eDiscovery & Social Media

The National Law Review’s featured guest blogger last week was Meredith L. Williams of  Baker Donelson provides some great insight on discovery issues related to social media sites: 

Social media is not going anywhere, so we must learn to live with it and use it to our advantage and within the confines of the newly articulated and always changing rules.  If ever a doubt, one can look to the Nielson Report (“What Americans Do Online: Social Media and Games Dominate Activity,” Aug. 2, 2010) that states two-thirds of the internet population utilize social media sites.  Internet users now spend more than 10% of their online time on social media sites, and usage is constantly increasing.  With this rise in social media usage, the issues surrounding ediscovery in the realm of social media data is an important consideration of litigation.

The definition of legal discovery is locating all documents that are relevant to support the litigation.  But how does ediscovery work when the content is not owned or controlled by the business? How does a business preserve data that is outside of its firewall? Finally, how does one seek relevant information held on social media sites?

Social media sites are not like email or word processing documents when it comes to preservation. These sites are operated outside of a business’s firewall by a third party. Data is normally scattered on many sites and connected by many people or custodians.  Finally, the retention policy or schedule of a business does not affect data located on social media sites.   When a business maintains social media pages, it has a duty to preserve the data that may be relevant in anticipated or actual litigation.

Seeking information from social media sites can be difficult at best.  Many times discovery of this data must be gained through consent or authorization of a third party, which only causes an extra, and often expensive, burden.  Each third party is different in how it maintains the data, and each has the right to delete any content for violation of its terms of use policy, at any time. That deleted information could be relevant to litigation.

Unfortunately for businesses, the courts are only beginning to outline the duty of preservation and the right to discover the information from social media sites.  The best line of defense for many businesses is to develop internal policies and training programs to educate all employees of the risks of using social media.  In addition, new software now exists that can aid in preserving data.

Duty to Preserve

The 2006 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure amendments changed the discovery rules to allow a party to request “electronically stored information” within the “possession, custody, or control” of the responding party.  A duty to preserve potentially relevant evidence exists when litigation is “reasonably anticipated.”  In addition, parties who fail to preserve electronically stored information (ESI) are subject to penalties. Social media data fits the definition of ESI; thus, businesses must deal with the issue of preserving and possibly producing social media data that falls under their data retention policy.

Due to the fact that social media sites are owned and controlled by third parties, vendors are beginning to develop technology to capture dynamic web pages for preservation.  The first few companies in this market include Iterasi, Smarsh, Arkovi and LiveOffice.  Additionally, Adobe may be used to capture web images in static format.  These are but a few examples of new technologies that businesses are considering to meet their duty to preserve and produce ESI.

Recent Case Law

Additional issues remain – whether the information on social media sites is considered private, whether it is discoverable and whether it is admissible as evidence.  Recent case law has addressed these as yet unanswered issues.

In Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001), the court held that there is a lack of expectation of privacy regarding public postings on social media sites.  The user has the right to select privacy preferences on his social media sites.  Certain settings allow the public to see limited information and authorized, connected individuals to have greater access. In addition, many social media site privacy policies specifically state that certain postings are subject to a weakened privacy expectation.  Courts have generally held that when a user makes information available publically via their privacy settings, there is a lower expectation of privacy and, therefore, the information is discoverable.

Jumping ahead to the current year, we find EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, No. 1:09-cv-1223-WTL-DML (S.D. Ind. May 11, 2010).  In this case, the court compelled production of relevant content from social media sites.  The court discussed discovery of social media site data as simply “requir[ing] the application of basic discovery principles in a novel context.”  The facts of Simply Storage Mgmt, involved the defendant seeking production of social media site profiles and communications from Facebook and MySpace.  The court ordered the plaintiff to produce the content that was relevant to the case.  The plaintiff argued that requiring such production would infringe on his privacy.  However, the court held that the expectation of privacy is not a basis for shielding discovery.  In addition, the court found that any privacy concern therein was lessened due to the fact the information had already been shared.

Earlier this year, Crispin v. Audigier (C.D. Cal.) (May 26, 2010), brought us a new ruling regarding social media and the Stored Communications Act (SCA).  In this case, the court was reluctant to allow discovery of private social media email communications.   The case involved a copyright infringement claim.  Audigier subpoenas the private social media messages of Crispin.  A magistrate judge disagreed with Crispin’s arguments that these communications fell under the SCA, preventing the provider of the messaging service from releasing private communications, because the social media sites messaging services are used solely for public display.  However, the district court reversed the ruling, holding that Facebook and MySpace allow private message or e-mail services which are separate from the general public posting.  This case held that the SCA protects Facebook and MySpace messages that aren’t publicly available.  Therefore, these messages cannot be subpoenaed in civil litigation.  In addition, the court left the door open for further clarification, noting that “Facebook wall postings and the MySpace comments are not strictly ‘public,’ but are accessible only to those users plaintiff selects.”

On the other side of the country, we find a slightly different ruling with Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 2010 WL 3703242 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 21, 2010).  TheRomanocourt allowed discovery of an entire social media site with all current and deleted postings.  The court ordered the plaintiff to provide the defendant with access to private postings from two social media sites. The court reasoned that information contradicting the plaintiff’s claims was included on the public sections of the plaintiff’s social media site and, therefore, it was reasonable to believe that the private sections might contain additional relevant information. The court even cited Facebook and MySpace policies, which warn users they should have “no expectation of privacy.”

Even if one is able to surmount the difficult hurtle of obtaining data from a social media site, an equally daunting challenge remains – getting the data admitted.  The main issue with admissibility is authenticity; spam, viruses, hackers and the like make social media sites susceptible to manipulation or fraud.   For this reason, courts have consistently been cautious when admitting social media data. In some cases, judges have become online “friends” with a party in order to authenticate postings, photos, captions and comments. (Barnes v. CUS Nashville, LLC).  Other courts have allowed printed copies with time date stamps to corroborate facts. (Treat v. Tom Kelley Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc.). Finally, some courts have used circumstantial evidence associated with the creation of the data (i.e. metadata and hash tags) to authenticate social media content.  (Lorraine v. Markel Am. Insur. Co.).  Admissability remains  an area of concern as the use of social media data in discovery becomes the norm.

Discovery of Social Media Data

A lawyer must decide early on whether relevant information exists on social media sites.  Within that evaluation, the costs to preserve, collect, review and produce the social media information should be considered.

Start discovery of social media by conducting large sweeping web searches for public social media sites of adverse parties or adverse witnesses.  Many individuals do not lock profiles or use privacy settings; therefore,  all postings, messages, comments, etc. are open to the public.  Preserve the sites with date stamps.

If an individual’s social media sites are set to private, and, therefore, not open to the public, what can a lawyer do?  Many boards of ethics do not allow lawyers to “friend” anyone to gain access to private profiles of information (NY State Bar Association Ethics Opinion 843 (Sept. 10, 2010)). So, instead of friending an individual, use discovery requests.  Start with a document request asking for all postings and messages that are related to and relevant in the litigation.  One can also consider requesting an access wavier to social media sites that allow for complete access to the site.  LinkedIn has a standard wavier located on its site. Finally, ask for all social media identifications used by the adverse party in an interrogatory.  Regardless of what direction taken, social media should be a part of the ediscovery process.

Conclusion

In conclusion, a business should take inventory of what social media sites are being used within the organization.  Then, set policies to help educate all employees of the risks regarding social media usage.  Finally, decide if backup software is needed to help with preservation and production of the business’s own social media data.  Regardless of retention schedule taken with social media, plan to always show the court that you’ve done your best, which is all that is expected.

For lawyers, be prepared to incorporate social media into an edisovery plan.  Start early within the litigation.  Draft standard document requests, waiver forms or interogatories around social media production.  Finally, be aware of the changing legal landscape on privacy, discoverability and admissibility, as these areas will continue to change, more and more rapidly in the future.

©2010 Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC. All Rights Reserved.

Law Firms Guarantee your ROI When Hiring an Interpreter

The National Law Review’s Business of Law Guest Blogger is Maria Cristina de la Vega who provides some great insight for legal professionals  on what to look for when hiring an interpreter. 

