The Unredeemable Debtor

The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the race.

– Oliver Wendell Holmes

Bankruptcy law decisions are replete with references to the “worthy debtor.”  In re Carp, 340 F.3d 15, 25 (1st Cir. 2003); In re BankVest Capital Corp., 360 F.3d 291 (1st Cir.2004); In re Institute of Business and Professional Educ., Inc., 79 B.R. 948 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re Nickerson, 40 B.R. 693 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984); In re Marble, (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1984); In re Doherty, 219 B.R. 665 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1998).

These decisions typically employ the “worthy debtor” nomenclature in the context of the entitlements that are afforded by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  It is always the “worthy debtor” that is entitled to a discharge of debts, a “fresh start”,  or to reject cumbersome contracts. This usage bespeaks a universe that also contains the “unworthy debtor,” a party whose behavior does not merit the statutory benedictions of the Bankruptcy Code. The identity of these parties is most often examined in the context of the discharge of debts and the behavior or actions that merit a denial of discharge or the finding that a particular debt is non-dischargeable.

There is a larger and more amorphous question though that also merits consideration, namely are their industries, companies, enterprises whose function and purpose is so odious and inconsistent with the precepts of good citizenship and the “moral development of the race”, to quote Justice Holmes, that they should be denied the benefits of reorganization afforded by the Bankruptcy Code.

If there is an argument to be made to prevent such enterprises from receiving the benefits of the Bankruptcy Code, to deny them the colloquial label of “worthy debtor”, that recourse likely lies within the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that require that a plan of reorganization be “proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law.”  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3).  The “not forbidden by law” requirement is of limited utility in situations where the behavior is recognizable as immoral or intrinsically evil to most but has not yet been sanctioned by any legislative authority. Notably, and perhaps inversely, enterprises engaged in the sale and growing of cannabis are without access to the Bankruptcy Code because they act in contravention of the federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq., which has been found to take precedence over state laws allowing the sale of cannabis. SeeGonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12 (2005).  As a result, bankruptcy being a creature of federal law, cannabis cases are generally being dismissed at the outset for cause in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) and not making it as far as the confirmation standard. See, In re Way To Grow, Inc., 597 B.R. 111 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2018).

If “forbidden by law” is unavailable as a source of relief, the last best hope to prevent the sanctioned reorganization of the unworthy debtor lies within the requirement that a plan be proposed in “good faith.”

“Good faith” is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code, a fact that makes it more likely that our  understanding of good faith may be transitory and that as the ‘moral development of the race’ proceeds, so might our understanding of ‘good faith.’  In other words, what was good faith yesterday might not, in light of our communal experience and growth as citizens, be good faith today.

In the first instance, we can understand from the ordering of the words within section 1129(a)(3) that the good faith standard exists independently of the ‘forbidden by law’ standard.  A plan of reorganization may describe a course of action not forbidden by law, but may still not meet the ‘good faith’ standard.

The good faith standard as used within section 1129(a)(3) is most commonly described as proposing a plan that fulfills the purposes and objectives of the Bankruptcy Code.  Those purposes and objectives within the context of Chapter 11 are most commonly understood as being “to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of economic resources.”  NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1983);  see alsoBank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 452 (1999) (“[T]he two recognized policies underlying Chapter 11 [are] preserving going concerns and maximizing property available to satisfy creditors”)

This case law, which is by far the most consistent usage of the term, emphasizes paying back creditors and preserving an ongoing enterprise. It does not suggest the existence of anything more amorphous beyond those standards and it supports the idea that the ‘good faith’ standard is not meant to be an existential inquiry into the moral worth of a particular industry.

Bankruptcy courts have, however, recognized that the absence of a definition of good faith leaves courts without “any precise formulae or measurements to be deployed in a mechanical good faith equation.”  Metro Emps. Credit Union v. Okoreeh–Baah (In re Okoreeh–Baah), 836 F.2d 1030, 1033–34 (6th Cir.1988) (interpreting good faith in context of Chapter 13).

Any successful collateral attack under section 1129(a)(3) on the ‘good faith’ of the immoral enterprise must likely follow the path of connecting the good faith standard to the “public good.”  Bankruptcy Courts have invoked the ‘public good’ in refusing to enforce certain contracts and have followed the dictates of some courts that “while violations of public policy must be determined through “definite indications in the law of the sovereignty,” courts must not be timid in voiding agreements which tend to injure the public good or contravene some established interest of society. Stamford Bd. of Educ. v. Stamford Educ. Ass’n., 697 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir.1982).

