Category: Real Estate

‘Tis The Season To Think About Your Retail Lease

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With November nearly upon us, the holiday shopping season is right around the corner. For retailers, the peak season can bring a whole host of issues to be considered in connection with a commercial lease. The best time to think about these issues is now – before the droves of eager customers start lining up at the doors. So, if you are a retailer and lease a space for your business, take a few minutes and consider the following:

  1. Does your lease require that you only operate during certain hours, preventing you from participating in “Black Friday” or staying open late during especially busy days?
  2. Is there available parking for seasonal employees?
  3. Are there any limitations in the lease about the type of signage or decorations? Must signs or decorations be approved by a landlord?
  4. Are there any provisions prohibiting special activities in or around the store (i.e., having carolers, a gift wrapping station, or passing out hot chocolate to bystanders)?
  5. If you are in a multi-unit building, how will advertising and general maintenance costs be divided? In other words, who is really paying for Santa and his elves to be stationed in the center?

Shopping Christmas Santa Claus

By addressing these issues early, landlords and tenants can reduce the possibility of misunderstandings and disputes during the shopping season. A little forethought and communication can go a long way in making everything merry and bright.

© 2014 by McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, PLLC. All rights reserved.

St. Jude’s Church Loses Historic Designation

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Last month, the Miami-Dade Circuit Court stripped St. Jude Melkite Catholic Church of its recently acquired historic designation. This church is located at 1501 Brickell Avenue, in the midst of multiple high rise condominiums and office buildings. It occupies one acre of some of Miami’s most valuable property.

St. Jude's ChurchThe court held that, in making the designation, the City failed to properly consider the church’s religious significance. Miami’s Historic Preservation Ordinance “expressly excludes properties owned by religious institutions or used for religious purposes unless the religious property derives its primary significance from its architecture, artistic distinction or historical importance rather than its religious purpose. This criterion requires a comparison of the site’s religious importance.” Diocese of Newton Melkite Church v. City of Miami, 2014 WL 4730075 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 16, 2014), at *3. Writing for the court, Judge Miguel de la O wrote, “[t]he record before us is devoid of any comparative analysis of St. Jude’s religious importance versus its historical and architectural importance. . . . This failure is fatal under the [Historic Preservation] Ordinance and compels us to conclude that the City did not follow the essential requirements of the law.”

This legal battle ensued in 2013, prompted by rumors that St. Jude’s may sell the property to capitalize on its prime real estate. Fearing sale and destruction of the 67-year-old church, concerned congregation members and preservationists banded together to lobby for the designation of the church as a historically and architecturally significant site under the Miami Historic Preservation Ordinance. Such a designation impedes the owner’s ability to sell and architecturally modify the property. According to St. Jude’s attorney, parishioners opposing the designation worried that historical status would make upkeep more expensive and would limit St. Jude’s ability to make certain aesthetic modifications to bring the architecture into conformity with the Melkite doctrine.

Historical designation is available if a property…

• maintains significance in the historical, cultural, archeological, aesthetic or architectural heritage of the city, state or nation

• possesses integrity of design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling and association

• is associated with important people, events or community developmental patterns or trends

• is representative of distinctive architectural styles, periods, methods of construction, a particular architect or builder’s work, or demonstrates significant innovation or adaptation to the South Florida environment, and ability to yield information important in prehistory or history.

In order to procure the designation, proponents pointed to the church’s Romanesque architecture, its connection with Operation Pedro Pan and the fact the church was host to an all-girls academy run by Sisters of Assumption, a Catholic order, for three decades. The diocese, which opposed the designation, argued that the church’s religious use far outweighed any purported historical significance. When the designation failed to receive the requisite number of commissioner votes, the City passed a special resolution to designate the church as a “local historic site.” The City did not make any findings of its own, but instead relied solely upon the Designation Report created by the Preservation Board.

The recent appellate ruling quashed the designation, creating speculation about whether the church will eventually sell the property or its air rights.

