Category: Media

Bouncing Back with Justice Leah Ward Sears [PODCAST]

Former Georgia Supreme Court Chief Justice Leah Ward Sears had to overcome multiple systemic barriers including racism and misogyny, but a personal setback – divorce – is something that profoundly shaped her. In this episode of Bouncing Back, Justice Sears shares with Rebecca Glatzer how she came to terms with her divorce and to accept that she could not control—or fix—everything in her life.

With decades of experience as an attorney, a jurist and an elected official, Justice Leah Ward Sears, a Partner in the Litigation Section of Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, brings a powerful combination of strategy, analytical thinking and tactical action that gives her clients a compelling edge in complex litigation, appeal, and arbitration and mediation.

Recognized as one of Georgia’s leading legal luminaries and role models, Ms. Sears broke numerous barriers in her swift rise to the highest court in Georgia. When she was elected to the Superior Court of Fulton County, she became the first woman to ever serve on that court. Later she was appointed, and then elected, to serve as a Justice on the Supreme Court of Georgia — again, the first woman as well as the youngest jurist ever on that court.

She rose to Presiding Justice and in 2005 her colleagues elevated her to Chief Justice of the Georgia Supreme Court, where she served until retiring from the bench in 2009. During her tenure at the Georgia Supreme Court, Ms. Sears spearheaded an effort to establish the Georgia Office of Dispute Resolution, which is a policy-making body under the auspices of the Georgia Supreme Court that oversees the development of court-connected alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs in Georgia. She also chaired the Judicial Council of Georgia and was a member of the Board of Directors of the National Conference of Chief Justices.

Since returning to private practice, Ms. Sears has concentrated on prosecuting appeals in both the state and federal courts in many jurisdictions across the United States. This often means embedding with the trial team to develop and execute pretrial and trial strategy, build credible evidence, and begin positioning for an appeal while the trial is underway by preserving evidence and proactively looking for narrowly focused issues at trial that will help protect a hard-fought victory or overturn an unfavorable outcome.

Ms. Sears earned an advanced degree (LLM) in Appellate Judicial Studies from the University of Virginia Law School, and she completed a Juris Doctorate (JD) at Emory University School of Law. She also holds a Bachelor of Science degree from Cornell University.

©2022 Major, Lindsey & Africa, an Allegis Group Company. All rights reserved.
For more articles about legal leaders, visit the NLR Civil Rights type of law page.

New Poll Underscores Growing Support for National Data Privacy Legislation

Over half of all Americans would support a federal data privacy law, according to a recent poll from Politico and Morning Consult. The poll found that 56 percent of registered voters would either strongly or somewhat support a proposal to “make it illegal for social media companies to use personal data to recommend content via algorithms.” Democrats were most likely to support the proposal at 62 percent, compared to 54 percent of Republicans and 50 percent of Independents. Still, the numbers may show that bipartisan action is possible.

The poll is indicative of American’s increasing data privacy awareness and concerns. Colorado, Virginia, and California all passed or updated data privacy laws within the last year, and nearly every state is considering similar legislation. Additionally, Congress held several high-profile hearings last year soliciting testimony from several tech industry leaders and whistleblower Frances Haugen. In the private sector, Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg has come out in favor of a national data privacy standard similar to the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Politico and Morning Consult released the poll results days after Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) accepted a 24,000-signature petition calling for Congress to pass a federal data protection law. Senator Wyden, who recently introduced his own data privacy proposal called the “Mind Your Own Business Act,” said it was “past time” for Congress to act.

He may be right: U.S./EU data flows have been on borrowed time since 2020. The GDPR prohibits data flows from the EU to countries with inadequate data protection laws, including the United States. The U.S. Privacy Shield regulations allowed the United States to circumvent the rule, but an EU court invalidated the agreement in 2020, and data flows between the US and the EU have been in legal limbo ever since. Eventually, Congress and the EU will need to address the situation and a federal data protection law would be a long-term solution.

This post was authored by C. Blair Robinson, legal intern at Robinson+Cole. Blair is not yet admitted to practice law. Click here to read more about the Data Privacy and Cybersecurity practice at Robinson & Cole LLP.

For more data privacy and cybersecurity news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.

WEBSITE LAYOUT PASSES MUSTER: Court Enforces Cruise Line’s TCPA and Arbitration Disclosures Over Objection

Those of you who attended Lead Generation World heard me discuss the big trend from back in 2020 in which Courts were refusing to enforce online disclosures owing to perceived problems with website layout.

Things like “below the button” disclosures and distracting visual elements were often described as defeating a manifestation of assent to disclosure terms in that unfortunate line of cases.

Well, 2022 has brought a couple of cases that have determined website disclosures to be just fine. Yesterday I reported on a big win by Efinancial, and today we have a nice victory by a cruise ship company.

In Barney v. Grand Caribbean Cruises, Inc., CASE NO. 21-CV-61560-RAR, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8263 (S.D. Fl. January 17, 2022) the Defendant moved to enforce an arbitration provision on its website arguing that the Plaintiff had agreed to the terms and conditions by submitting a sweepstakes entry form.

Predictably, the Plaintiff argued that the disclosures were not enforceable because the website layout was insufficient–specifically that the font was too small and the terms excessively lengthy.

The Court was not impressed.