The concept of the ‘public good’ is not a foreign one in bankruptcy courts.  Seeking relief for debtors that are the only providers of a service within their geographic area is an immensely easier task, no court, and no bankruptcy judge, likes to see a business fail and when the business is important to the community, support for reorganization from the bench often works to make reorganization easier.  Bankruptcy courts, although restrained by a statutory scheme, are as a matter of practice courts of equity.  Employing those equitable arguments to support a reorganization is both achievable and a reality of present practice.

Whether equitable arguments can be inversely employed to graft a sense of the ‘public good’ onto the good faith requirement within section 1129(a)(3) is decidedly uncertain and is not directly supported by the case law as it exists.

Somewhere out there though in one of those small border towns between the places of unelected legislators and the judicious and novel application of historical precedent lies the “moral development of the race” and the bankruptcy court that finds that incumbent within the concept of good faith is fair consideration of the public good.

Copyright ©2022 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP

California’s “Housing Crisis Act of 2019” May Boost Housing Production or Just Boost Housing-Related Litigation

On October 9, 2019, Governor Newsom signed into law Senate Bill (SB) 330, or the “Housing Crisis Act of 2019” in an effort to combat California’s current housing shortage, which has resulted in the highest rents and lowest homeownership rates in the nation. In a nutshell, the Housing Crisis Act of 2019 seeks to boost homebuilding throughout the State for at least the next 5 years, particularly in urbanized zones, by expediting the approval process for housing development. To accomplish this, the Housing Crisis Act of 2019 removes some local discretionary land use controls currently in place and requires municipalities to approve all developments that comply with current zoning codes and general plans. If not extended, SB 330 will only be effective from January 1, 2020 through January 1, 2025.

Governor Newsom signed SB 330 over the objections of local governments to help meet his ambitious goal of 3.5 million new housing units by 2025. One study by UCLA found that localities have already approved zoning for 2.8 million new housing units – 80% of Governor Newsom’s goal. However, if zoning alone was enough to increase housing production, California’s rate of housing production would be increasing. Instead, in the first half of 2019, there was a 20% reduction in the issuance of residential building permits compared to the same time period in 2018. California believes the reduction was due, in part, to excessive hearings and local approval procedures, mid-application spikes in development impact fees, and mid-application changes to development regulations, all of which can render a residential development project infeasible.

Only time will tell if SB 330 will actually increase the rate of housing production or merely fill the courts with more housing-related litigation prior to SB 330’s sunset in 5 years. However, one thing is for sure – local governments must tread carefully before denying the next housing project.

Major Provisions:

The Housing Crisis Act of 2019 applies to all housing developments consistent with objective general plan, zoning and subdivision standards in affect at the time an application is deemed complete, and affects all cities and counties in California – including charter cities. A “housing development” is defined as a project that is (1) all residential; (2) a mixed use project with at least two-thirds of the square-footage residential; or (3) for transitional or supportive housing.

SB 330 also places extra restrictions on certain “affected” cities and counties with housing statistics below national averages. As defined by the legislation, today there are nearly 450 cities and unincorporated parts of counties that qualify as “affected.”

For all cities and counties, the Housing Crisis Act of 2019’s major impacts include:

  • Retroactive prevention of zoning codes or design standards alterations that reduce residential density or intensity of use from that which was in place on January 1, 2018;
  • Authorization of proposed housing developments to override the local zoning codes that are inconsistent with the general plan, if the project is consistent with the general plan or land-use element of a specific plan;
  • Prevention of non-scheduled impact fees increases after a project applicant has submitted all preliminary required information;
  • Limitation of the number of public hearings on a development to 5; and
  • Specification that applications must be reviewed for completeness within 30 days of submission, provision of a written notice to the applicant if the agency believes the project is inconsistent with objective local development plans, policies and standards within 30 days if a housing project is under 150 units (and 60 days if the housing project is over 150 units).

Additional controls on “affected”[1] cities include:

  • Prevention of municipalities from enacting moratoriums on residential and mixed use projects;
  • Prevention of municipalities from establishing caps on the number of people who can live in the municipality, the number of housing units allowed, or the number of housing units to be constructed; and
  • Prevention of any density reductions or changes to design standards that downzone or limit housing development.

