Category: Mergers & Acquistions

Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Wins Appeal: ProMedica Merger with St. Luke’s Not Allowed

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On April 22, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Sixth Circuit) upheld the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) finding that the merger between Ohio-basedProMedica Health System, Inc. (ProMedica) and St. Luke’s Hospital (St. Luke’s), an independent community hospital that operates in the one of the same counties as ProMedica, would adversely affect competition in violation of federal antitrust law. Prior to the merger, ProMedica and St. Luke’s comprised two of the four hospital systems in Lucas County, Ohio. After the two systems merged, ProMedica held more than 50% of the applicable market share.

Accordingly, in 2011 the FTC ordered ProMedica to divest itself of St. Luke’s. ProMedica appealed the FTC’s order to the Sixth Circuit. In a unanimous opinion, the Sixth Circuit denied ProMedica’s petition to overturn the FTC order, citing concerns about anti-competitive behavior and the ability of ProMedica to unduly influence reimbursement rates with healthcare insurance companies.

The full 22-page court opinion may be accessed here.

Article By:

Patrick J. Cannon
Of: 
von Briesen & Roper, S.C.

Tips for Success in the Current Mergers and Acquisitions Environment

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If you have been waiting for a recovery in the Merger & Acquisition environment in the defense and government services industries, we have bad news: you will most likely have to wait until well into 2014. By almost all accounts, the M&A market has yet to snap out of the doldrums.

Back in 2008 and 2009, we could blame the problem on a dearth of available financing; however, today there is plenty of cash on corporate balance sheets. Lenders are more than willing to finance good deals. So, what gives? The reasons are diverse, including concerns over declining federal budgets, uncertain government programs, questions about the sustainability of global growth, and the increasing cost of business resulting from the vast array and complexity of government regulations, to name just a few.

With M&A volume meandering sideways, the fact that valuations are stagnant should also come as no surprise. Middle market M&A multiples continue to remain in the 4X to 6X EBITDA range, and sometimes higher in the case of acquisitions by strategic buyers.

While this all might sound depressing, it should not be. For companies with an interest in growing through M&A, conditions could not be much better. Between cash balances and available credit, there is plenty of financing available to fund good deals. Next, the Federal Reserve and other central banks have indicated a commitment to maintain low interest rate environments. Additionally, Baby Boomer retirements and generational transitions in family-owned businesses should continue to result in buying opportunities. Finally, the absence of frothy valuations typically present at this stage of a recovery have not yet materialized, increasing the likelihood of M&A success (when measured in terms of return on investment). This last point is particularly important, because M&A failure rates tend to increase dramatically as asset prices increase.  Additionally, many larger companies are opting to divest non-core business units.

Despite the favorable environment, it is important to remember that M&A is fraught with risk. To maximize your probability of success, keep the following points in mind:

  1. Make sure you have an M&A strategy. Clearly defining business objectives you intend to accomplish through M&A can help identify a broad pool of targets, sift through those targets to identify the best fit, and minimize merger premiums.
  2. Start small. Successful acquirers tend to grow through a large number of small acquisitions, rather than “betting the farm” on a single transaction.
  3. Set a walk-away price. The best acquirers set a maximum price early on and stick to it.
  4. No stone unturned.  Make sure you and your advisors do as much due diligence as possible before an acquisition, so you can make an informed investment decision and arrive at a proper valuation.  In addition to thoroughly understanding the business and the financial aspects of the transaction (the target’s assets, revenue streams, liabilities, cost analyses and projections), also make sure you have a firm grasp on the risks involved in the transaction, and mitigate them to the best of your ability.
  5. Do not fall in love with the deal. Negotiating a deal is exciting, but walking away is not. Call it what you want—pride, hubris, delirium—but the sheer desire to close the deal often leads incredibly brilliant people to do incredibly stupid things. Hit the pause button from time to time and ask the advice of those you trust.
Article By:

Michelle DiCintio
Of: 
Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C.

Call Waiting: Department of Justice (DOJ) to Maintain Scrutiny of Wireless Industry Consolidation

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The wireless industry has seen steady consolidation since the late 1980s.  Recently, in late 2013, reports began circulating about a potential merger between Sprint and T-Mobile, the nation’s third and fourth-largest wireless carriers, respectively.  Last week, however, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal, William Baer, the assistant attorney general for the antitrust division at the Department of Justice (DOJ), cautioned that it would be difficult for the Agency to approve a merger between any of the nation’s top four wireless providers.

T-Mobile’s CEO, John Legere, stated that a merger between his company and Sprint “would provide significant scale and capability.”  Baer, on the other hand, warned that “It’s going to be hard for someone to make a persuasive case that reducing four firms to three is actually going to improve competition for the benefit of American consumers,”  As a result, any future consolidation in the wireless industry is likely to face a huge hurdle in the form of DOJ’s careful scrutiny of any proposed transaction.

Much of the DOJ’s interest in the wireless industry stems from the Agency’s successful challenge of a proposed merger between T-Mobile and AT&T in 2011.  Since then, Baer believes consumers have benefitted from “much more favorable competitive conditions.”  In fact, T-Mobile gained 4.4 million customers in 2013, bringing optimism to the company’s financial outlook after years of losses.  In the final two quarters of 2013, T-Mobile’s growth bested that of both Sprint and AT&T.  The low-cost carrier attracted customers and shook up the competition by upending many of the terms consumers had come to expect from wireless carriers, as well as investing in network modernization and spectrum acquisition.  This flurry of activity has pushed the competition to respond with its own deals, resulting in “tangible consumer benefits of antitrust enforcement,” according to Baer.

