Category: Securities Law

Securities Fraud National Institute – November 15-16, 2012

The National Law Review is pleased to bring you information about the upcoming Securities Fraud Conference by the ABA:

This national institute is an educational and professional forum to discuss the legal and ethical issues surrounding securities fraud.

Program highlights include:

  • Panel discussions with senior officials from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission  and U.S. Department of Justice
  • Updates since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act
  • Breakout sessions focused on new financial reform legislation
  • Strategies for practitioners when representing clients under investigation, indicted and during appeals

When

November 15 – 16, 2012

Where

  • Westin New Orleans Canal Place
  • 100 Rue Iberville
  • New Orleans, LA, 70130-1106
  • United States of America

 

Derivatives Use by Public Companies – A Primer and Review of Key Issues

The Public Companies Group of Schiff Hardin LLP recently had an article regarding Derivatives published in The National Law Review:

Over the last several decades, the use of derivatives as a tool to mitigate and control risk has expanded significantly. Despite well-publicized abuses involving derivatives, the efficacy of derivatives as a means of managing economic and other forms of risk remains widely accepted. The evolving mix of users of derivatives in the last ten years has also impacted the derivatives landscape. Traditionally, commercial hedgers such as processors, mills and large corporations used derivatives to manage risks; today, while commercial hedgers remain active,much of the increase in volume in derivatives is attributable to non-traditional end-users, such as public companies, which have been active users of derivatives, most notably interest rate and foreign currency hedging instruments.

This article provides a brief primer on the various uses of derivatives, including the use of derivatives by public companies to manage risks. It also addresses a number of questions arising out of the Dodd-Frank Act, which provides a new level of regulation over derivatives.

1. What is a Derivative?

Put simply, a derivative is a contract whose value is based upon (or derived from) the value of something else. Virtually every derivative, from the most complex to the most mundane, falls within this definition. The “something else,” which is often referred to as the “underlying” or the “commodity,” can be a security (e.g., a share of company stock or a U.S. Treasury note), a commodity (e.g., gold, soybeans or cattle), an index (e.g., the S&P 500 index), a reference rate (e.g., LIBOR), or virtually anything else to which a value can be assigned and validated. As long as the value of the contract is based on or “derived” from the value of something else, the contract is a derivative.

2. Types of Derivatives

Conceptually, derivatives take many different forms. At the highest and broadest level, there are two types of derivatives: (1) exchange-traded derivatives, and (2) over-the-counter, or “OTC,” derivatives, which are not traded an exchange.

Exchange-traded derivatives include futures, options on futures, security futures and listed equity options. OTC derivatives are privately negotiated contracts conducted almost entirely between institutions on a principal-to-principal basis and designed to permit customers to adjust individual risk positions with greater precision. OTC derivatives include swaps, options, forwards and hybrids of these instruments.

3. Dodd-Frank Act

In July 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Act. Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act imposes a new regulatory regime on OTC derivativesand the market for those derivatives. The primary regulators are the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) for “swaps” and the SEC for “security-based swaps.” Subject to certain exceptions, [1] the term “swap” is broadly defined to include most types of products now known as OTC derivatives, including interest rate, currency, credit default and energy swaps. “Security-based swap” is a much narrower category of transactions based on a single security or loan or a “narrow-based security index” (as defined under the Commodity Exchange Act or “CEA”).

The CFTC’s general directive from Congress under the Dodd-Frank Act is to cause as many swaps as possible to be cleared by central clearing entities in order to reduce “systemic risk” to the financial markets, and to have as many swaps as possible traded on CFTC-regulated exchanges, or on or through other CFTC-regulated entities, in order to increase transparency in the markets. The Dodd-Frank Act thus makes it unlawful for a person to enter into a swap without complying with the Commodity Exchange Act and the rules published by the CFTC.

Fortunately, most public company users of derivatives can make use of an exemption under the Dodd-Frank Act. Under Title VII, an “end user” generally means a company that is not a “financial entity” and that uses derivatives to hedge or mitigate commercial risk. The concept is intended to include industrial corporations and other non-financial enterprises that use swaps on interest rates, foreign currencies, energy, commodities and other derivatives, as appropriate to their businesses, to hedge their business risks. A so-called “end-user exemption” from the clearing and exchange trading requirements is generally available to counterparties that (1) are not financial entities, (2) are hedging their own commercial risks and (3) notify the CFTC or SEC, as applicable, how they generally meet their financial obligations associated with entering into uncleared swaps. A public company that relies on the exemption is also required to obtain the approval of its board of directors or other governing body.

4. Use of Derivatives by Public Companies

As end-users, public companies often use derivatives to manage various risks associated with running a large enterprise, including interest rate, foreign currency and commodity risk. According to a recent study, 29 of the 30 companies that comprise the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) use derivatives. Similarly, a study has found that two-thirds of companies with sales of more than $2 billion use OTC derivatives and more than half of all companies that have sales between $500 million and $2 billion are “very active” in derivatives markets.

Further, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association conducted a survey on the use of derivatives by Fortune Global 500 companies and found that 94% of these companies use derivatives to manage business and macroeconomic risks. According to the survey, the most widely used instruments were foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives. Many industries reported participation at rates greater than 90%, including financial companies (98%), basic materials companies (97%), technology companies (95%), and health care, industrial goods and utilities (92%).

Public companies typically use derivatives to manage interest rate risk and foreign currency risk and to minimize accounting earnings volatility and the present value of their tax liabilities. A company, for instance, may use derivatives to offset increases in the price of commodities it uses in manufacturing or its other operations. Further, large public companies borrow and lend substantial amounts in credit markets. In doing so, they are exposed to significant interest rate risk — they face substantial risk that the fair values or cash flows of interest sensitive assets or liabilities will change if interest rates increase or decrease. These companies also have significant international operations. As a result, they are also exposed to exchange rate risk — the risk that changes in foreign currency exchange rates will negatively impact the profitability of their international businesses. To reduce these risks, companies enter into interest rate and foreign currency swaps, forwards and futures as a hedge against potential exposures.

As a result of the Dodd-Frank Act’s regulation of derivatives, a number of questions arise that public companies must consider (and revisit often as the regulatory landscape changes):

  • What are the implications of having our swaps — which were previously unregulated — executed on a regulated exchange or facility and cleared through a regulated clearinghouse?
  • How do we assure compliance with Section 723(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which provides that a public company may not enter into non-cleared swaps unless an “appropriate committee of the issuer’s board or governing body has reviewed and approved its decision to enter into swaps that are subject to such exemptions” and other aspects of the end-user exemption? A similar requirement for “approval by an appropriate committee” is included for security-based swaps under the SEC’s jurisdiction.
  • Are we able to continue to effect bilateral, uncleared swap transactions in the same manner as we have historically done? What alternatives are there to hedge risk?
  • How will our relationship with our banks change as a result of these evolving regulatory requirements?
  • To what extent are our transactions in swaps subject to CFTC or SEC jurisdiction and oversight? How does that change over time as new regulations and rules are imposed and the regulatory regime evolves?
  • How do these rules impact our inter-affiliate transactions?
  • What type of derivatives risk management infrastructure and compliance monitoring protocol should we have in place?