In addition to the above-mentioned controls on a local government’s ability to restrict development, there are also special limitations on reductions to affordable housing in a community. As to cities and counties, a local agency may not disapprove, or condition approval in a manner that renders infeasible a housing project for very low, low-, or moderate-income households or emergency shelters without specific written findings based on a preponderance of evidence in the record. This only applies to projects with 20% of the total units set-aside for affordable housing at 60% area median income (AMI) or 100% of the total units set-aside for affordable housing at 100% AMI.

As for developers, the Housing Crisis Act of 2019 bans any demolition of affordable or rent-controlled units unless the developer replaces all such units, allows tenants to stay in their homes until 6 months before construction begins, provides relocation assistance to tenants, and offers tenants a first right of return at an affordable rent.

SB 330 also implements penalties for violation of Housing Accountability Act (Govt. Code § 65589.5) (HAA) rules. Specifically, a court may require an agency make appropriate findings of denial or pay a $10,000 per unit fine into affordable housing funds. In the case of a local agency’s bad faith and failure to comply with a court order within 60 days, fines can increase to $50,000 per unit and the court can overturn a project denial and approve the project itself. Bad faith includes decisions that are frivolous or entirely without merit.


[1] SB 330 sets out criteria for identifying “affected” cities based on incorporation, size, and the average rent and vacancy rate compared to the national average.


Copyright © 2019, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

ARTICLE BY Jeffrey W. Forrest and Kelsey Clayton, Law Clerk at Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP.
For more on housing development, see the National Law Review Real Estate law page.

Poor Help: Audit Says Legal Aid Boss Charged Taxpayers for Club, Car

From the featured guest bloggers from the Center for Public Integrity. John Solomon and Laurel Adams share some insight on how federal tax dollars meant for legal aid for the poor took a detour down in the Bayou State. 

The head of a Louisiana legal aid group funded by the federal government routinely dined at a private club and drove a leased vehicle for personal use at taxpayers’ expense, according to an audit that exposes significant fringe benefits inside a profession dedicated to helping the poor.

The Legal Services Corp. (LSC) inspector general, the chief watchdog for federal funds given to local legal aid groups nationwide, challenged $318,768 in expenditures by the Capital Area Legal Services Corp.in Baton Rouge, La., that were charged to taxpayers.

The group provides legal aid to poor residents in a dozen Louisiana parishes and received $1.5 million from Legal Services Corp. in 2009.

Many of the questioned expenditures involved the legal aid group’s executive director, James A. Wayne, Sr., who routinely submitted meals for reimbursement as “business expenses” even when he dined alone and on weekends.

The watchdog report, released earlier this month, concluded Wayne charged his legal aid group $33,150 for meals he claimed were business-related from Jan. 1, 2005 to May 31, 2009.

“The Executive Director frequently dined (breakfast, lunch, and dinner) at a private business club and restaurants in Baton Rouge,” Inspector General Jeffrey Schanz said in his report. “Many of the meals were lunches and dinners where the Executive Director dined alone, and some meals took place on weekends.”

Wayne acknowledged that he routinely dined at the Camelot Club, an exclusive dining club in Baton Rouge where an annual membership runs close to $2,000, but he disputed the audit report’s portrayal of the spending as inappropriate.

Utility giant Entergy Corp., a donor to Wayne’s nonprofit legal aid group, paid for his Camelot Club membership and meals, he said. That meant Wayne only charged taxpayers for the meal of his guests. The arrangement, he said, may have left the auditors with a false impression he was dining alone.

“I’m a very visible nonprofit director, so my meal is paid for,” Wayne told the Center in a telephone interview. “The other person wasn’t.”

The Camelot Club, located atop a downtown office building, describes itself as one of Baton Rouge’s “most prestigious clubs” with panoramic views of the Mississippi River, the state capitol building, and Louisiana State University. The club overlooks a city where about 24 percent of residents live in poverty, according to U.S. Census Bureau data.

When asked by the Center about the private club membership, New Orleans-based Entergy said it has temporarily suspended funding for the Baton Rouge group.

“We provided funding to the organization for low-income advocacy issues. We are aware of a pending investigation against the organization and have suspended any funding until it is resolved,” Entergy said in a statement to the Center. “We have no knowledge or control over how the donations were spent by the organization once they were received.

Wayne said he did not believe the inspector general’s criticisms were warranted. “None of it has any merit. We’ve been through this before,” he said.

EXPENSES LACKED DOCUMENTATION

The audit concluded that $11,462 of Wayne’s meal reimbursements paid by federal tax dollars lacked proper documentation to show they were justified by business purposes.

In fact, the inspector general concluded that Wayne sometimes charged his legal aid group and taxpayers for personal meals under a loose reimbursement system that often sought to justify expenses after the fact. In some cases, Wayne added the names of guests or the business purpose of a meal to receipts more than a month later.

“Personal expenses are being inappropriately charged to the grantee and decisions on allowability of the charges are being made after the fact rather than on contemporaneous supporting documentation,” the inspector general concluded.

The Capital Area Legal Services Corp. is promising to revise its internal financial controls in response to the watchdog report, but disputes the assertion that there was anything wrong with Wayne’s meal reimbursements.

“CALSC maintains that it has provided evidence that the expenditures reviewed by the OIG meet the criteria set out in” federal regulations, the legal aid group said in a written response that was attached to the watchdog’s report.

A lawyer for the group, Vicki Crochet, told the Center in an e-mail that while certain expenses were questioned, CALSC “looks forward to the opportunity to show that it has properly accounted” for all Legal Services Corp. funding received. The expenses challenged by the inspector general are being submitted to the Legal Services Corp. for a final decision.

A Legal Services Corp spokesman told the Center that if it confirmed that funds were misspent, the federal agency could ask for the money to be repaid or could attach conditions to any future federal funding for Capital Area Legal Services Corp. “We take the inspector general’s reports very seriously and the Office of Compliance and Enforcement will give this a lot of attention,” Legal Services Corp spokesman Steve Barr said.

The inspector general also suggested the legal group’s problems might also extend to the Internal Revenue Service and state tax authorities.

“CALSC appears to have also improperly recorded transactions dealing with fringe benefits …, membership dues, lease payments, subscriptions, and client trust fund interest [and] may be liable for additional payments to the Internal Revenue Service and may be subject to sanctions from the State of Louisiana,” the inspector general warned.

LEASED CAMRY, BUILDING RENT QUESTIONED

Among those transactions, the watchdog questioned why Wayne charged taxpayers more than $78,555 over more than four years for a leased vehicle that he used both for business and personal transportation, and warned it might have violated tax laws.

Wayne said the leased vehicle was a Toyota Camry, and that he got a new model each year. “They change the cars out every year,” he said.

The inspector general challenged the need for a taxpayer-funded car.

“The Executive Director used the vehicle for both business and personal use without prior approval from LSC and without adequate documentation identifying when the vehicle was used for business and when the vehicle was used for personal reasons. Also, the Executive Director did not maintain and provide CALSC any records to document the use of the vehicle as required by the Internal Revenue Service,” the watchdog report concluded.

“Lacking adequate records, CALSC did not report to IRS as required the value of all use of the vehicle by the Executive Director as wages.”

Wayne said the car was leased for his business travel but that he began taking it home after the vehicle was vandalized in the legal aid group’s parking lot. The IRS recently gave him permission, Wayne said, to start reimbursing his nonprofit group $100 a month for personal use of the car.

Other practices at Capital Area Legal Services Corp. were questioned, including travel reimbursements for Wayne, LSC-funded payments of $144,646 to a fundraising consultant, and rent charged to the Legal Services Corp. even though the Baton Rouge group owned the building where its offices were located.

The rent payments appeared to charge taxpayers to help cover the group’s building mortgage, the inspector general said. “It is not reasonable and necessary for a single entity to pay itself rent in order to occupy a building that it already owns,” it concluded.

Wayne told the Center that the Legal Services Corp. approved the purchase of the building and was aware of the billing situation. He also asserts that the going rate for the rent was $900 per month, and Capital Area Legal Services Corp. only charged $750 per month, the same amount as its previous rent.

The Louisiana audit is the latest example of trouble inside the Legal Services Corp., the federally chartered corporation funded by Congress to provide legal assistance to the poor so they can access the civil courts. LSC provides tax dollars to local groups to do the work.

Members of Congress, including Republican Sen. Charles Grassley of Iowa and GOP Rep. Darrell Issa of California, and Democratic Sen. Barbara Mikulski of Maryland, are questioning whether LSC is doing enough to monitor the way groups spend the federal money to ensure it really helps the poor.

The Center reported in July that LSC has been struck by a rash of fraud cases in which tax dollars aimed at the poor were diverted to personal uses, including a Baltimore legal aid group executive accused of stealing more than $1 million, spending much of it, investigators said, on prostitutes and gambling.

Reprinted by Permission © 2010, The Center for Public Integrity®. All Rights Reserved.