Noting that the disclosure was plainly readable and above the button–and it required a check box–the Court simply refused to heed the Plaintiff’s argument that he didn’t know he was agreeing to consent and arbitration. Here’s the analysis:

First, in terms of placement, the Website does not tuck away its statement regarding the Terms & Conditions in an obscure corner of the page where a user is unlikely to encounter it. Rather, the statement is located directly between the contact information fields and the “Submit Entry” button. The user is required to check the box indicating assent to the Terms & Conditions before any information is submitted. Id. ¶ 14. Thus, it is impossible that a user would miss seeing the statement regarding the Terms & Conditions or—at the very least—the checkbox indicating assent to them. Second, rather than merely informing the user that the Terms & Conditions exist, the statement directs the user to the precise location where the Terms & Conditions can be accessed—namely, at the “bottom of the page.” Finally, and most significantly, the user is required to check an acknowledgement box to accept the Terms & Conditions before any information is submitted through the Website—an affirmative act indicating [*14] assent. The checkbox accompanies the statement, which specifically includes language indicating that the user “agree[s] to the Privacy Policy and Terms & Conditions.” Thus, there is an explicit textual notice that checking the box will act as a manifestation of an intent to be bound. A reasonable user confronting a statement that “I consent to receive e-mail, SMS/Text messages, and calls about offers and deals from an automatic dialing system and/or pre-recorded voice technology” and “confirm that I am over age 25 [and] agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms & Conditions that are hyperlinked at the bottom of the page” would understand that he or she is assenting to the linked terms, including those pertaining to mandatory arbitration. And the record shows that Plaintiff indeed checked the box before clicking “Submit Entry.” Connolly Decl. ¶ 20. Plaintiff’s objections to the design of the Website hold no water. Plaintiff assails the statement regarding the Website’s Terms & Conditions as “lengthy” with “extremely small font that blends into the background.” Resp. at 9. But as seen in the screenshot of the Website on the day of Plaintiff’s visit, the statement’s text is clearly legible [*15] and not overly long. Indeed, it is roughly the same size and color as the text indicating the fields for “First Name,” “Last Name,” “Email,” and “Phone Number.” Plaintiff also objects to the placement of the link to the Terms & Conditions at the bottom of the page. Id. at 10. But, as discussed supra, that is precisely where the statement directed the user to view them.

As you can see the Court found the layout to be perfectly appropriate and was particularly moved by the presence of the opt in check box. Although many cases have recently enforced disclosures WITHOUT checkboxes, they do remain favored by the Courts.

I think Barney represents a case of a pretty clearly enforceable provision. The above-the-button text coupled with the radial button and the clear articulation of the terms being accepted made this an easy case for the court.

I will note that the TCPA consent is connected to the terms and conditions lingo–I don’t love that since the TCPA disclosure should be “separately signed”. But the agreement by the consumer that they are over 25 is a nice touch–helps to protect against claims that minors are supplying consent illegally.

© Copyright 2022 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
For more articles about TCPA litigation, visit the NLR Litigation section.

Court Rejects Netflix’s Challenge to Poaching Injunction

In the latest blow against Netflix’s aggressive recruiting practices, a California appellate court has affirmed a trial court’s injunction against Netflix and in favor of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation (“Fox”), thus permanently barring the streaming giant from poaching Fox executives by inducing them to breach their fixed-term employment contracts.

Netflix challenged the injunction, which was issued two years ago under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), on two grounds. Netflix argued that there are triable issues of fact as to whether: (1) Fox had suffered damages; and (2) Fox’s employment contracts were void as against public policy. The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments, finding that the extent of damages to Fox was not relevant to its UCL claim. The Court also rejected Netflix’s public policy arguments, noting that there is well-settled law that fixed-term contracts are beneficial to both employers and employees and that, in any event, the challenged contractual provisions can be severed, even if they are in any sense unenforceable or unlawful.

The Court of Appeal also rejected Netflix’s challenges to the trial court’s permanent injunction, which barred Netflix from soliciting employees who are subject to fixed-term employment contracts with Fox or inducing such employees to breach their fixed-term employment contracts. Specifically, the Court rejected the argument that the injunction was vague or overbroad because Netflix had failed to explain the basis for the objection at the summary judgment hearing, despite having been given ample opportunity to do so. The Court also rejected Netflix’s argument that the injunction resulted in specific performance of personal services contracts, pointing out that the injunction only applied to Netflix’s tortious conduct—and did not bind any current or former Fox executives.

This decision follows a similar ruling late last year, when a trial court ruled in favor of our client Viacom in its anti-poaching lawsuit against Netflix.

A holding the other way for Netflix could have upended the way California employers solicit and retain employees, especially in the entertainment industry, where fixed-term employment agreements are relatively commonplace. Although the recent Court of Appeal decision is unpublished, it presumably sends a strong message to those who would poach the employees of a competitor who are subject to fixed-term employment agreements.

Article By Anthony J Oncidi, Philippe A. Lebel, and Dixie M. Morrison of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2021 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Patch Up – Log4j and How to Avoid a Cybercrime Christmas

A vulnerability so dangerous that Cybersecurity and Infrastructure (CISA) Director Jen Easterly called it “one of the most serious [she’s] seen in [her] entire career, if not the most serious” arrived just in time for the holidays. On December 10, 2021, CISA and the director of cybersecurity at the National Security Agency (NSA) began alerting the public of a critical vulnerability within the Apache Log4j Java logging framework. Civilian government agencies have been instructed to mitigate against the vulnerability by Christmas Eve, and companies should follow suit.

The Log4j vulnerability allows threat actors to remotely execute code both on-premises and within cloud-based application servers, thereby obtaining control of the impacted servers. CISA expects the vulnerability to affect hundreds of millions of devices. This is a widespread critical vulnerability and companies should quickly assess whether, and to what extent, they or their service providers are using Log4j.

Immediate Recommendations

  • Immediately upgrade all versions of Apache Log4j to 2.15.0.
  • Ask your service providers whether their products or environment use Log4j, and if so, whether they have patched to the latest version. Helpfully, CISA sponsors a community-sourced GitHub repository with a list of software related to the vulnerability as a reference guide.
  • Confirm your security operations are monitoring internet-facing systems for indicators of compromise.
  • Review your incident response plan and ensure all response team information is up to date.
  • If your company is involved in an acquisition, discuss the security steps taken within the target company to address the Log4j vulnerability.