5. Conclusion

In light of the Dodd-Frank Act and various rulemakings of the CFTC and SEC since its passage, the derivatives markets are undergoing an unprecedented regulatory and structural evolution that will present public company end-users of derivatives with both compliance and disclosure challenges, as well as new opportunities. Public companies should continually assess their use of derivatives and the potential implications under the Dodd-Frank Act as this regulatory regime continues to evolve.

1 Among the excepted categories are options on securities subject to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, contracts for the sale of commodities for future delivery and certain physically settled forward contracts.

© 2012 Schiff Hardin LLP

SEC Adopts Compensation Committee and Adviser Independence Rules

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP‘s David A. Sirignano, Amy I. Pandit, and Albert Lung recently had an article regarding The SEC’s New Rules featured in The National Law Review:

 

 

New rules address compensation committee member and adviser independence and disclosure requirements for compensation consultant conflicts of interest.

On June 20, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted final rules directing national securities exchanges and national securities associations (collectively, the exchanges) to establish listing standards addressing the independence of compensation committee members; the committee’s authority to retain Compensation Advisers (as defined below); and the committee’s responsibility for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of its advisers. The final rules implement Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act), which added Section 10C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the Exchange Act), and which requires the SEC to adopt rules directing the exchanges to prohibit the listing of any equity security of an issuer that is not in compliance with Section 10C’s compensation committee and Compensation Adviser requirements. The final rules also amend Item 407 of Regulation S-K to require companies to provide additional disclosures in their proxy statements on conflicts of interest of compensation consultants.

Under the final rules, the exchanges are required to propose new listing standards by September 25, 2012, and must have final rules or amendments that comply with Rule 10C-1 of the Exchange Act by June 27, 2013. Companies must provide new disclosures on conflicts of interest of compensation consultants in any proxy or information statement for an annual or special meeting of stockholders at which directors will be elected occurring on or after January 1, 2013.

Compensation Committee Independence Requirements

New Rule 10C-1 of the Exchange Act directs the exchanges to adopt new listing standards requiring a compensation committee to be composed solely of independent members of the board of directors, and requires the exchanges to establish new independence criteria for these members. While the final rules do not require a company to have a compensation committee, the new independence criteria, as well as the requirements relating to the consideration of a Compensation Adviser’s independence and requirements relating to the responsibility for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of Compensation Advisers, are equally applicable to any board committee performing the functions typically performed by a compensation committee. In formulating the new independence standards, the exchanges are instructed to consider relevant factors, which must include the following:

  • The sources of compensation, including consulting, advisory, or other fees paid by the issuer to such member of the board of directors.
  • Whether the board member is affiliated with the company, any subsidiary of the company, or an affiliate of a subsidiary of the issuer.

The exchanges may consider additional relevant criteria, such as share ownership or business relationships with the issuer. The SEC emphasizes that the exchanges are provided with the flexibility to develop their own independence standards consistent with the nature and types of listed companies. In this regard, the SEC notes that it may not be appropriate to prohibit directors affiliated with large stockholders, such as private equity funds and venture capital firms, from serving on a compensation committee. The SEC recognizes that directors elected by certain funds may have a strong institutional belief in the importance of appropriately structured and reasonable compensation arrangements and that their significant equity ownership may align the directors’ interests with public stockholders on matters of executive compensation.

The final rules also reiterate an important distinction between the compensation committee independence requirements under Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act and the existing independence requirements for audit committee members under Rule 10A-3 of the Exchange Act. While the audit committee independence rules prohibit a director from serving on the audit committee if such director accepts consulting or advisory fees or is otherwise affiliated with the listed company or any of its subsidiaries, the Dodd-Frank Act does not require any mandatory exclusion of compensation committee membership due to these factors. Instead, the final rules only require that these two factors be considered in determining the independence of compensation committee members.

Exemptions from Independence Standards

The following categories of listed issuers are not subject to the independence standards described above:

  • Limited partnerships
  • Companies in bankruptcy proceedings
  • Open-end management investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940
  • Any foreign private issuer that discloses in its annual report the reasons that the foreign private issuer does not have an independent compensation committee

The exchanges may exempt from the independence requirements a particular relationship with respect to members of the compensation committee as each exchange may determine, taking into consideration the size of an issuer and any other relevant factors.

Compensation Adviser Requirements

Authority and Oversight

The final rules require the exchanges to adopt listing standards providing the compensation committee with full discretion and authority to retain and obtain the advice of compensation consultants, independent legal counsel, and other advisers (collectively, Compensation Advisers). The compensation committee will be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of Compensation Advisers, and listed companies must provide appropriate funding to the compensation committee to retain these advisers. The final rules also make clear that the compensation committee is not required to obtain the advice or recommendation of any independent Compensation Adviser or to follow its advice.

Assessment of Compensation Adviser Independence

While the compensation committee is not required to retain any independent Compensation Adviser, the compensation committee is required to assess the independence of each Compensation Adviser prior to the Compensation Adviser being retained and to consider the following six factors (as well as any other factors identified by the relevant exchange):

  • Whether the employer of the Compensation Adviser is providing any other services to the issuer
  • The amount of fees received from the issuer by the employer of the Compensation Adviser as a percentage of such employer’s total revenue
  • Policies and procedures that have been adopted by the employer of the Compensation Adviser to prevent conflicts of interest
  • Any business or personal relationship of the Compensation Adviser with a member of the compensation committee
  • Any stock of the issuer owned by the Compensation Adviser
  • Any business or personal relationship of the Compensation Adviser or employer of the Compensation Adviser with an executive officer of the issuer

The final rules clarify that these six factors should be considered as a whole, and no one factor is determinative or controlling. This list is not exhaustive, and the exchanges may consider other relevant factors in determining the independence assessment requirement.

The final rules also state that a listed issuer’s compensation committee is required to conduct the independence assessment outlined above with respect to any Compensation Adviser that provides advice to the compensation committee, other than in-house legal counsel.

General Exemptions

The requirements relating to both the independence of compensation committees and the independence of Compensation Advisers shall not apply to the following categories of issuers:

  • Controlled companies (companies where more than 50% of the voting power for the election of directors is held by an individual, a group, or another entity)
  • Smaller reporting companies

The exchanges may also choose to exempt from the above-described requirements any further categories of issuers the exchanges determine appropriate.