The DOJ’s antitrust division has kept careful watch over the wireless industry the past few years. That scrutiny will remain, as the Agency persists to advocate that four wireless carriers are required for healthy market competition.  The cards are beginning to play out from the Agency’s decision, and as Baer stated, “competition today is driving enormous benefits in the direction of the American consumer.”

Article by:

Lisa A. Peterson

Of:

McDermott Will & Emery

Judge Rules in Favor of DOJ Finding Bazaarvoice / PowerReviews Merger Anticompetitive (Department of Justice)

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On January 8, 2014, Judge Orrick of the Northern District of California ruled that Bazaarvoice’s acquisition of competitor PowerReviews violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act.  The ruling was in favor of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).  The public version of the opinion was made available on January 10.  In its self-described “necessarily lengthy opinion,” which spans 141 pages, the court ultimately found that the facts overwhelmingly showed the acquisition will have anticompetitive effects and that Bazaarvoice did not overcome the government’s prima facie case.  The case included 40 witnesses at trial, more than 100 depositions and 980 exhibits.  Dr. Carl Shapiro testified as DOJ’s economist and Dr. Ramsey Shehadeh testified on behalf of Bazaarvoice/PowerReviews.  The court noted that the case presented some difficult issues, including that there were no generally accepted “market share statistics covering the sales of R&R solutions or social commerce solutions and no perfect way to measure market shares.”  And while neither side presented flawless analyses, the court found Dr. Shapiro’s approaches more persuasive than those of Dr. Shehadeh.

Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews each offered sophisticated “R&R platforms.”  R&R platforms provide a user interface and review form for the collection and display of user-generated content (i.e., user reviews) on the product page of a commercial website where the product can be purchased.  Often these are in the form of star ratings and open-ended reviews in a text box.  R&R platforms increase sales for the retailer and have a variety of different features.  The court noted that many on-ine retailers view an R&R platform as “necessary.”  Before the merger, Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews offered similar products and features and targeted similar customers.

The court found that the relevant product market was the narrow “R&R platforms,” rather than the broader “social commerce tools” or “eCommerce platforms.”  The court went through many popular social media platforms such as Facebook, Google+, Twitter, Instagram, and Pinterest, explaining why each was not a substitute for these R&R platforms.  In this relevant market, the court found that PowerReviews was Bazaarvoice’s only real competitor, and thus the merger “would eliminate Bazaarvoice’s only meaningful commercial competitor.”

At the end of the opinion, the court commented on the role of antitrust “in rapidly changing high-tech markets.”  It noted that there is a debate as to whether antitrust is properly suited to assess competitive effects in these markets.  The court declined to take sides and stated that its “mission is to assess the alleged antitrust violations presented, irrespective of the dynamism of the market at issue.”

The case now moves to the remedy phase.  In its complaint, the DOJ requested that the court order Bazaarvoice to divest assets originally possessed by either Bazaarvoice and/or PowerReviews to create a viable, competing business.   However, as Judge Orrick noted, 18 months after the merger, it may not be so simple to divest assets.  The judge scheduled a conference for January 22 with the parties to discuss a possible remedy.

There are several lessons to be gathered from this case.  First, the Bazaarvoice litigation is further evidence that the antitrust agencies are not shy about litigating mergers they feel are anticompetitive.  The DOJ invested significant resources and time – including three full weeks at trial in California – into litigating the case, beginning with its investigation that it launched two days after the firms closed their transaction on June 12, 2012.  It has established a significant record of bringing, and winning, merger cases.

Second, this is a significant event, having a federal district court evaluate a consummated merger transaction.  While the agencies have challenged many non-reportable transactions, almost all have been resolved by consent order, or litigated through the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) in-house administrative hearing process (where, not surprisingly, the FTC essentially always wins).  Accordingly, parties to a non-reportable transaction that raises significant antitrust risks should expect the agencies to investigate and, if warranted, litigate.

Third, the Court heavily discounted Bazaarvoice’s arguments regarding lack of any actual anticompetitive effect, because the companies knew the DOJ was reviewing the deal and could moderate their behavior.  The court discounted Bazaarvoice’s arguments that none of the 104 customers who were deposed complained that the merger has hurt them.  The court stated “it would be a mistake to rely on customer testimony about effects of the merger for several reasons.”  Among the reasons the court included was “Bazaarvoice’s business conduct after the merger was likely tempered by the government’s immediate investigation; the customers were not privy to most of the evidence presented to the Court, including that of the economic experts; many of the customers had paid little or no attention to the merger; and each had an idiosyncratic understanding of R&R based on the priorities of their company and their different levels of knowledge, sophistication, and experience.”  Thus, while raising prices after a transaction provides strong evidence to support the government’s case, the lack of a price increase does not necessarily support the merging parties’ defense.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the case shows the need to be circumspect in preparing ordinary course documents.  Aside from the fact that in reportable transactions, the DOJ and FTC are entitled to “4(c)” and “4(d)” documents about the transaction, once a second request is issued or discovery begins, documents created in the ordinary course of business are discoverable.  This includes Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analyses, board meeting minutes, business and strategic plans, market and market share analyses, and competitive assessments.  In this case, the court found the ordinary course documents, and particularly those made by the companies’ executives, some of the most persuasive evidence.  The court quoted extensively from the documents and cited numerous documents from Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews that showed that the parties viewed each other as their primary competitor, that there were no other strong competitors in this market, that the two companies operated in essentially a duopoly, and that the intent of the merger was to eliminate a primary competitor.  Despite the parties’ efforts to explain away these documents, the court was not persuaded.  Thus, it is important that companies carefully consider what to include in documents and e-mails, and assume that any non-privileged material may be discovered.