The versatility of this vulnerability has already attracted the attention of malicious nation-state actors. For example, government-affiliated cybercriminals in Iran and China have a “wish list” (no holiday pun intended) of entities that they are aggressively targeting with the Log4j vulnerability. Due to this malicious nation-state activity, if your company experiences a ransomware attack related to the Log4j vulnerability, it is particularly important to pay attention to potential sanctions-related issues.

Companies with additional questions about the Log4j vulnerability and its potential impact on technical threats and potential regulatory scrutiny or commercial liability are encouraged to contact counsel.

Article By Philip J. Bezanson, Brittney E. Justice, Claire E. Cahoon, and Seth D. DuCharme of Bracewell LLP

For more cybersecurity legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2021 Bracewell LLP

In the Coming ‘Metaverse’, There May Be Excitement but There Certainly Will Be Legal Issues

The concept of the “metaverse” has garnered much press coverage of late, addressing such topics as the new appetite for metaverse investment opportunities, a recent virtual land boom, or just the promise of it all, where “crypto, gaming and capitalism collide.”  The term “metaverse,” which comes from Neal Stephenson’s 1992 science fiction novel “Snow Crash,” is generally used to refer to the development of virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) technologies, featuring a mashup of massive multiplayer gaming, virtual worlds, virtual workspaces, and remote education to create a decentralized wonderland and collaborative space. The grand concept is that the metaverse will be the next iteration of the mobile internet and a major part of both digital and real life.

Don’t feel like going out tonight in the real world? Why not stay “in” and catch a show or meet people/avatars/smart bots in the metaverse?

As currently conceived, the metaverse, “Web 3.0,” would feature a synchronous environment giving users a seamless experience across different realms, even if such discrete areas of the virtual world are operated by different developers. It would boast its own economy where users and their avatars interact socially and use digital assets based in both virtual and actual reality, a place where commerce would presumably be heavily based in decentralized finance, DeFi. No single company or platform would operate the metaverse, but rather, it would be administered by many entities in a decentralized manner (presumably on some open source metaverse OS) and work across multiple computing platforms. At the outset, the metaverse would look like a virtual world featuring enhanced experiences interfaced via VR headsets, mobile devices, gaming consoles and haptic gear that makes you “feel” virtual things. Later, the contours of the metaverse would be shaped by user preferences, monetary opportunities and incremental innovations by developers building on what came before.

In short, the vision is that multiple companies, developers and creators will come together to create one metaverse (as opposed to proprietary, closed platforms) and have it evolve into an embodied mobile internet, one that is open and interoperable and would include many facets of life (i.e., work, social interactions, entertainment) in one hybrid space.

In order for the metaverse to become a reality, that is, successfully link current gaming and communications platforms with other new technologies into a massive new online destination – many obstacles will have to be overcome, even beyond the hardware, software and integration issues. The legal issues stand out, front and center. Indeed, the concept of the metaverse presents a law school final exam’s worth of legal questions to sort out.  Meanwhile, we are still trying to resolve the myriad of legal issues presented by “Web 2.0,” the Internet we know it today. Adding the metaverse to the picture will certainly make things even more complicated.

At the heart of it is the question of what legal underpinnings we need for the metaverse infrastructure – an infrastructure that will allow disparate developers and studios, e-commerce marketplaces, platforms and service providers to all coexist within one virtual world.  To make it even more interesting, it is envisioned to be an interoperable, seamless experience for shoppers, gamers, social media users or just curious internet-goers armed with wallets full of crypto to spend and virtual assets to flaunt.  Currently, we have some well-established web platforms that are closed digital communities and some emerging ones that are open, each with varying business models that will have to be adapted, in some way, to the metaverse. Simply put, the greater the immersive experience and features and interactions, the more complex the related legal issues will be.

Contemplating the metaverse, these are just a few of the legal issues that come to mind:

  • Personal Data, Privacy and Cybersecurity – Privacy and data security lawyers are already challenged with addressing the global concerns presented by varying international approaches to privacy and growing threats to data security. If the metaverse fulfills the hype and develops into a 3D web-based hub for our day-to-day lives, the volume of data that will be collected will be exponentially greater than the reams of data already collected, and the threats to that data will expand as well. Questions to consider will include:
    • Data and privacy – What’s collected? How sensitive is it? Who owns or controls it? The sharing of data will be the cornerstone of a seamless, interoperable environment where users and their digital personas and assets will be usable and tradeable across the different arenas of the metaverse.  How will the collection, sharing and use of such data be regulated?  What laws will govern the collection of data across the metaverse? The laws of a particular state?  Applicable federal privacy laws? The GDPR or other international regulations? Will there be a single overarching “privacy policy” governing the metaverse under a user and merchant agreement, or will there be varying policies depending on which realm of the metaverse you are in? Could some developers create a more “privacy-focused” experience or would the personal data of avatars necessarily flow freely in every realm? How will children’s privacy be handled and will there be “roped off,” adults-only spaces that require further authentication to enter? Will the concepts that we talk about today – “personal information” or “personally identifiable information” – carry over to a world where the scope of available information expands exponentially as activities are tracked across the metaverse?
    • Cybersecurity: How will cybersecurity be managed in the metaverse? What requirements will apply with respect to keeping data secure? How will regulation or site policies evolve to address deep fakes, avatar impersonation, trolling, stolen biometric data, digital wallet hacks and all of the other cyberthreats that we already face today and are likely to be exacerbated in the metaverse? What laws will apply and how will the various players collaborate in addressing this issue?
  • Technology Infrastructure: The metaverse will be a robust computing-intensive experience, highlighting the importance of strong contractual agreements concerning cloud computing, IoT, web hosting, and APIs, as well as software licenses and hardware agreements, and technology service agreements with developers, providers and platform operators involved in the metaverse stack. Performance commitments and service levels will take on heightened importance in light of the real-time interactions that users will expect. What is a meaningful remedy for a service level failure when the metaverse (or a part of the metaverse) freezes? A credit or other traditional remedy?  Lawyers and technologists will have to think creatively to find appropriate and practical approaches to this issue.  And while SaaS and other “as a service” arrangements will grow in importance, perhaps the entire process will spawn MaaS, or “Metaverse as a Service.”
  • Open Source – Open source, already ubiquitous, promises to play a huge role in metaverse development by allowing developers to improve on what has come before. Whether or not the obligations of common open source licenses will be triggered will depend on the technical details of implementation. It is also possible that new open source licenses will be created to contemplate development for the metaverse.
  • Quantum Computing – Quantum computing has dramatically increased the capabilities of computers and is likely to continue to do over the coming years. It will certainly be one of the technologies deployed to provide the computing speed to allow the metaverse to function. However, with the awesome power of quantum computing comes threats to certain legacy protections we use today. Passwords and traditional security protocols may be meaningless (requiring the development of post-quantum cryptography that is secure against both quantum and traditional computers). With raw, unchecked quantum computing power, the metaverse may be subject to manipulation and misuse. Regulation of quantum computing, as applied to the metaverse and elsewhere, may be needed.
  • Antitrust: Collaboration is a key to the success of the metaverse, as it is, by definition, a multi-tenant environment. Of course collaboration amongst competitors may invoke antitrust concerns. Also, to the extent that larger technology companies may be perceived as leveraging their position to assert unfair control in any virtual world, there may be additional concerns.
  • Intellectual Property Issues: A host of IP issues will certainly arise, including infringement, licensing (and breaches thereof), IP protection and anti-piracy efforts, patent issues, joint ownership concerns, safe harbors, potential formation of patent cross-licensing organizations (which also may invoke antitrust concerns), trademark and advertising issues, and entertaining new brand licensing opportunities. The scope of content and technology licenses will have to be delicately negotiated with forethought to the potential breadth of the metaverse (e.g., it’s easy to limit a licensee’s rights based on territory, for example, but what about for a virtual world with no borders or some borders that haven’t been drawn yet?). Rightsholders must also determine their particular tolerance level for unauthorized digital goods or creations. One can envision a need for a DMCA-like safe harbor and takedown process for the metaverse. Also, akin to the litigation that sprouted from the use of athletes’ or celebrities’ likenesses (and their tattoos) in videogames, it’s likely that IP issues and rights of publicity disputes will go way up as people’s virtual avatars take on commercial value in ways that their real human selves never did.
  • Content Moderation. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) has been the target of bipartisan criticism for several years now, yet it remains in effect despite its application in some distasteful ways. How will the CDA be applied to the metaverse, where the exchange of third party content is likely to be even more robust than what we see today on social media?  How will “bad actors” be treated, and what does an account termination look like in the metaverse? Much like the legal issues surrounding offensive content present on today’s social media platforms, and barring a change in the law, the same kinds of issues surrounding user-generated content will persist and the same defenses under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act will be raised.
  • Blockchain, DAOs, Smart Contract and Digital Assets: Since the metaverse is planned as a single forum with disparate operators and users, the use of a blockchain (or blockchains) would seem to be one solution to act as a trusted, immutable ledger of virtual goods, in-world currencies and identity authentication, particularly when interactions may be somewhat anonymous or between individuals who may or may not trust each other and in the absence of a centralized clearinghouse or administrator for transactions. The use of smart contracts may be pervasive in the metaverse.  Investors or developers may also decide that DAOs (decentralized autonomous organizations) can be useful to crowdsource and fund opportunities within that environment as well.  Overall, a decentralized metaverse with its own discrete economy would feature the creation, sale and holding of sovereign digital assets (and their free use, display and exchange using blockchain-based payment networks within the metaverse). This would presumably give NFTs a role beyond mere digital collectibles and investment opportunities as well as a role for other forms of digital currency (e.g., cryptocurrency, utility tokens, stablecoins, e-money, virtual “in game” money as found in some videogames, or a system of micropayments for virtual goods, services or experiences).  How else will our avatars be able to build a new virtual wardrobe for what is to come?

With this shift to blockchain-based economic structures comes the potential regulatory issues behind digital currencies. How will securities laws view digital assets that retain and form value in the metaverse?  Also, as in life today, visitors to the metaverse must be wary of digital currency schemes and meme coin scams, with regulators not too far behind policing the fraudsters and unlawful actors that will seek opportunities in the metaverse. While regulators and lawmakers are struggling to keep up with the current crop of issues, and despite any progress they may make in that regard, many open issues will remain and new issues will be of concern as digital tokens and currency (and the contracts underlying them) take on new relevance in a virtual world.

Big ideas are always exciting. Watching the metaverse come together is no different, particularly as it all is happening alongside additional innovations surrounding the web, blockchain and cryptocurrency (and, more than likely, updated laws and regulations). However, it’s still early. And we’ll have to see if the current vision of the metaverse will translate into long-term, concrete commercial and civic-minded opportunities for businesses, service providers, developers and individual artists and creators.  Ultimately, these parties will need to sort through many legal issues, both novel and commonplace, before creating and participating in a new virtual world concept that goes beyond the massive multi-user videogame platforms and virtual worlds we have today.

Article By Jeffrey D. Neuburger of Proskauer Rose LLP. Co-authored by  Jonathan Mollod.

For more legal news regarding data privacy and cybersecurity, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2021 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Multi-Level Marketing Gets Multi-Level Attention

Multi-level marketing has touched us all – whether it be purchasing beauty products, essential oils, or health supplements from a friend through social media, or receiving an invitation to join a team of seemingly successful people working their “side hustle.”  But multi-level marketing is now getting some additional multi-level attention, both in the media and in the court room.

With interest in documentaries on the rise throughout the pandemic, Amazon recently delivered with its four-part docu-series “LuLaRich.”  It follows the multi-level marketing company, LuLaRoe, which is known for its colorfully patterned clothing, messages of empowering women, and nearly $2 billion in purported sales in a single year.  But the docu-series also offers a glimpse at the dividing line between a multi-level marketing platform and a pyramid scheme, with the latter running afoul of the law.

Throughout its short existence, LuLaRoe has been no stranger to litigation.  Several class actions have been filed against it, including one with allegations that LuLaRoe’s leggings ripped as easily as wet toilet paper.  But most notable is a recent class action that was certified just last month by a Federal Court in Alaska. See, e.g., Katie Van et al. v. LLR Inc. dba LuLaRoe et al., No. 3:18-cv-00197, in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska.  The claims in Van allege that LuLaRoe charged sales tax on purchases to customers located in tax-free jurisdictions.  This was, allegedly, the result of a customized point-of-sale system that did not allow sales tax to be assessed based on the location to where the “retailer” (sales person) shipped the merchandise.  LuLaRoe addressed this by creating a “toggle switch” that allowed retailers to “turn off” the automatic tax charges and charge a different amount, including 0%.  However, some retailers used the toggle switch to override the collection of sales taxes on taxable transactions while others did not use the toggle switch to override sales taxes on transactions that were not taxable.  When LuLaRoe became aware of this, it allegedly disabled the toggle switch and asked retailers to leave the system’s sales tax box “checked,” while LuLaRoe developed a system that would compute and collect sales tax based on the address where the product was purchased and received.  The outcome: consumers in jurisdictions without sales tax (or no sales tax on clothing) were improperly billed for sales tax on their purchases, based on the taxes imposed by the retailer’s location, rather than the consumer’s location.  The certified class claim alleges LuLaRoe engaged in an unfair trade practice with the imposition of this non-existent sales tax.  And, while attempts at similar class actions against LuLaRoe have been made in the past, this class, with more than 10,000 potential class members, has now been certified.

With so many sales happening through social media controlled by individual retailers, multi-level marketing entities must address unique challenges, including the calculation and imposition of sales tax, especially when customers are located in different states (or even different countries) than their sales person, as was the case in Van.  Having the requisite resources – whether that be through staffing or usable technology and software – can be challenging when trying to keep up with the quick growth that often comes with multi-level marketing.  Additionally, a multi-level marketing entity’s approach to organizational structure, recruiting, compensation, and manufacturing warrants detailed attention and familiarity with state and federal law.

LuLaRoe’s story, while colorful and seemingly worthy of a hit docu-series, highlights the need to carefully navigate legal issues when operating or becoming involved with a multi-level marketing entity.  The potential for legal snags may be hidden in the seams.  And it’s never worth becoming too big for your (brightly patterned) britches when it comes to the law.

Copyright © 2021, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.
For more class actions, visit the NLR Litigation section.

Privacy Tip #219 – FBI Considers FaceApp a Counterintelligence Threat

For those of you who have downloaded the face editing app FaceApp, please note that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has classified FaceApp as a counterintelligence threat because of its Russian origins.

According to the FBI, “[T]he FBI considers any mobile application or similar product developed in Russia, such as FaceApp, to be a potential counterintelligence threat, based on the data the product collects, its privacy and terms of use policies, and the legal mechanisms available to the Government of Russia that permit access to data within Russia’s borders.”

When the FBI considers an app a security threat to the U.S., we all should. Downloading apps, in general, is risky, but downloading apps based in foreign countries that are trying to obtain information about U.S. citizens – and in fact are obtaining information from unwitting U.S. citizens – is potentially putting us in danger.

Now is the time to perform app hygiene. Check the apps on your phone to determine whether you are using them or not. If you aren’t using them, delete them. There is no reason to continue to allow them to collect your information if you are not using them and getting a benefit from them. If you are using them and can’t live without them, do some due diligence to determine the background of the app, read the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use to know what they are collecting and using about you, and delete the app if your gut tells you something’s not right. If you have downloaded FaceApp, that would be the first one to delete.

Copyright © 2019 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.

New York Times v. Sullivan Supreme Court Decision and its Impact on Libel Law: the Case, the Context and the Consequences

Aimee Edmondson, Ph.D. and Associate Professor and Director for Graduate Studies at Ohio University, has recently published a new book, In Sullivan’s Shadow on the landmark libel US Supreme Court case New York Times v. Sullivan. In the current contentious climate where even the weather has become a political topic, and with President Trump courting a combative relationship with the news media, this case from the Civil Rights Era (1964) has a new resonance. It seems appropriate to re-examine the case, the historical context surrounding it, and why it still matters today.

The following are the facts of this case. In the early ’60s, the New York Times (NYT) published a full-page advertisement by the supporters of Martin Luther King, Jr, criticizing the Montgomery Alabama police, and specifically L.B. Sullivan, the Montgomery Police commissioner, for the department’s mistreatment of Civil Rights protesters. Sullivan sued the paper for defamation, and the trial court ruled in his favor. The NYT appealed to the Supreme Court in Alabama, which affirmed, and then the NYT appealed to the U.S Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court heard the case and returned a unanimous decision 9-0, that the underlying decisions violated the First Amendment. This 1964 Supreme Court landmark decision is foundational in support of the First Amendment’s right of freedom of the press and ultimately demonstrates that the freedom of speech protections in the First Amendment restrict the ability of public officials to sue for defamation. This decision also created the “actual malice” standard, which required that the publication of false or erroneous information had to be done with actual intent to harm the public figure.

Libel litigation has really kicked up in recent years. While the “actual malice” standard is still firmly in place, a few high-profile libel actions have pressed forward. A few examples are the following: Sarah Palin suing the NYT; the Covington Catholic students, specifically Nicholas Sandmann and his ultimately dismissed lawsuit against the Washington Post (WP); and former Sheriff Joseph Arpaio’s lawsuit against the NYT and editorial writer Michelle Cottle which was also dismissed. Additionally, Trump frequently uses his Twitter feed to proclaim that libel suits “are out of reach” but continues to threaten libel action when unflattering press is published. To be clear, his threats have remained threats; to this date, he has not filed lawsuits regarding libel.

With this history and cultural context in mind, I am very grateful that Professor Edmondson took the time to speak with me regarding the state of libel litigation in the United States.

The NLR: The Sullivan case dates back to the ’60s and came out of the Civil Rights Movement when the NYT was sued by the Montgomery, Alabama police commissioner, L.B. Sullivan. Why is this precedent especially relevant now?

Sullivan is relevant for at least these three reasons.

First, journalism faces tough challenges. Local print journalism is withering. The president of the United States has launched an assault on news media. And manipulators, some of them foreign, are abusing technology with fakery and confusion. As the free press struggles, our Republic is well served by existing protection again libel abuse.

Second, we as a nation go to great lengths to protect free speech, even unpopular and hateful expression. The Supreme Court recently ruled that the government could not deny vulgar trademarks citing the First Amendment (Iancu v. Brunetti, decided June 24, 2019). Citizens who chant “send her back” at a Trump rally are protected. Journalists who cover controversy likewise should be protected from libel abuse.

When the nation’s Founders gathered to amend the Constitution through the Bill of Rights, they positioned freedom of speech and the free press side-by-side, as complementary. As we protect free speech, we also should protect the free press.

Third, the abuse of libel is an instinctive default position of authority facing criticism. When authority is irritated by the message, it can seek ways to injure or chill the messenger. America should guard against abuse of libel. Justice William Brennan wrote in the 1964 landmark Sullivan case that, left unchecked, abuse of libel can “threaten the very existence of an American press virile enough to publish unpopular views on public affairs and bold enough to criticize the conduct of public officials.”

In this era of divided citizenry, profound technological changes, and nervousness about the future, Sullivan is perhaps more relevant because it checks the misuse of libel.

The NLR:  Based on your research of libel prior to Sullivan, what can you tell us about the use and abuse of libel before Sullivan?

In the Jim Crow South, libel was weaponized against the press and individuals who challenged the racial status quo. The Sullivan case was the culmination of an onslaught of libel claims designed to brake progress, silence criticism, and bankrupt agents of change as the civil rights movement was gaining momentum.

The intersection of libel, race, and journalism can be tracked to the early years of our nation. In 1830, abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison was indicted in Baltimore for publishing a newspaper report of 75 enslaved people shipped from Baltimore to New Orleans. He was locked up for 49 days in part for criticizing the institution of slavery. Garrison’s lawyer, Charles Mitchell of Baltimore, described libel abuse as an “engine of tyranny.”

My book primarily focuses on civil rights-era libel litigation, mainly, but not exclusively, in the South. Chapter One is set in Los Angeles. The local Klan sued the African American editor-publisher of the California Eagle in 1925 after the newspaper published a Klan strategy memo on how to manipulate black voters in Watts. The judge ruled in favor of the paper, concluding that the Klan document, which had been handed over to police and then to journalists, was privileged. (In court, the Klan said the paper was fake.)

The win-loss record of libel cases was mixed before Sullivan was taken up by the nation’s high court. Defendants settled some cases to avoid expense and exposure. Some judges ruled that truth was a defense against libel claims.

Regardless of the legal outcomes, the pile-on of libel lawsuits against the press and civil rights leaders was draining financially. For example, Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth was a named defendant in the Sullivan case, even though he didn’t know that his name appeared in the full-page ad in NYT that prompted Sullivan’s lawsuit. Alabama courts awarded Commissioner Sullivan $500,000, a record-high judgment at the time. While the case was on appeal, authorities seized Reverend Shuttlesworth’s Plymouth, which brought $400 at auction to help pay the judgment. Land owned by three other ministers who also were defendants was sold at auction for $4,350.

By the time the U.S. Supreme Court heard the Sullivan case, there was plenty of evidence in multiple jurisdictions showing that libel abuse was weighing on the First Amendment.

The NLR: After the Sullivan ruling in 1964, the press went on to break some fairly fantastic stories. I am thinking about Watergate, in the early ’70s, specifically. What were the implications of Sullivan regarding press coverage of civil rights, Vietnam, Watergate, and other contentious news?

Yes. My colleague Christopher B. Daly at Boston University (author of “Covering America”) makes the profound point that Americans need a free and robust press in wartime and peacetime. He cites coverage of the Pentagon Papers, the My Lai Massacre, and the Abu Ghraib torture scandal.

I close my book by pointing out that Sullivan freed the press to ramp up its watchdog reporting on a wide range of issues. The press’ scrutiny must continue as a cornerstone of our democratic tradition.

Balancing police authority/public safety with respect for individual freedoms and free expression was at the core of much of the libel litigation before and after Sullivan. The Sullivan case at its heart was about criticism of police brutality against civil rights protesters in Montgomery, Alabama, which was a cradle of the Confederacy during the Civil War. As a result of Sullivan, today’s public criticism of law enforcement, such as press coverage of  “Hands up, don’t shoot,” and “I can’t breathe” are not actionable libel claims.

The NLR: Earlier this year, Justice Clarence Thomas suggested that the Supreme Court should take a look at Sullivan, after 55 years, to modify the standard on actual malice. The rest of the Court did not voice similar sentiments. What point is Justice Thomas making/what is on his mind, and do you think the Court will revisit libel anytime soon?