In addition, the rules adopted by the exchanges must provide for appropriate procedures for a listed issuer to have a reasonable opportunity to cure any defects that would be a prohibition for listing. Such rules may provide that if a member of a compensation committee ceases to be independent in accordance with the requirements of Rule 10C-1 of the Exchange Act for reasons outside the member’s reasonable control, that person, with notice by the issuer to the applicable exchange, may remain a compensation committee member of the listed issuer until the earlier of (i) the date of the next annual stockholder meeting of the listed issuer or (ii) one year from the occurrence of the event that caused the member to be no longer independent.

Conflicts of Interest Disclosures

The final rules amend Item 407(e) of Regulation S-K to expand the current proxy disclosure requirements regarding compensation consultants identified by listed issuers in their SEC disclosures, pursuant to Item 407(e)(3)(iii) of Regulation S-K, as having played a role in determining or recommending the amount or form of executive or director compensation. The final rules will require additional disclosures on (i) whether the work of a compensation consultant raised any conflict or interest, and (ii) if so, the nature of such conflict and how the conflict is being addressed. The new disclosure requirement applies only to conflicts of interest with respect to a compensation consultant, not to outside legal counsel or other advisers.

The final rules do not provide any definition of “conflicts of interest,” and companies should consider their specific facts and circumstances in making such a determination. However, the final rules instruct companies to consider the same six factors described above relating to the independence of Compensation Advisers in analyzing whether conflicts of interest exist.

The new disclosure requirements will be applicable to all reporting companies subject to the proxy rules, regardless of whether the company is listed on an exchange. Accordingly, smaller reporting companies and controlled companies will also be required to provide the additional disclosures, although foreign private issuers will be exempt from such requirements.

Practical Considerations

Assessment of compensation committee composition: While the new compensation committee independence requirements may not become effective until after the 2013 proxy season, companies should begin analyzing the composition of the compensation committee to determine whether the independence of any director may be affected by the new listing standards.

Review of the compensation committee charter and director and officer questionnaire: The new listing standards are likely to require companies to review and update compensation committee charters and director and officer questionnaires to reflect the new independence criteria for directors.

Analysis of Compensation Adviser independence and conflicts of interest: Given that new factors must be considered in determining the independence of Compensation Advisers, companies and compensation committees should be proactive in establishing or updating procedures for collecting the information necessary to conduct the required independence and conflicts of interest analysis. This may include new screening questionnaires for Compensation Advisers, additional interview sessions, and committee meetings to discuss independence and potential conflicts of interest. The collection of such information should be part of an enhanced disclosure and control procedure designed to ensure that companies can prepare and determine, in a timely manner, whether there are independence questions warranting further discussion regarding Compensation Advisers and if there will be conflicts of interest disclosures relating to compensation consultants in their proxy statements.

Copyright © 2012 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

After Gupta’s Insider-Trading Conviction, What’s Next?

An article by David Deitch of Ifrah Law, After Gupta’s Insider-Trading Conviction, What’s Next?, published in The National Law Review:

Yet another shoe has dropped in the long-running investigation and the series of prosecutions arising from allegations of insider trading in the stocks of Goldman Sachs and other companies. In May 2011, Raj Rajaratnam was convicted of insider trading and ultimately sentenced to 11 years in prison. On June 15, 2012, Rajat Gupta, a former director at Goldman Sachs, was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on four of six counts of an indictment that charged him with a conspiracy that included feeding inside tips to Rajaratnam in September and October 2008 about developments at Goldman Sachs.

As with the trial of Rajaratnam, the key pieces of evidence against Gupta appear to have been wiretapped conversations. The four charges on which Gupta was convicted all related to trades in support of which the government presented recorded conversations as evidence (though the government played only three recordings in the Gupta trial). The jury acquitted Gupta of two charges arising from other trades for which the government presented no such evidence. The jury clearly was influenced by hearing Rajaratnam on the recordings referring to his source on the Goldman Sachs board – powerful evidence that gave increased persuasive power to the government’s reliance on phone records showing substantial contacts between the two men.

Rajaratnam has appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and one significant issue he has raised is whether the government improperly sought authority to wiretap the conversations that were the cornerstone of his conviction. That ruling will be very significant, both because a decision in Rajaratnam’s favor is likely to result in a reversal of Gupta’s conviction as well, and because the Second Circuit’s ruling may have a major impact on the future ability of prosecutors to continue to use wiretaps against white-collar targets.

While Gupta is likely to receive a prison sentence for his conviction, it seems likely that he will receive a lower sentence that Rajaratnam, who engaged in the trades in question and reaped the benefits of those trades – estimated at trial to have generated $16 million in gains or in avoided losses from Rajaratnam’s fund. While prosecutors may seek a higher sentence based on acquitted conduct, Gupta’s advisory range calculated under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines may be as much as eight years in prison. There is also a significant question whether Judge Jed Rakoff, who has expressed frustration with what he calls “the guidelines’ fetish with abstract arithmetic,” will sentence Gupta to a shorter term than the one calculated under the Guidelines.

© 2012 Ifrah PLLC

Continued Uncertainty Surrounding the Future of the SEC’s “Neither Admit Nor Deny” Settlement Practice

The Securities Litigation Group of Vedder Price recently had an article regarding the SEC published in The National Law Review:

Since US District Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of New York rejected a $285 million settlement between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (Citigroup) last fall, both the SEC and federal courts have grappled with the future of what had been the SEC’s long-standing practice of permitting companies to settle cases without admitting any liability. However, the Second Circuit’s recent decision to stay the proceedings before the Southern District of New York, pending the resolution of the SEC and Citigroup’s appeals of Judge Rakoff’s settlement rejection, suggests that the appellate court may eventually set aside Judge Rakoff’s rejection of the parties’ settlement.

In SEC v. Citigroup, Judge Rakoff held that the proposed consent judgment between the SEC and Citigroup was “neither fair, nor reasonable, nor adequate, nor in the public interest” because Citigroup had not admitted or denied the allegations set forth by the SEC1. Per Judge Rakoff, the proposed settlement did “not serve the public interest, because it ask[ed] the Court to employ its power and assert its authority when it does not know the facts.”2

In the immediate aftermath of Judge Rakoff’s ruling, Robert Khuzami, the Director of Enforcement at the SEC, issued a statement, noting that Judge Rakoff’s decision “ignore[d] decades of established practice throughout federal agencies and decisions of the federal courts.”3Further, Khuzami stated that “[r]efusing an otherwise advantageous settlement solely because of the absence of an admission also would divert resources away from the investigation of other frauds and the recovery of losses suffered by other investors not before the court.”4

Notwithstanding Khuzami’s criticism of Judge Rakoff’s decision, in early January 2012, the SEC announced a policy change involving cases in which parallel criminal proceedings result in convictions or admissions of securities law violations. In such situations, per the new SEC policy, the “neither admit nor deny” language is no longer available, and the conviction or admission would be incorporated into the civil disposition. This policy change will likely have little impact on most defendants, since the bulk of cases brought by the SEC do not involve criminal proceedings.

