Category: Regulatory

Carried Interest Language Narrowed, but Remains Far-Reaching

Recently posted in National Law Review an article by Kevin J. Feeley, Gary C. Karch and Patrick J. McCurry of McDermott Will & Emery regarding Obama administration’s recent carried interest tax provision:

This newsletter summarizes the Obama administration’s recent carried interest tax provision. The provision is not expected to be enacted soon, but the proposal contains drafting changes of interest to those following the discussion.

On September 12, 2011, President Obama submitted to U.S. Congress legislative text for the American Jobs Act, including a revised version of the carried interest tax provision that has been introduced several times since 2007. The latest provision is unlikely to be enacted soon, but gives an indication of the form that ultimately enacted legislation may take. The latest language appears narrower than prior versions, but remains potentially applicable to more taxpayers and transactions than one would expect from the announced purpose to treat the carried interest income of investment fund managers as ordinary income subject to self-employment tax.

General Approach Continues

The latest provision would add a new Section 710 to the Internal Revenue Code. New Section 710 would continue to create a new defined term called anInvestment Services Partnership Interest (ISPI). It also continues to provide thata partner’s income from holding or disposing of an ISPI is ordinary and subject to self-employment tax, even if it would be capital gain and not subject to self-employment tax under general tax rules.

The latest provision also continues to apply to all partnership interests, not just interests received for services or otherwise disproportionate to capital, unless a Qualified Capital Interest (QCI) exception applies. The QCI exception continues to apply only to a class of equity that is held by persons who do not provide any services to the partnership and are not related to the partner holding the ISPI. There is no exception for completely pro rata partnerships, as there was in the most recent prior version.

ISPIs Defined More Narrowly

Prior versions defined an ISPI as any partnership interest where the holder was expected to provide services regarding the acquisition, financing, management and disposition of securities, real estate and partnership interests, referred to as Specified Assets. The latest proposal limits the ISPI definition to partnerships in which “substantially all” of the assets are Specified Assets; the holder owns the partnership interest in connection with a business that “primarily involves” the acquisition, financing, management and disposition of Specified Assets; and more than half the contributed capital of the partnership is contributed by persons who hold their partnership interests for the production of income. The “production of income” requirement appears intended to imply that the interest is not held as part of a business. This change may exclude partnerships that conduct operating businesses, and partnerships in which more than half the owners are involved in the business.

The ISPI definition attributes a business of one member of a corporate group to all others. This provision may be intended to remove most corporate internal partnerships and external joint ventures from becoming subject to the rules.

The limitation of the ISPI definition to partnerships in which substantially all of the assets are Specified Assets may remove the so-called enterprise value of some investment fund managers from ordinary income treatment. The fund manager’s carried interest from funds it operates would be ordinary, but a gain attributable to the enterprise value of the fund manager itself might qualify as capital gain.

No Loss Deferral

Prior versions of the carried interest legislation deferred all losses from an ISPI. This provision is dropped from the most recent legislation.

Disposition Provisions Narrowed Somewhat

The proposed legislation continues to require recognition of ordinary income in normally tax-free transfers. The proposal continues the exception for contributing an ISPI to another partnership if an election is made to treat the resulting partnership interest as an ISPI. The proposal adds an exception for some gifts and charitable contributions. However, other tax-free transactions including corporate contributions and mergers where ISPIs are among the assets would be taxable to the extent of the gain inherent in the ISPIs.

Publicly Traded Partnership Provisions Deferred 10 Years

The proposed legislation provides that publicly traded partnerships with income from ISPIs could continue to be publicly traded pass-through entities for 10 years after enactment.

Exceptions and Phase-Ins Removed

Unlike some prior versions of the legislation, the latest version would apply to 100 percent of ISPI income beginning January 1, 2013. The legislation does not contain an exception or a reduced rate of recharacterization for the disposition of ISPIs held more than five years.

The proposal does not contain exceptions for pro rata partnerships or family farms. The pro rata partnership exception was thought to exclude family partnerships that could not use the QCI exception because all partners are related. It is unclear whether family partnerships and family farms would avoid the provision due to the narrowing of the ISPI definition described above.

© 2011 McDermott Will & Emery

Recent NLRB Actions: Notice Posting Requirement, Proposed Election Rules and New Case Law Tilt Toward Organized Labor

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by  Irving M. Geslewitz of Much Shelist Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein P.C.  regarding NLRB published proposed rules:

Many recall the push a few years ago to enact a legislative bill, the Employee Free Choice Act, that would have required an employer to recognize and bargain with a union without a secret ballot election if the union could present cards signed by a majority of the employer’s workers indicating their wish to have a union. That bill, strongly favored by organized labor, never got enough traction to get passed into law.

Proponents of the measure turned to non-legislative approaches to alter what they saw as a stacked deck against unions that accounted, in part, for their poor record in union elections. With the advent of a newly constituted National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) appointed by the Obama administration, some of that hope may have been fulfilled. Through its rule-making authority, the NLRB recently has imposed on employers a new notice posting requirement intended to heighten employee awareness of their collective bargaining rights, and is also proposing a new set of election rules that should improve unions’ chances in elections. In addition, through its administrative case adjudication authority, the NLRB has issued three case decisions reversing precedent—one that makes it easier for a union to choose the unit of employees in which an election will be conducted, and two that make it harder for employees to oust an incumbent union.

These developments come on the heels of the controversial legal action by the NLRB’s Acting General Counsel seeking to enjoin Boeing from opening a new non-union manufacturing facility in South Carolina, as well as a flurry of unfair labor practice complaints against employers that discipline employees in connection with the use of social media (see related article on the NLRB’s recent guidance regarding social media in the workplace). Together, these actions have some in the business community complaining of a decidedly pro-union tilt by the NLRB.

The New Posting Rule

The NLRB has issued a final rule requiring most private-sector employers, beginning on November 14, 2011, to notify employees of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by posting a standard notice. Now available on the NLRB website and from NLRB regional offices, the notice informs employees that they have the following rights:

  • To organize a union to negotiate with their employer concerning their wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment;
  • To form, join or assist a union;
  • To bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing for a contract with their employer setting wages, benefits, hours and other working conditions;
  • To discuss their terms and conditions of employment or union organizing with their coworkers or a union; and
  • To strike and picket under certain circumstances.

The notice also advises employees of their right to choose not to engage in any of these activities.

The posting requirement applies to all but the smallest of private-sector employers, but not to agricultural, railroad and airline employers that are excluded from coverage by the NLRA. Posting is required whether or not there is a union in the employer’s workplace. In addition to a physical posting, every covered employer must post the notice on an Internet or Intranet site if personnel rules and policies are customarily available there.

Failure to post the notice may be treated as an unfair labor practice under the NLRA. In addition, if there are other unfair labor practice allegations against the employer, the NLRB may extend the six-month statute of limitations for the filing of those charges. Also, a failure to post may be considered evidence of unlawful motive in an unfair labor practice case involving other alleged violations of the NLRA.

The NLRB justifies its actions by claiming that many employees are not aware of their rights under the NLRA and that the new rule is in line with other labor laws that impose posting requirements. Opponents argue, however, that such a notice posting (previously required only in limited situations, such as when an election is scheduled) is unnecessary and promotes unionization through its heavy emphasis on the right to unionize and collectively bargain.

Proposed Rule Changes to NLRB Election Procedures

The NLRB has published proposed rules that would significantly accelerate the union election process. While not explicitly stated, the likely combined effect of the rule changes would shorten the time between the filing of an election petition and the election itself by more than half. Under the proposed rules, employers could expect the NLRB to conduct elections within 10 to 21 days after a petition is filed, rather than the current average of 31 days.

Among the more significant changes are the following:

  • Regional NLRB offices typically conduct pre-election hearings within 14 days after a petition is filed. Under the new rules, pre-election hearings would be held within seven days after an election petition is filed.
  • Employers are not currently required to identify every issue prior to the pre-election hearing. Under the new rules, employers would be required to identify all issues regarding unit scope, voter eligibility and supervisory issues before the pre-election hearing, at the risk of waiving issues not raised at the first opportunity.
  • Under current practice, pre-election hearings can involve disputes over whether certain employees are eligible to vote, such as whether an individual is a supervisor. Under the proposed rules, however, disputes over the eligibility or inclusion of less than 20% of the employees in the proposed unit will be deferred to post-election proceedings.
  • Review of pre-election hearing decisions now takes place before the election is conducted. Under the proposed rules, such review would be deferred until after the election.
  • Currently, employers must provide the NLRB with a list of eligible voters and their home addresses (used by the union to communicate with voters) within seven days after the NLRB Regional Director issues an order setting the election. Under the proposed rules, not only would that period be reduced to two days, but also the employer would have to provide the e-mail addresses and telephone numbers of employees eligible to vote in the election.

In effect, the proposed new rules would dramatically alter the landscape in NLRB-conducted union elections. By significantly shortening the pre-election period, the rules would hamper the employer’s ability to contest the scope of the unit of employees selected by the union for inclusion in the election. But of even more importance, the new rules would shorten the timeframe available to employers to communicate with employees on the wide variety of issues that arise in a union organizing campaign, such as the reasons why voting for the union may not be in their best interests. Opponents, who include dissenting NLRB Board Member Brian Hayes, contend that the real objective of the proposed new rules is to make it easier for unions to win elections by handicapping the employer’s ability to oppose them.

At the same time, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has proposed a new rule that also would negatively affect an employer’s ability to communicate with employees in union elections. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) already requires reporting of arrangements, receipts and expenditures derived from providing so-called “persuader activity” services. Historically, attorneys providing legal advice regarding lawful employer communications to employees have been exempt from this requirement. The DOL’s proposed rule, however, would severely curtail this exception, rendering such attorney advice as “reportable” under the law.

Recent NLRB Decisions Reversing Case Precedent

In addition to having rule-making authority, the NLRB acts as a review body that establishes case law interpreting the NLRA. In three decisions issued on August 26, 2011, the NLRB set new standards favoring organized labor—each time over a dissent.

Perhaps the most wide-ranging of these decisions is Specialty Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center of Mobile, 357 NLRB No. 83, in which a union sought an election at a non-acute care nursing home limited to certified nursing assistants. The employer argued that the unit was too small and should include cooks, schedulers, recreational staffers and other workers. Reversing case precedent, the NLRB disagreed. But the NLRB also indicated that in any case in which an employer challenges a petitioned-for unit as inappropriate because it does not contain additional employees, the burden is on the employer to demonstrate that the employees excluded by the petition share an overwhelming community of interest with the included employees. This decision may make it significantly easier for unions to organize sub-units of an employer—such as employees of one department—as opposed to an entire facility.

The other recent decisions make it harder for employees to oust incumbent unions. In Lamons Gasket Company, 357 NLRB No. 72, the NLRB ruled that if an employer voluntarily recognizes a union as a collective bargaining representative for a particular unit of the workforce based on a card check, then the NLRB would observe a strict bar of six to 12 months after the union’s first bargaining session during which it would not consider a petition by employees for an election to decertify the union or otherwise attempt to oust the union. This action reversed a 2007 decision holding that employees could ask for such an election within 45 days of management’s recognition of the union. Similarly, in UGL-UNICCO Service Company, 357 NLRB No. 76, the NLRB overruled a prior decision that had created a small window—immediately after the sale or merger of a business—during which the incumbent union’s status could be challenged if 30% of employees showed interest. Now, an incumbent union will have six to 12 months after the parties’ first bargaining session to negotiate with the successor company before such a challenge could be mounted.

© 2011 Much Shelist Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein, P.C.

OFAC Settles Alleged Sanctions Violations for $88.3 million

Posted in the National Law Review an article by Thaddeus Rogers McBride and Mark L. Jensen of Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP regarding OFAC’s settlements with financial institutions:

 

On August 25, 2011, a major U.S. financial institution agreed to pay the U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) $88.3 million to settle claims of violations of several U.S. economic sanctions programs. While OFAC settlements with financial institutions in recent years have involved larger penalty amounts, this August 2011 settlement is notable because of OFAC’s harsh—and subjective—view of the bank’s compliance program.

Background. OFAC has primary responsibility for implementing U.S. economic sanctions against specifically designated countries, governments, entities, and individuals. OFAC currently maintains approximately 20 different sanctions programs. Each of those programs bars varying types of conduct with the targeted parties including, in certain cases, transfers of funds through U.S. bank accounts.

As reported by OFAC, the alleged violations in this case involved, among other conduct, loans, transfers of gold bullion, and wire transfers that violated the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 515, the Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560, the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 538, the Former Liberian Regime of Charles Taylor Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 593, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 544, the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 594, and the Reporting, Procedures, and Penalties Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 501.

Key Points of Settlement. As summarized below, the settlement provides insight into OFAC’s compliance expectations in several ways:

1. “Egregious” conduct. In OFAC’s view, three categories of violations – involving Cuba, in support of a blocked Iranian vessel, and incomplete compliance with an administrative subpoena – were egregious under the agency’s Enforcement Guidelines. To quote the agency’s press release, these violations “were egregious because of reckless acts or omissions” by the bank. This, coupled with the large amount and value of purportedly impermissibly wire transfers involving Cuba, is likely a primary basis for the large $88.3 million penalty.

OFAC’s Enforcement Guidelines indicate that, when determining whether conduct is “egregious,” OFAC gives “substantial” weight to (i) whether the conduct is “willful or reckless,” and (ii) the party’s “awareness of the conduct at issue.” 31 C.F.R. Part 501, App. A. at V(B)(1). We suspect that OFAC viewed the conduct here as “egregious” and “reckless” because, according to OFAC, the bank apparently failed to address compliance issues fully: as an example, OFAC claims that the bank determined that transfers in which Cuba or a Cuban national had interest were made through a correspondent account, but did not take “adequate steps” to prevent further transfers. OFAC’s emphasis on reckless or willful conduct, and the agency’s assertion that the bank was aware of the underlying conduct, underscore the importance of a compliance program that both has the resources to act, and is able to act reasonably promptly when potential compliance issues are identified.

2. Ramifications of disclosure. In this matter, the bank voluntarily disclosed many potential violations. Yet the tone in OFAC’s press release is generally critical of the bank for violations that were not voluntarily disclosed. Moreover, OFAC specifically criticizes the bank for a tardy (though still voluntary) disclosure. According to OFAC, that disclosure was decided upon in December 2009 but not submitted until March 2010, just prior to the bank receiving repayment of the loan that was the subject of the disclosure. Although OFAC ultimately credited the bank for this voluntary disclosure, the timing of that disclosure may have contributed negatively to OFAC’s overall view of the bank’s conduct.

This serves as a reminder that there often is a benefit of making an initial notification to the agency in advance of the full disclosure. This also serves as reminder of OFAC’s very substantial discretion as to what is a timely filing of a disclosure: as noted in OFAC’s Enforcement Guidelines, a voluntary self-disclosure “must include, or be followed within a reasonable period of time by, a report of sufficient detail to afford a complete understanding of an apparent violation’s circumstances.” (emphasis added). In this regard, OFAC maintains specific discretion under the regulations to minimize credit for a voluntary disclosure made (at least in the agency’s view) in an inappropriate or untimely fashion.

3. Size of the penalty. The penalty amount—$88.3 million—is substantial. Yet the penalty is only a small percentage of the much larger penalties paid by Lloyds TSB ($350 million), Credit Suisse ($536 million), and Barclays ($298 million) over the past few years. In those cases, although the jurisdictional nexus between those banks and the United States was less clear than in the present case, the conduct was apparently more egregious because it involved what OFAC characterized as intentional misconduct in the form of stripping wire instructions. The difference in the size of the penalties is at least partly attributable to the amount of money involved in each matter. It also appears, however, that OFAC is distinguishing between “reckless” conduct and intentional misconduct.

4. Sources of information. As noted, many of the violations in this matter were voluntarily disclosed to OFAC. The press release also indicates that certain disclosures were based on information about the Cuba sanctions issues that was received from another U.S. financial institution (it is not clear whether OFAC received information from that other financial institution). The press release also states that, with respect to an administrative subpoena OFAC issued in this matter, the agency’s inquiries were at least in part “based on communications with a third-party financial institution.”

It may not be the case here that another financial institution (or institutions) blew the proverbial whistle, but it appears that at least one other financial institution did provide information that OFAC used to pursue this matter. Such information sharing is a reminder that, particularly given the interconnectivity of the financial system, even routine reporting by financial institutions may help OFAC identify other enforcement targets.

5. Compliance oversight. As part of the settlement agreement, the bank agreed to provide ongoing information about its internal compliance policies and procedures. In particular, the bank agreed to provide the following: “any and all updates” to internal compliance procedures and policies; results of internal and external audits of compliance with OFAC sanctions programs; and explanation of remedial measures taken in response to such audits.

Prior OFAC settlements, such as those with Barclays and Lloyds, have stipulated compliance program reporting obligations for the settling parties. While prior agreements, such as Barclay’s, required a periodic or annual review, the ongoing monitoring obligation in this settlement appears to be unusual, and could be a requirement that OFAC imposes more often in the future. (Although involving a different legal regime, requirements with similarly augmented government oversight have been imposed in recent Foreign Corrupt Practices Act settlements, most notably the April 2011 settlement between the Justice Department and Johnson & Johnson. See Getting Specific About FCPA Compliance, Law360, at:http://www.sheppardmullin.com/assets/attachments/973.pdf).

Conclusions. We think this settlement is particularly notable for the aggression with which OFAC pursued this matter. Based on the breadth of the settlement, OFAC seems to have engaged in a relatively comprehensive review of sanctions implications of the bank’s operations, going beyond those allegations that were voluntarily self-disclosed to use information from a third party. Moreover, as detailed above, OFAC adopted specific, negative views about the bank’s compliance program and approach and seems to have relied on those views to impose a very substantial penalty. The settlement is a valuable reminder that OFAC can and will enforce the U.S. sanctions laws aggressively, and all parties—especially financial institutions—need to be prepared.

Copyright © 2011, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

 

NLRB Permits Micro-Units In Specialty Healthcare Decision

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Mark A. Carter of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP regarding NLRB’s controversial decision to overturn 20 years of precedent:

In one of its most controversial decisions to date, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) has overturned 20 years of precedent and will now permit unions to organize a minority share of an employer’s workforce. As a result of this decision, organized labor will be able to establish footholds in businesses where the majority of the employees may not desire to be represented by a union. 

On August 26, 2011 the NLRB released its decision in Specialty Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center of Mobile, 357 NLRB No. 83 (2011). In Specialty Healthcare, the United Steelworkers petitioned for a representational election in a bargaining unit that was very distinct from the typical “wall to wall” unit. For decades, the NLRB has concluded that where employees share a “community of interest” that the appropriate bargaining unit in a representational election should include all of the employees of the employer who are similarly situated. Typically this type of unit is called a “wall to wall” bargaining unit and its common description includes all “production and maintenance” workers employed by the employer excluding clerical, administrative and security employees. This scope of employees insured that the union would be elected where the majority of the employer’s employees desired to be represented by a union, but that where a majority of the employees did not desire to be represented, their terms and conditions of employment, and their workplace, would not be impacted by the presence of a labor union. Moreover, the “wall to wall” unit insured that there was not a fracturing of the employer’s workforce where several unions represented several small groups of employees making the collective bargaining unmanageable for any of the parties.

This logical and longstanding policy of Democratic and Republican majority labor boards has been scuttled.

In Specialty Healthcare, the employer operates a nursing home and rehabilitation center in Mobile, Alabama. Among the job classifications – or job titles – at this facility is a “CNA”, or, certified nursing assistant. Rather than seeking to represent all of the employer’s employees, the union petitioned for a bargaining unit consisting only of the CNAs. The employer objected on the basis of the NLRB’s decision in Park Manor Care Center, 305 NLRB 872 (1991) and the Board’s longstanding practice of not certifying “fractured” units but insisting that all of the employer’s employees who shared a community of interest comprised an appropriate bargaining unit. The NLRB, through a regional director, initially concluded that this petition was appropriate and directed an election be held amongst only the employer’s full and part time CNAs. The employer appealed this decision, in essence, by asking the NLRB to review the regional director’s decision. The NLRB not only accepted this obligation but requested briefs from interested parties regarding whether its decision inPark Manor and its longstanding practice of certifying only bargaining units of all of the employees with a community of interest should remain the law. Significantly, the NLRB also requested interested parties’ positions regarding whether its decision should have application in all industries rather than just the health care industry which maintains unique standards under the National Labor Relations Act.

After inviting and, presumably, considering this argument, the NLRB reversed the Park Manor decision and will now permit appropriate units to be petitioned-for and certified even when larger and “more appropriate” bargaining units exist in the employer’s workforce.

“Nor is a unit inappropriate simply because it is small. The fact that a proposed unit is small is not alone a relevant consideration, much less a sufficient ground for finding a unit in which employees share a community of interest nevertheless inappropriate.”

To that end, the NLRB wrote that it will focus on the community of interest of the employees, the extent of common supervision, interchange of employees, geographic considerations “etc., any of which may justify the finding of a small unit.” An employer can challenge the determination regarding the composition of the unit, but the Board will now require that the burden to establish that a bargaining unit is not appropriate will be an “overwhelming” community of interest between the employees in the petitioned-for unit and the larger workforce.

“…when employees or a labor organization petition for an election in a unit of employees who are readily identifiable as a group (based on job classifications, departments, functions, work locations, skills, or other similar factors) and the Board finds that the employees in the group share a community of interest after considering the traditional criteria, the Board will find the petitioned-for unit to be an appropriate unit, despite a contention that employees in the unit could be placed in a larger unit which would also be appropriate or even more appropriate, unless the party so contending demonstrates that employees in the larger unit share an overwhelming community of interest with those in the petitioned-for unit…”

The NLRB did agree that cases may exist where the petitioned-for unit inappropriately “fractured” the workforce. For example, had the union petitioned only for CNAs working the night shift vs. all employees, or only CNAs working on the first floor and not the second floor, but it is eminently clear that the Board will direct elections and certify bargaining units of employees simply because they have one job title or job function and permit the union to ignore the other employees with distinct job titles or functions even when that means that the minority of the employees overall support the union. The reality is that all of the employees will have to deal with the union.

Employers should take no stock in some press suggestions that this decision has limited application to the health care industry. There is no holding or assurance that the rule is limited to the health care industry merely because the case arose within the health care industry. Rather, employers will be well served to heed the opening of Member Brian Hayes dissent which is absolutely accurate:

“Make no mistake. Today’s decision fundamentally changes the standard for determining whether a petitioned-for unit is appropriate in any industry subject to the Board’s jurisdiction.”

© 2011 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.

The Truth about Clean Energy Jobs

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by U.S. Department of Energy in response to The Washington Post’s assertions  about the Department of Energy’s loan programs:

The Washington Post’s assertions today about the Department of Energy’s loan programs are both incomplete and inaccurate.

Here are the facts: over the past two years, the Department of Energy’s Loan Program has supported a robust, diverse portfolio of more than 40 projects that are investing in pioneering companies as we work to regain American leadership in the global race for clean energy jobs. These projects include major advances for our renewable power industry including the world’s largest wind farm, several of the world’s largest solar generation facilities, and one of the country’s first commercial-scale cellulosic ethanol plants. Collectively, the projects plan to employ more than 60,000 Americans, create tens of thousands more indirect jobs, provide clean electricity to power three million homes, and save more than 300 million gallons of gasoline a year, all while investing in American competitiveness. What matters to the men and women who have those jobs is that the investments that this Administration is making are helping to keep factories open and running.

When the Washington Post claims that the program has created 3,500 jobs, here is what the reporters are excluding:

  • 33,000 American auto jobs saved at Ford. The Post article does acknowledge that the program enabled Ford to modernize its factories to produce more fuel efficient vehicles, which a Ford spokeswoman credits for “helping retain the 33,000 jobs by ensuring our employees can build the fuel-efficient cars people want to drive.”
  • More than 7,300 construction jobs. Many of the projects funded by the program are wind and solar power plants, which create significant numbers of construction jobs but once built can be operated inexpensively without a large workforce. But the Washington Post chose to ignore all of those jobs. If a community built a new highway or a bridge that employed 200 workers directly during construction – and many more in the supply chain — and that also strengthened the local economy by making it faster to transport goods, would anyone say that the project created zero jobs?
  • Supply chain jobs. While these jobs aren’t reflected in official government estimates because of the difficulty in obtaining a precisely accurate count, that doesn’t mean they don’t exist. When a company spends $100 million or $200 million building a wind farm or a solar power plant, most of that economic value actually goes into the supply chain – creating huge manufacturing opportunities for the United States.

In fact, when you look at the Washington Post’s graphic, you can see that the program has already created or saved roughly 44,000 jobs.  Many of the projects it has funded are just getting going, and many of the loans won’t even go out the door until the next few weeks. Others have not ramped fully up to scale. But we are on pace to achieve more than 60,000 direct jobs – and many more in the supply chain.

Here’s a simple example:

Last year, the Department awarded a loan guarantee to build the Kahuku wind farm in Hawaii. It employed 200 workers during construction. Those wind turbines were built in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The project also features a state of the art energy storage system supplied by a company in Texas. The supply chain reached 104 U.S. businesses in 21 states. But by the Washington Post’s count, none of those jobs – not even the 200 direct construction jobs – should count.

What’s critically important and completely ignored by the Washington Post, is that the value of this program can’t be measured in operating jobs alone. The investments are helping to build a new clean energy industry here in America. We are now on pace to double renewable energy generation from wind and solar from the time the President took office. Yet we are still in danger of falling behind China and other nations that are competing aggressively for leadership in these technologies. This is a race we can and will win, but only if we make these investments today. These investments will pay dividends not just in today’s jobs but in entire industries and supply chains – and in cleaner air and water for our children and grandchildren.

One of the goals of the program is to create projects that will encourage the private sector to take the financing risk on other, similar projects on its own. If we can show, for example, that a commercial scale cellulosic biofuel plant in Iowa can succeed, the private sector will likely finance many more of them around the country.

America’s economic strength has been built on technological leadership. The next great technological revolution is the clean energy revolution, and this Administration is committed to making sure that America will continue to lead the world.

Department of Energy – © Copyright 2011

Department of State Releases October 2011 Visa Bulletin

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Eleanor Pelta, Eric S. Bord and A. James Vázquez-Azpiri of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP regarding the DOS October 2011 Visa Bulletin:

The U.S. Department of State (DOS) has released its October 2011 Visa Bulletin. The Visa Bulletin sets out per country priority date cutoffs that regulate the flow of adjustment of status (AOS) and consular immigrant visa applications. Foreign nationals may file applications to adjust their status to that of permanent resident, or to obtain approval of an immigrant visa application at an American embassy or consulate abroad, provided that their priority dates are prior to the cutoff dates specified by the DOS.

What Does the October 2011 Bulletin Say?

EB-1: All EB-1 categories remain current.

EB-2: Priority dates remain current for foreign nationals in the EB-2 category from all countries except China and India.

The relevant priority date cutoffs for Indian and Chinese nationals are as follows:

China: July 15, 2007 (forward movement of three months)

India: July 15, 2007 (forward movement of three months)

EB-3: There is continued backlog in the EB-3 category.

The relevant priority date cutoffs for foreign nationals in the EB-3 category are as follows:

China: August 8, 2004 (forward movement of three weeks)

India: July 15, 2002 (forward movement of one week)

Mexico: December 8, 2005 (forward movement of two weeks)

Philippines: December 8, 2005 (forward movement of two weeks)

Rest of the World: December 8, 2005 (forward movement of two weeks)

How This Affects You

Priority date cutoffs are assessed on a monthly basis by the DOS, based on anticipated demand. Cutoff dates can move forward or backward, or remain static and unchanged. Employers and employees should take the immigrant visa backlogs into account in their long-term planning, and take measures to mitigate their effects. To see the October 2011 Visa Bulletin in its entirety, please visit the DOS website at http://www.travel.state.gov/visa/bulletin/bulletin_5560.html.

Copyright © 2011 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

Ninth Circuit Finds Grocers’ Revenue-Sharing Agreement Must Go Through Full Rule of Reason Check-Out

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by attorney  Scott Martin of Greenberg Traurig, LLP regarding Sitting en banc and affirming a district court decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held:

Sitting en banc and affirming a district court decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held in California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc.,[1]that an agreement among four large competing Southern California supermarket (“chains”) to share revenues during a labor dispute was neither protected from antitrust scrutiny under the non-statutory labor exemption nor so inherently anticompetitive as to be condemned per se or evaluated under a truncated “quick look” test. Rather, the agreement — which reimbursed to a chain targeted by a strike an estimation of the incremental profits, for a limited period of time, on sales that flowed to the other chains in the arrangement as a consequence of the strike — was subject to traditional rule of reason analysis, balancing any legitimate justifications against any substantial anticompetitive impacts.

Dissenting in part, Chief Judge Kozinski (joined by Judges Tallman and Rawlinson) stated that the majority’s “groundbreaking” ruling on the inapplicability of the non-statutory labor exemption was “very likely an advisory opinion,” and had “no basis in the record, common sense or precedent.”

The case arose from circumstances surrounding 2003 labor negotiations between local chapters of the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) union and three of the supermarket chains that, with the union’s consent near the expiration of the labor contract, formed a multi-employer bargaining unit to negotiate. Along with the fourth chain (which also had a labor agreement that expired within months), the supermarket chains entered into a Mutual Strike Assistance Agreement (MSAA). The MSAA provided that if one of the chains was targeted for a selective strike or picketing (a so-called “whipsaw” tactic by which unions increase pressure on one employer within a bargaining unit), the other chains[2] would lock out all of their employees within 48 hours. As part of the MSAA, the chains also entered into a revenue-sharing provision (RSP), under which any of them that earned revenues during a strike or lockout above their historical shares relative to the other chains would pay 15 percent of those excess revenues to the other chains in order to restore their pre-strike shares.[3]

After negotiations with the UFCW broke down, a strike ensued. Picketing was focused on only two of the chains in the bargaining unit, and lasted for approximately four-and-a-half months. The two picketed chains ultimately were reimbursed under the RSP to the tune of approximately $146 million.

While the strike was underway, the State of California filed suit, claiming that the RSP was an unlawful restraint of trade under Section One of the Sherman Act.The grocers sought summary judgment on the ground that the RSP was immune from Sherman Act scrutiny pursuant to the non-statutory labor exemption, which shield certain restraints from Sherman Act challenge in order to allow for meaningful collective bargaining. The State also sought summary judgment on the grounds that the provision was unlawful per se, or should have been analyzed under an abbreviated (“quick look”) analysis. The district court denied both motions, and the parties pursued a streamlined appeal, after agreeing to a stipulated final judgment for defendants under which the State would not pursue the theory that the RSP was unlawful under a full rule of reason analysis, and the grocers would not pursue their affirmative defenses other than the non-statutory labor exemption.

On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the original panel (in an opinion by Judge Reinhardt, who dissented in part[4]from the later en banc opinion that requires a full rule of reason analysis) considered the history of profit-sharing arrangements and the circumstances and details of the chains’ arrangement, applying a “quick look” analysis of sorts, and concluded that the RSP was likely to have an anticompetitive effect. The Ninth Circuit panel rejected the application of the non-statutory labor exemption, and also found that “driving down compensation to workers” as a consequence of the agreement did not constitute “a benefit to consumers cognizable under our laws as a ‘pro-competitive’ benefit.”[5]The Circuit then agreed to hear the case en banc.

In the en banc decision, the majority declared that “novel circumstances and uncertain economic effects” of the RSP required “open discovery and fair consideration of all factors relevant under the traditional rule of reason test,” thus approving the district court’s original determination of the proper standard. The Ninth Circuit majority acknowledged that application of the full test was “not a simple matter,” but concluded that “[g]iven the limited judicial experience with revenue sharing for several months pending a labor dispute, [it could not be said] that the restraint’s anticompetitive effects are ‘obvious’ under a per se or quick look approach.” The court distinguished the RSP from other profit-pooling arrangements subject to stricter scrutiny on the grounds that, by its terms, the RSP (i) was effective only for a limited and unknown duration, thus arguably preserving incentives to compete during the revenue-sharing period; and (ii) did not include all participants in the relevant markets, leaving other competitors in the market who could discipline pricing.

However, the majority then opined that the RSP was not entitled to protection from antitrust analysis under the non-statutory labor exemption. In so doing, the court distinguished the supermarket chains’ RSP from the agreement among a group of NFL teams to unilaterally impose terms and conditions from a lapsed collective bargaining agreement that was considered in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (holding that the non-statutory labor exemption may extend to an agreement solely among employers). The Ninth Circuit majority determined that revenue-sharing is not an accepted practice in labor negotiations with a history of regulation; does not play a significant role in collective bargaining; is not necessary to permit meaningful collective bargaining; does not relate to the “core subject matter of bargaining” (wages, hours and working conditions); and restricts a business or “product” market, not a labor market.

Because the State of California had stipulated to a dismissal in the event that it did not prevail on a categorical basis under a per se or quick look analysis (which it did not), Chief Judge Kozinski wrote in dissent that the majority had in effect written an impermissible advisory opinion, and had gone “out of its way to rule on thenon-statutory labor exemption.” Chief Judge Kozinski went even further, however, In his view, “all of the relevant Brown factors weigh heavily in favor of exempting the RSP from antitrust review.” This was not a case of employers using a labor dispute as a pretext for price-fixing, but rather one of employers responding to union strike tactics, and then only to the degree that the tactics were effectively deployed. According to Chief Judge Kozinski, adding to strikes “the additional threat of antitrust liability — with its protracted litigation, unpredictable rule of reason analysis and treble damages — will no doubt force employers to think twice before entering into a revenue-sharing agreement in the future” and, contrary to precedent and policy, force employers “to choose their collective-bargaining responses in light of what they predict or fear antitrust courts, not labor law administrators, will eventually decide.”[6]

With the Ninth Circuit having effectively elevated the antitrust laws over the labor laws, one might postulate a fair chance of a petition for certiorari being accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court in this case implicating significant questions of both law and public policy. Unfortunately, in light of the stipulated dismissal, such review may have to wait, as the grocery chains may lack standing, let alone incentive, to seek it here.

[1]Nos. 08-55671, 08-55708 (9th Cir. July 12, 2011).

[2]The fourth chain, which was not in the original multi-employer bargaining unit, was not required by the MSAA to engage in the lockout.

[3]The RSP would be in effect until two weeks following the end of a strike or lockout, and it required the chains to submit weekly sales data for an eight-week period prior to the strike or lockout to a third-party accountant.

[4]Judges Schroeder and Graber joined in Judge Reihardt’s partial dissent.

[5]California ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1171, 1192 (9th Cir. 2010).

[6]Quoting Brown, 518 U.S. at 247.

©2011 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

 

Specialty Healthcare 357 NLRB Decision No. 83: Impact on Nursing Home and Resident Care Industry

Posted on September 6, 2011 in the National Law Review an article by  Joshua W. Pollack of von Briesen & Roper, S.C. regarding a decision for those in the nursing home and resident care industry:

 

Recently, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) handed down an important decision for those in the nursing home and resident care industry: Specialty Healthcare, 357 NLRB No. 83. In this decision, the Board redefined the standard for “unit determination” cases for the “non-acute health care industry.” The Board’s conclusion reversed twenty years of precedent and made further unionization in the nursing home industry likely.

The Board’s decision makes unionization more likely because a key factor in the success of an organizing campaign is the size of the bargaining unit. Traditionally, unions fare better when organizing a smaller unit, whereas employers fare better when the union must organize a larger unit. Under the newly announced “traditional community of interest” standard, smaller units will be harder to challenge by employers, and thus are likely to proliferate. The Board summarized the new standard

[when a union] petition[s] for an election in a unit of employees who are readily identifiable as a group (based on job classifications, departments, functions, work locations, skills, or similar factors), and the Board finds that the employees in the group share a community of interest after considering the traditional criteria, the Board will find the petitioned-for unit to be an appropriate unit, despite a contention that employees in the unit could be placed in a larger unit which would also be appropriate or even more appropriate, unless the party so contending demonstrates that employees in the larger unit share an overwhelming community of interest with those in the petitioned-for unit.

Applying this standard, the Board held that a unit of Certified Nursing Assistants was the appropriate bargaining unit because the employer was unable to show that there was a larger group that had an “overwhelming community of interest” that overlapped the interest of the CNAs. In application, this rule will make it harder for employers to challenge prospective units and increase a union’s ability to organize smaller units.

Employers should be aware that Specialty Healthcare gives unions an advantage in their organizing efforts, and as a result employers should take proactive steps to prepare for a potential union campaign, especially those employers in the non-acute health care industry. At a minimum, supervisors should know the warning signs of unionization and how to respond. Supervisors should also be empowered with the information necessary to articulate the company’s position of a union-free workplace with credibility. Lastly, employers should also institute policies that guide employees regarding union solicitation, union access to facilities, and employee uniform policies.

©2011 von Briesen & Roper, s.c

Italian Competition Authority Finds Abusive Conduct in Withholding Data and Internal Communications Praising Company Strategy

Posted on August 25th in the National Law Review an article by Veronica Pinotti and Martino Sforza of McDermott Will & Emery which highlights the dangers faced by a dominant market player that owns intellectual property rights or data that are essential for other companies to compete. 

On 5 July 2011, the Italian Competition Authority imposed fines of €5.1 million on a multinational crop protection company for having abused its dominant position on the market for fosetyl-based systemic fungicides in breach of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  In addition, the Authority issued an injunction restraining the company from such conduct in the future.

The Authority considered that the multinational was able to increase its prices for finished products on the downstream market while increasing the volume of its own sales, showing a high degree of pricing policy independence.

In making its decision, the Authority also took into account the fact that, in addition to its high market share, the multinational was the only vertically integrated manufacturer with significant financial capability and it owned certain research data required for the commercialisation of fosetyl-based products.  According to the Authority, these data are vital for accessing the market, given that they are indispensable for competitors seeking to renew marketing authorisations, because the current legislation restricts the repetition of tests on vertebrate animals.  The Authority noted that certain competitors that had joined a task force for the purpose of negotiating access to the multinational’s data were disqualified from renewal of their marketing authorisations and had to leave the market.  Refusal by the multinational to grant access to the data was therefore found to be abusive.

The Authority reviewed a number of the multinational’s internal communications that praised the results obtained in the fosetyl-based business in Italy, thanks to the strategy adopted by the company.  According to the Authority, these communications proved that the company was aware of the anti-competitive character of their conduct.

In the Authority’s view, the company’s conduct constituted a serious infringement and therefore deserved a very high fine.

Comment

The case highlights the dangers faced by a dominant market player that owns intellectual property rights or data that are essential for other companies to compete.  The case also illustrates the importance of the language used by businesses in their internal communications, given that internal communications are often used by the Authority when reaching a decision on potential infringements. Refusals to licence or grant access to market-essential data can only be made if there are objective grounds for doing so.  This is a difficult issue on which dominant companies should seek legal advice.

© 2011 McDermott Will & Emery

Justice Department Investigation of S&P

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Jared Wade of Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. (RIMS) regarding the Justice Department investigating S&P:

The Justice Department is investigating Standard & Poor’s for improperly rating the garbage mortgage-backed securities that tanked the economy once the world caught on that they were toxic assets.

The anonymous folks who leaked this info to the press claim that the inquiry began prior to S&P’s downgrade of U.S. debt, but many have speculated that the fervor and depth of the probe has ratcheted up since the nation lost its AAA-status.

Either way, the law dogs are — finally — poking around in the ratings world.

The Justice Department has been asking about instances in which the company’s analysts wanted to award lower ratings on mortgage bonds but may have been overruled by other S.& P. business managers, according to the people with knowledge of the interviews. If the government finds enough evidence to support such a case, which is likely to be a civil case, it could undercut S.& P.’s longstanding claim that its analysts act independently from business concerns.

It is unclear if the Justice Department investigation involves the other two ratings agencies, Moody’s and Fitch, or only S.& P.

Any inquiry should of course involve looking at all three. Each overrated the used diaper mortgage-backed securities to a baffling degree. Whether or not it was incompetence or something more insidious is really the only question, I have. I presume they are capable of both.

But if this investigation focuses solely on S&P then it falls even more into how one talking head on MSNBC’s The Daily Rundown described it: more of a Washington story than a Wall Street one.

Honestly, the only weird thing about hearing today about an investigation going on right now is that it was something I expected to hear in 2008.

In related news, and not just to toot our own horn, but I would feel remiss not to mention that our Risk Management magazine cover story this month was titled “The Future of Ratings” and examines “how rating agencies gained so much power, helped tank the economy and figure into the future of risk assessment.”

I’m not going to pretend that I knew just how much play rating agencies would be getting in August when I commissioned the piece a few months ago. I’m many things, but clairvoyant is not one of them. But the piece speaks to many of the questionable issues surrounding the ratings world that have been curiously dormant in the mainstream media for years until recently.

A wonderful writer, Lori Widmer, did a fine job so please do give it a read.

Risk Management Magazine and Risk Management Monitor. Copyright 2011 Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. All rights reserved.