Interpreting/translating is a relatively young industry in the U.S. and it is currently unregulated.  Interpreters are not legally required to have an accreditation unless they are hired directly by the court system and are being paid with taxpayer dollars. Because it is relatively easy for a bilingual individual to hang out his shingle, the consumer, especially attorneys, need to know what to look for in a language professional to ensure that interpreted testimony faithfully follows the source language. Most cases rely heavily on testimony to decipher the facts at issue and to form an understanding of a witness’s credibility and motivation.  A misinterpretation or a nuance that is not conveyed properly can impact the outcome of a case.  To avoid this from happening, ask your language provider for his/her credentials.

Whereas an interpreter is bilingual, a bilingual individual is not necessarily an interpreter.  It is one thing to speak two or more languages, but quite another to be able to professionally interpret from and into those languages.  This fact may not be apparent in casual conversation and may not become evident unless the attorneys and/or parties involved speak both languages, know the specific terms used in the case and are able to recognize them.  In some situations, those listening may not speak one of the languages well enough to judge the quality of the interpretation.  Attorneys and clients in general are not set up to screen language providers to verify their proficiency, nor should they have to.  The best way to do this is to retain the services of an established agency or Language Services Provider (LSP).  The best ones to partner with are those that have experience in the industry, that source their interpreters from existing professionals and from reputable university-level language programs, that require accreditation from the interpreters they employ even if it is not yet mandatory, and that regularly strive to develop their personnel through continuing education.    These firms make sure that the interpreters they send you have the training and credentials to carry out your assignments at a specialized level. Available 24 hours a day 7 days a week to schedule interpreters for you anywhere in the U.S. as well as abroad, they can also provide you with written translations as well as certified linguists to render expert witness testimony on language issues.

What credentials should an interpreter have?

When an attorney needs an interpreter for a legal proceeding, he should first verify whether the interpreter holds an accredited certification, assuming there is one for the needed language combination. In the United States, there are several certification programs. The most common is the standardized interpreting examination offered by the Consortium for Language Access in the Courts at the National Center for State Courts.  There is also the Federal Court Interpreter Certification Exam which is currently being offered only in Spanish.  The National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators (NAJIT) offers another certification, as does the State Department.

If the candidate in question has the required proficiency as indicated by a recognized certification, some of the main skills he should possess and which are acquired from experience are: sight translation, a trained memory supported by note-taking skills to render testimony faithfully, a knowledge of specialized terminology, colloquialisms and slang in order to interpret in the correct register, and how to control the speed at which the attorney and the witnesses speak, if necessary, in order to have the opportunity to accurately interpret everything that is being said. It is difficult to interrupt witnesses giving testimony laden with emotions so it is critically important to have a professional interpreter that can render long statements, doing the interpretation.

Another useful indicator of the interpreter’s professionalism is membership in an industry association such as NAJIT or ATA  (American Translators Association) that have Codes of Ethics governing the profession that members must adhere to.  In addition, these organizations keep members abreast of developments in the field.

How to work with an interpreter

It is equally important for attorneys to know how to work properly with an interpreter. Unfortunately, interpreters are sometimes considered a necessary evil that must be borne and many attorneys subscribe to the myth that, because you are an “interpreter,” you are a walking dictionary who is able to communicate any terminology, notwithstanding the level of complexity, into another language.  Interpreters regularly work in diverse settings for widely differing industries and yet we are not specialists in these industries to the degree that our clients are. Hence, it is important when dealing with complex and/or technically challenging cases, that the interpreter be given an opportunity and sufficient time to acquaint himself, at a minimum, with the pleadings in the case and with any pertinent documents or prior testimony that will be discussed at the proceeding for which he is being scheduled. This is so that we may prepare a bilingual glossary of specialized terms to study, which will result in a more polished, professional interpretation.  In addition to our responsibility as officers of the court not to discuss the cases we work on, we also stand ready to sign confidentiality agreements to assuage any fears regarding sharing of information. To avoid unforeseen difficulties, the scheduling coordinators of established LSPs regularly ask how long proceedings are expected to take and what sort of testimony will be presented to ascertain who the best interpreter is for the assignment, based on experience, and whether he will have to study, for example, dedicated medical terminology or engineering language, among many possible specialties. Whenever possible, book services well ahead of time as good interpreters are in high demand. Check the reputation of the LSP in language-dedicated sites such as Proz.com or ask your colleagues in the legal community about their dealings with the firm being considered.

Guidelines to Working with an Interpreter

  • Ascertain the interpreter’s credentials
  • When relevant, give the interpreter case documents to prepare
  • Verify whether team interpreting is required
  • Address witnesses with direct speech as if the interpreter were not present.

Other useful tips to keep in mind are to use direct speech when using the services of an interpreter.  Address the witness in the first person, as if there were no interpreter present, to safeguard the integrity of the transcript.  Avoid using proverbs i.e. “Where there’s smoke there’s fire” because although it may translate, there may be no direct translation, or worse yet, there may be another cultural equivalent to the sense behind the saying and the witness could end up giving an answer that is framed in very different terms from what you asked.  Furthermore, you would be adding unnecessary stress to the interpreter’s job by asking him to do mental gymnastics  in a matter of seconds to come up with a viable interpretation of an artistic/literary term  When working with consecutive interpretation (speech followed by a pause to allow for interpretation), attorneys and witnesses should pause when a complete thought or phrase has been rendered.  The speech should not be so short that the sense is unintelligible nor so long that the interpreter cannot possibly remember it to give an accurate interpretation.  An experienced interpreter will quickly establish the required rhythm among the parties involved in the taking of testimony so that the process will be smooth.  It is important that only one person speak at a time for the same reason that a court reporter requires it, so that both the full question as well as all testimony is interpreted and taken down.

The length of time involved in an interpreted proceeding brings up another key point that is often overlooked, which is interpreter fatigue.  According to a NAJIT position paper on the topic,http://www.najit.org/documents/Team_Interpreting.pdf,team interpreting “should be used for lengthy proceedings as a quality control mechanism to preserve the accuracy of the interpretation.”  The way this works is that two interpreters substitute one another approximately every half hour.  It has been found in scientific studies, among which is one at the University of Geneva in 1998, that after a certain amount of time working, an interpreter reaches a saturation point as mental circuits become overloaded and this condition leads to errors.[1]

If the interpreter is going to be interpreting a proceeding simultaneously to the witnesses rather than interpreting from the witness stand, it is important that the interpreter be located in a position to properly hear and have visual contact with the parties speaking.  Sound equipment (earphones, a microphone and a transmitter) should preferably be used to interpret the event, transmitting to receivers worn by the parties requiring the interpretation. That way, the interpreter can avoid the additional stress, inconvenience and disruption caused by having to stand close to one or more individuals to whisper an interpretation of what is going on. Many courts have this equipment installed in their courtrooms; otherwise, the LSP can be asked to have the interpreter bring a portable system.  LSPs always have units available for their interpreters to use.

If the language at issue is not one for which there are interpreters readily available in your area or there are many dialects of the language, it is advisable that the interpreter selected speak with the witness in advance to ensure that they can understand one another well.  Lastly, explain to the witnesses the role of the interpreter.  That the interpreter is a neutral party and an officer of the court.  That witnesses cannot have private conversations with him while they are testifying, That they should expect that the interpreter will render everything said to him on the stand into the language of the Court (English) but in turn, the interpreter will keep any information gained in the course of his work outside of court, confidential. Parties/witnesses should also know that the interpreter is bound to report any ethical breaches to the appropriate authorities.

Awareness and adherence to these simple guidelines will go a long way towards making sure that you have a positive, productive experience every time you retain the services of an LSP. NAJIT has formed a working group entitled the Bench and Bar Committee to disseminate this information among the judiciary and practicing attorneys. Our objective as interpreters is to be an asset to attorneys in assisting you to present testimony in a seamless, professional manner that you can depend on.


[1] Moser-Mercer, B., Kunzli, B., and Korac, M., 1998  “Prolonged turns in interpreting: Effects on quality, physiological and psychological stress.” University of Geneva, École de Traduction et d’ Interprétation. Interpreting,Vol. 3 (1), p. 47-64. John Benjamin Publishing Co.