Justice Thomas often treads his own path in the area of First Amendment law. He is a noted defender of advertising (commercial speech), questioning why it should be more heavily regulated than other types of speech, even political speech. He has questioned laws that regulate political contributions, and strongly supported less government regulation of street and lawn signs. However, he has opposed free speech protections for high school students and prisoners.

I see Sullivan as a civil rights case as well as a libel case. How ironic that Justice Thomas, the only African-American on the Supreme Court, is calling for a retreat on civil rights-era protections in Sullivan. He made this remark in a concurring opinion released early this year when the court turned down an appeal from Kathrine McKee, who accused Bill Cosby of sexual assault. She sued Cosby for libel after his lawyers called her dishonest (McKee v. Cosby). As Justice Thomas says:

New York Times and the Court’s decisions extending it were policy-driven decisions masquerading as constitutional law. Instead of simply applying the First Amendment as it was understood by the people who ratified it, the Court fashioned its own “‘federal rule[s]’” by balancing the “competing values at stake in defamation suits.” (quoting Gertz v. Welch and Sullivan). We should not continue to reflexively apply this policy-driven approach to the Constitution. Instead, we should carefully examine the original meaning of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. If the Constitution does not require public figures to satisfy an actual-malice standard in state-law defamation suits, then neither should we.

As you noted in your question, Thomas’ colleagues on the Supreme Court have not publicly joined his push to roll back Sullivan. I do not expect that Court will revisit Sullivan immediately. But predicting what the Court will do is virtually impossible. Sometimes, the seeds planted by a single justice, like Thomas’ remarks about Sullivan, yield results later.

Generally, critics say Sullivan stacks the deck against the plaintiff, that actual malice is an impossible standard, and the press should not have license to run amuck.

The NLR: Sullivan set the standard pretty high for public officials seeking to win libel claims, they have to show “actual malice.” Does this, and other existing protections of the press, make it virtually impossible to win a libel claim?

Journalists are not totally protected from libel suits, nor should they be. Truth is the ultimate defense in a libel suit. If reporters get it wrong, certainly there can be ramifications.

If reporters get it wrong and the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, the reporters may lose a libel case if actual malice is proven in court. Actual malice is publishing content that is knowingly wrong, or journalists should have known it was incorrect.

After a 15-day trial, a jury in New York awarded $75,000 in damages to Barry Goldwater, the Republican nominee for president in 1964 (Goldwater v. Ginzburg). A federal appeals court affirmed the outcome in 1969, and the Supreme Court declined to review the case. Ralph Ginzburg, publisher of Fact magazine, ran an article that said Goldwater was paranoid, unfit for office, and troubled by “intense anxiety about his manhood.” This unflattering claim was based on a survey mailed to psychiatrists. Some of the respondents had warned that psychological evaluations must take place in clinical settings, but Ginzburg published anyway. He cited the Sullivan case when Goldwater took him to court, to no avail.

Rolling Stone settled multiple libel claims after retracting its 2014 story of gang rape at a University of Virginia fraternity. The flawed 9,000-word article portrayed an associate dean as “chief villain” of the incident. She won a $3 million verdict in court and then settled. Rolling Stone settled with the fraternity for $1.65 million, and also settled with members of the fraternity.

In June, a jury in Ohio awarded $44.4 million in punitive and compensatory damages to family-owned Gibson’s Bakery to be paid by Oberlin College (Gibson’s Bakery v. Oberlin College). Bakery owners said the college defamed and harmed their business after a shoplifting incident. “Even a college as influential as Oberlin,” noted conservative blogger Cornell Law Professor William Jacobson, “may be held accountable for its actions in a court of law.”

The NLR: What has candidate Donald Trump/President Trump said about libel?

In 2016 in Fort Worth, Texas, then-candidate Trump took aim at libel laws directly: “One of the things I’m going to do if I win, and I hope we do and we’re certainly leading. I’m going to open up our libel laws so when they write purposely negative and horrible and false articles, we can sue them and win lots of money. We’re going to open up those libel laws. So when The New York Times and Washington Post . . . writes a hit piece, we can sue them and win money instead of having no chance of winning because they are totally protected.”

President Trump lamented in 2018 that “totally false” reports are out of reach of libel law:

Trump Tweet

Trump has threatened libel action against both the media and individuals. For example, candidate Trump threatened to sue NYT in 2016 after NYT’S publication containing claims by women of his alleged inappropriate touching. In response, a NYT attorney said if Trump thinks “the law of this land forces us and those who would dare to criticize him to stand silent or be punished, we welcome the opportunity to have a court set him straight.”

Trump did not sue.

Threatening libel action is part of Trump’s broader effort, aimed at his voter base and the electorate, to de-legitimize the press.

The NLR: Defamation-libel litigation is very active lately. What are today’s courts saying about libel?

Legal outcomes vary because circumstances vary. There is significant activity on libel, in state and federal courts, showcasing the durability of the legal standard set more than a half-century ago in Sullivan.

The Sullivan standard resonates throughout the 11-page opinion dismissing former Sheriff Joseph Arpaio’s lawsuit against NYT and editorial writer Michelle Cottle. “Because plaintiff has failed to plead actual malice, his false light claim must fail as well,” wrote US District Court Judge Amit P. Mehta (District of Columbia) in a decision issued August 9, 2019. Arpaio was longtime sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona, before running for Congress in 2018. After Arpaio lost in the primary, NYT published an opinion piece by Cottle criticizing the sheriff’s treatment of immigrants (“he was so much more than a run-of-the-mill immigrant basher”). Arpaio, a public figure, claimed the column harmed his reputation and his chances to run for the U.S. Senate in 2020. The judge said Arpaio’s complaint “comes nowhere close to pleading sufficient facts that plausible establish ‘actual malice.’” (Arpaio v Cottle, August 9, 2019). This case is remarkably similar to the multiple libel suits filed by legendary southern lawman Lawrence Rainey, a former Neshoba County, Mississippi sheriff who sued multiple journalists and even Orion Pictures for his depiction in the film, Mississippi Burning, in 1989.

Current libel claims highlight the inflation in the amount of damages sought by plaintiffs. In the early 1960s, Sullivan (as well as then Alabama Governor John Patterson) sued NYT for $500,000. In 1982, General William Westmoreland sued CBS for $120 million regarding a Vietnam documentary (Westmoreland settled during the trial, ending the case without payment, retraction, or apology from CBS).

This year, a high school student from Kentucky sued WP for $250 million, the purchase price of the newspaper when Amazon founder Jeff Bezos bought it in 2013. On July 26, U.S. District Court Judge William O. Bertelsman (Eastern District of Kentucky) dismissed the case (Nicholas Sandmann v. The Washington Post). Publication of opinion is not actionable libel, the judge concluded. This case involved coverage of Sandmann’s encounter with Native American activist Nathan Phillips on the National Mall on January 19, 2019.

“The Court accepts Sandmann’s statement that, when he was standing motionless in the confrontation with Phillips, his intent was to calm the situation and to not impede or block anyone”, the judge said. “However, Phillips did not see it that way. He concluded that he was being ‘blocked’ and not allowed to ‘retreat.’ He passed these conclusions on to The Post. They may have been erroneous, but . . . they are opinion protected by the First Amendment. The Post is not liable for publishing these opinions.”

Days after the Sandmann case was dismissed in federal court, eight of Sandmann’s classmates (“John Does 1 through 8”) from Covington Catholic High School in Park Hills, Kentucky, filed a defamation suit in state court against 12 individuals. Defendants include two members of Congress, comic Kathy Griffin, and a batch of commentators and journalists.

Also, in August, a federal appeals court reinstated Sarah Palin’s defamation suit against NYT. Therefore, a court will consider whether a NYT editorial on gun violence exhibited “actual malice” against Palin, a former vice presidential candidate.

The NLR: You’ve raised some excellent points. How does all of this fit together?  What are we to make of this landscape in today’s contentious and media-saturated environment?

Truth-seeking is a primary mission of journalism. News reporting inspires debate. Reporting controversy does not constitute libel. Publication of malicious, reckless, falsehood is actionable libel.

Newsgathering is an ongoing process, as events evolve. Courts appear to understand this dynamic, with the media’s constant deadlines, and do not view updating as a story evolves as actual malice. It’s quite the opposite. We write what we know to be the truth as we know it.

It’s important to note that Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Sullivan protected even false information, as long as that information was published by accident (without actual malice). Later libel cases built on Sullivan with the U.S. Supreme Court declaring that “pure opinion” is also constitutionally protected speech (Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Company). The First Amendment, then, ensures that free speech isn’t “chilled” and thus clears the way for journalists to write about fast-moving and-or controversial issues without fear of costly libel litigation.

As we ponder the big picture, let’s remember Justice Louis Brandeis’ time-honored advice: “the answer to bad speech is more speech, not ‘enforced silence.’”

The NLR: Many thanks to Dr. Edmondson for her insights and useful examples on this important and timely matter.

Copyright ©2019 National Law Forum, LLC

For more freedom of speech issues, see the Constitutional Law page on the National Law Review.

How Harmful do Gender Stereotypes Need to be?

Ads Banned in UK Following New Rule

As we reported earlier this year, a new rule dealing with the depiction of harmful gender stereotypes, was introduced into the BCAP and CAP Codes as of June 2019.

The first decisions under the new rules have been released and we have seen two separate ads by Volkswagen and Philadelphia banned by the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) under the new rule.

Volkswagen’s advert for its eGolf electric car, with the slogan “when we learn to adapt, we can achieve anything” features a man and a woman camping on a sheer cliff face, two male astronauts floating in space, a male athlete with a prosthetic limb, and a woman sitting next to a pram.

Separately, the Philadephia ad by Mondalez depicts fathers being distracted by the cheese spread long enough for their babies to end up on a conveyor belt of Philadelphia, resulting in an embarrassed dad saying “let’s not tell mum”.

Both ads received a number of complaints from the public on the basis that they were contrary to the new rule, which aims to ban harmful gender stereotypes in ads which can

“contribute to inequality in society” and “can, over time, play a part in limiting people’s potential.”

Whilst Volkswagen argued that caring for a new born child was a life-changing experience about adaption, regardless of the gender of the parent depicted, and that a female was also engaged in the adventurous activity of camping on the mountain, the ASA ruled that “unlike her male counterpart, the female rock climber was passive, because she was asleep” and that the woman with the pram was depicted in a stereotypical care-giving role.

Mondalez told ASA that it was in a “no-win situation” having deliberately chosen two dads to avoid depicting the stereotypical image of women handling the childcare responsibilities. However the ASA banned the ad on the basis that it reinforced the stereotype that males are ineffective in care-giving roles.

Critics have said that the watchdog has gone too far and in a statement posted on the website for ISBA, the body representing the UK’s leading advertisers, Phil Smith (director-general and a member of a working group that helped develop the new rules) said the bans are “concerning, both in terms of the precedent they set and the likely impact they will have on advertisers.”

Smith further commented

“In our view, the two decisions go beyond the intent of the new rule and guidance and will likely create confusion for advertisers and the broader co-regulatory system as they seek to address the harmful gender stereotypes and outdated portrayals this rule was designed to tackle.”

The effectiveness of the new rule will be reviewed by CAP in June 2020, to determine whether it is suitable in helping the ASA meet the rule’s objective. It will be interesting to see how the ASA applies the rule in future decisions.

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

ARTICLE BY Carlton Daniel and Katie Rodgers of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP.
For more on advertising regulation, see the National Law Review Communications, Media & Internet law page.