Supreme Court Fair Housing Ruling: Will Plaintiff Housing Victory Help Employers?

Today, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court made clear that disparate impact discrimination claims are cognizable under the Federal Housing Act (“FHA”) despite the lack of explicit language authorizing such a cause of action. Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.

In the process of justifying its ruling, the majority opinion spoke generally about disparate impact and cited to several prior rulings applying disparate impact in the employment context. The Court’s broader guidance on disparate impact liability may be helpful for employers faced with disparate impact lawsuits.

Brief Primer on Disparate Impact Law

Sometimes referred loosely as “unintentional discrimination,” disparate impact claims arise when an employer’s (usually) neutral employment practice has a disparate impact against a group protected by Title VII. For example, in the criminal background context, the EEOC asserts that failing to hire employees based on prior criminal activity has a disparate impact against racial minorities. These lawsuits are largely statistical in nature.

In a Title VII disparate impact lawsuit, the initial burden is on the plaintiff to point to a policy or practice that causes a statistical disparity. If the plaintiff establishes impact, the employer must then show that the policy or practice is job related to the position in question and consistent with business necessity. Over the years, with varying degrees of success, plaintiffs have argued that the “job related and consistent with business necessity” defense is a high hurdle. The Supreme Court itself has struggled to properly define this defense.

Welcome Words from the Supreme Court

In the Inclusive Communities majority opinion, the Supreme Court found the FHA disparate impact defense to be “analogous” to the Title VII defense. The court went on to cite to language from employment discrimination precedent indicating that the “job related and consistent with business necessity” defense should not be an impossible hurdle for employers:

  • Quoting the seminal Title VII ruling Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: an employer may maintain a practice which is a “reasonable measurement of job performance.”

  • Citing Griggs again: “policies are not contrary to the disparate impact requirement unless they are artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.”

  • Stressing that limitations on disparate impact claims are “necessary to protect potential defendants against abusive disparate-impact claims.”

  • “Were standards for proceeding with disparate-impact suits not to incorporate at least the safeguards discussed here, then disparate-impact liability might displace valid governmental and private priorities, rather than solely removing artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers.”

In short, the Court has provided support for employers to argue that an employer meets the “job related and consistent with business necessity” defense if its practice is reasonable and “necessary to achieve a valid interest.”

The majority opinion also provided explicit instructions to lower courts:

  •  To be on guard for disparate impact lawsuits that might interject “racial considerations” into decision making.

  • To hold plaintiff’s to sufficient pleading standards: “a plaintiff who fails to allege facts at the pleading stage or produce statistical evidence demonstrating a causal connection cannot make out a prima facie case of disparate impact.”

Time will tell if lower courts rigorously apply Inclusive Communities’ “safeguards” and “limitations” in the employment context. In the meantime, management attorneys will be doing their best to remind lower courts of the need to show restraint when evaluating disparate impact claims.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2015

Real Estate Promoter Carlton Cabot Arrested – Is He the Worst Fraudster in Modern History?

The name Carlton Cabot was once synonymous with tenant in common (TIC) real estate projects. Cabot claimed to have raised hundreds of millions of dollars and public records show that he promoted approximately 18 large real estate projects nationwide.

The entire concept of TIC financed projects began in 2002 after the IRS issued a revenue ruling allowing investors to defer capital gains from the sale of real estate involving an “exchange” of properties. (These are sometimes called 1031 exchanges because of section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code.) For the first time, the IRS said individuals could pool their gains and invest in larger projects.

Unfortunately, along with legitimate developers came a number of scam promoters. Overnight, a new industry was born. Obviously, not all TIC projects are scams but many were.

The first few years of operations saw Cabot building his empire. A golf course in Georgia, a shopping center in Green Bay and an office park in Connecticut are but a few of Cabot’s many TIC financed projects.

The pooled money of the newly created TICs was used to make a down payment and the balance was financed. The borrowers were the TICs but most were told the loans were nonrecourse meaning the lender was only looking to the value of the property and not relying on the TIC members’ credit.

Unfortunately, stockbrokers who had no understanding of the complex loan documents and tax law behind 1031 exchanges sold many of these TIC investment interests including the TIC interests behind Carlton Cabot’s projects. The brokers relied on rosy projections and glossy brochures and other slick marketing materials. Few, if any, read the 1000+ page offering documents. Much higher than average sales commissions didn’t hurt their enthusiasm, either.