The agencies’ aggressive pursuit of perceived anticompetitive, non-reportable transactions places a premium on parties’ evaluating the antitrust risk.

The public version of the court’s opinion can be found here:http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f302900/302948.pdf

Article by:

Carrie G. Amezcua

Of:

McDermott Will & Emery

International Group Structures Are Subject to An Ongoing Review for Optimizing Their Tax Position

GT Law

The recent trends show that offshore jurisdictions are off the corporate agenda in view of the increased scrutiny and decreased levels of acceptance from both fiscal and corporate social responsibility perspectives. Client feedback confirms the following rationale for moving corporate tax planning solutions onshore:

  • Increased scrutiny on tax havens and statutory requirements regarding tax substance, potential issues concerning withholding tax and taxation of foreign profits; and
  • Avoiding overtly complicated tax systems with strict CFC (controlled foreign company) regulations, thin capitalization rules and prohibitive transfer tax applicability.

It is a well-known fact that the Netherlands is not a tax haven but a safe haven and a logical choice as an alternative with an extensive double taxation treaty network. In addition, the Netherlands has an extensive bilateral investment protection treaty network that is regarded to provide premium coverage in view of the broad definition of “investor” and “investment” and providing access to dispute resolution through arbitration against independent states and awards that are enforceable against states, often referred to as “the Dutch Gold Standard.” Dutch structures are increasingly a recurring feature in international corporate structures for the purpose of protecting key corporate and personal assets. In this GT Alert, we briefly set out the options for migrating a corporate structure to the Netherlands to benefit from the all of the features that the Netherlands has to offer.

How to Achieve a Corporate Migration

Migrating a corporate entity within the EU into the Netherlands is a straightforward process from a Dutch law perspective. The following options are available:

Registration of an EU member state entity with the Dutch Trade Registry

The tax residence of an existing holding company can often be changed by moving its place of effective management and control outside of its existing jurisdiction for tax purposes. This may trigger a tax charge on exit.

Cross border merger

EU parent companies can migrate to the Netherlands by effecting a statutory merger with a Dutch entity under the cross-border merger regulations. It is also possible for non-EU parent companies to merge with a Dutch company by initially entering into the EU through a conduit EU jurisdiction that permits cross-border mergers with non-EU entities.

Share swap

It is possible to incorporate a holding company in the Netherlands whereby the existing shareholders exchange their existing shares for shares in the newly created Dutch holding company.

Re-registration as Societas Europaea 

An EU parent company can re-register as a European Company (Societas Europaea) and transfer its statutory seat to the Netherlands followed by a re-registration in the Netherlands as a Dutch parent company.

Why migrate to the Netherlands?

Key drivers for migrating the top holding company of an international group structure to the Netherlands are:

  • Low corporate income tax rate of 25% on trading profits (20% up to EUR 200K first band);
  • The Netherlands has an extensive double taxation treaty network with well over 90 jurisdictions;
  • The Netherlands has entered into a vast number of bilateral investment protection treaties (BITS) that offer comprehensive protection against unfair treatment of investments by sovereign states through access to world class dispute arbitration;
  • International and well-recognized jurisdiction with one-tier corporate governance system similar to that of common law countries;
  • Straightforward, cost-efficient and fast incorporation process for Dutch entities;
  • Public company N.V. entities are widely recognized as listing vehicles;
  • The Netherlands is the premier port of entry to mainland Europe with excellent facilities in terms of corporate and financial services;
  • English language optional for proceedings before the Amsterdam courts; and
  • Limited and straightforward corporate reporting requirements.

Taxation

The Netherlands is a gateway to Europe and the rest of the world. For many years, the Netherlands has been a preferred location for foreign companies to establish a business. The location, the political stability and, especially, the beneficial tax regime have turned the Netherlands into one of the go-to countries in this respect. The following tax points are of particular relevance:

  • The general Dutch corporate income tax rate is 25% (20% up to EUR 200K first band). This rate is more than competitive in the region, as all countries surrounding the Netherlands have higher corporate income tax rates.
  • Traditionally, the Dutch participation exemption has been a major attractor of companies to the Netherlands. This facility allows the receipt of dividends and capital gains from subsidiaries free of tax in the Netherlands. The Dutch facility is still one of the most flexible and easy accessible compared to other jurisdictions, especially, with regard to the following conditions: no holding period is required, an interest of 5% is already sufficient to apply, interest in subsidiaries located in tax havens are allowed to benefit from the facility and certain other specific benefits are available.
  • No withholding tax on royalties and no withholding tax on interest.
  • Dividends are taxed at a statutory rate of 15%. However, this rate may be reduced by virtue of tax treaties to 0-10%. In principle, no dividend withholding tax applies to distributions made by a Dutch cooperative pursuant to the domestic rules.
  • No controlled foreign company/Subpart F rules
  • No thin capitalization rules.
  • There is no stamp duty or capital tax.
  • One of the most extensive international tax treaty networks (the Netherlands has concluded over 90 tax treaties, more than most other countries) and the membership of the EU (and corresponding access to EU treaties) ascertain minimal taxation on payments to any group company.
  • Another traditional benefit of the Netherlands is the open attitude of the Dutch tax authorities. The Netherlands offers the possibility to discuss and reach agreement on tax positions in advance with the Dutch tax authorities that can be formalized in agreements (or advance tax rulings) to offer optimum certainty in advance.
  • Currently, the Dutch government´s main focus is on innovation. In 2007, the government was one of the first countries to introduce a special tax regime aimed at innovation (Innovation box). Based on the Innovation box, income earned out of R&D activities can benefit from an 80% exemption, resulting in an effective tax rate of 5%;
  • The Netherlands has extensive experience in the use of hybrid structures (i.e. hybrid entities and hybrid loans). These structures can be used to further optimize the group tax rate.
  • The Netherlands has traditionally not only been very welcoming to foreign companies, but also to expatriates. In the Dutch Personal Income Tax Act, expatriates (with certain skills) can receive 30% of their income as a tax free allowance under the so-called “30%-ruling.” A benefit that also benefits the employer in negotiating (net) salaries.
  • Customs authorities in the Netherlands have a reputation for being cooperative, innovative and exceptionally efficient; all to facilitate the free flow of goods. Customs duties or import charges are charged at a later date, if the goods are stored in accordance with customs procedures in the Netherlands. This leads to considerable cash-flow advantages to foreign shippers.
  • The Netherlands’ position on Value Added Tax (VAT) is also advantageous. In contrast to other EU member states, the Netherlands has instituted a system that provides for the deferment of VAT at the time of import. Instead of paying VAT when the goods are imported into free circulations within the EU, the payment can be deferred to a periodic VAT return. The Dutch VAT system offers companies significant cash-flow and interest benefits.
  • Even though the Netherlands provides several unparalleled tax facilities, it is not blacklisted as a tax haven, but can be considered as a safe haven.
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Sanctions Revlon Financial Makeover; Tips for Setting a Strong Foundation for Going Private Transaction Success