 

© 2010 ProTranslating, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

About the Author:

Maria Cristina de la Vega holds an M.B.A. and has more than 35 years of experience in court interpreting.  She is a federally certified Spanish interpreter and is also certified by the State of Florida in that capacity. She is a regular contributor to publications that deal with language issues and she is a member of the Bench & Bar Committee of the National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators (NAJIT).  Ms. De la Vega  has done work for prominent law firms including Greenberg Traurig and Holland and Knight.  ProTranslating provides interpreting, translation services and linguistic solutions to individuals, law firms, and corporations worldwide. It offers a team of more than 100 qualified in-house linguists and a worldwide network of another 3,000 freelancers working in more than 100 languages. 888-532-7887 /www.protranslating.com

DOJ Releases, Then Tries to Reel Back FOIA Documents in Holocaust Case

Weekly guest bloggers at the National Law Review this week are from the Center for Public Integrity.   Author Amy Biegelsen reviews  how a  federal government ban on Holocaust survivors suing to collect on European insurance policies from that era may be on a shaky legal footing.  

A federal government ban on Holocaust survivors suing to collect on European insurance policies from that era may be on a shaky legal footing, according to memos accidentally released by the Justice Department in a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. The department wants the memos back and is trying to keep them from circulating.

However, the documents were used in Congressional testimony last month by Samuel Dubbin, an attorney representing Holocaust survivors and their families, and full copies were entered into the official public record.

The memos relate to a federal lawsuit Dubbin lost earlier this year when a federal appeals court rejected a U.S. citizen’s attempt to collect on insurance policies his father purchased in Europe before surviving imprisonment in Auschwitz and Dachau during World War II.

That court ruled Dubbin’s client, Dr. Thomas Weiss, could not bring his case to court. The decision was based, in part, on the Justice Department’s assertion that U.S. foreign policy requires special, non-adversarial agencies be used as the “exclusive forum” to help victims recover such claims.

The memos that Dubbin obtained in his FOIA request were intended as private correspondence among department officials discussing what advice to give to the court to clarify U.S. foreign policy. They reveal the Justice Department had some reservations about whether or not that policy could pre-empt a domestic lawsuit.

JUSTICE DEPT. WANTS COPIES DESTROYED

In a Sept. 24 e-mail to Dubbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General William Orrick III, said the department had “inadvertently and erroneously” sent him the memos in response to his FOIA request. Dubbin gave a copy of the e-mail to the Center for Public Integrity.

The e-mail landed in Dubbin’s in-box two days after his Sept. 22 testimony in front of a congressional subcommittee hearing on a bill that would make it easier for victims and their families to file suits. A stack of the photocopied documents sat on a table inside the hearing room, available for anyone attending to take.

The Justice Department e-mail instructs Dubbin to “immediately cease using or disclosing the above documents; return the documents to the Department of Justice; and destroy all copies of these documents in your possession.” It also orders him to retrieve any copies he may have circulated and advises him to ask a Holocaust survivors group to remove them from their web site.

Dubbin has refused to return the documents despite the Justice Department’s argument that the documents are confidential under the attorney-client privilege and that he has an ethical obligation to give them back. The department did not respond to Center requests for comment.

Lucy Dalglish, the former director for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press advocacy group, says it’s rare for a government agency to revoke records it has already released in a FOIA response. That’s especially true for the Justice Department, she added, because “they very seldom give out any documents.”

MEMOS SHOW MISGIVINGS

The memos illuminate some of the discussions — and misgivings — department officials had about their response to the New York-based Second Circuit Court of Appeals before it ruled in Dubbin’s case earlier this year.

On behalf of the State Department, the Justice Department sent the appeals court two separate memos, one in 2008 and another in 2009 to explain the U.S. foreign policy issues underlying the case. Its position changes from one to the next. The mistakenly released documents come from internal department discussion before each was sent.

The 2008 memo said that the State Department policy cannot necessarily pre-empt a court case. The 2009 memo was much firmer and told the appeals court that it was “in the foreign policy interests” of the United States for an international commission “to be the exclusive forum for the resolution” of Holocaust survivors’ claims against European insurers.

Among the documents that the government wants returned is a memo written by former assistant to the Solicitor General, Douglas Hallward-Driemeier. He wrote it before the 2008 memo was sent to the court, and it says that he had “reservations about the legal theory” underlying the advice that citizens cannot sue. A year later, before the 2009 memo was sent, Hallward-Driemeier wrote to his department colleagues that the Justice Department lawyers “should refrain from addressing the question whether the government’s foreign policy provides a basis for holding the plaintiffs’ claims preempted.”

Hallward-Driemeier, now a partner with the law firm Ropes & Gray, says he “can’t comment on attorney-client memos that should never have been released.”

Early this year, the Second Circuit ruled in favor of the Italian insurance company Assicurazioni Generali and rejected Dubbin’s attempt to help his client collect on a life insurance policy held by a Holocaust survivor. Dr. Thomas Weiss, a Miami Beach opthamologist born in 1949, has spent years trying to obtain the insurance benefits for a policy purchased by his father, Paul Weiss, in 1937 from Generali.

The appeals court’s ruling “was a direct result of the fact that DOJ hid the ball,” Dubbin told the House committee in September.

SPECIAL PANEL HANDLES EUROPEAN INSURANCE CLAIMS

Why can’t a U.S. citizen go to court to fight a European insurer over an insurance policy benefits? The answer is rooted in an agreement the United States entered into with Germany in 1999. The two countries decided at that time that it would be better to settle these insurance disputes through an international agency funded by European insurance companies, the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC).

As part of that arrangement, the federal government agreed that when cases of U.S. citizens suing German companies came up, it would file briefs with the judges informing them of the foreign policy interest. The agreement was not a treaty and doesn’t carry the force of law, so the U.S. cautioned the European governments that whether or not the cases would be thrown out would still be up to the courts.

These claims are particularly difficult because few death certificates were issued in extermination camps and Nazis routinely confiscated or destroyed contracts, deeds and other records. ICHEIC agreed to relax its standards for evidence, but it closed in 2007, the year before the Weiss suit arrived in federal court. Supporters of the commission say that other non-adversarial avenues still exist and site agreements from the insurance companies that participated in ICHEIC to voluntarily continue to process such claims.

When faced with the Weiss case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals wanted to know if ICHEIC was still the forum for resolution, or if policy-holders were barred from even suing in US courts. It asked the State Department to clarify, kicking off the discussions accidentally disclosed to Dubbin this summer.

This month, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case. A dozen law professors specializing in international and constitutional law filed a brief with the high court in support of the case, including American University law professor Steven Vladeck.

“While not affirmatively misrepresenting the government position,” Vladeck says, the memos that the Justice Department gave the court “obfuscated it in a way that made it difficult for the court to know what’s going on.”

Reprinted by Permission Center of Public Integrity

Reprinted by Permission © 2010, The Center for Public Integrity®. All Rights Reserved.

 

 

Picking the Perfect Jury:What Should Be Done About the Problem of Race-Based Exemptions ABA Teleconference & Live Audio Webcast – October 21st

The National Law Review would like to make you aware of an upcoming ABA Teleconference and Live Webcast which has been approved for Elimination of Bias Credits in applicable jurisdications as well as CLE credit — Picking the Perfect Jury:What Should Be Done About the Problem of Race-Based Exemptions: 

Program Description

As recently reported in the New York Times, “Today, the practice of excluding blacks and other minorities from Southern juries remains widespread” and, according to the Equal Justice Initiative and defense lawyers, is “largely unchecked.” There is a continuing indifference to prosecutors’ race-based exclusions of prospective jurors.  Prosecutors have learned how to claim that their exclusions are race-neutral, even where they do not exclude white jurors whose answers during jury selection are indistinguishable from those of jurors of color whom the same prosecutors do exclude.

At this program, the renowned Executive Director of the Equal Justice Initiative, Bryan Stevenson, will discuss his organization’s June 2010 report on this subject (a report which was the basis for the Times story and other media reports) and will join with other expert panelists and discussing the report’s implications and what those who attend this program can do to rectify this situation.  There will be special focus on Tennessee, Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi.

CLE Credit

1.0 hours of CLE credit in 60-minute states/1.2 hours of CLE credit in 50-minute states have been requested in states accrediting ABA teleconferences and live audio webcasts.*

NY-licensed attorneys: This non-transitional CLE program has been approved for experienced NY-licensed attorneys in accordance with the requirements of the New York State CLE Board for 1.0 total NY CLE credits.

Elimination of bias credit has been requested in states with elimination of bias requirements.

The following states accept ABA teleconferences for CLE credit:
AL, AK, AR, AZ, CA, CO, FL, GA, IA, ID, IL, KY, LA, ME, MN, MO, MS, MT, NC, ND, NH, NM, NV, NY, OK, OR, RI, SC, TN, TX, UT, VA, VI, VT, WA, WI, WV, WY.

*States currently not accrediting ABA teleconferences: DE, IN, PA, KS, OH

Teleconference / Live Audio Cast Hours: 

4:30 PM-5:30 PM Eastern

3:30 PM-4:30 PM Central

2:30 PM-3:30 PM Mountain

1:30 PM-2:30 PM Pacific

To Register or for More Information: 

Register by Phone:  800.285.2221 / Monday – Friday 
8:30 AM – 6:00 PM Eastern Event Code: cet0rbe   http://bit.ly/dkP9EQ

Class Action Defense Cases–American Honda v. Allen: Seventh Circuit Court Reverses Class Action Certification Order Holding District Court’s Daubert Analysis Inadequate And Expert Testimony Inadmissible

National Law Review’s featured blogger Michael J. Hassen of Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Mitchell LLP provides some insight on a recent 7th Circuit class action case which addresses expert testimony:

District Court Erred in Granting Class Action Certification because Expert Testimony Establishing Rule 23(b)(3)’s Predominance Prong was Unreliable and District Court’s Daubert Analysis Inadequate Seventh Circuit Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against American Honda and Honda of America (collectively “Honda”) alleging product defect liability concerning Honda’s Gold Wing GL1800 motorcycle; specifically, the class action complaint alleged that a design defect in the steering assembly causes the motorcycle to “wobble.” American Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 814 (7th Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs moved the district court to certify the litigation as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3), relying heavily on an expert’s opinion that common issues predominate; Honda opposed class action treatment and challenged the expert opinion relied upon by plaintiffs in their motion. Id. Defense attorneys moved under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), to strike plaintiffs’ expert report on the grounds that the expert’s “wobble decay standard was unreliable because it was not supported by empirical testing, was not developed through a recognized standard-setting procedure, was not generally accepted in the relevant scientific, technical, or professional community, and was not the product of independent research.” Id. The district court agreed to rule on the admissibility of the report prior to ruling on class certification because the report was central to the motion, id. But while the court announced “definite reservations about the reliability of [the expert’s] wobble decay standard,” it refused to exclude the report entirely “at this early stage of the proceedings.” Id., at 814-15. The district court granted class action certification, id., at 815, and Honda sought leave to appeal, id., at 814. The Seventh Circuit granted Honda’s request and reversed.

The Circuit Court explained that the issue before it was “whether the district court must conclusively rule on the admissibility of an expert opinion prior to class certification in this case because that opinion is essential to the certification decision.” American Honda, at 814. The Court summarized the expert’s “wobble decay” opinion, which was based on a standard the expert himself had devised and that he himself characterized as “reasonable.” Id. The expert opinion was important because “most of Plaintiffs’ predominance arguments rest upon the theories advanced by [their expert].” Id. (quoting Allen v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 264 F.R.D. 412, 425 (N.D. Ill. 2009)). In response to Honda’s objections and following the Daubert hearing, the district court “noted that it was concerned that, among other things, [the expert’s] wobble decay standard may not be supported by empirical evidence, the standard has not been generally accepted by the engineering community, and [his] test sample of one may be inadequate to conclude that the entire fleet of GL1800s is defective.” Id., at 814-15. Nevertheless, the lower court believed it was too early in the litigation to dismiss the expert’s opinion in its entirety, and so it granted class action treatment without prejudice to Honda moving to exclude the expert’s opinion. Id., at 815.

As a matter of first impression in the Seventh Circuit, the Court “specifically addressed whether a district court must resolve a Daubert challenge prior to ruling on class certification if the testimony challenged is integral to the plaintiffs’ satisfaction of Rule 23’s requirements.” American Honda, at 815. The Circuit Court held “that when an expert’s report or testimony is critical to class certification, as it is here…, a district court must conclusively rule on any challenge to the expert’s qualifications or submissions prior to ruling on a class certification motion.” Id., at 815-16. Thus, in the Seventh Circuit’s view, “the district court must perform a full Daubert analysis before certifying the class if the situation warrants.” Id., at 816. This includes not only the expert’s qualifications, but “any challenge to the reliability of information provided by an expert if that information is relevant to establishing any of the Rule 23 requirements for class certification.” Id.

In this case, the district court “started off on the right foot by beginning to undertake what might have become a fairly extensive Daubert analysis,” and both acknowledged “and largely agreed with” Honda’s concerns about the reliability of the testimony of plaintiff’s expert, “[y]et the district court ultimately declined, without further explanation, ‘to exclude the report in its entirety at this early stage of the proceedings.’” American Honda, at 816. The Circuit Court explained at page 816 that the district court’s analysis (or lack thereof) constituted an abuse of discretion: “The court’s effective statement of admissibility here is not even conclusory; it leaves open the questions of what portions of [the expert’s] testimony it may have decided (or will decide) to exclude, whether [the expert] reliably applied the standard to the facts of the case, and, ultimately, whether Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. As a result, the district court never actually reached a conclusion about whether [the] expert report was reliable enough to support Plaintiffs’ class certification request. Instead it denied Honda’s motion to exclude without prejudice and noted that the case was in an ‘early stage of the proceedings.’”

Reviewing the expert’s report on the merits, the Seventh Circuit held that “our examination of the record reveals that exclusion is the inescapable result when the Daubert analysis is carried to its conclusion.” American Honda, at 817. The issue here was one of reliability rather than qualifications, but the Circuit Court noted that “even the most ‘supremely qualified expert cannot waltz into the courtroom and render opinions unless those opinions are based upon some recognized scientific method and are reliable and relevant under the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Daubert.’” Id. (citing Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750, 759 n.5 (7th Cir.1999)). Based on the Court’s analysis, the expert’s testimony was unreliable, see id., at 817-18, and “expert testimony that is not scientifically reliable should not be admitted, even ‘at this early stage of the proceedings,’” id., at 819 (citation omitted). Because the expert’s testimony formed the foundation for Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance test, class action certification could not stand. Id. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit granted Honda’s petition for leave to appeal and vacated the denial of Honda’s motion to strike and the district court’s order grant of class action treatment. Id.

NOTE: In response to plaintiffs’ request that the Circuit Court deny leave to appeal, the Seventh Circuit explained, “Given the uncertainty surrounding the propriety of conducting a Daubert analysis at the class certification stage, and the frequency with which this issue arises, we find the question to be one appropriate for resolution under Rule 23(f).” American Honda, at 815 (citation omitted).

© 2010 Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP. All rights reserved.

About the Author:

Michael J. Hassen is a Litigation Partner at Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP with more than 23 years experience in general business and commercial litigation, including class action defense and matters involving intellectual property, securities and unfair competition.  415-984-9666 / www.jmbm.com

Class Action Defense Cases–Donovan v. Philip Morris: Massachusetts Federal Court Certifies Class Action Seeking Medical Monitoring For Lung Cancer Of 20-Year Marlboro Smokers

This week’s featured blogger at the National Law Review is Michael J. Hassen of Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Mitchell LLP who writes for the Class Action Defense Blog.

Class Action Against Tobacco Company Alleging Unfair Trade Practices and Breach of Implied Warranty and Seeking Medical Monitoring for Lung Cancer on Behalf of Class of Smokers who have not been Diagnosed with Lung Cancer and who are Asymptomatic Warranted Class Action Certification under both Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) Massachusetts Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Philip Morris alleging “unfair or deceptive” trade practices in violation of Massachusetts state law, breach of implied warranty, and negligence; specifically, the class action complaint “allege[d] that Philip Morris designed, marketed, and sold Marlboro cigarettes that delivered an excessive and dangerous level of carcinogens.” Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (D.Mass. June 24, 2010) [Slip Opn., at 1]. According to the allegations underlying the class action complaint, “plaintiffs have no apparent symptoms of lung cancer, and as such, are not seeking damages.” Id. Thus, this class action “diverges from a typical tobacco suit,” id. Instead of seeking damages, the class action sought to compel Philip Morris to pay for medical monitoring – “that is, regular screenings to determine whether they have early signs of the disease” based on the argument that “if [class members] do eventually develop lung cancer, these screenings will increase their likelihood of survival almost six-fold.” Id., at 1-2. Plaintiffs sought certification of a class action “on behalf of Massachusetts residents, age fifty and older, who have smoked Marlboro cigarettes for at least twenty pack-years.” Id., at 1. Further, “No class member may be diagnosed with lung cancer or be under a physician’s care for suspected lung cancer, and all must have smoked Marlboro cigarettes within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.” Id., at 2. Defense attorneys opposed class action treatment. In a 56-page order, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for class action certification.

In analyzing whether to grant class action treatment, the district court noted that “the motion was not easily resolved because it raised threshold issues of Massachusetts products liability law.” Donovan, at 2. First, the class action certification motion presented a set of issues tied to “the unusual remedy plaintiffs seek, a supervised medical monitoring program using Low-Dose Computed Tomography (‘LDCT’) scans.” Id. Plaintiffs argued that unlike x-rays, which could only detect lung cancer “when it had reached an advanced stage,” the new LDCT-scanning technology allowed for much earlier detection “significantly increasing survival rates from about fifteen percent to eighty-five percent.” Id. (Plaintiffs argued that monetary damages would not adequately compensate class members for the cost of medical monitoring, id., at 3.) Second, the class action certification motion presented the question of whether the named plaintiffs had standing to prosecute the class action because “[b]y definition, plaintiffs who seek medical monitoring to determine whether they have cancer are asymptomatic.” Id. And third, the class action presents a “novel issue [that] pertains to the timing of plaintiffs’ claims and the related issue of claim preclusion.” Id. “Typically, toxic tort exposure cases put the plaintiffs on the horns of a dilemma. If they bring a claim when they are aware of their exposure – assuming the standing issues are resolved – they take the risk that they cannot recover if they develop cancer in the future under the ‘single controversy rule.’ If they wait until they develop cancer to bring a claim, the statute of limitations will have expired because they knew of the risks at an earlier time.” Id. Here, plaintiffs argued that this dilemma was avoided because “The statute of limitations should run from the date that plaintiffs develop subcellular changes that substantially increase their risk of cancer and where that increase triggers a medically-accepted form of screening.” Id., at 4.

The district court noted that, in light of these novel issues, it certified two questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: “(1) Does the plaintiffs’ suit for medical monitoring, based on the subclinical effects of exposure to cigarette smoke and increased risk of lung cancer, state a cognizable claim and/or permit a remedy under Massachusetts state law? (2) If the plaintiffs have successfully stated a claim or claims, has the statute of limitations governing those claims expired?” Donovan, at 4. In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court answered “yes” to the first question, and “no” to the second. Id.; see Donovan v. Philip Morris, 914 N.E.2d 891, 894-95 (Mass. 2009). The federal court summarized that opinion at pages 4 and 5 as follows:

On the first question, the court held that subclinical effects on lung tissue constituted a legally cognizable injury on which plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claim could be based and outlined what comprised proof of such a claim. On the second question, the court held that the statute of limitations began to run only after the plaintiffs suffered “physiological change[s] resulting in a substantial increase in the risk of cancer” due to their smoking and “that increase, under the standard of care, triggers the need for available diagnostic testing . . .” Id. at 903. Finally, the Supreme Judicial Court held that there would be no claim preclusion under the “single controversy rule.” Litigation of the plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claim in this action would not preclude a future action for damages if plaintiffs eventually contract lung cancer.

Armed with the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision on the novel issues presented by the class action certification motion, the federal court granted class action treatment under both Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) to plaintiffs’ unfair trade practices and implied warranty claims, but denied class action treatment as to plaintiffs’ negligence claim. Donovan, at 6. Moreover, in light of Seventh Amendment concerns, the federal court held that the class action would proceed as a jury trial. Id.

© 2010 Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP. All rights reserved.

About the Author:

Michael J. Hassen is a Litigation Partner at Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP with more than 23 years experience in general business and commercial litigation, including class action defense and matters involving intellectual property, securities and unfair competition. 415-984-9666 / www.jmbm.com

Wal-Mart Class Action Defense Cases–Dukes v. Wal-Mart : Ninth Circuit Court Affirms Class Action Certification Of Largest Labor Law Class Action In U.S. History

The National Law Review’s Featured Guest Blogger Michael J. Hassen of Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Mitchell LLP discusses the recent California Employment Class Action cases involving WalMart’s female employees.  

Labor Law Class Action Alleging Wal-Mart Discriminates Against Female Employees in Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Properly Certified As Nationwide Class Action by District Court Ninth Circuit Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action against Wal-Mart alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; specifically, the class action complaint alleged that Wal-Mart discriminates against its female employees. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. April 26, 2010) [Slip Opn., at 6137, 6146]. According to the allegations underlying the class action complaint (originally filed in 2004), Wal-Mart discriminated against women employees in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act because “women employed in Wal-Mart stores: (1) are paid less than men in comparable positions, despite having higher performance ratings and greater seniority; and (2) receive fewer—and wait longer for—promotions to in-store management positions than men.” Id., at 6147. The class action complaint sought to represent a nationwide class on the grounds “that Wal-Mart’s strong, centralized structure fosters or facilitates gender stereotyping and discrimination, that the policies and practices underlying this discriminatory treatment are consistent throughout Wal-Mart stores, and that this discrimination is common to all women who work or have worked in Wal-Mart stores.” Id. The proposed class included “women employed in a range of Wal-Mart positions, from part-time entry-level hourly employees to salaried managers.” Id. Plaintiffs’ counsel moved the district court to certify the litigation as a class action, defined as “All women employed at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store at any time since December 26, 1998 who have been or may be subjected to Wal-Mart’s challenged pay and management track promotions policies and practices.” Id., at 6148. Defense attorneys opposed class certification and stressed that the proposed class would consist of as many as 1.5 million current and former employees who worked at 3,400 stores in 41 regions. Id., at 6148 and n.3. The district court granted the motion and certified the litigation as a class action, id., at 6146-47. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Circuit Court opinion is quite lengthy, so we simply “hit the highlights” in this article. Defense attorneys may contact the author of the Blog for a more detailed discussion of the case.

The Ninth Circuit spent a considerable amount of time discussing the standard governing district court consideration of class certification under Rule 23 and clarified the “proper standard of Rule 23 adjudication.” See Dukes, at 6149-83. This analysis includes a discussion, and rejection, of the dissent’s “significant proof” standard. See id., at 6177-83. The Circuit Court then turned to the merits of the Rule 23 analysis, beginning with Rule 23(a)(1)’s numerosity requirement, which was not contested given the enormous size of the class. Id., at 6185. The Court also found that Wal-Mart had not waived its right to object to Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement, see id., at 6209-10, but concluded that the district court did not err in finding that the named-plaintiffs’ claims were sufficiently typical of those of the class: “Even though individual employees in different stores with different managers may have received different levels of pay or may have been denied promotion or promoted at different rates, because the discrimination they claim to have suffered occurred through alleged common practices—e.g., excessively subjective decision making in a corporate culture of uniformity and gender stereotyping—the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that their claims are sufficiently typical to satisfy Rule 23(a)(3).” Id., at 6210. Moreover, “because all female employees faced the same alleged discrimination, the lack of a class representative for each management category does not undermine Plaintiffs’ certification goal.” Id., at 6211. And the Ninth Circuit found no difficulty in finding that the adequacy of representation test in Rule 23(a)(4) had been met. Id., at 6212.

The Circuit Court spent the vast majority of its time discussing Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality test. See Dukes, at 6186-6209. The district court found that this test had been met: “Plaintiffs have exceeded the permissive and minimal burden of establishing commonality by providing: (1) significant evidence of company-wide corporate practices and policies, which include (a) excessive subjectivity in personnel decisions, (b) gender stereotyping, and (c) maintenance of a strong corporate culture; (2) statistical evidence of gender disparities caused by discrimination; and (3) anecdotal evidence of gender bias. Together, this evidence raises an inference that Wal-Mart engages in discriminatory practices in compensation and promotion that affect all plaintiffs in a common manner.” Id., at 6186-87 (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit agreed, id., at 6287. Despite the wide-ranging nature of the class, the Court held that there was sufficient evidence of a common policy of discrimination, see id., at 6187-6207. The Circuit Court also found that the district court did not err in finding “substantial evidence suggesting common pay and promotion policies among Wal-Mart’s many stores” and that “Wal-Mart’s decision to permit its managers to utilize subjectivity in interpreting those policies offers additional support for a commonality finding.” Id., at 6207. Thus, the Court concluded at page 6209:

Plaintiffs’ factual evidence, expert opinions, statistical evidence, and anecdotal evidence provide sufficient support to raise the common question whether Wal-Mart’s female employees nationwide were subjected to a single set of corporate policies (not merely a number of independent discriminatory acts) that may have worked to unlawfully discriminate against them in violation of Title VII. Evidence of Wal-Mart’s subjective decision-making policies suggests a common legal or factual question regarding whether Wal-Mart’s policies or practices are discriminatory.

Finally, “Plaintiffs moved to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2), which requires showing that ‘the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief . . . is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.’” Dukes, at 6214. The Circuit Court recognized that a (b)(2) class was inappropriate if the primary relief sought by the class action complaint is monetary. Id., at 6214-15. The Ninth Circuit previously had adopted “a test that focuses on the plaintiffs’ subjective intent in bringing a lawsuit.” Id., at 6215. But the Court now reversed that position and adopted an entirely new standard, set forth at page 6217 as follows:

Rule 23(b)(2) certification is not appropriate where monetary relief is “predominant” over injunctive relief or declaratory relief. To determine whether monetary relief predominates, a district court should consider, on a case-by-case basis, the objective “effect of the relief sought” on the litigation. [Citation.] Factors such as whether the monetary relief sought determines the key procedures that will be used, whether it introduces new and significant legal and factual issues, whether it requires individualized hearings, and whether its size and nature—as measured by recovery per class member—raise particular due process and manageability concerns would all be relevant, though no single factor would be determinative.

The Court then concluded: “Under this standard…, the district court’s decision to include claims for back pay in a class certified under Rule 23(b)(2) was not an abuse of its discretion. On the other hand, the district court did abuse its discretion by failing to analyze whether certifying Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims under Rule 23(b)(2) caused monetary damages to predominate, notwithstanding its decision to require notice and an opportunity for Plaintiffs to opt-out of the punitive damages claims.” Dukes, at 6217. Thus, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the matter to the district court for further consideration of the punitive damage relief claim. Additionally, the Circuit Court agreed with Wal-Mart that (b)(2) class may not be proper as to employees who no longer worked for Wal-Mart at the time the class action was filed because those individuals “do not have standing to pursue injunctive or declaratory relief.” Id., at 6228. Wal-Mart argued that since former employees lacked standing to seek injunctive relief, monetary relief would predominate for those class members. Id. But while the Court reversed the district court order to the extent it included former employees in the (b)(2) class, it remanded the matter for further consideration as to whether a (b)(3) class could be certified for such individuals noting, “The district court may, in its discretion, certify a separate Rule 23(b)(3) class of former employees for back pay and punitive damages.” Id., at 6229. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Id., at 6236-37.

Judge Graber filed a brief concurring opinion to stress the “unremarkable” nature of the Court’s holding: “The majority and the dissent have written scholarly and complete explanations of their positions. What the length of their opinions may mask is the simplicity of the majority’s unremarkable holding: [¶] Current female employees may maintain a Rule 23(b)(2) class action against their employer, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and back pay on behalf of all the current female employees, when they challenge as discriminatory the effects of their employer’s company-wide policies. [¶] If the employer had 500 female employees, I doubt that any of my colleagues would question the certification of such a class. Certification does not become an abuse of discretion merely because the class has 500,000 members.” See Dukes, at 6237-38.

NOTE: Judge Ikuta dissented, joined by Chief Judge Kozinski and Judges Rymer, Silverman and Bea. See Dukes, at 6238-6279. The dissent argued that “the district court abused its discretion in two ways. First, it failed to follow the Supreme Court’s direction to ‘evaluate carefully the legitimacy of the named plaintiff’s plea that he is a proper class representative under Rule 23(a),’ [citation], and to ensure ‘after a rigorous analysis’ that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been met, [citation]. Second, the district court erred in ignoring Wal-Mart’s statutory right to raise defenses to liability for back pay and punitive damages under Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(g)(2); Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), and therefore abused its discretion in holding that the proposed class could be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).” Dukes, at 6243.

Chief Judge Kozinski joined the dissent and added the following concise explanation: “Maybe there’d be no difference between 500 employees and 500,000 employees if they all had similar jobs, worked at the same half-billion square foot store and were supervised by the same managers. But the half-million members of the majority’s approved class held a multitude of jobs, at different levels of Wal-Mart’s hierarchy, for variable lengths of time, in 3,400 stores, sprinkled across 50 states, with a kaleidoscope of supervisors (male and female), subject to a variety of regional policies that all differed depending on each class member’s job, location and period of employment. Some thrived while others did poorly. They have little in common but their sex and this lawsuit. [¶] I therefore join fully Judge Ikuta’s dissent.” Dukes, at 6279.

© 2010 Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP. All rights reserved.

About the Author:

Michael J. Hassen is a Litigation Partner at Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP with more than 23 years experience in general business and commercial litigation, including class action defense and matters involving intellectual property, securities and unfair competition.  415-984-9666 / www.jmbm.com


Cy Pres Class Action Defense Cases–In re American Tower: Massachusetts Federal Court Rejects Request To Distribute Class Action Settlement Cy Pres Funds To Non-Profit Organization

First of a series of daily guest blog spots from the National Law Review’s featured blogger Michael J. Hassen of  Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Mitchell LLPMichael Hassan authors  JMBM’s Class Action Defense Blog.

Distribution of Unclaimed Class Action Settlement Funds to Non-Profit Organization Unconnected to Harm Suffered by Class Members Inappropriate Massachusetts Federal Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against American Tower Corp. alleging violations of federal securities laws and purported to be brought on behalf of “members of the public who were harmed by the securities fraud.” In re American Tower Corp. Securities Litig., 648 F.Supp.2d 223, 224-25 (D.Mass. 2010). Eventually, the parties negotiated a settlement of the class action which provided for the distribution of unclaimed funds through a cy pres fund. Id., at 224. Lead Plaintiff moved the district court for authorization to distribute the cy pres funds “to The Peggy Browning Fund, a private, nonsectarian, not-for-profit organization with 501(c)(3) tax-deductible status.” Id. The federal court denied the motion because plaintiff sought “to disburse settlement funds to a non-profit organization with little connection to the harms class members suffered,” id. Because the author has received numerous inquiries from defense and plaintiff counsel concerning the proper scope of a cy pres fund, we include this article on the district court’s ruling.

The district court noted that the proper inquiry was to “determine whether the Peggy Browning Fund is an appropriate recipient of any residual settlement funds” of the class action settlement. In re American Tower Corp., at 224. The court explained that the purpose of the use of a cy pres fund is effect a distribution of class action settlement funds “to a ‘next-best’ recipient” when it is impractical to distribute the settlement funds to the class members. Id., at 224-25 (citing In re Airline Ticket Commission Antitrust Litig., 268 F.3d 619, 626 (8th Cir.2001)). “‘In such cases, the court, guided by the parties’ original purpose, directs that the unclaimed funds be distributed for the prospective benefit of the class.’” Id. (citation omitted). The federal court easily concluded, then, that the Peggy Browning Fund was “an inappropriate recipient of any unclaimed class funds.” Id. “Disbursement of unclaimed funds must have some relationship to the harm suffered by class members…. However, the Peggy Browning Fund focuses on labor issues…. Therefore, it does not appear that funds donated to the Peggy Browning Fund would benefit the class or address the harms suffered by class members.Id. (italics added). The district court therefore denied the motion, without prejudice to Lead Plaintiff renewing the request and noting that Lead Plaintiff “should, if possible, propose a national organization whose work relates to the harm suffered by class members in this case.” Id.

NOTE: The author notes that trial courts are far too willing to authorize the distribution of cy pres funds to practically any organization. In such cases, the courts appear to be more interested in punishing the defendant than in effecting a distribution of funds to the “next-best” recipient.

© 2010 Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP. All rights reserved.

About the Author:

Michael J. Hassen is a Litigation Partner at Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP with more than 23 years experience in general business and commercial litigation, including class action defense and matters involving intellectual property, securities and unfair competition.  415-984-9666 /www.jmbm.com

Protecting Tax Documents after United States v. Deloitte

This week’s National Law Review featured blogger is Matthew D. Lerner of Steptoe & Johnson LLP who provides some great tips on how to manage tax documents to best prepare for legal action. 

A recent appeals court decision provides the latest development in the ongoing battle between taxpayers and the IRS regarding the disclosure of tax workpapers.  It also provides hope that work product protections may still be available for litigation analyses that a company’s attest auditors review in preparing financial statements.[i] Typically, taxpayers claim that certain workpapers are protected by the work product doctrine because they contain analysis of potential tax issues raised by transactions in anticipation of future litigation with the IRS over those issues.  The IRS asserts that these workpapers are used to prepare financial statements and should not be subject to protection either because they are not prepared in anticipation of litigation or because they are disclosed to third party auditors, thus waiving any protection.

On June 29, 2010, the D.C. Circuit became the latest court to address this controversy in a matter that involved documents prepared by, or in the possession of, the accounting firm Deloitte LLP (then known as Deloitte & Touche LLP) (“Deloitte”).  In this case, the United States sought to compel Deloitte to produce two categories of documents related to a civil tax refund case brought by partnerships formed by subsidiaries of the Dow Chemical Company (“Dow”) (the partnerships are referred to as the Chemtech partnerships or “Chemtech”).   The first category included three documents Deloitte withheld on the basis of privileges asserted by Dow, including (i) a June 2005 tax opinion related to Chemtech; (ii) a September 1998 legal and tax analysis provided to Deloitte by an in-house attorney at Dow; and (iii) a July 1993 internal Deloitte memorandum recording thoughts and impressions of Dow’s attorneys concerning tax issues related to Chemtech.  The second category of documents included all responsive documents maintained at Deloitte’s affiliate in Zurich, Switzerland ( “Deloitte Switzerland”).

At the trial court level, the District Court for the District of Columbia held that the three documents in the first category were protected from disclosure by the work product doctrine because they were prepared in anticipation of future litigation over the tax treatment of Chemtech.[2]  The court held that the protection was not waived by disclosure to Deloitte because Deloitte, as Dow’s independent auditor, was not a potential adversary, and no evidence suggested that it was unreasonable for Dow to expect Deloitte to maintain confidentiality.

The trial court also denied the motion to compel with respect to the second category of documents.  The court held that Deloitte did not have sufficient control over the documents maintained at Deloitte Switzerland to enable their production.  The court stated that the government failed to establish that Deloitte had the “legal right, authority or ability to obtain documents upon demand” from Deloitte Switzerland.  The court determined, “Close cooperation on a specific project does not per se, establish an ability, let alone a legal right or authority, on [Deloitte’s] part to acquire documents maintained solely by a legally distinct entity.”

The United States appealed the District Court’s decision with respect to the three documents in the first category withheld by Deloitte: (i) the June 2005 tax opinion related to Chemtech; (ii) the September 1998 legal and tax analysis provided by an in-house attorney at Dow; and (iii) the July 1993 internal Deloitte memorandum recording thoughts and impressions of Dow’s attorneys concerning tax issues related to Chemtech.[3]

The government argued that the 1993 internal Deloitte memorandum was not work product because (i) it was prepared by Deloitte, not Dow or Dow’s counsel; and (ii) it was generated as part of the audit process, not in anticipation of litigation.  The D.C. Circuit rejected the government’s categorical arguments with respect to the first document prepared by Deloitte.  The court stated that Deloitte’s preparation of the document does not exclude the possibility that it contains Dow’s work product.  The court also stated that a document can contain protected work product material even though it serves multiple purposes, so long as the protected material was prepared because of the prospect of litigation.  However, the court determined that the District Court did not have a sufficient evidentiary foundation for its holding that the Deloitte memorandum was purely work product.  The court therefore remanded so that the District Court could conduct an in camera review of the document and determine whether it was entirely work product, or whether a partial or redacted version of the document could be disclosed.

The government also argued that the other two documents were not protected from disclosure because Dow waived work product protection by disclosing the documents to Deloitte. The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument and concluded that (i) Deloitte was not a potential adversary with respect to the litigation that the documents address and (ii) Deloitte was not a conduit to potential adversaries because Dow had a reasonable expectation of privacy as a result of Deloitte’s obligation to refrain from disclosing confidential information.

The Appeals court decision makes clear that some documents that become part of the tax audit workpapers do retain work product protection, even if disclosed to financial auditors to assist in the preparation of financial statements.  However, it is also evident from this decision that such work product claims will likely continue to be challenged by the IRS and heavily scrutinized by the courts.  Accordingly, it is imperative that taxpayers take as many precautions as possible to preserve work product protection, as well as attorney-client privilege, with respect to sensitive analysis contained in tax workpapers. 

Taxpayers must understand that proving work product generally involves common sense.  One trying to prove that a document was prepared in anticipation of litigation should ask herself what steps would indicate to a court that litigation truly was expected and this document was prepared for that purpose.  What follows is a series of suggestions to help preserve such protection to the extent possible. 

1.  Get Counsel Involved.

To preserve privilege, be certain to include counsel meaningfully in communications regarding legal issues, and document counsel’s substantive role in these communications.  While an attorney’s involvement is not legally required to make something work product in most jurisdictions, as an evidentiary matter, it helps to establish an anticipation of litigation and indicates that an issue is being treated as more than just an item for audit.  Coordinate with the company’s General Counsel with respect to sensitive tax documents to avoid waiver of work product with respect to those documents through disclosure in other litigation.   At the same time, be careful to avoid asserting inappropriate claims of protection on documents.  An inappropriate claim of privilege risks waiver of privilege with respect to documents that otherwise would be privileged with respect to the same issue.  Inappropriate privilege claims can also damage your credibility and result in higher tensions and increased controversy over what should be “routine” privilege claims.

2.  Formalize a Tax Litigation Group.

Creating a formal tax litigation group within the company can help to identify tax controversy matters more clearly and separate issues that are anticipated to result in litigation.  Such a group should advise the company on the conduct of tax controversies and litigation.  In this primary role, the group should give advice to the company regarding whether and how to proceed in litigation, whether to settle, and what settlement terms to propose or accept.   Secondarily, the company may use the group’s hazards-of-litigation advice in establishing financial statement tax reserves.

It is preferable that the group’s leader be an attorney responsible for managing tax litigation and have at least a dotted line reporting relationship to the law department (to enjoy a presumption that the attorney-client privilege applies as well).  The group should exclude the persons whose responsibilities are solely the preparation of financial statements.

This does not require hiring new personnel or re-assigning people to a new tax controversy position.  The group may be composed of people with other job responsibilities.  It is really a “part-time” committee of people with related roles.  The key is that decisions about which matters litigation may be expected for come in the setting of this separate group’s meetings or consideration, that the group members separately perform this function, and that they document their conclusions and clearly identify issues for which more than a mere audit is expected.  In the group’s analyses, it must be careful not to suggest that the company believes its position is wrong and that is why litigation is expected.  Document only that the IRS, given its policies and positions, is expected to challenge the company on the issue and the company intends to fight.[4]

 3.  Control Who Creates Documents.

If the company has a tax litigation group, sensitive analysis of tax issues should be confined to documents created at the direction of, and under the control and supervision of, the group’s leader.  If not, they should be prepared by someone with a key role and responsibilities regarding tax controversy decisions.  Such documents should indicate that they are prepared by attorneys or tax practitioners and that they are prepared at the request of the group leader for litigation purposes.  Take care not to attach these labels to other documents or that label will cease to have meaning and potentially be used to argue that a waiver of privilege or work product protection has occurred with respect to other documents.  Do not combine these work product analyses with non-work product discussions.