In recent months, other US district courts have mimicked the reasoning employed by Judge Rakoff in rejecting no-admit, no-deny settlements. For example, in December 2011, US District Court Judge Rudolph T. Randa of the Eastern District of Wisconsin took issue with a proposed settlement between the SEC and Kass Corp. CEO, Michael Koss, and requested that the SEC provide additional information showing why the settlement was in the public interest.  In response, the SEC redrafted the proposed settlement agreement. More recently, US District Court Judge Richard A. Jones of the Western District of Washington rejected a proposed no-admit, no-deny settlement between the SEC and three individual defendants. Judge Jones criticized the SEC for seeking judgments against the defendants while reserving the right to request disgorgement remedies and civil penalties in the future.5

On March 15, 2012, in a per curiam opinion, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit granted the motions of the SEC and Citigroup to stay district court proceedings, pending the resolution of their interlocutory appeals that seek to set aside Judge Rakoff’s decision rejecting the parties’ proposed settlement.6Although the panel did not hold that Judge Rakoff’s settlement rejection was improper, the Second Circuit concluded that the SEC and Citigroup had shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their appeals, which justified staying the lower court proceedings. Notably, the panel wrote that Judge Rakoff was likely incorrect in rejecting the proposed settlement on public policy grounds, stating that it is not “the proper function of federal courts to dictate policy to executive administrative agencies.”7

While the lower court proceedings remain stayed, on March 31, 2012, the Second Circuit scheduled oral arguments on the pending appeals for late September 2012.  Until then, the future of the SEC’s long-standing “neither admit nor deny” settlement practice will continue to remain unsettled.

1 SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.,__ F. Supp. 2d __, 2011 WL 5903733, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011).

2 Id.

3 Robert Khuzami, Public Statement by SEC Staff: Court’s Refusal to Approve Settlement in Citigroup Case (Nov. 28, 2011), available at:http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch112811rk.htm.

4 Id.

5 SEC v. Merendon Mining (Nevada), Inc. et al., No. 10 CV 00955 (Mar. 5, 2012).

6 SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., __ F. 3d __, 2012 WL 851807 (2d Cir. Mar. 15, 2012).

7 Id. at

© 2012 Vedder Price

SEC Speaks 2012

The Securities Litigation Group of Vedder Price recently had an article, SEC Speaks 2012, published in The National Law Review:

The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the Commission) held its annual SEC Speaks conference in Washington, DC from February 24–25, 2012. This past year was devoted to modernization initiatives and calls for renewed efforts to increase the unprecedented 735 enforcement actions filed in the fiscal year that ended September 30, 2011.

Chairman Mary L. Schapiro began the conference by noting the strides the SEC has made in improved modernization initiatives, including better hiring and training and more sophisticated technology, research capabilities and operational management. Schapiro specifically emphasized broadened hiring efforts to bring nonlawyer industry experts on staff, including traders and academics, as well as doubling the staff’s training budget and enhancement of the new agencywide electronic discovery program. Schapiro also lauded the staff’s increased ability to recognize threats and move rapidly to address them.

Robert Khuzami, director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, echoed chairman Schapiro’s remarks and emphasized the ongoing efforts to bring cases arising from the financial crisis, in addition to the nearly 100 actions brought to date against individuals and/or entities—more than half of which include CFOs, CEOs or other senior officers. Jason Anthony in the Structured and New Products Unit also addressed the SEC’s “very large focus” on financial crisis cases, reporting that the SEC has brought 95 actions against entities and individuals arising out of the financial crisis and has obtained almost $2 billion in monetary relief.

Matthew Martens, chief litigation counsel, discussed the SEC’s litigation record and settlement practices, in light of the uproar stemming from Judge Rakoff’s refusal last year to approve the SEC’s settlement with Citigroup. According to Martens, it is the SEC’s policy to accept settlements with recoveries that the SEC could reasonably expect to receive at trial, and he argued that it would be a mistake to reject settlements simply because they lack admissions of liability. Martens also noted that the use of detailed public complaints ensures that the public is adequately put on notice regarding any wrongful conduct that allegedly has occurred, and he stressed that out of approximately 2,000 cases settled in the past three years, judges have challenged settlements in fewer than ten instances.

Kara Brockmeyer, chief of the SEC’s specialized FCPA Unit, announced the December 2011 launch of the “FCPA Spotlight” page on the Commission’s website, which includes links to every FCPA action ever brought by the SEC and also provides FCPA case statistics going back five years. Brockmeyer noted that the SEC brought 20 FCPA actions in 2011 (19 companies, one individual) and collected $255 million in sanctions. Brockmeyer promised that “more will be coming,” including cases targeting the pharmaceutical industry. Indeed, in 2012, the SEC has already charged 14 individuals and five companies with FCPA violations. She also touched on various international developments in anticorruption enforcement, including recent antibribery laws passed in Russia and China, and noted that Switzerland recently brought its first foreign corruption case. Brockmeyer indicated that the SEC is seeing more and improved cooperation in connection with foreign corruption cases between regulators and across borders.

David Bergers, the SEC’s regional director in Boston, discussed Enforcement’s enhanced ability to pursue potential wrongful conduct based upon the delegation of formal order authority to senior officers in the Division, which permits the SEC to escalate an investigation more quickly and to compel testimony and document production. Bergers also noted that, under the streamlined Wells notice process, the SEC will allow only one post-Wells meeting so that settlement negotiations do not delay recommending an action to the Commission, which is consistent with Dodd-Frank’s requirement that an action be filed within 180 days of a Wells notice, with any extension requiring the Commission’s approval. Bergers stressed that the Enforcement staff is taking this deadline “very seriously.”

Commissioner Daniel Gallagher focused his comments on “failure to supervise” liability for a broker-dealer’s legal and compliance personnel. Although legal and compliance officers are not automatically considered “supervisors,” they can fall under this category when the facts and circumstances of a particular case reveal that they held the requisite degree of responsibility, ability or authority to affect the conduct of other employees such that they have become a part of the management team’s collective response to a problem. Gallagher acknowledged that “robust engagement on the part of legal and compliance personnel raises the specter that such personnel could be deemed to be ‘supervisors’ subject to liability for violations of law by the employees they are held to be supervising,” which then leads to “the perverse effect of increasing the risk of supervisory liability in direct proportion to the intensity of their engagement in legal and compliance activities.” Gallagher did conclude that the issue “remains disturbingly murky” and called upon the Commission to provide a framework that encourages such personnel to provide the necessary guidance without fear of being deemed “supervisors.”

Sean McKessy, chief of the SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower, reported that the new Whistleblower Program stemming from Dodd-Frank has resulted in hundreds of high-quality tips. McKessy stressed that his office has engaged in significant internal outreach to educate staff across the divisions to ensure they understand the type of information that should be captured from whistleblowers as well as how to process award payments, which Dodd-Frank directs the SEC to pay in amounts between 10 and 30 percent of monetary sanctions to individuals who voluntarily provide original information that leads to successful enforcement actions resulting in sanctions over $1 million. According to McKessy, the current priority is to improve and maintain communication with whistleblowers and their counsel, and he noted that the office has successfully returned more than 2,000 calls within 24 business hours of receiving the tip on the hotline.

In response to criticism that Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Program will stifle internal reporting, McKessy defended the approach as “balanced” because it includes “built-in incentives” that enable whistleblowers to report internally first yet still remain eligible for the award. McKessy also volunteered that his experience has been that a significant majority of the tips received were—according to the whistleblowers themselves—reported first internally within their respective companies, and said that he was “hard pressed” to think of an example in which the whistleblower did not first report internally.

Merri Jo Gillette, regional director in Chicago, commented on the expansion of aiding and abetting liability under Dodd-Frank, noting that the SEC now has more flexibility to assert aiding and abetting claims under the Securities Act and the Investment Advisers Act, as well as to seek civil monetary penalties. Prior to Dodd-Frank, the SEC was required to show that an aider and abettor knowingly provided substantial assistance, but now the SEC may prove the charge under a “knowing or reckless state of mind” standard. Gillette remarked that the SEC will continue to look at the application of aiding and abetting liability to so-called corporate gatekeepers, such as accountants and lawyers.

In terms of changes to civil penalties under Dodd-Frank, Gillette explained that the most significant development is the SEC’s authority to seek penalties in administrative proceedings as well as expanded authority to penalize secondary actors, as the SEC may now explicitly seek penalties against persons who commit direct violations and who were “causes” of direct violations.

Speakers at the conference continued to emphasize the importance of auditor independence. Because the SEC’s auditor independence standards are broader than those of the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA), the Accounting Enforcement panel cautioned that companies considering an initial public offering should carefully review the scope of their auditor’s services for compliance with the SEC’s more stringent requirements. Fraud enforcement in the context of financial reporting also continues to be a high priority for the SEC. The SEC warned that additional areas of focus will be cross-border transactions, disclosures, revenue recognition, loan losses, valuation, impairment, expense recognition and related-party transactions.

The revamped SEC now appears ready to expand upon its enforcement efforts in 2012, which is reflected within President Obama’s proposed budget for 2013, reflecting an 18.5 percent increase over the SEC’s 2012 appropriation, and which would permit the agency to increase its staff by 15 percent. This budget increase would support the Commission’s touted technology initiatives and continued expansion of the agency’s system to identify suspicious patterns and behaviors quickly and more effectively. The SEC appears engaged to exceed last year’s record number of enforcement actions, especially via the capabilities afforded by Dodd-Frank.

© 2012 Vedder Price

With Form PF Compliance Dates Quickly Approaching, Advisers Managing $150 Million or More of Private Fund Assets Should Begin to Prepare

An article about Form PF Compliance written by Eric R. Markus, Victor B. Zanetti, and William L. Rivers of Andrews Kurth LLP recently appeared in The National Law Review:

On October 26, 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) adopted Rule 204(b)‑1 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”) to require certain investment advisers that advise private funds to periodically complete and file the SEC’s new Form PF.1 Rule 204(b)-1 implements sections 404 and 406 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) and is intended to provide the SEC with information relevant to assessing the risks that certain advisers and funds pose to the stability of the financial system. Although Form PF is filed confidentially and exempt from the Freedom of Information Act, the SEC is permitted to share this information with other federal agencies (most notably the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Financial Stability Oversight Council).

The requirements of the rule and Form PF are novel and the amount of information required to be assembled can be—at least in certain instances—quite substantial. With the initial compliance dates for investment advisers to certain large private funds approaching in June 2012, now is the time for investment advisers to become familiar with this new regulatory requirement, to determine when their initial Form PF filing will be due, and to identify and begin to assemble the types and extent of the information that will be required.

The full text of the adopting release and the final rule is available here. The full text of Form PF is available here.

What Investment Advisers Are Subject to Rule 204(b)-1 and Must File Form PF?

The new rule requires any investment adviser registered (or required to register) with the SEC under the Advisers Act that advises one or more “private funds” and has, in aggregate, $150 million or more in private fund assets under management to file Form PF. For purposes of determining whether they meet certain regulatory thresholds established by Form PF, related advisers must aggregate their assets under management; however, related advisers do not need to aggregate their assets if they are “separately operated.”2

What is a “Private Fund”?

The term “private fund” is defined in Section 202(a)(29) of the Advisers Act as any issuer “that would be an investment company,” as defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the “ICA”), but is excepted by virtue of the exemptions provided in Section 3(c)(1) (funds with fewer than 100 beneficial owners) or Section 3(c)(7) (funds owned exclusively by qualified purchasers) of the ICA. Real estate funds relying on the exemption provided in Section 3(c)(5) of the ICA are not required to file Form PF (although many real estate funds, because of the nature and structure of their investments, rely on the exemptions provided under Section 3(c)(1) or (7) and therefore may be required to file).

Form PF establishes different treatment—in terms of initial filing dates, the frequency of filings and the content of those filings—based on the characteristics of the private funds involved and their advisers. The most important distinction that Form PF draws in this regard is between “Large Private Fund Advisers” and all other investment advisers to private funds.

What is a “Large Private Fund Adviser”?

A “Large Private Fund Adviser” is defined as a private fund adviser that meets any one or more of the following criteria:

  • it has at least $1.5 billion in regulatory assets under management attributable tohedge funds as of the end of any month in the most recently completed fiscal quarter;
  • it has at least $1.0 billion in combined regulatory assets under manage­ment attributable to liquidity funds and registered money market funds3 as of the end of any month in the most recently completed fiscal quarter; and/or
  • it has at least $2.0 billion in regulatory assets under management attributable toprivate equity funds as of the last day of the adviser’s most recently completed fiscal year.

How are Regulatory Assets Under Management Calculated?

The term “regulatory assets under management” has the same meaning given to it in the SEC’s recent amendments to Part 1A, Instruction 5.b of Form ADV. This definition measures assets under management gross of outstanding indebtedness and other accrued but unpaid liabilities.

In addition, in order to prevent an adviser from restructuring the way it manages money to avoid compliance with Form PF, the rule requires regulatory assets under management to include (a) assets of managed accounts advised by the adviser that pursue substantially the same investment objective and invest in substantially the same positions as private funds advised by the firm unless the value of those accounts exceeds the value of the private funds with which they are managed; and/or (b) assets of private funds advised by any of the adviser’s “related persons” other than related persons that are separately operated.

What is a “Hedge Fund”?

Form PF defines a “hedge fund” as any private fund that is not a securitized asset fund4 if it meets any of the three following criteria:

  • it is permitted to pay one or more investment advisers (or their related persons) a performance fee or allocation calculated by taking into account unrealized gains;
  • it is permitted to borrow an amount in excess of one-half of its net asset value (including any committed capital); and/or
  • it is permitted to sell securities or other assets short or enter into similar transactions (other than for the purpose of hedging currency exposure or managing duration).

Note that for purposes of the first criteria above, the fund must only be authorized to pay a fee based on unrealized gains (the classification applies whether or not the performance fee is actually paid). In the Adopting Release, the SEC clarified that the periodic calculation or accrual of performance fees based on unrealized gains solely for financial reporting purposes (as many private equity funds do) will not cause a private fund to be classified as a hedge fund. For purposes of the second and third criteria cited above, the private fund must be authorized to undertake such activities; actually undertaking the activities is not required.5

What is a “Liquidity Fund”?

Form PF defines a “liquidity fund” as any private fund “that seeks to generate income by investing in a portfolio of short term obligations in order to maintain a stable net asset value per unit or minimize principal volatility for investors.” Thus, a liquidity fund would be a private fund that resembles a registered money market fund.

What is a “Private Equity Fund”?

Form PF defines a “private equity fund” as any private fund that is not a hedge fund, liquidity fund, securitized asset fund, real estate fund,6 or venture capital fund7 and does not provide investors with a right to redeem their interests in the ordinary course.

Does the SEC’s Focus on Hedge Funds, Liquidity Funds and Private Equity Funds Mean that Other Types of Private Funds are Not Subject to Rule 204(b)(1) and Form PF?

No. As the charts below show, an investment adviser that is not a Large Private Fund Adviser and that does not advise any hedge funds, liquidity funds or private equity funds must still prepare and file Form PF if it advises private funds with $150 million or more in private fund assets.

What are the Initial Compliance Dates for Form PF?

Form PF and Rule 204(b)-1 establish June 15, 2012 as the initial “compliance date” for any registered investment adviser (or an adviser that is required to register) that meets one or more of the following criteria:

  • it has at least $5.0 billion in regulatory assets under management attributable to hedge funds as of the last day of its fiscal quarter most recently completed prior to June 15, 2012;
  •  it has at least $5.0 billion in combined regulatory assets under management attributable to liquidity funds and registered money market funds as of the last day of its fiscal quarter most recently completed prior to June 15, 2012; and/or
  • it has at least $5.0 billion in regulatory assets under management attributable to private equity funds as of the last day of its first fiscal year to end on or after June 15, 2012.

An adviser subject to the June 15, 2012 compliance date as a result of its advice to hedge funds and/or liquidity funds/money market funds will need to file its initial Form PF for the first fiscal quarter ending after June 15, 2012. For most such advisers, this will be for the fiscal quarter ending June 30, 2012 (and will be due August 29, 2012 for hedge fund advisers and July 15, 2012 for liquidity fund advisers). An adviser subject to the June 15, 2012 compliance date as a result of its advice to private equity funds will need to file its initial Form PF for the first fiscal year ending after June 15, 2012. For most such advisers, this will be for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2012 (and will be due April 30, 2013).

For all investment advisers that are not subject to the June 15, 2012 compliance date, the compliance date will be December 15, 2012. However, whether such advisers will be filing with respect to the first fiscal quarter or first fiscal year ending after that date (and the deadline for such filing) will depend on the type of private funds advised and the amount of assets under management as set forth in Table I below.

TABLE I

Regulatory assets under management for the fiscal quarter or year (as the case may be) ending immediately after June 15, 2012 are, for hedge funds and liquidity funds, measured as of the last day of the fiscal quarter ending immediately prior to such date, and for private equity funds measured, as of the last day of the fiscal year ending immediately prior to such date. For any other Form PF filing under Rule 204(b)-1, regulatory assets under management, for quarterly Form PF filers, are measured as of the end of each month in the immediately preceding fiscal quarter (and the threshold is passed if, as of any month end, the assets under manage­ment exceed the relevant threshold), and, for annual Form PF filers, are measured solely as of the last day of the immediately preceding fiscal year.

What Type of Information Must Be Included in the Form PF?

As with other issues under the new Form PF, the answer to this question depends on the size and nature of the private funds advised. Investment advisers to private funds (other than Large Private Fund Advisers) have much more limited disclosure obligations than Large Private Fund Advisers. In addition, as it relates to Large Private Fund Advisers, the additional disclosures required have been tailored to whether the private fund advised is a hedge fund, liquidity fund or private equity fund. Table II below summarizes the information requirements imposed by Form PF.

TABLE II

Investment Advisers should start now to determine whether they will be required to file the new Form PF, to determine the applicable filing date for any form PF filing, and to identify and begin to assemble the required information necessary to complete the form.

1. See Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, Release No. IA-3308; File No. S7-05-11 (October 31, 2011) (the “Adopting Release”).

2. An adviser is not required to aggregate its private fund assets with those of a related person if the adviser is not required to complete Section 7.A of Schedule D to its Form ADV with respect to such related person. The criteria for excluding a related person from Section 7.A of Schedule D to an adviser’s Form ADV include (i) the adviser having no business dealings with the related person in connection with advisory services provided to its clients; (ii) the adviser not conducting shared operations with the related person; (iii) the adviser not referring clients or business to the related person, and the related person not referring prospective clients or business to the adviser; (iv) the adviser not sharing supervised persons or premises with the related person; and (v) the adviser having no reason to believe that its relationship with the related person otherwise creates a conflict of interest with its clients.

3. An adviser that manages liquidity funds and registered money market funds must combine the assets in those funds for purposes of determining whether it qualifies as a Large Private Fund Adviser.

4. A securitized asset fund is a private fund whose main purpose is to issue asset backed debt securities.

5. This test does not require that the fund’s organizational documents expressly prohibit such leverage or short-selling as long as “the fund in fact does not engage in these practices … and a reasonable investor would understand, based on the fund’s offering documents, that the fund will not engage in these practices.” SeeAdopting Release at page 28.