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On June 13, 2013, the SEC entered into a cease and desist order and imposed an $850,000 civil money penalty against Revlon, Inc. (Revlon) in connection with a 2009 “going private” transaction (the Revlon SEC Order).  This article identifies some of the significant challenges in executing a going private transaction and highlights particular aspects of the Revlon deal that can serve as a teaching lesson for planning and minimizing potential risks and delays in future going private transactions.

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Background of Revlon Going Private Transaction.

The controlling stockholder of Revlon, MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc. (M&F), made a proposal to the independent directors of Revlon in April of 2009 to acquire, by way of merger (the Merger Proposal), all of the Class A common stock not currently owned by M&F (the Revlon Minority Stockholders).  The Merger Proposal was submitted as a partial solution to address Revlon’s liquidity needs arising under an impending maturity of a $107 million senior subordinated term loan that was payable to M&F by a Revlon subsidiary.  A portion of this debt (equal to the liquidation value of the preferred stock issued in the Merger Proposal) would be contributed by M&F to Revlon, as part of the transaction.  This was submitted as an alternative in lieu of potentially cost-prohibitive and dilutive financing alternatives (or potentially unavailable financing alternatives) during the volatile credit market following the 2008 sub-prime mortgage crisis.

In response to the Merger Proposal, Revlon formed a special committee of the Board (the Special Committee) to evaluate the Merger Proposal.  The Special Committee retained a financial advisor and separate counsel to assist in its evaluation of the Merger Proposal.  Four lawsuits were filed in Delaware between April 24 and May 12 of 2009 challenging various aspects of the Merger Proposal.

On May 28, 2009, the Special Committee was informed by its financial advisor that it would be unable to render a fairness opinion on the Merger Proposal, and thereafter the Special Committee advised M&F that it could not recommend the Merger Proposal.  In early June of 2009, the Special Committee disbanded, but the independent directors subsequently were advised that M&F would make a voluntary exchange offer proposal to the full Revlon Board of Directors (the Exchange Offer). Revlon’s independent directors thereafter chose to continue to utilize counsel that served to advise the Special Committee, but they elected not to retain a financial advisor for assistance with the forthcoming M&F Exchange Offer proposal, because they were advised that the securities to be offered in the Exchange Offer would be substantially similar to those issuable through Merger Proposal.  As a result, they did not believe they could obtain a fairness opinion for the Exchange Offer consideration.  The Board of Directors of Revlon (without the interested directors participating in the vote) ultimately approved the Exchange Offer without receiving any fairness opinion with respect to the Exchange Offer.

On September 24, 2009, the final terms of the Exchange Offer were set and the offer was launched.  The Exchange Offer, having been extended several times, finally closed on October 8, 2009, with less than half of the shares tendered for exchange out of all Class A shares held by the Revlon Minority Stockholders.  On October 29, 2009, Revlon announced third quarter financial results that exceeded market expectations, but these results were allegedly consistent with the financial projections disclosed in the Exchange Offer.  Following these announced results, Revlon’s Class A stock price increased.  These developments led to the filing of additional litigation in Delaware Chancery Court.

The Revlon SEC Order and Associated Rule 13e-3 Considerations.

A subset of the Revlon Minority Stockholders consisted of participants in a Revlon 401(k) retirement plan, which was subject to obligations under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA) and a trust agreement (the Trust Agreement) between Revlon and the Plan’s trustee (the Trustee).  Provisions of ERISA and the Trust Agreement prohibited a 401(k) Plan participant’s sale of common stock to Revlon for less than “adequate consideration.”

During July of 2009, Revlon became actively involved with the Trustee to control the flow of information concerning any adequate consideration determination, to prevent such information from flowing back to Revlon and to prevent such information from flowing to 401(k) participants (and ultimately Revlon Minority Stockholders); certain amendments to the Trust Agreement were requested by Revlon and agreed to by the Trustee to effect these purposes.  This also had the additional effect of preventing the independent directors of Revlon from being aware that an adequate consideration opinion would be rendered for the benefit of Revlon’s 401(k) Plan participants.

