, the Court reviewed an Internal Revenue Service regulation that allowed tax subsidies under the Affordable Care Act for insurance plans purchased on either a federal or state-created “Exchange.”  In Michigan v. EPA, the Court reviewed EPA’s threshold determination under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act that it was “appropriate and necessary” to initiate regulation of hazardous air pollutants emitted by power plants, without consideration of costs at that initial stage of the regulatory process.

The outcome in each case depended upon the Court’s review of the regulatory context of the applicable ambiguous statutory clause.  Since the context of Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act differs markedly from the contexts of the Affordable Care Act and Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, the outcomes in King v. Burwell and in Michigan v. EPA do not likely portend the outcome of future court challenges of the Clean Power Plan.  However, the Court’s application of Chevron deference in these two cases may portend a strikingly less deferential judicial review of EPA’s Clean Power Plan than might have been expected under the traditional two-part test of Chevron.

Under Chevron, courts examine first whether a regulatory statute leaves ambiguity and, if so, courts are directed to defer to a federal agency’s reasonable resolution of the ambiguity in a statute entrusted to administration by that agency.  All of the Court’s majority and dissenting opinions in King v. Burwell and in Michigan v. EPA (except for Justice Thomas’s lone dissenting opinion questioning the constitutionality ofChevron deference) confirm the applicability of the traditional Chevronframework.  What stands out in these cases is that the Court’s majority opinions do not defer to the agency’s resolution of ambiguity.

Chief Justice Robert’s opinion for a 6-3 majority in King v. Burwell grounds Chevron in “the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.”  But, “in extraordinary cases,” the Court states that Congress may not have intended such an “implicit delegation.”  The Court holds the statutory ambiguity before it to be one of those extraordinary cases in which Congress has not expressly delegated to the respective federal agency the authority to resolve the ambiguity and, therefore, seemingly, zero deference is given by the Court to the applicable IRS regulation.  The Court explains that whether billions of dollars in tax subsidies are to be available to insurance purchased on “Federal Exchanges” is a question of “deep economic and political significance,” central to the scheme of the Affordable Care Act, such that had Congress intended to assign resolution of that question to the IRS “it surely would have done so expressly,” especially since the IRS “has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.”  Eschewing any deference to the IRS interpretation, the Court assumed for itself “the task to determine the correct reading of” the statutory ambiguity.

King v. Burwell is the rare case in which the Court accords a federal agency zero deference in resolving statutory ambiguity under Chevron.  Notably, the Court left open how appellate courts should determine whether other statutory ambiguities similarly deserve less or no deference to agency interpretations.  The Court, perhaps, offered a hint by citing to its much quoted dicta in its 2014 decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA that the Court “typically greet[s] … with a measure of skepticism, … agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate a significant portion of the American economy.”  Many commenters have opined, even before King v. Burwell, as to whether this dicta has implications for judicial review of the Clean Power Plan, which, it may be argued, has “deep economic and political significance” comparable to the Affordable Care Act.  However, EPA surely has longer experience, greater expertise and wider latitude in crafting policy under the Clean Air Act than the IRS has in crafting health insurance policy.  Given the Court’s strong precedent establishing that greenhouse gases are expressly within the scope of the Clean Air Act, appellate courts might distinguish King v. Burwell and apply traditional Chevron deference to the final Clean Power Plan.

Michigan v. EPA applies Chevron to EPA regulations under a different part of the Clean Air Act.  In this case, the Court reviewed EPA’s threshold determination, under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, that it was “appropriate and necessary,” without regard to costs, to regulate hazardous air pollutants, such as mercury, from power plants.  The specific mercury emission limits imposed on categories of power plants were established during subsequent phases of EPA’s rulemaking under Section 112 based on EPA’s explicit consideration of costs.  Justice Scalia’s opinion for a 5-4 majority strikes down EPA’s determination that it could find regulation of hazardous air pollutants from power plants to be “appropriate and necessary” without consideration of costs.  The Court states it was applying the traditional Chevron framework, under which it would normally defer to EPA’s choice among reasonable interpretations of the  ambiguous and “capacious” statutory test requiring an EPA finding that regulation be “appropriate and necessary.”  But, the Court finds EPA’s interpretation of this test, as not requiring any consideration of costs, to “have strayed far beyond … the bounds of reasonable [statutory] interpretation.”  Michigan v. EPA may be the first case in which the Court has applied Chevron to find that EPA adopted an entirely unreasonable resolution of statutory ambiguity in its Clean Air Act regulations.

Justice Kagan’s dissent in Michigan v. EPA faults the Court for failing to give due deference under Chevron to EPA’s decision as to when in its regulatory process it gives consideration to the costs involved in regulating hazardous air pollutants from power plants.  While all nine Justices seem to agree that EPA must consider costs in its Section 112 rulemakings, and seem also to agree that EPA gave consideration to costs in later stages of its rulemaking, the dissent criticized the majority’s “micromanagement of EPA’s rulemaking,” emphasizing that EPA reasonably determined “that it was ‘appropriate’ to decline to analyze costs at a single stage of a regulatory proceeding otherwise imbued with cost concerns.”

It is difficult to predict whether, based upon King v. Burwell and Michigan v. EPA, appellate courts might narrow the deference accorded to EPA’s resolution of statutory ambiguities under Section 111(d).  Those ambiguities arise in a quite different context than those considered by the Court.  As one example, critics of the Clean Power Plan have argued that two different versions of Section 111(d) appear to have been signed into law, one of which critics claim should prohibit EPA from issuing regulations under Section 111(d) for sources of pollution already covered by other EPA regulations, such as hazardous pollutant regulation under Section 112.  EPA sharply disagrees with its critics and defends its interpretation of which statutory version applies and the scope of permissible regulation under either statutory text.  A related issue under the statutory version pressed by critics concerns whether the status of the hazardous air regulations under Section 112, during remand after Michigan v. EPA, should alter EPA’s analysis the potentially competing statutory provisions.  It remains to be seen what kind ofChevron deference courts will give to EPA’s reasoned interpretations of the different versions of Section 111(d).

Critics also point to purported ambiguity in Section 111(d) as to whether EPA may prescribe carbon dioxide performance standards based on so-called “outside the fence” measures, and whether those standards may be determined on an average state-wide basis, rather than for individual sources.  EPA’s resolutions of these and related programmatic issues have occasioned widespread commentary and may feature prominently in future court challenges to the Clean Power Plan.  Again, it remains to be seen whether the Court’s recent cases will influence the extent of Chevron deference given by appellate courts to EPA’s well-considered interpretation of its authority to craft the details of the Clean Power Plan under Section 111(d).

On one point, there should be little doubt.  Section 111(d) expressly directs EPA to consider costs in establishing performance standards reflecting “the best system of emission reduction.”  Unlike in Michigan v. EPA, EPA expressly addressed “costs” as a factor considered in its proposed rules.  EPA is expected to elaborate upon the costs (and benefits) of regulation in its final Clean Power Plan.  Michigan v. EPA should, therefore, be inapposite with respect to any possible challenges of the manner in which the Clean Power Plan addresses costs.

The applicability of Chevron deference is, of course, only one among many legal issues that could face the U.S. Courts of Appeals and, ultimately, the Supreme Court, if and when they review the Clean Power Plan.  The precise legal issues to be framed for the courts and the timing of litigation will not begin to come into focus until after the Obama Administration issues the final Clean Power Plan later this summer.  And, Congress could step in and alter the course of judicial review.  Stay tuned.

ARTICLE BY Mark L. Perlis of Covington & Burling LLP
© 2015 Covington & Burling LLP

Supreme Court to Again Review Higher Education Affirmative Action Case

In a week full of front-page news, the United States Supreme Court has agreed to again review the appropriateness of the University of Texas at Austin’s race-based admissions process in the case of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.

The Supreme Court first reviewed the school’s consideration of race as a component of its admission process almost a year ago and remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for reconsideration.  Upon re-review the Fifth Circuit again held the University’s practice of using race a factor in its admissions decisions was constitutional. Fisher filed an appeal arguing the Fifth Circuit did not follow the Supreme Court’s direction when conducting the subsequent review.

While the ultimate outcome of this case will certainly impact affirmative action programs of institutions of higher education, its effects on other types of non-admissions affirmative action programs, such as though enforced by OFCCP, remains unknown.

ARTICLE BY Laura Mitchell of Jackson Lewis P.C.
Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2015