4.  Create Only Defined Types of Documents.

Categorizing your documents and establishing guidelines for what types of analysis should be included in each category can help confine sensitive legal analysis to litigation-oriented documents that are most entitled to privilege and work product protection.  When creating documents, separate legal analysis from non-privileged information, including: (i) business advice; (ii) tax reserve numbers and calculations; and (iii) other advice not intended to remain confidential.   Create specific documents for disclosure outside the group that are limited to only hazards-of-litigation percentages and only aggregate reserve information.[5] 

5.  Control How Documents Are Labeled

Documents should be labeled, as appropriate, to state that they contain confidential legal advice, subject to privilege and protected by the work product doctrine.  While not legally required, attaching a work product label to a document intended as such provides evidence of the company’s intent with respect to that document.  Likewise, be careful not to label business advice, tax return advice, or other advice not intended to be confidential, as privileged or protected.  If one overuses labels, the labels lose credibility even when properly attached, and may be ignored by a court in its analysis.  At the same time, also take care not to label documents containing legal analysis and advice as documents that relate to tax reserve analysis or tax contingency analysis.

6.  Control Access to Documents Inside the Company

The wider the distribution of a document, the more likely it is that a court will find there has been a waiver with respect to attorney-client privilege or work product protection.  Because one of the indicia of privilege or work product is the care with which a document is handled, common sense dictates that a court will look askance at claims for protection of documents that were made widely available within the company to people whose jobs did not require their access to those materials.  Accordingly, only disclose legal documents with respect to an issue to other employees/officers on a need-to-know basis.  Also, to the extent possible, try to avoid “broadcast” emails and limit email “chains” related to documents.  Each e-mail and response to an e-mail generates a copy of the document and increases the risk of waiver.  When storing documents, separate and clearly mark legal documents.  This not only protects against waiver, but can demonstrate intent to keep the information confidential.  Keep in mind that no protections attach to business advice documents, so store business documents in a separate location from the legal documents.

 7.  Enact and Follow Policies to Identify Anticipated Litigation

It is critical to prove that litigation was anticipated with respect to an issue in order to establish work product protection for documents that contain analysis of that issue.  General litigation policies can be used effectively as “designation” tools to identify issues for which litigation is anticipated clearly.  For example, make use of document hold requests to communicate that litigation is anticipated.  Consider formal guidelines that certain counsel must be involved in issues expected to result in litigation, and then include such counsel only when litigation is expected.  When enacting such general policies, be cognizant of the fact that the presence of a general policy and the absence of its application in a specific case can create a negative inference.  Thus, if a company has a general policy that documents related to issues for which litigation is anticipated are made subject to a litigation hold, then the absence of a litigation hold with respect to documents related to another issue may be used to demonstrate that litigation was not anticipated with respect to that issue.[6]  As a result, the tax department must apply a litigation hold to those documents relating to any issue for which the company is claiming to anticipate litigation Likewise, if company policy dictates that the General Counsel must approve litigation-related decisions (e.g. budget, choice of counsel), be sure those policies are followed for potential tax litigation.

8.  Work With Your Auditors and Other Third Parties to Protect Work Product

Interactions with auditors and other third parties create significant risks that material that would otherwise be subject to privilege or work product protection will lose that protection as a result of waiver.  Accordingly, take steps to work with your auditors and other third parties to develop a good relationship and preserve protection where possible. 

For example, many times accountants are hired not as auditors but to provide specific support in connection with a tax issue.  In those instances, enter into written agreements through counsel with third-party consultants to whom you wish to disclose privileged information (e.g., so-called Kovel arrangements), so that their work is performed under the direction and control of counsel.  Such a step makes the assertion of attorney-client privilege possible for communications with the consultant, and provides strong evidence of the anticipation of litigation.  Be aware of the potential limitations of the accountant-client privilege, particularly when considering whether to disclose sensitive documents in the context of the preparation of an opinion letter.  Request that your attest auditors’ engagement letter include a specific confirmation that those accountants must and will maintain confidentiality of your documents to the fullest extent allowed by law.  It may also be helpful to have the engagement letter acknowledge that the relationship between company and auditor is non-adversarial and the two expect to work together cooperatively. Where possible, have auditors review key documents but not take copies.  While that has no direct, legal effect on whether a protection is actually waived, it can bolster a claim that you took all possible steps to avoid wider dissemination by keeping control of the actual document, which is a key element of proving work product protection should apply.  Ask that your auditors specifically note when a conclusion in their workpapers was derived from documents prepared by the company as litigation analyses.  Finally, do not prepare separate documents directly for the auditors that discuss litigation analysis.  While a decision regarding work product should be based on the purpose for which the underlying analysis was prepared, not the specific documents, the recent decisions suggest that it is easier to preserve work product protection when the document itself was prepared for the purpose of litigation.

9.  Negotiate Disclosures with the IRS

After taking some or all of the above steps above to preserve protection of documents, take steps to prevent inadvertent disclosure to the IRS of protected documents.  Require approval of the group’s leader before documents are disclosed to the Service or establish some other formal screening process to prevent disclosures that could result in a waiver of privilege.  When withholding documents subject to protection, prepare a detailed privilege log, stating the specific grounds that support the claim for privilege and protection of each document withheld.

It is inevitable that there will be disagreements about the scope of protection afforded specific documents.  Try to manage the disclosure process to minimize the scope and intensity of these disagreements.  Be candid with the IRS about your concerns, try to get overbroad demands for protected materials scaled back, work quickly to provide responsive, non-protected materials, and be reasonable about the scope of your privilege claims.  Doing this can help establish a cooperative relationship with the IRS and focus the controversy, if any, on the most protected documents. Likewise, consider disclosing the least confidential documents to the Service.  For example, disclose to the Service those documents that contain no legal analysis or advice.  Where there is protected material the IRS really wants that the company is willing to disclose, attempt to negotiate a written agreement that the disclosure of that document will not waive privilege or work product protection more broadly.  If, after all this, controversy about a protection still arises, the fact of your cooperation and efforts to comply as much as possible may influence either the IRS’s decision to seek the documents through judicial proceedings, or the judge’s view of the matter.  Force the IRS to determine whether it wishes to press the issue against a taxpayer that has cooperated, but that has taken careful steps to create and maintain confidential documents.

The confines of the work product doctrine in the tax context are still being defined.  These suggested steps will help you best position your company to obtain the maximum protection.  As you consider the creation of materials, ask yourself “does this step help show that we really did anticipate litigation and that this document was created for that purpose.”   That is what a court may be called on to determine, and you want the record to demonstrate that the answer is yes.


[1] This is important because the review of such documents by third party auditors waives attorney-client privilege, the other common protection for sensitive materials.

[2] United States v. Deloitte, Case No. 08-411 (D. D.C. June 8, 2009).

[3] United States v. Deloitte, No. 09-5171, (D.C. Cir. June 29, 2010)

[4] Although not free from doubt, it is generally believed that the expectation of having an issue be unagreed and go to IRS Appeals is sufficient to show “an expectation of litigation.”

[5] Understand that there is a tension between protecting the attorney-client privilege and the work product protection.  Providing your accountant with a privileged document prepared in anticipation of litigation may result in a broad attorney-client privilege waiver, but it is more likely the document will be viewed as work product than a document drafted especially for the auditor.  Given the broad scope of auditors’ need for information and the fact that the document prepared for an auditor likely reveals privileged communications anyway and thus waives attorney-client privilege, many companies are placing more of their eggs in the work product basket.   

[6] A litigation hold consists of formal notification of the likelihood of litigation to personnel whose files may contain relevant information, and the implementation of document preservation steps to make certain those materials are not discarded.

© 2010 STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

About the Author:

Matthew D. Lerner is a partner in the Washington-based law firm of Steptoe & Johnson LLP, where he is a member of the Litigation and Business Solutions Departments. He represents both corporations and high net worth individuals involved in tax controversies, from pre-audit advice about transaction documentation, file organization and privilege protection, to representation during IRS audits and appeals, through litigation in the Federal Courts. His experience is broad and includes cases involving repair and rehabilitation expenses, asset classification for depreciation purposes, losses from trading in securities and derivatives, corporate restructuring, domestic production activities, international intercorporate transactions, foreign tax credits, tax accounting method questions, and valuation issues. Matt also advises clients facing legal and public relations crises, coordinating responses to congressional inquiries, criminal investigations, civil litigation, public relations scrutiny, and agency review. 

Matt received his J.D. from Harvard Law School, magna cum laude, and was editor of Harvard Law Review. He received his A.B. from Amherst College, Phi Beta Kappa. 202-429-8024 /  www.Steptoe.com