On September 28, 2009, the financial advisor to the 401(k) Plan rendered an adverse opinion that the Exchange Offer did not provide adequate consideration to 401(k) Plan participants.  As a result, the Trustee informed 401(k) Plan participants, as previously directed by Revlon, that the 401(k) Plan Trustee could not honor tender instructions because it would result in a “non-exempt prohibited transaction under ERISA.”  Revlon Minority Stockholders, including 401(k) Plan participants, were generally unaware that an unfavorable adequate consideration opinion had been delivered to the Trustee.

In the Revlon SEC Order, the SEC concluded that Revlon engaged in a series of materially misleading disclosures in violation of Rule 13e-3.  Despite disclosure in the Exchange Offer that the Revlon Board had approved the Exchange Offer and related transactions based upon the “totality of information presented to and considered by its members” and that such approval was the product of a “full, fair and complete” process, the SEC found that the process, in fact, was not full, fair and complete.  The SEC particularly found that the Board’s process “was compromised because Revlon concealed from both minority shareholders and from its independent board members that it had engaged in a course of conduct to ‘ring-fence’ the adequate consideration determination.”  The SEC further found that “Revlon’s ‘ring-fencing’ deprived the Board (and in turn Revlon Minority Stockholders) of the opportunity to receive revised, qualified or supplemental disclosures including any that might have informed them of the third party financial advisor’s determination that the transaction consideration to be received by the 401(k) members . . . was inadequate.”

Significance of the Revlon SEC Order.

The Revlon Order underscores the significance of transparency and fairness being extended to all unaffiliated stockholders in a Rule 13e-3 transaction, including the 401(k) Plan participants whose shares represented only 0.6 percent of the Revlon Minority Stockholder holdings.  Importantly, the SEC took exception to the fact that Revlon actively prevented the flow of information regarding fairness and found that the information should have been provided for the benefit of these participants, as well as all Revlon Minority Stockholders.  This result ensued despite the fact that Revlon’s Exchange Offer disclosures noted in detail the Special Committee’s inability to obtain a fairness opinion for the Merger Proposal and the substantially similar financial terms of the preferred stock offered in both the Merger Proposal and the Exchange Offer transactions.

Going Private Transactions are Subject to Heightened Review by the SEC and Involve Significant Risk, Including Personal Risk.

Going private transactions are vulnerable to multiple challenges, including state law fiduciary duty claims and wide ranging securities law claims, including claims for private damages as well as SEC civil money penalties.  In the Revlon transaction, the SEC Staff conducted a full review of the going private transaction filings.  Despite the significant substantive changes in disclosure brought about through the SEC comment process, the SEC subsequently pursued an enforcement action and prevailed against Revlon for civil money penalties.

Although the SEC sanction was limited in scope to Revlon, it is worth noting that the SEC required each of Revlon, M&F and M&F’s controlling stockholder, Ronald Perelman, to acknowledge (i) personal responsibility for the adequacy and accuracy of disclosure in each filing; (ii) that Staff comments do not foreclose the SEC from taking action including enforcement action with regard to the filing; and (iii) that each may not assert staff comments as a defense in any proceeding initiated by the SEC or any other person under securities laws.  Thus, in planning a going private transaction, an issuer and each affiliate engaged in the transaction (each, a Filing Person) must make these acknowledgements, which expose each Filing Person (including certain affiliates who may be natural persons) to potential damages and sanctions.

The SEC also requires Filing Persons to demonstrate in excruciating detail the basis for their beliefs regarding the fairness of the transaction.  These inquiries typically focus on the process followed in pursuing and negotiating the transaction, the procedural fairness associated with such process, and the substantive fairness of the overall transaction, including financial fairness.  As a result of this, each Filing Person (including certain natural persons) in a going private transaction should be prepared to diligently satisfy cumbersome process and fairness requirements as part of the pre-filing period deliberative process, and later stand behind extensive and detailed disclosures that demonstrate and articulate the basis of the procedural and substantive fairness of the transaction, including financial fairness.

Damages and Penalties in Going Private Transactions Can Be Significant.

It is worth noting that civil money penalties and settlements that have been announced to date by Revlon for its Exchange Offer going private transaction is approximately $30 million.  After factoring in professional fees, it would not be surprising that the total post-closing costs, penalties and settlements approach 50 percent of the implied total transaction value of all securities offered in the Exchange Offer transaction.  From this experience, it is obvious that costs, damages and penalties can be a significant component of overall transaction consideration, and these risks must be factored in as part of overall transaction planning at the outset.

Given the risks of post-transaction damages and costs, it is essential that future going private transactions be structured and executed by Filing Persons with the foregoing considerations in mind in order to advance a transaction with full transparency, a demonstrably fair procedural process and deal consideration that is substantively fair and demonstrably supportable as fair from a financial point-of-view.

Yahoo!/Tumblr Deal and the Tax Cost of Cash Acquisition Payments

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When Yahoo! recently acquired the blogging service Tumblr, the two companies structured the deal so that virtually all of the $1.1 billion price tag for Tumblr will be paid in cash. In the current economy, many companies, particularly tech companies, have a lot of cash available, making the more traditional payment in stock appear less desirable. However, tax planning during mergers or acquisitions can be invaluable because, with proper counsel, the organizations can anticipate and mitigate the tax ramifications for the companies, individuals and shareholders.

Specific information about any tax planning in the Yahoo!/Tumblr deal hasn’t been released, but let’s consider the potential tax consequences of an essentially all-cash deal.

Most of Tumblr’s existing shareholders likely purchased their stock for substantially less than it was valued at the time of Yahoo’s acquisition. Since capital gains taxes are levied on the difference between the purchase price and the sale price, those Tumblr shareholders may be facing a hefty capital gains tax bill that will come due as soon as the transaction is complete.