© 2014 Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP
ARTICLE BY

Robert M. Siegel
Shalia Sakona
OF
Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP

Real Estate “Change in Ownership” Can Trigger Documentary Transfer Tax

Sheppard Mullin Law Firm

926 North Ardmore Avenue, LLC v. County of Los Angeles, (9/22/14, B248536)

The California Court of Appeals has recently held that, as a general rule, the Documentary Transfer Tax (“DTT”) applies whenever there is a “change in ownership” of real property under the California Revenue & Taxation Code. In the case, 926 North Ardmore Avenue, LLC v. County of Los Angeles, the court held that the phrase “realty sold” under the DTT Act includes a “change in ownership” (subject to the limited exceptions expressly included in the DTT Act).  San Francisco and Santa Clara Counties have already enacted amendments to their DTT ordinances to provide for this result, and there are several other counties (most notably Los Angeles and San Diego) that have taken this position without any change to their ordinances.

ARTICLE BY

D. Matthew Richardson
OF
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

Wisconsin – Don’t Forget to Take the Real Estate Developer’s Rights as Collateral

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The long real estate recession is over, and thank goodness for that. New developments are sprouting up everywhere in response to pent-up demand. There are even condominium developments beginning or long-stalled condominium developments resuming, and it’s time for a reminder about taking collateral in these unique projects.

A condominium is purely a creature of statute. Chapter 703 of the Wisconsin Statutes, the Wisconsin Condominium Act, defines what rights are created when a developer, called a “Declarant,” records a condominium declaration which contains the magic language, “I hereby submit this land to the condominium form of ownership.”

As soon as that declaration, and its accompanying condominium plat, are recorded in the Register of Deed’s Office in the county where the land is located, they create condominium units, which are legally existing separate boxes of air, whether anything is physically built or not. Everything inside the boundaries of the land submitted to the declaration is either a unit, or a common element. Each unit can be separately owned and mortgaged, carries a separate real estate tax bill, and is capable of being assessed a lien for that unit’s share of the expenses of owning, maintaining, and insuring the common elements.

Under the Condominium Act, the Declarant can write into the Declaration, special rights reserved only to the Declarant, and to those the Declarant authorizes to specifically receive those rights, including the Declarant’s lender. These rights are very important, and taking a security interest in those rights can make a significant financial difference to a lender, should the lender need to foreclose those rights, or put them into a receivership. Those rights can include:

  • the right to expand the condominium into more land reserved as the “Expansion Land;”

  • the right to create more units in the condominium;

  • the right to avoid paying a full association assessment for each of the units, as long as it pays the associations’ costs above what other unit owners pay under the association budget;

  • the right to reconfigure the boundaries between units by combining units and separating units;

  • the right to control the condominium association until a sufficient number of the units in the condominium have been sold to unrelated third parties;

  • in some limited circumstances, the power to unilaterally amend the declaration; and

  • the right to declare easements over the common elements of the condominium.

The correct way for a lender to take a security interest in these Declarant rights is to take a collateral assignment of declarant’s rights, in a manner similar to an assignment of rents, which gives an immediate grant to the lender of these rights, with a limited license back to the Declarant to exercise these rights, as long as the Declarant is not in default.

ARTICLE BY

Nancy Leary Haggerty
OF
Michael Best & Friedrich LLP

IRS Ruling Creates Opportunities for Tax Savings by Companies With Substantial Real Estate Assets

Katten Muchin Law Firm

On July 29, Windstream announced that it plans to spin off certain telecommunications network assets into an independent, publicly tradedreal estate investment trust (REIT). Windstream made the announcement after it obtained a favorable private letter ruling from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regarding the tax-free nature of the spin-off and the qualification of the spun-off entity’s assets as real property for REIT purposes.

Under the transaction, Windstream will spin off its existing fiber and copper network, real estate, and other fixed assets into a publicly traded, independent REIT. The REIT’s primary activity will be to lease the use of the assets back to Windstream through a long-term “triple net” exclusive lease. Windstream shareholders will retain their existing shares and receive shares in the REIT commensurate with their Windstream ownership. The transaction is intended to effectively enable Windstream to deduct, for federal income tax purposes, the amount of rent paid to the REIT without a corresponding corporate level income tax inclusion in income by the REIT—estimated to generate up to a $650 million annual overall reduction in taxable income between Windstream and the REIT.

Particularly notable about this transaction is that the private letter ruling obtained by Windstream is seemingly an indication by the IRS that it will respect the tax-free transaction of a spin-off even when coupled with an election for REIT status. The fact that the ruling recognized transmission infrastructure (e.g., wires and cable), in addition to the related real estate, as qualifying assets for REIT purposes is also a key development. The IRS issued proposed regulations in May that provided more specific guidance on what types of assets would be considered “real property” for purposes of meeting the requirements for making a REIT election, and Windstream’s private letter ruling is among the first to address the issue in light of the new regulations.

These developments mean that a REIT spin-off transaction might be available to many kinds of businesses. Companies (other than master limited partnerships) with similar assets, such as telecommunications, cables, fiber optics, and data centers, may be wise to explore opportunities to realize substantial tax savings through a similar transaction. However, there are several challenges that must be overcome to execute a successful REIT spin-off transaction.

ARTICLE BY

Jill E. Darrow
Reid A. Mandel
Glenn S. Miller
Saul E. Rudo
 
OF
Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

Will Governor Christie Extend the Moratorium on Non-Residential Development Fees?

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A new bill (A1907) that would extend the statewide moratorium on the collection of non-residential development fees (“NRDFs”) recently passed both the New Jersey State Assembly and Senate. It now awaits Governor Christie’s signature. If signed into law, the bill would reinstate the moratorium on the collection of NRDFs that expired July 1, 2013, extending it to December 31, 2014. Developers who paid NRDFs during that period would be eligible to seek a refund, which must be granted so long as the NRDF has not already been expended for affordable housing.

NRDFs were initially established in New Jersey by P.L. 2008, c. 46 and codified in the Municipal Land Use Law. For any non-residential development, the required NRDF is 2.5% of the equalized assessed value of land and proposed improvements. The NRDF is collected at the municipal level and paid into a state fund for the development of affordable housing.

The initial moratorium on the collection of NRDFs was contained in P.L. 2009, c. 90 and ended July 1, 2010. The second moratorium was found in P.L. 2011, c. 122, which extended the moratorium to July 1, 2013. As of July 1, 2013, municipalities were again required to impose a n NRDF on new non-residential development. No NRDFs may be assessed against projects that received site plan approval prior to July 1, 2013, provided that a construction permit is issued by July 1, 2015.

If signed into law, the re-imposition of the moratorium would be an important albeit relatively short lived, benefit to non-residential developers.

ARTICLE BY

Michael A. Bruno
Steven P. Gouin
Of:
Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, P.C

Attention Tenants! Grow-NJ Tax Credits Without Prevailing Wage

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A little known regulation makes a big difference for tenants taking less than 55% of a leased facility. Namely, these tenants may be eligible to receive millions of dollars of monetizable corporate income tax credits under New Jersey’s Grow-NJ Program, without having to comply with that program’s prevailing wage mandate. For many, especially suburban tenants, that equates to a great deal of free money.

Grow-NJ is economic incentive program born out of the New Jersey Economic Opportunity Act of 2013 (L. 2013, c. 161) (“EOA”) and administered by the New Jersey Economic Development Agency (“NJEDA”). The goal of the program is to encourage businesses to either stay in or relocate to New Jersey. The program does this by offering tax credits for each job created or retained that range from $500 to $5000 per job, depending on the scope, location, and industry of the project.

However, the EOA specifies that each Grow-NJ recipient must agree to pay the “prevailing wage” to its contractors. The “prevailing wage” is that wage and fringe benefit rate based on collective bargaining agreements established for a particular craft or trade in the locality where the project is taking place. In New Jersey, prevailing wage rates vary by county and statewide and by the type of work performed.

Paying the “prevailing wage” can increase the cost of tenant work by 20% to 30% over non-prevailing wage. Though less of a concern in urban areas where tenants are likely to use union workers, in suburban areas, paying the “prevailing wage” may add substantial costs to the project. Depending on size of the award, this added cost may negate the value of the tenant’s Grow-NJ tax credits.

However, the NJEDA’s regulations provide an important exception to Grow-NJ’s prevailing wage requirements. Under the N.J.A.C. 19:30-4.2, the prevailing wage need not be paid on any project where:

(1) It is performed on a facility owned by a landlord of the entity receiving the assistance;

(2) The landlord is a party to the construction contract; and

(3) Less than 55 percent of the facility is leased by the entity at the time of the contract and under any agreement to subsequently lease the facility.

Because of this regulation, tenants taking less than 55% of a leased facility may be able to benefit from Grow-NJ’s tax credits, without paying “prevailing wage” for their fit-out.

Article By:

Michael A. Bruno
Steven P. Gouin
Of:
Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, P.C.