Two more factors made these TIC projects the recipe for disaster. First, Carlton Cabot was the master tenant in each of the projects. That gave him the ability to collect rents on behalf of the TICs. Cabot also set up the loan documents so that the mail addressed to the TIC investors was sent to him.

By 2012, we believe that Carlton Cabot was skimming rents. Mortgage payments therefore began being missed. Had the TIC investors known these things, they could have easily cured any default and removed Cabot as the master tenant. Many of the projects had sufficient reserves that could have been used to pay a missed mortgage payment or two.

Unfortunately, Cabot didn’t tell the TICs about his misdeeds. Nor did the lenders, loan trustees or loan servicers. Instead, the TICs often received phony financial statements from Cabot. Even though defaults were occurring everywhere, the TICs had no idea.

By the time the TICs found out, the loans had been accelerated and were in serious default. The TICs went from being investors to owing tens of millions on defaulted mortgages.

The criminal complaint against Carlton Cabot and his manager Timothy Kroll claims that $17 million was stolen from the projects. The feds say some of that money went into Carlton Cabot’s pocket while some was used to pay off and silence the few investors who were beginning to ask questions. We are sure that the money wasn’t going to the mortgage payments, however.

Theft of $17 million is already a serious charge. Because the TICs were forced into default, the problem is much larger. The TICs lost not only the rent payments but also their equity in the property and their investments. For many Cabot victims, the money they lost was their life savings. Worse, they may still be on the hook for any shortfall or deficiency upon foreclosure.

Many of the investors are also quite elderly. Some have died since the various lawsuits began. For those folks, they will never see any justice. The Justice Department says both Carlton Cabot and Timothy Kroll were arrested at their homes. Both men are charged with seven felony crimes including wire fraud, securities fraud, money laundering and conspiracy. Both men face 105 years if convicted on all counts.

We suspect that absent an immediate plea, the charges will increase as the IRS and U.S. Postal Inspection Service continues its investigation.

In announcing the arrests, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara said, “As alleged, Carlton Cabot and Timothy Kroll conspired to defraud investors out of millions of dollars by misappropriating investor funds, in part to pay for personal luxuries, and they falsified financial statements in an attempt to cover their tracks.  The investigative work of the Postal Inspection Service and the IRS put an end to the alleged scheme.”

Is there hope for investors? Maybe. Investors who purchased from a stockbroker or other financial professional may have a claim against the person who sold or recommended the investment.

Unfortunately, there was such a wave of TIC frauds that many of the broker dealers selling TIC investments are already out of business.

Investors facing foreclosure or the lost of their investment may have valid claims against the servicers, loan trustees, property managers and others who turned a blind eye or actively participated in the crimes. Suing Carlton Cabot is probably not a great idea. We suspect that getting money from him is nearly impossible. Any justice from Cabot will be had if he is convicted and forced to face his victims at sentencing.

In summary, what was once billed as the investment of a lifetime has turned into a life sentence for many victims.  Even if you lost everything, don’t give up. A good fraud recovery lawyer may be able to help defend you against suits from lenders and may even be able to get back some of your lost money from third parties.

ARTICLE BY Brian Mahany of Mahany Law
© Copyright 2015 Mahany Law

New Chicago Affordable Housing Ordinance Means Greater Costs for Developers

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The Chicago City Council recently passed an amendment to the existing Affordable Requirements Ordinance (the 2015 ARO), which will increase the cost to develop most affordable housing projects in Chicago.  With the passage of the 2015 ARO, developers must now provide on-site or off-site affordable housing in addition to the in lieu fees which makes it impossible for developers to circumvent the purpose of the affordable housing requirements mandated by the ordinance.  In addition, the 2015 ARO significantly increases the in lieu fees that developers must pay in order to satisfy the requirements of the ordinance.

The Affordable Requirements Ordinance was enacted in 2003 and revised in 2007 to expand access to housing for low-income and moderate-income households and to preserve the long-term affordability of such housing in the Chicago.  Housing is considered “affordable” if the sales price or rent for the housing unit does not total more than a certain percentage of a family’s household income.  To qualify for affordable housing, the household must make at or below a certain percentage of an area’s median income as established by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Before the 2015 ARO, developers could pay an “in lieu fee” in the amount of $100,000.00 for every affordable unit they elected not to include in their projects to completely satisfy the affordable housing requirements.

You can click here for a complete summary of the 2015 ARO.  It is a quick reference guide for anyone considering the development of residential projects in Chicago.

Application

The 2015 ARO applies to residential projects that contain ten (10) or more residential units and satisfy one of the following requirements:

  • The project receives a zoning change that permits a higher floor area ratio, changes the use from non-residential to residential or permits residential uses on ground floors where that use was not previously allowed;

  • The project includes land that was purchased from the City of Chicago;

  • The project received financial assistance from the City of Chicago; or

  • The project is part of a planned development in a downtown zoning district.

Minimum Percentages of Affordable Housing

While there are certain exemptions, the 2015 ARO creates minimum percentages for affordable units in projects as follows:

  • Rezoning – In the case of a rezoned property, the developer is required to designate 10% of the units in the project as affordable housing (or 20% if the developer receives financial assistance from the City of Chicago).  Financial assistance from the City of Chicago includes grants, direct or indirect loans or allocation of tax credits to the development.

  • City Land Sales – Where the City of Chicago sells property to a developer and such property is subsequently developed for residential purposes or is incorporated into a residential housing project site in order to satisfy City of Chicago Municipal Code requirements, the developer must designate no less than 10% of the units in the project as affordable housing (or 20% if the developer receives financial assistance from the City of Chicago).

  • Existing Buildings | Zoning Change – Where there is an existing building that contains housing units at the time of an approved zoning change or an existing building that contains a mixed-use occupancy with use being residential at the time of an approved zoning change, only the additional housing units permitted under the rezoning are subject to the affordable housing requirements of the ordinance.  However, in the event the developer has received financial assistance from the City of Chicago, then the entire building is subject to the affordable housing requirements of the ordinance.

Additional Considerations for Affordable Housing Units by Project Location

Compliance with the ordinance will depend on the area where the project is located:

1.  Low-Moderate Income Areas 

  • For low-moderate income areas (designated by the City of Chicago Department of Planning and Development), a developer must provide at least 25% of the required affordable units on-site.

  • For the remaining 75% of the required affordable housing units, the developer has the option of satisfying the requirements of the ordinance by (a) establishing additional on-site affordable housing units; (b) paying an in lieu fee in the amount of $50,000.00 per unit; or (c) any combination of (a) and (b).

2.  Higher Income Areas 

  • In higher income areas (those areas that are not designated as low-moderate income areas), the developer must provide at least 25% of the required affordable units on-site or off-site.

  • For the remaining 75% of the required affordable housing units, the developer has the option of satisfying the requirements of the ordinance by (a) establishing additional on-site or off-site affordable units; (b) paying an in lieu fee in the amount of $125,000.00 per unit; or (c) any combination of (a) and (b).

  • All off-site units must be located within a two (2) mile radius of the residential housing project at issue and in the same or a higher income area or in a district zoned “D” (downtown district) under the City of Chicago Zoning Ordinance.

3.  Rental Units in Downtown Districts

  • In downtown districts and planned developments in a downtown district (zoned “D”), a developer of rental units must provide at least 25% of the required affordable rental units on-site or off-site.

  • For the remaining 75% of the required affordable housing units, the developer has the option of satisfying the requirements of the ordinance by (a) establishing additional on-site or off-site affordable units; (b) paying an in lieu fee; or (c) any combination of (a) and (b).

  • The in lieu fee is $140,000.00 per unit through and including the first anniversary of the publication date of the ordinance in the Journal of the Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Chicago.  The in lieu fee is increased to $175,000.00 thereafter.

  • All off-site units must be located within a two (2) mile radius of the residential housing project at issue and in the same or a higher income area or in a district zoned “D” (downtown district) under the City of Chicago Zoning Ordinance.

4.  Owner-Occupied Units in Downtown Districts 

  • In downtown districts and planned developments in a downtown district (zoned “D”), a developer of owner-occupied units (i.e., condominiums) may establish affordable housing in the following ways: (a) establishing affordable owner-occupied units as part of the residential housing project; (b) establishing off-site affordable owner-occupied units; (c) paying an in lieu fee; or (d) any combination of (a), (b) and/or (c).