If the deal had been structured as a stock transaction, on the other hand, it might have been structured to defer the capital gains tax for those shareholders until they actually sell their stock to Yahoo! There are a number of methods, such as 1031 exchanges, Section 368 tax-free reorganizations, and or 338(h)(10) stock purchase elections, that might also be effective in mitigating the tax burden.

An all-cash deal also presents challenges for Yahoo! in that it could affect the incentives for Tumblr’s founder and senior management going forward. In a tax-free reorganization, for example, they would generally be compensated in Yahoo! stock, which automatically creates an incentive for Tumblr’s leadership to build value for Yahoo! Without stock, a different incentive plan is needed.

According to The New York Times’ DealBook blog, Yahoo! may not need to worry about incentivizing Tumblr’s leadership, however, as it plans to continue to run the blog service as a separate company with the same group of executives. That may leave the existing incentives for success in place.

In this particular case, we don’t have enough information to determine why Yahoo! and Tumblr structured the acquisition as an all-cash deal. Well-considered tax planning, however, is essential for any business considering a merger or acquisition, stock sale, or major asset sale. Anticipating and minimizing transactional taxes, including business transfer taxes and business succession taxes, can help ensure that companies garner all potential benefits of the deal.

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NetSpend: Delaware Chancery Criticizes Single-Buyer Negotiating, Use of DADW & Revlon Process, But Denies Injunction

GT Law

In a nutshell, plaintiff’s motion to enjoin Total System Services’s $16 per share/$1.4 billion (cash) acquisition of Netspend Holdings was denied because the balance of the equities tipped in favor of the defendants (i.e., the court’s perceived risk to the target’s stockholders of a deal that might fail in the face of a MAC or breach when it was the only deal on the table) even though Vice Chancellor Glasscock concluded that it was reasonably likely that at trial the plaintiff would successfully establish that the Netspend board did not conduct a reasonable Revlon value maximizing process.

The key facts and observations in the case included, among others:

– A single-buyer negotiating strategy employed by the Netspend Board with no formal pre-sign check (although a go-shop was asked for several times in the negotiations and repeatedly rejected by the buyer, the repeated asks appear to have helped obtain the $16 per share price.

– An unaffected 45% premium without giving effect to an immediate pre-sign, positive earnings release by Netspend).

– Netspend had prior bad experience with collapsed sale processes and, therefore, it was queasy about undertaking another formal or elongated process.

– Netspend was not “for sale” and responded to Total System’s initial IOI and commenced discussions mainly because Netspend’s 31% stockholder and 16% stockholder wanted to exit an illiquid and volatile stock (Netspend was content to execute management’s stand-alone operating strategy absent a compelling price).

– Appraisal rights are available under DGCL 262; Vice Chancellor Glasscock questioned whether Netspend’s directors had a “reliable body of evidence” and “impeccable knowledge” of the company’s intrinsic value in the absence of a pre-sign market check and despite Netspend’s prior failed sale processes some years before.

– The fairness opinion obtained by the Netspend board was “weak” under all of the circumstances (putting more pressure on the directors’ understanding of the company’s intrinsic value).

– No interloper surfaced even after the transaction litigation delays (putting maximum pressure on plaintiff’s demand for an injunction); the deal protection package was pretty plain vanilla (the break up fee was in the “northern sector” of the range at 3.9% of total equity value, but certainly not preclusive or coercive; matching rights and other buyer protections were customary).

– A reasonable arms-length negotiating strategy was employed to obtain the $16 per share.

– Netspend’s CEO (who led the negotiations with appropriate Board participation and oversight) was not conflicted (in fact, he was found to be aligned with the non-affiliate stockholders in several respects).

– The nominees of Netspend’s 31% stockholder and 16% stockholder constituted a majority of the Netspend Board (but Vice Chancellor Glasscock found that their interests were aligned with the non-affiliate shareholders).

– Two private equity firms had conducted diligence and looked at buying a significant stake in the company from Netspend’s 31% stockholder and 16% stockholder at a materially lower price than Total System’s initial (and final) bid, but they never indicated a desire to buy 100% of Netspend.

– The support agreements entered into between Total Systems and each of the two large stockholders were coterminous with the merger agreement (but were not terminable upon the Netspend Board’s withdrawal of its declaration of advisability of the merger agreement).

In a noteworthy passage, Vice Chancellor Glasscock faulted the decision of the Netspend Board not to waive the “don’t ask-don’t waive” clauses in the confi-standstills with the two private equity firms at the time discussions commenced with Total Systems and, in the case of any post-sign unsolicited “superior offers” that might arise, he noted the ineffectual fiduciary out to the no-shop covenant in the merger agreement which required Netspend to enforce and not waive pre-existing standstills (thus, the private equity firms were precluded from lobbing in a post-sign jumping bid).

Vice Chancellor Glasscock refers to Vice Chancellor Laster’s In re Genomics decision and to Chancellor Strine’s decision in In re Ancestry pointing up, again, the Court’s sensitivity to, and the highly contextual nature of, DADW provisions in pre-sign confi-standstill agreements and perhaps further underscoring the distinction between using a DADW in a single-buyer negotiating strategy vis a via using one in a formal auction setting or where a full pre-sign market check is conducted.