Chicken Restaurant Case Serves Up A Bucket of Sound Contract Principles for Commercial Leases

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In Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality LLC, 2013 WI 62, the Wisconsin Supreme Courthighlighted the importance of including precise language in commercial leases, especially if the lease includes an integration clause. The court confirmed that when dealing with a fully integrated lease, it is guided by the terms of the lease as written rather than by extrinsic evidence or unwritten understandings between the parties. While this may seem obvious, this case serves as a good reminder for those who negotiate commercial leases to always include all specific business and legal terms.

Tufail (“Landlord”) and Midwest Hospitality LLC (“Tenant”) entered into a lease for commercial property that was then being used by Landlord as a “New York Chicken” restaurant. Tenant leased this property with the intent of operating a “Church’s Chicken” restaurant. However, during build-out, Tenant discovered that a special use permit would be required to operate its fast food restaurant with a drive-through. While Tenant was able to obtain the permit it needed, the permit was conditioned upon the restaurant being closed by 9 p.m. (as opposed to the 4 a.m. close time allowed for the prior restaurant).

Tenant terminated the Lease and notified Landlord that it would stop paying rent due to the adverse effect the earlier closing time would have on its profitability. Tenant argued that the permit requirement was contrary to Landlord’s representation that Tenant would not be prevented from using the premises for the permitted uses set forth in the lease. The lease contained the following use clause: “[t]enant may use and occupy the Premises for any lawful purposes, including, but not limited to, the retail sales, consumption, and delivery of food and beverages which shall include, but not be limited to, Chicken products, Fish products, bread products, salads, sandwiches, dessert items, promotional items, and any other items sold by any Church’s Chicken store.”

After reviewing the lease’s integration clause and finding it to be complete, the court rejected Tenant’s argument that the general reference to “Church’s Chicken” in the use clause required that a fast food restaurant with a drive-through be allowed because the understanding between the parties was that Church’s Chicken restaurants were in fact drive-through fast food restaurants. The court concluded that the lease did not include a false representation and also limited its review to the specific language used in the use and representation clauses of the lease due to its conclusion that the lease was fully integrated.

The court also concluded that the terms of the representation clause as written required simply that Tenant not be prevented from using the property for the purposes set forth in the use clause. The court stated that there was nothing that prevented Tenant from specifically addressing hours of operation, the requirement that a drive-through be allowed, or other specific requirements it considered to be vital to the successful operation of its restaurant in the lease. However, the court was bound to interpret only the contract to which the parties actually agreed, and these requirements were not included therein.

While this is a misrepresentation case on its face, the case ultimately turned on basic contract principles and is an important reminder of the effects of integration clauses. Not only can these “boilerplate” clauses intensify the scrutiny of the specific language chosen by the parties, but, as shown in this case, they can be used to support the theory that even the smallest of deal points should have been included in the agreement if they were important to the parties. This case demonstrates that it is extremely important to include precise, unambiguous language in leases and to double check that even the seemingly minor deal points are included in the lease if they are necessary to make the deal viable.

Article By:

Chris A. Jenny
William R. West
Megan L.W. Jerabek
Of:
von Briesen & Roper, S.C.

Landlords, Make Sure Your Eviction is URLTA-Compliant – Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act

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As tempting as it may be to immediately attempt to throw an unruly and non-abiding tenant out of the house or apartment, doing so can have serious legal consequences. Kentucky has codified the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act in KRS 383.500 – 383.715 (“URLTA”). Pursuant to KRS 383.500, in order for the URLTA to be applicable in a given locale, that particular city, county, or urban county government must adopt the URLTA in its entirety. In areas where the URLTA has been adopted, tenants are often afforded greater protection at the landlord’s expense.

It is imperative that if your property is in an URLTA jurisdiction, you follow the specific, detailed requirements to effectuate a legal, proper eviction. Adequate notice must be provided and contain precise elements, such as the tenant’s name and property address, the nature of the breach and the time period within which said breach must be remedied. Depending on the type of breach, URLTA also requires that the tenant be given a certain period of time to remedy the breach (i.e., 7 days for nonpayment of rent; 14 days for material noncompliance with the lease agreement). It is only after the URLTA notice requirements have been satisfied and the period for remedying the breach elapsed that a landlord may initiate eviction proceedings by filing a petition with the court.

In Kentucky, the eviction procedure is known as a “forcible detainer” action under the law and is outlined in KRS Chapter 383. The biggest misconception in forcible detainer actions is that the end result will be the landlord receiving the money owed to him for past due rent and/or damages. However, this is not the purpose of a forcible detainer action. The purpose is solely to determine who has the right to possession of property. If a forcible detainer judgment is entered against the tenant, the tenant has seven (7) days to vacate the premises. If the tenant does not vacate within the allotted seven (7) day period, the landlord may seek a writ of possession and have the tenant’s property removed from the premises. A separate civil action must be filed against the tenant in order to recover the past due rent, late fees, damages, etc.

 

 

Supreme Court Finds that CERCLA Does Not Preempt Statutes of Repose – Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

GT Law

On June 9th, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger et al., No.13-339 (June 9, 2014) (slip op.) [link], in which it held that CERCLA section 309, 42 U.S.C. § 9658, does not preempt statutes of repose, reversing the Fourth Circuit.  Section 9658(a) preempts state law statutes of limitation for personal injury and property damage claims related to the release of a hazardous substance.  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, reaffirmed the oft-repeated “presumption against preemption” in reasoning that Section 9658 does not preempt state statutes of repose.  Statutes of limitations bar claims after a specified period of time based on when the claim accrued, whereas statutes of repose bar suits brought after a specified time since the defendant acted, regardless of whether the plaintiff has discovered the resulting injury.

CTS Corporation (“CTS”) operated an electronics plant in Asheville, North Carolina from 1959 to 1985.  CTS, which manufactured and disposed of electronics and electronic parts, contaminated its property with chlorinated solvents.  CTS sold the facility in 1987, and portions of the property were sold off.  Owners of those parcels, and adjacent landowners, brought suit against CTS in 2011, alleging that they discovered contamination on their properties in 2009.

The District Court found that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16), North Carolina’s statute of repose, barred the suit.  That section prohibits a “cause of action [from] . . . accru[ing] more than 10 years from the last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action.”  The Fourth Circuit reversed on the basis of CERCLA preemption, finding that section 9658 was ambiguous because it did not explicitly list “statutes of repose.”

The main issue at oral argument before the Supreme Court was whether the distinction between statutes of repose and statutes of limitation actually existed when Congress enacted Section 9658.  As Justice Scalia said, “. . . I used to consider them when I was in law school and even as late as 1986 [when section 1958 was added by Congress], I would have considered that a statutes of limitations.  Now, you think Congress is smarter.  They know the law better.”  Although other justices seemed to agree—and the distinction had only begun to be made in the 1980s—a 1982 Senate Superfund Study Group Report made that distinction and recommended that the few states that have statutes of repose repeal them.  Despite the overlap between statutes of repose and statutes of limitation, the Court found the distinctions important—statutes of repose are not related to the accrual of any cause of action and  cannot be tolled.  Because the Study Report made the distinction between the two, and because section 9658 fails to mention “statute of repose” and is not written in a way to suggest that it is intended to include both, the Court reversed.

The Court cited, as additional support for its conclusion the “well-established ‘presumptions about the nature of pre-emption.’”  The presumption against preemption counsels courts, when interpreting the text of a preemption clause susceptible of more than one possible reading, to “ordinarily accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.”   The Fourth Circuit failed to mention this presumption (although the dissent relied on it).

This opinion follows recent Superfund cases in the Supreme Court in two respects.  First, the Supreme Court attempts to apply the “natural reading” of the statutory text rather than to reach out to interpret the statute broadly to effectuate its “remedial purpose.”  Indeed, Justice Kennedy explicitly derides that rationale for interstitial lawmaking.  Second, the Supreme Court attempts to preserve ordinary state law principles to the greatest extent possible.  So, for example, United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998), was very respectful of state corporation law, and so too Waldburger is respectful of state tort law.  In this way, one might consider today’s decision to be fairly unremarkable.

The majority does not even address Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in which she and Justice Breyer worry that personal injuries with long latencies—like cancers—will go uncompensated.  But some of the long latencies arise not from the progress of some disease but of slow migration of a hazardous substance, in a groundwater plume for example.  Indeed, to the extent that many environmental toxic tort claims rest on allegations of property damage or diminution in value, the cancer model may be misplaced.