  • The in lieu fees are the same as rental units in downtown districts; however, in the event the developer elects not to provide a minimum of 25% of the required affordable owner-occupied units either on-site or off-site, the in lieu fee shall be increased to $160,000.00 per unit through and including the first anniversary of the publication date and $225,000.00 per unit thereafter.

  • Off-site affordable owner-occupied units may be located anywhere in the City of Chicago, subject to the Department of Planning and Development’s approval.

In summary, the 2015 ARO has significantly increased a developer’s cost to develop residential units in the City of Chicago.  It also mandates that affordable housing units be built even if it is off-site.  It remains to be seen if these new laws will in fact inhibit developers from constructing residential projects in the City of Chicago.  To learn more about 2015 ARO and its implications for your business, contact a member of the Much Shelist Real Estate practice group.

© 2015 Much Shelist, P.C.

Troubles for Massachusetts Town’s Wind Turbine

Beveridge & Diamond PC environmental and energy law firm

In the long-running dispute between the Town of Falmouth and the neighbors to the Town’s wind turbine that powers the municipal wastewater treatment facility (WWTF), score one for the neighbors. The Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed the decision of Barnstable Superior Court Justice Robert C. Rufo in Drummey v. Town of Falmouth, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 127 (2015), finding that the Town was required to obtain a special permit from the Falmouth Zoning Board of Appeals to install the wind turbine on Town land.

Claiming harm from sound pressures and noise from the turbine’s operations, the plaintiffs first sought the building commissioner’s enforcement of the Zoning Bylaw. They alleged that the town violated the Bylaw by failing to secure a special permit for the turbine’s construction and maintenance. The building commissioner denied their request. The plaintiffs appealed to the ZBA and the Superior Court, both of which affirmed the building commissioner’s ruling.

Notwithstanding that the Bylaw provides that a petitioner may apply for a special permit to construct a windmill, the Superior Court found that this provision did not “apply in the limited circumstance where the Town itself desires to construct and operate a windmill for municipal purposes in a district where all such purposes are permitted as of right.” The Court explained that the turbine was a “municipal purpose” that fell within the enumerated community service uses permitted as of right in the Bylaw, which includes: “All municipal purposes, including the administration of government, parks, playgrounds, recreation buildings, Town forests, watershed, water towers and reservoirs, beaches, fire and police stations and armories.” Although turbines were not expressly included in the list of municipal purposes, the Superior Court found the list to be illustrative and not exclusive.

On appeal, the Appeals Court first recited the rule of law that the interpretation of a town’s bylaw raises a question of law. As such, the Court “reviews the judge’s… interpretations of zoning bylaws, de novo[anew or afresh].” It remarked that, as in other districts of the Bylaw, windmills were specifically designated in the public use district as an accessory use by special permit. Therefore, it logically followed that windmills could not have been intended to fall within the list of more general municipal uses allowed as of right. While the Superior Court’s understanding of the non-exclusive nature of the list was accurate, the Appeals Court found that that characterization of the list “did not adequately consider the weight that must be given a specific by-law provision that has been drafted to take into account the public welfare.” Specifically, the Bylaw included “a comprehensive scheme” for wind turbines including controls on their placement and impact on the town. In effect, the lower court erroneously reviewed the key Bylaw provision in isolation, not in context as the law requires.

The Court vacated the judgments of the Superior Court and remanded the case to the Superior Court for entry of new judgments consistent with its opinion. The Town has filed an application for further appellate review, which is pending before the Supreme Judicial Court.

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Tax Issues in Divorce: Real Estate Itemization Credits

Stark and Stark Attorneys at Law

With the April 15th tax filing deadline quickly approaching, I am beginning to see an increase of the tax-related issues arise in my client’s cases.  The right of either of the parties to claim itemized deductions associated with the real estate taxes and mortgage interest paid on the marital residence is a frequent issue of contention.

It is important to first understand that if you were divorced in the early part of 2015 and filing under a “married, filed jointly” designation for the 2014 tax year, by default, you are sharing in the itemized deduction with your spouse due to the joint filing.  From a practicality standpoint, many divorced couples that file their last joint tax return together reach an agreement to equally split any tax refund or liability associated with their joint filing.

With a “married, filing separately” or “individual” tax filing designation, it is important to come to an agreement with your spouse or ex-spouse regarding the itemized deductions associated with the marital residence.  As the combined deduction between yourself and your spouse cannot exceed the actual interests or taxes paid in a tax year, getting ahead of the issue and reaching an agreement prior to either party’s tax filing is extremely important.

For successfully navigating this issue, I recommend that you consider the following three points:

How much did either party pay towards the mortgage interest and real estate taxes

With the overwhelming number of divorce matters settling by private agreement, it is important to take into consideration the financial obligations under the controlling agreement.  For example, if a party is behind on child support support or failed to make timely mortgage payments, they should not receive the tax benefit of claiming 50% of the mortgage interest or real estate tax deductions.

It is also common for the parties to pay a disproportionate amount towards the monthly mortgage/tax obligation due to either a greater income level or private agreement.  In these scenarios, I often find it useful for the parties to split the itemized deduction in direct proportion to the amount paid.

Balancing out the real estate tax deductions with other tax-related benefits.

Many parties often overlook the benefit of trading off real estate tax deductions with other tax-related benefits such as claiming the children as dependants, charity deductions or medical expenses.  If the goal is to equalize tax credits to both parties in a divorce litigation, applying other deductions or credits to one party may assist the parties in achieving their tax credit equalization plan.

Maximize your tax benefit by speaking with a qualified tax professional.

The goal of applying any itemized deduction is to reduce your adjusted gross income (AGI) by as much as possible.  As there may be scenarios in which it is beneficial from a tax standpoint for one spouse to claim the majority of the mortgage interest deduction, it is very important that you engage a qualified tax professional to maximize the tax benefit to both parties in the divorce process.  Similar to my previous point, if one spouse benefits from taking a disproportionate amount of the real estate itemizations, there are other available remedies to ensure that the other party receives similar tax benefits, such as, claiming children as dependants and/or a uneven distribution of the charity donations.etc.

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New Jersey Law Blog

Bank of America’s Inconsistent Positions re: Faulty Residential Mortgage-backed Securities

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Bank of America recently moved to dismiss a lawsuit filed by Ambac Assurance Corp. in New York state court, alleging $600 million in damages for fraudulent inducement in connection with payments it made under policies insuring faulty residential mortgage-backed securities issued by Countrywide. In its complaint filed at the end of 2014, Ambac claims that it insured securities in eight RMBS trusts worth $1.68 billion at the height of the housing boom from 2005 to 2007, in reliance on Countrywide securities offerings that contained false and misleading information. Ambac contends it would have never insured the transactions had it known Countrywide failed to follow strong underwriting guidelines as it claimed. The bond insurer filed a similar lawsuit against Bank of America in 2010 which is still ongoing.

BofA Launches Stones From its Glass House

MoneyIn its motion seeking dismissal, Bank of America denigrates Ambac’s lawsuit as a “sophisticatedmonoline insurer’s hindsight effort to shift blamefor its own recklessness.” Bank of America goes on to state that Ambac, having sued every major participant in the RMBS market it did business with in the years leading up to the collapse of the housing market, is now “unwilling to accept the consequences of its own losing bets.” In its heated argument for dismissal, Bank of America is also critical of Ambac for having “access to offering documents rife with relevant disclosures” and that it was “incumbent on an insurer of its size and sophistication” to conduct its own due diligence.

Like a chameleon that changes its colors to conform to the surrounding environment, Bank of America appears to be changing positions to meet the needs of each case. The use of the defenses cited above are astounding considering that Bank of America itself (which can easily be regarded as a “sophisticated” financial institution engaged in a “hindsight effort to shift blame,” because it is “unwilling to accept the consequences of its own losing bets”) has alleged in various lawsuits and pre-litigation payment demands that correspondent lenders misrepresented the quality of the loan products it structured, such as stated income loans, no doc loans, and “fast and easy” loans. Countrywide originated such loans on a retail basis, and also was a voracious purchaser from correspondent lenders and other parties during the housing boom. In these lawsuits, Bank of America engages in revisionist history by attempting to shift the blame onto correspondent lenders for its own recklessness. For each transaction, Countrywide, a bank of considerable size and sophistication, had access for years as purchaser and usually servicer, to documents that contained the same alleged “misrepresentations” and “defects” that form the very questionable basis for its lawsuits filed years later.

Correspondent lenders defending buyback lawsuits brought by Bank of America should consider the bank’s use of these key defenses as a validation of the merit of those defenses. In any such lawsuit, correspondent lenders now have an even greater ability than they already did to hold Bank of America’s strikingly inconsistent positions against it.

Zombie Properties May Haunt Lenders in Wisconsin Foreclosures

von Briesen & Roper, S.C.

A recent Wisconsin Supreme Court case holds that a foreclosure court can require a foreclosing lender to sell an abandoned or “zombie” property at a sheriff’s sale within a court-determined reasonable time after the expiration of the 5-week redemption period applicable in such cases.

In The Bank of New York v. Carson, the lender foreclosed on Carson’s residence in the City of Milwaukee. More than 16 months after the judgment of foreclosure was entered, the lender still had not sold the property through a sheriff’s sale. Carson filed a motion to amend the judgment to include a specific finding under § 846.102(2) that the property was abandoned, and asked that the lender be ordered to sell the property promptly after the expiration of 5 weeks from entry of the amended judgment. The circuit court concluded that it lacked authority to compel a lender to sell an abandoned property and denied the motion.

Carson appealed and the Court of Appeals agreed with Carson, reversing the circuit court and determining that the plain language of the statute “directs the court to ensure that an abandoned property is sold without delay, and it logically follows that if a party to a foreclosure moves the court to order a sale, the court may use its contempt authority to do so.” The lender then appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, arguing that the use of the word “shall” in the statute was “permissive” and not mandatory, and that instead the lender had 5 years to conclude a sheriff’s sale based on a different statute.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the trial court has authority to order a lender to sell an abandoned property after expiration of the redemption period because § 846.102(1) states that:

the sale of such mortgaged premises shall be made upon the expiration of 5 weeks from the date when such judgment is entered.

Carson also holds that the trial court can require a lender to sell the abandoned property within a “reasonable” time after the expiration of the redemption period, but does not provide any criteria for determining what a reasonable time is. The decision discussed the challenges posed by abandoned properties and reasoned that the legislature intended a prompt sale of abandoned properties to address such problems.

Carson contrasts with another recent Court of Appeals case not involving an abandoned property, but also involving whether a foreclosing lender can be required to sell a foreclosed property upon the expiration of the applicable redemption period. In the consolidated case of Bank of America, N.A. v. Prissel and Bank of America, N.A. v. Gerlach (“Gerlach”) the lender elected to waive its right to a deficiency judgment thereby shortening the residential redemption period from 12 to 6 months. The lender did not promptly proceed with sheriff’s sales and the borrowers then moved to vacate the foreclosure judgments on the grounds that since the lender did not publish notice of the sales prior to the expiration of the redemption period, valid sales could not be conducted without such publication and therefore the foreclosure judgments could not be satisfied. This argument was based on subsection (2) of § 846.101 which provides that:

the sale of such mortgaged premises shall be made upon the expiration of 6 months from the date when such judgment is entered.

and that

[n]otice of the time and place of sale shall be given… within such 6-month period…

The Gerlach court affirmed the circuit court’s decision denying the motions, holding that the use of the word “shall” in § 846.101(2) is “directory” and not mandatory. In other words, the statute allowed for the publication of the sale notice prior to the expiration of the redemption period to ensure that a sale can occur immediately upon the expiration of the period, but did not require such publication. A lender’s decision not to so publish is not fatal to its ability to publish and direct the sheriff to conduct a sale at a later date.

The Gerlach court noted that the borrowers were in no worse a position due to the lender’s decision not to sell the properties. The Gerlach decision also opined that in a hypothetical situation a borrower would benefit from a lender’s decision against immediately publishing a sale notice (a prerequisite to a Sheriff’s sale) by continuing to occupy a home without having to pay the mortgage and knowing (in these cases) there was no liability for any deficiency. Such extra time would also afford the borrower an opportunity to redeem or work out a loan modification with the lender.

Are Carson and Gerlach Contradictory?

Carson and Gerlach both involved appellate court interpretation of the word “shall” in the applicable statute governing the deficiency election and applicable redemption period, and each addressed the issue of whether a lender can be compelled to sell a property after the redemption period. However, the cases are differentiated by the nature of the property being foreclosed; Carson involved an abandoned home and Gerlach did not. In fact, theCarson decision (from the Supreme Court, and decided after Gerlach) was careful to limit its holding to abandoned homes. Therefore, the holdings are not contradictory.

Practical Implications of the Decisions

Although Carson permits a circuit court to require a lender to sell an abandoned property within a reasonable time after the redemption period expires, the case does not require the lender to buy the property. Foreclosing lenders are often the first and only bidders for their collateral at sheriffs’ sales, but there is no law requiring the lender to bid. However, if the lender does not bid, anybody else (including the owner) could attend the sale and win the bidding for the property with a very small bid. If that did not happen and there are no bids at the sale, further court involvement may be necessary to address the limbo status of the unsold abandoned property. This would lead to further delay in the ultimate disposition of the zombie property, which Carson was trying to avoid.

Other takeaways for lenders from Carson are:

  1. Lenders should recognize before starting a foreclosure if they may be dealing with an abandoned property. The statutory criteria that will evidence abandonment include:

    • Boarded, closed, or damaged windows or doors.

    • Missing, unhinged, or continuously unlocked doors.

    • Terminated utility accounts.

    • Accumulation of trash or debris.

    • Reports to law enforcement officials of trespassing, vandalism, or other illegal acts.

    • Conditions that make the premises unsafe or unsanitary.

  2. If some or all of those factors are present in the lender’s pre-foreclosure due diligence, an early informed decision should be made as to whether the lender really wants to own the property through foreclosure.

  3. Some municipalities (notably the City of Milwaukee) have ordinances that put registration and maintenance obligations on the lender after just starting a foreclosure action, which should also be considered prior to filing.

  4. Lenders should consider just suing the borrower on the note and not foreclosing on the property if there is a risk that it is abandoned and the lender does not want to own the property or let it be sold at a sheriff’s sale for a minimal amount. More money judgments against borrowers who abandon their properties may be an unintended consequence of Carson because in a foreclosure on residential property, the deficiency is usually waived.

  5. If the facts permit, lenders should seek a finding in the foreclosure judgment (a final judgment for purposes of appeal) that the property is not abandoned, thereby increasing the procedural burden on the borrower to seek a different finding post-judgment.

Carson should encourage lenders to make an earlier decision as to whether they really want to own an abandoned property at the end of the foreclosure process. If not, then the lender still has the option to just sue on the note.

Gerlach confirms the current practice as to properties that are not abandoned, so its impact may be minimal. Borrowers frequently lack creditworthiness for post-foreclosure refinancing or modification of their mortgage loans, and therefore there is generally little incentive for lenders to delay a sheriff’s sale of unabandoned foreclosed property after the expiration of the redemption period to allow additional time for such negotiations. As a result, the perceived benefit of additional time being afforded to borrowers by not compelling a sale at the conclusion of the redemption period (which is the holding in Gerlach) may be limited.

Real Estate Joint Venture Tips

recent New York Times article described the increased presence of New York developers in the South Florida condominium market. The fact is that Miami real estate market has always been a seductive one for out of state developers, and the upside in the development opportunities in the South Florida real estate market simply continues to proliferate. Best of all, more interest in South Florida means more opportunities for local developers to partner with or enter into joint ventures with those venturing into this market.

As South Florida developers look to partner with real estate firms and investors to develop projects in South Florida, South Florida developers should pay particular attention to the removal provisions of the joint venture agreements or management agreements entered into with these firms and investors.  Typically, the removal of the developer should be limited to “cause,” such as  the developer committing some kind of “bad act” or materially breaching an agreement. Developers should be cautious about agreeing to any “performance standards” or similar removal triggers, which can allow a developer to be removed from the deal through no fault of its own. In connection with a breach of the agreement, developers should negotiate materiality standards and notice and cure rights. In addition, developers should negotiate the right to cure any default caused by any employee by firing that employee and having the opportunity to cure any damage caused by the employee.

Finally, the developer should make sure to have its removal conditioned on the developer being released from any guarantees related to the project or, if the release cannot be obtained, being indemnified from a credit-worthy affiliate of the joint venture partner for such guarantees. The developer should not continue to be on the hook for the project guarantees after the developer is no longer involved with the management of the project.

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What You Need To Know: Boston and Cambridge Energy Use Disclosure Ordinances

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On July 28, 2014, Cambridge, Massachusetts enacted an energy use disclosure ordinance, joining Boston and several other cities.  The Cambridge ordinance is similar to its Boston counterpart, but contains several differences.  Property owners in each municipality should be familiar with these ordinances.

1.  Properties Covered By Each Ordinance

Cambridge:

  • Municipal buildings of 10,000 square feet or larger;
  • Non-residential buildings of 25,000 square feet or larger; and
  • Multi-family residential buildings with 50 or more units.

Boston:

  • City buildings (those the City owns or for which the City regularly pays energy bills);
  • Non-residential buildings (those located on a parcel of land with one or more buildings of at least 35,000 square feet and of which 50% or more is used for non-residential purposes, and which are not City buildings); and
  • Residential buildings (i) (a parcel with one or more buildings with 35 or more dwelling units that comprise more than 50% of the building, excluding parking, or (ii) any parcel with one or more buildings of at least 35,000 square feet and that is not a City building or a non-residential building, or (iii) any grouping of residential buildings designated by the Commission as an appropriate reporting unit).

2.  Obligations of Owners and Tenants of Covered Properties

Both ordinances broadly defined “Owner” to include owners of record or a designated agent, and net lessees for a term of at least forty-nine years.

Cambridge:

No later than May 1st of each year, all covered properties must disclose energy consumed by such property during the prior year, together with other information required by an EPA Benchmarking Tool:  (i) address; (ii) primary use type; (iii) gross floor area; (iv) energy use intensity; (v) weather normalized source energy use intensity; (vi) annual greenhouse gas emissions; (vii) water use; (viii) energy performance score; and (ix) compliance or noncompliance with ordinance.

Tenants (those who lease, occupy, or hold possession) of a covered property must comply with an owner’s request for information within thirty days or risk a fine.

Boston:

No later than May 15th of each year, owner of each covered non-city building shall accurately report previous calendar year’s energy, water use, and any other building characteristics necessary to evaluate absolute and relative energy use intensity of each building through Energy Star Portfolio Manager.

Owners must request information from tenants separately metered by utility companies in January for the previous year, and tenant must report information to owner no later than end of February, though a tenant’s failure to respond does not relieve an owner’s duty to report.

Enforcement and Penalties

Cambridge:

Failure to comply with the ordinance or misrepresentation of any material fact may result in a written warning on the first violation, and a fine of up to $300 per day for any subsequent violation.

Boston:

The Air Pollution Control Commission may issue written notice of violation, including specific delinquencies, to those failing to comply, giving thirty days within which an owner may cure the violation or request a hearing.  The Commission also may seek injunctive relief requiring an owner or non-residential tenant to comply with the ordinance.

Boston provides a sliding scale fine schedule for failure to comply with a notice of violation, depending on the type of property, which ranges from $35 per violation up to $200 per violation.  Each day of noncompliance is a separate violation, but owners or non-residential tenants may not be liable for a fine of more than $3,000 per calendar year per building or tenancy.

Both cities are actively developing programs to address climate change and adaptation.  Property owners should monitor these efforts as well as similar initiatives by federal and state agencies.

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“Is this the airport, Clark?”: Home Owner's Associations and Holiday Decorations

McBrayer NEW logo 1-10-13

Your guests have arrived and you’ve just spent that last ten hours Griswolding your home and now you and your company are standing in the front yard ready to bask in the warm glow of a million tiny lights, when your neighbor strolls over and says, “I wouldn’t do that. The homeowner’s association won’t allow it. Oh, and you can’t park there.” What? But you nearly died placing those reindeer on the roof! And where are all these people supposed to park??

Holiday Lights

Beloved by some, and loathed by others, homeowners associations or HOAs seem to be misunderstood and ubiquitous these days. If you live in a community subject to a homeowners association or are thinking of moving into one that does, it’s a good idea to get a lay of the land before you make your move…or try to clamber up on the roof with those reindeer.

Some things to think about are:

  1. Have you read a copy of the rules and restrictions?

  2. Does the homeowners association require advance notice or written approval for certain activities?

  3. Are there parking restrictions that could lead to trouble for you or your guests?

  4. Are there any limitations about the type of signage or decorations you may display in your yard? Must signs or decorations be approved by the HOA in advance?

  5. Are there any provisions prohibiting special activities in or around your home (i.e., no burning the yule log out back)?

  6. Are you subject to possible fines for non-compliance?

By understanding in advance what sort of things may and may not be allowed, homeowners or potential homeowners can reduce the possibility of misunderstandings and disputes that can arise from some of the activities we are often accustomed to doing without a thought. You can’t always control whether you live next to the Chesters, or the Griswolds for that matter, but you can at least understand your rights.

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