6. A real estate fund is defined as a private fund that invests primarily in real estate and real estate-related assets as long as it is not a hedge fund and does not provide investors the right to redeem in the ordinary course.

7. A venture capital fund is defined by reference to Rule 203(l)-1 of the Advisers Act. That rule is complex, subject to various exceptions, definitions and other discussions, and easily could be the subject of its own client alert. In short, a venture capital fund is defined as a private fund that: (i) holds no more than 20 percent of the fund’s capital commitments in certain non-qualifying investments; (ii) does not incur leverage, other than limited short-term borrowing; (iii) does not offer its investors a right to redeem except in extraordinary circumstances; (iv) represents itself as pursuing a venture capital strategy; and (v) is not registered as a business development company.

8. For purposes of calculating the amount of regulatory assets under management by a manager to a liquidity fund, regulatory assets under management include the combined assets under management attributable to all liquidity funds and registered money market funds.

9. A “Large Private Fund Adviser” includes (i) any adviser that has at least $1.5 billion in regulatory assets under management attributable to hedge funds, (ii) any adviser that has at least $1.0 billion in regulatory assets under management attributable to liquidity funds and registered money market funds, or (iii) any adviser that has more than $2.0 billion in regulatory assets under management attributable to private equity funds.

10. An adviser solely to private funds other than hedge, liquidity and private equity funds would not be a Large Private Fund Adviser regardless of the assets under management in those funds.

11. See Note 9.

12. Form PF requires additional disclosures in Section 2b by Large Private Fund Advisers with respect to any hedge fund that has a net asset value of at least $500 million.

13. See Note 10.

© 2012 Andrews Kurth LLP

Will Auditors Influence How Executives Are Paid?

Recently The National Law Review published an article by Andrew C. Liazos of McDermott Will & Emery regarding Executive Pay:

PCAOB proposals would have auditors reading the employment and compensation contracts of corporate leaders and, possibly, forcing changes to comp programs due to unacceptable risks of material restatement.

Unfortunately, the PCAOB is suggesting that auditors also evaluate whether the design of an executive-compensation program could itself lead to excessive risk taking. Here’s what one of the board members, Steven Harris, had to say about this matter:

“Equity-based compensation arrangements may also provide strong incentives for excessive risk-taking by executives. Studies have shown that these arrangements can position executive officers to benefit from the upside of high-risk investments, while largely insulating them from the downside risks. In addition, excessive risk taking generally is viewed as one of the contributing factors to the recent financial crisis. For example, ‘The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report’ concluded that ‘Executive and employee compensation systems at these institutions disproportionately rewarded short-term risk taking.’ The Board’s proposals would require auditors to focus on the potential opportunities and motivations for executive officers to exaggerate gains, or minimize losses, and to consider any effect compensation incentives might have on the reliability of the financial statements.” (Emphasis added)

That type of statement raises the possibility that an auditor might view the structure of an executive-compensation program to be so problematic that, when coupled with other factors, the auditor may be unable to issue an unqualified opinion. This risk (i.e., not receiving an unqualified opinion on financial statements) could give the auditor significant influence over executive-compensation decisions.

What’s particularly interesting about the timing of the PCAOB release is that its focus on executive compensation is happening when shareholders now have a “say on pay” under Dodd-Frank and there is an increasing focus on “pay for performance.” As discussed in my January column, ISS, the leading shareholder advisory service, recently revamped its guidelines for making recommendations on executive compensation by focusing on total shareholder return (TSR) as compared with peer companies, and it’s reasonable to expect that issuers will start to use TSR performance goals. One can only imagine the reaction of compensation committees if their decisions to restructure executive pay in response to shareholders were to be second-guessed by auditors, particularly in light of the current lawsuits regarding failed say-on-pay votes.

The PCAOB is moving quickly on this change. While the proposed amendments require SEC approval, the PCAOB anticipates that these changes would be effective for audits of financial statements for companies with fiscal years beginning on or after December 15, 2012.

© 2012 McDermott Will & Emery

JOBS Act – Jumpstart Our Business Startups: U.S. House of Representatives Legislation

Recently published in The National Law Review was an article by Jeffrey M. Barrett and Gregory J. Lynch of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP regarding the JOBS Act:

On Thursday, March 8, 2012, the U.S. House of Representatives easily passed a package of bills called the Jumpstart Our Business Startups, or JOBS Act aimed at making it easier for small businesses to go public, attract investors, and hire workers by reducing U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration requirements and other restrictions.  If it becomes law, the JOBS Act has the potential to significantly reduce the securities compliance costs of raising capital for emerging companies.

The Senate is expected to soon introduce its own version of the legislation and President Obama has indicated his support of the measure.Business Startups, or JOBS Act aimed at making it easier for small businesses to go public, attract investors, and hire workers by reducing U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration requirements and other restrictions.  If it becomes law, the JOBS Act has the potential to significantly reduce the securities compliance costs of raising capital for emerging companies.

Increase of 500 Investor Threshold to be a Reporting Company

The JOBS Act increases the offering threshold for companies exempted from SEC registration from $5 million – the threshold set in the early 1990s – to $50 million.  The measure also raises the threshold for mandatory registration under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, from 500 shareholders to 1,000 shareholders for all companies (and 2,000 shareholders for all banks and bank holding companies) and excludes securities held by shareholders who received such securities under employee compensation plans from the calculation.  Raising the offering and shareholder thresholds is intended to help small companies gain access to capital markets without the costs and delays associated with the full-scale securities registration process.

Crowdfunding

Also included in the legislation is a new registration exemption from the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, for securities issued through internet platforms also known as “crowdfunding.”  To use this new exemption, the issuer’s offering cannot exceed $1 million, unless the issuer provides investors with audited financial statements, in which case the offering amount may not exceed $2 million.  An individual’s investment must be equal to or less than the lesser of $10,000 or 10 percent of the investor’s annual income.  By exempting such offerings from registration with the SEC and preempting state registration laws, the legislation seeks to enable entrepreneurs to more easily access capital from potential investors across the United States to grow their business and create jobs.

Removal of Ban on Small Company Advertisements to Solicit Capital

Lastly, the legislation would remove the prohibition against general solicitation or advertising on sales of non-publicly traded securities, provided that all purchasers of the securities are accredited investors.  The Securities Act of 1933, as amended, currently requires that any offer to sell securities either be registered with the SEC or meet an exemption.  Rule 506 of Regulation D is an exemption that allows companies to raise capital as long as they do not market their securities through general solicitations or advertising.  The legislation would allow small companies offering securities under Regulation D to utilize advertisements or solicitation to reach investors and obtain capital, provided that all purchasers of the securities are accredited investors.  The goal is to allow companies greater access to accredited investors and to new sources of capital to grow and create jobs, without putting less sophisticated investors at risk.

Emerging Growth Companies

The legislation establishes a new category of security issuers, identified as “Emerging Growth Companies” (EGCs), which will be exempt from certain regulatory requirements until the earliest of three conditions: (1) five years from the date of the initial public offering; (2) the date an EGC has $1 billion in annual gross revenue; or (3) the date an EGC becomes what is defined by the SEC as a “large accelerated filer,” which is a company with a  worldwide market value of outstanding voting and non-voting common equity held by non-affiliates (also known as “public float”) of $700 million or more.  The regulatory relief provided by the legislation is designed to be temporary and transitional, encouraging small companies to go public but ensuring they transition to full conformity with regulations over time or as they grow large enough to have the resources to sustain the type of compliance infrastructure associated with more mature enterprises.

© MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP

Process Improvement Can Drive Shareholder Returns: Is Your Institution Ready for Process Improvement?

Recently an article by The Financial Institutions Group of Schiff Hardin LLP regarding Process Improvement was published in The National Law Review:

Many banks have been fighting for their lives since the financial crisis began in 2008—focusing on improving credit quality, finding capital and persuading the regulators to release enforcement actions. As the economy slowly improves and bank balance sheets stabilize, boards and CEOs will start to focus on growth opportunities and improving their banks’ operating efficiency, all with the goal of driving shareholder returns. With challenging revenue prospects going forward and increasing compliance costs, banks need to reduce the cost of their operating models while improving customer service and sales. This requires a laser focus on process improvement.

Reviewing your organization’s processes increases the likelihood that you can eliminate redundancy, reduce risk and expense, address regulatory requirements and take advantage of technology to better serve your banking customers. In this article, guest author Kristin Kroeger of Fifth Star Consulting LLC, reviews the criteria for assessing whether or not your bank is ready for an effective process improvement program.

Real Life Examples of Process Improvement Opportunities

  1. A community bank with a focus on C&I (commercial and industrial) lending survived the financial crisis and remains well capitalized. As its focus returned to organic growth in a very crowded and competitive market, the bank undertook a review of its end-to-end commercial lending processes with a goal of reducing its delivery cost and increasing its market responsiveness. By increasing the use of technology through adoption of a workflow tool and electronic document storage, as well as a realignment of its client-facing support staff, the bank was able to remove costly rework and improve its credit risk management process while reducing response time to client requests.
  2. A community bank that experienced a significant contraction in business during the financial crisis found itself with excess real estate and decentralized operations across multiple functions. By undertaking a process review of its deposit and retail operations, the bank determined it could consolidate certain functions, reduce headcount, eliminate a(non-target) leased location, and reduce operating risk within a better controlled environment.
  3. A community bank with new executive leadership decided to centralize its operations functions that historically had been managed within each line of business. This transition required the bank to examine each process it owned, challenge the status quo, and address existing technology and control deficiencies. As a result of the process review, redundant positions and processes were eliminated and a new operating culture emerged, which was better focused on the customer with a lower overall cost to the bank.

Success Begins by Asking the Right Questions Early

Before embarking on a process improvement effort, ask yourself these questions:

  • Does the bank’s executive management team fully support this effort?
  • Does the bank have a culture that rewards performance?
  • Does the bank understand how to effectively change management and, if so, does it have the capacity to make it happen?
  • Does the bank have the people with the right skills aligned with the process improvement project?
  • What value-based outcomes do we expect from the process improvement project?

Executive Management Engagement

Process improvement, by definition, invites an organization to question why it does things a certain way. Management support is critical to the success of these initiatives. Bank leadership must champion the value of becoming process-focused and provide the necessary resources—both time and money—to enable the success of the program. Having the CEO repeatedly remind employees why the process improvement program is valuable to the bank, its customers and shareholders, and the employees’ livelihood will motivate and drive employee commitment and performance.

To this end, bank management needs to focus on process improvement as a core initiative and tie it to the strategic vision, shared goals of the organization and compensation program. In doing so, you ensure that process improvement has the continuous focus of the management team and becomes part of the culture and fiber of the organization.

Culture of Success and Commitment To Managing Change

From the lowest paid employee to the top levels of management, a passion for doing the right thing breeds success in a company. Banks will benefit from using their reward and recognition program to complement process improvement plans. Recognize employees who embrace the program early. Continue to build a following by repetitive recognition of early wins and contributions.

Additionally, one of the biggest obstacles to a successful process improvement initiative is resistance from those who may benefit the most. Organizations that are most successful at getting results from process improvement have change management as a core discipline. First, banks should embed a readiness approach into their project plan that addresses training and communication to impacted employees. Second, ensure that affected employees have the time and training they need to learn the new methods. They need to know that management supports time away from daily activities if it is dedicated to learning new skill sets. Finally, be aware that organizations can only absorb so much change at one time. Plan your initiative so that impacted employees have time to adjust prior to adding more change to their environment.

Cross-Functional Engagement

One of the cornerstones of successful process improvement projects is to select what processes to study and then define where they start and where they end. When one particular bank department is sponsoring the improvement initiative, it is easy to become internally focused. Rarely, however, does the same department own the start point, handoffs and end point. Truly transformational change comes from evaluating an organization’s processes across functions. This requires interdepartmental involvement and a commitment to the same vision and goals through proper resourcing and support.

The Right People

While all of the prerequisites for a successful process improvement initiative are important, having the right people resourcing your project is critical to its success. How do you select the right people? Think about your bank organization and the people within it, and ask yourself the following questions:

  • Who is already improving processes on an informal, undirected basis?
  • Who amongst our employees has the credibility and courage to question the status quo?
  • Are there natural leaders in the organization who can establish rapport easily with other departments?
  • Which employees understand our banking business and have the ability to capture processes and document them?

While your employees may be great at what they do, often they may not be good at documenting what they do and explaining why it is done that way. Flourishing process improvement programs select employees who have the respect of their own team, can establish rapport with other departments, have the trust and credibility with management to question and interrogate current processes, and can document them with the level of specificity required by the project team. Lack of properly qualified resources will quickly grind your program to a halt.

Patience and Avoiding Perfection

Process improvement is a journey, and depending on the state of your organization it may take several iterations to achieve the smooth-running, well-oiled machine you are envisioning. If you are considering embarking on this journey, understand that it can be a multi-year voyagerequiring patience and commitment to achieve the long-term vision that enables a series of early wins to grow into an engine of continuous improvement.

Evaluate, Review, Audit

Regardless of your approach, any process improvement effort becomes dated and ineffective without a culture of continuous review. Banking organizations that truly embrace process improvement are evaluating their processes on a regular schedule, reviewing the processes with their business partners, and auditing how the employees perform their jobs against the documented processes.

© 2012 Schiff Hardin LLP