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Top Five Traps for the Unwary in Spin-Offs

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A wave of corporate breakups has swept through the United States over the last few years as investors have taken notice of the fact that smaller companies focused on a single business tend to outperform their more diversified peers.  A primary vehicle for these breakups has been the spin-off transaction, in which a publicly traded parent company distributes the shares of the spin-off company (spinco) to its own shareholders, creating a new, independent publicly traded entity.  The New York Times, citing Dealogic, reported that there were 93 spin-off transactions worth $128 billion in 2011, and that 2012 kept pace with 85 spin-off transactions worth $109 billion.  The rationale for a spin-off often is to unlock the value in a business or division that is trapped in a larger corporate bureaucracy.  Conglomerates tend to spread capital across all of their divisions rather than focusing on the individual opportunities within each business that are the most promising.  Holding company structures also can make decision-making more cumbersome and equity incentives less incentivizing for division management who feel as though their hard work is being diluted by the underperformance of other divisions or businesses.

Spin-offs, however, are complicated transactions that require a great deal of advance planning.  In many cases, an announcement that a parent company is considering the spin-off of one of its businesses is actually the start of a “dual-track” process wherein the parent company considers and plans for a spin-off while also remaining open to potential bids from third parties to acquire the business.  In even more complicated cases, a parent company agrees to sell a business to an acquirer in connection with a spin-off transaction.

The vast majority of spin-off transactions are designed to qualify under the rules of the Internal Revenue Code as “tax free” to the parent company and the shareholders who receive the spinco stock.

With this in mind, any company considering spinning off a division or business should keep in mind the following five potential traps.

1.  Tax-Free Qualification – Legitimate Business Purpose 

The spin-off must satisfy a legitimate business purpose in order to qualify under both the tax-free rules of the Internal Revenue Code and the Securities Act of 1933.  The tax authorities require that the spin-off be motivated in whole or in substantial part by one or more legitimate corporate business purposes in order to ensure that the purpose of the transaction is not simply “tax avoidance.”  The business purpose requirement is one of many requirements under the tax laws to qualify for a tax-free spin-off.  Because the costs of triggering tax in a spin-off transaction often are very high, most parent companies obtain a legal opinion from outside counsel and obtain a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service as a condition to completing a spin-off transaction.  As discussed in relation to trap number five below, a legitimate business purpose for the spin-off also is required under the securities laws in order for the distribution of the spinco stock to not be treated as a “sale” of securities by the parent company or the spinco requiring Securities Act of 1933 registration and the strict liability standard of care that comes with such a registration.  See the article entitled, “Five Key Tax Considerations for Spin-Off Transactions” for a more in depth discussion of tax issues raised in spin-offs.

2.  Separation of Assets and Liabilities

Before a business or a division can be spun off, both its assets and its liabilities must be separated.  Large companies with long operating histories often find that the process of separating out the spinco business is not straightforward, because the legal entities that house the business might also house other businesses and divisions that share assets, services, products, employees, vendors and customers with the spinco business.  The pre-spin separation transactions should avoid triggering contractual defaults and remedies under commercial agreements, financing agreements, intellectual property licensing agreements, collective bargaining agreements, employment contracts, benefit plans, etc.  Often the spinco and the parent company or another legacy business must enter into complex sharing or licensing agreements or joint ventures relating to valuable intellectual property, such as trade names, trademarks or patents, as well as employee matters.  See the article entitled “Trademark, Domain Name and Other IP Considerations for Spin-Offs” for a more in depth discussion of IP issues raised in spin-offs and see the article entitled, “Employee Benefit Issues in a Spin-Off” for a more in depth discussion of employee benefit issues raised in spin-offs.

The sharing of liabilities is often the most complicated endeavour because of the slew of legal obligations that are triggered.  In allocating liabilities to the spinco, the parent company must evaluate the impact such allocation will have on the solvency of the parent and the spinco.  Parent company directors can face personal liability under state corporate law for making an unlawful dividend because the company lacked sufficient capital to make such a dividend or for rendering the parent company insolvent by distributing out the spinco business, and the parent company itself can face claims of constructive fraudulent conveyance—i.e., the parent company received less than equivalent value, and either the parent or spinco was rendered insolvent (assets do not exceed liabilities), the parent and/or spinco was left with unreasonably small capital to run its respective business, or the parent or spinco was left with debts that exceed its respective ability to pay those debts as they become due.  Parent company directors can rely on legal experts and financial advisors to assist them in satisfying their duty of care.  A solvency opinion from a nationally recognized provider of such opinions is often a condition to the consummation of a spin-off transaction.  Such an opinion may be helpful to the directors of the parent company and spinco for a variety of reasons: (i) it can help to show that the directors properly exercised their duty of care in determining to enter into the spin-off transaction; (ii) it can assist in rebutting a fraudulent conveyance claim; and (iii) it can assist in rebutting a claim that the company had insufficient capital to make such a dividend.

3.  Transition Services

While one of the key rationales for spinning off a business or division is to allow the enterprise to operate independently, the reality in most cases is that, at least during the first year or so post-spin, a spinco must rely on its former parent company to provide many key administrative and operational services during the spinco’s transition period to a self-sufficient, independent public company.  During the pre-spin planning period, companies should consider, among other things, which transition services will be required, how they will be provided, for how long and under what pricing terms.  Typical transition services include legal, internal auditing, logistics, procurement, quality assurance, distribution and marketing.  These arrangements often have durations that last between six and 24 months.  Many parent companies agree to provide such transition services purely on a cost basis, while others will use a “cost plus” or “market” rate.

4.  Spinco Management and Board of Directors

Again, while independence from the former parent company is a key benefit for most spincos, having corporate managers with institutional knowledge and history with the enterprise is an important factor in assisting the spinco to successfully transition to independence.  Many spinco management teams include members who have served as executives at the former parent company.  In many cases, these are managers who served as division leaders who reported to the parent company CEO or CFO and are now ready to step into executive roles on their own.  It is also common for between one and three members of the parent company board to agree to take seats on the spinco board to provide the new public company board with a source of the company’s history and culture to ensure a smooth transition.  However, because of the competing fiduciary duties that these directors will face if they hold seats on both the parent and spinco boards, it is important for the spinco board to also have a majority of truly independent directors.  Spinco directors who are former executive officers of the parent also must be aware that the stock exchanges and influential shareholder services firms such as Institutional Shareholder Services will not view them as being truly independent from a corporate governance standpoint for some time after the completion of the spin-off.  This will inhibit their ability to serve on key board committees of the spinco.

5.  Preparation of the Disclosure 

Under the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s rules, a spin-off of the shares of a subsidiary to a parent company’s shareholders does not involve the sale of securities by either the parent company or the subsidiary as long as the following conditions are met: (i) the parent company does not provide consideration for the spun-off shares; (ii) the spin-off is pro rata to the parent company shareholders; (iii) the parent company provides adequate information about the spin-off and the subsidiary to its shareholders and to the trading markets; and (iv) the parent has a valid business purpose for the spin-off.

To meet the adequate public information requirement, parent companies are required to prepare and disseminate detailed “information statements” that effectively look like initial public offering registration statements for the spinco.  These information statements are filed with the spinco’s Form 10 registration statement, which is required in order to register the spinco’s shares under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and to permit listing of such shares on a national securities exchange.  The preparation of the spinco information statement can take up to three or four months and requires a great deal of effort and cooperation among the lawyers, the business leaders, the finance department, the human resources/employee benefits department and the auditors.  In addition, under New York law, a spin-off of all or substantially all of a company’s assets may require a vote of such company’s shareholders, while under Delaware law, such a requirement is much less likely.

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Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans Under Scrutiny

The National Law Review recently published an article, Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans Under Scrutiny, written by the Financial, Corporate Governance and M&A Litigation Group of Barnes & Thornburg LLP:

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For more than a decade, corporate officers and directors of publicly traded companies have relied on trading plans, known as Rule 10b5-1 trading plans, in order to trade stock in their companies without running afoul of laws prohibiting corporate “insiders” from trading on material information not known to the general public. Historically, effective 10b5-1 plans have provided corporate insiders with an affirmative defense to allegations of unlawful insider trading.

Such plans typically involve a prior agreement between a corporate executive or board member and his or her broker. Under such agreements, the insider would provide standing trading instructions to the broker, requiring the broker to trade at a set stock price or a set time, for example. The broker would then effect the trade at the required price or time, regardless of the information held by the insider.

Recently, notwithstanding the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) longtime knowledge of potential abuses, such 10b5-1 plans have been under fire. In a Nov. 27, 2012, article in the Wall Street Journal titled “Executives’ Good Luck in Trading Own Stock,” the authors aired several complaints about such plans, including that “[c]ompanies and executives don’t have to file these trading plans with any federal agency. That means the plans aren’t readily available for regulators, investors or anyone else to examine. Moreover, once executives file such trading plans, they remain free to cancel or change them—and don’t have to disclose that they have done so. Finally, even when executives have such a preset plan, they are free to trade their companies’ stock at other times, outside of it.” The article went on to chronicle several purported abuses by officers and directors of such plans.

The current regulatory environment has simultaneously raised suspicions about plans and trades that are innocent, and potentially provided shelter for others that may be less so. In fact, in a Feb. 5, 2013, article in the Wall Street Journal entitled “SEC Expands Probe on Executive Trades,” the author noted that “[t]he Securities and Exchange Commission, expanding a high-profile investigation, is gathering data on a broad number of trades by corporate executives in shares of their own companies, according to people familiar with the probe.”

It would appear, from news like this, that the SEC is concerned that corporate insiders are adopting or amending 10b5-1 plans when in possession of non-public information that might affect market participants’ decision to trade in the company’s stock. Such changes could nullify the use of a 10b5-1 plan as a defense.

Seemingly in reaction to the perceived manipulation of 10b5-1 plans, the Council of Institutional Investors (CII) submitted a letter to the SEC on Dec. 28, 2012, requesting that the SEC implement rulemaking to impose new requirements with respect to Rule 10b5-1 trading plans. The CII letter calls for company boards of directors to become explicitly responsible for monitoring 10b5-1 plans, which undoubtedly will subject boards to increased scrutiny by the SEC. In addition, the CII letter proposes stricter regulatory rules including:

  • Adoption of 10b5-1 plans may occur only during a company open trading window
  • Prohibition of an insider having multiple, overlapping 10b5-1 plans
  • Mandatory delay of at least three months between 10b5-1 plan adoption and the first trade under the plan
  • Prohibition on frequent modifications/cancellations of 10b5-1 plan

The CII also advocates pre-announced disclosure of 10b5-1 plans and immediate disclosure of plan amendments and plan transactions. Under the CII’s suggested new rules, a corporate board also would be required to adopt policies covering 10b5-1 plan practices, monitor plan transactions, and ensure that such corporate policies discuss plan use in a variety of contexts. A similar set of suggestions can be found in Wayne State University professor Peter J. Henning’s Dec. 10, 2012, article, “The Fine Line Between Legal, and Illegal, Insider Trading,” found online at:  http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/the-fine-line-between-legal-and-illegal-insider-trading/.

Given the uncertainty in the market concerning the current use of Rule 10b5-1 plans and the future of such plans, companies or individuals who may be subject to Rule 10b5-1 plans and/or future regulations in this area should consult with counsel before adopting or amending such plans.

© 2013 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP